2020 QCCQ 8317, 2020 QCCQ 8317

Shallhorn c. Leblanc 2020 QCCQ 8317 COURT OF QUEBEC Small Claims Division CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC DISTRICT OF GATINEAU TOWN OF GATINEAU Civil Division No: 550-32-024387-182 DATE: December 11 th , 2020 ______________________________________________________________________ BY THE HONOURABLE STEVE GUÉNARD, J.C.Q. ______________________________________________________________________ DAVID SHALLHORN Plaintiff v. RICHARD LEBLANC Defendant ______________________________________________________________________ JUDGMENT ______________________________________________________________________ [ 1 ] Mr.

Shallhorn is an architectural technologist. He is, at all times relevant, the owner of a 8’ X 40’ dock which he built in 2010. [ 2 ] Mr. Leblanc operates a marina, known as the “Marina Leblanc”, in Gatineau, since 1988. His residence is located just in front of said Marina. [ 3 ] Because of his health condition, Mr. Leblanc [1] is duly represented, at Trial, by his wife, Mrs. Jocelyne Leblanc. [ 4 ] In order to protect it during the winter months, Mr. Shallhorn has stored his dock, for many years, through Mr. Leblanc. [ 5 ] Indeed, Mr.

Leblanc, in return of the payment of an annual fee of 300$, collects, stores and tows back said docks to approximately 15 clients, including Mr. Shallhorn. [ 6 ] More precisely, in mid-October 2016, the parties meet at Mr. Shallhorn’s property, which is located at about 1.5 kilometer from the Marina. At such time, Mr. Shallhorn gives possession of his dock to Mr. Leblanc, as well as to the ropes that will be used to tie down the dock to the Marina. [ 7 ] The dock is attached to Mr. Leblanc’s boat [2] for a safe travel down to the Marina. Mr. Leblanc then ties down the dock to the Marina using Mr.

Shallhorn’s rope. Mr. Leblanc then collects, a few days afterwards, the annual fee of 300$. As Mr. Shallhorn resumes the situation: “ Everything is under the supervision of Mr. Leblanc ”. [ 8 ] Mr. Shallhorn’s dock, at the Marina, is located close to a long series of wave breakers (brise-lames) [3] . [ 9 ] It is not contested that the water levels in the Gatineau region rose quite importantly in the early spring months of 2017. [ 10 ] In early June of 2017, Mr. Leblanc notices that Mr. Shallhorn’s dock has disappeared. He consequently informs Mr. Shallhorn of the situation.

Some preliminary discussions occur in order to find a solution but those quickly end, Mr. Leblanc informing Mr. Shallhorn that he believes that he bears no liability as to the loss of the dock. [ 11 ] Mr. Shallhorn introduces, on July 6 th , 2018, an Application in the Small claims division of the Court of Québec. He claims from Mr. Leblanc an amount of 8 000$, which would represent the approximate value of the dock. [ 12 ] Mr. Leblanc contests the Application, essentially stating the following:

i) He acted in good faith; ii) He did not commit any fault nor any negligence as to his handling and supervision of the dock; iii) The rope provided by Mr. Shallhorn was probably not sufficient in the circumstances; iv) Furthermore, he cannot be held liable of the sudden – and very important - rise of the water levels;

v) Such situation should qualify as an “Act of God/ Force majeure”; vi) The rise of the water would have contributed to the eventual partial disintegration of the rope furnished by Mr. Shallhorn, which eventually led to the disappearance of the dock; vii) Subsidiarily, in case his liability is retained, Mr. Shallhorn’s dock cannot be valued at 8 000$, because it was old and damaged in 2017; QUESTIONS IN ISSUE [ 13 ] The Court must answer, in the current instance, the following questions:

i) What qualification can be given to the contract entered upon between the parties? ii) Is Mr. Leblanc liable for the loss of the dock? iii) Does Mr. Leblanc succeed in demonstrating that the events that occurred in the spring of 2017 constituted a superior force (force majeure) as per the criterions established in the law and in the jurisprudence? iv) In case of Mr. Leblanc’s liability, what is the duly demonstrated value of the prejudice suffered by Mr. Shallhorn? ANALYSIS 1) Mr. Leblanc’s potential liability [ 14 ] The existence of the contract concluded between the parties is not contested.

