2020 QCCQ 3058, 2020 QCCQ 3058

Translated from the original French Protection de la jeunesse — 203717 2020 QCCQ 3058 COURT OF QUEBEC CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC DISTRICT OF [...] LOCALITY OF [...] “Youth Division” No.: 540-41-003515-110 DATE: August 11, 2020 ______________________________________________________________________ PRESIDING: THE HONOURABLE PIERRE HAMEL, J.C.Q. [CASEWORKER 1], duly authorized by the Director of Youth Protection Applicant - and - X, born on …, 2008 Child - and - A B, Parents JUDGMENT Pursuant to s. 95 of the Youth Protection Act ______________________________________________________________________ WARNING: The Youth Protection Act prohibits the publication or broadcast of any information that would allow a child or the child’s parents to be identified.

Every person who contravenes this provision is liable to a fine (ss. 11.2.1 and 135 YPA ). [ 1 ] On January 23, 2019, the Court declared that the security and development of the child X was still in danger pursuant to ss. 38( b )(1)(iii) and (

c) of the Youth Protection Act ( YPA ) due to a situation of educational neglect and exposure to conjugal violence by the father. [1] [ 2 ] At the time, the Court ordered that the child’s placement in a rehabilitation centre continue until June 30, 2019, with various other measures of assistance and supervision for a period of one year. [ 3 ] However, on June 25, 2019, before the end of the placement period, the Director filed an application for review of this order accompanied by an application for provisional measures.

The Director recommended to the Court that the child be maintained at the rehabilitation centre, with various measures of assistance and supervision until he reaches the age of majority. [ 4 ] On June 26, 2019, Denis Saulnier J. granted the Director’s application for provisional measures and ordered that the child be maintained in the rehabilitation centre until the hearing on the application for review.

[ 5 ] The mother acknowledges the grounds of protection but contests the Director’s recommendations. She asks that her son be returned to her. Alternatively, she agrees to his being entrusted to his maternal aunt (the sister of the child’s maternal grandmother), Ms. C. (the aunt). [ 6 ] The father supports the mother’s position. [ 7 ] The child wants to return to his mother. [ 8 ] The hearing was held over several days, specifically, on November 22, 2019, February 17, 2020, and July 28, 2020. [2] [ 9 ] Several witnesses were heard, including the child and two expert psychologists.

In addition, abundant documentary evidence was filed. [ 10 ] At the end of the hearing, the Court took the case under advisement.

BACKGROUND [ 11 ] The Director submits that the mother was not able to follow through on her commitments, particularly those to help with the child’s homework and visit the group home once a week. [ 12 ] Moreover, the mother’s cooperation with the follow-up by the educator was apparently lukewarm, as she was absent for most of the scheduled meetings. [ 13 ] When the child was given leave to stay at the mother’s home, his homework was not done; school absences and significant tardiness were also noted. [ 14 ] In addition, special education services were suspended after the child was absent numerous times. [ 15 ] Over the past few months, the child’s behaviour in school has become disruptive and he is failing. [ 16 ] According to the Director, the child is even able to identify the times spent at the mother’s home and the lack of supervision he receives in that environment as the reason why he is failing in school. [ 17 ] In addition, the child is obsessed with video games and the mother is not able to place limits on him, such that he spends numerous hours online when he is at his mother’s home. [ 18 ] Over the past few months, the child experiences somatic symptoms when he is at his mother’s home; for example, he has stomach aches, headaches, and nausea. [ 19 ] Among other things, the mother is not able to provide the supervision the child needs. [ 20 ] The father is still incarcerated.

His situation has not really changed. [ 21 ] The child was placed at the A group home. He has been transferred to the A centre, where is making good progress. ISSUES • Can cultural considerations explain the parenting issues and alone justify returning the child to the family environment? • Can returning the child to his mother be considered? • Can the option of integrating the child into the home of the mother’s aunt be considered? • Is it necessary to place the child in a rehabilitation centre? • If so, is it necessary to maintain him there until he reaches the age of majority?

