2022 NBKB 242, 2022 NBKB 242

2022 NBKB 242 COURT FILE: FM-114-2021 IN THE COURT OF KING’S BENCH OF NEW BRUNSWICK TRIAL DIVISION JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF FREDERICTON IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION for Judicial Review pursuant to 69 of the Rules of Court B E T W E E N: NURSES ASSOCIATION OF NEW BRUNSWICK , Applicant - and - COMMISSIONER OF OFFICIAL LANGUAGES FOR NEW BRUNSWICK, Respondent Before: The Honourable Mister Justice Danys R.X. Delaquis Date of hearing: June 30, 2022 Date of Decision: December 14, 2022 Appearances: Josie Marks and Marie-Pier Cyr - for the Applicant Marion Sandilands and Robert Basque, K.C. - for the Respondent

Summary: Enforcement of Settlement and Judicial Review of Decision from the Commissioner of Official Languages TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

PART I – OVERVIEW 1

PART II – FACTS 2

PART III – ISSUES 19

PART IV – LAW AND ANALYSIS 19 1. Issue 1 – Motion to Strike 19 (

a) Pleadings 20 (

b) Affidavit Evidence 25 2. Issue 2 – Settlement 49 3. Issue 3 – Judicial Review 53 (

a) Legislative Framework 53 (

b) Prematurity 56 (

c) Applicable Standard & Analysis 62 (

i) Reconsidering and/or Re-Deciding the Prior Decision 66 (ii) Issues Pre-Determined and Not Determined 75 (iii) Unreasonable Error of Law 82 4. Issue 4 – Injunctive Relief 99

PART VI - DISPOSITION 99 DECISION DELAQUIS, J.:

PART I - OVERVIEW [ 1 ] The Nurses Association of New Brunswick (“the Applicant”), is a self-regulated association created for “(…) the purpose of advancing and maintaining the standard of nursing in the Province, for governing and regulating those offering nursing care and for providing for the welfare of members of the public and the profession.” (See

Preamble of the Nurses Act, S.N.B. 1984, c.71 ). The public interest component of its mandate includes ensuring that persons admitted to the profession have the entry-level ability required to deliver safe, competent and ethical nursing care.

The entry-level competence of candidates is assessed, in part, by an entry-to-practice examination called the National Council Licensure Examination for Registered Nurses (the “NCLEX-RN”). [ 2 ] On October 15, 2021, the Office for the Commissioner of Official Languages (“the Respondent”), rendered a decision to investigate a Complaint alleging that use of the NCLEX-RN as an entry-to-practice exam violates the Official Languages Act (“the OLA ”).

In essence, the Complaint alleges that the NCLEX-RN exam creates a disadvantage for francophone nursing students trying to enter the profession. [ 3 ] The Applicant argues that the Respondent has already investigated the same or similar allegations with respect to the NCLEX three times and, as a result, the decision to again do so constitutes an abuse of process.

The Applicant not only claims that it is being vexed by the Respondent’s October 15, 2021, decision to investigate (“the Decision”), but also that it was rendered contrary to a valid and binding settlement of a prior judicial review application, that the same issue is presently before the Court in litigation and that there is no evidence to support the decision in any event.

The Applicant therefore asks the Court to enforce the settlement under Rule 16.04, in addition to seeking judicial review of the Decision pursuant to Rule 69 of the Rules of Court . [ 4 ] The Respondent argues firstly in its Notice of Motion that certain parts of the Notice of Application should be struck, as well as portions of the Affidavit evidence submitted by the Applicant, because they improperly raise new issues and evidence in the context of a Judicial Review Application.

On the merits of the Application, the Respondent takes the position that the Application is premature, fails to demonstrate that the Commissioner acted unreasonably in carrying out her statutory duties, and that the remedies being sought are wholly inappropriate. [ 5 ] In this case, the Respondent did not have the legislative authority to investigate subject matter that had already been investigated and settled, nor to reconsider or redecide a prior decision to refuse to investigate the same complaint and close the file.

The Respondent also pre-determined two key issues and did not determine, or misconstrued, the material issue of whether a settlement was reached. Lastly, the Respondent interpreted certain key provisions of the OLA narrowly, or not at all, and by doing so fettered legislative

discretion and committed an unreasonable error of law. Given the factual matrix and legal considerations of the case, detailed reasons are necessary to explain why the Court finds that the Decision is unreasonable.

PART II - FACTS [ 6 ] On January 1, 2015, the NCLEX-RN was adopted by the Applicant as an entry-to-practice exam.

However, in August of 2016, a Complaint was filed with the Respondent alleging poor translation of the NCLEX-RN, coupled with insufficient French language study resources. (“hereinafter Complaint #1”). [ 7 ] The Applicant says that: “The undisclosed complainants did not file any evidence in support of Complaint #1; the complaint was based upon allegations alone.” On November 24, 2016, the Applicant nonetheless “provided a 17-page response to Complaint #1, supported by more than 550 pages of supporting documentation.” [Paras 11 and 13 of Laurie Janes Affidavit, Pages 10 and 26 to 45 of the Joint Record on Application (“the Record”)]. [ 8 ] An investigation was undertaken by the Respondent.

A Report was subsequently issued (“the Report”) on May 9, 2018.

The following Conclusion and Recommendations were included in the Report: The Office of the commissioner concludes that the complaints are founded and that the Nurses Association of New Brunswick violated subsection 41.1(3) of the Official Languages Act; which specifies that "No person shall be placed at a disadvantage by reason of exercising his or her right to choose an official language in which to fulfill requirements imposed by a professional association," It must also be remembered that each official linguistic community in New Brunswick has the right to distinct educational institutions, in order to preserve and promote each community.

This duality means, in fact, that each community develops its own post-secondary training programs in terms of its needs and priorities. In the context of its activities, the Nurses Association of New Brunswick has a legal obligation to act in a way that respects the constitutional principle of equality inherent in the language rights recognized in the OLA. Following its investigation, the Office of the Commissioner concludes that the Association has not respected this principle of equality, because it adopted a licensing exam that places members of the francophone community at a disadvantage.

There is indeed a significant gap in the exam preparation resources available to one linguistic community compared to the other. Whereas there is only one French language question bank tool, with no simulation exam and a limited number of practice questions, there is a vast array of high-quality English-language exam simulations that are commercially available. Therefore, Francophone candidates are not on a level playing field compared to their Anglophone counterparts. It acknowledged that the Association does not exercise control over these resources, nor does it endorse them.

However, the NCLEX-RN does not exist in a vacuum and the Office of the Commissioner finds that the Association cannot ignore the existence of these resources as well as their availability. From the time the Association made the decision to use the NCLEX-RN exam, Francophone and Anglophone candidates have not been on an equal footing. Moreover, the Office of the Commissioner notes that the adoption of this exam has created a situation that encourages Francophone students to use English-language resources to prepare for the Association's exam, which negatively affects the vitality of the French language.

The Office of the Commissioner strongly denounces that the French version of the NCLEX-RN exam may have been subject to modifications that were not reviewed by certified translators. Such practices compromise the quality of this exam. [Page 67 of the Record]. [ 9 ] Ms. Laurie Janes, the Applicant’s Executive Director, explains NANB’s response to the Report at paragraphs 17 and 18 of her Affidavit:

17. During the 18-month period from NANB’s filing of its response to Complaint #1 on November 24, 2016 to the issuance of the Report on May 9, 2018, NANB was not contacted by Commissioner d’Entremont or by the OCOL except for their request in February 2018 to help arrange an independent translation review. NANB was not at any time asked questions with respect to the voluminous response material it provided. NANB was not provided with any evidence submitted by the complainants to allow it to respond.

While the Report refers to and relies upon statistics provided by the faculty at U de M, along with information and opinions gathered by investigators through interviews with such faculty members, none of these statistics, opinion or information were shared with NANB for comment, nor were any members of NANB invited to be interviewed by OCOL investigators. 18.

