2019 QCCA 755, 2019 QCCA 755

Association canadienne pour les armes à feu c. Procureure générale du Québec 2019 QCCA 755 COURT OF APPEAL CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC REGISTRY OF MONTREAL No.: 500-09-027171-172 (500-17-094350-165) DATE: May 1, 2019 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE NICOLE DUVAL HESLER, C.J.Q. NICHOLAS KASIRER, J.A. JOCELYN F. RANCOURT, J.A. NATIONAL FIREARMS ASSOCIATION (CANADA) PHILIPPE SIMARD APPELLANTS – Plaintiffs v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF QUEBEC RESPONDENT – Defendant and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA IMPLEADED PARTY – Impleaded Party JUDGMENT * [ 1 ] The appellants appeal a judgment rendered on October 18, 2017 by the Honourable Mr.

Justice Lukasz Granosik of the Superior Court, District of Montreal, which dismissed their application for a declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction seeking to have the Firearms Registration Act declared unconstitutional. [ 2 ] For the reasons of Chief Justice Nicole Duval Hesler, with which Kasirer and Rancourt, JJ.A. concur: THE COURT: [ 3 ] DISMISSES the appeal, with legal costs. NICOLE DUVAL HESLER, C.J.Q. NICHOLAS KASIRER, J.A. JOCELYN F. RANCOURT, J.A. Mtre Guy Lavergne GUY LAVERGNE, ATTORNEY AT LAW For the appellants Mtre Samuel Chayer BERNARD ROY (JUSTICE-QUÉBEC)

For the respondent Mtre Dominique Guimond DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CANADA For the impleaded party Date of hearing: February 26, 2019 REASONS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE * [ 4 ] The appellants appeal a judgment rendered on October 18, 2017 by the Honourable Mr. Justice Lukasz Granosik of the Superior Court, District of Montreal, which dismissed their application for a declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction [1] seeking to have the Firearms Registration Act [2] declared unconstitutional.

The appellants argue that this statute merely reproduces the federal long-gun registry, which has now been abolished, and that a presumption of invalidity therefore applies pursuant to R. v. Morgentaler . [3] [ 5 ] For the following reasons, I would dismiss the appeal. THE FACTS [ 6 ] In 1995, Parliament enacted the Firearms Act . [4] This statute created a Canada-wide scheme requiring all holders of firearms to obtain licences and register their firearms.

The scheme, combined with the relevant provisions of the Criminal Code , divided firearms into three categories: restricted firearms, prohibited firearms and non-restricted firearms (hereinafter “long guns”). [ 7 ] The Firearms Act created two types of registries.

The first, the CFR, is a single registry kept by the Registrar of Firearms, which was required to contain a record of the registration certificates for all prohibited firearms, restricted firearms and long guns acquired, transferred or possessed in Canada. [5] The second, which is the responsibility of a chief firearms officer appointed in each province and territory, authorizes persons to possess firearms and contains a record of all licences and authorizations that have been issued or revoked. [6] Under the statute, possession of an unregistered long gun was a criminal offence. [7] [ 8 ] When the registry was created, it was challenged by several provinces, but not Quebec. [ 9 ] In 1996, Alberta brought a reference before its Court of Appeal [8] which ultimately led to an appeal to the Supreme Court.

In answering the questions asked in the Reference re Firearms Act (Can.) , [9] the Supreme Court ruled that the Firearms Act came within the criminal law authority of the federal Parliament and that the “provinces ha[d] not established that the effects of the law on provincial matters [were] more than incidental.” [10] [ 10 ] In April 2012, Parliament enacted

An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Firearms Act , [11] which eliminated the obligation to register long guns and decriminalized the possession of unregistered long guns. Furthermore,

section 29 of this statute required the destruction of all records in the registry related to the registration of firearms other than prohibited firearms and restricted firearms. It is worthwhile noting that possession of any type of firearm without holding a licence continues to be a criminal offence under

section 91 Cr.C . [ 11 ] In these circumstances, Quebec informed the federal authorities of its intention to create its own long-gun registry and asked the federal authorities to provide it with the CFR data pertaining to the province. Faced with the federal government’s refusal to turn over this data, the Attorney General of Quebec at the time sought a declaration from the Superior Court that

section 29 of

An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Firearms Act was ultra vires and that Quebec was therefore entitled to obtain the data from the federal government. [12] His arguments were dismissed by the Court of Appeal, [13] and then by the Supreme Court. [14] [ 12 ] In June 2016, the National Assembly enacted the Firearms Registration Act [15] (hereinafter the “ Act ”).

