2019 QCCQ 4134, 2019 QCCQ 4134

Ramsden c. Iaquinta 2019 QCCQ 4134 COURT OF QUÉBEC CANADA PROVINCE OF QUÉBEC DISTRICT OF MONTREAL TOWN OF MONTREAL Civil Division No: 500-22-220180-155 DATE: July 5, 2019 ______________________________________________________________________ PRESIDED BY THE HONOURABLE DAVID L. CAMERON, J.C.Q. ______________________________________________________________________ DANIELA RAMSDEN and DANIELA RAMSDEN es qualité SYNDICATE OF THE CO-OWNERS OF 454-456 GROSVENOR AVENUE IN WESTMOUNT Plaintiffs v.

GINA IAQUINTA Defendant ______________________________________________________________________ JUDGMENT ______________________________________________________________________ [ 1 ] The Plaintiff Daniela Ramsden, personally and es qualité director of the Syndicate of the co-owners of 454-456 Grosvenor Avenue in Westmount, sues the other co-owner Gina Iaquinta with respect to various financial matters concerning the condominium common portions in the period from 2011 through to 2018.

The Defendant Gina Iaquinta contests the suit and brings a counter claim for matters related to the condominium in the same period. [ 2 ] The two co-owners share in the common expenses according to their fractions, as set out in the declaration of co-ownership: Ms. Ramsden (unit 454) 40%, Ms. Iaquinta (unit 456) 60%. The Plaintiff’s claims [ 3 ] The Plaintiff’s first claim relates to a payment of $5,000.00 [1] that the Defendant made on March 22, 2012 by means of a cheque drawn on the Syndicate of co-owners’ account to a contractor, 103441 Canada inc.

The Plaintiff asserts that this payment was made on an invoice dating from January 19, 2007 that the Plaintiff alleges was prescribed. [ 4 ] Ms.

Ramsden, therefore seeks to recover her share, 40%, of this payment, which she alleges was made from the Syndicate’s funds without cause given that a claim for this invoice would have been prescribed. [ 5 ] She asserts that the Defendant made this payment in order to favour a friend, the principal of 103441 Canada inc., in conflict with her interests to the Syndicate. [ 6 ] Her second claim results from a series of payments totalling $5,352.00 she made relating to a roof repair, allegedly an emergency, in 2012. [ 7 ] She seeks the reimbursement by Iaquinta of $3,271.25 in the same 60% share, with the exception of one small part of the total, for the withdrawal and re-installation of a deck for which Ms.

Iaquinta was, according to the Plaintiff’s allegation, responsible, which she claims on a 100% basis. [ 8 ] Thirdly, another series of payments made in in 2014 and 2015 totalling $15,791.09 relate to structural repairs of the common portions. she claims 60%: $9,474.65 [ 9 ] Fourthly, she refers to an amount of $143.56 disbursed by the Defendant from the Syndicate bank account, should be restored to the Syndicate. Ms.

Ramsden’s interests in this amount would be 60%: 57.42$. [ 10 ] Fifthly, the Plaintiff claims miscellaneous expenses that she alleges having incurred on behalf of the Syndicate in 2015, 2016 and 2018 in the amounts of $362.66, $280.60 and $297.44 respectively. [ 11 ] In respect of the first two amounts, she asserts a claim for the Defendant’s 60% contribution: $385.96.

With respect to the amount of $297.44, she claims reimbursement of 100% of this cost which she allegedly incurred for replacement of deck boards, part of a common portion of exclusive use by the Defendant for which the Defendant would be responsible, according to the declaration of co- ownership for 100%. [ 12 ] Finally, the Plaintiff Ramsden seeks reimbursement of legal fees estimated at $10,000.00 alleging that she was victim of bad faith

on the part of the Defendant Iaquinta, causing her to incur legal expenses. The Defendant’s counter claims [ 13 ] The plea and counter claim asserts that the debt that the Syndicate owned to 103441 Canada inc. was not prescribed, or if it was, the Syndicate could validly pay it because of its moral obligation. The Defendant therefore asserts her claim on behalf of the Syndicate, of Ms.

Ramsden’s 40% share of the balance i.e. the amount of $2,068.52, so that she can remit it to the creditor. [ 14 ] In reply to this claim, the Plaintiff Ramsden asserts that this part of the invoice for 103441 Canada inc. is equally prescribed. She also asserts that the litigation between the Syndicate, the two co-owners and 103441 Canada inc. (known as “International”) resulted in a judgment of the Court of Quebec which has been declared satisfied. [ 15 ] In defence of the claim concerning roofing and structural repairs carried out in 2012 and 2014, she asserts that Ms.

