2013 FC 320, 2013 FC 320

[2014] 4 F.C.R. 274 IMM-6116-12 2013 FC 320 The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration ( Applicant ) v. B377 ( Respondent ) Indexed as: Canada (C itizenship and I mmigration ) v . B377 Federal Court, Blanchard J.—Vancouver, February 5 and May 8, 2013.

Citizenship and Immigration — Status in Canada — Convention Refugees and Persons in Need of Protection — Judicial review of decision by Immigration and Refugee Board, Refugee Protection Division (RPD) granting respondent refugee status — Respondent Tamil from Sri Lanka, arriving in Canada aboard MV Sun Sea — Allegedly interrogated, tortured in Sri Lanka on suspicion of being Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam member — RPD finding respondent establishing basis for sur place refugee claim because of membership in group of refugee claimants aboard MV Sun Sea — Whether RPD erring in concluding respondent’s claim having nexus to ground in Convention refugee definition pursuant to Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, s. 96 — RPD’s decision reasonable — Initially characterizing nexus analysis as “particular social group” — However, RPD conducting detailed “mixed motives” analysis, finding respondent facing persecution based on Tamil ethnicity — Reasoning in Symes v.

Canada applied herein to determine that subgroup of Tamils traveling on Sun Sea may be persecuted — RPD’s erroneous articulation of Convention ground nexus inconsequential; analysis clearly setting out respondent’s fear of persecution on grounds of Tamil ethnicity or race — Application dismissed. This was an application for judicial review of a decision by the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) of the Immigration and Refugee Board granting the respondent refugee status. The respondent, a Sri Lankan citizen of Tamil ethnicity, arrived in Canada aboard the MV Sun Sea .

He described being subjected to interrogation and torture in Sri Lanka on suspicion of being a member of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). While the RPD found that the respondent’s claims of persecution in Sri Lanka were not credible, it nevertheless found that the respondent had established a basis for a sur place refugee claim because of his membership in a group of refugee claimants aboard the MV Sun Sea . The RPD found that the respondent became a target of the government of Sri Lanka because the government has accused travelers aboard the Sun Sea of having links to the LTTE.

The main issue was whether the RPD erred in concluding that the respondent’s claim had a nexus to a ground in the Convention refugee definition pursuant to

section 96 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act . Held , the application should be dismissed. The RPD’s decision was reasonable. The RPD initially characterized its nexus analysis as “particular social group.” However, the RPD went on to conduct a detailed “mixed motives” analysis and found that the respondent had established a foundation for a sur place claim for refugee protection as he faced “a serious possibility of persecution based on his being a Tamil who was a passenger on the MV Sun Sea ”.

It was clear that the RPD turned its mind to the respondent’s ethnicity and that it was satisfied that the respondent’s alleged fear of persecution was based at least in part on his Tamil ethnicity or race. The RPD concluded that a nexus to a Convention ground was established, “in which the claimant’s Tamil race” along with other factors were combined elements of the grounds on which the respondent may face persecution in Sri Lanka. This finding satisfied the required nexus to a Convention ground, namely race. The Court applied the Supreme Court of Canada’s reasoning in Symes v.

Canada wherein a finding of ill-treatment against a subgroup of individuals is sufficient to warrant a finding of discrimination, to determine that while not all Tamils are subject to persecution in Sri Lanka, the subgroup of Tamils traveling on the Sun Sea may well be. The RPD afforded the respondent refugee protection on the basis of a well-founded fear of persecution based on “his particular social group”. This was an erroneous articulation of the Convention ground nexus. However, the RPD’s analysis clearly set out the respondent’s fear of persecution on the grounds of his Tamil ethnicity or race.

