2021 QCCA 1956, 2021 QCCA 1956

Luft c. Estate of Magien 2021 QCCA 1956 COURT OF APPEAL CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC REGISTRY OF MONTREAL No: 500-09-028229-193 ( 500-17-096167-161 ) MINUTES OF HEARING DATE: December 22, 2021 THE HONOURABLE CHRISTINE BAUDOUIN, J.A.

APPELLANT COUNSEL Samuel Luft Mtre Jean Lemoine ( Ravinsky, Ryan, Lemoine ) By videoconference RESPONDENT COUNSEL Gershon (Jerry) Grief , in his capacity as liquidator of the estate of the late Tauba (Tusia) Magien Mtre Edward Figlarz ( Bernier Figlarz ) By videoconference DESCRIPTION: Application to suspend the provisional execution of a judgment of the Court of appeal (Articles 390(2) C.c.p . and 65.1(1) Supreme Court Act ). Clerk at the hearing : René Gutknecht Courtroom: RC-18 HEARING 11:04 Commencement of the hearing.

Identification of counsel. 11:06 Submissions by Mtre Figlarz. 11:14 Submissions by Mtre Lemoine. 11:28 Reply by Mtre Figlarz. 11:32 Recess of the hearing.

11:35 Resumption of the hearing. 11:36 BY THE JUDGE: Judgment – see page 3. Conclusion of the hearing.

René Gutknecht, Clerk at the hearing JUDGMENT [ 1 ] Applicant, Greif Gershon, in his capacity as liquidator of the estate of the late Tauba Magien, presents an Application to Suspend the Provisional Execution of a judgment of this Court rendered on September 14, 2021, which overturned the judgment of the Superior Court that had granted in part his recourse against Respondent, Samuel Luft, for an amount of $541,593.44, with costs in first instance and in appeal. [ 2 ] On November 12, 2021, Applicant filed an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada and thus requests a suspension of the execution of this Court’s judgment pursuant to the second paragraph of

article 390 C.C.P. and subsection 65.1(1) of the Supreme Court Act , essentially to stay the execution by Respondent of the award of judicial costs in the amount of $20,500. [ 3 ] The criteria applicable to obtain a stay in such circumstances are settled law. Applicant must demonstrate that: i. the contemplated appeal raises serious question(s); ii. the immediate execution is likely to cause irreparable harm; and iii. the balance of convenience favours the party seeking the stay.

These criteria were well summarized by my colleague Beaupré, J.A.: [1] Les critères applicables à une demande de suspension d’exécution d’un arrêt de notre Cour sont connus. Premièrement, une étude du fond du litige doit permettre d’établir qu’il y a une question sérieuse à juger. Deuxièmement, il faut déterminer si la

partie qui demande la suspension subirait un préjudice irréparable si sa demande était rejetée. Troisièmement, il faut identifier laquelle des parties subirait le plus grand préjudice selon que la suspension serait accordée ou refusée dans l’attente d’une décision sur l’appel en Cour suprême du Canada. Des considérations liées à l’intérêt public peuvent par ailleurs être prises en compte dans le cadre de cette pondération.

Ces critères sont cumulatifs et doivent tous être satisfaits pour que la suspension d’exécution soit accordée. [References omitted] [ 4 ] The questions raised by Applicant in his Notice of Application for Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada dated November 12, 2021 are the following: 5. (…) A. Is an elderly person who is vulnerable and in a relationship of trust with a family member in the impossibility to act, in the sense of

section 2904 of the Civil Code of Québec ? B. Can money that is borrowed from a vulnerable elderly person be acquired by fiduciary-mandatary through extinctive prescription, given the laws of trusts? C. Did the Court of Appeal err in changing the date that prescription started running against the Applicant, given that the trial judge fixed the date after hearing and evaluating the credibility of all the evidence? [ 5 ] I do not consider the issues so raised by Applicant to be serious in the context of the present file.

This Court, after a careful review of the evidence, determined that Applicant’s action was prescribed because his proceedings were introduced in 2014 and the last statement of account was given by Respondent to the late Tauba Magien in 2004. Furthermore, this Court rejected Applicant’s assertion that the late Tauba Magien was at the time unable to act: [39] Quoique je reconnaisse que Tusia était âgée, vraisemblablement affligée de divers problèmes de santé et qu’elle faisait confiance à Luft, la preuve au dossier, selon moi, ne permet pas de conclure qu’elle était dans l’impossibilité de faire valoir ses droits.

