His Majesty the King - v. -, 2022 SKPC 50

IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF SASKATCHEWAN Citation: 2022 SKPC 50 Date: November 17, 2022 Information: 991183085, 991186893 Location: Moose Jaw _____________________________________________________________________________ Between: His Majesty the King - and - Mark Friesen, Jasmin Grandel, Richard Wintringham and Chey C raik -and- His Majesty the King - and - Hinderager Holdings Ltd. Appearing: Noah Wernikowski and Theodore Litowski For The Attorney General for Saskatchewan Robbie Parker For the Crown Elaine Anderson For the Accused

DECISION ON APPLICATION TO DISMISS CHARGES PURSUANT TO SECTION 52(1) OF THE CONSTITUTION ACT, 1982 B. HENDRICKSON , J [ 1 ] On Information 991183085, Mark L. Friesen, Jasmin R. Grandel, Richard B. Wintringham, and Chey A. Craik are charged as follows: On or about the 16 th day of January, 2021 at or near Moose Jaw, Saskatchewan did: By participating in an outdoor public gathering of more than ten people, fail to comply with a Public Health Order dated January 12, 2021, made pursuant to

section 38 and subsection 45(2) of The Public Health Act, 1994 and

section 25.2(2) of The Disease Control Regulations contrary to

section 61 of The Public Health Act, 1994 . [ 2 ] On Information 991186893, Hinderager Holdings Ltd. is charged as follows: On or about the 27 th day of October, 2021 at or near Moose Jaw, Saskatchewan did: By failing to require a patron who entered the premises of its business to provide at the point of entry one piece of personal identification and proof that she was fully vaccinated against COVID-19 or had received a negative COVID-19 test administered within the previous 72 hours, fail to comply with a Public Health Order dated October 19, 2021, made pursuant to

section 38 and subsection 45(2) of The Public Health Act, 1994 and

section 25.2(2) of The Disease Control Regulations contrary to

section 61 of The Public Health Act, 1994 . [ 3 ] Ms. Elaine Anderson is counsel for both Hinderager Holdings Ltd. and for Mr. Friesen, Ms. Grandel, Mr. Wintringham and Mr. Craik. Mr. Parker appears for the Crown and Mr. Wernikowski and Mr. Litkowski appear for the Attorney General. I will refer to this party as the Crown throughout my decision. [ 4 ] On each of the Informations, essentially Ms. Anderson makes a similar application. Pursuant to section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 , she applies for an order or declaration that both

section 25.2 of The Disease Control Regulations , RRS c P-37.1, Reg 11 [the Regulation ] and the Public Health Order are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution Act, 1982 and are null and void and of no effect. The applicant asks for an order or declaration dismissing the charges and/or quashing the proceedings. In the alternative, she asks the applicant or applicants be acquitted. [ 5 ] In an amended Notice of Constitutional Question, the applicant says the grounds of inconsistency with the Constitution Act, 1982 include inter alia that the power conferred under

section 25.2 exceeds the authority granted in The Public Health Act, 1994 , SS 1994, c P-37.1 [the Act ]; that

section 25.2 of The Disease Control Regulations transforms a legislative power into an administrative power and is thus illegal; executive regulations and orders amounting to the exercise of legislative power invalidly intrude on the exclusive authority of the Legislature and the Regulation and Public Health Order involve the exercise of a substantive legislative power properly the subject of direct legislative enactment. [ 6 ] By agreement of defence and Crown, the applications on each of the two Informations were heard at the same time. [ 7 ] I had the benefit of written briefs of law and oral submissions from the Crown and defence.

I wish to thank counsel for their briefs and submissions. [ 8 ] The Act , is, not surprisingly, a statute dealing with issues of public health. In their written briefs, counsel for the applicants and for the Crown directed my attention to certain sections of the Act as being particularly relevant for the purposes of the applications. Crown counsel directed my attention to sections 2(a); 45, 46(l)(q); 46(1)(u), 46(1) (gg); 46(l)(oo) and 61 of the Act . Counsel for the applicant directed my attention to sections 38 , 45 and 46 of the Act . In addition, both parties have directed my attention to

section 25.2 of the Regulation . Finally, Crown counsel have directed my attention to The Legislation Act , SS 2019 c L-10.2 [ The Legislation Act ].