The Act has been in force since January 29, 2018. [16] THE PROCEEDINGS [ 13 ] On June 17, 2016, after the Act had been assented to, the appellants filed an application in Superior Court for a declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction. [17] They argued that the Act is ultra vires the powers of the province, because it encroaches on Parliament’s criminal law power ( s. 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 1867 [18] (hereinafter “ C.A. 1867 ”)). They also asked the court to declare

section 13 of the Act inoperative pursuant to the doctrine of federal paramountcy, on the ground that it conflicts with

section 2 of the Firearms Information Regulations (Non-restricted Firearms) . [19] Moreover, the appellants sought the following conclusion: “ORDER the Defendant to destroy all records created and data received pursuant to the Registration of Firearms Act , within thirty (30) days of the final decision to be rendered herein.”

[14] The Attorney General of Canada did not take

part in the hearing before the Superior Court or before this Court. [15] The Superior Court ruled that the statute was constitutionally valid. [16] The Notice of Appeal asks the Court of Appeal to: [translation] DECLARE that the Firearms Registration Act (S.Q. 2016, c. 15) is constitutionally invalid, and therefore of no force or effect, because itencroaches on Parliament’s criminal law power; ORDER the respondent to destroy all data compiled (including any data received from the federal government) in connection with or forpurposes of the application of the Registration of Firearms Act, within thirty (30) days of the date on which this judgment becomes final; [17] I note from the foregoing that the argument regarding the existence of a conflict between

section 13 of the Act and

section 2 ofthe Firearms Information Regulations (Non-restricted Firearms) has been abandoned.

Moreover, this argument was not mentioned in theappellants’ submissions either. [18] Lastly, it is worthwhile mentioning that the appellants’ application for a safeguard order staying the Act’s coming into force during the appeal was dismissed.[20] THE JUDGMENT A QUO [19] The judgment a quo began with an overview of the historical and judicial context of the dispute.[21] I note therefrom that there are approximately 500,000 licensed firearms holders and approximately 1,600,000 firearms in Quebec.[22] [20] The trial judge then indicated that it is not the role of the courts to rule on a statute’s advisability or efficacy.[23] He also statedthat he would not rule on the appellants’ underlying argument dealing with the protection of privacy and

section 64 of the Act respecting access to documents held by public bodies and the protection of personal information [24] because of the discretionary nature of the recourse, because the argument was theoretical and because he doubted the appellants’ interest to act with respect to this matter.[25] [21] He began his analysis by setting out the applicable framework, that is, the pith and substance[26] of the impugned legislation. Inorder to identify the pith and substance of the Act, he first considered its purpose.

Based on the intrinsic evidence and the extrinsicevidence, he concluded that the purpose of the Act is to ensure the safety of police officers and the public, and that it therefore deals with matters of public safety.[27] Moreover, he noted that the appellants had admitted this in their amended pleadings, at paragraphs 78 and 84.[28] [22] The trial judge then considered the Act’s legal effects in order to determine whether it is a colourable attempt to legislate in matters of criminal law.

He concluded that, although the Supreme Court ruled, in the Reference re Firearms Act (Can.),[29] that theregulation of firearms as dangerous products is a valid purpose within the criminal law power, this finding related to both the management of firearms licences and the registration of firearms, while, here, the impugned Act deals only with registration.[30] He added that the existence of an evil to be repressed is but one of the three characteristics of criminal law,[31] and stated that a legislative overlap isvalid and almost inevitable in matters of criminal law and preventive measures aimed at public safety.

He cited Chatterjee v. Ontario (Attorney General)[32] to that effect. [23] The trial judge next noted that the offences the Act creates are not stand-alone infractions, but merely incidental measuresintended to ensure compliance with the Act’s requirements. Indeed, mere possession of any category of unregistered firearms is not an offence under the Act.

Moreover, the Act does not prevent anyone from possessing a firearm.[33] Lastly, the amount of the fines – ranging from $500 to $15,000 – is not exorbitant to the point that it would constitute a criminal rather than a penal sanction.[34] [24] In short, the trial judge was of the opinion that the fact that the Premier at the time stated, during the debates in the NationalAssembly, that it was necessary to [translation] “recreate” in Quebec [translation] “the portion [of the federal firearms] registry dealingwith long guns”, did not, in and of itself, lead to the conclusion that the Act is a colourable attempt to legislate in matters of criminal law.