Elle démontre, au contraire, que Tusia était capable d’exercer ses droits puisqu’elle l’a fait à de nombreuses reprises entre la fin des années ’90 et l’année 2011. […] [43] Ces gestes, que la juge ne mentionne aucunement, sont, à leurs faces même, tout simplement incompatibles avec l’idée que Tusia, en 2004, ait été dans l’impossibilité en fait d’agir et le soit demeurée de façon ininterrompue par la suite. [44] Quoique cela soit suffisant pour infirmer la conclusion de la juge d’instance et quoiqu’elle ne semble pas s’être appuyée sur la preuve médicale, il me semble utile de faire état de celle-ci, ne serait-ce que pour démontrer qu’elle ne permet davantage pas de conclure à une impossibilité d’agir de Tusia. […]

[47] Cette preuve fait, certes, état de problèmes de santé, mais elle ne révèle aucun problème cognitif duquel pourrait découler uneimpossibilité d’agir. […] [50] Or, dans la mesure où Tusia n’était pas dans l’impossibilité d’agir, le constat s’imposant est celui voulant que la prescription detrois ans applicable aux recours de nature personnelle (art. 2925 C.c.Q.) ait commencé à courir en 2004 et que le recours ait été éteint, parprescription, quelque part en 2007, soit trois ans après que Luft lui ait remis l’état de compte P-27 et représenté que tout ce qui lui étaitdû avait été remboursé. [6] The issues raised by Applicant are essentially rooted in the evidence and are, at best, mixed questions of fact and law: the stateof vulnerability or inability of Tauba Magien and the application of the starting point of the delay of extinctive prescription.

They do notprima facie appear to be serious questions or questions of national importance as stated in Applicant’s Memorandum of Argument forLeave to Appeal to the Supreme Court. [7] Therefore, after a preliminary examination, I cannot conclude that the proposed appeal involves questions of such seriousnessthat a stay should be ordered pending the Supreme Court's decision whether or not to grant leave to appeal. [8] Moreover, Applicant has failed to demonstrate the irreparable harm he would suffer in the event he were required to pay thejudicial costs of $20,500, his application only stating that “it would be inequitable for the estate to remit court costs” and that “[p]aying$20,500 in claimed costs will have a dissuasive effect upon [him] and risks limiting resources available for the Supreme Court Appeal;while [Respondent] can be compensated by the payment of interest”. [9] The Supreme Court in RJR-Macdonald inc. stated that: "Irreparable" refers to the nature of the harm suffered rather than its magnitude.

It is harm which either cannot be quantified in monetaryterms or which cannot be cured, usually because one party cannot collect damages from the other. Examples of the former includeinstances where one party will be put out of business by the court's decision (R.L. Crain Inc. v. Hendry (1988), (SKKB), 48 D.L.R. (4th) 228 (Sask. Q.B.)); where one party will suffer permanent market loss or irrevocable damage to its businessreputation (American Cyanamid, supra); or where a permanent loss of natural resources will be the result when a challenged activity isnot enjoined (MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v.

Mullin, (BC CA), [1985] 3 W.W.R. 577 (B.C.C.A.)). The fact that one partymay be impecunious does not automatically determine the application in favour of the other party who will not ultimately be able to collect damages, although it may be a relevant consideration (Hubbard v. Pitt, [1976] Q.B. 142 (C.A.))[2]. [10] The present situation departs from the existence of an irreparable prejudice. Applicant does not invoke financial duress,permanent loss, or even the existence of an impecunious situation.

Moreover, our Court has already determined that a financial prejudicealone will not, save exceptional circumstances, be considered as being irreparable thus justifying a stay of execution of a Court of appeal judgment.[3] [11] Finally, I do not consider that the balance of inconvenience favours the Applicant who will have to pay the Court costs over theprinciple of the execution of judgments in these specific circumstances. FOR THESE REASONS, THE UNDERSIGNED: [12] DISMISSES the Application to suspend the provisional execution of a judgment of the Court of Appel, with costs. CHRISTINE BAUDOUIN, J.A.