2018 QCCQ 8870, 2018 QCCQ 8870

R. c. Law 2018 QCCQ 8870 COURT OF QUEBEC Criminal & Penal Division CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC DISTRICT OF MONTREAL N° : 500-01-171030-189 DATE : November 29 th 2018 ______________________________________________________________________ BEFORE THE HONOURABLE D. GALIATSATOS, J.C.Q. ______________________________________________________________________ HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN Prosecution v.

DARIO LAW Accused ______________________________________________________________________ REASONS FOR JUDGMENT ON THE VERDICT (rendered orally on November 20 th 2018) ______________________________________________________________________ INTRODUCTION [ 1 ] The accused is charged with one count of uttering death threats to Mr. Primus Milton, pursuant to

section 264.1(1) (

a) of the Criminal Code . The Crown elected to proceed by way of

summary conviction. [ 2 ] The trial took place on November 20 th 2018 and ended in the afternoon.

After reserving for a short time, I delivered oral reasons for judgment on the same day, omitting headings, footnotes, references to caselaw and certain sections for the sake of time. [1] This is the written version of those reasons; though they are somewhat more polished, their substance is the same. [2] [ 3 ] Essentially, what is alleged is that on March 17 th 2018, the accused threatened the complainant that he would shoot him the next time he saw him. [ 4 ] The accused testified in his own defence and denied the allegation. [ 5 ] The live issue at trial was credibility. [ 6 ] For the reasons that follow, the accused is found not guilty. [ 7 ] Several issues are not litigious in the case at bar. [ 8 ] For instance, it is not disputed that on March 17 th 2018, the accused uttered words to the complainant.

Nor is it disputed that said words were insulting and proffered for that very purpose. Moreover, subject to a partial recanting by the accused in cross- examination, [3] it is admitted that the words were said loud enough to be heard over the blaring music that was playing. In fact, that was precisely the point: by his own account under oath, the accused explained that he wanted to insult the complainant and let him know what he thought of him. [ 9 ] Most importantly, the applicable legal principles (as they relate to the substantive offence charged) are not the source of any serious debate.

Stated otherwise, if the words “Yo, pussy! I don’t like you. Next time I see you, I will shoot you!” were actually uttered, combined with: - The fact that the accused was inches away from the complainant while poking him and gesturing at something in his pocket, and - The history of animosity and disdain by the accused for the complainant,

the Court would have no trouble concluding that the essential elements of the offence set out at s. 264.1(1) C.C. were be established, applying the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court of Canada in the leading cases of R. v. Clemente , [4] R. v. McCraw [5] and R. v. McRae . [6] In the circumstances, these words would obviously be objectively threatening and would lead to the inescapable inference that they were uttered with the aim of intimidating Mr. Milton. [ 10 ] But in the Court’s view, this case is not about the law, per se . It is about the facts: what was said and how it was said. THE EVIDENCE [ 11 ] Given the straightforward nature of the allegations, a short

summary of the evidence suffices. [ 12 ] The Crown and defence each produced only one witness: the complainant and the accused. Their versions were almost diametrically opposed. Testimony of the complainant [ 13 ] Both the accused and Mr. Milton hail from Trinidad and Tobago. They met when Mr. Milton first immigrated to Montreal in the late nineties. At the time, they had several mutual friends and saw each other daily as they attended school together. They knew each other closely and Mr.

Milton considered the accused to be a friend. [ 14 ] Around the year 2002, the complainant started distancing himself from the accused since the latter started to associate with shady characters and got involved in questionable behaviour. In fact, many of their mutual friends also engaged in disreputable conduct.

The complainant thus chose “to follow a different path” and remove himself from the group. [ 15 ] Since then, he saw the accused only sporadically, randomly at various community events. [ 16 ] Incidentally, in the last decade, the complainant had become actively involved in Montreal’s West-Indian community, hosting a radio-show and writing in their cultural newspaper. [ 17 ] In terms of how the relationship between the two men evolved since their studies, the complainant explained that when they crossed paths, the accused always made negative comments about him.

He could not explain why other than to speculate that the accused might have been jealous about the straight path he took, or otherwise felt like the complainant was looking down on him. He added that the accused had a drinking problem that may have contributed to his behaviour during their encounters. [ 18 ] On March 17 th 2018, [7] Mr. Milton was volunteering as a DJ at a cultural community gathering taking place at a reception hall. His DJ booth was at the corner of the room near the stage.