Consequently, the error had no bearing on the analysis itself and did not render the decision unintelligible so as to preclude the Court from understanding the reasons and affecting the Court’s ability to review the decision. STATUTES AND REGULATIONS CITED Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms , being

Part I of the Constitution Act , 1982 ,

Schedule B, Canada Act 1982 , 1982, c. 11 (U.K.) [R.S.C., 1985, Appendix II, No. 44], s. 15. Federal Courts Act , R.S.C., 1985, c. F-7, s. 18.1(3)( b ). Federal Courts Immigration and Refugee Protection Rules , SOR/93-22, R. 22 . Immigration and Refugee Protection Act , S.C. 2001, c. 27, ss. 72(1), 74 ( d ), 96 , 97(1) . CASES CITED applied:

Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, (SCC), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, (1993), 103 D.L.R. (4th) 1; Veeravagu v. Canada(Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] F.C.J. No. 468 (C.A.) (QL); Symes v. Canada, (SCC), [1993] 4S.C.R. 695, (1993), 110 D.L.R. (4th) 470. distinguished: Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. B380, 2012 FC 1334, 421 F.T.R. 138. referred to: Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190; Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v. Newfoundland andLabrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 708; Republic of Cyprus (Commerce and Industry) v.

International CheeseCouncil of Canada, 2011 FCA 201, 93 C.P.R. (4th) 255; Yang v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety), 2008 FC 158, 79 Admin. L.R. (4th)168; Levano v. Canada (Attorney General), , 182 F.T.R. 153 (F.C.T.D.); Stefanov v. Canada (Minister of Citizenshipand Immigration), 2002 FCT 704; Ivakhnenko v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 1249, 41 Imm. L.R. (3d)15; Gonsalves v. Canada (Attorney General), 2011 FC 648, 391 F.T.R. 22; Nara v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC364, 9 Imm. L.R. (4th) 128; Canada Post Corp. v.

Public Service Alliance of Canada, 2010 FCA 56, [2011] 2 F.C.R. 221, revd in part2011 SCC 57, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 572; Adjei v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), (FCA), [1989] 2F.C. 680, (1989), 57 D.L.R. (4th) 153 (C.A.); Kozak v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FCA 124, [2006] 4F.C.R. 377; Ndungu v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FCA 208, 423 N.R. 228. appLICATION for judicial review of a decision by the Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board granting therespondent refugee status. Application dismissed.

APPEARANCES Banafsheh Sokhansanj for applicant. Douglas Cannon for respondent. SOLICITORS OF RECORD Deputy Attorney General of Canada for applicant. Elgin, Cannon & Associates, Vancouver, for respondent.

The following are the public reasons for judgment rendered in English by [1] Blanchard J.: The Minister seeks judicial review under subsection 72(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C.2001, c. 27 (IRPA) of a decision by the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) of the Immigration and Refugee Board, dated June 4, 2012,granting the respondent refugee status. [2] The applicant seeks an order pursuant to paragraph 18.1(3)(

b) of the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-7 quashing or settingaside the decision and referring the matter back to the RPD for determination in accordance with such directions as the Court considersappropriate. I. Facts [3] The respondent is a young adult Sri Lankan citizen of Tamil ethnicity from the northern part of the country. He arrived in Canadaaboard the MV Sun Sea on August 13, 2010, and immediately sought asylum pursuant to

section 96 and subsection 97(1) of the IRPA. [4] In his Personal Information Form (PIF), the respondent described his personal circumstances as follows: (

a) The respondent’s family was originally from Jaffna, the northernmost district in Sri Lanka, but was displaced three times in the 1990sdue to the Sri Lankan civil war. Separated from his family in 2006, the respondent moved to an area controlled by the Liberation Tigersof Tamil Eelam (LTTE) where his family managed to rejoin him in 2008. (

b) The respondent and his family left and were taken to an internally displaced persons (IDP) camp in mid-2009. Once there, therespondent was subjected to interrogations concerning his possible membership in the LTTE. Upon presenting a letter from the church atwhich he had worked, the respondent was released from the IDP camp. (

c) One month later, the Sri Lankan Criminal Investigation Division (CID) and a paramilitary group came searching for him, and whenhe reported to them, he was interrogated and tortured on suspicion of being a member of the LTTE. The respondent was released oncondition that he report to the CID weekly, which he did for 15 weeks. He was often beaten when he reported. (