NANB was extremely disappointed by factual inaccuracies in the Report, many of which could have been corrected if NANB had been provided with an opportunity to comment upon the evidence and information gathered by OCOL. [Page 11 of the Record] [ 10 ] Shortly after the Report was issued on May 28, 2018, la Société de l’acadie du Nouveau-Brunswick Inc. and la Fédération des étudiants et étudiantes du Centre universitaire de Moncton Incorporée initiated legal proceedings against the Applicant alleging, inter alia , violations of the OLA . [Pages 83-92 of the Record].

The legal proceeding was initially dismissed by this Court for lack of standing: see SANB and FÉÉCUM v. NANB , 2020 NBQB 19 . However, the Court of Appeal reinstated the action to permit the Plaintiffs to amend their pleading: see La Société de l’Acadie du Nouveau-Brunswick Inc. et al. v. Nurses Association of New Brunswick , 2021 NBCA 21 . This litigation remains ongoing. [ 11 ] On or about June 20, 2018, Michel Carrier, Q.C. was appointed interim Commissioner for the Respondent. [ 12 ] On August 21, 2018, the Applicant filed a Notice of Application with a supporting Affidavit from Ms.

Janes seeking judicial review with respect to the Report. In the Application, the Applicant alleged, inter alia , procedural unfairness and/or violation of the natural justice as well as unreasonable factual findings. [Pages 97 to 122 of the Joint Record on Application].

In essence, the NANB wanted to challenge what it considered to be factual “inaccuracies” in the Report which may have been corrected if it had been provided with an opportunity to respond to the allegations from the outset. [ 13 ] It is against that backdrop that settlement discussions ensued between the parties with respect to the Application for Judicial Review.

It is necessary to review the settlement discussions between the parties given the relief sought by the Applicant, namely enforcement of the alleged settlement. [ 14 ] On September 24, 2018, the Commissioner advised counsel for the Applicant, Andr é Richard, Q.C. (now K.C.), in an email that: J’ai aussi trouvé que la rencontre s’est bien déroulée. Je suis d’accord qu’il va falloir faire des efforts de part et d’autre pour arriver à régler cette situation qui est, de fait, très complexe, et cette complexité va bien au-delà du rapport de la commissaire.

Comme je l’ai mentionné ce matin, si on peut s’entendre sur l’arrêt des procédures, je suis disposé à reconnaitre formellement que la qualité de la traduction, contrairement à ce que les médias ont rapporté, est adéquate et que selon les experts, la version français ne devrait causer problèmes aux étudiants et étudiantes. Sans me compromettre, je suis aussi disposé à considérer toute autre suggestion de l’association qui pourrait faire avancer les choses tout en respectant le mandat des deux organismes.

C’est avec plaisir que j’accepte de jeter un coup d’oeil à l’ébauche de la réponse avant son envoi. [Page 123 of the Record] [ 15 ] The next day, on September 25, 2018, counsel for the Applicant requested that the matter be set over to the December Motion’s Day to allow further time to explore potential resolution of this litigated matter. [Page 124 of the Record]. [ 16 ] On November 30, 2018, the Commissioner sent this email to counsel for the Applicant: Michel Doucet a accepté de nous représenter dans le dossier si nous allons de l'avant avec la requête. Je lui donnerai le mandat

officiellement plus tard si nécessaire, mais pour le moment je préfère continuer d'interagir directement avec toi et l'association dans l'espoir qu'on va en arriver à s'entendre. Cela dit, il me dit que la date du 18 janvier ne laisse peut-être pas assez de temps pour continuer nos échanges et se préparer pour le tribunal. II nous suggère de demander qu'on remette le tout plus tard au printemps. Je suis d'accord avec lui. J'aimerais être capable de travailler le dossier et en arriver à une position qui est mutuellement acceptable , mais pas sentir la pression d'y arriver avant le 18.

Aussi quand tu auras la chance, tu peux m'envoyer le tableau des points soulevés par l’association. [Page 132 of the Record] [Emphasis mine]. [ 17 ] Settlement discussions between the parties continued January 3, 2019, as evidenced by the following email from counsel for the Applicant to the Commissioner: Suite à notre discussion de cette après-midi, voici les conclusions que nous avons discutées. Advenant un accord sur ces conclusions, je serais prêt à recommander à ma cliente de mettre fin à la requête déposée en cour. 1.

La Commissaire aux langues officielles accuse réception de la réponse détaillée de l’AIINB au rapport de la Commissaire aux langues officielles de mai, 2018. 2. Basé sur les examens indépendants de traducteurs certifiés, le Commissaire aux langues officielles réitère la conclusion contenue dans le rapport du mai 2018 que la version française de l’examen NCLEX-RN correspond à la version anglaise et est conforme aux exigences de l’article 41.1 de la

Loi sur les langues officielles. 3. Le Commissaire aux langues officielles reconnait que l’AIINB, à

titre d’organisme réglementaire au Nouveau-Brunswick, n’a aucun mandat et/ou, contrôle sur la préparation ou la production de textes commerciaux préparatoires aux examens NCLEX-RN. La Commissaire reconnait que tous les documents préparatoires aux examens NCLEX-RN recommandés par l’AIINB sont disponibles dans les deux langues officielles. 4. Le Commissaire est encouragé de constater les efforts soutenus entrepris par l’AIINB de voir à la disponibilité accrue de matériaux préparatoires recommandés aux examens NCLEX-RN dans la forme de questionnaires simulant les examens NCLEX-RN. 5.

Le Commissaire est conscient qu’il y a présentement un litige devant les tribunaux du Nouveau-Brunswick portant directement sur la question de la disponibilité de matériaux préparatoires commerciaux en français pour les examens NCLEX-RN au Nouveau- Brunswick. Dans ce contexte le Commissaire ne commentera pas davantage cette question. 6. Le Commissaire considère maintenant le dossier comme étant clos. [Page 139 of the Record] [ 18 ] On January 4, 2019, the Commissioner sent another email to counsel for the Applicant in furtherance of their settlement discussions.

Here is what the email states in part: J’ai rédigé une première ébauche de la position que pourrait nous être acceptable. Je veux tout simplement avoir ta réaction avant d’aller plus loin. Je n’en ai pas discuté avec mes collègues ici au bureau mais ils seront tous de retour au bureau lundi et je pourrai en jaser avec eux à ce moment. Comme tu peux voir, je dis clairement que la traduction est correcte. Je reconnais les efforts faits à date. Je laisse la question du déséquilibre en matière d’outils commerciaux à la cour. Je me suis aussi inspiré de l’ébauche de réponse que tu m’as envoyée le 26 novembre.

Voice ce que je propose: Nous accusons réception de la réponse détaillée de l’AIINB comme le demandait le rapport de la Commissaire aux langues officielles du 9 mai, 2018 dans le dossier 2016-3071.

D’entrée de jeux, nous réitérerons que, basé sur les examens indépendants de traducteurs certifiés, la version français de l’examen NCLEX-RN correspond à la version anglaise et que le rapport n’a pas conclu que la qualité de la traduction enfreignait les exigences de l’article 41.1 de la

Loi sur les langues officielles du Nouveau-Brunswick. Qui plus est, l’AIINB s’engage à assurer le maintien de la qualité la traduction. Dans sa réponse, L’AIINB maintient, qu’à

titre d’organisme réglementaire au Nouveau-Brunswick, elle n’a aucun mandate et/ou contrôle sur la préparation ou la production de textes commerciaux préparatoires aux examens NCLEX-RN et que tous les documents préparatoires aux examens NCLEX-RN recommandés par l’AIINB sont disponibles dans les deux langues officielles. Cela dit, l’AIINB reconnait l’importance d’outils préparatoires pour les candidats et candidates.

Nous sommes encouragés de constater les efforts entrepris par l’AIINB de voir la disponibilité accrue de matériaux préparatoires recommandés aux examens NCLEX-RN, notamment, la parution au mois de juillet 2018 d’un examen de simulation dans les deux langues officielles contenant 125 questions fournies directement par le fournisseur du NCLEX-RN dans la forme exacte du NCLEX-RN, accompagner d’un tutoriel. Nous incitons l’Association à continuer ses efforts dans ce domaine.