A BRIEF LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND [ 9 ] The background to the issuing of Public Health Orders (PHOs) in response to the global pandemic is discussed in R v Keough , 2022 SKPC 23 at paragraphs 1-2 [ Keough ]. The Court said: [1] In late 2019, an outbreak of COVID-19, a disease caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) was reported and by the spring of 2020, the outbreak had become a global pandemic. Attempting to mitigate the transmission of the COVID-19 virus, governments around the world began implementing public health measures.

The Government of Saskatchewan was no exception. [2] On March 20, 2020, a state of emergency was declared by the Government of Saskatchewan pursuant to The Emergency Planning Act which was renewed from time to time… Further, the Government of Saskatchewan designated COVID-19 a 'category I' communicable disease pursuant to The Disease Control Regulations pursuant to The Public Health Act, 1994 granting the Minister of Health the ability to make Public Health Orders (PHOs) in response to COVID-19 pandemic. [ 10 ]

Section 46 of the Act says for the purpose of carrying out the Act according to its intent, the Lieutenant Governor in Council may make regulations. Those regulations may include: (

q) respecting the detention, investigation, prevention, reduction, control and removal of health hazards, prohibiting or regulating acts that create or contribute to health hazards, and imposing requirements to prevent the creation or worsening of health hazards; (

u) respecting the detection, investigation, notification, treatment, prevention and control of communicable diseases; (gg) prescribing and governing the health and safety standards required for public outdoor events; (oo) respecting any other matter or thing that the Lieutenant Governor in Council considers necessary to carry out the intent of the Act . [ 11 ]

Section 2 of the Act defines "health hazard" and "serious public health threat".

Section 38 of the Act deals with orders of a medical health officer. [ 12 ]

Section 45 of the Act says, in part, that the Minister may make an order described in subsection (2) if the Minister believes on reasonable grounds that a serious public health hazard exists in Saskatchewan and the requirements set out in the order are necessary to decrease or eliminate the serious public health threat. Subsection (2) says, in part, the order may prohibit public gatherings in a specified area of Saskatchewan and other conditions. Subsection (3) says in an order under

section 45, the Minister or medical health officer shall set out the reasons for the order and may specify the area in which the order applies and may specify when the persons to whom the order is directed must comply. [ 13 ]

Section 25.2 of the Regulation says in part that, based on the opinion of the Chief Medical Officer that the increased rate of infection or the expectation of an increased risk of infection from SARS-CoV-2 is likely to cause a serious public health threat, the Minister if he or she determines that it is in the public interest to do so, may order any or all of the measures set out in subsection (3) to be taken for the purpose of preventing, reducing and controlling the transmission of SARS-CoV-2.

Subsection (3) says an order made may impose all or any of listed measures the Minister considers necessary for the purpose of the order including a requirement to limit the size of gatherings; a requirement that persons who own, operate or have control over indoor premises advise persons who enter those premises of the applicable measures aimed at preventing, reducing and controlling the transmission of SARS-CoV-2 and ensuring the persons take those measures and a requirement to implement screening measures for persons entering or leaving a workplace or other premises that are open to the public. [ 14 ] This power of the Ministers' was later delegated to the Province's Chief Medical Health Officer pursuant to

section 2 - 34(2) of The Legislation Act .

ISSUES [ 15 ] The argument of the applicant essentially is that the PHOs under which the applicants are charged are unenforceable because the Regulation which purports to authorize the orders are legally defective. In her written brief Ms. Anderson says the following: "In the context of the proceeding, the question for this Honourable Court is whether the executive exceeded its' authority when it enacted the Regulation and the Public Health Order." Ms.

Anderson says subsection 25.2 of the Regulation upon which the PHO is ostensibly authorized is ultra vires the Act ; the Regulation and PHO are illegal for unauthorized sub-delegation of statutory power; and the Regulation and PHO are inconsistent with subsection 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 . [ 16 ] The position of the Crown is the impugned Regulation is not ultra vires the Act and does not affect an invalid sub delegation. The Crown says the Regulation is consistent with the Constitution Act, 1982 .