Nor his essential content. [ 15 ] The potential liability of Mr. Leblanc is consequently contractual by nature, as per

section 1458 of the Civil Code of Québec (hereinafter the CCQ ) which, as a principle, provides: 1458. Every person has a duty to honour his contractual undertakings. Where he fails in this duty, he is liable for any bodily, moral or material injury he causes to the other contracting party and is bound to make reparation for the injury; neither he nor the other party may in such a case avoid the rules governing contractual liability by opting for rules that would be more favourable to them. [4] [ 16 ] The contract hereby qualifies as a deposit contract, as defined in

section 2280 of the Civil Code of Québec , which provides as follows: 2280. Deposit is a contract by which a person, the depositor, hands over movable property to another person, the depositary, who undertakes to keep custody of it for a certain time and to restore it to him. Deposit is by gratuitous title but may be by onerous title where permitted by usage or an agreement. [ 17 ] Indeed, a deposit contract is characterized by four specific elements. The Court of Appeal reminds us of such in the case of Porterlane Investments Ltd v. Chambre des notaires du Québec [5] , in such terms: [41] Quatre éléments caractérisent le contrat de dépôt : 1- la remise d’un bien (

article 2281 C.c.Q. ), 2- la nature mobilière du bien (

article 2280 C.c.Q. ), 3- l’obligation de garder le bien ( articles 2280 et 2283 C.c.Q. ) et 4- l’obligation de restituer le bien ( articles 2285 et 2286 C.c.Q. ). [ 18 ] In the current instance, the contract concluded between the parties consequently, clearly, qualifies as such. [ 19 ] Moreover, said deposit contract qualifies as being onerous [6] by nature. Indeed, it is not contested, and the documentary evidence validly demonstrates it [7] , that Mr. Leblanc’s actions were not gratuitous but were linked with the payment, by Mr.

Shallhorn, of an annual fee of 300$. [ 20 ] The specific obligations of the depositary (namely Mr. Leblanc) are established, more precisely, in sections 2283 and 2285 CCQ, which are declined as follows: 2283. The depositary shall act with prudence and diligence in his custody of the property; he may not use the property without the permission of the depositor. 2285. The depositary is bound to restore the property deposited to the depositor on demand, even if a term has been fixed for its restitution.

Where the depositary has issued a receipt or any other document evidencing the deposit or giving the person holding it the right to

withdraw the property, he may require that the document be returned to him. [ 21 ] However, it is to be noted that the potential liability of a depositary, like Mr. Leblanc, is to be evaluated through the lenses of

section 2289 CCQ, which reads as follows: 2289. Where a deposit is by gratuitous title, the depositary is liable for the loss of the property deposited, if caused by his fault; where a deposit is by onerous title or where it was required by the depositary, he is liable for the loss of the property, unless he proves superior force. [The Court’s emphasis] [ 22 ]

Section 2289 CCQ provides that the depositary – in an onerous deposit contract – is liable for the loss of the property unless he proves the existence of a superior force / force majeure [8] . [ 23 ] Consequently, once the existence of the onerous contract of deposit is established, as well as the loss of the dock in the current instance, Mr. Leblanc is to be held liable, under

section 2289 CCQ, unless he demonstrates, through preponderant evidence, the existence of a superior force. [ 24 ] In other words, the demonstration, by Mr. Leblanc, le cas échéant , that he did not act negligently [9] in the circumstances cannot remediate, in itself , to his potential liability in the circumstances. [ 25 ] Justice Marie-Andrée Villeneuve, J.C.Q. explains such principle, as follows, in the case of Royal & SunAlliance compagnie d’assurances du Canada v. 2858-5644 Québec inc (RL Marine & Sports) [10] : [27] Il ressort de la lecture de ceux-ci que l'obligation du dépositaire à

titre onéreux est une obligation de résultat [11] . D'ailleurs, c'est ce qui est mentionné dans les commentaires du Ministre de la Justice reproduits dans le Code civil du Québec annotée des auteurs Baudouin et Renaud : - L’intensité de l’obligation du dépositaire en cas de perte du bien varie. - Le dépositaire bénévole est tenu à une obligation de moyens et le dépositaire rémunéré a une obligation de résultat.

