2010 QCCQ 3694, 2010 QCCQ 3694

R. c. Kaluza 2010 QCCQ 3694 JV 0532 QUEBEC COURT CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC DISTRICT OF MONTREAL LOCALITY OF MONTREAL No: 500-01-010709-076 DATE: May 6, 2010 ______________________________________________________________________ BY: THE HONOURABLE MARTIN VAUCLAIR, j.c.q. ______________________________________________________________________ Her Majesty The Queen v. Leland KALUZA ______________________________________________________________________ JUDGMENT (Rectified on May 7, 2010) ______________________________________________________________________ [ 1 ] The Crown brings an application pursuant to

section 672.23 Cr.C ., to have the Court render a verdict that Mr. Leland Kaluza is unfit to stand trial pursuant to

section 672.31 Cr.C . [ 2 ] Mr. Kaluza is charged with serious criminal accusations. He faces one count of possession of a loaded prohibited firearm contrary to section 95(2) (

a) Cr.C ., and one count of possession of marijuana for the purposes of trafficking contrary to section 5(2)(4) of the Controlled Drug and Substances Act. The first offence is punishable by a minimal term of imprisonment of one year and a maximum of 10 years. The second offence carries a maximum of 5 years less a day. [ 3 ] Nevertheless, this Court is mindful of what the Alberta Court of Appeal wrote: There are strong interests, both public and personal, in an accused being fit to proceed to trial. The public interest is in en de suring that persons who are accused of committing crimes are brought to justice.

The personal interests of the accused are twofold. First, a person accused of a crime has a right to his “day in court” and to make full answer and defence to the charge. Second, a person who is declared unfit to stand trial risks being hospitalized indefinitely until considered “fit”. Depending upon the extent of the person’s condition, such incarceration could theoretically be longer than any sentence the accused might have received if tried and convicted. [1] Factual background leading to the fitness hearing [ 4 ] Mr.

Kaluza was arrested on August 21 2007 and, according to the Court's record, he was released on August 28 that same year. The file followed an ordinary succession of dates. At one time, Mr. Kalzula failed to be present before the Court and a bench warrant issued but was rapidly cancelled a couple of weeks later when Mr. Kaluza presented himself. [ 5 ] On April 14, 2009, his preliminary inquiry was held on count one, the illegal possession of a loaded prohibited firearm. It appears that Mr. Kaluza acted for himself, having discharged his lawyer that same morning. Mr.

Kaluza was eventually ordered to stand trial [2] , and he re-elected for a trial before a judge without a jury. [ 6 ] The course of Mr. Kaluza's file became somewhat unusual on the morning of his trial, last October 8, 2009. On the said date, Mr. Kaluza appeared before a judge and said that he was in fact Yoseph Yisrael, a natural person, appearing for Leland Kaluza, his artificial person. The judge asked him if he was a lawyer and Mr. Kaluza said something to the effect that he was in his own way. [ 7 ] That led to a more difficult discussion.

At one point, taking the accused on his own words, the judge asked that Leland Kaluza be called on the microphone. Mr. Kaluza, representing himself as Yoseph Yisrael, told the judge that Leland Kaluza had no physical body and was thus not present before him. The judge readily issued a bench warrant that was immediately executed. [ 8 ] Mr. Kaluza was thus arrested and his recognizance of August 28, 2007 was revoked. It is not clear if Mr.

Kaluza had, at that time, a further hearing to determine if he could be released given the fact that he was now arrested on a bench warrant. [ 9 ] Notwithstanding, the judge further issued an assessment order to determine whether the accused is fit to stand trial and pursuant to

section 672.11 (

a) C.cr ., ordered the assessment within five days while the accused is detained.

[ 10 ] The file came back on October 13, 2009. As usual, because of lack of appropriate resources in this judicial district, the assessment was not completed and the file was further postponed a week later. [ 11 ] On October 20, a very brief report by a psychiatrist, Dr. Talbot, was filed. The Crown called for an inquiry on the fitness issue. The Court's record indicates that Mr. Kaluza was represented at that point. The inquiry was again postponed to November 12, 2009 at which time Mr. Kaluza's lawyer filed a motion to withdraw. The motion was granted. Also, on or about that date, the prosecution notified Mr. Kaluza that it would as well seek a forced treatment according to

section 672.58 Cr.C . if he were to be declared unfit. [ 12 ] Being aware of

section 672.24 Cr.C ., the judge ordered a lawyer assigned to Mr. Kaluza to proceed with the fitness hearing. The file was then again postponed to November 26, 2009. On the said date, Mr. Kaluza managed to have a fax send to the judge who filed that document as exhibit J-1 [3] . Because of an overbooked docket, the file was transferred to my courtroom around 3 p.m. [ 13 ] Maître Bourassa, senior counsel at the Legal Aid Office in Montreal, was present and aware of the proposed hearing. He informed the Court that he had no mandate to represent Mr.