Finally, the Crown says I have no jurisdiction to make an order as requested by the applicant under section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 . [ 17 ] In my view, the issues I must consider are: 1. Is the impugned Regulation ultra vires its parent Act , the Public Health Act, 1994 ? 2. Is the impugned Regulation inconsistent with the Constitution Act, 1982 ? 3. If I find the Regulation ultra vires or inconsistent, what remedy, if any, flows from that determination? I.

Is the impugned Regulation ultra vires its parent Act , the Public Health Act, 1994 ? [ 18 ] I begin by considering the law relating to a challenge of a regulation on the basis of it being ultra vires its' parent legislation.

This is the argument made by the applicants. [ 19 ] In Katz Group Canada Inc. v Ontario (Health and Long Term Care) , 2013 SCC 64 , [2013] 3 SCR 810, the Supreme Court said the following, in part, at paragraphs 24 to 28: [24] A successful challenge to the vires of regulations requires that they be shown to be inconsistent with the objective of the enabling statute or the scope of the statutory mandate...

This was succinctly explained…: In determining whether impugned subordinate legislation has been enacted in conformity with the terms of the parent statutory provision, it is essential to ascertain the scope of the mandate conferred by Parliament, having regard to the purpose(

s) or object(

s) of the enactment as a whole. The test of conformity with the Act is not satisfied merely by showing that the delegate stayed within the literal (and often broad) terminology of the enabling provision when making subordinate legislation. The power-conferring language must be taken to be qualified by the overriding requirement that the subordinate legislation accord with the purposes and objects of the parent enactment read as a whole. [25] Regulations benefit from a presumption of validity.

This presumption has two aspects: it places the burden on challengers to demonstrate the invalidity of regulations rather than on regulatory bodies to justify them and it favours an interpretative approach that reconciles the regulation with its enabling statute so that, where possible , the regulation is construed in a manner which renders it intra vires . [26] Both the challenged regulation and the enabling statute should be interpreted using a “broad and purposive approach …”…

[27] This inquiry does not involve assessing the policy merits of the regulations to determine whether they are “necessary, wise or effective in practice”. As explained in Ontario Federation of Anglers and Hunters v. Ontario (Ministry of Natural Resources) : … the judicial review of regulations as opposed to administrative decisions is usually restricted to the grounds that they are inconsistent with the purpose of the statute or that some condition precedent in the statute has not been observed.

The motives for their promulgation are irrelevant. [28] It is not an inquiry into the underlying “political, economic, social or partisan considerations”. Nor does the vires of regulations hinge on whether in the court's view they will actually succeed at achieving the statutory objectives.

They must be “irrelevant”, “extraneous” or “completely unrelated” to the statutory purpose … In effect, although it is possible to strike down regulations as ultra vires on this basis, as Dickson J. observed “it would take an egregious case to warrant such action” ( Thorne’s Hardware , at p. 111). [citations and sources omitted] [ 20 ] In Hudson's Bay Company ULC v Ontario (Attorney General) , 2020 ONSC 8046 , 154 OR (3d) 103 a case dealing with the staged closure of businesses due to the pandemic, the Court said at paragraph 41, that assessing whether the regulation at issue is ultra vires is a two- step process: The first step is to determine the purpose and scope of the authority under the enabling statute.

The second step is to assess whether the regulation is authorized by the statute, including whether it falls within its' purposes. [ 21 ] I begin the two-stage analysis. I am satisfied the purpose and scope of the Act has as its' objective the protection of the health and well-being of the people of Saskatchewan. The Act sets out broad measures that may be taken to accomplish this objective.

The Act says this objective may be accomplished for example, through establishing goals for the health of the population, facilitating public awareness of health issues, and establishing standards for public health programs and services. As part of the objective to protect the health and well-being of the population, the Act also allows for the establishment of measures to control the spread of communicable diseases and allows for other measures such as placarding or shutting down premises to prevent or control a health hazard or allowing for the seizure of food. [ 22 ]

Section 46 of the Act provides the Lieutenant Governor in Council, for the purpose of carrying out the Act , may make regulations including the prevention and control of health hazards; for the prevention and control of communicable diseases; and prescribing health and safety standards for public outdoor events.

