Her Majesty the Queen - v. -, 2014 SKPC 197
Opinion
IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF SASKATCHEWAN Citation: 2014 SKPC 197 Date: November 12, 2014 Information: 24447838 & 35805049 Location: Prince Albert _____________________________________________________________________________ Between: Her Majesty the Queen - and - Garrett Lawrence Daniels Appearing: Ms. Elizabeth Addabor For the Crown Ms. Pamela Cuelenaere, Q.C. For the Accused DECISION ON SENTENCE F. M. DAUNT , J [ 1 ] Mr.
Daniels pled guilty to the following indictable offences: Information 35805049: Between September 22, 2013 and October 12, 2013 at Sturgeon Lake Park District in the Province of Saskatchewan did commit break and enter a place, to wit, a cabin at Wilf’s Beach Lot #5 and con# 104 and did commit therein the indictable offence of Mischief, contrary to Section 348 (1) (
b) of the Criminal Code ;
Information 24447838: On or about the 16th day of March, 2014 at Sturgeon Lake Regional Park in the Province of Saskatchewan: Count #2: did having consumed alcohol in such a quantity that the concentration thereof in his blood exceeded eighty milligrams of alcohol in one hundred millilitres of blood, did have the care or control of a motor vehicle, contrary to Section 253(1) (
b) and Section 255(1) of the Criminal Code ; Count #3: did operate a motor vehicle while disqualified from doing so by reason of an order pursuant to Section 259(1) of the Criminal Code , contrary to Section 259(4) of the Criminal Code ; Count #4: did break and enter a place, to wit: #11 Sturgeon Drive, Wilf’s Beach, Sturgeon Lake Regional Park situated at Sturgeon Lake, Saskatchewan and did commit therein the indictable offence of theft, contrary to Section 348(1) (
b) of the Criminal Code ; Count #5: did commit mischief by willfully damaging, without legal justification or excuse or colour of right, property to wit: clothing and telephone cable of Jeff Freisen, the value of which did not exceed five thousand dollars, contrary to Section 430(4) of the Criminal Code ; and Count #8: did possess a firearm, to wit: a rifle, without being the holder of the license under which he may possess it, contrary to Section 91(1) of the Criminal Code . [ 2 ] Mr. Daniels was arrested on March 16, 2014 on all charges.
He was released after a show cause hearing on a cash recognizance on March 20, 2014. He has been subject to the strict conditions of this recognizance since then. CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENCES: [ 3 ] Regarding the first break and enter, in the fall of 2013, Mr. Daniels had been drinking and got lost. He had been reported as a missing person. He found himself at the property in question. He broke the kitchen window and entered the cabin. In true Goldilocks fashion, he used a coffee mug and a towel, and slept in the owner’s bed. The owner claims restitution in the amount of $505.00, which Mr.
Daniels is willing to pay. Mr. Daniels was caught because his fingerprint was found on the coffee mug. [ 4 ] Regarding the March 16, 2014 incident, the police found Mr. Daniels trying to back an unregistered motor vehicle out of a driveway next to a cabin, but he was stuck. He showed signs of impairment. The truck was still in “Drive” and rolling forward. They placed him under arrest for impaired care or control of a motor vehicle. They found a rifle in the box of the truck. It was not in a case and had no trigger guard. Mr. Daniels had no license to possess a firearm. The cabin had been broken into.
The victim had an alarm system, but the alarm did not sound because the telephone line had been cut. The entire inside of the cabin had been gone through. The police also noticed burnt clothes from the cabin had been used for traction for the vehicle. The police demanded a breath sample from Mr. Daniels. He complied, and blew .140 and .120. [ 5 ] Mr. Daniels says he had been drinking heavily and remembers little about the incident. He was driving a vehicle he was supposed to be fixing. He says he was looking for more alcohol in the cabin.
He is not sure where the rifle came from, but says it was not loaded. [ 6 ] There was no victim impact statement tendered for either incident. There is no information as to the value of the property damaged in the March 14 incident.
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENDER: [ 7 ] Mr. Daniels is a 48 year-old Cree man, a member of the Sturgeon Lake First Nation. According to the Pre-sentence Report, “The community of Sturgeon Lake is a community with social problems such as domestic violence, substance abuse, criminal activity, violence, and a high level of unemployment.” Mr. Daniels has lived in Sturgeon Lake all his life with a few exceptions. As a child, he resided in five different foster homes due to his parents’ alcoholism. When he was 16, he relocated to Hobbema, Alberta, to live with his mother. He returned to Sturgeon Lake a year later.
