R. v. Green, 2022 BCPC 32

Citation: R. v. Green 2022 BCPC 0032 Date: 20220217 File No: 43659-1 Registry: Duncan IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA REGINA v. CLARKE EARL GREEN ORAL REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE J.P. MACCARTHY Counsel for the Crown: S. Meijers Counsel for the Accused: N. Brooks Place of Hearing: Duncan , B.C. Date of Hearing: November 18, 2021 and February 17, 2022 Date of Judgment: February 17, 2022

A Corrigendum was released by the Court on February 17, 2022. The corrections have been made to the text and theCorrigendum is appended to this document. Introduction [1] THE COURT: Clarke Earl Greene has been charged on Information 43659-1 that on or about the 12th day of January, 2021, ator near Ladysmith, in the Province of British Columbia, that he did drive a motor vehicle on a highway or industrial road, knowing thathe was prohibited from driving a motor vehicle.

That offence is contrary to s. 251(4) of the Motor Vehicle Act, and contrary to s. 95(1) ofthe Motor Vehicle Act. [2] Clarke Earl Greene, (hereinafter referred to as the "Defendant") has admitted that he was driving on the offence date of January12, 2021, but he alleges that he held a valid Ontario driver's licence which permitted him to drive in the Province of British Columbia.Hence, this matter went to trial. The task of this court is to determine whether the Crown has proven this offence beyond a reasonabledoubt.

Presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt [3] The obligation is upon the Crown to prove all elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt. If that occurs then, and onlythen, can the court convict the accused person. Where a reasonable doubt exists on any element of the offence charged, the accused mustbe acquitted. The burden of proof rests upon the prosecution throughout the trial and never shifts to the accused person. [4] Reasonable doubt is not an imaginary or frivolous doubt, nor is it based upon sympathy or prejudice.

Reasonable doubt is adoubt based on reason and common sense which must logically be derived from the evidence or absence of evidence. [5] The Crown must prove more than probable guilt. However, reasonable doubt does not involve a proof to an absolute standard,since that would be an impossibly high standard. The standard of reasonable doubt falls much closer to absolute certainty than to proofon a balance of probabilities. (See R. v. Lifchus, (S.C.C.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 320, and see R. v. Starr, 2000 SCC 40, [2000] S.C.C. 40 , [2000] 2 S.C.R. 144).

The W.(D.) formulation [6] I must instruct myself that in the trial of criminal matters and on matters in the nature of that presently before me that areprosecuted under the Motor Vehicle Act, it is not a question of which witness's evidence or version of the events I believe, but ratherwhether, on the totality of the evidence, Crown has proven each essential element of each offence beyond a reasonable doubt. [7] Where there is evidence of the accused that raises a defence, as in the case in this matter, I must further instruct myself, and Imust apply to this evidence the well-known process of analysis set out in R. v.

W.(D.), (S.C.C.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742,found at paragraph 28. [8] First, if I believe the evidence of the accused, obviously I must acquit. Secondly, if I do not believe the testimony of theaccused, but I am left in a reasonable doubt by it, I must acquit. Third, even if I am not left in doubt on the evidence of the accused, Imust ask myself whether, on the basis of the evidence which I do accept, I am convinced beyond a reasonable doubt by that evidence ofthe guilt of the accused. [9] I am also guided by the following comments of the Prince Edward Island Court of Appeal in R. v. J.M.H, 2012 PECA 6, [2012]P.E.I.J.

No. 10, at paragraphs 30 to 31: [30] Our courts have stated that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not satisfied by belief of a complainant coupled with disbelief ofan accused. Correct application of the principle in W.(D.) involves going on from step one to step two to analyze and consider whetherthat evidence nevertheless raises a reasonable doubt, and if not, then going on to step three and determining whether the evidence takenas a whole raises a reasonable doubt (R. v. Ellis, 2006 PESCAD 25, at ¶18).

Proper application of the third step involves moving thefocus from the evidence of the accused to the Crown's evidence and assessing it in its own right (in relation to all the evidence) on thecriteria of coherency, reliability, credibility. This goes toward the issue of whether the Crown has satisfied the burden of bringingevidence that can prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (R. v. S.F., 2007 PESCAD 17, at ¶28-31). The Supreme Court of Canadarecently stated in R. v.