d) Although the respondent was threatened with death if he failed to report, he also feared torture if he did. He went to Colombo withthe intention of fleeing Sri Lanka. With the help of an agent, he reached Thailand in early 2010, and registered with the United NationsHigh Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) shortly after he arrived. He boarded the MV Sun Sea in mid-2010. II. Decision under Review [5] The RPD found the respondent to have a well-founded fear of persecution based on his membership in a particular social group.Consequently, the RPD found the respondent to be a Convention refugee pursuant to

section 96 of the IRPA. [6] The RPD found that the respondent’s claims of persecution in Sri Lanka were not credible. Consequently, it found that at the

time the respondent left Sri Lanka, he did not face a serious possibility of persecution based on a Convention ground or face a risk to lifeor risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. The RPD nevertheless found that the respondent had established a basis for a surplace refugee claim because of his membership in a group of refugee claimants aboard the MV Sun Sea.

The RPD found that therespondent’s voyage to Canada aboard the Sun Sea made him a particular target of the government of Sri Lanka because the governmenthas accused travelers aboard the Sun Sea of having links to the LTTE and demonstrated willingness to use torture to secure informationfrom those whom it suspected of having information about alleged terrorists. III. Issues [7] The following issues are raised in this application: 1. Did the RPD err in concluding that the respondent’s claim had a nexus to a ground in the Convention refugee definition pursuant tosection 96 of the IRPA? 2.

Were the reasons for decision unintelligible so as to render the decision unreasonable? 3. Did the RPD apply the correct standard of proof? IV. Standard of Review [8] The issue of nexus to a Convention ground raises a question of mixed law and fact. The question raised concerns the existence ofa connection between Convention grounds and the respondent’s particular factual circumstances. It follows that the applicable standardof review is reasonableness. See: Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, at paragraph 53.

Issues relating to thesufficiency and intelligibility of reasons are reviewable on the reasonableness standard. See: Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Unionv.

Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 709, at paragraph 22; Dunsmuir, at paragraph 47. [9] Issues relating to the sufficiency of the evidence to link a claimant to a particular social group and the “well foundedness” of therespondent’s fear raise questions of mixed law and fact and are also reviewable on the reasonableness standard. [10] Questions relating to the appropriate standard of proof are reviewable on the correctness standard. See: Republic of Cyprus(Commerce and Industry) v.

International Cheese Council of Canada, 2011 FCA 201, 93 C.P.R. (4th) 255, at paragraphs 18–19; Yang v.Canada (Minister of Public Safety), 2008 FC 158, 79 Admin. L.R. (4th) 168, at paragraph 6. V. Analysis [11] I will now consider the above issues in turn. Nexus [12] The applicant argues that the RPD erred in finding a nexus between the persecution feared by the respondent and one of theenumerated Convention grounds, namely by reason of a particular social group or his political opinion, as set out in Canada (AttorneyGeneral) v.

Ward, (SCC), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689. [13] The applicant contends that the RPD’s reasons are unclear as to which Convention ground it is making the nexus link. The RPDdecision is therefore neither intelligible nor transparent and does not allow a reviewing court to understand the reasons for its decision.The applicant argues that there is an apparent contradiction between the RPD’s conclusion that “Tamil passenger on the MV Sun SeaShip” may be a “particular social group” under

section 96, and its subsequent conclusion that this implication would be “contrary tosettled law”. [14] The applicant further argues that the RPD did not find that the Sri Lankan authorities will perceive the respondent as sharing apolitical opinion with the LTTE. Rather, it concluded that the respondent would be perceived to have information about the LTTE. Theapplicant contends that “having information” is not a “political opinion”. [15] The applicant also maintains that being a “Tamil passenger on the MV Sun Sea” does not meet the test for “particular socialgroup” under

section 96. In support of this contention, the applicant argues that the Supreme Court in Ward (at pages 729–730) rejectsthe notion that membership in a social group can be found by identifying a group of persons who share a thread in common. Theapplicant contends that the paramount consideration for determining whether a person is a member of a particular social group is toconsider the general underlying themes of the defence of human rights and anti-discrimination that form the basis for the internationalrefugee protection initiative (Ward, at page 739).