He completed his analysis of the pith and substance of the Act by citing the Ontario Court of Appeal ruling in R. v.

Dyck[35] as a convincing precedent, one in which the Court upheld the validity of the province’s sex offender registry.[36] He concluded that the pith and substance of the Act is, indeed, public safety.[37] [25] As regards the connection between this purpose and a provincial head of power, the trial judge had the following to say:[38] [translation] From the outset, it should be noted that the Attorney General of Canada did not intervene in this dispute, and one can infer therefrom thatshe is not challenging Quebec’s power to enact the impugned legislation.

Moreover, I note that Canada has previously acknowledged thelegality of this kind of action or decision by Quebec before the Supreme Court of Canada, in Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canada(Attorney General) (Exhibit PGQ-9, Factum of the Attorney General of Canada, Supreme Court, Docket No. 35448, para. 81, 86-87 and103.). Thus, where both jurisdictions agree, the Court must be even more cautious when considering the constitutionality of legislation(OPSEU v. Ontario (Attorney General), (SCC), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 2, para. 29.), although the Court, of course, remains the

guardian of the Constitution. [ 26 ] He then referred to the fact that public safety has a double aspect.

He noted, for example, that both levels of government have public safety departments. [39] He also cited Professor Hogg’s opinion that Quebec would undoubtedly have the power to establish a long- gun registry under subsection 92(13) C.A. 1867 . [40] Lastly, he concluded that the registration, in accordance with certain parameters, of an item owned by a citizen, for the purpose of preventing accidents and crimes and facilitating the enforcement of judicial orders, has a clear connection to subsections 92(13) and (14) C.A. 1867 . [41] [ 27 ] Although the appellants raise several questions on appeal, they can essentially be summarized as follows: Did the trial judge err in law by finding that the Act ’s pith and substance brings it under sub sections 92(13) and (14) C.A. 1867 ?

I am of the opinion that his judgment contains no errors of law. ANALYSIS [ 28 ] The following is the applicable legislation: Constitution Act, 1867 [42] 91.

It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate and House of Commons, to make Laws for the Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada, in relation to all Matters not coming within the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces; and for greater Certainty, but not so as to restrict the Generality of the foregoing Terms of this Section, it is hereby declared that (notwithstanding anything in this Act ) the exclusive Legislative Authority of the Parliament of Canada extends to all Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated; that is to say, […] 27.

The Criminal Law, except the Constitution of Courts of Criminal Jurisdiction, but including the Procedure in Criminal Matters. […] 92. In each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated; that is to say, […] 13. Property and Civil Rights in the Province. 91.

Il sera loisible à la Reine, de l’avis et du consentement du Sénat et de la Chambre des Communes,de faire des lois pour la paix, l’ordre et le bon gouvernement du Canada, relativement à toutes les matières ne tombant pas dans les catégories de sujets par la présente loi exclusivement assignés aux législatures des provinces; mais, pour plus de garantie, sans toutefois restreindre la généralité des termes ci-haut employés dans le présent article, il est par la présente déclaré que (nonobstant toute disposition contraire énoncée dans la présente loi) l’autorité législative exclusive du parlement du Canada s’étend à toutes les matières tombant dans les catégories de sujets ci- dessous énumérés, savoir; (…) 27.

La loi criminelle, sauf la constitution des tribunaux de juridiction criminelle, mais y compris la procédure en matière criminelle. (…) 92. Dans chaque province la législature pourra exclusivement faire des lois relatives aux matières tombant dans les catégories de sujets ci-dessous énumérés, savoir : (…) 13. La propriété et les droits civils dans la province; 14. L’administration de la justice dans la province, y compris la création, le maintien et l’organisation de tribunaux de justice pour la province, ayant juridiction civile et

14. The Administration of Justice in the Province, including the Constitution, Maintenance, and Organization of Provincial Courts, both of Civil and of Criminal Jurisdiction, and including Procedure in Civil Matters in those Courts. 15. The Imposition of Punishment by Fine, Penalty, or Imprisonment for enforcing any Law of the Province made in relation to any Matter coming within any of the Classes of Subjects enumerated in this Section. 16. Generally all Matters of a merely local or private Nature in the Province. criminelle, y compris la procédure en matières civiles dans ces tribunaux; 15.

