R. v. Rousseau, 2019 BCPC 187

Citation: R. v. Rousseau 2019 BCPC 187 Date: 20190726 File Nos: 21002-3-KC; 21002-4-KA; 21002-5-KA Registry: Western Communities IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA REGINA v. Jason Martin Alin Rousseau ORAL REASONS FOR SENTENCE OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE E.C. BLAKE Counsel for the Crown: P. Cheeseman Counsel for the Accused: R. Drury Place of Hearing: Colwood , B.C. Date of Hearing: July 24, 2019 Date of Sentence: July 26, 2019 INTRODUCTION [ 1 ] Jason Rousseau has pled guilty to the following offences: 1. breach of an undertaking by communicating with Kirsten Lageri on December 25, 2018, contrary to section 145 (5.1) of the Criminal Code ;

2. breaking and entering a dwelling house with intent to commit the indictable offence of assault therein on December 26, 2018, contrary to

section 348 of the Criminal Code ; 3. assault upon D.B. on December 26, 2018, contrary to

section 266 of the Criminal Code ; 4. arson by setting a truck on fire on December 26, 2018, contrary to

section 434 of the Criminal Code ; 5. breach of a court order by having contact with Kirsten Lageri between February 1, 2019 and February 14, 2019, contrary to section 145(3) of the Criminal Code ; and 6. a further breach of a court order between February 16, 2019 and March 19, 2019 by having contact with Kirsten Lageri, contrary to section 145 (3) of the Criminal Code . [ 2 ] All of the offences were prosecuted by indictment. [ 3 ] On July 24, 2019, counsel made lengthy and helpful sentencing submissions before me, and I was provided with victim impact statements, case authorities and letters of reference.

Given the seriousness of the charges and the divergence between counsel concerning the appropriate disposition for Mr. Rousseau, I adjourned the passing of sentence to allow me time to review the materials in more detail and to reflect further on the disposition. These are my Reasons for Sentence after giving the matter my full consideration.

ANALYSIS [ 4 ] It is well established that when determining an appropriate sentence, a judge should consider the matter from three different perspectives -- the seriousness of the charges; the particular circumstances under which the offences were committed; and the individual circumstances of the accused person. Each of those lines of inquiry must be viewed against the background of the general principles of sentencing set forth in sections 718 to 718.2 of the Criminal Code . I will proceed in accordance with that established methodology. 1.

The Seriousness of the Offences [ 5 ] The most serious charges in this case undoubtedly are the charge of breaking and entering a dwelling house, and the charge of arson. [ 6 ] The Criminal Code provides that the offence of breaking and entering a dwelling house renders an offender liable to a potential maximum sentence of life imprisonment.

In the classification of offences for sentencing purposes, therefore, it ranks on a par with the offences of armed robbery and the most aggravated forms of sexual assault. [ 7 ] Recent case law establishes that the general range of sentence for the offence of breaking into a dwelling house in this province is between nine months and five years, in the absence of specially mitigating or aggravating features: R. v. Bernier (2003), 177 (3d) 137 (BCCA); R. v.

Powis , [2007] BCJ No. 452 (BCCA) . [ 8 ] It is not difficult to understand why the law treats so seriously the offence of breaking into a private residence for purposes of committing some further offence while inside. As my colleague Caryer, PCJ said in R. v. Crittenden, [2010] BCJ No. 2672 (BCPC) : [A] break and enter into somebody’s private residence is an extremely serious offence.

It is an offence that caries with it a tremendous impact on the victims of the offence not only on the specific victims who own the property or may even be residing or occupying the premises at the time, but it also has a significant impact on the community in that it shakes even the neighbours’ sense of security. It shakes the community sense of safety in their own residences and in their own neighbourhoods.

These sorts of crimes go a long way to impact what the community feels about the quality of life in their community. [ 9 ] I would venture one further comment, which has particular relevance to the present case. A break-in not infrequently causes those inside the residence to respond by resisting the intrusion. When that happens, there is no way of predicting what sort of negative consequences may occur, but the possibilities certainly include property damage, serious physical injury or even death.