The Regulation empowers the Minister to make orders which they are satisfied are in the public interest to prevent, reduce or control the transmission of COVID-19, a communicable disease and health hazard. [ 23 ] Having undertaken the two-stage analysis, I am satisfied the Regulation is authorized by the statute (the Act ) and falls within the purpose of the Act . [ 24 ] I next consider the argument of the applicants. The applicants argue the Regulation is ultra vires the Act . The thrust of the argument, as I understand it, is largely threefold. Firstly, the applicants argue the authority granted under

section 46 of the Act does not empower the creation of administrative orders; they say the Regulation is ultra vires the Act because

section 46 does not specifically say the Lieutenant Governor in Council has the power to allow others to make orders respecting communicable diseases nor the power to make regulations respecting these items in a way that may affect fundamental freedoms. [ 25 ] With respect, I do not agree with the Applicant's position. I am satisfied the position of the Crown regarding this argument is correct.

I quote from paragraphs 20 and 21 of the Crown's brief of law because it is a position with which I agree: [20] But the Applicant provides no authority for the notion that such regulations cannot be made without such an explicit grant of power. And, as John Mark Keyes — the often-cited author of the seminal textbook on regulations or “executive legislation” — notes, "There are now many examples of courts rejecting arguments for a narrow

interpretation based on a lack of detail in the relevant enabling provision," such as those advanced by the Appellants in the instant application.

Imposing a requirement that an enabling provision must specifically mention an order-making power would stand in stark contrast to the “broad and purposive approach” to interpreting enabling provisions the SCC mandated by Katz . [21] The fact remains that impugned Regulation is a regulation “respecting” communicable diseases and health hazards: the SCC has explicitly stated that “the phrase ‘in respect of’ is probably the widest of any expression intended to convey some connection between two related subject matters." It was also, in the LGIC’s view, necessary to carry out the intent of the PHA .

This fact is not changed just because s. 46 does not specifically mention order- making powers or the power to make regulations in a manner that may affect established rights. The Impugned Regulation is therefore well within the scope of its enabling provisions.

[ 26 ] Secondly, the applicant argues "the additional power bestowed by the regulation offends the established principle that a statutory body cannot re-delegate legislative power to itself to be exercised in an administrative or discretionary fashion. They argue the regulation effectively re-delegates power by revising and reciting the power to make orders provided in section 45(1) of the Act .

The applicant argues that the Regulation simply repeats the formula of the statute without specifying standards and leaving everything in the discretion of the delegate amounts to a re-delegation of power into a form different from that originally authorized. [ 27 ] I do not accept this argument. [ 28 ] In my view

section 45 of the Act and the Regulation are distinct and different. The Regulation does not parrot the words of the legislation. There are standards in the Regulation . [ 29 ] Section 45(1) of the Act provides the Minister may make an order described in subsection (2) if the Minister believes on reasonable grounds that a serious public health threat exists in Saskatchewan and the requirements set out in the order are necessary to decrease or eliminate the serious public health threat.

Subsection (2) says an order may direct the closing of a public place; restrict travel to or from a specified area; prohibit public gatherings in a specified area of Saskatchewan; in the case of a serious public health threat that is a communicable disease, require any person who is not known to be protected to be immunized or excluded from school; establish temporary hospitals; require a local authority, a medical health officer or a public health officer to investigate matters; require a person in certain circumstances to disclose information; authorize public health officers to confiscate substances; and in the case of a serious public health threat that is a communicable disease, require the isolation of a person. [ 30 ]

Section 25.2(2) of the Regulation says if, based on the opinion of the Chief Medical Officer that the increased rate of infection or the expectation of an increased risk of infection from SARS​ CoV-2 is likely to cause a serious public health threat, the Minister determines that it is in the public interest to do so, the Minister may order that any or all of the measures set out in subsection (3) are to be taken for the purposes of preventing, reducing and controlling the transmission of SARS-CoV-2.