L’infliction de punitions par voie d’amende, pénalité, ou emprisonnement, dans le but de faire exécuter toute loi de la province décrétée au sujet des matières tombant dans une des catégories de sujets énumérés dans le présent article; 16.

Généralement toutes les matières d’une nature purement locale ou privée dans la province. [ 29 ] The constitutional validity of a statute, based on the division of powers set out in sections 91 and 92 C.A. 1867 , must be decided according to the pith and substance doctrine, [43] which requires a two-step analysis. [ 30 ] In the first step, one must determine the pith and substance of the impugned legislation by examining its purpose and effects. [44] The purpose of the legislation is assessed on the basis of intrinsic evidence, such as its

preamble, and extrinsic evidence, such as legislative debates. [45] In this regard, one must not “[confuse] the purpose of the legislation with the means used to carry out that purpose.” [46] Moreover, where appropriate, one must consider “the actual or predicted practical effect of the legislation in operation” [47] in addition to the legal effect, which “refers to how the legislation as a whole affects the rights and liabilities of those subject to its terms […]”. [48] The practical effect will be relevant only if it “reveal[s] a serious impact upon a matter outside the enacting body’s legislative authority and thus either contradict[s] an appearance of intra vires or confirm[s] an impression of ultra vires .” [49] By considering the practical effects, one can determine whether the legislation is colourable, that is, whether it really regulates a matter other than the one set out in its stated purpose. [50] [ 31 ] The second step is to establish a connection between the purpose of the legislation and a head of power.

To do so, one must identify the scope of the applicable head of power. [51] The “specific characteristics” of a head of power generally provide an indication of its scope. [52] [ 32 ] One must also consider the double aspect doctrine, which was developed in Hodge [53] by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London and which allows the two levels of government to legislate concurrently with respect to the same matter. [54] While our federal system generally attributes a legislative matter to a single head of power, certain matters have several aspects, such that, in one aspect and for one purpose, they fall within

section 92 and, in another aspect and for another purpose, they fall within

section 91. [55] [ 33 ] As regards the application of these doctrines to the case at bar, the appellants argue that both the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence shows that the Act is designed to fill the vacuum left by the abolishment of the federal long-gun registry, by reproducing its content and functions, such that the [ translation ] “presumption of invalidity resulting from the judgment in Morgentaler ” applies. They also argue that the Act and the former federal legislation have essentially the same legal and practical effects.

Consequently, they submit that the Act ’s pith and substance is gun control and that the Act is therefore a [ translation ] “clear and deliberate incursion into an area of federal jurisdiction”. [ 34 ] I would point out from the outset that the presumption of invalidity invoked by the appellants does not exist in Canadian law.

As the Supreme Court stated quite clearly in Goodwin , “whether or not an impugned law is alleged to be colourable, the fundamental pith and substance analysis remains the same.” [56] Indeed, the mere fact that a provincial statute has effects similar to a repealed federal statute cannot give rise to a presumption that the provincial statute is constitutionally invalid, because doing so would deny the existence of the double aspect doctrine, a doctrine that applies precisely at the pith and substance determination stage. [57] Moreover, as Multiple Access Ltd. v. McCutcheon [58] and Smith v.

The Queen [59] clearly show, provincial and federal provisions that are virtually identical in substance can coexist. [ 35 ] I also note that the appellants have given the Act a circumstantial and general purpose that provides no information on the “matter” to which it essentially relates. [60] I agree with the respondent that the appellants are focusing solely on what the Act does, without answering the principal question, which consists in identifying the Act ’s purpose, [61] notwithstanding that, at trial, they stated that “[t]he pith and substance of the Registration of Firearms Act is public safety”. [62] In my opinion, the trial judge used the proper analytical framework and did not err in assessing the intrinsic [63] and extrinsic evidence.

There is no doubt that the Act ’s purpos e is to

ensure public safety—that of police officers and that of the public. [36] Moreover, the appellants are wrong in asserting that the Act’s effects are identical to those of the former federal legislation. Asthe trial judge pointed out in his reasons, the Act deals solely with the registration of firearms and has no legal effect on the federal licensing scheme.[64]

Section 7 of the Act reads as follows: 7. The owner of a registered firearm must, withinthe time and in the manner prescribed bygovernment regulation, notify the Minister of anychange in the information provided forregistration purposes or of the loss of the uniquefirearm number or the registration number. As soon as the owner of a registered firearmtransfers ownership of the firearm, he or shemust notify the Minister in the mannerprescribed by government regulation. Theregulation must also prescribe the terms fortransferring ownership of a firearm. 7.