The applicant argues that voluntarily choosing to set sail for Canada on an illegalhuman smuggling ship does not engage the defence of human rights or anti-discrimination and consequently does not fall into a Wardcategory. [16] Regarding the RPD’s finding of a nexus with “political opinion”, the applicant contends that the RPD’s analysis is equallyflawed. The applicant points to the jurisprudence of this Court confirming that fear of persecution by reasons of being perceived to haveinformation about the LTTE does not have a nexus to the Convention ground of political opinion (see Levano v.

Canada (AttorneyGeneral), , 182 F.T.R. 153 (F.C.T.D.); Stefanov v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCT 704,at paragraphs 21–25; Ivakhnenko v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 1249, 41 Imm. L.R. (3d) 15, atparagraphs 65–67).

This is particularly so where the RPD explicitly found the respondent’s claim to be perceived as a member of theLTTE for being on the MV Sun Sea not to be credible. [17] The respondent argues that the applicant has misstated the RPD’s mixed motives analysis in its reasons and ignored the relevantpassages in the reasons related to the issue of nexus.

He contends that the RPD determined that because he was a Tamil migrant on theMV Sun Sea, he would be perceived as a person with links to the LTTE making him part of a “particular social group” and, alternatively,a person with a “political opinion” for the purposes of the Convention.

[18] The parties do not dispute that the single matter of having been a passenger on a ship is, in and of itself, insufficient to establish anexus to the Convention ground of membership in “a particular social group”. Indeed, the RPD expressly states this at paragraph 21 of itsreasons. In its reasons and decision, the RPD goes on to consider the possibility of mixed motives on the part of the agents ofpersecution.

The RPD concludes that it is a combination of factors that leads to the respondent’s fear of persecution including therespondent’s Tamil ethnicity and perceived political opinion as a passenger on the MV Sun Sea. [19] In support of his argument on nexus, the applicant relies on Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. B380, 2012 FC 1334, 421F.T.R. 138. In that case the question on nexus was whether there was sufficient evidence before the RPD to justify the conclusion thatthe respondent is a member of a particular social group.

In its analysis, the RPD in B380 did not conduct a detailed analysis of the raceand political opinion Convention grounds. In my view, this case can therefore be distinguished on its facts. [20] It is true the RPD initially characterized its nexus analysis as “particular social group.” However, that is not the only Conventionground considered by the RPD in its decision. The RPD went on to conduct a detailed “mixed motives” analysis and concluded that therespondent had established a foundation for a sur place claim for refugee protection.

I reproduce, in part, that analysis: However, I do find that the claimant has the foundation for a sur place claim for refugee protection. This finding is based on the countryevidence, which indicates that agents of the government of Sri Lanka engage in a systematic use of torture as a means of securinginformation or confessions from detainees, and on an analysis of the claimant’s particular circumstances as a Tamil and as a person whotraveled to Canada on the Sun Sea.

The government of Sri Lanka has accused the travelers of being linked to the LTTE, and hasdemonstrated its willingness to use torture to secure information from those whom the government believes has information aboutalleged terrorists. This tactic, in conjunction with documented discrimination against Tamils in Sri Lanka, demonstrates a heightened riskfor passengers on the Sun Sea.

I therefore find that the claimant faces a serious possibility of persecution based on his being a Tamil whowas a passenger on the MV Sun Sea ship. [21] It is clear that the RPD turned its mind to the respondent’s ethnicity in concluding as it did. It is also clear that the RPD wassatisfied that the respondent’s alleged fear of persecution was based at least in part on his Tamil ethnicity or race.

The jurisprudence ofthis Court has accepted the proposition that where a fear of persecution is based on more than one motive, and where there is evidence tosupport a motive based on a Convention ground, nexus might be established. See: Gonsalves v. Canada (Attorney General), 2011 FC648, 391 F.T.R. 22, at paragraph 29. [22] The circumstances here fall squarely within the circumstances underlying the decision in Veeravagu v. Canada (Minister ofEmployment and Immigration), [1992] F.C.J.