J.H.S., 2008 SCC 30, at ¶8, that a series of decisions has affirmed and reaffirmed that where credibility is a centralissue in a jury trial, the judge must explain the relationship between the assessment of credibility and the Crown's ultimate burden toprove the guilt of the accused to the criminal standard. [31] The third step in W.(D.) stresses that the onus is on the Crown to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. It ispossible that the trial judge would disbelieve the accused but still find the Crown had not proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Thekey is whether the correct burden and standard of proof were applied; not what words were used in applying them (R. v. C.L.Y., 2008SCC 2 at ¶7). [10] The supplemental test enunciated by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in R. v. C.W.H., [1991] B.C.J. No. 2735, adds a fourthstep to the W.(D.) analysis; namely, if, after consideration of all the evidence, the court is unable to decide whom to believe with respectto the central issue in a prosecution, then the accused must be acquitted. Josiah Wood, J.A., (as he then was) suggests that logically thisought to be the second in order in the W.(D.) analysis.

[11] It is also important to instruct myself that the W.(D.) model is not intended to be a precise formulation to be used at all times or toachieve a level of sanctity or immutable perfection. Once again, I must instruct myself on the main point that the burden never shiftsfrom Crown to prove every element of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt. The lack of credibility on the part of the accused does notequate to proof of his or her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (See R. v. S.(J.H.), 2008 SCC 30 , [2008] 2 S.C.R. 152.) [12] In this matter, I have heard evidence that is conflicting on material matters.

Therefore, I must assess the credibility of thewitnesses who provided this conflicting evidence. In doing so, I must weigh all of the evidence and, in so weighing the evidence, I mayreject or accept some or all of the witnesses' testimony, after having taken into account a multitude of factors which include, but are notlimited to, appearance or demeanour, ability to perceive, ability to recall, motivation, probability or plausibility, and the internal orexternal consistency.

I must also direct myself that even honest witnesses may be mistaken in their evidence or have errors ofrecollection, or may present upon the stand in a nervous or uncertain manner for reasons unrelated to the truthfulness of their testimony. [13] It is an error in cases of contradictory evidence to simply weigh the evidence of one witness against the evidence of another. (SeeR. v. Jackson, 2007 BCSC 636; see also R. v. Mann, [2010] A.J. No. 1094).

Assessing credibility and reliability of witnesses [14] As previously mentioned, here I have heard evidence that is conflicting on material matters regarding the alleged offence. I mustassess the credibility and reliability of those witnesses who have provided this conflicting evidence. [15] In doing so, the testimony of each of the witnesses can be considered from three perspectives:

a) their truthfulness, whether they are trying to tell the truth or intentionally lying when testifying;

b) their objectivity, whether they have been influenced by assumptions or emotions which may affect the accuracy of their perceptions;and

c) the accuracy of their observations, their abilities to observe, remember and communicate accurately. [16] In the decision of R. v.

Cuhna, 2015 BCPC 60 at paragraphs 5 and 6, the Honourable Judge Merrick provides a useful review ofthe factors to be considered when assessing the testimony of a witness from these three perspectives: Truthfulness [17] Relevant factors for truthfulness include previous inconsistent statements or occasions on which the witness has been untruthful;inconsistences in testimony during direct examination and cross-examination; reliable evidence that conflicts with the testimony of thewitness, and the attitude and the demeanour of the witness.

However, when considering demeanour, it is important to consider allpossible explanations for the witness's attitude and to be sensitive to individual and cultural factors which may affect demeanour. Objectivity [18] When assessing a witness's objectivity, it is important to bear in mind that such objectivity may be influenced by the witness'sexpectations, the assumptions of unproven facts, or by subsequent events. Accuracy [19] Factors that may assess the accuracy of a witness's testimony include the attentiveness of a witness during the period ofobservation and the circumstances of the witness's observation.

The reasons for recalling an event and the length of time betweenwitnessing an event and providing testimony about it may affect the accuracy of the witness's testimony and, hence, his reliability. Somewitnesses may have difficulty communicating their evidence clearly due to factors such as nervousness. The Statutory Framework [20] The applicable provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act, R.S.B.C 1996, c. 318 are as follows: Driving while prohibited 95 (1)A person who drives a motor vehicle on a highway or industrial road knowing that (

a) he or she is prohibited from driving a motor vehicle under

section 91, 92, 93, 94.2, 215, 215.43 or 251(4). . . commits an offence and is liable, (

c) on a first conviction, to a fine of not less than $500 and not more than $2 000 or to imprisonment for not more than 6 months, or toboth, and (

d) on a subsequent conviction, regardless of when the contravention occurred, to a fine of not less than $500 and not more than $2 000and to imprisonment for not less than 14 days and not more than one year.