And it is no answer at all for the intruder to later maintain that if the occupier of the property had not resisted, the negative consequences would not have occurred. Resistance in the face of intrusion is an instinctive and easily anticipated human reaction to criminal behaviour. [ 10 ] The offence of arson is also serious.

Section 434 of the Criminal Code provides for a maximum penalty of 14 years for the commission of that offence. In R. v. Leer , [2017] BCJ No. 1642 (BCPC) a recent decision in this Court, my colleague Judge Koturbash reviewed well over a dozen sentencing decisions in arson cases, noting that the sentences ranged from suspended sentences to eight years in jail, with the majority of sentences being in excess of two years. [ 11 ] Again, it is not difficult to understand the reasons why the law treats the offence of arson so seriously. In the case of R v. H.K.

(1994) NBR (2d) 372, the New Brunswick Court of Appeal made this observation, which has been frequently quoted ever since: By any yardstick, arson is a serious offence. An adult is liable to imprisonment for fourteen years. Fire, no matter how well planned, is often erratic and unpredictable and gives rise to unforeseen consequences. For sentencing purposes, arsonists are sometimes divided into four types: pyromaniacs or persons who are mentally disturbed, those who burn for no special reason or a grudge, vandals and those who burn for financial gain.

KH and his two companions fall into the latter category, which is generally considered to be the most blameworthy type of arson, thus attracting the most severe punishment, although there are ranges within each category. [ 12 ] The offence of common assault, as defined in

section 266 of the Criminal Code , is in a different sentencing category. It attracts a maximum sentence of five years of imprisonment when the offence is prosecuted by indictment, as in this case. [ 13 ] The offences involving breaching court orders and police undertakings, referred to in various subsections of

section 145 of the Criminal Code , are in a different category again. It attracts a maximum penalty of two years incarceration.

2. The Circumstances under which the Offences Occurred [ 14 ] On this aspect of the matter, I wish to say at the outset that I am greatly indebted to counsel for having prepared a 22-paragraph “admission of facts” document. The admissions outline the essential sequence of events concerning the first four offences referred to in the Introduction above, being all of the offences which occurred on December 25 and 26, 2018. The admissions of fact read as follows: 1. The events described here all took place in 2018. 2. Mr.

Rousseau and Kirsten Lageri have a child together, X.X., whose date of birth is [omitted for publication]. 3. Mr. Rousseau had been working in Alberta, and showed up unannounced at Ms. Lageri’s residence some time on the night of December 23 or in the early morning of December 24. Ms. Lageri allowed him to sleep on the couch at her residence. 4. On December 24, Mr. Rousseau spent the day with is son. When he arrived back at the residence he had no key to get in, and began consuming alcohol while waiting for Ms. Lageri to return.

He eventually kicked the door while trying to get in, but was unsuccessful in gaining entry to the house. 5. On December 24, police were called to Ms. Lageri’s residence as a result of Mr. Rousseau’s behaviour, and he was arrested for mischief. On December 25, he was released on a police undertaking with conditions to have no contact with Ms. Lageri and to not attend her residence. 6. On December 25, Mr. Rousseau showed up at the house of Carla Martin, who is Ms. Lageri’s step mother. He spent the day there, and had contact with Ms. Lageri and X.X. when they came over for Christmas dinner. 7.

On the morning of December 26, Mr. Rousseau went to Ms. Lageri’s residence. 8. Ms. Lageri’s new boyfriend D.B. had spent the night of December 25, at her residence. On the morning of December 26, he was sleeping in the bedroom and his truck was parked outside of the residence. 9. Shortly before 6 a.m., Ms. Lageri woke up to find Mr. Rousseau banging at her door, asking to be let in. She refused to let him in. She was holding X.X. in her arms. 10. Mr. Rousseau kicked in the locked door and pushed past her into the house into the bedroom. 11. Mr. D.B. was in the bedroom when Mr. Rousseau entered. Mr.