Kaluza but was ready to represent him if so ordered according to the Criminal Code provisions. He wisely suggested that the Court gives some leeway to Mr. Kaluza in order for him to question witnesses or to make representations to the Court. He further suggested that the Court should hear some background to make its own primary assessment of the reasonable grounds to hold the proposed hearing. [ 14 ] For its part, the Crown was ready to proceed. The sole witness, the psychiatrist Talbot, was present. However, the Crown also understood that Mr.

Kaluza just received an addendum to the psychiatrist report, and that he might want some time to take knowledge of it. [ 15 ] Indeed, Mr. Kaluza expressed his difficulty with the French language, that he cannot readily read the addendum and further more, insisted that the Court read exhibit J-1 (now R-6a), the document faxed to the judge that same morning. It is a 20-page recital of the accused situation as seen and understood by him. Its content will be discussed later in this decision. [ 16 ] Based on that document, the Court came to the conclusion that it had reasonable grounds to believe Mr.

Kaluza was unfit to stand trial. More specifically, the Court spoke of its concern that the dichotomy of Mr. Kaluza's identity would prevent him to understand the consequences he is facing. [ 17 ] The Court agreed to postpone the hearing in order to give Mr. Kaluza time to prepare and maybe consider a counter-expertise and/or further procedures to the Superior Court to deal with his claim of illegal detention. [ 18 ] On December 3 rd , once more, the prosecution disclosed additional material concerning the eventual testimony of the psychiatrist Talbot, again placing the defense in a difficult situation.

Notwithstanding, Mr. Kaluza told the Court that he had discussions with Maître Bourassa and asked for a further delay to prepare. Again, he raised a discussion on the legality of his detention. [ 19 ] The Court was very much concerned with the delays. According to

section 672.14 Cr.C . the assessment order is valid for a maximum of 60 days, given compelling circumstances. Those were not shown at this point and the detention flirted with illegality. But, as the Crown argued and conceded by Maître Bourassa, Mr. Kaluza was also detained on a bench warrant. Although much could be said about the legality of that detention order, this Court had no jurisdiction to deal with it. Indeed, the Crown did not consent, according to 523 Cr.C ., for this Court to do so. Thus, the Superior Court was the only forum available for Mr. Kaluza.

The hearing was further remanded. [ 20 ] On December 17, 2009, after being served with a writ of habeas corpus (RD-1), the Crown agreed to give jurisdiction to the Court and Mr. Kaluza was released that same day. He asked for time to prepare. Being released, he said he could now prepare adequately to answer the Crown's case against him on the fitness issue. Maître Bourrassa was also more optimistic and said that he might be getting a direct mandate from Mr. Kaluza. The fitness hearing was thus remanded to March 29, 2010.

The fitness hearing of March 29, 2010 [ 21 ] At the start of the hearing, Maître Bourassa saw appropriate to specify that he had no mandate from Mr. Kaluza, but that he would act according to his appointment by the Court under

section 672.24 Cr.C . [ 22 ] Mr. Kaluza then addressed the Court. He insisted in reading a document that he had prepared to explain his situation. Among other statements with religious overtones, he explained something to the effect that he was " commanded under eternal law, which governs God's internal plan for the Universe that God alone understands, to come to Court on October 8 and make a special appearance as a human being in his natural person to lawfully deal with the Crown's accusation against his artificial person Leland Kaluza ". He further explained that the Court reacted unlawfully by detaining him.

However, he was now ready to clarify the " previous transactions " with this Court. He referred to Black's Dictionary to draw a parallel between a corporation and his artificial person. [ 23 ] He said that he willingly underwent a psychiatric evaluation to show that he was fit to stand trial. He does not understand why the Crown is pursuing this matter, since he is a " clearly sound and mentally healthy and loving human being ".