Le propriétaire d’une arme à feu immatriculéedoit aviser le ministre, dans les délais et de lamanière prescrits par règlement dugouvernement, de toute modification auxrenseignements fournis pour immatriculer cettearme ou de la perte du numéro unique d’arme àfeu ou du numéro d’immatriculation. Le propriétaire d’une arme à feu immatriculéedoit, dès qu’il en transfère la propriété, aviser leministre de la manière prescrite par règlement dugouvernement. Ce règlement prévoit aussi desmodalités relatives au transfert de propriété d’unearme à feu. [37]

Section 7 of the Regulation respecting the application of the Firearms Registration Act[65] states that: 7. A firearm owner must, when transferringownership of his or her firearm, make surethat the person to whom ownership istransferred holds the licence referred to inparagraph 23(

a) of the Firearms Act (S.C.1995, c. 39) and that the person is stilleligible for the licence. 7. Le propriétaire d’une arme à feu doit,lorsqu’il transfère la propriété de son arme àfeu, s’assurer que la personne à qui il entransfère la propriété est titulaire du permismentionné au paragraphe

a) de l’article 23de la

Loi sur les armes à feu (L.C. 1995, c.39) et que cette personne y est toujoursadmissible. [38] It is clear that the Act is not concerned with the ownership or use of long guns, but rather with ensuring that the Minister isinformed of their existence and their location within Quebec. The trial judge was therefore quite right in finding that the Act’s pith and substance is public safety and not gun control.[66] [39] The subtle distinction between the registration of long guns and the licensing scheme comes into play when connecting the pithand substance of the Act to one or more provincial heads of power.

Indeed, in the Reference re Firearms Act (Can.), the Supreme Courtconcluded that although the federal statute had regulatory aspects, their intrusion into the provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights was not so excessive as to upset the balance of federalism.[67] In concluding so, it was referring to the statutory provisions dealing with registration, because the previous acquisition certificate scheme had not included a registration system.[68] Ontario andSaskatchewan had argued in the Supreme Court that even if the licensing provisions of the statute were valid criminal legislation, the registration provisions were mainly provincial property legislation and should therefore be severed and struck out.[69] The Supreme Courtrejected their argument on the ground that the effect of the registration provisions were secondary to the implementation of the public safety purpose validly pursued by Parliament.[70] In so doing, it confirmed that it is ordinarily up to the provinces to enact this type ofregulation pursuant to their competence over property and civil rights. [40] Professor Hogg is of the opinion that the provinces can rely on subsection 92(13) C.A. 1867 to establish a long-gun registry within their territory:[71] “Quebec, whose police forces had been making use of the long-gun registry, announced that it would establish aprovincial registry for the long guns, which the province would undoubtedly have the power to do under its power over property and civil rights in the province. ” I find this view consistent with the remarks of the Supreme Court in R. v.

Felawka:[72] In this area of the law, the regulation of firearms is not monolithic. They are controlled by a variety of statutes for a variety of purposes.At the federal level, the grave danger posed by guns means that firearms regulations come within the scope of the criminal law powerunder s. 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 1867. See Attorney-General of Canada v. Pattison (1981), 1981 ABCA 98 , 59 C.C.C.(2d) 138 (Alta. C.A.), approved of in R. v. Swain, (SCC), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933, at p. 1000.

At the same time, provincialregulations pertaining to hunting with firearms are within the purview of the provinces as matters of local interest (s. 92(16) of theConstitution Act, 1867) or as matters of property or civil rights (s. 92(13)) as noted by La Forest J.A. (as he then was) in R. v. Chiasson(1982), (NB CA), 135 D.L.R. (3d) 499, affirmed (SCC), [1984] 1 S.C.R. 266. Dickson J. in Myranv. The Queen, (SCC), [1976] 2 S.C.R. 137, at pp. 141-42, observed that the province has an interest in regulating thosewho would otherwise “hunt dangerously and without regard for the safety of other persons in the vicinity”.

We are therefore in a fieldwhere both levels of government have a legitimate interest and an overlapping jurisdiction to regulate. The mere presence of provincialrestrictions on firearms does not therefore create a paramountcy problem so long as the two sets of enactments can be reconciled.

[41] It should also be noted that in Quebec (Attorney General) v.