(2) If a person is charged with an offence under subsection (1) that pertains to a prohibition under

section 91 or 215, the court hearing thecharge may admit into evidence (

a) a certificate of the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia, or

(

b) a certificate of the superintendent dated before the date this paragraph comes into force stating the information required by subsection (4) and if the certificate is admitted into evidence it is proof that the defendant had knowledge of the prohibition in effect at the time of the alleged offence.

(3) If a person is charged with an offence under subsection (1) that pertains to a prohibition under

section 92, 93, 94.2, 215.43 or 251 (4) , the court hearing the charge may admit into evidence a certificate of the superintendent stating the information required by subsection (4), and if the certificate of the superintendent is admitted into evidence, it is proof that the defendant had knowledge of the prohibition in effect at the time of the alleged offence.

(4) If a person is charged with an offence under subsection (1), the certificate referred to in subsection (2) or (3), as the case may be, must state that the prohibition was in effect on the date of the alleged offence and that the records of the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia or the superintendent, as the case may be, (

a) show that a notice of the prohibition was mailed by registered mail or certified mail to the person at the person's most recent address recorded in the records of the corporation and that the corporation or superintendent subsequently received a copy of a confirmation of delivery provided by Canada Post showing a recipient's signature that, from a comparison with the signature on the records of the corporation, appears to be that of the person to whom the notice . . . was sent, (b) `contain a document that (

i) indicates that the person so charged (

A) has acknowledged that he or she is prohibited from driving a motor vehicle, (

B) has acknowledged that he or she has received from the corporation or the superintendent a notice of prohibition against driving a motor vehicle, or (

C) has surrendered his or her driver's licence to the corporation or the superintendent subsequent to receiving from the corporation or the superintendent a notice of prohibition, relating to a prohibition under

section 91, 92 or 93, or a notice of suspension, and (ii) is signed with a signature that, from a comparison with the signature on the records of the corporation, appears to be that of the person whom the corporation or superintendent intended to prohibit from driving a motor vehicle, or to whom the corporation or superintendent mailed a notice of prohibition, or (

c) contain a certificate of service established under

section 94.3 (a)(ii), 215.47 (

c) or 251 (3) (

b) showing that a notice of driving prohibition under

section 94.1, 215.41 or 251 (1) (h), as applicable, was personally served on the person subject to the prohibition.

(5) This

section applies to any document contained in the records of the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia or the superintendent, whether that document was signed before, on or after the date this subsection comes into force. The Evidence Evidence in the Crown's case [ 21 ] The evidence for the Crown was provided solely by Constable Hendrik Slofstra. Constable Slofstra is a long-serving member of the RCMP who has been based out of Nanaimo, British Columbia, since the early part of September of 2021. He has served in other parts of the province. He was on duty at the time that the alleged offence took place.

He was the police constable responsible for conducting the original traffic stop which led to the charges being laid against the Defendant in this case. [ 22 ] In Constable Slofstra's testimony, he indicated that he stopped the motor vehicle due to inconsistencies between the licence plates and the records that were available to him by means of his police car’s computer. When he pulled the vehicle over, the driver was asked to provide a driver's licence or other identification. The driver, who as it turns out is the Defendant in this case, did produce a B.C. Identification Card which contained his photograph.

Constable Slofstra compared it to the Defendant. Then a further investigation took place with respect to questioning the Defendant about the validity of the insurance on the vehicle and some other issues relating to the licensing of the motor vehicle. [ 23 ] It was during that investigation that the statement was made by the Defendant to the police constable that the Defendant said he had a valid Ontario driver's licence. However, the constable had some difficulty finding any record of it, other than certain things which were available on a limited basis from the databases.

He was uncertain as to whether or not there was an existing valid driver's licence, but there was clear indication that the Defendant did not have a valid British Columbia driver's licence and, in fact, was subject to a prohibition. [ 24 ] As part of the Crown's case, various documents were entered.