La question à savoir si l’absence d’outils préparatoires commerciaux en français défavorise les étudiantes et étudiants francophones, comme en faisait état le rapport du 9 mai 2018, reste entière. Nous sommes conscients qu’il y a présentement un litige devant les tribunaux du Nouveau-Brunswick portant directement sur la question de la disponibilité de matériaux préparatoires commerciaux en français pour les examens NCLEX-RN au Nouveau-Brunswick. Nous devons respecter le processus juridique et faire preuve de discrétion.

Par conséquent, nous ne ferons pas d’observations additionnelles à ce sujet. [Page 140 of the Record] [ 19 ] On January 7, 2019, further email correspondence was exchanged between the parties confirming the following: J'ai de bonnes nouvelles. Je peux maintenant confirmer que notre cliente accepte vos suggestions de règlement. Je comprends que tu voulais également avoir une consultation interne avant de me communiquer ton accord final et ma cliente en fut bien informée. L’AIINB peut finaliser la lettre de réponse aujourd’hui.

La lettre officielle sera dans la langue français puisqu’il s’agit de la langue des plaintes initiales. Nous vous fournirons également une version anglaise non signée et non officielle de la lettre de réponse. Nous pourrions finaliser ce dossier cette semaine et éviter de demander un ajournement à l’audience. Advenant que cela s’avère impossible, ma cliente m’a donné instruction d’accepter ta demande d’ajournement. Je suis au bureau toute la journée.

Avise-moi si tu désires en discuter. [Page 141 of the Record] [Emphasis mine] [ 20 ] The Respondent then sent correspondence to the Applicant in both official languages on January 10, 2019, in accordance with settlement discussions. I reference the following portions of the French version of this correspondence: Dans votre lettre, vous semblez maintenir que l’AIINB n’a aucun mandat et n’exerce aucun contrôle en ce qui a trait à la préparation ou à la production de textes commerciaux préparatoires aux examens NCLEX-RN.

Vous rappelez aussi que tous les documents préparatoires aux examens NCLEX-RN recommandés par l’AIINB sont disponibles dans les deux langues officielles. Par la suite vous énumérez une série de mesures prises par l’AIINB qui sont destinées à accroitre l’offre des ressources préparatoires à l’examen NCLEX-RN en français. A cet égard, nous avons été ravis d’apprendre la parution au mois de juillet 2018 d’un examen de simulation dans les deux langues officielles contenant 125 questions fournies directement par le fournisseur du NCLEX-RN, et ce, dans la forme exacte du NCLEX-RN et accompagne d’un tutoriel.

Nous saluons cette mesure et nous vous encourageons à poursuivre dans cette voie.

Tout en reconnaissant ces progrès, nous estimons que la question de l’écart quant aux ressources préparatoires commerciales à l’examen en anglais et en français demeure entière. Étant donné que cette question et d’autres éléments de ce dossier font l’objet d’un litige devant les tribunaux du Nouveau-Brunswick et par égard pour le processus judiciaire, le Commissariat ne fera pas d’autres déclarations publiques concernant ce dossier durant le déroulement de cette procédure judiciaire .

Nous considérons maintenant le dossier 2016-3071 comme étant clos . [Pages 154-157 of the Record] [Emphasis mine]. [ 21 ] On January 14, 2019, counsel for the Applicant advised the Court in correspondence, a copy of which was sent to the Commissioner, that the Application for Judicial Review had been settled: Nous désirons informer la Cour que le dossier susmentionné est maintenant réglé. Par conséquent, la Requérante, l’Association des infirmières et infirmiers du Nouveau-Brunswick, retire sa requête qui était cédulée pour le 18 janvier prochain.

Les parties se sont entendues que le retrait de l’Avis de Requête est en fait sans frais . Nous vous prions de bien vouloir en informer immédiatement le Juge assigné à cette cause. [Page 158 of the Record] [Emphasis mine]. [ 22 ] Despite the foregoing, on July 31, 2019, a second complaint was filed against the Applicant seeking to have the allegations re-investigated by the Respondent (“Complaint #2”). [Para 10 of Affidavit of Shirley MacLean, K.C. at page 259 of the Record (hereinafter “the MacLean Affidavit”)] [ 23 ] In her Affidavit, Ms.

Janes indicates that the Complainants held a press conference contemporaneously with the filing of Complaint #2 and references the press report. The press report is dated July 31, 2019, the same day that Complaint #2 was filed. [Paras 29 and 30 of the Janes Affidavit, pages 14 and 159 to 161 of the Record]. [ 24 ] On August 6, 2019, an identical complaint to Complaint #2 was filed by Solange Haché, President of the Association francophone des ainées du Nouveau-Brunswick. [Para 11 of the MacLean Affidavit, page 259 of the Record] [ 25 ] Ms.

Janes indicates in her Affidavit that she and other representatives of the Applicant met with Interim Commissioner Michel Carrier, Q.C. (now K.C.) in August 2019 to discuss Complaint #2: 32. After learning of Complaint #2 in the media, the OCOL reached out to NANB to request a meeting. An in-person meeting between myself, another NANB employee and Commissioner Carrier to discuss Complaint #2 occurred in August of 2019. 33. At that meeting, Commissioner Carrier did not provide NANB with a copy of Complaint #2 but confirmed that it raised the same issues investigated in Complaint #1.

He advised that, as the matter had already been thoroughly investigated and resolved through Complaint #1, and it remained before the Courts, the decision had been made to not move forward with an investigation of Complaint #2. [Page 15 of the Record] [Emphasis mine]. [ 26 ] Indeed, on October 31, 2019, Interim Commissioner Carrier sent correspondence to the spokesperson for the group of complainants, Véronique Landry, confirming their meeting and stating he would not investigate the Complaint (Complaint #2): Je tiens à vous exprimer à quel point nous avons apprécié vous rencontrer le 21 aout 2019.

Cette rencontre nous a permis de mieux saisir les doléances clairement exprimées par vous et vos collègues. Cela dit, je dois vous informer qu’étant donné que cette affaire est devant les tribunaux, il nous est impossible de procéder à une

enquête. Le Commissariat se voit donc dans l’obligation de clore ce dossier.

Soyez toutefois assure que si, dans l’avenir, les circonstances entourant cette affaire devant la cour devaient changer, le Commissariat pourra réévaluer la situation. [Page 362 of the Record] [Emphasis mine] [ 27 ] Shortly thereafter, on November 22, 2019, Shirley MacLean Q.C. was appointed Commissioner and took office on January 2, 2020, for a seven-year term. [Page 258 of the Record] [ 28 ] Commissioner MacLean explains in her Affidavit the genesis of being asked by a group of complainants to revisit the decision of her predecessor to not investigate the prior Complaint (Complaint #2).

This request to re-investigate is Complaint #3: [13] On March 9, 2020, a group of complainants wrote a letter to me, requesting that I revisit interim Commissioner Carrier's decision not to proceed with the complaints. A true copy of the letter is attached to my affidavit as "Exhibit G". In accordance with OCOL practice, the names of the complainants have been redacted . [14] I assigned two investigation files numbers as follows. Investigation file 2020-085 pertains to the complaint against NANB by the group of complainants.

Investigation file 20-21-030 pertains to the complaint against NANB by the Association francophone des ainées du Nouveau-Brunswick. [Page 259 of the Record] [Emphasis mine]. [ 29 ] On October 15, 2020, Commissioner MacLean advised the Applicant in correspondence of her intention to nonetheless investigate Complaint #3. Parts of Complaint #3 are quoted in that correspondence. Here is an extract that summarizes the essence of Complaint #3: En conséquence, par la présente, nous soutenons que l’Association des infirmières et infirmiers du Nouveau-Brunswick, viole le paragraphe 41.1(3) de la

Loi sur les langues officielles en maintenant en place l’examen américain NCLEX-RN pour accès à la profession d’infirmières

Le paragraphe 41.1(3) de la loi prévoit : « Nul ne peut être défavorisé du fait qu’il a exercé son droit de choisir la langue officielle dans laquelle il satisfait aux exigences qu’impose l’association professionnelle.» Nous soutenons que cet examen défavorise les étudiantes et étudiants qui ont choisi la langue française pour satisfaire aux exigences de l’association. [Page 374 of the Record] [ 30 ] On November 13, 2020, counsel for the Applicant advised the Respondent in correspondence of its objection to the decision to investigate.