Ramsden is solely responsible for these costs. She also asserts a claim in respect of an indemnification of that Ms. Ramsden allegedly received with respect to hidden defects affecting the brickwork, plumbing and the drain pipe of the building for which she could hold her vendor, the previous owner of Ms. Ramsden’s unit (454) liable. [ 16 ] This potential claim allegedly became prescribed and Ms.

Ramsden made a settlement with the attorneys she had hired to represent her interests who had failed to represent her adequately in respect of this prescription issue. [ 17 ] The Defendant Iaquinta claims a 60% share in the proceeds of this settlement. [ 18 ] The Court made reference to this issue in the interlocutory judgment rendered January 11, 2019 [2] .

The Court refused to force the Defendant Ramsden to disclose the amount of the settlement she received on the grounds that it was a settlement of her personal interests in her 40% share in the common interests and it would not represent an amount in which the Defendant-Cross Plaintiff would have a right. [ 19 ] As part of her counter claim, the Defendant alleges that Ms.

Ramsden owes an amount of $1,800.00 for a contribution to her common expenses as agreed between the parties in April 2011. [ 20 ] She asserts a claim for an additional outstanding amount of $6,400.00 owned by the Plaintiff Ramsden on account of her contributions to the common expenses as of the date of the filling of the proceedings, April 15, 2016. [ 21 ] Finally, she asserts a claim for Ms. Ramsden’s 40% share of a series of expenses the Defendant alleges having personally incurred on behalf of the Syndicate for the maintenance, carrying and insurance of the property between 2013 and 2018.

Her claims amounts to $1,496.85. [ 22 ] Finally, she seeks an order whereby the Court would compel the Plaintiff Ramsden to remove a floor heating system that she installed in the basement of the property, a common area, as well as personal belongings, garbage and building materials that the Plaintiff Ramsden allegedly stored in the basement.

General remarks about the litigation [ 23 ] The Court heard a fair amount of detail about the conflicts existing between the parties over the years. [ 24 ] The condominium is comprised only of the two units, 454, that Daniela Ramsden purchased from the previous owner on August 18, 2004 and 456, the unit of which the Defendant Gina Iaquinta has been the owner since January 31, 1997. [ 25 ] After acquiring the property to unit 454 the Plaintiff consulted lawyers with a view to obtaining a reduction of price or damages, from the previous owner, because of alleged latent defects. [ 26 ] The claim against this previous owner became prescribed and the Plaintiff brought legal proceedings against her lawyers for her loses in respect of these latent defects, resulting in a confidential settlement. [ 27 ] Scrutinizing the legal proceedings, it was impossible for the Court to see any indication that this claim made against the attorneys could have resulted in her being compensated for a loss accruing to the Syndicate or to the Defendant Gina Iaquinta. [ 28 ] The Court therefore came to the opinion that this settlement was not relevant to the matters debated in the present case. [ 29 ] In another register, the Court heard evidence about the deadlock that developed between the two co-owners as to the administration of the co-ownership.

The banking affairs of the Syndicate were always managed by Ms. Iaquinta. The parties were unable to agree to a joint account. It was also impossible for them, from an early stage, to carry out the affairs of the Syndicate in a proper manner with annual meetings, budgets, proper resolutions and the like. [ 30 ] The allegation is made by the Defendant that they had agreed, in view of the 60-40 split, that advances towards the common expenses would be made in the amount of $100.00 per month by Daniel Ramsden and $150.00 by Gina Iaquinta. [ 31 ] At the time of the special meeting that occurred on May 20, 2011 Ms.

Alleges that she had made deposits of the full amount of $5,400.00 then owing whereas the following month on May 20, 2011 Ms. Ramsden only contributed $1,800.00 that is to say half of her share of the $3,600.00 owing at that time.

[ 32 ] Be that as it may, claims that could be made for contributions to the common fund, as it were, prospectively would affect both co- owners equally, because they both suspended their contributions after May 2011. [ 33 ] From a point in time when the conflict formed into a deadlock, each party acted more or less unilaterally, apart from the circumstance where Gina Iaquinta used her control of the Syndicate account to pay the contractor, International, $5,000.00 on hand in the account at that time.

