2010 QCCQ 4890, 2010 QCCQ 4890

Brinker Ink c. Quality Goods IMD Inc. 2010 QCCQ 4890 COURT OF QUEBEC CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC DISTRICT OF MONTREAL Civil Division No: 500-22-128282-061 DATE: April 23, 2010 ______________________________________________________________________ BY THE HONOURABLE ELIANA MARENGO, J.C.Q. ______________________________________________________________________ BRINKER INK Plaintiff v. QUALITY GOODS I.M.D. INC.

Defendant ______________________________________________________________________ JUDGMENT (on defendant's verbal motion under art. 165(1) C.C.P.) ______________________________________________________________________ [ 1 ] On February 5, 2002, plaintiff filed a motion for recognition and enforcement of two judgments rendered by a foreign jurisdiction, under arts. 785 and 786 C.C.P. and arts. 3155 and ff. C.C.Q., before the Superior Court. [ 2 ] On June 9, 2004, the following decision was rendered by Roger E.

Baker, J.S.C.: "[1] The Court has heard an Amended Motion for Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments rendered by the United States District Court, Middle District of Florida, Orlando Division under Art. 3155 and ff.

C.C.Q., as well as Art. 785 and 786 C.C.P. [2] The application deals with two judgments of a Florida Court, which together are requests of condemnation against the Defendant in the amount of approximately $ 50,000 CAN. [3] The application to enforce foreign judgments is subject to somewhat narrow rules which are found in the Civil Code , and a Quebec judge's authority in connection which ( sic ) this kind of an application is circumscribed considerably by a Code which gives a certain formality to the rules and which are set out in the Code which are to be found at Art. 3155 CC.Q. [4] This case, in my view, comes down to a very technical issue.

Were the two judgments which this Petition seeks to homologate enforceable under our law? [5]

Article 3156 C.C.Q. reads as follows: " Art. 3156. A decision rendered by default may not be recognized or declared enforceable unless the plaintiff proves that the act of procedure initiating the proceedings was duly served on the defaulting party in accordance with the law of the place where the decision was rendered. […]" [6] The one possible Defense open to the Defendant in this case is the technical argument founded upon the absence of service of the proceedings upon the Defendant in Florida. [7] I will turn first to the Code of Civil Procedure Art. 786 which reads as follows: " 786 .

A party seeking recognition or enforcement of foreign decision attaches to his application a copy of the decision and an attestation emanating from a competent foreign officer stating that the decision is no longer, in the State, in which it was rendered, subject to ordinary remedy and that it is final or enforceable. " [8] I would say immediately that the Court is satisfied that the judgments of the courts in Florida have been properly certified and that they are final and enforceable. I don't think that there is serious issue on that score.

However, I will now read the second paragraph of Art. 786 C.C.P., which reads as follows:

" If the decision was rendered by default, a certified copy of the documents establishing that the procedure which instituted the proceedings was duly served on the defaulting party is attached to the application " [9] The issue as stated in paragraph 2 of Art. 786 C.C.P. is reflected thoroughly in the Civil of ( sic ) Code of Quebec in Art. 3156 which has been cited earlier in [5] of this judgment. [10] In spite of the abundance of exhibits which have been filed in connection with these proceedings, I am essentially asked by Plaintiff counsel to take it on faith that the two hearings in Florida, the subject of the decisions which have been sought to be homologated, were contested at the time the judgments issued. [11] I am aware of course that there were subsequent appeals.

It is not these decisions which Petitioner is attempting to exemplify; it is the original trial judge's decisions. [12] At the end of the hearing here today counsel to Petitioner discovered that he had only a photocopy of a certificate of service of the first judgment Exhibit R-1 that was sought to be exemplified. [13] Counsel made an application to re-open the hearing for the purpose of obtaining a certified copy of the signification, and to file it at a later date to fulfill the requirement of Art. 786 C.C.P. together with Art. 3156 C.C.Q. [14] If the legislator which enacted our articles both in the Civil Code and in particularly ( sic ) the Procedure Code under 785 and ff. wished to permit this kind of an application proceed with less formality than what otherwise appears to be the case, then I fully expect that the articles of the Procedure Code would have reflected that; but they do not, and as our proceedings to exemplify a foreign judgment are surrounded with a certain formality, and I am therefore compelled to deny Petitioner's application for permission to reopen the hearing for the purposes of filing proof of service. [15] Accordingly, the application is dismissed with costs." ("the Judgment") [ 3 ] Again, art. 3156 C.C.Q. states: " 3156.

A decision rendered by default may not be recognized or declared enforceable unless the plaintiff proves that the act of procedure initiating the proceedings was duly served on the defaulting party in accordance with the law of the place where the decision was rendered. However, the authority may refuse recognition or enforcement if the defaulting party proves that, owing to the circumstances, he was unable to learn of the act of procedure initiating the proceedings or was not given sufficient time to offer his defence." (emphasis added) and art. 786 C.C.P. states: " 786.