Approximately 60 partygoers took in the festivities, including several children. [ 19 ] He first saw the accused at around 8:00pm from across the room, but nothing noteworthy happened at that time. Much later, at around 11:40pm as the event was winding down, while playing his music, he looked up and was surprised to see the accused approach him from his left-hand side. [ 20 ] At that moment, the accused had his hand in his pocket, gestured towards it, poked the complainant with something and approached close enough to whisper: “Yo, pussy! I don’t like you. Next time I see you, I will shoot you!”.

The accused’s breath smelled of alcohol and he slurred his words. [ 21 ] According to the complainant, no one else was close enough to hear what was said. Asked how he felt at that moment, he answered that he was “shocked and upset… I was more annoyed too”, adding that “it was kind of getting overbearing”.

The last remark was a reference to the many previous “negative comments” the accused had made in the past. [ 22 ] After making the threat, the accused immediately turned and left the building without further incident. [ 23 ] The complainant did not call the police, claiming this was due to his state of shock and disbelief. It was only on Monday, after a full day’s work, that Mr. Milton decided to report the incident to the authorities. He went to his neighbourhood police station, only to find it closed. He thus returned the following day, where he eventually met with the sergeant on duty.

According to the complainant, the police officer seemed dismissive of his concerns and expressed that he should have filed the complaint instantly after the event. This was enough to discourage Mr. Milton from pursuing the matter further. [ 24 ] It was only a full 3 weeks later that he formally pressed charges. After his car had been vandalized, police asked him if he suspected anyone as the perpetrator or if anyone had a bone to pick with him. It was then that Mr. Milton flagged the accused to the police, newly motivated to formally pursue the matter.

As he stated, the damage to his car gave him the “extra push” to press charges regarding the previous death threat. [ 25 ] In cross-examination, he acknowledged that there were slight differences between what he recounted in his testimony in chief and what he reported to the police. For instance, while he described the words “Yo! Pussy” in his testimony, he told police officers that the accused had said “Yo!

Pussy-hole”. [8] Similarly, instead of “I don’t like you”, he told the police that the accused had said “I hate your fucking ass!”. [ 26 ] Asked if he was merely approximating or paraphrasing the words spoken by the accused (rather than describe the exact words), the complainant answered that “that was the meaning of what he told me”, to the best of his recollection. [ 27 ] Finally, he was asked in cross-examination if he occasionally expressed his personal views on his radio show regarding current events and political issues in Trinidad which might have provoked criticism – or strong reactions – from within the community.

He first

responded that he only gave his views on music; when pressed further, he acknowledged somewhat reluctantly that his views as expressed in the newspapers might have garnered him some criticism. [9] Testimony of the accused [ 28 ] The accused confirmed that the two men saw each other daily during their studies. In fact, they had been “partners in crime”, [10] along with “other associates”. In the last 10 years, he only saw the complainant twice a year. [ 29 ] He acknowledged being at the Caribbean party on March 17 th 2018. Upon arriving, he saw Mr.

Milton who was spinning records at the DJ booth. [ 30 ] The accused denied having ever been near him. He certainly denied having threatened him in any way and similarly denied having poked him. [ 31 ] Instead, he admitted that he approached and called him a pussy-hole, but from a distance. “That was it”, claimed the accused. He immediately left. [ 32 ] Moreover, he explained that it was impossible for him to approach the complainant since the latter was in a “box” or a “cube”, words used to describe the DJ booth area.

Further questioning revealed that the DJ equipment was on tables shaped in the form of a “U”, much like the judge’s desk in the courtroom. The open (or back) side of the “U” was against the wall. As such, according to the accused, it was impossible to access Mr. Milton physically. [ 33 ] His examination in chief was quite brief. Conversely, his cross-examination was extensive and revealed the following points. [ 34 ] First, he acknowledged that despite the “U” shape of the tables, it was possible for the DJ to exit from the side, as there was an opening left for that purpose.

In fact, such an observation was most obvious to the Court. No one, including the accused, suggested that the complainant was trapped inside the tables or had to jump over them to exit. Thus, similarly, the same can be said about the accused being able to go inside and meet the complainant. [ 35 ] Second, at the start of his cross-examination, the accused admitted that the music was very loud in the reception hall. While he did not scream, he did speak loud enough for his voice to carry over the music and for Mr.