Le caractère onéreux du contrat implique une intensité plus grande du devoir de garde. - Le dépositaire qui exige un dépôt, tel le dépôt d’effets personnels comme condition d’accès à un lieu, est tenu à une obligation de résultat dont il ne se libère qu’en prouvant la force majeure." [5] [28] Les auteurs Baudouin et Jobin décrivent les conséquences de l'obligation de résultat : "Sur le plan de la preuve, l'absence de résultat fait donc présumer la faute du débiteur et place sur ses épaules le fardeau de démontrer que l'inexécution provient d'une cause qui ne lui est pas imputable.

Le débiteur n'a pas la possibilité de tenter de prouver absence de faute de sa part; il doit identifier, par prépondérance de la preuve, une force majeure ou encore le fait de la victime, qui a empêché l'exécution de l'obligation. À défaut de décharger ce fardeau, le débiteur est tenu responsable de l'inexécution ." [6] [The Court’s emphasis] [ 26 ] The notion of preponderant evidence is defined in sections 2803 and 2804 CCQ, which read as follows: 2803. A person seeking to assert a right shall prove the facts on which his claim is based.

A person who claims that a right is null, has been modified or is extinguished shall prove the facts on which he bases his claim. 2804. Evidence is sufficient if it renders the existence of a fact more probable than its non-existence, unless the law requires more convincing proof. [ 27 ] Evidence, to be qualified as being preponderant, must be clear and convincing. [12] [ 28 ] As to the notion of superior force, it appears specifically in

section 1470 CCQ: 1470. A person may free himself from his liability for injury caused to another by proving that the injury results from superior force, unless he has undertaken to make reparation for it. Superior force is an unforeseeable and irresistible event , including external causes with the same characteristics. [The Court’s emphasis] [ 29 ] The Courts have constantly reminded that such demonstration of a superior force is not an easy task. The Honourable Jacques Chamberland, from the Court of Appeal, confirms such in the case of American Homes, Compagnie d’assurances v. Inter Tex Transport

inc [13] : Il lui incombe de faire cette preuve par ailleurs très exigeante . Il s'agit ici d'une question de fait qui doit normalement être laissée à l'appréciation du juge du procès. [The Court’s emphasis] [ 30 ] To the same effect, Justice Michel Simard, J.C.Q., in Groupe commerce, Cie d’assurances v. Rodrigue [14] , stated the following as to the evidence needed to demonstrate the existence of a superior force : [14] Enfin, sur le fardeau de la preuve imposé en cette matière, ce même auteur[8] affirme : « La jurisprudence, dans l’ensemble, se montre exigeante dans la preuve de la force majeure.

Le fardeau repose sur le débiteur de montrer l’existence du fait qui a empêché l’exécution d’une part, et d’autre part, que celui-ci possède les caractères requis[9]. Le débiteur est donc tenu responsable, même s’il démontre son absence de faute, s’il ne peut précisément établir la cause exacte de l’inexécution[10].

En d’autres termes, le débiteur assume le risque de l’absence de preuve du fait ayant entraîné l’inexécution. » [ 31 ] Justice Villeneuve, in the previously quoted case of Royal&SunAlliance , exposes the elements needed to be proven in regards to the potential existence of such a superior force: [30] M. le juge Jocelyn Verrier [7] rappelle les propos des auteurs Jean-Louis Baudouin et Patrice Deslauriers sur la définition de la force majeure et sur le caractère d'imprévisibilité et d'irrésistibilité de l'événement que l'on qualifie de force majeure : "La force majeure est définie à la fois par l'article 1470 C.c. et par la doctrine classique comme un événement extérieur à la personne humaine, que celle-ci ne pouvait prévoir, auquel elle ne pouvait résister et qui a rendu absolument impossible l'exécution de l'obligation." [8] … "Imprévisibilité - La loi requiert, en outre, l'imprévisibilité de l'événement .

