R. v. Greenlaw, 2020 NSSC 47

SUPREME COURT OF Nova Scotia Citation: R. v. Greenlaw , 2020 NSSC 47 Date: 20200204 Hfx No.: 474235 Registry: Halifax Between: Her Majesty the Queen v. Adam Ray Greenlaw Respondent D E C I S I O N Judge: The Honourable Justice James L. Chipman Heard: February 4, 2020, in Halifax, Nova Scotia Oral Decision: Written Decision: February 4, 2020 February 5, 2020 C ounsel: Timothy A. McLaughlin, for the Federal Crown Trevor K.F. McGuigan, for Mr.

Greenlaw By the Court (orally): Introduction [ 1 ] On March 15, 2018 the Indictment was filed charging Adam Ray Greenlaw as follows: Count 1 … between the 21 st day of June 2017 and the 1 st day of July 2017, at or near Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, did unlawfully traffic in cocaine, a substance included in

Schedule I of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act , SC 1996, c 19 and did thereby commit an offence contrary to section 5(1) of the said Act . Count 2

… , on the 30 th day of June 2017, at or near Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, did unlawfully have in his possession for the purpose of trafficking, not in excess of three kilograms, cannabis (marihuana), a substance included in

Schedule II of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act , SC 1996, c 19 and did thereby commit an offence contrary to section 5(2) of the said Act . [ 2 ] On April 12, 2018 Mr. Greenlaw plead not guilty to both counts. A trial before a Supreme Court Judge sitting alone was subsequently scheduled for November 13, 14, 15 and 16, 2018. Approximately one month before the scheduled trial Mr. Greenlaw and his then legal counsel parted ways. The trial was adjourned and later re-scheduled for November 12, 13, 14 and 15, 2019. [ 3 ] On the first day of trial Mr.

Greenlaw appeared with his current counsel and changed his plea on count one to guilty. The sentencing along with the disposition on count two was set for January 21, 2020. A pre-sentence report (PSR) was ordered and the Court was informed that the facts would be agreed upon but that there would not be a joint sentencing recommendation. [ 4 ] During a January 9, 2020 Crownside appearance the sentencing was adjourned until today. [ 5 ] In advance of passing sentence the Court has considered the PSR, Victim Impact Statement (VIS), parties briefs and enclosures along with today’s oral submissions and Mr.

Greenlaw’s address to the Court. Facts [ 6 ] Upon listening to counsel’s submissions I have no hesitation in setting out the facts as follows: 1. Adam Greenlaw is a 37 year old father of one, who currently resides in Digby, Nova Scotia. He has entered a plea of guilty to an offence of 5(1) trafficking in cocaine. The person he trafficked to was Nicole Burkert, who was 15 years of age at the time of the offence. 2. Mr. Greenlaw’s record, at the time of the offence was as follows: Offence Offence date Sentence date Sentence CC 266(

b) assault 02-Oct-2002 03-Apr-2003 Suspended sentence, probation 2 years. CC 334(

b) theft under $5000 26-Jul-2002 to 29-Jul- 2002 03-Apr-2003 Suspended sentence, probation 2 years. CC 334(b)(ii) theft under 06-Jul-2002 19-Aug-2002 Fine $100.00 plus restitution $35.

CDSA 4(1) possession of substance 06-Jul-2002 19-Aug-2002 Fine $500.00 CDSA 4(1) possession of substance 08-Jul-2001 16-Jul-2001 2 weeks continuous custody in provincial facility CC 145(5.1) breach of undertaking 10-Dec-2000 15-Jan-2001 4 months custody in provincial facility CC 145(5.1) breach of undertaking 07-Dec-2000 15-Jan-2001 4 months custody in provincial facility CC 145(5.1) breach of undertaking 04-Nov-2000 15-Jan-2001 4 months custody in provincial facility 3. On the 28th of June, 2017, Cst J. Brown attended the residence of Barbara Burkert in Sackville, Nova Scotia.