" According to divine law ", he then motioned that the question of his fitness be quashed and that a date for his trial be set. [ 24 ] He also asked the Court to call him by his name, Yoseph Yisrael and not Leland Kaluza. Further, the Court explained to him the reason of the proceedings and invited him to sit next to Maître Bourassa. He interrupted and said: Mr. Kaluza: Well then before we do that I must make one more statement Sir.

This court as unlawfully taken action against my artificial person, civil codes have been breached in this case, and they do apply, specially to me because I am a free man, the prosecution has not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that I am a criminal or engaged in any illegal actions therefore my civil freedoms do apply and on a higher rate, my constitutional rights have not been respected here. And therefore I am not obligated to participate in this unlawful procedure been taken against me by the Crown .

This is a Court of first instances and it does not have jurisdiction to rectify this transaction, I am here to appeal to the Superior Court.

The Court: Well, you will have time to appeal but after the proceeding has been held. Mr. Kaluza: I'll sit in silence and let you proceed if you like but as I said I am not obligated to participate being this is a violation of my constitutional rights. It does say that in criminal code

section 672.24 but it also states if a verdict of unfit as not been rendered that a person is considered fit therefore I am fit that's clear for everybody in here. If you'd like to proceed I'll let you proceed as you choose to but I made my intentions here today very clear . [ 25 ] The hearing commenced and one witness was heard, Dr. Jacques Talbot, a psychiatrist from the Institut Philippe-Pinel de Montréal. The doctor's expert qualifications are not contested. [ 26 ] After interviewing Mr.

Kaluza and observing him in Court on various dates, he filed a report on October 15, 2009 and then addendums on October, 22 and 27, November 13 and 24, and finally December 3 rd . At the end of the day, Dr. Talbot's evidence stands undisputed. [ 27 ] Dr. Talbot testified that Mr. Kaluza suffers from a " mode de pensée psychotique " (a psychotic thinking) to be more specifically qualified because of Mr. Kaluza's defensive attitude towards the process for the expertise. His psychotic thinking is affected by religious thoughts about himself and the world around him. Dr. Talbot noted that Mr.

Kaluza thinks that the judge needs to share and understand Divine law in order to understand his case. Although Mr. Kaluza seemed to understand the seriousness of the accusations, he thinks that the seriousness emanates from the importance of his person. In his first report, Dr. Talbot concludes that Mr. Kaluza would have difficulty assisting counsel and participate appropriately in the proceedings. [ 28 ] Dr. Talbot is of opinion that antipsychotic and mood stabilizer medication is necessary for Mr. Kaluza's fitness to improve. This medication can be taken orally or by forced intramuscular injections.

A medical supervision at the Institut Phlippe-Pinel will avoid unwanted secondary effects. Dr. Talbot estimates that Mr. Kaluza could be fit to stand trial within six weeks. [ 29 ] Dr. Talbot's opinion did not change over time. His observations following the first interview confirmed that Mr. Kaluza entertains the same grandiose religious thoughts. He is defensive towards Dr. Talbot, accusing him of being "against him". Over the weeks, Mr. Kaluza became very preoccupied by his illegal detention and the fact that he would soon be released. [ 30 ] In his December 2, 2009 addendum, Dr. Talbot describes Mr.

Kaluza's behavior in the courtroom. Dr. Talbot admits that he was spontaneous, consistent, calm, actively participating in the debate and accepting the opinions opposite to his, either coming from the Court or counsel, without getting disorganized or aggressive. Having read exhibit R-6a, Dr. Talbot did find some elements, which confirmed his earlier conclusion. [ 31 ] Consequently, Dr. Talbot maintains his diagnosis of a psychotic pathology, pointing towards a paranoid delusional disorder or the like. Mr. Kaluza poses himself as a victim of a plot from the Bar, the police, etc.

His pathology brings him to attribute the accusations and the proceedings to his artificial person, and therefore, he does not relate with the actors of, or the proceedings itself. [ 32 ] In an effective cross-examination by Maître Bourassa, Dr. Talbot agreed that Mr. Kaluza is well oriented in time and in space, that he never had a "false identity" but an "alternative identity" and that he could participate in the proceedings. In a few words, Dr. Talbot admitted that Mr. Kaluza was exhibiting an appropriate behavior in the courtroom, but he maintained his opinion.