He attended residential school briefly as a child. It is unclear from the presentence report whether or not his parents attended residential school. [ 8 ] Mr. Daniels is currently single and has no children. He has a grade 10 education, which he received while serving a sentence at the Saskatchewan Penitentiary. He has a stable residence on reserve and works repairing vehicles. His neighbour, Mr. Peters, has an auto wrecking business and employs Mr. Daniels to strip vehicles and other metals for sale. Mr.
Daniels wants to create a towing service for Sturgeon Lake; a service he says is needed and could lead to a more stable income. Mr. Peters is supporting Mr. Daniels in his struggle to turn his life around. [ 9 ] Mr. Daniels has $3,175.00 in unpaid fines and $130.00 in unpaid provincial surcharges. He has begun participating in tree planting and garbage cleanup projects, and so far has logged 40 hours towards working off these fines. He also has outstanding restitution of $600.00. He has two functioning vehicles for sale. He hopes to pay off his restitution with the proceeds. [ 10 ] Mr.
Daniels also has a positive relationship with his father although it has been strained in the past. [ 11 ] Mr. Daniels admits to an alcohol addiction, which underlies his criminal history. In the past, he has started -- but never completed -- inpatient treatment for his addiction. Since the date of the index offences, however, he has completed treatment at the Cree Nations Treatment Haven and has remained sober. He has been abiding by his strict recognizance since March 20, 2014. [ 12 ] Mr. Daniels has a lengthy criminal record beginning in 1982, including 31 prior convictions for breaking and entering.
According to the PSR, the last of these occurred in 2006 and he received six months in jail. Since 2006, the only entry on his record is an impaired driving from 2010, for which he received a fine and a driving prohibition. [ 13 ] According to his CPIC record, only once in his long career was he ever sentenced to probation. In 1995, he received a sentence of six months incarceration consecutive to the penitentiary sentence he was serving, to be followed by 18 months of probation. It appears from the record that the probation was never served.
Apart from that one probation order, none of his sentences were aimed at rehabilitation. All his sentences have been fines or jail time. Despite his long career, there is no violence on his criminal record. It consists almost totally of property offences and system generated charges. [ 14 ] According to the Pre-sentence Report: Garrett’s attitude towards his offences is that he takes full responsibility for his actions and behaviour. He said he feels remorseful for his actions and behaviour because he is afraid he is going back to the way he used to be, not caring about how people feel.
The subject reported alcohol was a factor in his offences but does not blame alcohol for his current index convictions. Garrett’s self-management awareness is that he is able to recognize high risk situations and is able to identify realistic intervention strategies to deal with these situations. [ 15 ] Mr. Daniel’s risk for re-offending was assessed through administration of the Saskatchewan Primary Risk Assessment. He was assessed as being a medium risk to reoffend generally. This risk can be reduced by targeting his major risk factors: alcohol use and family relationships. Mr.
Daniels has completed inpatient alcohol treatment and has maintained sobriety while subject to his recognizance. He has reached out to his father and is rebuilding his relationship with him. He also has support in the community, especially from his neighbour, Mr. Peters. [ 16 ] The Pre-sentence Report goes on to say: The subject takes full responsibility for his actions and behaviour. He does not blame any outside factors for his action and behaviour. Garrett understands his alcohol use is a major contributing factor in his current charges.
From a risk reduction perspective, Garrett’s strengths are his recognition of his addiction problem, his desire for change, and his willingness to accept treatment. He has started this process by attending and completing a 35 day in-residence treatment program at Cree Nations Treatment Haven on June 18, 2014. The subject could continue one-on-one out-patient counselling with the Sturgeon Lake First Nation NNADAP. The subject appears to be manageable in the community with a case plan focusing on his criminogenic risk factors. POSITION OF CROWN AND DEFENCE: [ 17 ] The Crown takes the position that Mr.
Daniels should receive a global sentence of three to four years in a penitentiary. Crown points out his extensive record for property offences, as well as a previous conviction for pointing a firearm from 1990 and for possession of a weapon in 1992. She states that offenders of a similar age and criminal record have received sentences of three and four years. She refers to the SKCA Sentencing digests, specifically R v Pizzey , 2011 SKCA 102 , 375 Sask R 214 [ Pizzey ], R v Lavoie , 2008 SKCA (SentDig) 6 [ Lavoie ], and R v Carlston , 2003 SKCA 106 , 238 Sask R 183 [ Carlston ].