Canada (Attorney General), the majority of the Supreme Court stated the following:[73] [40] […] As we have discussed earlier, s. 29 of the ELRA does not seek either in substance or in form to limit Quebec’s legislativeauthority to create a provincial long-gun registry, whereas the impugned legislation in Upper Churchill did seek to interfere withQuebec’s legislative authority. […] [42] In their brief, the appellants seem to suggest that public safety is a matter that falls exclusively within the area of criminal law.It is true that Rand, J., in the Margarine Reference, stated that public peace, order, security, health and morality are the ordinary ends served by criminal law.[74] According to the jurisprudence, however, legislation of a criminal nature must include, in addition to a valid criminal law purpose, a prohibition and a penalty, all with a view to suppressing an evil.[75] Thus, it is incorrect to think that anylegislation addressing public safety is necessarily criminal and therefore falls exclusively within the purview of the federal government.In the case at bar, the Act does not have the characteristics of criminal legislation, because it does not contain a prohibition and does notcriminalize the possession of an unregistered firearm.

On the contrary, it creates positive obligations coupled with penalties whose solepurpose is to ensure compliance therewith, in accordance with subsection 92(15) C.A. 1867. In short, it is a regulatory scheme. [43] It would be somewhat baffling, in fact, to prevent a government from legislating for the safety of its population within the scope of the authority conferred upon it. Laforest, J., as he then was, expressed this very idea in R. v.

Chiasson:[76] [11] The mere fact that legislation has as its purpose the protection of “human life and limb”, to use the trial Judge’s phrase, doesnot necessarily bring it within the ambit of the criminal law. The safety of persons and property in the Province is also a matter ofconcern to the provincial Legislature.

It can scarcely be argued that it is a matter falling solely within the domain of criminal law, sincewe have repeatedly been told on the highest authority that there is no such domain: see, for example, Re Nova Scotia Board of Censors etal. and McNeil (1978), (SCC), 44 C.C.C. (2d) 316 at p. 344, 84 D.L.R. (3d) 1 at p. 26, 19 N.R. 570 at p. 603.

The basicpurpose of criminal law as the Law Reform Commission of Canada has noted is to underline fundamental values by prohibiting conductinfringing on these values, including, of course, the sanctity of human life: see the Commission’s Report No. 3, “Our Criminal Law”.But whatever protection is thus afforded in no way precludes provincial action.

The Province has, in fact, frequently legislated with aview to protecting the safety of persons and property in a wide variety of contexts, from the regulation of mining and factories, to safetyregulations for theatres and other places of public amusement, to highway traffic regulations. In doing so it has resorted to variousstrategies ranging from administrative regulation to penal sanctions imposed by virtue of s. 92(15) of the B.N.A. Act, 1867. I find it hardto believe that the validity of this

section would have been contested before the enactment of federal laws relating to the carelesshandling of firearms. We are clearly dealing with a subject matter that has a double aspect. In Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General),[77] thedissenting justices stated just that: [149] In our opinion, the federal-provincial partnership with respect to firearms control is consistent with the spirit of co-operativefederalism.

This partnership has enabled the federal and provincial governments to work together, rather than in isolation, to achieve bothfederal (criminal law) and provincial (public safety and administration of justice) purposes. [44] Thus, while the federal legislation “is directed to enhancing public safety by controlling access to firearms through prohibitions and penalties”,[78] the Act’s purpose can very well be to enhance public safety by collecting information on the firearms present inQuebec and their owners, in order to serve as a source of information and a tool for police officers.

The former legislation falls withinthe federal criminal law power, while the latter is a valid exercise of the province’s powers in relation to the administration of justice andto property and civil rights. As the Supreme Court stated in Dupond, “[i]t is now well established that the suppression of conditions likely to favour the commission of crimes falls within provincial competence […]”.[79] This principle dates back to Bédard v.

Dawson,[80] and to the Reference re the Adoption Act, in which Chief Justice Duff wrote:[81] […] Moreover, while, as subject matter of legislation, the criminal law is entrusted to the Dominion Parliament, responsibility for theadministration of justice and, broadly speaking, for the policing of the country, the execution of the criminal law, the suppression ofcrime and disorder, has from the beginning of Confederation been recognized as the responsibility of the provinces and has beendischarged at great cost to the people; so also, the provinces, sometimes acting directly, sometimes through the municipalities, haveassumed responsibility for controlling social conditions having a tendency to encourage vice and crime. [45] The appellants are attempting to use arguments challenging the wisdom of the Act’s enactment in order to convince the Courtthat the Act cannot be connected to subsection 92(14) C.A. 1867.