PRIOR DECISIONS [ 22 ] The Court believes that it is useful to review the judicial interventions that have been necessary in this child’s situation to properly understand the context of this judgment. [ 23 ] This is a brief overview; the reader should refer to the earlier decisions for a complete picture of the evolution of the family’s situation. [ 24 ] First, it should be noted that the child’s situation was brought before the Court of Québec for the first time in October 2011. The child was 3 years old at the time.

First judicial intervention [ 25 ] On February 21, 2012, Luc Joly J. declared that the security and development of the child were in danger due to the father’s conjugal violence and educational neglect. [3]

[ 26 ] Joly J. then entrusted the child to his mother with various measures of assistance and supervision, including a prohibition on placing the child in contact with the father. The mother asserted at the time that she no longer had any contact with the father. Second judicial intervention [ 27 ] On July 3, 2012, the Director again applied to the Court and asked for the order to be extended. [ 28 ] In March 2012, the father had broken into the mother’s home and was violent towards her.

At the time of the hearing, the father was incarcerated for 21 months in connection with various cases involving violence, including towards a member of the mother’s extended family. [ 29 ] On September 11, 2012, Joly J. rendered his judgment and maintained the child with his mother, but the judge noted that she needed support to improve her parenting skills and assert her authority with the child. He also noted that the parents’ situation remained largely unchanged.

That judgement was in force until September 11, 2013. [4] Third judicial intervention [ 30 ] On August 15, 2013, the Director filed an application to extend that order. [ 31 ] However, on September 12, 2013, Bolduc J. had to issue an order to search for the child and bring him before the Director. [5] [ 32 ] The mother and the child had been missing since September 5, and the mother’s extended family stated that they did not know where they were.

It must be noted that the father had been released from custody on September 5. [ 33 ] On September 16, 2013, the undersigned ordered the provisional placement of the child with a foster family. The evidence had revealed among other things that the mother had been hiding out at the home of the father’s extended family, with the father. The child had not attended school since September 5. [ 34 ] On March 28, 2014, the undersigned extended the order issued by Joly J. and ordered the placement of the child with a foster family, while also authorizing the child’s reintegration with the mother.

That judgment was for a period of one year. [ 35 ] It must be noted that already at that time, the aunt, Ms. C., had offered to support the mother in taking care of the child. However, none of the arrangements suggested by the extended family members were implemented, since they did not follow up on them. [6] The evidence also revealed that since his placement in a foster family, the child’s behaviour had greatly improved. The mother affirmed at the time that she would participate in all of the measures aimed at returning her child to her.

Fourth judicial intervention [ 36 ] On February 23, 2015, the child’s situation was brought before the Court again. For various reasons, and with the parties’ consent, the status quo was provisionally maintained. [7] [ 37 ] On March 3, 2016, the undersigned extended the judgment rendered in March 2014. The Court then rendered an interim judgment maintaining the child with the foster family, while providing for the child’s gradual return to his mother.

It must be noted that this recommendation, which was accepted by all of the parties, was made by the psychologist Pérusse, who assessed the child at the mother’s request. [8] [ 38 ] At the end of the presentation of the evidence, on June 15, 2016, the Court, as final measures, entrusted the child to his mother. The mother had made firm commitments to cooperate with the Director, which the Court then made into a condition.

Fifth judicial intervention [ 39 ] On June 7, 2017, Antoine Cloutier J. ordered the compulsory placement of the child in a rehabilitation centre because the child challenged his mother’s authority and she was unable to discipline him properly. [ 40 ] On November 24, 2017, the undersigned rendered a new judgment ordering the placement of the child in a rehabilitation centre until August 2018, while also ordering his reintegration into the family, to begin no later than April 1, 2018. [ 41 ] Once again, the mother undertook to participate in follow-up with educational services and in therapy with very specific and detailed intervention objectives. [9] Sixth judicial intervention [ 42 ] On September 26, 2018, Jean La Rue J. ordered the compulsory placement of the child in a rehabilitation centre. [ 43 ] In accordance with the Court’s judgment, contact with the mother was increased with the aim of returning the child to his mother.