Milton to hear him. [ 36 ] Firmly and unapologetically (almost proudly), the accused boasted to the Court: I called him a pussy. A pussy-hole. Because that’s what he is. That’s his mentality. That’s how he acts. He’s a prick, you know, a prick. Some people are pricks. [ 37 ] After the insult, he did not remember how the complainant reacted. Instead, he simply turned around and walked out of the building. THE LAW [ 38 ] The Court’s sole focus is on whether or not the threat to shoot Mr. Milton was made.

The rest of the words alleged (and admitted), while being deplorable, do not attract criminal liability; society’s condemnation of such language comes from other sources. Alas, in law, it is the prerogative of every Canadian to spew crude epithets, rude remarks or wildly offensive insults towards his fellow citizens. [ 39 ] It is trite law that Mr. Law, like every other person charged with a crime, is presumed to be innocent, unless and until the Crown has proven his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Crown bears the burden of proof throughout the entire trial, from beginning to end.

The accused does not have to present evidence or prove anything. Moreover, it is not enough for the Court to believe that he is probably or likely guilty. Conversely, proof establishing absolute certainty is not required of the Crown, nor may the doubt be imaginary, frivolous or irrational. [11] Such a burden would be nearly impossible to meet. Nevertheless, the reasonable doubt standard falls much closer to absolute certainty than to proof on a balance of probabilities. [12] [ 40 ] Reasonable doubt must stem from reason and common sense and is logically connected to the evidence or lack thereof.

It cannot be based upon sympathy, pity or prejudice. [13] Finally, it cannot be grounded in hypotheticals, speculation or fanciful conjecture. [14] [ 41 ] As mentioned above, credibility is at the heart of this case. The Court is confronted with conflicting evidence, with both witnesses offering diametrically opposed versions. [ 42 ] Counsel both correctly submit that the Court must carefully avoid engaging in a “credibility contest”. In other words, a criminal allegation cannot be resolved by simply choosing between conflicting accounts.

Doing so would shift the burden of proof to the accused or lower the standard of proof resting with the Crown, both of which are scrupulously prohibited. [15] [ 43 ] Similarly, a Court cannot dismiss the credibility of an accused on the basis that it finds the complainant credible.

[ 44 ] Finally, even where the Court flatly rejects the accused’s evidence as being untruthful, that, in and of itself, does not establish guilt. Mere disbelief of the accused does not equate to guilt. At most, it simply implies that the defence is completely rejected – a situation akin to cases where no exculpatory evidence had ever been adduced.

The Court’s analysis must then continue by assessing whether, on the evidence that it accepts, the Crown has proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [16] After all, a reasonable doubt may arise independently from the Crown’s evidence. [17] [ 45 ] These basic rules all flow from the elementary principle of the presumption of innocence in criminal matters. [ 46 ] Of course, where credibility is a live issue, the accused’s testimony must be examined in light of the evidence as a whole. As the Supreme Court of Canada expressed in R. v.

MacKenzie : "an accused's version of events is entitled to the benefit of the doubt as against a competing version, providing the comparison is made having due regard to all the evidence". [18] The evidence heard at a trial is not to be compartmentalized in watertight partitions, to be assessed in a piecemeal fashion. [ 47 ] Thus, the accused is not entitled to having his version analyzed in isolation first, with the rest of the evidence being relegated to the subsequent steps of the assessment.

If that were the case, every accused presenting a contradictory and exculpatory version would be almost automatically acquitted, which cannot be endorsed as being the state of the law. Rather, the Court must consider all the evidence at each step, even in he-said-she-said cases where only one witness is heard by each side. [19] [ 48 ] Ultimately, I have instructed myself to apply the law with respect to credibility as inspired by the framework proposed by Cory J. in R. v.

W.(D.) . [20] However, in addition to the traditional tripartite incarnation of the test, I rely heavily on a slightly more detailed set of propositions, as listed by Paciocco J.A. in his

article Doubt about Doubt: Coping with R. v. W.(D.) and Credibility Assessment . [21] These propositions not only respect the spirit and underlying purpose of W.(D.) , but they update the 3-step methodology following developments in the appellate caselaw, all of which are beneficial to the accused: (

i) The criminal trial cannot properly be resolved by deciding which conflicting version of events is preferred; (ii) A Court that believes evidence that is inconsistent with the guilt of the accused must acquit; (iii) Even if the Court does not entirely believe evidence inconsistent with guilt, if the Court is left unsure whether that evidence is true, there is a reasonable doubt and an acquittal must follow; (iv) Even where the Court entirely disbelieves evidence inconsistent with guilt, the mere rejection of that evidence does not prove guilt; (

v) Even where the Court entirely disbelieves the evidence inconsistent with guilt, the accused should not be convicted unless the evidence that is given credit proves the accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. ANALYSIS [ 49 ] In the case at bar, does the Court believe the accused on the elements of his version inconsistent with guilt? [ 50 ] The answer is a resounding “no”. For the following reasons, the Court does not believe the accused.