As the trial judge stated, however, it is not the role of the courts to rule on a statute’s advisability or efficacy.[82] [46] In my opinion, the trial judge rightly saw a convincing analogy between the case at bar and R. v. Dyck:[83] [38] Christopher’s Law is not in pith and substance criminal law. It is legislation designed (

i) to promote public safety and protection and(ii) to assist police in their investigatory efforts with a view to enhancing the prevention of crime. Its primary purpose and effect is not toimpose prohibitions and penalties for a criminal law purpose, but rather to create a regulatory registry scheme.

Christopher’s Law is avalid exercise of the legislature’s power and its enactment falls within the legislative competence of the provinces under ss. 92(13)(property and civil rights) and 92(14) (administration of justice) of the Constitution Act, 1867. […] [60] In any event, to the extent that Christopher’s Law may overlap with a federal head of power, this is constitutionally permissible. Thejurisprudence supports the existence of a concurrent authority between the federal government and the provinces with respect to the

suppression of conditions giving rise to crime and the prevention of crime: see Schneider; Di Iorio v. Montreal (City) Common Jail, (SCC), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 152, [1976] S.C.J. No. 113, 33 C.C.C. (2d) 289; and O’Hara v. British Columbia, (SCC), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 591, [1987] S.C.J. No. 69, 38 C.C.C. (3d) 233.

This is sometimes known as the “double aspect” doctrine. […] [47] Ultimately, the trial judge did not err by concluding that the Act’s pith and substance, which relates to public safety, brings itunder subsections 92(13) and (14) C.A. 1867. [48] In conclusion, the appellants’ argument is simple:[84] [translation] Two statutes to the same effect, one federal and the other provincial, cannot, over a 17-year interval, fall within different heads of power,given that, in 2000, the Supreme Court ruled that the effects of the federal statute in the areas of provincial jurisdiction were minor and atthe very most incidental. […] [49] This argument does not stand up to analysis, because it disregards the previously discussed double aspect doctrine. [50] For these reasons, I would dismiss the appeal, with legal costs.

NICOLE DUVAL HESLER, C.J.Q. [1] Association canadienne pour les armes à feu c. Procureure générale du Québec, 2017 QCCS 4690 [Judgment a quo]. [2] CQLR, c. I-0.01. [3] (SCC), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 463. [4] S.C. 1995, c. 39. [5] Id., s. 83. [6] Id., s. 87. [7] Id., s. 112. [8] Reference Re Firearms Act, 1998 ABCA 306. [9] 2000 SCC 31, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 783. [10] Id., para. 50. [11] S.C. 2012, c. 6. [12] Québec (Procureur général) c. Canada (Procureur général), 2012 QCCS 4202. [13] Canada (Procureur général) c. Québec (Procureur général), 2013 QCCA 1138. [14] Quebec (Attorney General) v.

Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 14, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 693. [15] Supra, note 2.

When the trial was held, the Act had been assented to (June 10, 2016), but had not yet come into force. [16] O.C. 1194-2017 dated December 6, 2017. [17] Originating Application for Declaratory Relief and Permanent Injunction and Application for an Order of InterlocutoryInjunction, June 17, 2016, para. 65; Amended Originating Application for Declaratory Relief and Permanent Injunction and Applicationfor an Order of Interlocutory Injunction and a Safeguard Order, July 16, 2016. [18] 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3 (U.K.). [19] SOR/2012-138. [20] Association canadienne pour les armes à feu c.

Procureure générale du Québec, 2018 QCCA 179. [21] Judgment a quo, para. 1-5. [22] Id., para. 10.

[23] Id ., para. 11-15. [24] CQLR, c. A-2.1 . [25] Judgment a quo , para. 16-17. [26] Id ., para. 18-20. [27] Id ., para. 21-32. [28] Id ., note 23. [29] Reference re Firearms Act (Can.) , supra , note 9. [30] Judgment a quo , para. 33-41. [31] Id ., para. 41-42. [32] Chatterjee v. Ontario (Attorney General) , 2009 SCC 19 , [2009] 1 S.C.R. 624 . [33] Judgment a quo , para. 44. [34] Id ., para. 45. [35] R. v. Dyck , 2008 ONCA 309 .