However, it was observed at the time that the mother cooperated little or not at all with the services put in place and that she had organizational issues for which the educators from the group home had to constantly compensate. [ 44 ] On January 23, 2019, the undersigned extended the order and ordered the placement of the child in the rehabilitation centre until June 2019. [ 45 ] The evidence had revealed that the mother was unable to take action and participate in the measures she had committed to. Despite the strategies suggested, the mother’s resistance defeated every attempt at reintegration.

In addition, it was observed that the child was able to function well at the group home with clear and consistent supervision.

[ 46 ] As stated above, in June 2019, the Director applied to the Court once again to extend the child’s placement in the rehabilitation centre. These proceedings arise from that application. ANALYSIS AND DECISION Can cultural considerations explain all of the parenting issues and alone justify returning the child to the family environment? [ 47 ] The mother’s arguments were centred on this consideration to explain certain behaviours or attitudes and to justify returning the child to her or, alternatively, to the aunt, Ms.

C. [ 48 ] In this regard, the mother produced the assessment of the psychologist Resnier, who broadly described the impact of the culture of origin to explain the family dynamic. [10] [ 49 ] Under the

chapter on general principles and children’s rights, the YPA establishes that persons exercising responsibilities towards a child, and every person called upon to make decisions with respect to a child must, in their interventions, take into account the characteristics of cultural communities, among other factors . [11] [ 50 ] The YPA provides that this factor must be taken into account when decisions or measures must be taken with respect to a child and his or her family. [ 51 ] It is easy to hypothesize that the values from the family’s country of origin and the traditions or practices current there will continue after their arrival in Quebec.

In many respects, this appears entirely legitimate. [ 52 ] It is therefore common for families to invoke their customs or culture before the court to explain or justify some of their behaviours or attitudes. [ 53 ] Thus, as the YPA provides, these characteristics must be taken into account to properly understand and identify the difficulties encountered by an immigrant family that has settled in Quebec, sometimes recently. [ 54 ] Often, immigrants display attitudes or behaviours that might be perceived differently in Quebec than in their country of origin, sometimes leading to incorrect

interpretations, on the part of both the authorities and the persons targeted by interventions. [ 55 ] In particular, the respective roles of the parents and the extended family in relation to children can influence the family dynamic.

In addition, the relationship with authorities or representatives of the state may have an impact on their cooperation with state authorities. [ 56 ] This consideration should be taken into account not only when assessing the report to properly understand the issues, but also when proposing corrective measures. [ 57 ] However, the effect of taking this factor into account must not be to minimize or limit the protections that the YPA confers on children. [ 58 ] Although these characteristics must be taken into account to properly understand the family’s difficulties and the issues they raise, this does not lessen the protections to which the child is entitled. [ 59 ] As Gagnon J. aptly pointed out: [ translation ] A child’s cultural identity is certainly an important element in the child’s development.

But cultural identity on its own does not represent all of the child’s fundamental needs to which parents must respond . [12] [ 60 ] The Court shares this opinion. [ 61 ] Therefore, the Court is of the view that the intervention strategies are primarily where any adaptations or adjustments can be made. [ 62 ] Indeed, the intervention strategies employed often face resistance due to the families’ values and customs, which thwart the strategies or greatly diminish their effect, forcing caseworkers to constantly innovate and adapt their interventions to support the families. [ 63 ] In this case, the Court has on more than one occasion insisted that it is necessary for the Director to take into account this family’s distinctive dynamics, where each member of the extended family is very present in the child’s life and exercises responsibilities related to parental authority to a greater or lesser extent. [13] [ 64 ] In addition, the mother has argued that the way this family system functions is not due to negligence, but to characteristics related to her family’s origin and how it functions. [14] [ 65 ] The mother and her family are from A, and they identify with the A culture. [ 66 ] The evidence has established that the Director tried to involve the extended family in the intervention to a certain extent, but this did not allow for real action.

Indeed, the evidence reveals that the Director invited the grandmother and the aunt to participate, but they did not really respond. On this subject, the caseworker, Ms. [caseworker 1], testified about the aunt’s anger towards the caseworkers.