He spoke with Barbara Burkert and a friend of Nicole Burkert. They told him that Nicole Burkert had died by suicide on June 25, 2017 around 10:30 am. In an attempt to better understand why she had died from suicide, they looked at the contents of her cell phone. They discovered (and told Cst. Brown) that Nicole had been in contact with a man named ‘Adam’ for a period of time and that she had been with him the night before her death. 4. Cst. Brown took possession of the cell phone and after careful analysis of the contents the following information was obtained:

a) Nicole began communicating with “Adamcomeau71” through social media/text on June 16, 2017. The communications continued up to June 25 at 04:47 hours.

b) On Nicole Burkert’s “Snap Chat” account Cst. Brown observed three photographs/videos: i. A photo of three ‘lines’ of white powder on a wood style table and a green object adjacent to the white powder (believed to be cocaine powder). This image was taken at 0105 hours June 25, 2017. ii. A photo of four ‘lines’ of white powder (on a wood style table), with a computer keyboard in the background. This image was taken at 0219 hours June 25, 2017. iii. A video of Nicole Burkert snorting two lines of white powder (believed to be cocaine) off a coffee table. This video was taken at 0548 hours June 25, 2017. 5.

The phone number 902-499-2769 associated with the name “adamcomeau71” and came back to the accused, Adam Greenlaw. Cst. Brown authored and obtained a search warrant for apartment 205, 55 Highfield Park Drive, Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, the residence of Adam Greenlaw.

6 The warrant was granted and the search was executed on June 30, 2017 at 1910 hours. Mr. Greenlaw was arrested without incident. 7. Located in the residence was the coffee table that Nicole Burkert snorted powder from. Mr. Greenlaw was also in possession of 25 grams of cannabis marihuana, working digital scales, other drug paraphernalia and documents associated with both his name and address. 8. A deeper review of the contents of Nicole Burkert’s phone showed Nicole Burkert at Mr. Greenlaw’s residence wearing only her undergarments (bra and panties).

Many of the photos were taken by someone other than Nicole, and most likely Mr. Greenlaw. 9. Throughout the course of the evening Mr. Greenlaw shared cocaine with Nicole Burkert, a person younger than him and in fact only 15 years of age. 10. Mr. Greenlaw and Nicole Burkert parted company at approximately 08:55 hours June 25, 2017, when he dropped her off at or near a friend’s residence in Dartmouth. The name of this friend is believed to be “Mike”, who was going to provide her with “shrooms” (a slang term for psilocybin or ‘magic mushrooms’). Mike resided near Primrose Avenue. 11.

The next communication with Nicole Burkert is when she advises Mr. Greenlaw she will be committing suicide. Mr. Greenlaw attempts to dissuade her from this. 12. Mr. Greenlaw then heard from Nicole’s friend, Jamie Dobbin, and during the course of the conversation admits to providing Nicole with cocaine. He advised that his “buddy” gave her valium, as well as spending the previous evening with Nicole. He also confirms that the photos were taken at his residence. Circumstances of Mr. Greenlaw [ 7 ] The December 24, 2019 PSR was prepared by probation officer Laurie Ann Whalley.

While considering the bulk of the PSR, I have disregarded the comments attributed to then Cpl. Brown at p. 8. The PSR reveals as follows: (

a) Mr. Greenlaw is 37 years of age. He is currently single, residing in Digby. Mr. Greenlaw has a 13-year-old son whom he has regular contact with; (

b) Mr. Greenlaw has one sibling, an older brother and they grew up in a two parent household with a good lifestyle; (

c) The offender self reported being “disruptive” in class and that it was thought (although never diagnosed) that he may have had Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder; (

d) Mr. Greenlaw has a grade 12 education. His employment has been in various sales positions. He currently works full time as a sales representative with modest income. Mr. Greenlaw’s goal is to operate his own car dealership; (

e) Mr. Greenlaw is not a first time offender. He has an unrelated criminal record involving offences dating back almost twenty years. He has served a period of probation and a conditional sentence order; (

f) The offender reports good physical health. He is not currently taking any prescription medication. Mr. Greenlaw has had depression and anxiety. At the time of the PSR just over a month ago, he reported being “clean and sober” for 18 months. (

g) Mr. Greenlaw’s past drug use started when he was around 20 years of age. He began with occasional cocaine use and this progressed to approximately three times per week; (

h) Mr. Greenlaw stated that while he was living in Halifax he met a woman and became involved in a relationship that was going well. Their relationship ended in June, 2016 and he reported that his life began to “spiral out of control”. He associated with negative peers and abused illicit drugs; (

i) The offender said he became addicted to drugs and that this led to the charges before the Court. Mr. Greenlaw realizes it was a mistake to become involved with the young victim. He has struggled with the death of the teenager and this along with the Court proceedings have caused him a great deal of stress. Impact of the Crime [ 8 ] The VIS was filed on January 7, 2020 by the mother of the deceased. Barbie Burkert’s 7-page handwritten letter is a mother’s heart wrenching account of the loss of her 15-year-old daughter, Nicole Alexandria Burkert.