A party seeking recognition or enforcement of a foreign decision attaches to his application a copy of the decision and an attestation emanating from a competent foreign public officer stating that the decision is no longer, in the State in which it was rendered, subject to ordinary remedy and that it is final or enforceable. If the decision was rendered by default, a certified copy of the documents establishing that the procedure which instituted the proceedings was duly served on the defaulting party is attached to the application.

All documents drafted in a language other than French or English must be accompanied with a translation authenticated in Québec." (emphasis added) [ 4 ] As appears from paragraph 10 of the Judgment, based on the evidence adduced at trial, the Court was unable to ascertain whether or not the two judgments of foreign jurisdiction were rendered by default. [ 5 ] Accordingly, given the mandatory nature of the above cited articles and given the absence of proof regarding service of the act of procedure initiating the proceedings in the foreign jurisdiction, the Court dismissed plaintiff's application. [ 6 ] Plaintiff appealed the Judgment, but subsequently discontinued its appeal proceedings. [ 7 ] However, on October 16, 2006, plaintiff filed another motion before this Court for the recognition and enforcement of the same two judgments, this time taking care to make allegations regarding contestation and service of the foreign proceedings.

The original motion as filed in Superior Court did not address this issue, nor did the evidence. [ 8 ] Defendant has now presented a verbal motion for the dismissal of plaintiff's application, based on the Judgment and res judicata . [ 9 ] Is there, in fact, res judicata ? [ 10 ] WHEREAS the Judgment is rooted in a matter of evidence and not in a matter of procedure; [ 11 ] WHEREAS , in 2625-8277 Québec inc. v. Henuset et al [1] , the Court of Appeal decided as follows: "5. Art. 169 C.C.P. provides:

Lorsque le jugement qui accueille une requête sur un des moyens prévus à l'article 168 enjoint au demandeur de faire un acte dans undélai imparti et que celui-ci fait défaut de s'y conformer, le défendeur peut, dès l'expiration du délai, obtenir le rejet de la demande ou laradiation des allégations concernées. 6 In this matter, appellant was ordered to furnish, within the stipulated delay, particulars affecting more than half the allegations set outin its action against respondent. 7 Appellant failed to comply with this order.

Rousseau J., on respondent's motion, thereupon dismissed appellant's action instead ofmerely striking out the allegations contemplated by the judgment ordering particulars. 8 The judgment of Rousseau J. was not appealed. It is presumed to be well-founded and has become final. 9 Manifestly, Rousseau J. concluded that, without the allegations for which particulars were ordered, there was nothing left to supportappellant's claim.

Dismissal of the action on that basis operates, in my respectful view, as res judicata." and as follows: "17 Les jugements qui jouissent de l'autorité de la chose jugée sont les jugements définitifs qui mettent fin à la contestation,sinon d'une manière irrévocable, du moins dans des conditions telles que le juge n'a plus à revenir sur le point litigieux. La présomptionde l'article 1241 C.c.B.C. (2848 C.c.Q.) ne s'applique pas à la décision préparatoire ou interlocutoire rendue en cours d'instance et portantsur une question incidente au litige (Voir Trudeau c. Adel, (QC CA), [1990] R.D.J. 483 (C.A.)).

Il en est de même dujugement qui rejette une action parce que mal intentée ou prématurée (Daishowa Inc. c. Syndicat démocratique des salariés de la scierieLeduc, C.A. 200-09-000437- 944, 18 août 1994 (J. Delisle)) ou encore du jugement qui rejette une requête pour défaut de forme(Lespinasse c. Goyette, [1965] B.R. 704 ; Leclerc c. Tétrault, [1962] B.R. 649) ainsi que du jugement qui ne se prononce pas sur le fonddu litige mais uniquement sur son aspect procédural (Begama Ltd c. Banque fédérale de Développement, (QC CA),[1987] R.D.J. 617 (C.A.); Société hypothécaire Québec Ltée c. Perreault, J.E. 89-1524 (C.S.)).

Tous ces jugements renvoient une actionsans décider du mérite de la cause et ne font pas obstacle à une nouvelle action intentée pour le même objet.

Un demandeur peut alorsreformuler son action en y corrigeant les défaillances qui ont entraîné son rejet." [12] WHEREAS the Judgment was not an interlocutory judgment, nor did it merely settle an incidental question; [13] WHEREAS the Court ruled on the core issue of evidence and whether or not plaintiff had met its burden of proof under arts.3155 and ff C.C.Q. and 785 and ff C.C.P.; [14] WHEREAS the party who has the burden of proof, does not get a second chance to rectify an omission and present evidencewhich it had, but failed to submit when it should have; [15] WHEREAS: "[30] Une

partie ne peut ainsi invoquer de nouveaux arguments pour faire échec au «principe de la chose jugée» et persister dans desrecours répétitifs." [2] [16] WHEREAS, furthermore, if plaintiff was in disagreement with the Judgment, it should not have discontinued its appealproceedings; [17] WHEREAS: "[30] À la lumière de l’ensemble de ce qui précède, il appert que le défendeur, à toutes fins utiles, souhaite faire le même débatque celui fait devant le juge Richard, il y a moins de deux ans, et ce, en l’absence de faits nouveaux pouvant justifier de quelque façonl’annulation ou la diminution de la pension alimentaire.