[ 67 ] However, that does not appear to be enough. [ 68 ] The caseworker’s testimony to the effect that she did not know where the family was from, which she justified by her recent arrival on the file, is not very reassuring and suggests that the Director treated this aspect as merely an accessory consideration. [ 69 ] That being so, the Court is of the view that, in this case, it is more than appropriate, even necessary, to try to directly involve the extended family members in the intervention and to permit or even encourage them to participate as though they were the parents . [ 70 ] Nevertheless, the parents also have a duty to perform actions that will allow their child to function properly and integrate into the host society.

Although the family’s cultural reality explains some reactions or attitudes, in this case, the evidence has established that the extended family has in some respects displayed an extremely high level of resistance and mistrust. [ 71 ] In other words, this explanation cannot justify a refusal to cooperate or participate in the measures ordered. [ 72 ] Here, the mother made several commitments before the Court that were generally not kept. On more than one occasion, the Court relied on these commitments. [ 73 ] Does the Director still need to do more, nevertheless?

Certainly. [ 74 ] As the Court has stated, the Director must attempt to place the extended family at the centre of the intervention.

The evidence has revealed that their contribution has often been secondary and that they have been treated as merely supporting players, not the leading actors. [ 75 ] On several occasions, the evidence has revealed that, in this family system, parental authority is not concentrated solely in the hands of the mother but naturally transfers to other family members depending on the needs and difficulties encountered. [ 76 ] Indeed, for a long time now, the child’s eldest sister Y has been taken care of by the aunt, the grandmother, and the great- grandmother, who all live under the same roof.

This is part of the cultural reality of this family. The Director must take it into account in his intervention. [ 77 ] It has been observed that the mother’s aunt has compensated for the mother’s shortcomings several times, in particular by taking care of transportation for the child. [ 78 ] Denying this obvious fact puts the intervention at risk of failure. [ 79 ] In any case, in addition to the considerations related to the family’s culture of origin, the Court must render a decision in the best interests of the child . [ 80 ]

Section 3 of the YPA provides several factors that the Court must consider: Decisions made under this Act must be in the interest of the child and respect his rights.

In addition to the moral, intellectual, emotional and material needs of the child, his age, health, personality and family environment and the other aspects of his situation must be taken into account. [15] [ 81 ] Cultural considerations are part of the analysis the Court must perform, but these considerations are no more determinative than the other aspects that the Court must take into account. [ 82 ] Doing otherwise could have the effect of privileging the parents’ point of view to the child’s detriment. [ 83 ] In the end, this is a complex exercise where the ultimate goal is always to determine the best interests of the child.

Can returning the child to his mother be considered? [ 84 ] The evidence establishes on a balance of probabilities that the child’s security and development are still in danger for the reasons already identified. This issue is not in dispute.

Consequently, the Director’s intervention with the family is still necessary. [ 85 ] The placement measure is the subject of contestation. [ 86 ] The Court notes, based on all of the decisions rendered over the years, that the mother’s situation has not changed in any significant respect, despite the services that have been offered. [ 87 ] All of the expert psychologists who have performed an assessment of the mother have noted significant shortcomings in her parental capacities. [16] [ 88 ] Her participation in the measures ordered and her cooperation with the Director were never undertaken in earnest and the evidence does not suggest any changes in this regard in the future. [ 89 ] The Court must also point out that it has rendered several decisions where the principal objective was to return the child to his mother. [ 90 ] However, every time, the absence of genuine cooperation from the mother, her lack of transparency, and her failure to keep her commitments prevented the child from being returned to her on a permanent basis.