D.B. observed Mr. Rousseau rushing at him with two rocks in his hand. Mr. Rousseau threw one of the rocks at Mr. D.B. which hit him in the chest. Another rock was thrown and put a hole in the wall of the bedroom. Mr. D.B. had a can of bear spray in the bedroom, which he tried to get to protect himself. 12. Mr. Rousseau engaged with Mr. D.B., the two men struggled on the ground, Mr. D.B. attempted to spray Mr. Rousseau with the bear spray, and Mr. Rousseau punched Mr. D.B. in the head. The bear spray went off during the struggle. Mr. D.B. reported that Mr. Rousseau got a hold of his neck, and that Mr.

Rousseau was trying to rip his head off his body, continuing to punch him as he held him like that. 13. Mr. D.B. started screaming to please stop, and Mr. Rousseau did stop. Mr. D.B. tried to get out of the bedroom at which point Mr. Rousseau blocked him in the doorway and tried to smash his head into the wall. 14. Mr. D.B. was able to get out and run outside of the residence in his boxer shorts. 15. During the altercation, Ms. Lageri took X.X. into the bathroom and closed the door. 16. The bear spray affected Mr. Rousseau, Mr. D.B., Ms. Lageri and X.X., and they were all contaminated from the spray. 17. Mr.

D.B., Ms. Lageri, and X.X. ended up running to Ms Lageri’s mother’s house, which is located on the same property as Ms. Lageri’s house, and observed Mr. Rousseau damaging the truck while they were running away. 18. Mr. Rousseau threw rocks through the truck windows, and put a pick axe through one of the tires. This damage was observed later on by police officers and firefighters. 19. Mr. Rousseau then lit the truck on fire. 20. Ms. Lageri had her mother call 911, requesting police, ambulance and fire. 21. When firefighters arrived on scene, Mr. D.B.’s truck was on fire.

Firefighters took steps to ensure nobody was inside the truck, and then took steps to extinguish the fire. 22. When firefighters arrived on scene, the truck was in a different location than it had been when Ms. Lageri left the residence. It was found against a mound of earth, and was further away from the residence than it had been when Mr. D.B. had parked it the previous night. [ 15 ] The admissions do not refer to any of the events that occurred after December 26, 2018.

In particular, the admissions do not outline the circumstances of the fifth and sixth offences referred to in the Introduction above, being the charges of breaching court orders in February and March 2019. Accordingly, I will provide a

summary of those matters now. [ 16 ] After the events of December 26, 2018, Mr. Rousseau was ordered detained in custody pending trial or disposition. The detention order contained a provision that he have no contact or communication with Kirsten Lageri, as contemplated by s. 515 (12) of

the Criminal Code . [ 17 ] I am advised that on February 14, 2019, Mr. Rousseau intended to plead guilty to some or all of the charges against him arising out of the events of December 25 and 26, 2018. In the two weeks leading up to that court date, however, he began to initiate telephone calls to Ms. Lageri from his place of incarceration, presumably with the intention of smoothing his passage through the sentencing proceedings. There were eleven such communications. [ 18 ] In their content, the communications covered the spectrum from innocent chatter to much more sinister plotting.

There were some very doubtful discussions about Ms. Lageri making payments to certain persons. These communications can be interpreted either as initiating plans to sway the position of certain victims for purposes of the court proceeding or, alternatively, as attempts to make restitution ahead of the court case. Either way, they were of course totally inappropriate. Even more serious were the discussions in which Mr. Rousseau discussed with Ms. Lageri how she might revise her version of the events for court purposes. [ 19 ] Counsel became fully aware of Ms.

Lageri’s desire to revisit the sequence of events, and her apparent change of heart toward Mr. Rousseau, when the case came before the court on February 14, 2019. Not surprisingly, the court proceeding then had to be adjourned in order for counsel to deal with the rapidly-developing situation. [ 20 ] At around the same time, the sequence of telephone calls that had taken place between Mr. Rousseau and Ms. Lageri came to the attention of the authorities. On February 27, Mr. Rousseau was formally charged with breaching the non-communication order with Ms.