La jurisprudence, reprenant les données de la doctrine classique, demande au débiteur de démontrer non seulement qu'il n'a pas effectivement prévu l'événement, mais encore que celui-ci n'était pas normalement prévisible. Établir le caractère imprévisible de l'événement consiste à comparer la conduite du débiteur au moment de la formation du contrat, à celle d'un modèle abstrait du débiteur avisé. Les tribunaux ne poussent cependant pas cette comparaison à la limite. Tout événement est, en effet, théoriquement prévisible par un débiteur éclairé, même les plus inattendus.

Pousser cette exigence jusqu'au bout aurait donc pour effet de vider le concept même de la force majeure de son contenu. La jurisprudence fait donc appel, encore une fois, à la notion classique relative de la personne raisonnablement prudente et diligente et se pose la question suivante : l’événement était-il normalement prévisible au moment où l'obligation a été contractée pour une telle personne?

Celle qui a pu prévoir l'arrivée de l'événement ne saurait s'en plaindre si elle a quand même contracté, puisqu'elle aurait dû alors, soit prendre toutes les précautions pour l'éviter, soit refuser de contracter face au risque. (page 769)" [9] … – Irrésistibilité - Le caractère irrésistible de l'événement doit être tel qu'il rende toute opposition de la part du débiteur inutile ou futile [15] . L'événement qui rend l'exécution simplement plus difficile, plus périlleuse ou plus onéreuse pour le débiteur, ne tombe pas dans cette catégorie [16] .

Celui-ci a, en effet, le devoir de tout mettre en œuvre pour fournir l'exécution, même si un changement de circonstances a accru pour lui la difficulté du paiement. (page 770)" (Nos soulignements) [10] … [31] Les auteurs commentent aussi l'état de la jurisprudence : " – État de la jurisprudence - La caractérisation et la qualification de la force majeure sont laissées à la sagesse des tribunaux et il est parfois difficile de tracer les lignes directrices en la matière.

En effet, les critères théoriques précédemment examinés s'interprètent différemment suivant les circonstances particulières à chaque espèce et, en outre, l'appréciation de la force majeure comporte aussi, dans les faits, la prise en compte par le juge de principes d'équité.

Les faits de la nature (pluie, inondation, neige, débâcle, gelée, vent, etc.), les faits de l'homme (grève, incendie, vol, guerre, fait du prince, embargo, maladie ou accident, etc.) ne sont pas, en eux-mêmes, des forces majeures, mais peuvent le devenir suivant les circonstances propres de la cause et leur conformité aux conditions d'extériorité, d'imprévisibilité, d'irrésistibilité et d'impossibilité absolue d'exécution. (pages 771-772)" [The Court’s emphasis] [ 32 ] What about the facts in the current instance? [ 33 ] Both parties recognize, without difficulty, that the water levels in the Gatineau region, and clearly in the vicinity of the Marina Leblanc, rose considerably in the spring months of 2017 [17] . [ 34 ] That is undeniable. [ 35 ] Mrs.

Leblanc testifies to the effect that the Marina was never confronted, since its inception in 1988, to such situation. She adds that even the wave-breakers were covered with water and that said water rose about 6 feet higher than normally.

[ 36 ] Indeed, the photos produced by the Defendant do establish such situation. [ 37 ] However, even if the Court was to establish, or presume, of the unforeseeable nature of such event, the end result would be, in the current instance, the same. [ 38 ] Indeed, and as previously established, the unpredictability of an event is not, in itself, sufficient to qualify such as a superior force. Indeed, such unpredictable/unforeseeable event must also qualify as being irresistible. [ 39 ] The evidence in the current instance demonstrates that Mr. Shallhorn’s dock was the only one who disappeared.

Indeed, both parties confirm that the other 15-20 docks, all located in the same vicinity under the care of Mr. Leblanc, were still at their original location following the 2017 spring events [18] . [ 40 ] This appears to be quite logical considering that Mrs. Leblanc explains that the docks are not anchored down. In other words, the docks do follow the flow of the water. When the level of the water goes up, so does the dock.