While considering the below quoted passages of the VIS, I have disregarded the earlier portions which I do not consider relevant. In this regard, they were redacted by agreement of counsel as they relate to questioning of Mr. Greenlaw’s remorse and acceptance of responsibility, his motivation for pleading guilty and speculating as to his intention and mindset at the time of the offence. Towards the end of her VIS, Ms.

Burkert states: Impact 1 The pain I feel is so devastating words can not even begin to describe what losing a child does to that of a mother, especially to suicide because grief becomes even more complex.

There is no word in any language to describe a mother who lost a child. The pain changes us forever. The heart is so broken that the mind body and should become so weakened and damaged. In June 2019 I was hospitalized and was asked if I wanted to be resuscitated if need be. The doctor told me my grief was not allowingme to heal and they weren’t sure if I was going to make it (survive). The sadness and loss is so debilitating and so overwhelming it causes so much, crying without warning, sleeping too much, not enough,loss of friends, loss of self, loss of feeling reason to live, loss of life.

I fee so robbed of my daughter and the life that is gone too soon. To look into the eyes of her brother and sister and see their pain is another pain no mother wants to see. Losing a child is too hard to come back from. Most days you just want to go joint them because you can’t bare to be without them. Impact 2 I feel robbed of joy for myself and for her brother and sister and myself and my future joy. I have read that mothers who lose children to suicide suffer from PTSD.

And I have also read that they have done brain scans on motherswho’ve lost children to suicide and their brain scans are very similar or worse to the brain scans of those men who’ve gone to war. I also had to leave my job of 32 years at the QE2 Hospital with significant loss to my income. I could no longer think clearly and wouldhave put lives of patients in danger. I have lost so many friends because they do not know how to cope watching someone they love in so much deep pain. It truly changesus forever. [9] Today Ms. Burkert read the relevant portions of the VIS and the Court thanks her for her courage.

Sentencing Principles [10] In sentencing Mr. Greenlaw, I must apply the sentencing provisions in ss. 718, 718.1 and 718.2 of the Criminal Code and s. 10of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA). [11] The objectives of sentencing are to protect the public and to contribute to respect for the law and the maintenance of a safesociety.

Section 718 instructs that this is to be done by imposing just sanctions that have, as their goal, one or more of the following: denunciation; general and specific deterrence; separation from society where necessary; rehabilitation of the offender; promotion ofresponsibility in offenders; and acknowledgement of the harm done to victims and to the community. [12]

Section 718.1 states that the fundamental principle of sentencing is that a sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of theoffence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. [13]

Section 718.2 requires consideration of the aggravating and mitigating factors relating to the offence and the offender, theprinciples of parity and proportionality, that an offender should not be deprived of liberty, if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriatein the circumstances, and that all available sanctions, other than imprisonment, that are reasonable in the circumstances and consistentwith the harm done to victims or to the community should be considered for all offenders.

Denunciation, Deterrence and Protection of the Public [14] The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal has consistently said that denunciation and general deterrence must be the primaryconsiderations when sentencing offenders who traffic in

Schedule I drugs. Cocaine trafficking at any level has consistently attractedsubstantial periods of imprisonment, even for first offenders, with federal penitentiary being the norm ( R. v. Byers, (NSCA); R. v. Huskins, (NSCA); R. v. Dawe, 2002 NSCA 147, at para. 6; R. v. Steeves, 2007 NSCA 130, at para. 18;R. v. Knickle, 2009 NSCA 59, at para. 18; R. v. Butt, 2010 NSCA 56, at para. 13; R. v. Jamieson, 2011 NSCA 122, at para. 38; R. v.Scott, 2013 NSCA 28, at paras. 88-91; R. v. Oickle, 2015 NSCA 87, at paras. 30-32; R. v. Chase, 2019 NSCA 36, at paras. 28, 48). [15]

Section 10 of the CDSA incorporates these principles and specifically requires that a sentence in appropriate circumstances,encourage treatment of the offender. [16] The long-term protection of the public informs how I balance the principles and purposes of sentencing and apply them to thefacts to arrive at a fit sentence. Caselaw provides guidance with respect to the balancing of these principles and how they should beapplied to different categories of offence. Our Courts have consistently recognized that sentencing is an individualized process (R. v.Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64 at para. 1).