Instead, it finds his version patently unrealistic on many levels and inherently unbelievable. [ 51 ] To his credit, the accused did not attempt to depict himself in a positive light before the Court. Quite the contrary, he was candidly steadfast in his testimony that the complainant was/is a pussy-hole. Nevertheless, his denial that he threatened him does not withstand scrutiny.

a) The spontaneous insult without any prior history between the men [ 52 ] Late in his cross-examination, the accused claimed that he had not spoken to the complainant at all in the last 10 years, or have any other interaction with him. Yet, he admitted seeing him roughly twice a year. [ 53 ] This is in sharp contrast with Mr. Milton’s version, who claimed they saw each other at various events, during which the accused always spoke to him. [ 54 ] Instead, the accused claimed that when he saw him on March 17 th 2018, “it was just random” that he spontaneously decided to approach and insult him.

He denied ever having spoken to him, rather claiming that in the past, “I’d pass him straight, like a bus” without any interaction whatsoever between the two men. [ 55 ] In such circumstances, the Court finds it illogical that he would, completely out of context and unprovoked (by his own admission), go out of his way to approach Mr. Milton and rudely insult him that way.

b) The tone of voice used to deliver the insult [ 56 ] As mentioned above, the accused first admitted in cross-examination having spoken very loud in order for the insult to be heard over the music. [ 57 ] However, at the end of his cross-examination, [22] he offered a very different account. According to the accused, his tone of voice was cool, calm and collected, devoid of any aggressiveness. He then repeated several times that the tone of voice used to deliver the insult was the same tone of voice he was using to testify.

[ 58 ] Having heard and seen the accused testify, the Court notes that his tone of voice on the stand was extremely low and calm, almost quiet and docile. [23] [ 59 ] In addition to having contradicted himself about the tone used, it is patently unrealistic that the accused would use such a gentle tone of voice. First, to state the obvious, if his [admitted] intention was that the insult be heard by Mr.

Milton over the music, using such a gentle and low voice would be counterintuitive. [24] Second, it would be equally illogical to use such a quiet and gentle tone while calling someone he disliked a pussy-hole. [ 60 ] This affects the credibility of the accused, as he clearly tried to minimize the scope of his words and their impact.

c) The accused’s consumption of alcohol [ 61 ] The accused raised his alcohol consumption himself in his cross-examination, volunteering – unsolicited – “to be honest, I had a few drinks in my system”. [ 62 ] He thus explicitly admitted having had less self-restraint due to his consumption. [ 63 ] When asked, he claimed not to remember how much he had to drink, or even what type of drinks he had. [25] He then asserted that this level of intoxication was at a “3/10”, which is rather minimal. [ 64 ] This plainly contradicts his earlier answer. [ 65 ] Moreover, the Court disbelieves that the accused could not remember what type of drinks he even had, though he somehow remembers it was vodka and supposedly vividly remembers the words he uttered to the complainant. [26]

d) The reason the accused disliked the complainant [ 66 ] When questioned about the reasons that he disliked the complainant, the accused remained elusive. In and of itself, this appeared strange to the Court. [ 67 ] Given the fact that the accused was so quick to openly and firmly call Mr.

Milton a pussy-hole or a prick in open Court, his reluctance to tell the Court why makes little sense, other than to suggest that the accused is not being full and frank about their past relationship and the source of his existing animus. [ 68 ] When pressed by the Crown as to the reasons why he hated the complainant (which incidentally was an obvious and foreseeable question), the accused became visibly annoyed and impatient. [ 69 ] He eventually answered, somewhat vaguely, that he disliked Mr. Milton because when the latter had DJ’d at events in the past, he always made “comments” on the microphone.