Il demande, en fait, de façon déguisée, la révision du jugement du juge Richard,qui a acquis l’autorité de la chose jugée lorsque le défendeur s’est désisté de son appel, jusqu’à la survenance d’un changementsignificatif." [3] [18] WHEREAS, in matters of recognition and enforcement of judgments rendered by a foreign jurisdiction, the Court's role islimited to determining whether or not the conditions set out in arts. 3155 and 3156 C.C.Q. and 785 and 786 C.C.P. have been fulfilled; [19] WHEREAS, therefore, the Judgment is indeed a judgment on the merits and constitutes res judicata [4]; [20] WHEREAS the authority of the Judgment applies to the object of the judgment, namely the recognition and enforcement oftwo foreign judgments, as the motion here in question is based on the same cause and is between the same parties acting in the samequalities and the thing applied for is the same (art. 2848 C.C.Q.); [21] WHEREAS: "[18] La cause d'action est le fait juridique qui a donné naissance au droit réclamé.

C'est ce qui doit être prouvé pour obtenir gain decause." [5] [22] WHEREAS: "[21] Dans l’arrêt Roberge c. Bolduc, la Cour suprême, se référant à la doctrine et à la jurisprudence, mentionne que l’objet dansune action ou une demande, c’est le droit que le plaideur exerce, c’est le bénéfice que l’on se propose d’obtenir en le formulant : « […]

Selon Nadeau et Ducharme, op. cit., au no 577, p. 478: L’objet, dans une action, c’est le droit que le plaideur exerce, c’est le bénéfice juridique immédiat qu’il veut faire reconnaître par le tribunal. (Voir également Chauveau, op. cit., au no 135, p. 130, et Royer, op. cit., au no 794, p. 293.) Pour déterminer, donc, l'''objet'' d’une action, il y a lieu d’examiner à la fois la nature du droit dont l’exécution est poursuivie et le redressement ou le but recherché. Cela ne signifie pas qu’il doit y avoir identité du redressement recherché ou du but poursuivi.

Mignault, op. cit., explique, à la p. 105: … il importe de compléter la règle en disant qu’il n’est pas nécessaire que les deux demandes concluent identiquement à la même condamnation, mais qu’il y aura chose jugée dès que l’objet de la seconde action se trouve implicitement compris dans l’objet de la première.

Nadeau et Ducharme, op. cit., au no 577, p. 479, expriment un avis semblable: Il n’est donc pas nécessaire que les deux demandes concluent à des condamnations identiques; il suffit que l’objet de la seconde action soit implicitement compris dans l’objet de la première … [Références omises.] (Voir aussi Royer, op. cit., au no 795, pp. 294 et 295.) Cette position trouve également appui dans la jurisprudence. L’arrêt de principe sur la question de l’identité d’objet est Pesant v.

Langevin (1926), 41 B.R. 412 , où le juge Rivard dit, à la p. 421: L’objet d’une demande, c’est le bénéfice que l’on se propose d’obtenir en la formulant. L’identité matérielle, c’est-à-dire l’identité d’une même chose corporelle, n’est pas nécessairement exigée.

Peut-être force-t-on un peu le sens du mot ''objet'', mais on admet comme suffisante une identité abstraite de droit. ''Cette identité de droit existe non seulement lorsque c’est exactement le même droit qui est réclamé sur la même chose ou sur quelqu’une de ses parties, mais encore lorsque le droit qui fait le sujet de la nouvelle demande ou de la nouvelle exception, sans être absolument identique à celui qui a fait l’objet du premier jugement, en forme néanmoins une

partie nécessaire, y est virtuellement compris, comme en étant un démembrement, une suite ou une conséquence essentielle''.

En d’autres termes, si deux objets sont tellement connexes que les deux débats qui se font à leur sujet soulèvent la même question concernant l’accomplissement de la même obligation, entre les mêmes parties, il y a chose jugée. [Références omises.] […] » (Nos soulignements)" [6] [ 23 ] WHEREAS plaintiff's motion before the Superior Court was dismissed based on a lack of evidence not a question of procedure; [ 24 ] WHEREAS , therefore, as stated above, there is res judicata , and defendant's verbal motion under art. 165(1) C.C.P. is well- founded and must be granted; WHEREFORE THE COURT HEREBY: GRANTS defendant's verbal motion under 165(1) C.C.P. for res judicata ; DISMISSES plaintiff's motion for recognition and enforcement of judgments rendered by a foreign jurisdiction; THE WHOLE with costs. __________________________________ ELIANA MARENGO, J.Q.C.

Me Dominic Bianco Mercadante Di Pace Attorneys for plaintiff Me Jean Bergeron Spiegel Sohmer Inc. Attorneys for defendant Date of hearing: March 24, 2010