No. 468 (C.A.) (QL) in which Justice Hugessen implicitly dealt with the Convention nexuswhen he wrote: In our view, it is obvious beyond any need of demonstration that if a person faces “real and oppressive” risks, including a risk of“substantial violence”, from state sponsored sources (the IPKF) because he or she belongs to a group one of whose definingcharacteristics is race, (young Tamil males), it is simply impossible to say that such person does not have an objective fear of persecutionfor reasons of race. See also Nara v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 364, 9 Imm.

L.R. (4th) 128, at paragraph 38. [23] In its comprehensive reasons, the RPD dealt with the issue of race and found that the evidence established a “pattern ofdiscrimination by government authorities against Tamils”. It also found that Tamil ethnicity is an “aggravating factor” in addressing thetreatment the respondent may receive upon his return. The RPD concluded that a nexus to a Convention ground was established, “inwhich the claimant’s Tamil race” along with other factors are combined elements of the grounds on which the respondent may facepersecution in Sri Lanka.

In my view, this finding, reasonably open to the RPD on the record before it, satisfies the required nexus to aConvention ground, namely race. [24] In Ward, at pages 738–739, the Supreme Court relies on

section 15 Charter [Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, beingPart I of the Constitution Act, 1982,

Schedule B, Canada Act 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.) [R.S.C., 1985, Appendix II, No. 44]]jurisprudence to inform its

section 96 analysis. I find it useful to adopt such an approach here. In Symes v. Canada, (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 695, at pages 768–769 the Court determines that in a

section 15 Charter analysis a finding of ill-treatment againsta subgroup of individuals is sufficient to warrant a finding of discrimination. Justice Iacobucci explains that “if I were convinced that s.63 [the impugned provision in Symes] has an adverse effect upon some women (for example, in this case, self-employed women), Iwould not be concerned if the effect was not felt by all women…. [A]n adverse effect felt by a subgroup of women can still constitutesex-based discrimination” [emphasis in original].

Here, while not all Tamils are subject to persecution in Sri Lanka, applying theSupreme Court’s reasoning in Symes the subgroup of Tamils traveling on the Sun Sea, in their particular circumstances, may well be. [25] I now turn to the applicant’s argument that in its reasons, the RPD is unclear to which Convention ground it is making the nexuslink. The applicant argues that the decision is therefore neither intelligible nor transparent and does not allow a reviewing court tounderstand the reasons for its decision. [26] I reject the applicant’s argument.

While the RPD at paragraph 4 of its decision afforded the respondent refugee protection on thebasis of a well-founded fear of persecution based on “his particular social group”, for the most part, the analysis on “particular socialgroup” focuses on the treatment of Tamils (paragraphs 20–25 of the decision). As I mentioned earlier, the reasons refer to therespondent’s “Tamil ethnicity” or the fact that the respondent is Tamil throughout, most importantly in the concluding paragraphs 39 and41. The mixed motives analysis and the fact that it hinges on “race” or “ethnicity” are clear and explicit in the reasons.

The content ofparagraph 4 of the decision is an erroneous articulation of the Convention ground nexus. However, the RPD’s analysis clearly sets outthe respondent’s fear of persecution on the grounds of his Tamil ethnicity or race. Consequently, the error has no bearing on the analysisitself and does not render the decision unintelligible so as to preclude the Court from understanding the reasons and affecting the Court’sability to review the decision (see Newfoundland Nurses’ Union, at paragraph 16). See also Canada Post Corp. v.

Public ServiceAlliance of Canada, 2010 FCA 56, [2011] 2 F.C.R. 221, at paragraph 164 (dissent upheld on appeal 2011 SCC 57, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 572). [27] Finally, I find that the RPD’s conclusion with respect to political opinion is problematic. Imputed knowledge does not necessarily

lead to a finding of imputed political opinion. While it was open to the RPD to conclude that political opinion is imputed to therespondent, it did not clearly justify this finding. Rather, the RPD found that, “the claimant is a Tamil who is perceived to haveinformation about a possible LTTE-affiliated smuggling operation”. Such a finding does not result in a nexus to a Convention ground.However, having established a nexus to one of the Convention grounds, namely race, is sufficient.