And vice-versa. [ 41 ] Consequently, it appears that the rise of the level of the water, even if unpredictable, could not be qualified as being irresistible. [ 42 ] After all, the evidence does demonstrate that all the other docks remained in place. Consequently, the execution of the Defendant’s obligations as per the deposit contract was certainly possible . It was, actually, such a possibility that it appears that it was duly executed for all the docks, except Mr. Shallorn’s. [ 43 ] Furthermore, Mrs.

Leblanc states to the Court that the water levels were the same in 2019 and that no docks were lost, again demonstrating, very clearly, that the execution of the obligation is certainly possible . [ 44 ] As previously established, an obligation that only becomes more difficult to execute, or more onerous, does not qualify as being caused by an irresistible superior force. [ 45 ] Which brings us to another argument explained, at Trial, by Mrs.

Leblanc. [ 46 ] Indeed, she exposes that the disappearance of the dock can be explained by two reasons, namely the existence of that alleged force majeure , and the lack of quality, or durability, of the rope furnished by Mr. Shallorn. [ 47 ] Furthermore, Mrs. Leblanc explains that the other owners furnished “nylon ropes” to tie down their docks. Mr. Shallorn’s furnished rope was different in nature. It was indeed, as per the photos [19] provided, a “traditional” rope. [ 48 ] Consequently, Mrs.

Leblanc submits the hypothesis that the disappearance of the dock could be explained by the lack of quality of said rope, for which the Defendant could not, as alleged, be liable. [ 49 ] With respect, this hypothesis is quite problematic. For numerous reasons. [ 50 ] Firstly, the evidence clearly demonstrates that the rope in question, when it was furnished by Mr. Shallhorn in October 2016, was in a great condition. [ 51 ] Indeed, Mr. Shallhorn’s testimony to that effect is credible and solid.

Even though it was the fourth year that he was using such rope, nothing tends to demonstrate that it was not in a solid condition. [ 52 ] Furthermore, Mrs. Leblanc confirms that, even though her husband’s clients are the ones furnishing their “own ropes”, it happens, from time to time, that Mr. Leblanc requests from one of his clients to “buy” a new kind of rope. As explained by Mrs. Leblanc: “C’est arrivé qu’il a dit à un client de lui fournir une corde qui n’avait pas été achetée au Canadian Tire ». [ 53 ] In other words, if the rope was in any kind of deteriorated, or unsatisfactory state in October 2016, Mr.

Leblanc would have mentioned it to Mr. Shallhorn. [ 54 ] He did not. Consequently, it appears obvious, and certainly preponderantly demonstrated, that the rope was a solid one. Furthermore, and as pointed out by Mr. Shallhorn: “ It was a good thick rope. It was strong enough to retain the dock for the 1.5 kilometer ride, by Mr. Leblanc, from my residence to the Marina Leblanc ”. [ 55 ] Secondly, Mrs.

Leblanc does testify to the effect that her husband did verify the status of the various docks once the level of the water started to rise. [ 56 ] Again, if there had been any difficulty with the condition of the rope, Mr. Leblanc would have seen it. In such eventuality, he would certainly have mentioned the problematic to Mr. Shallhorn. [ 57 ] Furthermore, if Mr.

Leblanc considered, at any time, that the rope was not sufficient – either in October 2016 or once the water levels had started to rise – it was certainly his specific duty, as a depositary acting onerously, to either add a new rope, or, at the very least , to inform Mr. Shallhorn of the situation. [ 58 ] Neither of those options occurred in the current instance, even though the evidence demonstrates that the water levels rose gradually. “About one feet” every day, as mentioned by Mrs. Leblanc. In other words, it did not occur all at once. [ 59 ] Consequently, Mr. Leblanc had the time to react.

If he believed that Mr. Shallhorn’s dock was in any kind of danger, he needed to react accordingly. [ 60 ] Surely enough, Mrs. Leblanc mentions to the Court that the precise location of Mr. Shallorn’s dock, because it was the “ first in line ”, was in “the safest of the spots reserved to the docks” [20] .

