Knowles (re), 2023 NSSC 94

SUPREME COURT OF Nova Scotia IN BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY Citation: Knowles (re) , 2023 NSSC 94 Date: 20230315 Docket: No. 41668 Registry: Halifax Estate Number : 51-2322341 In the Matter of: The bankruptcy of Leah Jean Knowles Registrar: Raffi A. Balmanoukian, Registrar in Bankruptcy Heard: January 13, 2023, in Halifax, Nova Scotia Counsel: Leah Knowles, applicant/bankrupt Balmanoukian, Registrar: [ 1 ] Ms. Knowles, now 45, went bankrupt owing a substantial sum to Canada Revenue Agency.

Mostly, that was because she was receiving taxable spousal support which was not subject to source deductions, and did not save enough or make adequate installments to cover the tax bill. She also had tax payable as a result of an RRSP withdrawal, some of which was immediately taxable and some of which was under the Lifelong Learning Plan [1] . When she went bankrupt in 2017, she was still receiving spousal support.

The minimum unrepaid portion of the Lifelong Learning Plan withdrawal is being added to her income in yearly installments. [ 2 ] Her budgets, for the purposes of her required payments into her estate pursuant to s. 68 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act , RSC 1985, c. B-3 as amended (the “ BIA ”), reflected an appropriate 33% deduction – resulting, when applied, in lower total payments to her estate. Her actual in-bankruptcy tax payments were well below that.

She fell into further post-bankruptcy arrears. [ 3 ] At her discharge hearing in 2020, I ordered that she file, be assessed for, and pay her 2018 and 2019 taxes. At the time of the order, these returns had been assessed and the amounts payable were known. Ms. Knowles’ support had by then ceased and she had re- entered the paid workforce. This situation remains. [ 4 ] She hasn’t complied with the payment requirement under the conditional order. She says she now cannot, and wants me to vary the order pursuant to s. 172(3) of the BIA [2] .

She wants this variation in favour of an absolute discharge so she can make another assignment, or proposal, principally if not exclusively to deal with the post-bankruptcy tax arrears. [ 5 ] Should I do it? Additional Background [ 6 ] Ms. Knowles is a math coach – a public education function that was described to me as “teaching the teachers.” She started in that vocation in 2001, taking a leave of absence in 2011. She returned in 2013-15, taking a further unpaid leave of absence in 2015 to attend law school in the United Kingdom.

Although that was not without its difficulties due to family illness, she successfully completed her law degree. She has neither articled nor “domesticized” her credentials so as to be admitted to a Canadian bar. She has instead returned to her math coach job, where she is a member of the bargaining unit and has a secure position, with benefits including pension. Her current take home pay is stated to be $1,833.48 biweekly (or $3,972.54 per month). She is a single person household with no dependents [3] . The 2022 Superintendent’s standards for a single person household is $2,248.

In other words, if she had a current bankruptcy, her estate payment obligation would be approximately 50% of the difference, or $862 per month. In a second bankruptcy that would equate to 36 months or $31,032. She says she wants her discharge so she can file a consumer proposal, meaning that her proposal would likely have to exceed this amount to have a reasonable prospect for approval. [ 7 ] She separated in 2013 after an approximate 12 year marriage. At my direction, I was provided with the separation agreement.

While not every asset was outlined in it, what is relevant to these proceedings are the following: - Ms. Knowles received spousal support in the amount of $10,000 per month from October 2013 to March 2020. This was done [4] , less amounts Ms. Knowles made in the workforce near the end of this period. - She received approximately $35,000 for her interest in the matrimonial home. This was, she said, applied as a down payment towards another property in Nova Scotia, which was surrendered during the bankruptcy.

Minimal net proceeds were realized and applied to the bankruptcy estate [5] - There are no children of that marriage which could give rise to future child support obligations by or against Ms. Knowles.

- In addition to the education expenses incurred by Ms. Knowles, her former spouse had paid for a semester’s tuition at Dalhousie University in 2013 - The agreement set out treatment for 2012 and 2013 taxes. It is not clear whether any of these, for Ms. Knowles, formed part of her bankruptcy. [ 8 ] Upon bankruptcy in 2017, CRA proved its claim for $99,228.02. It is about 38% of her proven unsecured debt [6] , upon which there was an approximate 10% dividend (net of levy and just under $22,000 in trustee fees, plus tax and disbursements).