It matters not, in the circumstances ofthis case, whether the RPD’s assessment and determination of the other factors in its mixed motives analysis relating to nexus wasdeficient. In this instance, such deficiencies have no bearing on the outcome. Reasonableness of the decision [28] The applicant contends that the RPD erred by applying incorrect standard of proof.

In particular, the applicant argues that theRPD rejected extensive documentary evidence to the effect that returnees to Sri Lanka are questioned, but not mistreated, on the groundsof its own speculation that this evidence may be tainted because it was based on the experiences of international observers. [29] In the concluding paragraph of its decision, the RPD found that the claimant faces more than a mere possibility of persecution ifhe returns to Sri Lanka. Detailed reasons for this conclusion are provided by the RPD.

Reading the decision as a whole, I am satisfiedthat the RPD applied the correct standard of proof in making its findings, namely: the respondent must establish his case on a balance ofprobabilities but does not have to prove that persecution would be more likely than not. He need only show that there is “a seriouspossibility”, “a reasonable chance” or more than a mere possibility that he will be persecuted upon return to his country.

See Adjei v.Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), (FCA), [1989] 2 F.C. 680 (C.A.), at page 682. [30] With respect to the challenged finding that returnees were mistreated, it was open to the RPD to prefer reports of individualincidents and some NGO [non-governmental organization] reports, which indicate that returnees to Sri Lanka are ill-treated, over otherevidence on the record which indicates that returnees were not mistreated.

The RPD’s finding that “public reports are likely to be skewedin the direction of less — rather than more — reporting of instances of torture or other abuse” is supported by evidence on the recordthat Sri Lankan authorities are secretive about their internal practices, bar access to detainees, and threaten those individuals who speakup about their treatment in detention. In addition, a finding that Sri Lankan authorities behave differently when being observed isconsistent with the evidence that Sri Lanka is reluctant to show the world its internal practices.

I am satisfied that this finding wasreasonably open to the RPD on the record. [31] I am also satisfied that the RPD’s conclusion that the respondent would face a serious possibility of persecution upon his returnto Sri Lanka was reasonably open to it on the record. Conclusion [32] For the above reasons, I find the RPD’s decision to be reasonable. As a result, the application will be dismissed. Costs [33] The respondent seeks an order for its costs on the application.

According to Rule 22 of the Federal Courts Immigration andRefugee Protection Rules, SOR/93-22, “[n]o costs shall be awarded to or payable by any party in respect of… an application for judicialreview… unless the Court, for special reasons, so orders.” With this in mind, I have “broad discretion exercisable over costs” (Kozak v.Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FCA 124, [2006] 4 F.C.R. 377, at paragraph 70). [34] I am not satisfied that there are “special reasons” in this case to justify an award of costs.

This is not a novel or test case, therewas no unreasonable delay, and neither the parties nor their counsel acted unreasonably or engaged in misconduct (Ndungu v. Canada(Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FCA 208, 423 N.R. 228, at paragraph 7). I am also of the view that the parties did not adoptunreasonable or abusive positions in litigating the application. I therefore decline to award costs. Certified Question [35] The parties are requested to serve and file their respective submissions relating to certification of a question of generalimportance, if any, within ten days of receipt of these reasons.

Each party will have a further four days to serve and file replysubmissions, if any. Following consideration of those submissions, a judgment will issue dismissing the application for judicial reviewand disposing of the issue of a serious question of general importance as contemplated by paragraph 74(

d) of the IRPA. Confidentiality [36] The parties shall file written submissions setting out their respective positions on the content of the reasons to be releasedpublicly no later than ten days from receipt of these reasons. Postscript a. These public reasons for judgment are a redacted version of the confidential reasons for judgment issued on March 28, 2013, pursuantto a confidentiality order dated July 23, 2012. b. Counsel for the respondent proposed certain redactions to the confidential reasons for judgment by letter dated April 3, 2013. Counselfor the applicant agreed to the proposed redactions. c.

I am satisfied that the redacted confidential reasons for judgment dated March 28, 2013, can be issued.