This correspondence sets out in some detail the background and context of the Applicant’s objections. Suffice it to say that this correspondence highlighted objections based upon a settlement concluded between the parties that was relied upon by the Applicant, that the matter was still before the Court, that Complaint #3 raises the same allegations as in prior Complaints and therefore constituted an abuse of process and lastly, that there was no evidence submitted in support of Complaint #3.

In addition, the fact that the Complainants were not identified was raised to make the following point: «les plaignants ne sont pas nommés, ce qui fait en sorte qu’il est impossible de savoir si les plaignants sont les mêmes que ceux à l’origine de la Plainte #1, la Plainte #2, ou l’instance en cours devant les tribunaux, ou s’ils ont un intérêt légitime suffisant afin de leur donner la qualité pour agir afin de déposer une plainte (…) » [Pages 384-386 of the Record] [ 31 ] In response, counsel for the Respondent stated on December 2, 2020, inter alia , that the legislative exceptions in s. 43(10.1) and 43(11) of the OLA to investigate a complaint based on the Report did not apply.

Counsel also explained that Commissioner MacLean was not bound by the decision of her predecessor : « (…) comme le dernier mot à la plainte déposée en 2016 ne lie pas la Commissaire dans la prise de démarches exigées par la Loi suite au dépôt d’une nouvelle plainte.

Il est ainsi pour la décision du prédécesseur de la Commissaire de ne pas procéder à une enquête plus tard en 2019 ». [ 32 ] When the Applicant attempted to highlight that, inter alia , re-opening the investigation was a violation of the Settlement concluded between the parties, the Respondent denied a settlement existed: (…) veuillez noter que la Commissaire n’est pas d’avis que celle-ci représentait un règlement entre les parties dans le cadre de la révision judiciaire du Rapport de mai 2018.

La Commissaire rejette également la caractérisation des huit points notes dans votre lettre comme étant un résumé d’une « résolution négociée ».

[Pages 177-181 of the Record] [ 33 ] The Applicant also pointed out that re-investigation was an abuse of process. On December 2, 2020, counsel for the Respondent acknowledged in correspondence that the abuse of process doctrine may apply in an administrative law context but stated that the bar was not met in this case. More specifically, counsel wrote that: De plus, le sujet de la plainte est un examen récurrent. Il est entièrement possible que de nouveaux faits puissent surgir avec le temps. Il incombe au Commissaire d’agir lorsqu’il y a une plainte.

Cela étant dit, il est évident que n’importe de quelle enquête qui considère un sujet qui a déjà été traité par le Commissariat prendrait en compte le travail antérieur. [Page 179 of the Record] [ 34 ] On December 14, 2020, counsel for the Applicant responded by sending to the Respondent copies of all correspondence exchanged between the parties in relation to the settlement and further requested that the Commissioner consider all of the documentation filed in relation to the Application for Judicial Review, as well as all representations made by her predecessor with respect to settlement during the course of her review of the file.

Counsel for the Applicant then stated: Votre lettre indique que le CLO est en mesure d’enquêter sur une nouvelle plainte si de nouvelles informations à l’appui ont surgi. La confusion de l’AIINB réside dans le fait que les plaintes qui ont été acheminées ne semblent contenir aucune information nouvelle. Si le Commissariat a reçu de nouvelles informations factuelles à l’appui des plaintes, veuillez s’il vous plait faire parvenir cette information a l’AIINB dès que possible.

Entre temps, nous incluons en pièce jointe une copie de la plainte avec les réponses et commentaires de notre cliente reproduite directement dans le texte.

Étant donné que le texte des deux plaintes est identique, nous incluons seulement une copie en réponse aux deux plaintes. [Pages 182 to 197 of the Record] [ 35 ] Indeed, in correspondence dated April 15, 2021, Counsel for the Respondent confirmed the following, approximately six months before the Decision was rendered: (…) Au cours de cette enquête, la Commissaire a l’intention de prendre en compte tout travail et toute conclusion antérieure en rapport avec le dossier 2016-3071.

La Commissaire prendra également en compte les documents déposés dans la demande de révision judiciaire de l’AIINB déposée le 3 aout 2018 et retirée le 14 janvier 2019. La présente plainte ne porte pas seulement sur les ressources préparatoires, mais sur l’égalité réelle dans l’accès à la profession d’infirmière : l’évaluation sélectionnée par l’AIINB pour contrôler cet accès, y inclus l’examen ou ses ressources préparatoires, place-t- elle les candidat(e)s francophones dans une situation désavantageuse? L’examen et les ressources préparatoires sont-ils bien adaptés aux besoins des candidat(e)s francophones?

Comme mentionné dans la lettre du 2 décembre 2020, le sujet de la plainte est un examen récurrent. A ce stade, la question d’intérêt principal pour l’enquête est celui de la qualité et la disponibilité des ressources préparatoires à l’examen . Toutefois, la Commissaire peut exiger des informations supplémentaires si d’autres questions deviennent importantes pour l’enquête. [Pages 210-211 of the Record] [Emphasis mine] [ 36 ] On May 21, 2021, the Applicant’s solicitor sent an email to the Commissioner and counsel advising in part as follows: “In follow up to Ms.

Taylor's request below, we reiterate that NANB does not agree that the office of the Commission of Official Languages (“the OCOL”) is permitted to undertake a re-investigation of matters already investigated from 2016 to 2018. We understand from the most recent correspondence from Me Sandilands that your office seeks to re-review the materials received with respect to its prior investigation, as well as the materials NANB filed in support of a judicial review application to quash the 2018 investigative report.

If the OCOL felt that further review or a re-investigation of these materials was needed, we are at a loss to understand why the OCOL did not simply consent to having the 2018 report quashed on judicial review in favor of re-examination of the file in a timely manner. In the above context, and for reasons already communicated to your office, our instructions are to file an application with the court to

prevent the OCOL from engaging in a re-investigation of this matter.

Prior to doing so, NANB is more than willing to sit down with your team, on a without prejudice basis, to determine if there is a way to move forward without the need for a Court process (…). [Page 430 of the Record] [ 37 ] On June 24, 2021, the parties met with their counsel on a "without prejudice” basis. [Para. 21 of the MacLean Affidavit, page 260 of the Record]. [ 38 ] On July 22, 2021, counsel for the Respondent sent correspondence to counsel for the Applicant explaining how the investigation would be carried out and further stating with respect to the identity of the Complainants that: Vous avez demandé à la Commissaire de divulguer les noms des porte-paroles des plaignantes.

Cette enquête est liée à deux plaintes déposées en juillet 2019, dossiers 20-21-030 et 2020-085. Les plaintes vous été divulguées le 15 octobre 2020 dans deux lettres de la Commissaire. La Commissaire a obtenu le consentement des porte-paroles de divulguer leurs identités. La plainte dans le dossier 20-21- 030 a été déposée par l’Association des ainés du Nouveau-Brunswick. La plainte dans le dossier 2020-085 a été déposée par un groupe d’individus.

Le Commissaire a obtenu le consentement de divulguer les noms des porte-paroles de ce groupe, Lise Guerrette-Daigle et Véronique Landry. [Pages 436-437 of the Record] [ 39 ] On July 28, 2021, counsel exchanged further correspondence. Counsel for the Respondent stated that: (…) Or, comme je l’ai précisé dans ma lettre du 22 juillet 2021, la présente enquête porte sur des plaintes déposées en juillet 2019. Vous avez indiqué qu’au cours de l’année 2019, le Commissaire Carrier a avisé verbalement l’AIINB qu’il n’enquêterait pas des nouvelles plaintes déposées en 2019.

Il a envoyé une lettre à la porte-parole des plaignant(e)s en octobre 2019 (voir l’Annexe « A » de la présente lettre). Pour une meilleure clarté, les plaintes sur lesquelles la Commissaire enquête actuellement sont les mêmes que celles mentionnées par le Commissaire Carrier. En mars 2020, les plaignant(e)s ont demandé une nouvelle fois à la Commissaire actuelle d’enquêter sur les plaintes (voir l’Annexe « B »). Sur la base de cette demande, l’actuelle Commissaire a procédé à l’enquête.