The SRD shows her as having an exempt pension, but no further RRSPs or other exempt assets save for personal effects. Ms. Knowles confirmed this under oath at the variation hearing. [ 9 ] As noted, her bankruptcy filing showed – at that time – the $10,000 per month spousal support as her sole income. From this, the Trustee deducted $3,333 as a non-discretionary expense for taxes, or $40,000 per year. This was a sensible estimate.

Her surplus income obligations, as calculated by the Trustee, and over the 21 month bankruptcy period, totalled $53,580. [7] There is nothing on the SRD to show a 2017 post-bankruptcy tax refund. Nor does her 2018 notice of assessment show a “balance from prior account,” so I conclude that at some time prior to the issuance of the 2018 NOA, any post-bankruptcy 2017 tax balance was cleared. As she filed her bankruptcy on December 5, 2017, the post-bankruptcy 2017 amount due or refundable is likely nominal. [ 10 ] Ms.

Knowles’ 2018 and 2019 notices of assessment are dated June 1, 2020; in other words, by the time of the discharge hearing on July 28, 2020 the amounts payable were known, the spousal support had ceased, and she had returned to the paid workforce. All of those facts as they existed at the time remain. [ 11 ] Ms. Knowles’ 2018 NOA shows that she had taxable income of $136,423. Of this, $2,000 is from the Lifelong Learning Plan. Presumably $120,000 is from spousal support. The rest is indeterminate.

From that, $2,751.76 was paid in tax from source deductions, and $28,500.12 from installments (as opposed to the $40,000 apparently credited in her s. 68 income and expense statements, as verified by her during the variation hearing), leaving a balance of $15,172.23 including $1,877.03 in penalties for late filing and $781.64 in arrears interest. When I asked why this return was late filed, Ms. Knowles testified at the variation hearing that “I was avoiding.” [ 12 ] The 2019 return has similar characteristics.

Income of $151,391 including $2,000 from the Lifelong Learning Plan, $10,378.43 in source deductions, and $12,666.72 from installments, for a balance for that year of $24,433.29 and a net total for both years of $39,605.52. The 2019 NOA was issued on the same date as for 2018. [ 13 ] It will be recalled that in addition to the tax shortfall, Ms. Knowles says she was given credit in her income and expense statements during the 21 month bankruptcy period for $3,333 per month in taxes ($40,000 per year). If so, this had the effect of reducing her s. 68 surplus income obligations.

This is fine so far as it goes – but she didn’t remit anything close to that to the authorities. The result, if the $3,333 per month was credited throughout, is that creditors received a lower dividend, with a lower-than-calculated net remittance to the taxation authorities. [ 14 ] At the 2020 discharge hearing I ordered – as I often do in bankruptcies with a substantial tax component – the debtor to file, be assessed for, and pay post-bankruptcy taxes for the 2018 and 2019 taxation years (of which the bulk was during her 21 month bankruptcy period, having filed in December 2017).

Notably, I did not include a provision which I also sometimes include, namely that the debtor be up to date with her taxes at the time of her discharge (which, in these circumstances, would have included the 2020, 2021, and now 2022 tax years). The evidence is that her payroll deductions were adequate, or nearly so, to pay for 2020 onward. [8] The Law [ 15 ] This application is made under s. 172(3) of the BIA , which reads:

(3) Where at any time after the expiration of one year after the date of any order made under this

section the bankrupt satisfies the court that there is no reasonable probability of his being in a position to comply with the terms of the order, the court may modify the terms of the order or of any substituted order, in such manner and on such conditions as it may think fit. [ 16 ] A few initial points are in order. [ 17 ] A Subsection 172(3) application is not a substitute for an appeal. [ 18 ] It is not a re-hearing. [ 19 ] It is also not a back door to either of these things, through the modality of asking the same question on the same known facts in the hope of getting a different answer.

The burden is on the applicant to “satisfy the Court that there is no reasonable probability of being in a position to comply with the order.” If I am so satisfied to a civil standard then, and only then, does the Court’s discretion to vary come into play. [ 20 ] And a discretion it is: see Re Croft , 2002 NSSC 266 , per McDougall, J. at para. 3; Re Kanovsky , 2012 MBQB 265 at para. 2 . The language of the

section is that the Court “may” modify the terms “on such conditions as it may think fit.” Even if I am satisfied that the bankrupt has no “reasonable probability” of “being in a position to comply,” I am not compelled to vary the order if, taking into account and placing proper weight on relevant factors, I in my discretion do not think it just and proper to do so.