Justice Wagner, as he then was, pointed out in para. 67 of Lacasse that a deviation from a sentencingrange is not an error in principle unless it “departs significantly and for no reason from the contemplated” range. Rehabilitation [17] Even in cases requiring emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, rehabilitation remains a relevant objective. In LacasseJustice Wagner noted at para. 4:

4 One of the main objectives of Canadian criminal law is the rehabilitation of offenders. Rehabilitation is one of the fundamental moral values that distinguish Canadian society from the societies of many other nations in the world, and it helps the courts impose sentences that are just and appropriate. Proportionality [ 18 ] Proportionality in the context of sentencing a cocaine trafficker was recently reviewed by Justice Warner in R. v.

Forward , 2017 NSSC 190 , paras. 14 - 20 : 14 The principle that a sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender requires that I first consider the gravity of the offence. 15 Possession of cocaine and MDMA,

Schedule I substances, for the purpose of trafficking are very serious offences. This is reflected by the fact that Parliament has set the maximum sentence at life imprisonment and removed the offences from consideration for a conditional sentence order. 16 The tremendous harm that comes from trafficking these substances has been repeatedly commented on by our Court of Appeal. It has recognized the "creeping evil" and danger of cocaine. In Butt , at para. 13 , the court referred to cocaine as a deadly and devastating drug that ravages lives.

People who traffic in cocaine take advantage of the vulnerabilities of others. Some do it for profit and some do it because they are themselves addicts with the same vulnerabilities as those they sell to. 17 The other aspect of proportionality is the degree of responsibility of the offender. Mr. Forward was found in possession of significant amounts of powdered cocaine, MDMA and cannabis marihuana, paraphernalia, and cash. The Crown and defence agree that he falls within the definition of a petty retailer, as that term was described in R v Fifield , [1978] N.S.J.

No. 42 . 18 There is no evidence that anyone else was involved in the offence. Mr. Forward is solely responsible. Sometimes courts have held that moral blameworthiness is reduced when the offender is young or an addict (selling to support his or her addiction). Mr. Forward does not fit into either category. 19 In Oickle , Scanlan, J.A. questions whether addiction is properly considered a mitigating factor on sentencing for drug trafficking offences.

He comments that the consequences of drug trafficking to individuals and communities is the same whether the trafficker is motivated by profit or addiction. 20 An addiction certainly does not excuse criminal behavior, but it has been recognized by some courts as a factor which, when proven, can have a mitigating effect on sentence. Justice Hill of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in R v. Andrews , [2005] OJ No. 5708 , provides a

summary of the philosophy behind this approach: … Parity [ 19 ]

Section 718.2 includes the parity principle. That is to say, a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for like offences in similar circumstances. Aggravating Factors and Mitigating Circumstances [ 20 ]

Section 718.2 requires consideration of the aggravating factors and mitigating circumstances relating to the offence and the offender. Aggravating Factors [ 21 ] The major aggravating factor is that Mr. Greenlaw knowingly trafficked cocaine to a minor. Mr. Greenlaw was not recruited or pressured to sell cocaine. Rather, he made a deliberate choice in this case to give the cocaine to a 15 year old girl. It is agreed by the parties that Mr. Greenlaw shared approximately one gram of cocaine with Nicole Burkert. He did this knowing that she was a minor. Hard drugs were given to a young and vulnerable female.

I regard this offence as extremely serious and Mr. Greenlaw has a high degree of moral culpability. Mitigating Circumstances [ 22 ] Mr. Greenlaw pled guilty, albeit on the first day of his scheduled trial. At the time of the offences, he reports that he was addicted to illicit drugs. He adds that he was in an out of control spiral, associating with negative peers. [ 23 ] Mr. Greenlaw has expressed remorse both today in Court and through the PSR. Since the time of the offence, Mr. Greenlaw has attended a wellness clinic, Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous. He is currently clean and sober. Mr.