Subsection (3) says an order made may impose measures including a requirement to limit the size of gatherings in the manner set out in the order; and requiring a person who owns operates or controls an indoor premises to advise persons entering the premises of the applicable measures aimed at preventing or controlling the transmission of SARS-CoV-2 and ensuring those persons entering the premises take those measures. [ 31 ] I am satisfied the Regulation does not affect the Minister's ability to make an order under

section 45 of the Act . I am satisfied the Regulation which is enacted pursuant to

section 46 of the Act , creates a distinct order making power. The Regulation is directed to measures to deal with SARS-CoV-2; the possible measures that may be included under an order made under the Regulation are different from measures in

section 45 . The Regulation is independent of and augments the order making power created by

section 45 of the Act . [ 32 ] As stated by the Crown, subordinate legislation is presumed to be consistent with its' parent legislation and courts do not lightly conclude that legislative texts are inconsistent. Wherever the parent and subordinate legislation can be interpreted as to not conflict, courts will adopt such an

interpretation. [ 33 ] In addition, I agree with the Crown's submissions that there is nothing in the Act to suggest the Legislature intended that

section 45 operate as an exhaustive list of the Minister's order making powers.

Section 45 and the Regulation in my view supplement each other and can operate at the same time. [ 34 ] The third argument of the applicant is that the Regulation effects an invalid sub delegation. They argue the Regulation transforms a legislative power, ostensibly granted under

section 46 of the Act into an administrative power vested in the Minister.

The argument on this issue is generally contained in paragraphs 17 to 24 of the applicants written brief. [ 35 ] While not precisely set out in this way in the applicant's brief, as I understand the argument of the applicant they say that where regulatory powers are subdelegated by the Lieutenant Governor in Council without any constraints, the sub delegation is unlawful if it fails to carry out the clear intent of the Act , namely that the discretionary power be entrusted to and remain with the Lieutenant Governor in council and no one else.

A similar argument was considered in the case of Peralta v Ontario (1985), 49 OR (2d) 705 (Ont CA) [ Peralta ] . [ 36 ] The presumption against sub delegation of a statutory power is no more than that and it may be inferred from the statutory context and objects that sub delegation is impliedly authorized by the enabling provision. See Law Society of Upper Canada v Canada

(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FCA 243. See also References re: Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, 2021 SCC 11at para 84 [Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act]. [37] In my view, the Regulation does not affect an invalid sub delegation. I agree with the Crown's argument on this issue. I findthe sub delegation is valid. Firstly, the use of the word "respecting" in

section 46 empowering the Lieutenant Governor in Council toenact regulations respecting the control of health hazards and respecting the prevention and control of communicable diseases, hasimport. As stated in Peralta, supra, the use of the word 'respecting' in an enabling provision allows for the delegation of theadministration of the regulations. Secondly, the powers conferred upon the Lieutenant Governor in Council in

section 46 of the Act aredistinct from the powers conferred upon the Minister by the Regulation. The language of the sub delegation does not simply repeat thelanguage of the delegation and the subdelegate is not empowered to do the exact same thing the delegate is empowered to do.

Thirdly, itis not a situation where no standards exist; the Minister's order making authority is restricted and the Minister is only able to makespecifically listed orders and the Minister's ability to make any order requires that such orders are in the public interest based on theopinion of the Chief Medical Officer and with a view to preventing reducing and controlling the transmission of COVID-19. Fourthly theconcept of administrative necessity militates in favor of a finding that the sub delegation is valid.

As stated in Jackson v Ontario (NaturalResources), 2009 ONCA 846: [36] In addition to these considerations, administrative necessity underscores Parliament's intent. In Peralta, Mackinnon A.C.J.O.commented on the importance of administrative necessity at p. 717: When courts have considered whether delegation of ministerial powers was intended, considerable weight has been given to“administrative necessity”, that is, it could not have been expected that the Minister (in this case the Governor in Council) wouldexercise all the administrative powers given to him.

Further, in such cases the suitability of the delegate has been a material factor indetermining whether such delegation is intended and lawful. [Citation omitted.] See also C.E. Jamieson & Co. (Dominion) v Canada (Attorney General), (FC), [1988] 1 FC 590 (Fed Ct). [38] In conclusion, the applicants have not established the Regulation is ultra vires The Public Health Act, 1994. Thus, the answerto the question posed in issue one is: 'NO'. The Regulation is not ultra vires its' parent Act, The Public Health Act, 1994. II.