Lageri between February 1 and February 14, 2019. [ 21 ] Matters did not end there, however. Mr. Rousseau continued to communicate with Ms. Lageri despite the ongoing court order prohibiting him from doing so. Between February 16 and March 19, there occurred a series of 22 further telephone communications. Again, in some at least of those communications Mr. Rousseau discussed with Ms. Lageri the prospect that she might change her evidence in the proceedings against him. In other communications, he spoke about Ms.

Lageri providing false letters of commendation, or character references, for some of his associates in custody. [ 22 ] The above recitation constitutes a rough

summary of the circumstances under which Mr. Rousseau committed the various offences for which he is now being sentenced. It is necessary to consider the aggravating and mitigating features in each case. [ 23 ] The offence which occurred first in time is the breach of undertaking by communicating with Ms. Lageri, indeed spending part of the day with her, on Christmas Day 2018. The deliberate breach of a release order, especially a breach occurring so soon after the release order was made, is always a matter of concern since it reflects a fundamental disrespect for the judicial system.

In this case, however, it may fairly be said that the breach falls toward the bottom range of seriousness. The communication with Ms. Lageri on Christmas Day appears to have taken place without any resistance from her and in the presence of her family. It is not surprising that Mr. Rousseau would seek some company from friends and family on Christmas Day, and it does appear that the day passed in harmonious fashion. [ 24 ] The events of December 26, 2018 may have begun in similar benign fashion, but they certainly did not end that way. I accept Mr. Rousseau’s submission that he went to Ms.

Lageri’s residence for entirely innocent purposes – apparently to say goodbye once more before heading out of town – but then he saw what he believed to be Mr. D.B.’s motor vehicle outside the residence. He became suspicious that Mr. D.B., whom he knew and did not like, was involved with Ms. Lageri. It was only then that he formed the intention to enter the residence using force and to confront Mr. D.B. The fact that his weapon of choice consisted of rocks, presumably picked up outside the residence, indicates that his decision to commit the breaking and entering offence was not premeditated.

To some extent at least, the lack of premeditation is a mitigating factor. [ 25 ] On the other hand, it is clear that when Mr. Rousseau chose to enter the home with force, he knew full well that the residence was occupied. Indeed, the whole point of his entry was to confront one of the occupants, Mr. D.B. He did indeed confront Mr. D.B., but only after ignoring Ms. Lageri’s requests, made with a baby in her arms, that he go away. He kicked in the door with force over Ms. Lageri’s objections and confronted Mr. D.B. in the bedroom of the residence.

Section 348.1 of the Criminal Code specifically directs sentencing judges to take note that the knowledge of the accused that a residence is occupied and the use of violence against any occupant are both factors that must be considered as aggravating factors tending to increase the severity of any sentence imposed. Plainly, that subsection applies here. [ 26 ] Mr. Rousseau’s confrontation with Mr. D.B., which forms part of the breaking and entering charge, as well as the substance of the assault charge, involved the use of weapons, being the two rocks, and that is a serious matter. He threw the rocks at Mr.

D.B. and one of them hit him in the chest. Crown counsel advises that Mr. D.B. has declined to provide a victim impact statement, and so I have no information to suggest that Mr. D.B. was injured as a result of being struck in the chest. The potential for harm was certainly present, however. The same might be said of Mr. Rousseau’s subsequent efforts to physically batter Mr. D.B. about the head before he left the premises. [ 27 ] I cannot overlook the fact that this whole sorry episode took place in the presence of a two-year old boy, Mr. Rousseau’s son X.X. Ms.

Lageri’s victim impact statement makes it clear that the boy has indeed been traumatized by the event, most specifically as result of being pepper sprayed during the fracas. In my view, Mr. Rousseau’s apparent obliviousness to the presence of the child in the midst of the melee in this case must be considered as a significantly aggravating feature for sentencing purposes. [ 28 ] After the physical confrontation ended, Mr. Rousseau took out his anger upon the truck outside the residence, believing the truck to belong to Mr. D.B.