She says that a lesser sentence will not achieve the objectives of denunciation and deterrence. The Crown also seeks a DNA order, a
section 109 firearms prohibition and a two year driving prohibition. [ 18 ] Defence acknowledges that Mr. Daniels is facing the mandatory minimum sentence of 30 days for the over 80 charge. Although conceding that denunciation and deterrence are important sentencing objectives, she points out that Mr. Daniels has taken steps toward his own rehabilitation by completing treatment, and that these efforts should be recognized in the sentence. She points out the significant Gladue factors in his background, and the long gap in his criminal record.
She asks for a global sentence of 90 days or less to be served intermittently, to be combined with a probation order containing strict conditions including no alcohol and personal counselling. [ 19 ] Although neither counsel mentioned it, Mr. Daniels is also facing $1,200.00 in mandatory victim surcharges. PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF SENTENCING: [ 20 ] The fundamental principle of sentencing is proportionality. A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender [s. 718.1]. The punishment must fit the crime.
That is the outside limit within which a sentence must achieve the listed objectives. For example, jaywalking does not attract a life sentence, even though a fine may not sufficiently denounce the conduct. Similarly, murder can never attract a fine and probation, even though that might be most likely to rehabilitate the offender.
That punishment simply wouldn’t fit that crime. [ 21 ] Within the limits of proportionality, then, a sentence must be designed to achieve one or more of these goals (s. 718): To denounce unlawful conduct; To deter the offender and other persons from committing offences; To separate offenders from society, where necessary; To assist in rehabilitating offenders; To provide reparations for harm done to victims in the community; and To promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims and to the community.
[22] As well, within the constraint of proportionality, a sentence may be increased to reflect aggravating circumstances andreduced to reflect mitigating circumstances [s. 718.2(a)]. Other principles include parity, totality, and restraint [s. 718.2 (b), (c), and(d)]. Furthermore, as we are dealing with an Aboriginal offender, s. 718.2(
e) is of particular application.
That subsection states: All available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all offenders, withparticular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders. [23] In R v Gladue, (SCC), [1999] 1 SCR 688; 171 DLR (4th) 385; 133 CCC (3d) 385; 23 CR (5th) 197; 121BCAC 161; 238 NR 1; [1999] CarswellBC 778; AZ-50061963; JE 99-881; [1999] SCJ No 19 (QL); 198 WAC 161; [1999] 2 CNLR 252;[1999] ACS no 19; 41 WCB (2d) 402 [Gladue], and R v Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13 , [2012] 1 S.C.R. 433; 280 CCC (3d) 265; 91 CR(6th) 1; 318 BCAC 1; 428 NR 1; AZ-50841754; JE 2012-661; [2012] SCJ No 13 (QL); [2012] 2 CNLR 218; 288 OAC 224; 99 WCB(2d) 91 [Ipeelee], the Supreme Court of Canada directed sentencing judges to take judicial notice of the history of colonialism,displacement and residential schools, and how that history continues to translate into lower educational attainment, lower incomes, higherunemployment, higher rates of substance abuse and suicide, and higher levels of incarceration for Aboriginal peoples.
The Courtcautions against putting too much weight on the parity principle at the expense of undervaluing s. 718.2(e). Courts must use a differentmethod of analysis in determining a fit sentence for Aboriginal offenders. I must consider the unique systemic or background factorswhich may have played a
part in bringing Mr. Daniels before the courts. I must also consider the types of sentencing procedures andsanctions which may be appropriate in the circumstances for the offender because of his or her particular Aboriginal heritage orconnection. Gladue factors are also relevant to proportionality, specifically the “degree of responsibility of the offender.” ANALYSIS: 1. Proportionality [24] The first break and enter had a low impact on the victim and minimal monetary damage ($505.00), which the offender iswilling and able to repay. The degree of responsibility was low, as Mr. Daniels was lost and needed shelter.