Greenlaw does not have a gambling addiction. He is pro-social and his parents are supportive. He maintains contact with his 13 year old son. Mr. Greenlaw is gainfully employed. Positions of the Parties on Sentence Crown

[ 24 ] The Crown acknowledges that in Chase our Court of Appeal re-affirmed that proof of “exceptional circumstances” is not a condition precedent to imposing a lesser sentence than federal imprisonment (i.e. two years or more) for

Schedule I drug trafficking. In their brief the Crown goes on to articulate that departing from federal time should be based on only the “clearest of cases”: 50 Restricting extraordinarily lenient sentences to only the "clearest of cases" is consistent with 30 years of jurisprudence from Nova Scotia Courts, which has emphasized that departure from the established sentencing range for trafficking hard drugs should be "rare indeed". 51 That includes the recent decision in Chase. Noteworthy is that the Trial Judge in Chase made an express finding that the numerous mitigating factors established by Mr.

Chase made his circumstances "exceptional", thereby justifying a substantial departure from the normally applicable sentencing range. This case has an exceptionally aggravating fact. The trafficking of hard drugs to a young and vulnerable person. This fact alone, regardless of the level of trafficking, is profoundly disturbing. [ 25 ] In the result, the Crown recommends the following sentence: i. Two years federal imprisonment; ii. A secondary DNA order; iii. Forfeiture of any offence related property iv. A firearms prohibition pursuant to s. 109 of the Criminal Code .

Defence [ 26 ] The Defence emphases that at the time of the offence Mr. Greenlaw was a regular cocaine user. The defence points out that the offence involves Mr. Greenlaw offering to share – and ultimately sharing – a small amount of cocaine with Ms. Burkert for their personal use. At paras. two and three of the Defence submissions, the following is submitted: 2. Determining a proportionate sentence for Mr. Greenlaw requires an analysis of the gravity of the specific criminal act in question and ensuring that the sentence is consistent with that act and his moral blameworthiness.

A trafficker peddling to clients for profit – even those doing so to support a habit – is not the same as a user sharing with another user. 3. There are devasting facts as part of this case. Ms. Burkert was only 15 years old and sadly took her own life after spending time with Mr. Greenlaw. He will have to live with that forever and wrestle with how his brief time with her may have affected her or contributed to mental health issues that she was experiencing.

However, he is not being sentenced for causing or contributing to her tragic death. [ 27 ] The Defence goes on to argue that the appropriate sentence is a suspended sentence with probation and conditions. Analysis and Disposition [ 28 ] This is a sad and tragic case. Mr. Greenlaw participated in the trafficking of cocaine with deadly consequences. Our Court of Appeal recently affirmed the typical range of sentence in Nova Scotia for

Schedule I trafficking offences in R. v. Livingstone ; R. v. Lungal ; R. v. Terris , 2020 NSCA 5 at para. 8 : [8] The range of sentence in Nova Scotia for

Schedule I trafficking offences is typically a custodial sentence of two years or more: ( R. v. Butt , 2010 NSCA 56 ; R. v. Conway , 2009 NSCA 95 ; R. v. Knickle , 2009 NSCA 59 ; R. v. Steeves , 2007 NSCA 130 ; and R. v. Dawe , 2002 NSCA 147 ). [ 29 ] Later, at para. 52, Justice Farrar noted that trafficking in controlled substances is a serious offence, usually warranting a prison sentence: [52] I am satisfied the sentencing judge erred in principle in imposing a suspended sentence for Mr. Livingstone.

His reasons do not explain why a suspended sentence, in these circumstances, honours the purposes and principles of sentencing. An appropriate sentence for Mr. Livingstone’s circumstances would be 18 months incarceration. This is somewhat less than the typical two year custodial sentence, taking into account the appropriate mitigating factors identified by the sentencing judge, but sending the clear message that trafficking in controlled substances is a serious offence, at any level, and will usually result in imprisonment. [ 30 ] In Livingston , Justice Farrar provides a

summary of 37 recent s. 5(2) CDSA sentencing decisions where suspended sentences were imposed, noting at para. 23: 23 Attached as a

schedule to this decision is a

summary of the recent decisions under s. 5(2) of the CDSA in which suspended sentences were imposed in Nova Scotia and other jurisdictions in Canada. I have provided this

summary for two reasons: to illustrate that suspended sentences are not, as suggested by the Crown, an aberration from the norm; and to illustrate the circumstances where courts suspend the passing of sentences. [ 31 ] Clearly, there will be situations when a suspended sentence might be warranted in the context of