And if I do, I have yet a further discretion to substitute such order as I see fit in the circumstances. [ 21 ] In Re Kankovsky, supra , Justice Saul framed the s. 172(3) inquiry this way: [17] Section 172(3) of the Act permits a bankrupt to apply to vary the terms of a conditional order of discharge after one year from the date of the order.

[18] In such an application, the onus is on the bankrupt to demonstrate that the court should exercise its discretion in his or herfavour: see e.g. Re Whyte (1980), 35 C.B.R. (N.S.) 194 (Ont. S.C.). [19] It is well settled that upon such an application, the court should consider the following four factors:

(1) Were there any changes in circumstances of the bankrupt that have occurred since the making of the conditional order ofdischarge, and were those changes within the control of the bankrupt?

(2) Is there material indicating that the bankrupt cannot comply with the terms of the conditional order of discharge? Thismaterial must be more than a statement of income and expenses.

(3) What is the credibility of the bankrupt?

(4) What is the evidence concerning the efforts that the bankrupt has made to comply with the terms of the conditional order ofdischarge during the preceding year? See Re Cowie (1991), 6 C.B.R. (3d) 227 at para. 5 (Ont. Ct. J. (Gen. Div.) [Bktcy]), Farley J. [20] In Re Appleby (2001), (ON SC), 27 C.B.R. (4th) 1 at para. 11 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.), Deputy Registrar Sproatheld that all four tests must be applied by the court and that an adverse finding on any one of them is sufficient to deny an applicationunder section 172(3) of the Act.

However, more recently, in Re Estrin, 2005 ABQB 234, 10 C.B.R. (5th) 176 at para. 28 (Alta. Q.B.),Veit J. described that which was stated in Re Appleby, supra was overly broad and urged that the four tests are guidelines.

Failure tosatisfy one of them does not necessarily preclude the bankrupt from securing a modification. [22] In Re Besner, 2015 BCSC 27, Master Bouck also summarized several leading cases and the applicable law as follows: [24] In Mossman (Re), 2005 BCSC 155, Dorgan J. set out the approach to be taken on this type of application: [10] An application under s. 172(3) is not an appeal from the original order, nor is it a new hearing.

What is to be determined is whether,after one year of the original order, the bankrupt has no reasonable probability of being able to comply with the terms of the order suchthat a modification is warranted (Re Whyte (1980), 35 C.B.R. (NS) 194, [1980] O.J. No. 2951 (Ont. S.C.)). [11] A bankrupt who seeks a s. 172(3) modification must meet the test set out in Elliot (Trustee of) v. Elliot, (1994) (BC SC), 29 C.B.R. (3d) 174 (B.C.S.C.), which requires the court to consider: 1.

Whether or not there have been changes in circumstances that have occurred since the order was made and whether those changeswere within the bankrupt's control; 2. Whether or not there is material indicating that the bankrupt cannot comply with terms of the conditional order of discharge, whichmust be more than a statement of income and expenses; 3. The credibility of the bankrupt; and 4.

Whether or not there is evidence that the bankrupt has made a bona fide effort to comply with the discharge order during the precedingyear. [12] An adverse finding on any of these factors will be sufficient to deny an application for an order of modification (ReAppleby (2001), (ON SC), 27 C.B.R. (4th) 1, [2001] O.J. No.3247 (Ont.

S.C.)). [25] Moreover, if the bankrupt has created circumstances that render it impossible for him to meet the discharge conditions, the court will likely refuse any modification of the original order: Croft (Re) (2001), 2002 NSSC 266 , 39 C.B.R. (4th) 62. [26] The onus is on the bankrupt to satisfy the registrar that the test has been met. [emphases added] [23] Besner was applied in Re Kielb, 2016 BCSC 1760, a case which in many ways is on “all fours” with the case at bar. He wentbankrupt with income tax and GST debt amounting to about $160,000, or just over 25% of his total.

The original order provided forpayment of a sum certain together with filing and payment of post-bankruptcy GST and tax returns. He made some of the estatepayments, but not the tax payments. Following a CRA garnishment notice (which Ms. Knowles says she fears as well), Mr. Kielb appliedunsuccessfully to vary the orders. He was given leave to apply again in a year if he had a “sustainable plan” to address the arrears. Hemade some incomplete progress, at the cost of not paying the balance due under the conditional order.