His actions in first damaging the vehicle and then setting fire to it involved pure malice. About the only relevant mitigating factors emerging in that part of the fact pattern are the fact that Mr. Rousseau apparently made some effort to put the fire out before it got out of control and then, finding those efforts to be unsuccessful, rolled the vehicle some distance away from the house. [ 29 ] The end result of the arson was to totally destroy the truck, which turned out not to be owned by Mr. D.B. at all, but by his father. For reasons which are not relevant to this proceeding, Mr.

D.B., Sr. was unable to obtain compensation from his insurers for the

total loss of his vehicle. Thus, it may fairly be said that an entirely innocent person has suffered significant financial hardship as a result of Mr. Rousseau’s outrageously unlawful behaviour. He has filed a victim impact statement which sets out quite the full extent of that hardship, which I acknowledge. An application for restitution made on his behalf in this Court was unsuccessful due to the contentious nature of the documentation provided, but he may yet have the opportunity to seek relief against Mr.

Rousseau in the civil courts. [ 30 ] One final aggravating feature to emphasize with respect to the events of December 26, 2018 is that Mr. Rousseau was of course still subject to the non-contact order with Ms. Lageri. He should not have been at her residence at all that morning. [ 31 ] As a result of the events of December 26, 2018, Mr. Rousseau was taken into custody and he has been there ever since, subject to a court order that he have no contact with Ms. Lageri.

His actions in contacting her repeatedly by telephone from his custodial facility give rise to the last two charges against him. [ 32 ] There is very little that can be said in mitigation of his actions with respect to these last two charges, except perhaps that his communications with Ms. Lageri were never threatening towards her and appear to have occurred with her willing participation. [ 33 ] The aggravating factors, however, are easy to find and are most troubling. Over a significant period of time, Mr. Rousseau seems to have set out on a plan to involve Ms.

Lageri in affecting the outcome of the prosecution against him. He was meddling with the legal system, and that is serious business indeed. It seems to me that his actions were serious enough that they could equally have led to charges of obstruction of justice, charges that carry a maximum penalty of ten years, far in excess of the maximum penalty on the charges of breaching a court order which he is actually facing. The sort of behaviour in which he engaged cuts to the heart of the judicial system.

In order to preserve the integrity of the system for the benefit of the community at large, a sentencing judge must send a clear message that tampering of this sort will not be tolerated. [ 34 ] I am quite frankly astounded that Mr. Rousseau carried on with his attempts to communicate with Mr. Lageri and to influence her involvement in the legal process even after his initial attempts to do so had been discovered and he had been charged. His persistence in continuing his pattern of wrongdoing was remarkable indeed, and must be denounced in the clearest of terms. 3.

The Circumstances of the Offender [ 35 ] It remains for me to consider Mr. Rousseau’s personal circumstances. [ 36 ] Mr. Rousseau is 33 years of age. He grew up in a small town in Saskatchewan and remains close to his parents and his brother. His mother, who is a retired hospital security officer, has written a letter of support for her son. In that letter she describes her son’s many positive characteristics, including his willingness to help her through times when she was physically challenged. [ 37 ] Counsel advises that while Mr.

Rousseau had some drug issues in his younger days, he has never had mental health problems. He left school when he was in grade 10 and took on a number of labouring jobs in the years thereafter, before finding more lucrative work in the oil fields, primarily in Alberta. In recent years, as is well-known, work of that sort has become somewhat unstable, but in December 2018 Mr. Rousseau was still working as a heavy equipment operator near Grand Prairie, Alberta.

As a result of his present incarceration, he no longer has that job, though he has reason to be optimistic that he may get similar work once he is ultimately released. [ 38 ] Mr. Rousseau has been involved with Ms Lageri since about 2015. X.X. is their only child, born in [omitted for publication]. Clearly, the relationship between Mr. Rousseau and Ms. Lageri has had its ups and downs, but it now appears that she is supportive of him. She is not an aggrieved victim. She attended the sentencing proceeding in order to support him and she has written a long note explaining her position.