Les motifs de la poursuite de l’enquête ont été exposés dans les lettres précédentes. [Page 441 of the Record] [ 40 ] On September 10, 2021, the Applicant again objected to the re-investigation of the Complaints and argued, in part, as follows: Les Plaintes 2020 ne sont étayées par aucune preuve. Il s’agit simplement d’une série d’allégations concernant le NCLEX-RN et, en particulier, l’étendue des ressources d’études commerciaux en lien avec la préparation au NCLEX-RN.

Cette question a déjà fait l’objet d’une enquête par le CLO suite au dépôt de la plainte 2016, et constitue aussi le centre d’un litige présentement devant les tribunaux dans une poursuite déposée par la Société de l’Acadie du Nouveau-Brunswick et la Fédération des étudiants du Centre universitaire de Moncton. Ces mêmes allégations ont fait

partie de l’enquête de la plainte 2016 et aucun nouvel élément de preuve n’a été identifié depuis la publication du rapport final du CLO le 9 mai 2018, tel qu’amendé le 9 janvier 2019.

De plus, CLO a précédemment déterminé, à la fois en janvier 2019 et en octobre 2019, qu’il n’était pas approprié pour le CLO de commenter sur les questions en lien avec les ressources commerciales préparatoires au NCLEX-RN alors que cette question est devant les tribunaux. [Page 455 of the Record] [ 41 ] In that same correspondence dated September 10, 2021, counsel for the Applicant raised the argument that a re-investigation of prior complaints was vexatious in addition to being an abuse of process. [Page 457 of the Record] [ 42 ] On October 15, 2021, the Commissioner dismissed the Applicant’s objections and rendered the Decision to investigate.

The Commissioner referred to the factual backdrop in her decision and relevant sections of the OLA . However, she did not list all the documentation that she reviewed and considered in rendering the Decision. It appears that she focused on the four arguments raised in the so-called “formal objection” of the Applicant dated September 10, 2021, despite noting that since October 15, 2020:

Depuis lors, l’AIINB s’est opposé à plusieurs reprises à l’enquête au motif que l’affaire a déjà fait l’objet d’une enquête, que l’affaire est actuellement devant les tribunaux et que les plaints n’étaient pas étayée par aucune nouvelle preuve (…) Après un certain nombre de correspondances et de discussions, le 10 septembre 2021, l’avocate de l’AIINB a soumis une objection formelle à l’enquête (…) [Page 460 of the Record] [ 43 ] I will now refer to the salient portions of the Decision in some detail to highlight the underlying rationale and the current dispute between the parties: [11] (…) A la lumière de ces principes, je constate que l’obligation d’enquêter prévue au paragraphe 43(1) doit recevoir une interprétation large et les motifs de refus au paragraphe 43(11) doivent recevoir une interprétation étroite. [12] Dans cette optique, je doute sérieusement d’avoir le pouvoir de refuser d’enquêter au motif qu’une plainte constitue un abus de procédure.

L’alinéa 43(11)

b) donne clairement au commissaire la possibilité de refuser d’enquêter au motif qu’une plainte est vexatoire, mais il n’est prévu nulle part que le commissaire puisse refuser de faire enquête au motif qu’une plainte constitue un abus de procédure.

Compte tenu des principes énoncés ci-dessus, j’hésite à reconnaitre l’abus de procédure comme un nouveau motif distinct du motif « vexatoire » prévu à l’alinéa 43(11)b). [13] Toutefois, je n’ai pas besoin de trancher cette question, car j’estime que les plaintes ne sont ni vexatoires, ni abusives. (…) [16] L’AIINB semble traiter les termes « vexatoire » et « abus de procédure » de manière quelque peu interchangeable. De l’examen ci- dessus, il est clair que les notions de « vexatoire » et « abus de procédure » sont des doctrines souples et parfois se chevauchent.

Par exemple, une tentative de faire réexaminer la même affaire est à la fois vexatoire et un abus de procédure (vois Olumide v. Police Commisioner and Human Rights Commission, 2021 PECA 4 aux para 33-34 ). C’est essentiellement la base de l’objection d’AIINB. [17] L’AIINB a fourni quelques exemples de la jurisprudence traitant des plaintes vexatoires et abusives. Même si cette jurisprudence donne des exemples de ces doctrines, il n’y a rien dans ces exemples qui me lient, car les contextes factuels et statutaires sont distincts.

De plus, rien dans cette jurisprudence n’établit que l’abus de procédure est un motif indépendant pour un commissaire statutaire de refuser d’enquêter. (…) [27] Ainsi, l’AIINB indique que l’enquête elle-même pourrait être abusive à la lumière de la décision préalable de ne pas enquêter. Cependant, l’AIINB ne développe pas cet argument et n’apporte aucun soutien juridique à l’argument selon lequel la décision d’un commissaire antérieur de ne pas enquêter fait de l’enquête actuelle un abus de procédure.

Ce facteur en lui-même ne rend ni la plainte ni l’enquête abusive. (…) [32] (…) A mon avis, il serait incompatible avec l’objet de la

Loi sur les langues officielles de refuser d’enquêter sur cette plainte au motif que d’autres parties ont choisi de plaider des questions similaires devant la Cour du Banc de la Reine. (…)

[34] Le deuxième motif doit être complètement écarté, puisque la décision du commissaire précèdent n’affecte pas la nature des plaintes. Les autres motifs, pris ensemble, établissent-ils qu’il s’agit des plaintes vexatoires ou abusives? Constituent-elles une mauvaise utilisation des ressources de la Commissaire ou sapent-ils le rôle de la Commissaire en vertu de la

Loi sur les langues officielles? A mon avis, ce n’est pas le cas. Compte tenu de la multiplicité des plaintes reçues, il s’agit manifestement d’une question importante pour de nombreuses personnes. Bien qu’il y ait un chevauchement entre les différentes procédures, les présentes plaintes ne sont pas une tentative de reconsidérer des questions déjà tranchées : il s’agit d’une continuation du même sujet des plaintes de 2016.

Même si les questions abordées dans les présentes plaintes font aussi l’objet d’une procédure judiciaire en cours, cette procédure judiciaire n’a pas été résolue, et donc, le cas échéant, l’enquête serait une procédure concurrente plutôt qu’un nouveau litige d’une question résolue. Bien que ces plaintes puissent gêner l’AIINB en raison des enquêtes multiples, ce n’est pas l’objet de l’interdiction des plaintes vexatoires ou abusives. [35] Ainsi, je ne refuserai pas d’enquêter sur les plaintes au motif qu’elles sont vexatoires en vertu de l’alinéa 43(11)

b) de la

Loi sur les langues officielles, ni, en supposant que j’en aie le pouvoir, au motif qu’elles sont abusives. [Pages 237 to 244 of the Record] [ 44 ] The Applicant has attempted to discover the identity of the individual Complainants to respond more fully to Complaint #3 before and after the Decision was rendered. The Respondent states that the decision to not disclose the identity of the Complainants is pursuant to its practice to redact the names of the complainants. [Paragraph 10 of MacLean Affidavit, page 259 of the Record]. The specific identities of individual complainants have therefore not been disclosed to the Applicant up to the present date.

PART III - ISSUES [ 45 ] The issues raised in the Application are as follows: (

a) The preliminary issue relates to the relief sought by the Respondent in its Notice of Motion to strike part of paragraph 16(

d) and paragraph 17(

d) in its entirety in the Notice of Application, as well as paragraphs 31, 48 to 50 and Exhibits U, EE and FF of the Affidavit of Laurie Janes. (

b) The second issue raised is whether there is a binding Settlement that precludes the Respondent from proceeding with its investigation of Complaint #3. In other words, the Applicant asks the Court to enforce the alleged settlement pursuant to Rule 16.04 of the Rules of Court . (

c) The third issue pertains to judicial review of the decision pursuant to Rule 69 of the Rules of Court and, more specifically, whether a writ of prohibition or certiorari should be issued to quash the decision and/or prevent the Respondent from proceeding with its investigation of Complaint #3. (

d) Lastly, the NANB raised the issue of whether an injunction should be issued to prevent the Respondent from proceeding with its investigation of the Complaint.