By the time the case came beforeMaster Muir, he was on his fourth variation application (one of which successfully reduced the amount payable under the conditionalorder, but extended the tax compliance provision). She continued: [36] It is inappropriate to use the provisions of the BIA allowing for variation to supplant the appeal process. The CRA referred meto the decision in Re Whyte [1980] O.J. No. 2951 (S.C. - H. Ct.

J.), in which it was held: [13] On an application under s. 142(3) [now 172(3)] of the Act the onus is on the bankrupt to satisfy the court that there is noreasonable probability of his being able to comply with the terms of the conditional order of discharge. This proceeding is not an appealfrom discharge order.

It is to be assumed that the conditional order of discharge is a proper order, and in the present case the order ofSteele, J. was not appealed. [14] What is to be determined on the application is not whether the previous order is such as the judge hearing the application wouldor would not have made in the first instance; the issue is whether after one year has passed since the making of the order the bankrupt

genuinely has no reasonable probability of being able to comply with its terms. … [40] Here, Mr. Kielb says he recognizes that the CRA debts would survive if he was granted a discharge. He allows that CRA wouldhave all of the other potent collection remedies available to it. He says he will make every effort to repay the amounts owing. [41] That, unfortunately, has been said many times by Mr. Kielb in the past. It has not proven to be the case.

I need only point to theevidence of his income and bank balances in 2015 to show that he has not made every effort, or even reasonable efforts, to retire thesedebts. [42] Mr. Kielb says that his mental and physical health have suffered as a result of the bankruptcy, but that is not new. That evidenceexisted when the order was made in 2014. [43] Mr. Kielb says that for the past three years or so he has been involved in a development project in Maple Ridge.

He says thisproject being brought to fruition will enable him to repay CRA, but for him to do that, he will have to be involved as a director and chiefoperating officer of the company and he cannot do that as an undischarged bankrupt. [44] CRA is concerned that if discharged, Mr. Kielb will not make a bona fide effort to pay the post-bankruptcy arrears, but willinstead again declare bankruptcy as he has threatened to do in the past. … [48] It cannot be forgotten that the post-bankruptcy debt was incurred in violation of Mr. Kielb’s conditional discharge order.Further, Mr.

Kielb applied for the variation of his conditional discharge order in 2014 and entered into the new order by consent. He didso to avoid the very collection procedures he now invites CRA to utilize. Assuming, as I must, that the order was proper and fair whenmade, there is nothing new in the fact that an absolute discharge will only be granted when the CRA debt is paid. [49] The fact that interest is accruing is not sufficient for me to conclude that the order is any less capable of being complied withnow than it was when Mr. Kielb consented to it. [50] Mr.

Kielb submits that there has been a change in circumstances, as he cannot avail himself of the development opportunity asan undischarged bankrupt, and further, that all payments for the benefit of the bankruptcy creditors have been made. [51] In my view, the changes in circumstances contemplated by the cases referenced are changes that would negatively impact theability of the bankrupt to comply with the order. [emphases added] [24] In Re Estrin, 2005 ABQB 234 (cited in Kanovsky, supra), Justice Veit (in the course of dismissing an uncontested variationapplication) cast some doubt on whether any failure of the four factors noted in Elliot would necessarily be fatal to a s. 172(3)application.

The Court concluded it would not, considering them instead to be “guidelines” of assistance to Courts and applicants alike.In Re Hagerman, supra, Registrar Thompson outlined the same four factors (in the context of s. 172.1(6), which is the “high tax debt”equivalent of s. 172(3)), but added a fifth – “the policy underlying the

section applicable to the discharge,” which in some ways issummarizing the same principle – one must look to circumstances in each case and apply them to the applicable statutory provision. [25] I am inclined to agree with both Justice Veit and Registrar Thompson.

Had Parliament intended to mandate the Court to lookto specific criteria each and every time, as opposed to using its discretion having regard to all the circumstances and the statutory test of“no reasonable probability of his [sic] being in a position to comply with the terms of the order,” it could have done so – as indeed it hasfor example in mandating the considerations the Court “must” consider when a tax debtor is captured by s. 172.1(4). That said, the “fourquestions” outlined in Elliot were indeed pondered in Estrin and given their due weight.

I also consider the fifth question raised byRegistrar Thompson to be something of a holistic overview of the other four (and such other considerations as the circumstances andevidence may require), worthy of note. [26] As well, these four factors were applied in Croft, supra. Justice McDougall also clarified: [5] To assist the court in the approach that should be taken in assessing applications of this nature, counsel for Croft referred meto the case of Peat Marwick Thorne Inc. v. Elliott (1994), (BC SC), 29 C.B.R. (3d) 174 (B.C.S.C.).