With respect to the offences before the court, and particularly those which occurred in December last year, she has plainly forgiven him, or at least is prepared to let bygones be bygones. She wishes to start a family life with Mr. Rousseau and describes him as generally a good provider and role model for their son. [ 39 ] Mr. Rousseau has had only one previous encounter with the criminal justice system. In 2009, at a time when he was about 23 years of age, he was convicted of the offences of assault with a weapon and unlawful possession of a firearm in a motor vehicle.

He received a suspended sentence and a year of probation. [ 40 ] Mr. Rousseau has accepted responsibility for his wrongdoing with respect to the present offences. He cooperated with the police when he knew that they were on their way to arrest him on December 26, 2018 and he quickly provided them with an inculpatory statement. I am advised that the investigating officer in the case visited him in custody and was impressed with the sincerity of his professions of embarrassment and shame about what he had done.

As I have already said, as early as February 2019 he intended to plead guilty to some or all of the offences arising out of the events of December 2018, and he was derailed only by his ill-conceived and unlawful efforts to affect the outcome of the sentencing process through his communications with Ms. Lageri. He does not appear to have wavered from his desire to plead guilty, however, and he ultimately did just that, on July 24, 2019. [ 41 ] Leaving aside his illegal communications with Ms. Lageri from jail, it must be said that Mr. Rousseau has used his time in custody in constructive fashion.

He has completed programs designed to curb both substance abuse and domestic violence, and provided confirmatory certificates of completion to this Court on the sentencing hearing. When I consider those documents, together with his general personal history and the various letters of support which have been filed on his behalf, I must say that the criminal behaviour which brings him before the court now seems more than a little out of character. I retain some confidence that he will in due course return to his place as a constructive member of the community. CONCLUSION [ 42 ] Mr.

Rousseau has now spent 213 days in custody, for which he is entitled to credit to the extent of 320 days, or approximately 10 and a half months. [ 43 ] Crown counsel has submitted that if I consider all relevant factors in this case and balance them in accordance with established sentencing principles, I will conclude that a global sentence of two and a half years in custody would be appropriate, before allowing

credit for the time that Mr. Rousseau has already spent in detention. The allowance for time spent in custody would reduce the newsentence to about 19 and a half months. [44] Defence counsel, on the other hand, submits that I should consider that the time which Mr. Rousseau has served in detention upto the date of sentencing, credited at 10 in a half months, as amounting to the full custodial penalty that should be required of him, ornearly so.

He points out that quite apart from all of the individual features of the case which touch upon the principles of deterrence,denunciation and rehabilitation, I must consider the principle of totality. I accept that to be correct. [45] In support of their respective positions, counsel have provided me with a number of case authorities. I have reviewed all ofthose authorities and I have found them to be generally helpful. In the end, though, the cases are of limited specific application becausesentencing is such an individualized process, as the Supreme Court of Canada pointed out some years ago in R. v.