Schedule I trafficking. As noted by Farrar, JA at para. 24: 24 Based on a review of this case law,

Schedule I trafficking cases in which sentencing is suspended are cases wherein:

1. the mitigating factors substantially outweigh the aggravating factors; 2. specific and general deterrence are satisfied by the imposition of a community-based sentence; and 3. a custodial sentence would negatively impact the offender’s rehabilitation progress. [ 32 ] Indeed, the Court of Appeal went on to dismiss the appeal of Mr. Lungal’s suspended sentence. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the Court allowed the Crown’s appeal of Mr. Livingstone’s and Mr. Terris’ suspended sentences. In so doing, Justice Farrar stated as follows with respect to Mr. Livingstone (some of which I find applicable to Mr.

Greenlaw) at para. 48: 48 Mr. Livingstone made a considered and deliberate choice to traffic cocaine. There was no suggestion he was recruited or pressured to do so in any way. He was not an addict selling to support an addiction. His only apparent motive was profit. He had cocaine on his person and in his residence. He was in the business and had all the necessary tools of the trade. [ 33 ] Mr.

Livingstone was ultimately sentenced to 18 months, albeit the Court stayed the sentence for reasons not germane to this matter. [ 34 ] Having regard to all of the circumstances I am of the view that the situation before the Court requires transmission of a strong message. This case is surely testament to the statement that trafficking in

Schedule I drugs such as cocaine is not a victimless crime. Mr. Greenlaw engaged in a deadly business. He made a deliberate choice to traffic cocaine. He was not pressured or recruited to do so. He drew the young victim into this situation by posing as a 28-year-old, using an alias. The texting record demonstrates exchanges between the two individuals between June 16 and 25, 2017. The facts disclose that the young victim snorted powder cocaine from a coffee table at Mr. Greenlaw’s residence. Instead of appropriately caring for the girl (who was not much older than his son), Mr. Greenlaw gave her a hard drug.

The tragic last text from the teenage girl to Mr. Greenlaw tells of her suicide plans. Although Mr. Greenlaw attempted to dissuade her of this, she sadly carried through with her plan. [ 35 ] I have reviewed the cases submitted by both parties. The Defence draws upon Fifield in asserting that this case “falls within the lowest possible category of trafficking… lower even than a petty retailer”. Recently, in R. v. LeBlanc , 2019 NSSC 192 Justice Rosinski had cause to consider the range of sentences throughout the cocaine trafficking hierarchy at paras. 10 – 22.

After conducting an exhaustive review of the caselaw, starting with Fifield , Justice Rosinski concludes, as follows: 22 To recap, in my opinion, the normal range of sentences for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking or trafficking in cocaine appear to be : * as I concluded in Murphy , for a petty retailer the range is from approximately 18 to 30 months in custody; * for small scale retailers (with cocaine up to 1/3 kilogram available for further distribution), such as Messrs.

LeBlanc and Benoit, the range of sentence is from 2 to 6 years in custody; * for medium scale retailers/small wholesalers (distributing more than 1/3 kilogram and up to lower single digit kilograms) the range of sentence is from 5 years to 8 years; * for larger wholesalers and large scale retailers (distributing higher single digit, double digit or more multi-kilogram quantities), the range of sentence is from 8 to 15 years in custody; * for importers (double digit or more multi-kilogram quantities) the range of sentences is from 12 to 20 years in custody. [ 36 ] In the result, the two year sentence suggested by the Crown is within the range of appropriate sentences. [ 37 ] I will resist stating all that might be said of Mr.

Greenlaw’s actions. What is relevant is a just and proper sentence for the count in question. In my view, when I consider all of the circumstances of the offender and the crime, what the Crown has asked for is indeed a just, fit and appropriate sentence. Accordingly, Adam Ray Greenlaw is hereby sentenced to: 1. Two years federal imprisonment; 2. A secondary DNA order; 3. Forfeiture of any offence related property; and 4. A firearms prohibition pursuant to s. 109 of the Criminal Code . [ 38 ] The Crown offers no evidence on the second count and it is hereby dismissed for want of prosecution. Chipman, J.