Justice Wilsonstated that in deciding how to modify a Conditional Order of Discharge, the court should consider the application as if the factualsituation which existed at the time of the application under s-s. 172.(3) had existed at the time of original application for discharge. [6] Obviously only changes that are beyond the control of the bankrupt should be considered.

If the bankrupt has created thesituation rendering him incapable of meeting his obligations under the Conditional Order, then the court would likely exercise itsdiscretion to deny the relief sought. [emphasis added] [27] He went on to find that various “changes” in the Bankrupt’s affairs were inadequate to engage the Court’s s. 172(3) discretion.

He did, however, go on to find that the Registrar had miscalculated the bankrupt’s net income and modified the order saying “I willdecide this application as if today’s factual situation existed at the time of the original discharge,” ie framing the payment obligation onthe net rather than gross income. [28] This is to be contrasted with, for example, Re Harris, 2009 NSSC 292 in which Registrar Cregan found that the bankrupt’ssituation had “changed significantly” (para. 2), including significant physical health deterioration, loss of employment, and substantiallyreduced income – all of which occurred after the original conditional order.

He reached a similar conclusion in Re Hendsbee, 2014NSSC 148, in which the bankrupt had experienced financial and personal changes after the conditional order, and also lacked the recordsnecessary to comply with the original order (which provided for filing and payment of post-bankruptcy taxes).

Application to Ms. Knowles [ 29 ] I now turn to the factors outlined in Elliot and Hagerman . [ 30 ] Changes in the bankrupt’s circumstances : None post-date the discharge hearing. There were no facts presented to me that were unknown at the time of the 2020 application. The employment, termination of spousal maintenance, and amount of tax arrears were all available. That decision was not appealed. Unlike the cases cited above, there have been no post-order changes of consequence to Ms. Knowles’ affairs. There are no “known unknowns” or “unknown unknowns” that have manifested themselves since then.

If anything, her circumstances have stabilized in that her employment is secure and the transition period following her separation and return to school has ended, and her career path reverted to its prior status. [ 31 ] Material indicating an inability to comply with the conditional order : I find there is none. Ms. Knowles’ primary complaint at this point is she, having not complied with the conditional order in full, finds herself in difficulty as a result. She does indicate that she has difficulty “securing stable housing due to the continuation of bankruptcy,” as a result of negative credit checks.

As I pointed out in the hearing, her credit rating will not improve overnight from a discharge, and as such is not a new (or any) factor I consider relevant to the exercise of my discretion. [ 32 ] She also cites the need for “emergency funds…when new tires or maintenance is needed on my vehicle which is a necessity for work purposes.” There is no indication that this is any different from the time of her discharge hearing, nor is there any indication that Ms.

Knowles – whose address is on peninsular Halifax – cannot avail herself of public transportation if the circumstances require. [ 33 ] As for compliance with the conditional order, her tax balance as of her 2019 assessment was $39,605.52. She says she has been paying $1,000 to CRA and estimated, at hearing, to have paid a total of $5,000 (meaning various partial or omitted payments). There would be added interest. [ 34 ] Her take-home income is significantly above the one-person “surplus income” standards. As noted, if Ms.

Knowles filed for bankruptcy today, her payment obligations would approximate her 2018-9 tax balance, assuming no non-exempt assets. She presented no evidence that she has any other post-bankruptcy debt. [ 35 ] I have also reviewed the draft income and expense statement in evidence. It presents as balanced with a $1,000 “current [monthly] payment to CRA.” In a bankruptcy, that would be replaced with an approximate $862 “surplus income” payment. For a proposal – which Ms.

Knowles says she wants to make – to be accepted, the total return to creditors would presumably have to be superior to a bankruptcy (net of fees). Accordingly, not only am I not satisfied that there is evidence of inability to comply with the order, I am not even satisfied she would be materially ahead if I provided her with an absolute discharge by which to attempt further arrangements with CRA. What would suffer is precisely the compliance lesson that the original order sought to instil, with the ensuing systemic integrity issues that follow. [ 36 ] Credibility: I found Ms.

Knowles to be credible in the sense that she appeared to give straightforward and sincere evidence. I was pleasantly surprised not to detect a sense of entitlement. I do accept that she does not want to be in the position she is in, and with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight may have made different choices not only with respect to her taxes, but with the outlays and expenses and choice of education venue. [ 37 ] Efforts to comply with the conditional order: The only post-order efforts that were in evidence are the payments discussed above. I do wish to be fair to Ms.