First of all, Exhibit 1 is the Certificate of Superintendent which confirms, in part, as follows, and I quote [as read in]: I do hereby certify that Clarke Earl Greene, whose British Columbia driver's licence number is [omitted] and whose recorded date of birth is [omitted] was prohibited from driving a motor vehicle during the entire day of the 12th of January, 2021, under s. 251(4) of the Motor Vehicle Act . continuing: I do hereby certify that the records kept by the Superintendent of Motor Vehicles under the Motor Vehicle Act contain a certificate of service in the form established by the Superintendent under s. 251(3) (

b) of the Motor Vehicle Act , which I attach to this certificate showing that a notice of driving prohibition under s. 251(1) (

h) of the Motor Vehicle Act prohibiting Clarke Earl Greene from driving was

personally served on Clarke Earl Greene on the 3rd of October, 2012. [ 25 ] Exhibit Number 2 was admitted into evidence, and that being a copy of the notice of driving prohibition which was apparently served by a D. Buchanan, being a peace officer, on October 3, 2012. That service was at 12:30 hours on Chemainus Road at or near Ladysmith, British Columbia. Evidence in the Defence’s case [ 26 ] The Defendant testified on his own behalf and was subject to cross-examination.

The Defendant confirmed that he resided in British Columbia and then moved his residence from Vancouver Island, British Columbia, to Ontario in or around 2013 for employment purposes. When he was residing in Ontario, he apparently made several trips back to British Columbia to check on his rental workshop and other personal property in this province. [ 27 ] He stayed in British Columbia for periods of time ranging from weeks to months.

Each time thereafter he returned to Ontario. [ 28 ] It is uncontested that prior to his departure for Ontario in 2013, his British Columbia driver's licence had expired on his birthdate anniversary in 2012. He had a number of unpaid fines which prevented him from renewing his B.C. driver's licence. [ 29 ] It is noteworthy that Exhibit 2, being the certificate of the B.C. Superintendent of Motor Vehicles, appears to have been served a few days prior to the birthdate anniversary of the Defendant in 2012. [ 30 ] The Defendant testified that he applied for and obtained an Ontario learner's driver's licence in 2013.

He completed a road test and obtained what I understand to be a graduated licence. As I understand his evidence, in 2015 he obtained a "G" category licence after completing a road test. He stated that his Ontario licence expired on the anniversary of his birthdate in 2020. He failed to renew it on time by some two days. [ 31 ] On June 28, 2019, he was in British Columbia and he obtained a B.C. Identity Card. A copy of that card has been admitted as Exhibit 3.

That is the Identity Card that was apparently produced to the police constable at the time that the Defendant was stopped while driving on January 12, 2021. [ 32 ] The evidence of the Defendant is to the effect that he believed that by having a valid Ontario driver's licence, it permitted him to be driving in British Columbia. He initially indicated that he had little or had no recollection of having been served with the Notice of Prohibition entered as Exhibit Number 2. Later in his evidence, he was less definitive about that.

He admitted that he had some memory issues, and then conceded it was possible that he had been served with that Notice of Prohibition at the time and date as set out in the notice itself. [ 33 ] The Defendant also testified that one of the reasons that he obtained the B.C. Identification Card on June 28, 2019, was that his Ontario driver's licence had expired. [ 34 ] The evidence of the Defendant is quite unclear as to when he actually did obtain a new driver's licence in Ontario.

At one point, there was an indication that he had not done so, but then in contradictory evidence he indicated that, at the time of the offence, he had actually a valid Ontario licence. He suggested in his evidence that he had not produced any form of licence to the investigating officer at the time of the traffic stop because he was awaiting its receipt in the mail. [ 35 ] There is before the court Exhibit Number 4 which is an extract of CPIC information obtained by the investigating officer, Constable Slofstra, but it is subject to uncertainty as to what it actually discloses.

Constable Slofstra was unable to give any indication as to whether or not he could discern that there was an existing and valid driver's licence from Ontario at the time of the alleged offence. No separate evidence was introduced to explain the process by which an individual obtains a licence in Ontario. I find the Exhibit 4 to be of little help in determining whether or not, at the time the Defendant was stopped for driving in British Columbia, he did or did not have a valid Ontario licence. [ 36 ] The evidence provided by the Defendant is also quite telling.

That evidence was that the Defendant understood and continued to understand that he owed significant outstanding fines in British Columbia which prevented him from renewing or obtaining a valid driver's licence in British Columbia, going back to prior to his departure to Ontario in 2013. At one point, he actually flew back to British Columbia in order to try to resolve the outstanding amounts, believing that there may be an ability to negotiate some lower amount for the fines owing, which apparently were over some $9,600.