[ 61 ] Well, maybe in October 2016. [ 62 ] However, Mrs. Leblanc further admits that the dock, following the water level’s rise, was located in the “worst” spot in the spring months. Because it was, still, “ the first in line ”. [ 63 ] Consequently, if Mr. Leblanc believed that the combination of a “traditional rope” with the localised spot of the dock created a difficulty, he had to react and adjust, the whole in order to execute his onerous obligation under the deposit contract. [ 64 ] It is, indeed, a bit peculiar, that the Defendant tries to state that Mr.

Shallhorn was negligent, basically, in not providing a strong enough rope, one that could withstand the force of an alleged “force majeure”. [ 65 ] To accept, in the current instance, this argument raised by the Defendant, would – basically – drain any and all essential obligations and potential liability from a depositary in the case of a dock. Indeed, it would mean that if the dock disappears, it would necessarily be caused by the potential destruction of the rope, which in turn would be the responsibility of the owner of the dock, thus rendering void any contractual obligations of Mr.

Leblanc as a depositary acting onerously. [ 66 ] Consequently, and for all those reasons, the Court cannot conclude, from the evidence adduced at Trial, that the events that occur in the spring of 2017 qualify, in the precise circumstances of the current instance, as being a force majeure in regards with Mr. Leblanc’s obligations arising from the deposit contract. [ 67 ] Mr. Leblanc is thus liable regarding the loss of the dock. 2) The value of the prejudice [ 68 ] The demonstration of such prejudice, and the value associated herewith, rested upon Mr.

Shallhorn’s shoulders, as per sections 2803 and 2804 CCQ. [ 69 ] Sections 1607, 1611 and 1613 CCQ establish the principles as to the evaluation of the prejudice suffered by a plaintiff. [ 70 ] The parties do not agree on the quality, and condition, of the dock in October 2016. [ 71 ] Mr. Shallhorn explains that he built the dock himself, with the help of his father and some friends, back in 2010. It would have taken approximately 100 hours to build. He comments that the 8’ X 40’ frame was in one piece, thus adding to the inner strength of the structure. [ 72 ] Mr.

Shallhorn also produces a copy of a very precise plan [21] that he prepared showing the various portions of the dock, including the ¾” galvanised rods that are bolted in the structure, rendering it even stronger. The plan also refers to Anchor plates and various floatation devices. [ 73 ] “ It was a sturdy and solid dock ”, he adds. “ It was as solid as when I built it. You could have landed a helicopter on it ”. [ 74 ] Mr. Shallhorn also produces a “Google aerial photo” that would date back to the summer of 2016. The photo is, by definition, quite distant.

It does give, however, a rather good idea of the important size of the dock. [ 75 ] That photo is also useful since it shows, nearby, Mr. Shallhorn’s pontoon boat. Mr. Shallhorn, who uses a wheelchair, explains that he custom-built the dock in order for it to be at the exact same height than his pontoon boat. He also explains that it helped some of his friends, who suffer from muscular dystrophy, to use the dock. [ 76 ] Mr. Shallhorn submits that the material used for the dock costed him, approximately , 4 000$ back in 2010. “Without including the labour”, he adds. [ 77 ] No bills, no invoices are produced.

No estimates, neither, in regards to the cost of a potential reconstruction of the dock. [ 78 ] In his letter of demand, dated May 8 th 2018 [22] , Mr. Shallhorn referred to an “ estimated cost of 4 500 – 8 000$ ”. [ 79 ] Another element must be kept in mind when establishing the value of the prejudice suffered by the Plaintiff. Indeed, it is obvious that the dock, in 2017, had certainly suffered some depreciation since its construction back in 2010. [ 80 ] The preponderant evidence does show, however, that the dock was still in a good shape seven years after it was built. Mr.

Shallhorn testifies that a dock, of that nature, can normally last, with some maintenance along the way, for a period of anywhere between 20 to 25 years. That evidence is not contested. [ 81 ] The Defendant submits a photo [23] of a brand new dock sold at a Rona store, for an amount of 1 799$. Mrs. Leblanc furthermore adds that: “ Un quai ou un autre quai, c’est quoi la différence? ”.