PART IV - LAW AND ANALYSIS Issue 1 - Preliminary Issue - Motion to Strike

[ 46 ] The preliminary issue relates to the relief sought by the Respondent in its Notice of Motion to strike the words “on or behalf of the same interests as the persons or privies” in paragraph 16(

d) and paragraph 17(

b) in its entirety in the Notice of Application, as well as paragraphs 31, 48 to 50 and Exhibits U, EE and FF of the Affidavit of Laurie Janes. (

a) Motion to Strike the Pleadings [ 47 ] First, the impugned parts of the Amended Notice of Application read as follows: 16. NANB submits that to permit the Commissioner to proceed with the Investigation would constitute an abuse of process as the Third Complaints: (

d) are brought by the same parties or "on or behalf of the same interests as the persons or privies" who advanced a prior complaint; and 17. NANB further submits that permitting the Commissioner to proceed with the Investigation is further abusive and improper as (

b) the spokespersons for the undisclosed complainants have an interest in the Investigation that conflicts with the public interest mandate of the Commissioner, giving rise to a concern that the OLA complaint process is being used for an improper purpose. [ 48 ] The Respondent takes the position that the above quoted sections of the Notice of Application were not properly raised before the Commissioner rendered her decision and, as a result, the Applicant is precluded from raising these allegations now. In other words, these paragraphs raise “new issues”. The Respondent also says the impugned paragraphs are vexatious and frivolous and should be struck pursuant to Rule 27.09(

b) of the Rules of Court . Rule 27.09(

b) states that: 27.09 Striking Out a Pleading or Other Document The court may strike out any pleading, or other document, or any part thereof, at any time, with or without leave to amend, upon such terms as may be just, on the ground that it (

b) is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, [ 49 ] The Applicant goes to some length to demonstrate that these are in fact not new issues at all. I refer to certain sections of the Applicant’s written submission on this issue, for ease of reference: 6. In its initial letter of objection dated November 13, 2020, under the heading “Objections à la Plainte #3”, NANB listed numerous objections, including: • Il s’agit d’un abus de procédure d’ouvrir une enquête en lien avec une affaire ayant déjà été enquêtée de façon complète et définitive; […]

• les plaignant(

s) ne sont pas nommés, ce qui fait en sorte qu’il est impossible de savoir si les plaignants sont les mêmes que ceux à l’origine de la Plainte #1, la Plainte #2, ou l’instance en cours devant les tribunaux, ou s’ils ont un intérêt légitime suffisant afin de leur donner la qualité pour agir afin de déposer une plainte; et, • le CLO exige, entre autres, la production de renseignements commerciaux confidentiels de l’AIINB qui ne sont aucunement liés avec l’objet de la plainte, ce qui soulève la question à savoir si le CLO exerce un jugement indépendant. 7.

The third bullet above is in reference to the Respondent’s request, when issuing the Complaint #3 notification letter, that NANB provide a copy of its commercial contract with the provider of the NCLEX-RN Exam. (…) 9. These objections were well-substantiated by the documentation in the Respondent’s file materials. The fact that the complainants (or their privies) appear to be the same across Complaint #1, #2 and #3, as well as the fact that they appear to be affiliated with CASN which is development a competing exam, is amply supported in the Respondent’s own file material: (

a) Complaint #1 was purportedly based upon a CASN study which is referenced in Complaint #1 and in the OCOL Report of May 9, 2018 (“the Report”); (

b) the Report confirms that the persons who provided evidence to and were interviewed by the OCOL in relation to Complaint #1 were faculty from the school of nursing at Université de Moncton; (

c) Complaint #2 was filed in conjunction with a press conference held by current and former nursing faculty at Université de Moncton who, in conjunction with announcing the filing of Complaint #2, promoted the CASN exam as a solution for alleged problems with the NCLEX-RN; (

d) the letter issued by the OCOL in relation to Complaint #2 refers to a meeting with Véronique Landry (member of the Université de Moncton nursing faculty) and her colleagues, which confirms the OCOL was aware of the role played by nursing faculty in Complaint #2; and (

e) the Commissioner’s letter to NANB dated July 28, 2021, confirming that Complaint #2 and Complaint #3 are the same, confirms the accuracy of the allegation at paragraph 16(

d) of the Notice of Application that Complaint #3 is brought by the same persons as complaint #2. [ 50 ] On October 15, 2020, the Commissioner advised the Applicant that she had decided to investigate Complaint #3. On November 13, 2020, counsel for the Applicant advised the Commissioner of their objections to the decision to investigate the Complaint.

Among those objections was the fact that the complainants were not identified and how that impeded the Applicant’s ability to know if they were the same as in the previous complaints, or whether they had a sufficiently legitimate interest to give them proper standing. [Page 175 of the Record] [ 51 ] In this matter, the Respondent refused to disclose the identity of the complainants to the Applicant and disagreed that the identity of the complainants was a relevant consideration to the issue of standing under the OLA .

Counsel for the Respondent did however confirm in correspondence that the complainants were not the same as those who complained in 2016, nor the same as those who initiated legal proceedings [page 180 of the Record]. However, the Respondent nonetheless confirmed that Complaint #2 and Complaint #3 were identical complaints. In addition, the evidence in the Record demonstrates that, at the very least, Véronique Landy was involved in Complaints #2 and #3 either as a “spokesperson” for the Complainants, or as a complainant.

The Commissioner knew that Véronique Landry was a faculty member at the school of nursing at the Université de Moncton. [ 52 ] Indeed, the Report makes several references to interviews with individuals from the nursing faculty at the Université de

Moncton in relation to Complaint #1. [Pages 57, 59, 64 of the Record]. The letter issued by the Respondent in October 2019 toVéronique Landry confirming its decision to decline to investigate Complaint #2 refers to “les doléances clairement exprimées par vouset vos collègues”. [Page 224 of the Record].

The Applicant says that this evidence suggests that faculty at Université de Moncton aredirectly or indirectly involved in Complaint #1 and Complaint #2. [53] The issue relating to the identity of the complainants was raised less than one month after the Commissioner sentcorrespondence on October 15, 2020, advising the Applicant of her decision to investigate, and almost one year before her October 15,2021, decision rejecting the Applicant’s objections. [54] The issue of the identity of the Complainants, and the Respondent’s refusal to disclose their identities, permeated this entirefile right from the outset.

This was an issue created by the Respondent, not the Applicant. [55] As paragraph 17(

b) of the Notice of Application makes clear: “The spokespersons for the undisclosed complainants have aninterest [sic] the Investigation that conflicts with the public interest mandate of the Commissioner (…)” [Emphasis mine]. In essence, theallegations raised in paragraphs 16(

d) and 17(

b) of the Notice of Application are intertwined with the fact that the Respondent did notdisclose the identity of the complainants.

If the identity of the complainants was disclosed, it follows that their interests may be moreapparent. [56] In any event, the notion that the “interests” of the unidentified complainants is a new “issue”, or a “surprise” may also bebuttressed by, and considered within the context of, the allegation in paragraph 11 of the Notice of Application, which reads as follows: On or around March 9th, 2020, two more complaints were filed with the Commissioner under file numbers 20-21-085 and 20-21-030(“the Third Complainants”).

The Third Complaints are word-for-word identical to each other and to Complaint #2 and are basedupon the same facts that were investigated in Complaint #1 and are before the court in Litigation. No new facts or evidence havebeen put forward in support of the Third Complaints. [Emphasis mine] [57] The main allegation in paragraph 16 of the Notice of Application is that: “NANB submits that to permit the Commissionerto proceed with the investigation would constitute an abuse of process as the Third Complainants (…)”; and then references paragraphs(

a) through (d). Paragraph 17 of the Notice of Application also references the broad allegation that “permitting the Commissioner toproceed with the investigation is further abusive and improper as (…)”, then references paragraphs (

a) to (

c) in support of that broadallegation. In essence, the impugned paragraphs constitute particulars of the Applicant’s position with respect to abuse of process. [58] The allegations in paragraphs 16(

d) and 17(

b) in the Notice of Application dovetail with the overarching argument and issueadvanced by the Applicant that the decision to further investigate constitutes an abuse of process and is vexatious. The question of theidentity of the Complainants and their interests is relevant to the issue of abuse of process and the alleged vexatious nature of theComplaints. Those are not new issues.