However, he met with resistance from ICBC and they were unwilling to negotiate a lower amount. [ 37 ] Accordingly, no steps were taken to renew the Defendant's B.C. driver's licence at that time nor to seek any sort of reinstatement. [ 38 ] It is the evidence of the Defendant that as at the date of the offence on January 12, 2021, he was not sure whether or not he was under what he described as "suspension" in British Columbia.

As I understand his evidence, he certainly did not make any formal inquiries with the Superintendent of Motor Vehicles or with representatives of the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia as to the status of his licence. [ 39 ] I have no evidence before me as to the licensing procedures in the Province of Ontario as to what inquiries are made with respect to individuals applying for licences and being under suspension or prohibition from driving in other parts of Canada.

I have no evidence before me as to whether or not issuance of a driver's licence in Ontario may trump a prohibition in another province and thereby permit an individual to drive. What I do have, of course, is the evidence tendered by Crown as it relates to the fact that within the records of the Superintendent of Motor Vehicles, the Defendant was prohibited from driving as at the offence date. The Applicable Law [ 40 ] As I understand it, Crown and defence agree that it is an element of the offence under s. 95(1) of the Motor Vehicle Act that a

person must know that they are prohibited from driving. [ 41 ] In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the knowledge of the accused about being prohibited from driving is imputed when the Notice of Prohibition and the certificate of the Superintendent are entered at trial as an exhibit. However, that is in the absence of any evidence to the contrary which, if believed, rebuts the presumption of the accused's knowledge and thus leads to a reasonable doubt.

So long as the court is not left in doubt by that evidence or any other evidence, then Crown has satisfied its burden. [ 42 ] Evidence that is disbelieved by the court is not evidence to the contrary. Crown's Position [ 43 ] Crown says that it has satisfied the burden on the evidence of the police officer and the certificates that have been admitted into evidence.

Crown also says that the evidence of the Defendant in this case to the contrary should be disregarded on the basis of both its credibility and on its reliability. [ 44 ] On the other hand, Crown says that the evidence of the police officer was satisfactory and should be relied upon. Where there is any conflict in the police officer’s evidence and that of the Defendant, the police officer’s evidence is to be preferred, and specifically with respect to the Defendant's knowledge that he was a prohibited driver.

Defence's Position [ 45 ] Defence says that the evidence of the Defendant should be accepted and, as I understand the submission, it should be satisfactory to rebut the presumption of knowledge of the driving prohibition.

In that regard, it is conceded by defence that there were some inconsistencies in the evidence proffered by the Defendant which was explained away as either nervousness or the fact that, as the Defendant indicated, he was on medications for various medical conditions. [ 46 ] So I am basically being invited to apply the W.(D.) analysis and specifically the supplemental test as noted by Josiah Wood, J.A., as he then was, to the effect that if I am unable to decide whom to believe with respect to a central issue in a prosecution, then an accused person must be acquitted.

Case authorities [ 47 ] Defence has presented one case authority for the court's consideration, and that being the case of R. v. Billard , 2017 BCPC 256 . [ 48 ] I have had the opportunity of reviewing other case authorities which were not presented to the court. In particular, I have reviewed the decision of R. v. Webster , [2016] B.C.J. No. 2212 , also cited as 2016 BCPC 326 . [ 49 ] I have also had the opportunity and the benefit of reviewing the recent decision of the Honourable Judge D.M. Mah in R. v. Tsai , 2022 BCPC 2 . The Tsai decision is useful on many levels.

Most importantly, it does review a number of case authorities from paragraphs 15 through 21 inclusive, which deal with the same offence or similar offences, the various defences that were raised and conclusions reached. Included in Judge Mah's decision are references to the cases of: R. v. Webster , supra ; R. v. Tantrum , 2005 BCPC 427 ; R. v. Biason , 2009 BCPC 162 ; R. v. Billard , supra ; R. v. Colegrave , 2018 BCPC 69 ; and R. v. Prentice , June 10, 2019, North Vancouver File 66355-1 (BCPC).

Analysis [ 50 ] I have assessed the evidence of the witnesses using the W.(D.) formulation, and utilizing and reviewing the factors set out in R. v. Cuhna . I find the evidence of the Police Constable Slofstra to be credible, trustworthy, and reliable. His evidence was given in a straightforward manner and it was consistent, both internally and externally. His evidence made sense.