[ 82 ] Some comments must be made in regards to that “Rona dock”. First, and foremost, as conceded by Mrs. Leblanc and as it appears from said photo (D-12), that dock is 8’ X 16’, which is considerably smaller than the dock built by Mr. Shallhorn. [ 83 ] Furthermore, the Court finds Mr. Shallhorn’s to be quite credible and believable when he states that the dock that he built was of a considerably higher quality and strength. It was a lot longer, too.

And custom made with special requirements, for the reasons already evoked. [ 84 ] That being said, the Court must remind that the ordered compensation must have the objective of replacing the Plaintiff in the same situation than before the prejudice was suffered. The “victim” must not be enriched by the compensation. Nor must he be impoverished by such. [ 85 ] In that objective, the Court must apply a depreciation in the value of the dock considering that it was already 7 years old when it disappeared. [ 86 ] Indeed, by analogy and as mentioned by Justice Jean Faullem, in Côté v.

Laflèche [24] : Cependant, dans l’évaluation des dommages subis, le Tribunal doit tenir compte de la plus-value apportée à la résidence à la suite des travaux de réparation effectués et ainsi déduire de l’indemnité accordée à l’acheteur la valeur de cette plus-value. [The Court’s emphasis] [ 87 ] To the same effect, and as reminded by Professor Patrice Deslauriers, in L’indemnisation résultant d’une atteinte à un bien [25] Un élément extrêmement important et inhérent au concept de la restitutio in integrum est que le créancier ne peut jamais s’enrichir au moyen de dommages-intérêts.

C’est pourquoi, lorsqu’il s’agit d’un bien qui n’était pas destiné à la revente ou à la spéculation, le créancier aura le droit de réclamer, en cas de perte totale, le montant suivant : le coût de remplacement du bien neuf duquel on soustrait la dépréciation (…) Dans l’hypothèse où le bien n’a été que partiellement endommagé, encore là, une somme sera allouée pour sa remise en état à condition que la preuve en soit faite. Toutefois sera soustraite la portion représentant la plus-value du bien remis à neuf. [The Court’s emphasis] [ 88 ] Justice Richard Landry, J.C.Q., in the very often quoted case of Beaudet v.

Bastien [26] , reiterates the principle as follows: [59] Dans leur traité sur La Responsabilité Civile [21], les auteurs Baudouin et Deslauriers approchent la question de l'indemnisation en ces termes (à la page 313): « La jurisprudence tente de réaliser un équilibre entre deux impératifs. Le premier est de voir à ce que l'indemnisation ne soit pas une source d'enrichissement pour la victime.

Le second est, au contraire, d'éviter de la laisser dans une situation ne reflétant pas une réparation intégrale. » [60] Ils précisent (à la page 315): « Lorsque l'objet avait déjà subi les assauts du temps et n'était donc pas neuf au moment où le dommage a été subi, accorder la pleine valeur de remplacement est, dans un sens, enrichir la victime qui se retrouve avec un objet complètement neuf et non dévalué. C'est pourquoi, en général, les tribunaux compensent ce fait en tenant compte de la dépréciation selon les circonstances." (…) [ 89 ] It is undeniable in the circumstances that Mr.

Shallorn did suffer a prejudice. [ 90 ] Based on the applicable principles, considering the somewhat imprecise evidence as to any specific value to be attributed to the dock, and keeping in mind the necessary depreciation of the value of the dock through the years, the Court establishes that an amount of 4 000$ does represent a reasonable and proportionate value for the loss of the dock. [ 91 ] Consequently, the Court will grant, but partially, Mr. Shallhorn’s claim.

FOR THOSE REASONS, THE COURT: PARTIALLY GRANTS the Plaintiff’s claim; CONDEMNS the Defendant to pay to the Plaintiff an amount of 4 000$, with the interests calculated at the legal rate, as well as the additional indemnity provided in

section 1619 of the

Civil Code of Québec , to accrue from May 27 th 2018 [27] ; THE WHOLE, with the legal costs in favour of the Plaintiff [28] . __________________________________ STEVE GUÉNARD, J.C.Q. Date of hearing: November 25th, 2020