Is the impugned Regulation inconsistent with the Constitution Act, 1982? [39] The position of the applicant is that unwritten constitutional principles and the principles associated with the rule of lawpreclude the Government from imposing the Regulation. The applicant argues there is no inherent power in the executive to take anyaction unauthorized by law and the power to infringe civil liberties is a substantive legislative power.

They argue "the rules andrestrictions enacted under the ostensible authority of the executive, through the operation of the Regulation and the PHO, not onlyrestrained and trammeled civil liberties but imposed exorbitant penalties for non-compliance." They say the unauthorized exercise ofpublic power transgressed the rule of law and is inconsistent with the principle of constitutionalism.

They argue the Regulation isinconsistent with the Constitution Act, 1982. [40] I begin by observing that unwritten principles and the principles associated with the rule of law are not independent basesupon which to invalidate legislation. In Toronto (City) v Ontario (Attorney General), 2021 SCC 34, the Supreme Court said theunwritten principle of democracy cannot be used as a device for invalidating otherwise valid provincial legislation.

The Court said inpractical terms, unwritten constitutional principles may assist courts in two distinct but related ways: first they may be used in theinterpretation of constitutional provisions and second, they can be used to develop structural doctrines unstated in the written constitutionbut necessary to the coherence of and flowing by implication from its' architecture.

The Court said neither of these functions support theapplication of unwritten constitutional principles as an independent basis for invalidating legislation. [41] Similarly, in British Columbia v Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., 2005 SCC 49, [2005] 2 SCR 473 the Court said it wasdifficult to conceive of how the rule of law could be used as a basis for invalidating legislation.

The Court said that is because none ofthe principles that the rule of law embraces speak directly to the terms of legislation. [42] Moreover, case law says delegations such as the one effected by the Regulation are consistent with the constitution. See forexample References re: Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, 2021 SCC 11. This point is also made in the case of Gateway BibleBaptist Church v Manitoba, 2021 MBQB 218 [Gateway Bible Baptist Church].

[ 43 ] In Gateway Bible Baptist Church , the applicants challenged the constitutionality of various emergency Public Health Orders made under The Manitoba Public Health Act . The orders were made and issued for the purpose of addressing the ongoing public health threat posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. [ 44 ] The Court in Gateway Bible Baptist Church said the following at paragraph 34: [34] ... delegated laws have been described as the lifeblood of the modern administrative state.

Far from being incompatible with our constitutional architecture or endangering the rule of law as suggested by the applicants, contemporary Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence contemplates and assumes a certain degree of delegated lawmaking (see for example Alberta v.

Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony 2009 SCC 37 , at paragraph 40 ). [ 45 ] At paragraph 38, in part the Court said: [38] The applicants’ argument that the delegation of powers under s. 67 offends the unwritten constitutional principles of democracy, rule of law and separation of powers is without merit. … It need be acknowledged that since the Privy Council case in Hodge and now continuing through to the recent pronouncements of the Supreme Court of Canada (including References re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act (see paragraphs 83-88 )), there is indeed, as Manitoba submits an “unbroken chain” of the highest binding authority that has repeatedly confirmed the legislature's authority to delegate broad and general legislative powers.

In that sense, s. 67 of the PHA is indeed entirely consistent with the Constitution, including unwritten principles. [ 46 ] At paragraph 41, the Court said: [41] I have also considered the applicants’ arguments with respect to the impugned provisions and the threat to the rule of law. I am not persuaded. In my view, the rule of law is preserved by judicial review and judicial review is more than possible in relation to the PHO’s in question. [ 47 ] In conclusion, I find the applicant has not demonstrated the Regulation is inconsistent with the Constitution Act, 1982 .

Thus, the answer to the question posed in Issue II is: 'NO', the impugned Regulation is not inconsistent with the constitution. III. If I find the Regulation ultra vires or inconsistent, what remedy, if any, flows from this determination? [ 48 ] I agree I have no jurisdiction to make an order and/or determination pursuant to subsection 52(1) as requested by the applicant. See Keough supra . However, it is not necessary that I consider the issue of remedy.

Having found that the Regulation is not ultra vires its' parent Act , The Public Health Act, 1994 and having found the Regulation is consistent with the Constitution Act, 1982 , I dismiss the applications. ____________________________ B. Hendrickson, J