[ 91 ] Generally, through her attitude, the mother has thwarted all attempts to return the child to her or to increase contact. [ 92 ] The Court cannot decide whether this results from the mother’s inability or from her objection to the Director’s intervention, but the result is the same. [ 93 ] Whatever the case, the Court notes that the mother is unable to reassure and soothe this child, who cannot rely on her as parental figure who provides security and structure and who is capable of ensuring his development. [17] [ 94 ] In this context, it is not possible to consider returning the child to his mother now or in the reasonably foreseeable future. [ 95 ] The conditions that led to the child’s provisional placement in June 2019 have not changed, and nothing in the evidence suggests that things would be any different today. [ 96 ] The mother’s words are always the same: she will [ translation ] “do everything that is asked of her” and she insists that her son misses her. [ 97 ] She also adds that her son no longer has fits and that he will be able to do what she says from now on. [ 98 ] As if the difficulties were caused (solely) by the child. [ 99 ] Although she is an important figure to the child on an emotional level, the mother is not a credible parental figure capable of meeting his needs and providing him with the supervision he requires. [ 100 ] The Court considers that this child cannot be placed again before an attempt at reintegration that will end in failure.

This child’s disappointed expectations and the suffering this has caused him are profound and harmful to his development. [ 101 ] Consequently, returning the child to his mother cannot be considered. Can the option of integrating the child into aunt’s home be considered? [ 102 ] The aunt volunteered to receive the child into her home. [ 103 ] As stated, she is the mother’s aunt.

This aunt lives with the maternal grandmother, the great-grandmother, and the child’s eldest sister, whose given name is Y. [ 104 ] This is not the first time that this person has testified before the Court, but it is the first time she has stated – or at least, stated this clearly – that she wants to take care of the child. [ 105 ] It must be stated, as the Court has already done in its earlier decisions, that the members of the mother’s family are from [country A] (as is the father) and define themselves as being [...]. [ 106 ] That being so, they have adopted a way of life whereby many generations live together under the same roof and where care for the children is assumed by all of the family members.

As previously mentioned, this aspect is among the considerations submitted by the mother. [ 107 ] Although this option may appear to be a solution in the context of this family, the Court nevertheless has some important reservations. [ 108 ] In her testimony, the aunt reiterated several times that the Director was a [ translation ] “monster” in whom she had no trust whatsoever.

Also, to her, the centre where the child is currently placed is nothing more than a [ translation ] “prison” from which he must be released. [ 109 ] Despite attempts by counsel for the mother and counsel for the child to suggest during her testimony that she agree to cooperate with the Director, her position remained unchanged.

What emerges from her testimony is that she does not currently intend to cooperate. [ 110 ] Although counsel for the mother submitted in her arguments that the aunt would cooperate if the Court entrusted the child to her, nothing in the evidence supports such an assertion. [ 111 ] However, Court does not believe that this means that this resource should be rejected definitively.

Such emotional, even impulsive, reactions can sometimes change and give way to fruitful cooperation. [ 112 ] Of course, without active and transparent cooperation, integrating the child into the aunt’s home can in no way be considered. [ 113 ] However, if the aunt agreed to be more open to the Director’s intervention, it would be possible to consider contact and even outings with the extended family, including at the aunt’s home, in addition to contact with the mother. [ 114 ] This could also potentially allow an assessment of that environment and of whether the child could receive the proper care there. [ 115 ] However, the Court has another reservation based on the fact that the aunt (like the mother) appears to blame the child alone for his behavioural problems, which she describes as [ translation ] “fits”.

In her statements, the aunt appears to reject the mother’s responsibility. In addition, she asserts that, in her home, the child does not have fits and he does what she asks. [ 116 ] Unlike the aunt, the Court is of the opinion that the child’s reactions are more likely the result of the mother’s lack of supervision and her inconsistent interventions. At least, that is what appears from the evidence.

[ 117 ] For all these reasons, the Court does not believe that integration into the aunt’s home can be considered at this time. [ 118 ] Any consideration of this option will depend on the aunt’s future attitude, her openness towards the Director, and the cooperation she will be able to provide. [ 119 ] In other words, the ball is in her court.

Is it necessary to maintain the child in the rehabilitation centre? [ 120 ] The child just turned 12 years old last July. [ 121 ] Returning him to the family environment is not possible at this time. [ 122 ] Although he currently needs stronger support, overall, the child is able to function well if he receives clear and consistent supervision. [ 123 ] It should also be noted that several of the child’s problematic behaviours appeared due to the failure in the maternal environment to provide him with appropriate and adequate supervision. [ 124 ] An alternative family-type environment cannot be considered.