Regarding the second breakand enter and mischief, I have no information about either the monetary damage suffered or the impact on the victim. There was noviolence. None of the statutory aggravating circumstances were present. Neither victim was present when the offence occurred. As foras the driving offences, the offender was stuck in the driveway and didn’t get very far. Regarding the firearm charge, there is nosuggestion that the accused intended to use this weapon in any way. Indeed, he says he doesn’t know how it got there. [25] Furthermore, I find that, given Mr.
Daniel’s background, specifically the Gladue factors, his degree of responsibility isreduced. Given the dysfunction of his home community, the instability of his foster home placements, the separation from family andcommunity, the role of residential schools in the fracturing of traditional parenting, and many other factors, it is not surprising that hemade bad choices, especially given his long-term alcohol problem. [26] In addition, Mr.
Daniels faces a mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment of 30 days, as well as mandatory victimsurcharges totaling $1,200.00, in addition to any restitution that may be ordered. He also faces a mandatory DNA order and a mandatorydriving prohibition on top of any other sentence I may give him. In order for the sentence to be proportionate, I must keep in mind theseadded constraints on his economic liberty and his security of the person.
Discretionary punishment should be tempered accordingly, lestthe total burden of punishment become disproportionate. [27] I find that a penitentiary sentence is disproportionate to the gravity of the offences and the degree of responsibility of theoffender. I find that a sentence of two years less a day would be the outer limit of a proportionate sentence. [28] Within that limit, I now must decide how best to achieve the objectives of sentencing, and how best to apply the principles oftotality, restraint, parity, and the Gladue factors. 2. Objectives a. Denunciation
[29] Every citizen rightly expects their property rights to be respected, even if they are not physically present to protect them. It isimportant to a just, peaceful, and safe society that courts not condone Mr. Daniel’s actions. The sentence must send the message that thisbehaviour will not be tolerated.
However, incarceration is not the only means to achieve denunciation (R v Proulx, 2000 SCC 5, [2000] 1 SCR 61; 182 DLR (4th) 1; [2000] 4 WWR 21; 140 CCC (3d) 449; 30 CR (5th) 1; 249 NR 201; [2000] CarswellMan32; AZ-50068947; JE 2000-264; REJB 2000-16192; [2000] SCJ No 6 (QL); 142 Man R (2d) 161; [2000] ACS no 6; 212 WAC 161; 44WCB (2d) 479; 49 MVR (3d) 163 ). b. Deterrence [30] I find that a lengthy jail sentence is not necessary to deter Mr. Daniels personally. This has been tried in the past and failed. Furthermore, he is taking steps to deal with the underlying causes of his criminal behaviour.
I also do not find that a lengthy jail sentenceis necessary to deter others of like mind. These offences were not premeditated. Mr. Daniels was intoxicated. An intoxicated individualtends to act on impulse, and not consider the penal consequences of his actions until much later, when sober. Any sentence I give Mr.Daniels would not deter other intoxicated individuals, other “like-minded individuals,” from acting on impulse. c. Separation from society [31] Given the steps Mr. Daniels has taken toward his own rehabilitation, I find that it is not necessary to separate him fromsociety. He is not violent.
Although he has a history of committing property offences, his last was some eight years ago. He seems tohave his alcohol problem under control, and a lengthy jail sentence is not necessary to protect the public. d. Rehabilitation [32] A lengthy jail sentence would likely frustrate any attempts at rehabilitation at this point in Mr. Daniel’s life. Rather, asentence, the bulk of which is served in the community, would be the most likely to result in his successful rehabilitation. He has alreadytaken steps in this regard, and he seems sincere in his desire to turn his life around. e. Reparations [33] Mr.
Daniels is able and willing to pay restitution of $505 to one of the victims. If he goes to jail for a lengthy period, that issimply not possible. f. Sense of responsibility and acknowledgment of harm done [34] Again, paying restitution would achieve this goal of sentencing. 3. Parity [35] A sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similarcircumstances. The Crown relies on three Court of Appeal entries in the Sentencing Digests: R v Pizzey, R v Lavoie, and R v Carlston.
In Lavoie, there are no written reasons, but the circumstances of the offence are quite different from those in the present case. InCarlston, the accused was being sentenced for 22 offences, including robbing churches during the Christmas season. There were otheraggravating factors in that case that simply are not present here. In Pizzey, the court distinguishes both Carlston and R v Mozylisky, 2009SKCA 94, 331 Sask R 303. In the latter case, Smith, J.A. affirmed a sentence of 25 months after a jury found the accused guilty of twobreak and enters. He had a record similar to Mr. Daniel’s.