Knowles by reiterating that the 2018-19 tax years are not bereft of any servicing at all – these are recounted above [9] . However, these reflect payments made during the bankruptcy period, or at least prior to the discharge hearing – both 2018 and 2019 assessments are dated June 1, 2020 and the discharge hearing was on July 28, 2020. Ms. Knowles testified that she thinks her post-hearing payments are about $5,000.

With her income and benefits and job security, and she knowing her obligations, I am not satisfied that this is an adequate effort that should move me to exercise my discretion in her favour. [ 38 ] I add another note. In both the pre-hearing activity after the “Goldhar” filing, and at the hearing itself, I asked why Ms. Knowles did not make a proposal now, as that is an option available to a bankrupt. Although Ms. Knowles pointed me to s. 66.4(2)(

c) BIA which provides that Division II proposals capture only claims made as of the bankruptcy (it being recalled that here, the issue is post-bankruptcy tax), I was neither referred to nor am aware of any prohibition against her making a Division I proposal. Her response at hearing was that was not something she wanted to do. That may well be so, but in taking that position she in essence seeks to force the hand of the Court in providing an unearned discharge so she can deal with the same kind of tax defaults that contributed heavily to her first bankruptcy.

I strongly question whether this is consistent with either common law or the statutory duty of good faith that is now s. 4.2 BIA . Whether or not a Division I proposal is an option open to her, it is inappropriate to attempt to compel the Court to exercise its discretion against its will. [ 39 ] Statutory purpose : It is clear to me that Parliament did not intend s. 172(3) to be a statutory “mulligan.” As noted, it is not a substitute for an appeal; nor is it an invitation to ask the same question – possibly of different decision-makers in larger jurisdictions – in hopes of getting a different answer.

It is in place to account for materially changed circumstances, not known or knowable at the time of the original discharge hearing, that have intervened to preclude the “honest but unfortunate debtor” from exiting the process because of circumstances beyond their reasonable control. Health issues, unforeseen and uncontrolled family obligations, and involuntary and unforeseen adverse employment changes come to mind. None of these apply to Ms. Knowles, with the arguable exception that she cites the stress of the conditional order as impacting her job performance.

She had resources available to her that she could have, but did not, use to comply with the order. I must therefore categorize that as, with due respect, more of a self-inflicted wound than a factor favouring exercise of my discretion. As Justice McDougall said in Croft , “the bankrupt has created the situation.” [ 40 ] In conclusion, I find that Ms.

Knowles has not met the test of not having a “reasonable probability of being in a position to comply with the terms of the order.” In the event that I am incorrect, in the circumstances outlined – the post-bankruptcy issue being one of the same as in the bankruptcy itself, the RRSP withdrawal (and the non-repayment of the lifelong learning component), the level and security of Ms. Knowles’ (public) employment, her age and lack of family commitments, and her very substantial income for the post-bankruptcy years in question – I would not exercise my discretion to vary the order.

[ 41 ] In Besner , Registrar Bouck noted that the BIA contains no prohibition against multiple applications. In order to avoid misuse (or in her words, “in balancing the rights of the creditors with those of the bankrupt and considering the integrity of the bankruptcy system from the public’s perspective”) she placed a prohibition on making a further application for a period of time. I think that is appropriate here; I also do so pursuant to my “practice and procedure” jurisdiction conferred by ss. 192(1) (

k) and 192(1) (

m) BIA . One of the Kielb applications also had a “blackout period” for subsequent re-application. [ 42 ] It is clear that Ms.

Knowles’ application, paraphrased, consisted of “you ordered me to comply with two years’ post-bankruptcy tax payment obligations; taxes were also one of the causes of my bankruptcy; I didn’t appeal and didn’t comply; and now I want you to change the order because as a result of not doing it I have a problem; I can’t get out of it until I get a discharge; and my way of dealing with it will be to make a proposal or if that fails perhaps file another bankruptcy.” That’s not in keeping any of the objectives of debtor rehabilitation, creditor protection, or system integrity.

I accordingly order that no further application for variation can be made for a period of one year from the date of release of this decision, without prior leave of the Court. [ 43 ] The application is dismissed, with the restriction on re-application noted above. For reasons both indeterminate and unfathomable CRA, as the only creditor with rights at issue in this proceeding, did not appear. No costs are ordered. Balmanoukian, R.