No further contributions were made and it is not contested that Gina Iaquinta closed the account, withdrawing a small balance that remained in the account, of $143.56 [3] . [ 34 ] One possible approach to the fact that expenses were paid unilaterally by each of the co-owners, would be to say that neither of them can make a claim given that these amounts weren’t approved in a budget submitted by the administrators to the co-owners in the manner provided for within the civil code. [ 35 ] Neither party takes this position, however, each claiming that the expenses that she carried out unilaterally ought to be matched by the other co-owner according to the 60-40 split set out in the declaration of co-ownership.

This makes sense, because a contribution made unilaterally by one party to a useful or necessary expense would give rise to an unjust enrichment if the other party withheld a proportionate financial contribution.

In reality, this is the only possible escape from the deadlock, and the only matter on which the parties agree. [ 36 ] The case was argued on the basis that the Court should determine, based on the evidence, whether the costs should accrue to the co-owners because of the intrinsic merit of the expenditure. [ 37 ] The Court has therefore proceeded without addressing the issue of the formalities of the co-ownership. Given the deadlock and although Ms.

Iaquinta owned a 60% share and has 60% of the votes, the Civil Code of Quebec provides that the voting rights are deemed to be equal, given that there are only two owners. 1091.

Where, in a co-ownership comprising fewer than five fractions, a co-owner is entitled to more than one-half of all the votes available to the co-owners, the number of votes to which he is entitled at a meeting is reduced to the total number of votes to which the other co-owners present or represented at the meeting are entitled [4] . [ 38 ] Reference was made to this disposition in Moisan [5] : [27] Le législateur a voulu que toutes les copropriétés de moins de cinq fractions soient visées par l'

article 1091 C.c.Q. Le législateur n'a pas dit « les copropriétés de moins de cinq fractions possédées par plus de deux copropriétaires. » [28] L'objet de la disposition est d'empêcher que dans les petites copropriétés, un seul copropriétaire prenne le contrôle de la propriété du simple fait de sa majorité.

À tort ou à raison, le législateur a souhaité imposer le dialogue plutôt que la force brute du nombre. [ 39 ] In our case it is truly a situation of deadlock, not of dialogue, comparable to a situation that can arise in partnerships and closely held corporations. [ 40 ] Unlike the partnership or the corporation, were a partnership analogy can be applied, undivided co-ownership does not permit a dissolution or a forced buyout. [ 41 ] The parties are therefore condemned to remain in their state of deadlock and manage the best they can. [ 42 ] A more global resolution of their conflict is also not part of the proceedings before the Court: it is more a question of a judicial establishment of a state of accounts between the two parties, based on the premise that proper expenses of the co-ownership should be contributed to, on a 60-40 basis, as they would have been if there had been budgets, meetings, resolutions and management of funds by the Syndicate. [ 43 ] The Syndicate has been made party to the proceedings by the Plaintiff, who asserts a representative role.

This creates a formal, but not a substantial difficulty. Since the Syndicate does not operate a bank account and is, for all intents and purposes, an inactive entity, its position in the proceedings is really one of mise-en-cause, and the true legal issue is between the two individuals, co-owners, in regard to their respective and mutual obligations to each other without the intermediary of the Syndicate. [ 44 ] In the last version of her modified Plea and Counter-Claim Gina Iaquinta added in the designation “Gina Iaquinta es qualités Syndicate of the co-owners of 454-456 Grosvenor avenue in Westmount”.

This modification had not been authorized by the Court at the hearing and the Plaintiff contested the addition in the written proceeding made subsequently. This is without consequence with respect to the monetary claims added in paragraphs 66.1 and 66.2.

It has certain ramifications in respect of the claim concerning the basement mentioned in paragraphs 67 to 70. [ 45 ] The Court’s condemnation will therefore be in respect of each individual with the Syndicate being bound to the decision passively. [ 46 ] On the whole of the evidence, the Court was not able to find more fault with one party than with the other, when it came to the creation and the persistence of the deadlock situation. [ 47 ] As well, neither party was in a position of abuse of proceedings, or of abuse of rights and there is no basis on which either party could claim damages in the form of compensation for legal expenses.

[ 48 ] It is simply a question of an unfortunate conflict leading to a deadlock for which there is no simple practical solution, failing a reconciliation between the antagonists or the sale, by one or both of the parties, of their units to third parties. [ 49 ] The Court will now deal in turn which each of the claims.

A) The Plaintiff's claims I. The payment to International [ 50 ] 103441 Canada inc. (International) was engaged by the Syndicate to carry out various works estimated in 2006 [6] and revised in 2007 [7] .