They were raised from the outset, and more specifically, as early as November 2020. [59] On the argument that the impugned paragraphs are frivolous and vexatious, I refer to the decision from our Court of Appeal,in University of New Brunswick Student Union Incorporated et al. v. Smith (S.) et al.; University of New Brunswick StudentUnion Incorporated et al. v. Vaillancourt et al., (NB CA) where the Court of Appeal said at paragraph 3: [3] As noted, the learned motions judge concluded that the appellants' actions should be dismissed. The propriety of that decision hasbeen appealed.

Our task in respect of the present motions is not to determine the appeals but rather to decide if the appeals are frivolous,vexatious or without grounds. Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed.), defines a frivolous appeal as one in which no justiciable question hasbeen presented and the appeal is readily recognizable as devoid of merit in that there is little prospect that it can ever succeed. The sameauthority defines vexatious proceedings as those instituted maliciously and without probable cause.

And we would underline that it haslong been settled that the court's jurisdiction to dismiss a suit as frivolous or vexatious is to be used sparingly and only in cases which areclear and beyond doubt. [60] In M.B. v. L.B., 2019 NBCA 75, Richard C.J.N.B., for the Court, referred to the definition of frivolous and vexatious asfollows: Black’s Law Dictionary, 10th ed. (St. Paul, MN: Thompson Reuters, 2014), defines “frivolous” as “[l]acking a legal basis or legal merit;

not serious; not reasonably purposeful.” The word “vexatious” is defined as “([o]f conduct) without reasonable or probable cause orexcuse; harassing; annoying.” As Rooke J. states in Unrau v. National Dental Examining Board, 2019 ABQB 283, [2019] A.J. No. 496(QL): “These

definitions in many senses overlap. For example, an action that is ‘without reasonable or probable cause’ (vexatious), isalso one ‘lacking a legal basis or legal merit’ (frivolous)” (para. 67). Simply stated, a frivolous appeal is one that is readily recognizableas devoid of merit, as opposed to one that has little prospect of success. A vexatious appeal is one initiated to annoy or embarrass theother party. Broadly speaking, the Rule is designed to prevent an abuse of the court’s process, time and resources, as well as to insulatethe other litigant from the attendant costs associated with defending a frivolous appeal. [para. 12] [61] I find that paragraphs 16(

d) and 17 (

b) in the Notice of Application do not raise new issues as alleged by the Respondent andshall therefore not be struck on that basis. Furthermore, the impugned paragraphs in the Notice of Application shall not be struck basedon Rule 27.09(

b) of the Rules of Court either, because I find that they are not frivolous nor vexatious, based on the Record before theCourt. (

b) Motion to Strike Affidavit Evidence [62] The Respondent next argues that paragraphs 31 and 48 to 50 as well as Exhibits U, EE and FF of the Affidavit of LaurieJames are inadmissible as none of that evidence “was properly before the Commissioner in the proceeding below”. [Paragraph 30 of theRespondent’s Pre-Motion Brief]. [63] The Respondent relies on several cases for the proposition that “new” evidence is not admissible on a judicial reviewapplication, except where jurisdictional error or relevant post-hearing conduct is alleged: Grand Bay-Westfield (Town) v CUPE Local2404, 2006 NBCA 115; Dionne v Sawyer, (NBCA) at 2-3; Tessier v New Brunswick, (NBCA) atpara 16; McAllister v Cleary, (NBCA) at para 21 and Mr.

Shredding Waste Management Ltd v New Brunswick(Minister of Environment and Local Government), 2004 NBCA 69 at para 59. [64] In Mr.

Shredding Waste Management Ltd v New Brunswick (Minister of Environment and Local Government),supra the Court of Appeal explained some of the challenges and circumstances that apply in determining the admissibility of affidavitevidence in judicial review applications: [59] Most judicial precedents, with respect to the use of affidavit evidence on judicial review, deal with the more familiar review of ajudicial or quasi-judicial act or decision of an administrative tribunal, as opposed to decisions made in the exercise of the Minister’sdiscretion.

In this Province, the general rule has been expressed as follows in Dionne v. Sawyer (1990), (NBCA), 106N.B.R. (2d) 25 at para. 5 (C.A.): … The general rule is that on judicial review affidavit evidence is only admissible to show jurisdictional error: see R. v. West SussexQuarter Sessions; Ex p. Johnson Trust Ltd., [1973] 3 All E.R. 289 (C.A.); Re Keeprite Workers' Independent Union et al. andKeeprite Products Ltd. (1980), (ON CA), 29 O.R. (2d) 513 (C.A.); Wade, Administrative Law, (4th Ed. 1977), atp. 282, and Reid & David, Administrative Law and Practice (2nd Ed. 1978), at p. 349. …

[64] In my view, affidavit evidence in a case of this nature may be allowed to the extent that it is relevant with respect to an allegednominate defect causing a loss of jurisdiction such as an allegation that a discretionary decision was made for an improper purpose. Noone can seriously suggest that if evidence existed that the discretionary decisions of the Minister in this case were only motivated bypartisan politics, rather than by the objects of the legislation, that affidavit evidence to prove it could not be brought before the reviewingjudge.

On this point, I would adopt the views expressed in Donald Brown & John Evans, Judicial Review of Administrative Action inCanada, vol. 2, loose-leaf (Toronto: Canvasback Publishing, 1998) c.6 at 6:5300: … Thus, any evidence that relates to excess of jurisdiction is admissible, as is evidence in support of an allegation that there was “noevidence” in support of a material finding of fact made by an administrative tribunal, evidence establishing an insufficient basis for theadministrative action taken, or evidence of a breach of duty of fairness.

Of course, where the basis for judicial review involves bias orfraud, it will almost always be necessary to have evidence which is not part of the administrative record.

As Denning L.J. noted in anearly case, “[w]hen certiorari is granted on the ground of want of jurisdiction, or bias, or fraud, affidavit evidence is not only admissible,but it is, as a rule, necessary.” On the other hand, where the alleged error of law is not jurisdictional in nature and review is limited toonly those errors of law which appear on the face of the administrative record, the applicant will be confined to the record of thetribunal’s proceeding, and supplementary affidavit evidence will not be admitted. [65] In Town of Grand Bay-Westfield v.

The Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 2404, 2006 NBCA 115 ,the Court of Appeal reiterated the general rule as follows: [3] (…) The reviewing judge ruled that the affidavit was inadmissible on the basis that only the evidence presented to the arbitrator isrelevant to the judicial review application. As a general proposition, this statement of the law is accurate. However, it must be qualified. [4] The law with respect to the admissibility of affidavit evidence on judicial review is summarized in Dionne v. Sawyer (1990), (NB CA), 106 N.B.R. (2d) 25 (C.A.), [1990] N.B.J.

No. 318 (QL) at para. 5: “The general rule is that on judicial reviewaffidavit evidence is only admissible to show jurisdictional error”. In that case, the Civil Service Commission had revoked anappointment on the basis that there was no evidence to establish compliance with a statutory requirement. On judicial review, theapplication judge accepted an affidavit for purposes of establishing that the requirement had been met. It was on the basis of thatevidence that the judicial review application was allowed. On appeal, this Court held that the review judge had erred in admitting theevidence.

Thus, it is clear that Sawyer stands for the proposition that, in judicial review proceedings, it is impermissible to acceptaffidavit evidence that should have been presented to the tribunal. This is certainly not a novel proposition of law, nor is the propositionthat affidavit evidence is admissible for purposes of establishing jurisdictional error. For example, an allegation of tribunal bias or simplya breach of the fairness duty will invariably require the introduction of affidavit evidence before the review court.

Indeed, this is whathappened in the present case and no one took objection to the admissibility of several affidavits touching on matters that occurred duringthe arbitration hearing. The only objection was with respect to an affidavit dealing with an event that occurred after the arbitrationhearing but prior to the judicial review hearing. Specifically, the issue is the post-hearing conduct of an applicant and its relevance to ajudicial review application.