He called on this Court to decide, ultimately, the issue of fitness. [ 33 ] Exhibit R-6a is titled « From concerned Citizens of Montreal, Quebec, in fulfillment of CIVIL, DUTY and RESPONSIBILITY: The War in Heaven ». This document includes many relevant statements.

Only some are reproduced herein with the original emphasis and symbols: Explaining who is Yoseph Yisrael: « Yoseph Yisrael is a member of a sovereign Hebrew Israelite people who share common customs, origin, culture, language, and religious belief based upon the commandments, judgments, laws, and statutes of God, , as taught by His Son, (Yahweh Ben Yahweh).»

Explaining the events that occurred October 8 before the trial judge: « He was again asked by the Justice Of Peace if he was "Leland KALUZA" and with more clarity, Yoseph Yisrael answered that he was making a special appearance in his Natural Person "Yoseph Yisrael" to represent his Artificial Person "Leland KALUZA". »

Explaining his understanding of his legal situation: «This unlawful attack against Yoseph Yisrael is a highly complex " judicial stratagem " in an attempt to disregard , discredit , and disallow the fact that Yoseph Yisrael's special appearance in his Natural Person could transact as a " special plea " if continued to trial; constituting a sufficient answer to the action of law; preventing the Crown from further prosecuting with effect.

Consequently, the "bench" ordered the unauthorized seizure of his " bodily property ," before Yoseph Yisrael could establish his proof, defeating and destroying the accusation altogether!» Explaining the unnecessary medical intervention and psychiatrist report: «They used deliberate, suggestive "buzz-word" verbiage to reprehensibly depict him as inapt, religiously fanatic, psychotic, and in need of medications that have been proven to be devastatingly harmful to his body.

Such fallacious portrayals make Yoseph Yisrael, The Nation of Yahweh, along with his affiliates of the Eyes Wide Open Artistic Peace Movement and 0 Ciel Embassy of Art, victims of egregious hate crimes. We consider this a declaration of word "war" against not only Yoseph Yisrael, but his family, friends, supporters,

and affiliates as well.» Explaining his understanding of the prosecution's case: «The Crown is attempting to compile evidence from sources who not only have controversy and a dispute with The Nation of Yahweh, but who also hate Yoseph Yisrael's claim to sovereignty and want to totally refute his beliefs. What sources?

The Montreal Police, the Montréal Bar, Institut Philippe-Pinel de Montreal, and a few mainstream Jewish political families who take strong, hostile opposition with Yoseph Yisrael's public teaching of the fact that the Nation of Yahweh and the so-called "black" people of America, the descendants of slaves, are, in reality , the descendant of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob (Israel): the true "chosen people" of the God of the Bible, , Yahweh.» THE MAY 6, 2010 HEARING [ 34 ] On May 6, 2010 there were still two questions that were apparently unsettled. First, Dr.

Talbot testified without being qualified as an expert according to law. Clearly this mistake is of no consequence and counsel immediately admitted that the issue was not contested. Mr. Kaluza, after a discussion with Maître Bourassa, also agreed that it was not an issue. Second, there was the question of the credentials of Dr. Talbot with regards to

section 672.62 Cr.C . To cut short, it was Maître Bourassa's understanding that March 29 was a hearing on the issue of fitness, not forcible treatment to which that

section relates. He argues that the Court must first find Mr. Kaluza unfit before considering forcible treatment and eventually, a hearing should be held if that is the case. The Crown has no objection, although the accused was notified as required by law. [ 35 ] There is logic to Maître Bourassa's position. It is also true that an accused found unfit might have evidence to file relevant to the decision on

section 672.58 Cr.C . but not to the fitness issue per se. [ 36 ] Finally, the Court permitted Mr. Kaluza to file new evidence that did not exist on March 29, 2010. Exhibit R-7 is a record of the Court of Appeal in file 500-09-020567-103 in which, according to Mr. Kaluza, Justice Duval Hesler authorized his brother to act before the Court in his Natural person Daviyd Yisrael when she refused him permission to appeal [4] . Of course, that is completely irrelevant to the decision of this Court in this specific matter.