A statement of account dated March 28, 2011 [8] shows invoices and payments between January 2007 and March 2010 on a revised global price of $35,906.50, plus tax. [ 51 ] It is unclear whether the residual amount shown on the statement of account of $10,921.31 after the payment of May 6, 2010 was prescribed when the payment of $5,000 was made on March 22, 2012. [ 52 ] It would appear that the last work carried out was in December 2007 (invoice 7493). The amount was paid in part on February 21, 2018, with a small balance being carried forward and forming part of a balance invoiced on May 3, 2010 (invoice 8202).

This invoice stated the total contract price and treated each payment as a "draw", from which it can be inferred that the invoice of January 19, 2007, (invoice 7217, in the amount of $6,723.10) was part of the balance of $15,245.40, paid in part by a cheque in the amount of $12,500.00. [ 53 ] The statement of account of March 28, 2011 shows the initial invoice 7217 in the amount of $ 6,723.10 as covered by a cheque, but under the column "credit" the amount does not appear: one reads "unpaid". [ 54 ] So, the bill was matched by a cheque that was "unpaid" and the amount continued to comprise part of the ongoing calculation of the balance.

The statement of account is a more specific accounting than the May 3 rd invoice which is more of an accounting of a global contract price with deduction for progress payments. [ 55 ] The Plaintiff maintains that the initial bill of $6,723.10 was prescribed and that the payment of $5,000.00 in 2012 was therefore irregular on the part of the Defendant, using the common funds inappropriately despite the prescription. [ 56 ] The Defendant argues that she had made various promises to International that the debt, in the global sense, would be honoured, although the proof is not very precise as to when in the chronology she did this. [ 57 ] In the Court's view, the burden of proving this prescription of the initial amount, the payment of which apparently defaulted lies upon the Plaintiff.

That burden is not met, because, on balance, the proof tends to show that the contract was a global matter, with progress payments, and the last payment before the disputed $5,000.00 payment of March 22, 2012 covered that initial payment as part of an ongoing balance being carried forward.

The payment of 2012 of $5,000 was a payment on the remaining balance at that time. [ 58 ] Even if the Plaintiff's analysis is correct, the payment of a prescribed debt, out of the Syndicate's cash flow, would be a valid payment supported by the Syndicate's moral obligation to pay [9] . [ 59 ] The amount was part of a contractual commitment of the Syndicate and the Syndicate had funds to pay it. Gina Iaquinta had the signing authority on the account and she also had the apparent authority, in her dealings with International, to bind the Syndicate to a decision to pay and not to raise prescription.

For her to have raised prescription on behalf of the Syndicate, it would have required the intention of both co-owners to act against the Syndicate's moral obligation, and this intention was lacking because of the deadlock that had developed within the co-ownership that is the source of the litigation in this matter. [ 60 ] Since the burden of proof on this claim is with the Plaintiff, it fails. II. The roof repairs of 2012 [ 61 ] The technical reports obtained by the Plaintiff point to two issues with the roof, which is clearly a common portion.

The first report, dated June 21, 2012 [10] points to poor workmanship in the installation of the roof membrane in 2006 and the possible absence of a central drain on the roof, or the clogging of the drain if there is one (the presence of a wooded deck prevented the expert from seeing whether there was a drain). [ 62 ] A second report of August 28, 2012 [11] confirmed the blockage of the drain, possibly due to debris put there by racoons, and also confirmed the poor quality of joints in certain areas. [ 63 ] Works were carried out in furtherance of the issues found to exist as a result of these investigations [12] . [ 64 ] Some payments were made through the Syndicate's account, but funded solely by the Plaintiff Ms.

Ramsden. Others were made by Ms. Ramsden directly. [ 65 ] The Defendant Ms. Iaquinta should pay for 60% of these costs, which are a legitimate common expense. [ 66 ] The Plaintiff asserts that 100% of the cost of removing the wooden deck and putting it back should be to the Defendant's account because she is solely responsible for the upkeep of the deck, a common portion for her exclusive use.

[ 67 ] The Court disagrees: the cost of removing and reinstalling the deck is incidental to the remedial work carried out on the roof, as a common portion, and the cost should be borne by the co-owners collectively, as it was necessary for the repair of the common portion, not for the maintenance and repair of the portion of exclusive use. [ 68 ] The amount accruing to the Plaintiff under this

chapter is therefore $ 3,211.26. III. The structural repairs of 2014-2015 [ 69 ] These were serious structural repairs carried out in the central support of the building in the basement required because of a partial failure of part of the timber structure. The problem may have arisen because of some structural changes that had been carried out prior to 2004, presumably by Ms.