Pressed again for details regarding said troublesome comments, the accused answered that the complainant “always” called people faggots and disrespected them on the mic, adding that such comments “were not right” and he disapproved of them. [ 70 ] The Court understood these answers as the accused claiming he strongly disapproved of the use of unacceptable homophobic slurs. [ 71 ] This portion of his testimony was particularly incredible.

Let us recall, by his own admission under oath, that the accused called the complainant a pussy-hole, which is itself an emasculating term with sexist origins and an arguably homophobic connotation. A case of the pot calling the kettle black, if ever there was one. [27] In the common-day English vernacular, the lewd insults “pussy”, “pussy- hole” and “faggot” are often used interchangeably. All take aim at the recipient’s manhood. [28] [ 72 ] By claiming to be offended by use of homophobic comments, the accused was clearly attempting to cast himself in a good light before the Court. He failed.

e) The presence of children [ 73 ] The accused expressed that he would never have made such a death threat in the presence of children on the scene. [ 74 ] However, if Mr. Milton is believed, the death threat was made from inches away with no one else close enough to hear it. [ 75 ] Moreover, insofar as the accused claimed to be mindful of the children’s sensibilities, this did not make him think twice before loudly shouting a vulgar obscenity to the complainant. [ 76 ] Thus, the accused’s supposed concern for the children seemed convenient and contrived.

f) The accused’s criminal record [ 77 ] The accused acknowledged having several related prior convictions, many of which are recent. In 2017, he received a 120-day jail sentence for uttering death threats (s. 264.1 C.C. ) in a domestic violence setting, in addition to a 3-year probation order. He was also convicted of uttering death threats in 2015 in a separate incident. That same year, he was convicted of fraud (s. 380 C.C. ) and violating a firearms prohibition (s. 117.01 C.C. ). Finally, he was convicted in 2003 of robbery and what he described as “possession of ammunition”.

[ 78 ] The Court has considered them as they relate to the accused’s credibility. However, I have instructed myself to limit my reasoning to that permitted by s. 12 of the Canada Evidence Act , that is: the permissible inference that a person with persistent prior criminal convictions may be seen as less credible and trustworthy, as well as having less respect for the truth and for his oath, which touches on his testimonial reliability. [29] [ 79 ]

Section 12 C.E.A. applies to any criminal offence and is in no way limited to a finite category of convictions. [30] Having said that, the impact of such convictions on the accused’s credibility will be greater when they involve so-called crimes of dishonesty, which are inherently probative of deception. [31] [ 80 ] Moreover, the Court has specifically instructed itself to not consider the prior convictions as indicative of guilt, propensity to commit crimes or bad character. [32] I am therefore particularly cautious with respect to the convictions for uttering threats.

Since they are of a similar nature, the Court is very much alive to the danger of subconscious propensity reasoning [33] and has strived to steer clear of that path. [ 81 ] As such, while all the convictions are relevant, the most impactful in the Court’s analysis are those for fraud and breaching his weapons prohibition. [ 82 ] For all these reasons, the Court does not believe the accused. [ 83 ] Having said that, while I clearly disbelieve the explanations offered by the accused, that does not settle the issue.

Notwithstanding this finding, as required by the authorities, the Court’s analysis must continue. [ 84 ] Returning to propositions 2, 3 and 4 in Paciocco J.A.’s list, nothing in the defence (considered with the evidence as a whole) raises a doubt in the mind of the Court.

g) Did the complainant’s version establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt? [ 85 ] Mr. Milton’s account was not corroborated by anyone. I note that this is no way fatal, as corroboration is not required for a complainant’s account to be believed by the Court. [34] It is however a relevant consideration in the Court’s assessment of the evidence as a whole. [ 86 ] The Court raises several sources of concern in Mr. Milton’s evidence. [ 87 ] Some are minor, while others are more troubling. [ 88 ] Similarly, some go to his reliability, while others raise concerns about his credibility.

The content of the words uttered by the accused [ 89 ] Human beings are not expected to be robots or digital tape recorders. This is especially so when they are on the receiving end of verbal death threats – something that is inherently emotional, sometimes traumatic. Logic dictates that they may not remember exactly what was said to them. [ 90 ] In fact, in R. v. Meikle , the British Columbia Court of Appeal upheld a conviction for uttering threats despite the fact that the complainant had been uncertain about the exact words spoken. [35] [ 91 ] On this specific point, I agree with Porter J. in R. v.