M.(C.A.), (SCC), [1996] 1 SCR 500. [46] Applying the various sentencing principles to the pattern before me, I have concluded that the following sentences would havebeen appropriate, leaving aside for the moment the credit that must be given for time already spent in custody: a. on the first charge, the offence of breaching an undertaking by communicating with Kirsten Lageri on December 25, 2018(Count 5 of Information 21002-3-KC): one day in custody, concurrent to any other sentence imposed on that same Information; b. on the second charge, the offence of breaking and entering a dwelling house with intent to commit the offence of assault onDecember 26, 2018 (Count 2 of Information 21002-3-KC): 15 months’ incarceration (450 days) concurrent to any other sentenceimposed on that same Information; c. on the third charge, the offence of arson by setting a truck on fire on December 26, 2018 (Count 3 of Information 21002-3-KC):15 months’ incarceration (450 days), concurrent to any other sentence imposed on that same Information; d. on the fourth charge, common assault on December 26, 2018 (Count 6 of Information 21002-3-KC): six months’ incarceration(180 days), concurrent to any other sentence imposed on that same Information; e. on the fifth charge, breach of a court order by having contact with Kirsten Lageri between February 1, 2019 and February 14,2019 (Count 1 of Information 21002-4-KA): three months’ incarceration (90 days), consecutive to any other sentence imposed on today’sdate; and f. on the sixth charge, breach of a court order by having contact with Kirsten Lageri between February 16, 2019 and March 19,2016 (Count 1 of Information 21002-5-KA): three months’ incarceration (90 days), consecutive to any other sentence imposed on today’sdate. [47] Thus, the global sentence that would have been imposed, but for the credited time, is 21 months (630 days), being 15 months(450 days) plus three months (90 days) plus three months (90 days). [48] I then must give effect to the credit to be allowed for time which Mr.

Rousseau has already spent in custody. Since that credit isbest expressed in terms of individual days (320 days), I will henceforth refer to each of the individual sentences that I have imposedsolely in terms of individual days.

This becomes a bit of an awkward exercise when there are consecutive sentences involved, but I willdeduct the 320 days of credited time in the following way: a. on the first charge, there is no deduction and the sentence remains at one day of incarceration, concurrent; b. on the second charge, there is a deduction of 225 days and the resulting sentence is 225 days’ incarceration, concurrent to allother sentences imposed on Information 21002-3-KC; c. on the third charge, there is a deduction of 225 days and the resulting sentence is 225 days’ incarceration, concurrent to all othersentences imposed on Information 21002-3-KC; d. on the fourth charge, there is no deduction and the sentence remains at 180 days’ incarceration, concurrent to all othersentences imposed on Information 21002-3-KC; e. on the fifth charge, there is a deduction of 50 days and the resulting sentence is 40 days’ incarceration, consecutive to any othersentences imposed on today’s date; and f. on the sixth charge, there is a deduction of 40 days and the resulting sentence is 50 days’ incarceration, consecutive to any othersentences imposed on today’s date. [49] Thus, the global custodial sentence that takes effect today is 315 days, being 225 days globally on Information 21002-3-KC, 40days consecutive on Information 21002-4-KA, and a further 50 days consecutive on Information 21002-5-KA. [50] In addition, there will be a probation order that will be one year in length.

The conditions of the probation order will be asfollows: a. The statutory conditions to keep the peace and be of good behaviour, report to court if called upon to do so, and notify the courtor probation officer in advance of any change of name or address, promptly notify the court or probation officer of any change ofemployment or occupation. b. You shall report to a probation officer at 1756 Island Highway, Colwood, British Columbia within 48 hours of your releasefrom custody, unless you have received permission from a probation officer, before your release, that you may report at some other timeor place.

Thereafter, you shall report as directed to the probation officer.

c. You shall have no contact or communication directly or indirectly with D.B., Jr. or D.B., Sr. d. You shall not go to any place which you know to be the residence or place of employment of either D.B., Jr. or D.B., Sr. e. You shall not possess any weapons as defined in

section 2 of the Criminal Code . f. You shall attend and participate in such assessment, counsel or program as may be directed by your probation officer, which may include counselling for anger management. [ 51 ] In addition, I will make an order requiring you to provide such samples of your bodily substances as may be required for DNA analysis and registration. This order is made with respect to the convictions for breaking and entering a dwelling house, arson and assault, all of which are secondary designated offences as described in

Section 487.04 of the Criminal Code . I expect that the samples will be taken by a peace officer during the time that Mr. Rousseau is serving the custodial part of his sentence. [ 52 ] Finally, there will be a 10-year weapons prohibition pursuant to

section 109 of the Criminal Code . The prohibition applies both the breaking and entering charge and the assault charge. _________________________________ The Honourable Judge E.C. Blake Provincial Court of British Columbia