Ramsden's predecessor. [ 70 ] The corrective work involved underpinning the central beam with a new steel beam to retransmit the load down through posts to newly-poured footings. [ 71 ] The engineering work [13] and the construction work [14] are well documented and their necessity and the appropriateness of the approach taken seem obvious. [ 72 ] The Defendant's 60% share is $9,474.65. IV. The closing of the bank account [ 73 ] The closing of the Syndicate's account was the wise thing to do, given the deadlock.

The small amount left in the account in February $143.56, given the de facto liquidation of the cash assets, should be split 60%-40%. The Plaintiff is entitled to $57.42. V . Miscellaneous expenses [ 74 ] The replacement of a pump in the basement: a common expense of $280.60 gives rise to a 60% share payable by the Defendant of $168.36. [ 75 ] Work carried out by an HVAC contractor to install a dehumidifier in the basement [15] for the comfort of her tenants.

Even if the equipment was set up in the common basement, the comfort of the tenants is an expense associated with the privative portion. [ 76 ] The cost of replacement of boards on the deck which is the sole responsibility of the Defendant, $287.44 [16] should be taken 100% by her, because the initiative taken by the Plaintiff to have some rotten boards replaced was to her benefit [17] . The initiative was taken in the context of the ongoing battle with racoons, whose presence on the roof was facilitated by rotten deck boards. VI.

Legal Fees [ 77 ] As alluded to above in the introductory section, the requirement of litigation to resolve, to the extent possible, the conflicts that led to and resulted from the deadlock between the parties is not attributable to one party more than to the other. It is a conflict of personality that got out of control and became stabilized by each party, motivated by self-interest, doing what she could to take care of the property. The conduct of both parties in the litigation was moderate and reasonable. There will be no extra-judicial legal costs awarded.

B) The Defendant's claims. I. The settlement with Ramsden's attorneys [ 78 ] As the Court pointed out in the interlocutory decision, whatever claim Ramsden had against the attorneys related to their alleged neglect of her interests in protecting her claim, based on a contract of sale with the previous owner. She did not purport to act in the interest of the Syndicate in her claim against these attorneys. Any settlement she made with the attorneys would be a compromise of her rights, not those of the Syndicate or of Gina Iaquinta, assuming they had any. II.

The claim for moneys payable to International [ 79 ] It follows from what was decided above that the claim for a residual amount by International against the Syndicate may not be prescribed, depending in part upon facts that have occurred since the last payment. The claim made by the Defendant Ms. Iaquinta that the Plaintiff be compelled to pay toward the payment of this balance of account, for the benefit of International is a recourse on behalf of another. If International were to seek payment, and if the claim is not prescribed or if the parties opted not to raise prescription, International may well succeed.

But, given the deadlock, Ms. Iaquinta, not having funds in the Syndicate account, did not pay. The deadlock prevents an easy resolution of the conflict that could arise if International asserted its claim. Since it has not done so, there is no impetus for the Court to act. It will not do so in the interest of International on the request of a third party, Gina Iaquinta, who does not have a direct interest in the claim.

III. Contributions to the common expenses of the co-ownership [ 80 ] It is not contested that, in accordance with the 60-40 participation, the parties resolved, at a special meeting of co-owners held in April 2011, to pay arrears for the years 2008, 2009 and 2010, that is, 36 months times $150.00 for Ms. Iaquinta ($5,400.00) and 36 months times $100.00 for Ms. Ramsden ($3,600.00), a total of $9,000.00. [ 81 ] Ms. Iaquinta did in fact deposit the promised $5,400.00 to the Syndicate's account, while Ms. Ramsden only deposited $1,800.00, a fact she admitted it in her testimony.

Only $7,200.00 was available, and spent, for common charges. This left a shortfall of $1,800.00. [ 82 ] There was thus an imbalance in the account such that when these funds were used, it was as if Ms. Iaquinta had contributed 75% of the common charges, rather than 60% and Ms. Ramsden had only contributed 25% rather than 40%. To correct this imbalance, Ms. Ramsden shall make up the difference directly to Ms. Iaquinta, 15% of $7,200.00 ($1,080.00).