Taylor , in which he expressed that “it is the concept, or idea, of the threat, and not the exact words used, which constitute the offence of uttering threats… it is the meaning conveyed by the words that is important. The exact words need not be proven, as long as the intended meaning of the threat is clear”. [36] [ 92 ] As such, in the case at bar, while defence counsel correctly points out that Mr. Milton’s version in examination in chief slightly differed from the version given to the police officers (some 3 weeks after the incident), that is not fatal to the charge.

For instance, as the Court suggested during the submissions, the distinction between “pussy” and “pussy-hole” can fairly be described as a minor, almost insignificant detail. The same can be said of the distinction between “I don’t like you” and “I hate your fucking ass”.

While it is less minor than the previous one – and not insignificant –, it is understandable to a certain extent. [ 93 ] What is more concerning to the Court is the complainant’s assertion that he was paraphrasing to the best of his recollection, trying to transmit the meaning of what was said to him, but 3 weeks later to police. [ 94 ] That a witness paraphrases the words of the accused will not always be problematic. Its impact will vary from case to case, depending on the circumstances. [ 95 ] Let us recall that here, the formal complaint was made 3 weeks later.

To paraphrase or sum up what was said 3 weeks after an event is clearly not the same as a victim paraphrasing or summing up in a written statement to police 24 hours after the event. The passage of time affects the reliability of the witness’ paraphrasing. The suggestion that he did not see the accused approaching before the threat [ 96 ] Another source of concern for the Court is the complainant’s assertion that he never saw the accused coming. [ 97 ] On this specific matter, the Court agrees with defence counsel. [ 98 ] Even if Mr.

Milton’s attention was forward-looking, or on his turntables, the location of his booth at the corner of the room was such that it is highly unlikely from a logical standpoint that he would not see the accused (even in his peripheral vision) until he crept

next to him. [ 99 ] The Court cannot accept that assertion. The implications of this finding are troubling: why would the complainant not want to admit that he saw the accused coming? Without delving into speculation, his reluctance seems indicative that there had been some contact (visual, verbal, gestures, etc.) between the two men before the words were uttered. The delay in reporting [ 100 ] This is the most problematic aspect of the complainant’s account. [ 101 ] The Court states from the outset that the fact that he made his formal complaint only after his car was vandalized does not lessen his credibility.

In fact, the police officers specifically asked him whom he might have suspected as the culprit. Thus, we cannot fault him for answering their question. [ 102 ] The Court’s concern is quite different. [ 103 ] Mr. Milton claimed that the accused threatened to shoot him the next time he saw him. To that end, the accused even poked him physically, suggesting he was armed. Furthermore, the complainant knew that the accused was a “trouble maker” which was specifically why he cut ties with him. Then the accused left the building; for all Mr.

Milton knew, the accused might have been waiting for him outside. [ 104 ] In such circumstances, if he was threatened with death in the presence of children by an apparently armed man, it seems unfathomable that he would not promptly call 9-1-1 that night. Similarly, it seems equally incredible that he would not immediately go to the police station the following morning. [ 105 ] Instead, he claims to have waited for the following Monday, after work no less .

And where he found the police station closed, this still did not prompt him to call 9-1-1. [ 106 ] This delay in reporting, in the circumstances of the case, greatly affects the credibility of his account. [ 107 ] The Court is sensitive to the fact that different victims react in different ways to various crimes. For that reason, generalizations regarding victim behaviour post-offence are sometimes not helpful and will most certainly depend on the circumstances of each case. Caution will always be prudent.

However, what is alleged here is not a sex crime, where such concerns are prevalent and where a significant body of caselaw warns against prohibited impermissible stereotypes about how a victim of sexual abuse should behave. [37] [ 108 ] The case at bar is far simpler: it is an allegation of a death threat, which in no way triggers sexual stereotypes that the courts strive to avoid. In the circumstances, I believe it is entirely appropriate to consider the fact that the complainant did not report the supposedly serious death threat promptly.

It is a matter of common sense. [ 109 ] In light of the foregoing, has the prosecution succeeded in satisfying the Court beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused threatened that he would shoot Mr. Milton? [ 110 ] I answer in the negative. The Court is left with a reasonable doubt. CONCLUSION The accused is found not guilty of the charge contained in the information. __________________________________ D. Galiatsatos, J.C.Q.

M e Marie-Jeanne Gratton Counsel for the Crown M e Charles Montpetit Counsel for the accused Hearing date: November 20 th 2018