In that case, the range of sentence for break and enter offences wasconfirmed as being between one and two years, although a court could go beyond that in exceptional circumstances. While those casesare helpful in applying the parity principle, judicially created guidelines do not constitute a de facto minimum sentence. That would beinconsistent with the fundamental principle of proportionality [R v Jacko, (2010, 2010 ONCA 452 , 256 CCC (3d) 113 (OntCA)]. Furthermore, none of the cases submitted deal with Aboriginal offenders.
[ 36 ] Sentencing is an individual process; no two offenders are identical, and no two offences are identical. Even two offenders co- accused in the same offence may have differing degrees of responsibility and so receive different sentences. As stated in Ipeelee at para. 78 : The interaction between s. 718.2(
e) and 718.2(b) – the parity principle – merits specific attention.
Section 718.2(
b) states that “a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances”. Similarity, however, is sometimes an elusory concept.... In practice, similarity is a matter of degree. No two offenders will come before the courts with the same background and experiences, having committed the same crime in the exact same circumstances.
Section 718.2(
b) simply requires that any disparity between sanctions for different offenders be justified. To the extent that Gladue will lead to different sanctions for Aboriginal offenders, those sanctions will be justified based on their unique circumstances – circumstances which are rationally related to the sentencing process. Courts must ensure that a formalistic approach to parity in sentencing does not undermine the remedial purpose of s. 718.2(e). ... It is true that on the surface imposing the same penalty for the nearly identical offence is only fair.
That might be closer to the truth in a society that is more equitable, more homogeneous and more cohesive than ours. But in an ethnically and culturally diverse society, there is a differential impact from the same treatment. Indeed, that has been recognized in the jurisprudence on equality rights under the Charter . Thus, there is a constitutional imperative to avoiding excessive concern about sentence disparity. [ 37 ] Furthermore, our Court of Appeal has said in the past that it is acceptable to depart from the range of sentences in certain circumstances.
If the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender demand it, the court can impose a sentence higher than the upper end of the range, up to the maximum allowed by the statute. Conversely, the court can impose a sentence lower than the bottom of the range in certain circumstances.
The sentencing judge may take a “calculated risk” and give a non-custodial sentence where the range would dictate a custodial one. [ R v Keepness , 2000 SKCA 28 ; [2000] SJ No 136 (QL); 189 Sask R 173, R v Laliberte , 2000 SKCA 27 ; [2000] 4 WWR 491; 143 CCC (3d) 503; 31 CR (5th) 1; [2000] CarswellSask 132; [2000] SJ No 138 (QL); 189 Sask R 190]
SUMMARY: [ 38 ] Mr. Daniels has been on a strict recognizance since March 20, after spending 5 days in custody. He has not breached his recognizance. He has completed inpatient treatment. He is working off his outstanding fines. He is able to pay restitution. It is not necessary to separate him from society. Even though he has a lengthy criminal record, Gladue and Ipeelee dictate that rehabilitation is always an issue with Aboriginal offenders. He can make reparations to at least one victim. He is a medium risk to re-offend, but that can be reduced by targeting his risk factors.
He has a long criminal record for similar offences, although the last conviction occurred in 2006. [ 39 ] I find that a global sentence of less than two years is appropriate. I am satisfied that service of a portion of the sentence in the community would not endanger the safety of the community, and is consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing. Mr.
Daniels has pled guilty to two counts of breaking and entering a “place,” not a “dwelling house.” It was not alleged in the information nor conceded in submissions that the two cabins were “dwelling houses” within the meaning of the Criminal Code . The maximum sentence for this offence is thus 10 years in prison. Therefore, a conditional sentence is available as a sentencing option. Mr. Daniels also faces a mandatory minimum sentence of 30 days, as well as $1,200.00 in victim fine surcharges, as well as several ancillary orders.
I therefore, sentence him as follows: Info 24447838: Count #2 [ s. 253(1) (b)] 30 days intermittent Count #3 [ s. 259(4) ] 5 days’ time deemed served Count #4 [ s. 348(1) (b)] 18 month CSO concurrent Count #5 [ s.430(4) ] 6 month CSO concurrent Count #8 [91(1)] 30 days intermittent consecutive
Info 35805049: Count #1 [ s. 348(1) (b)] 30 days intermittent consecutive [ 40 ] On counts 2 and 8 on information 24447838 and on count 1 on information 35805049, he will comply with the following conditions of probation when not in confinement during the period that the sentence is being served: 1. Keep the peace and be of good behaviour. 2. Appear before the court when required to do so by the court. 3. Notify the court or the probation officer in advance of any change of name or address, and promptly notify the court or the probation officer of any change of employment or occupation. 4.