This is the functional equivalent of her paying $1,800.00 to the inactive Syndicate and this amount being treated as a surplus, and, notionally paid out at the closing of the account (as was the case for the small balance of $140.00) distributed to the parties in their 60-40 shares, (Ms. Iaquinta $1,080.00 and Ms. Ramsden $720.00). [ 83 ] The rest of the claim for condo fees, relating to the period commencing after the special meeting is without merit, because both parties ceased to make payments to the Syndicate's account, acting unilaterally, given the deadlock. IV.

Miscellaneous payments relating to the common expenses [ 84 ] Some of these charges are supported by invoices [18] . Others are estimates based on recollections of undocumented cash payments to informal workers. One is a small amount that Ms. Iaquinta asserts having paid to make up an amount owing by the Syndicate for insurance. [ 85 ] The explanations given by Ms. Iaquinta in her testimony are acceptable. Given the routine and minor nature of the expenses not supported by invoices, the Court would have arbitrated sums in the same order of magnitude as the amounts claimed. [ 86 ] The amount attributable to Ms.

Ramsden on her 40% share is $1,496.85. V. Removal of the heating system and removal of debris. [ 87 ] The claims relate to the alleged failure of Daniela Ramsden to respect the co-ownership agreement by using the common area, without right, to house a heating system and by leaving in the basement personal effects or debris. [ 88 ] The claim by Gina Iaquinta is the exercise of a personal right as opposed to a real right. It is a personal right pertaining to the building, a right ad rem not in rem .

If as co-owner, she is prejudiced by the failure of Daniela Ramsden to respect an obligation imposed by the declaration of co-ownership, the claim for reparation of that prejudice becomes prescribed three years after she becomes aware of the fault and the prejudice resulting therefrom. [ 89 ] She was aware of the situation in the basement as least as early as the meeting of April 10 2005 where one of the items on the agenda was "2. COMPLAINT HEATING SYSTEM".

Prescription was acquired before the institution of the principal demand and the counter claim. [ 90 ] It is not necessary to go into the issue of the Court's jurisdiction to award the relief sought as being either injunctive, where there would not be jurisdiction versus specific performance of a contractual obligation and damages. [ 91 ] Judicial compensation will be awarded. The awards given by the Court to the parties are tabulated as follows: Credits to the Plaintiff, Ms. Ramsden: I. The payment to International $0 II. The roof repairs of 2012 $3,211.26 III. The structural repairs of 2014-2015 $9,474.65 IV.

The closing of the bank account $57.42 V. Miscellaneous expenses $455.80 VI. Legal Fees $0 TOTAL $13,199.13 Credits to the Defendant, Ms. Iaquinta: I. The settlement with Ms. Ramsden’s attorneys $0

II. The claim for moneys payable to International $0 III. Contributions to the common expenses of the co-ownership $1,080.00 IV. Miscellaneous payments relating to the common expenses $1,496.85 V. Removal of the heating system and removal of debris $0 TOTAL $2,576.85 [ 92 ] Applying compensation, the end result is subject to the interest calculated by which run from different dates. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT: GRANTS the action of the Plaintiff Daniela Ramsden in part; CONDEMNS the Defendant Gina Iaquinta, to pay the Plaintiff Daniela Ramsden, the sum of $13,199.13 together with interest at the legal rate together with the additional indemnity provided by

article 1619 of the Civil Code of Quebec , calculated from the date of the institution of the proceedings, March 20, 2015; DISMISES the action of the Plaintiff Daniela Ramsden es qualité Syndicate of the co-owners of 454-456 Grosvenor avenue in Westmount; GRANTS the Counter Claim of Gina Iaquinta in part; CONDEMNS the Plaintiff Daniela Ramsden to pay the Defendant Gina Iaquinta the sum of $2,576.85 together with interest at the legal rate together with the additional indemnity provided by

article 1619 of the Civil Code of Quebec , calculated from April 20, 2016; PRONOUNCES judicial compensation between the two condemnations up to the lesser amount, after taking into account the interest calculation; DECLARES the judgment opposable to the Syndicate of the co-owners of 454-456 Grosvenor avenue in Westmount, as mise-en-cause; WITHOUT legal costs. _______________________ David L. Cameron, J.C.Q. Me Crystal Corrente Frégeau & Associés inc. For the Plaintiff Me Nicolas Brochu Fishman Flanz Meland Paquin s.e.n.c.r.l.

For the Defendent Date of hearing: February 8, 2018, March 1, 2018 and November 27, 2018 Judgment taken under advisement after the interlocutory judgment of January 10, 2019.