Past experiences have shown that this was not possible, as the child quickly found himself in a conflict of loyalty that was harmful to his development. [ 125 ] The evidence has also established that a foster family with whom the child had previously been placed had unacceptable attitudes towards the child making the family’s acceptance of this approach even more difficult. [ 126 ] Therefore, at present, the Court finds that the child’s placement in a rehabilitation centre appears to meet his needs, while allowing him to maintain a connection with his family.

Is it necessary to maintain the child in the rehabilitation centre until he reaches the age of majority? [ 127 ] The Court answers this question in the negative. [ 128 ] It is difficult to conceive of a child of this age having no permanency plan other than placement in an institutional environment until he reaches the age of majority. [ 129 ] While a rehabilitation centre is a place that provides treatment and a living environment that some children need to ensure their security or development (it is certainly not the prison that the family says it is), the reasons for such a measure must be based on the grounds of protection upon which the Court declared that the security or development of the child is in danger and on the child’s need for rehabilitation and supervision. [ 130 ] It is not a place that provides housing, to be resorted to solely because the family environment cannot receive the child. [ 131 ] Even though returning the child to the mother does not appear possible, as stated above, the possibility that the mother’s extended family could eventually receive the child cannot be set aside. [ 132 ] In addition, the Court does not fully agree with the Director’s claim that once the decision is rendered, the child will [ translation ] “calm down” and will be able to get involved at the centre on a more sustained basis and create better relationships with the educators. [ 133 ] Indeed, a long proceeding may have been keeping the child in a state of waiting for a decision, thereby hindering his investment in more therapeutic measures. [ 134 ] However, what the maternal family environment represents to this child and his attachment to it cannot be disregarded. [ 135 ] The child has always expressed a desire to return to his family, to which he has always remained extremely loyal.

Indeed, in his testimony, X made statements modeled largely on his mother’s. [ 136 ] It is also true that the mother has never really [ translation ] “allowed” her son to invest himself in another environment. [ 137 ] In any event, in this sort of situation, it is unlikely that the child will accept such a proposition and easily get over not returning to the family environment. [ 138 ] This appears unrealistic, as is often the case in this sort of situation. [ 139 ] In addition, such an approach appears consistent with the principles set out in s. 4 of the YPA : Every decision made under this Act must aim at keeping the child in the family environment.

If, in the interest of the child, it is not possible to keep the child in the family environment, the decision must aim at ensuring that the child benefits, insofar as possible with the persons most important to the child, in particular the grandparents or other members of the extended family , from continuity of care, stable relationships and stable living conditions corresponding to the child’s needs and age and as nearly similar to those of a normal family environment as possible.

Moreover, the parents’ involvement must always be fostered, with a view to encouraging and helping them to exercise their parental responsibilities. [18]

[ 140 ] Although the Director did not raise this point, the Court is also fully aware that the maximum placement periods set out in the YPA have been reached. [ 141 ] Indeed, s. 91.1 of the YPA provides that if the court orders that a child be entrusted to an alternative living environment, the total period for which the child is so entrusted may not exceed 24 months if the child is six years of age or over. [ 142 ] Such is the case for this child. [ 143 ] Thus, at the expiration of the time periods, the court must make an order aimed at ensuring continuity of care, stable relationships, and stable living conditions corresponding to the child’s needs and age on a permanent basis. [ 144 ] Nevertheless, the Court believes that it is appropriate to set aside the time periods in accordance with the provisions of the penultimate paragraph of s. 91.1 of the YPA : However, the tribunal may disregard the periods specified in the first paragraph if it is expected that the child will be returned to his family in the short term, if the interest of the child requires it or for serious reasons, such as failure to provide the services agreed upon. [19] [ 145 ] In this case, the Court believes that it is not possible to definitively reject the possibility of returning the child to the family environment, or more specifically, to the aunt’s home. [ 146 ] In addition, given the child’s deep desire to return to the family environment and the possibility (however slight) that the extended family environment may eventually be able to receive the child, at least for outings, the Court considers that it is too early to totally reject any return to the family environment and that it does not appear to be in the child’s interest to render such an order until he reaches the age of majority. [ 147 ] The Court considers that a period of one year will allow the child to gain a clearer outlook and to define a plan to which he can more fully commit. [ 148 ] However, if by then end of this year it is impossible to consider integrating the child into the aunt’s home within a realistic timeframe because of her attitude, it will be time to provide the child with an alternative permanency plan.