He is to surrender himself into custody at the Prince Albert Correctional Centre by no later than 6:00 p.m. on Friday, November 14, 2014, and each Friday after that, and remain in custody following every Friday admission until 7:00 a.m. on Monday, until his sentence is completed. [ 41 ] The terms of the Conditional Sentence order are as follows: 1. Keep the peace and be of good behaviour. 2. Appear before the court when required to do so by the court. 3. Report to a supervisor within two working days and after that when required and in the manner directed by the supervisor or designate. 4.
Remain within the jurisdiction of the court (Saskatchewan) unless written permission to go outside that jurisdiction is obtained from the court or supervisor. 5. Notify the court or supervisor in advance of any change of name or address and promptly notify the court or supervisor of any change of employment or occupation. 6. Immediately give the clerk of the court his current address and phone number if available. 7.
Stay inside his residence from 11:00 pm each night to 6:00 am the next morning unless he has the prior written permission of the supervisor or the court, or unless he is serving the custodial portion of his sentence. 8. Not possess or consume alcohol. 9. Not enter or be in any place in which the main purpose is the sale of alcohol, such as bars or liquor stores. 10. Participate in an assessment and complete programming for addictions as told to do so by the supervisor. 11. Attend personal counselling as told to do so by the supervisor.
12. Seek and maintain employment, including self-employment, as directed by his supervisor. 13.
Make restitution by paying to the Provincial Court $505.00 in trust for Peggy Schultz by November 1, 2015. [ 42 ] On counts 2 and 3 on information 24447838, there will be a mandatory driving prohibition for a period of two years, as well as a licence suspension under The Traffic Safety Act . [ 43 ] On Count 4 on information 24447838 and on count 1 on information 35805049, there will be an order in Form 5.03 authorizing the taking of a DNA sample. [ 44 ] There will be a Victim Surcharge of $200 for each count, for a total of $1,200.00. Because of his other financial obligations, I give Mr.
Daniels time to pay these until November 30, 2016. [ 45 ] The Crown submits that there should be a mandatory firearms prohibition pursuant so s. 109. However, that
section reads:
(1) Where a person is convicted, or discharged under
section 730, of (
a) an indictable offence in the commission of which violence against a person was used, threatened or attempted and for which the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for ten years or more, (
b) an offence under subsection 85(1)..., subsection 85(2)..., 95(1)..., 99(1)..., 100(1)..., 102(1)..., 103(1)..., or
section 264..., (
c) an offence relating to the contravention of subsection 5(1) or (2), 6(1) or (2), or 7(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act , or (
d) an offence that involves, or the subject-matter of which is, a firearm, a crossbow, a prohibited weapon, a restricted weapon, a prohibited device, any ammunition, any prohibited ammunition or an explosive substance and, at the time of the offence, the person was prohibited by any order made under this Act or any other Act of Parliament from possessing any such thing, the court that sentences the person or directs that the person be discharged, as the case may be, shall, in addition to any other punishment that may be imposed for that offence or any other condition prescribed in the order of discharge, make an order prohibiting the person from possessing any firearm, cross-bow, prohibited weapon, restricted weapon, prohibited device, ammunition, prohibited ammunition and explosive substance during the period specified in the order as determined in accordance with subsection (2) or (3), as the case may be.
Subsection 109(1)(
a) does not apply, as no violence was used, threatened or attempted. Subsections (
b) and (
c) do not apply because Mr. Daniels has not committed any of the enumerated offences. Subsection (
d) does not apply because, although the subject matter of one of the offences was a firearm, there is no evidence before me that Mr. Daniels was subject to a prohibition order at the time. Although, the offence contrary to subsection 91(1) may give rise to a discretionary prohibition under s. 110(1)(b), in the circumstances of this case, I decline to so order. [ 46 ] Dated this 12 th day of November, A.D., 2014, at the City of Prince Albert, in the Province of Saskatchewan. ______________________ F. M. Daunt, J
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