He was clear that when he did not know a particular fact, or understand certain matters; he was unshaken in his evidence, notwithstanding the scope of cross-examination. [ 51 ] I have also assessed the evidence of the Defendant in this case. I found aspects of the evidence to be quite confusing and contradictory. I do not believe that the Defendant was intentionally trying to deceive the court, but there were huge gaps in his evidence as to his steps taken to make any inquiry as to his B.C. driving status, or whether or not the prohibition that had been previously imposed upon him remained in effect.

His evidence certainly did confirm that he was aware that he was, in his words, “under suspension” in B.C., due to the fact that he had significant unpaid fines. [ 52 ] Based on my assessment of the Defendant’s evidence, I find that when it comes to the contradictory or uncertain provisions within it, I cannot accept that evidence as being reliable or credible.

Summary of analysis steps [ 53 ] In

summary, the analysis I must undertake in this matter is as follows: 1) Driving while prohibited is a full mens rea offence and the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had actual knowledge of the prohibition or was wilfully blind or reckless with respect to this knowledge.

Wilful blindness arises when the accused has become aware of the need for some inquiry and declines to make the inquiry because he does not wish know the truth, and recklessness is knowledge of a danger or risk and persistence in a course of conduct which creates a risk that the prohibited result will occur. 2) With respect to actual knowledge, the court can: a. rely upon a Notice of Driving Prohibition and Certificate of Service as evidence of the record and of the facts in the record if a certified copy is filed;

b. presume that the accused has knowledge or had knowledge of the prohibition in effect at the time of the alleged offence if aCertificate of the Superintendent is admitted into evidence. The presumption of knowledge can be rebutted by a mistake of fact, but it isnot a defence if the accused did not clearly understand the prohibition, did not read the document that he was given, or misplaced it. 3) The court must apply the W.(D.) test if the defence calls the accused to give evidence. [see R. v.

Tsai at paragraph 23] Findings [54] Based on the facts that I accept and the analysis that I am required to conduct, I am satisfied that Crown has proven the offenceof driving while prohibited against the Defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. The Doctrine of Officially Induced Error of Law [55] I am then asked by defence to consider applying the doctrine of officially-induced error and to enter a judicial stay. The decisionof R. v. Billard considers the doctrine of officially induced error at paragraph 23. [56] The R. v.

Billard decision notes that the leading authority on this doctrine is the Supreme Court of Canada decision in R. v.Jorgensen, (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 55 at paragraph 25. It indicates that officially induced error of law exists as anexception to the rule that ignorance of law is not an excuse. Further at paragraph 26 of Jorgensen it says that the Crown has to establishthe elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt. The accused then has to prove six elements on the balance of probabilities to beentitled to a judicial stay.

These factors are: (1) that an error of law or mixed law and fact was made; (2) the accused considered the legal consequences of his actions; (3) the advice came from an appropriate official; (4) the advice was reasonable; (5) the advice was erroneous; and (6) the person relied on the advice in committing the act giving rise to the charges. [57] Having regard to consideration of these elements, I am not satisfied that the Defendant can rely upon officially induced error.

Inote that, in particular, it is completely unclear as to whom, either generally or specifically, the Defendant was relying upon for adviceand what the nature of that advice was, other than the fact that he was possibly issued an Ontario driver's licence.

There is no evidencebefore me that indicates that there was any advice given by anyone in Ontario to the Defendant that any driving prohibition in BritishColumbia was no longer operative, because of the issuance of an Ontario driver's licence. [58] Accordingly, I cannot find that any advice given was reasonable in the circumstances. [59] I am also of the view that any advice that was given was not from what can be regarded as an appropriate official, in thesepresent circumstances.

It seems to me that the appropriate official that could give that advice was either the Superintendent of MotorVehicles or an official of the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia. There is no evidence that any steps were taken by theDefendant to obtain that sort of advice from those appropriate officials, hence the defence’s request for a judicial stay arising out ofofficially induced error is not available in this case.

Conclusion [60] Therefore, I do find the accused Clarke Earl Greene guilty of the alleged offence of driving while prohibited on the 12th day ofJanuary, 2021. (JUDGMENT CONCLUDED) CORRIGENDUM - Released March 7, 2022 In the Oral Reasons for Judgment dated February 17, 2022, the following changes have been made: [1] Paragraph 33, to now read: The Defendant also testified that one of the reasons that he obtained the B.C. Identification Card on June 28, 2019, was that his Ontariodriver's licence had expired. _____________________________ The Honourable Judge J.P. MacCarthy Provincial Court of British Columbia