THE LAW [ 37 ] He who initiates an application to determine the accused's fitness has the burden of proof that he is unfit to stand trial [5] . Indeed, in law, fitness is presumed. [ 38 ] A definition of 'unfitness' is provided by

section 2 of the Criminal Code : “unfit to stand trial” means unable on account of mental disorder to conduct a defense at any stage of the proceedings before a verdict is rendered or to instruct counsel to do so, and, in particular, unable on account of mental disorder to (

a) understand the nature or object of the proceedings (

b) understand the possible consequences of the proceedings, or (

c) communicate with counsel; [ 39 ] The definition, the procedure and the possible outcome of the fitness issue are codified since 1992. However, although the new provisions may have clarified some aspects of the traditional common law on the fitness issues [6] , they did not change the test for fitness. [ 40 ] Before the new provisions came into force, the Quebec Court of Appeal in the case of R. v. Steele reaffirmed a long-standing principle that an accused must be mentally fit to be tried.

As the Law Reform Commission of Canada once wrote, this simply promotes fairness because it would be wrong to convict or sentence a person who does not appreciate what is happening to him [7] . Thus, in R. v. Steele , J. Fish (as he then was) reaffirms the importance of the issue of fitness in the administration of justice. [ 41 ] He further went on to discuss the test of fitness: Insanity alone is not enough. Nor is incapability of conducting the defense. Both elements must be present-- and causally related.

If they are, the accused is "unfit to stand his trial" within the meaning … of the Code . [8] [ 42 ] In interpreting the former provision [9] , Justice Fish then struggled with the meaning of “ conducting his defense ”. He indicated that: An accused is incapable of conducting the defense, within the meaning of s. 615 of the Criminal Code , if he or she: (

a) cannot distinguish between available pleas; (

b) does not understand the nature or purpose of the proceedings, including the respective roles of the judge, jury and counsel; (

c) does not understand the personal import of the proceedings; (

d) is unable to communicate with counsel, converse with counsel rationally or make critical decisions on counsel's advice; or (

e) he is unable, if necessary, to take the stand. [10] [ 43 ] Justice Fish acknowledged that the law could not go as far as protecting an accused against himself. He referred to the decision

of R. v. McIlvride[11] where it had been stated that the test is not for the accused to act in his best interest[12]. Justice Fish, however, leftan opened-door when he wrote: Finally, I recognize that the law is helpless to protect an accused against his own bad judgment. On the other hand, I do not understandMcIlvride and Gorecki, supra, to preclude a finding of unfitness where, by reason of serious mental illness, the accused is incapable ofacting in her or his own best interests. That issue should be left for another day.[13] [44] That day was though to be in R. v. Taylor, at least that was the opinion of Mr.

Taylor[14]. However, the Court did not giveeffect to that argument in that case and, on the other hand, it may be said that the Court did not squarely answer that argument because ofthe particular facts. The Court did confirm that the incapability of a defendant to act in his own best interests is not the proper test[15].The Court wrote in R. v.

Taylor that an accused will be allowed to stand trial, even if his decisions are misguided: « … adopting a high threshold of fitness, including a "best interests" component, derogates from the fundamental principle that anaccused is entitled to choose his own defense and to present it as he chooses… An accused who has not been found unfit to stand trialmust be permitted to conduct his own defense, even if this means that the accused may act to his own detriment in doing so.

Theautonomy of the accused in the adversarial system requires that the accused should be able to make such fundamental decisions andassume the risks involved.»[16] [45] What is required is a "limited cognitive capacity" as opposed to an "analytic capacity"[17].

The Court concluded that Taylorhad the limited cognitive capacity to communicate with counsel[18], the sole issue with the three fitness criteria and on the appeal[19]. [46] The test is said to be “whether the appellant had the capacity to make an active or conscious choice for reasons he consideredappropriate” and it is not “that an accused be able to engage in a careful, reasoned weighing of options”[20]. [47] As well, it does seem very clear that the issue of fitness also means that an accused must have a meaningful participation in theproceedings. Again in R. v.

Steele, Justice Fish resorted to the Law Reform Commission of Canada and endorsed the proposition that “atrial at which the accused is mentally unable to exercise his rights is really a trial at which these rights do not exist”[21]. The OntarioCourt of Appeal echoed that proposition and more clearly in R. v.

Morrisey where Justice Blair wrote: [36] An accused must be mentally fit to stand trial in order to ensure that the trial meets minimum standards of fairness and accords withprinciples of fundamental justice such as the right to be present at one's own trial and the right to make full answer and defence: see R. v.Steele (1991), (QC CA), 63 C.C.C. (3d) 149, 4 C.R.R. (4th) 53 (Que. C.A.), at pp. 172-73 and 181 C.R.; R. v. Roberts(1975), (BC CA), 24 C.C.C. (2d) 539 (B.C.C.A.).