CONCLUSION [ 149 ] The Court believes that this is a pivotal judgement for the future of this child. [ 150 ] This is a child who experiences great anguish and expresses the desire to return to his family, which does not appear possible, at least at present. [ 151 ] Currently, the placement of the child in the rehabilitation centre appears to be necessary and in his best interest.

Furthermore, it is beneficial to him. [ 152 ] The extended family must actively participate in the Director’s intervention and in this respect, the child’s integration into the aunt’s home in particular must be considered. [ 153 ] The aunt (and the extended family) must cooperate with the Director.

However, if she continues to display her current attitude, it seems clear that this option cannot be considered. [ 154 ] Consequently, if the conditions necessary for the extended family’s positive involvement cannot be achieved, an alternative permanency plan for this child must be implemented. [ 155 ] The situation of the father remains unchanged, and the measures already put in place concerning him are still necessary.

THEREFORE, AND FOR ALL THESE REASONS, THE COURT: [ 156 ] DECLARES that the security and development of the child are still in danger for the reasons identified; [ 157 ] ORDERS the placement of the child in a rehabilitation centre for a period of one year; [ 158 ] ORDERS that contact between the mother and the child be determined by agreement between the parties as to its frequency and conditions; [ 159 ] AUTHORIZES the Director to organize contact between the child and the mother’s extended family, more particularly, with Ms.

C.’s aunt; [ 160 ] RECOMMENDS that the Director assess whether the aunt can receive the child into her home or whether she can exercise some responsibilities in relation to the child; [ 161 ] AUTHORIZES the supervision of contact between the child and the mother or the extended family by the Director or any other person designated for this purpose, to the extent deemed necessary; [ 162 ] SUSPENDS contact between the child and the father;

[ 163 ] ORDERS that the mother and the father report periodically to the Director of Youth Protection on the steps they are taking to put an end to the situation of endangerment to the security or development of the child; [ 164 ] ORDERS that the child and his mother and father take an active

part in the measures ordered; [ 165 ] PROHIBITS the mother from placing the child in contact with the father, under any circumstances; [ 166 ] ORDERS that the mother inform the Director of Youth Protection if the father enters into contact with her or attempts to do so; [ 167 ] WITHDRAWS from the father the exercise of certain attributes of parental authority regarding the school, school activities, extracurricular activities, health care, travel, and obtaining a passport, which attributes the mother may exercise alone; [ 168 ] AUTHORIZES the Director of Youth Protection to inform Canada Border Services that the situation of the child is subject to an order under the Youth Protection Act and, in the event that the father is arrested and a hearing before the Immigration Board is held, that the Director be informed so that he may make submissions, should he deem it relevant to do so; [ 169 ] ORDERS the mother to inform the Director of Youth Protection prior to any passport application concerning the child; [ 170 ] ORDERS that a person working for an institution or body provide aid, counselling, or assistance to the child and the child’s family and extended family; [ 171 ] ENTRUSTS the child’s situation to the Director of Youth Protection of the Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux A for the execution of the order; [ 172 ] THE WHOLE for a period of one year. __________________________________ PIERRE HAMEL, J.C.Q.

Mtre Louise Deschênes Counsel for the Director of Youth Protection Mtre Annie Miele Counsel for the child Mtre Calina Jurju Bala Counsel for the mother Mr. B Father, not represented PH/mcb Hearing dates: November 22, 2019, February 17, 2020, and July 29, 2020.