Meaningful presence and meaningful participation at the trial,therefore, are the touchstones of the inquiry into fitness.[22] ANALYSIS [48] The main conclusion of Dr. Talbot remains undisputed. Mr. Kaluza is affected by a psychotic pathology, pointing towards aparanoid delusional disorder and his pathology brings him to attribute the accusations and the proceedings to his artificial person. That isvery much troubling, specifically so when one considers the second criterion of fitness. [49] In cross-examination, Dr. Talbot tempered some of his conclusions, therefore, in can be said that Mr.

Kaluza meets the thirdcriterion of the fitness definition, which is to communicate with counsel. It is abundantly evident that Mr. Kaluza has the ability tocommunicate, with the Court and with others. Maître Bourassa produced RD-1, which is the motion for Habeas Corpus that was theresult of instructions received from Mr. Kaluza and the Court must conclude from it that Mr. Kaluza can communicate to some degreewith counsel when he decides to do so. [50] It is also shown that Mr. Kaluza meets the first branch of the definition, which is that he understands the nature or object of theproceedings. Indeed, to Dr.

Talbot and in his document filed R-6a, clearly Mr. Kaluza understands he must face criminal accusations in acriminal Court before a Judge and that the police and the Crown are working to have him convicted. Although one may pick up someexpression of delusions, obviously Mr. Kaluza shows a limited cognitive capacity in that regard. [51] The second criterion is more problematic. Whether or not one may have a limited cognitive capacity to meet the other two, inthe case of Mr. Kaluza, the Court is faced with an individual who was diagnosed with a psychotic pathology and thinks that he is nothimself, but someone else.

The Court was troubled by that fact since the very beginning and the evidence heard only confirms that it is areal concern. [52] Not only the opinion of Dr. Talbot, which is not determinative by itself, but the numerous affirmations by the accused in theproceeding that he is not Leland Kaluza, but another entity, confirms that the problem is real. He insisted on the Court to be called by thename Yoseph Yisrael. Whether the accused is playing a game or gives himself to some artistic extravagancies, like Maître Bourassasuggested, the evidence those not support it.

In fact, no efforts were made to bring the Court to conclude that it is the case. [53] It is true that exhibit R6-a states that Mr. Kaluza is a member of an artistic group, but that is not convincing. Otherwise, themedical opinion directly links his illness to his artificial entity and Mr. Kaluza demonstrated, in fact before the Court, that thatconclusion is convincing. [54] Now the question remains: how does it affect the fitness issue?

In short, the Court cannot bring itself to conclude that someoneis fit, if he takes important decisions for his defense in a criminal trial thinking that it will only affect his artificial person, not himself.Otherwise, a plea of guilty offered because of an ill belief that the consequences would not affect he who gives it but only his artificialentity, would have to be accepted. [55] That is very different from the case in R. v. M.A.W. where a person affected by a major depression offered a plea of guiltywithout being able to weigh properly the options that were in his best interest.

Here, the accused simply thinks that the consequences ofthe decision he will take do not concern him, but his artificial person. The idea of this happening in the hypothetical context of a crime

punishable by death is frightening. It also illustrates that a Court cannot just sit back and watch. [ 56 ] That would obviously be unfair to the accused, because he would not have participated in a meaningful way in the proceedings. It would also bring the administration of justice in disrepute by putting on trial someone whom never clearly understood “who” was on trial. [ 57 ] It is true that the evidence does not permit a conclusion beyond doubt that Mr. Kaluza as a double-personality. But that is not the burden of the Crown. Given all the evidence the Court finds that Mr.

Kaluza is affected by a mental illness that prevents him from understanding the possible consequences of the criminal process. His delusion does not only distort his comprehension of the judicial process, it distorts the very basic understanding that every decision he will take has a potential of affecting a 'real' person, Leland Kaluza. CONCLUSION [ 58 ] Accordingly, the Court finds that Mr. Kaluza is unfit to stand trial. __________________________________ MARTIN VAUCLAIR, j.c.q. Mr. Leland Kaluza, personally Me Gaétan Bourassa Community Legal Centre of Montreal Appointed Counsel for Mr.

Kaluza Me Caroline Dulong Directeur des poursuites criminelles et pénales Counsel for the prosecution Date of hearing: March 29 and May 6, 2010