Regrettably, the rule articulated in Sawyer does not address the admissibility of affidavit evidence in suchcircumstances. [66] The Court in Porter v NB Police Commission, 2019 NBQB 297 , was asked to decide a motion by the applicant

pursuant to Rule 69.10 of the Rules of Court for production of certain documents. The applicant argued that the documents werenecessary for the Court to decide a question of jurisdiction. The respondent argued that the entire application for judicial review waspremature, and that production of the documents would necessarily entail an extensive evidentiary review by the Court, thereby turningthe application for judicial review into an evidentiary hearing or trial de novo.

In denying the relief sought, Justice Morrison reviewedthe authorities and stated that: [21] Judicial restraint is the watchword when it comes to the admission of evidence that was not before the tribunal. In AdministrativeLaw in Canada (Sixth Edition), S. Blake, (LexisNexis: Toronto 2017) at paragraph 7.91 it states: Evidence that was not before the tribunal is not admissible without leave of the court because the role of the court is to review thetribunal decision, not to decide the matter anew. For this reason, the only evidence that is admissible before the court is therecord that was before the tribunal.

The tribunal’s findings of fact may not be challenged with evidence that was not before thetribunal. Evidence challenging the wisdom of the decision is not admissible. Fresh evidence, discovered since the tribunal made itsdecision, is not admissible. The tribunal may not file additional evidence to buttress its decision. Correspondence from the tribunalsubsequent to its decision is not admissible except to the extent that it contain supplementary reasons for decision or concernsreconsideration or amendment of the decision.

All of this inadmissible material concerns the substantive merits of the decision underreview. The one exception allows the evidence to prove that the tribunal had no evidence to support a material finding of fact.[Emphasis in original] (…) [25] It is clear from the above-mentioned authorities that extrinsic evidence should be admitted only in exceptional circumstances. Theauthorities admit, however, to an exception when, as here, jurisdictional error is advanced as a ground for judicial review.

However, inmy view, the mere fact that a jurisdictional error is raised does not open the door to an evidentiary free-for-all on judicial review. Thereare limits on what can and cannot be adduced as evidence.

That is in keeping with the underlying principle that a judicial review is not tobe transformed into a trial on the merits. (…) [67] The general rule is therefore that the record on judicial review is normally restricted to what was before the decision-maker.One of the rationales that underlies this general rule relates to the notion that the court’s function on judicial review is to only review thedecision below, not to hear the case de novo, nor as an appeal. [68] There are, however, exceptions to the general rule such as where jurisdictional error is in issue, as noted by our Court ofAppeal above.

The exceptions to the general rule were recently summarized in Chaboyer v Saskatchewan, 2021 SKQB 200 and even more recently, in Sandeson v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General), 2022 NSSC 170 . [69] The exceptions are best understood in circumstances where the rationale behind the general rule is not offended. As JusticeStratus explained in Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada v.

Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency, 2012 FCA 22(F.C.A.) at paragraph 20: There are a few recognized exceptions to the general rule against this Court receiving evidence in an application for judicial review, andthe list of exceptions may not be closed. These exceptions exist only in situations where the receipt of evidence by this Court is notinconsistent with the differing roles of the judicial review court and the administrative decision-maker (described in paragraphs 17-18,above).

In fact, many of these exceptions tend to facilitate or advance the role of the judicial review court without offending the role ofthe administrative decision-maker. [70] In Bernard v. Canada Revenue Agency 2015 FCA 263, the applicant filed an affidavit in support of an application forjudicial review of a decision of the Public Service Labour Relations and Employment Board.

The respondent sought an order striking outcertain paragraphs and exhibits in the affidavit by arguing that the impugned evidence was not before the administrative decision-maker.Justice Stratus provided further insight into one of the exceptions at paragraph 24: [24] The second recognized exception is really just a particular species of the first. Sometimes a party will file an affidavitdisclosing the complete absence of evidence on a certain subject-matter.

In other words, the affidavit tells the reviewing court notwhat is in the record—which is the first exception—but rather what cannot be found in the record: see Keeprite Workers’Independent Union v. Keeprite Products Ltd. (1980), (ONCA), 29 O.R. (2d) 513 (C.A.) and Access Copyright, above

at paragraph 20. This can be useful where the party alleges that an administrative decision is unreasonable because it rests upon akey finding of fact unsupported by any evidence at all.

This too is entirely consistent with the rationale behind the general rule andadministrative law values more generally, for the reasons discussed in the preceding paragraph. [Emphasis mine] [71] In Hartwig v Commission of Inquiry into matters relating to the death of Neil Stonechild, 2007 SKCA 74, theSaskatchewan Court of Appeal was asked to quash findings made by the Commission of Inquiry appointed to consider matters relating tothe death of Neil Stonechild. Three of the parties to the judicial review application sought to restrict the scope of the materials before thecourt.

The Court of Appeal recognized the reviewing court’s need to consider the evidence presented to the Commission of Inquiry. TheCourt of Appeal explained: [19] It is readily apparent therefore that the scope of judicial review has evolved significantly in the 55 years since the Northumberlandcase was decided. In contrast, the conception of what is properly before the court in a judicial review application has been largely static.

As a result, we are currently at a point where, on one hand, the factual findings of administrative decision-makers made withinjurisdiction can be reviewed from the perspective of reasonableness but, on the other hand, the evidence on which those findings aremade cannot be put before the courts. This situation frequently creates serious injustices and precludes meaningful review.

In myopinion, there is a pressing need to bring the law concerning the materials which can be placed before the courts in judicial reviewapplications into line with the substance of contemporary administrative law doctrine. (…) [32] As indicated, I prefer to base my conclusion in this regard on the straightforward proposition that the parties to a judicial reviewapplication should be able to put before a reviewing court all of the material which bears on the arguments they are entitled to make.

If atribunal decision can be challenged because it involves a patently unreasonable finding of fact, then the evidence underpinning thatfinding should be available for the Court to consider.

This is ultimately a sounder and more transparent approach to this issue than onecouched in terms of the sometimes elusive notion of “jurisdiction” or framed around the complex and rather uncertain and unsatisfactorybody of case law relating to the concept of decisions based on “no evidence”. [72] In Martin v Province of New Brunswick and Chaleur Terminals Inc., 2016 NBQB 138 , Madam JusticeLavigne (as she then was), referred to the general rule, citing Town of Grand Bay-Westfield v. The Canadian Union of PublicEmployees, Local 2404, supra in support.

Justice Lavigne noted the rationale for the general rule and stated that it was not “absolute”.Furthermore, she explained the exceptions as follows: [84] Evidence extrinsic to the record is usually not admissible. As a general rule, the scope of admissible evidence in a judicial reviewproceeding is limited to the record that was actually before the decision-maker whose decision is under review: Smith v. Canada, 2001FCA 86, [2001] F.C.J. No. 450, at para. 7; Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 2404 v. Grand-Bay Westfield (Town), 2006NBCA 115, [2006] N.B.J.

No. 512, at para. 4. [85] This general rule arises from the limited role of the court in a judicial review proceeding; judicial review is concerned withassessing the evidence that was before the tribunal and not additional evidence that is tendered after the fact. [86] However, this is not an absolute rule. Extrinsic evidence is admissible on a judicial review in unique and special circumstanceswhere there is demonstrable justification for such evidence.

The typical exceptions for admitting extrinsic evidence on judicial reviewsare to fill gaps in the record, to demonstrate procedural unfairness, or to establish jurisdictional error. The Applicants have the onus toestablish that the affidavits fall within the narrow exceptions that would render them admissible at a judicial review. [73] The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, in Saskatchewan (Worker's Compensation Board) v Gjerde, 2016 SKCA 30, heard an appeal from a judicial review determination.

The Court of Appeal relied on the approach taken in Hartwig, supra inits determination that supplementing the record was appropriate in certain circumstances including when an inability to supplement therecord would make a review of the impugned decision impossible. The Court of Appeal explained: [41] A key component of any judicial review is the record. In determining whether that record should be supplemented, it isimportant to keep in mind the distinct roles played by administrative bodies and the courts.

The provincial Legislatures and Parliamenthave seen fit to create a wide variety of administrative bodies and put into their hands all manner of decision-making that directly affectsthe rights, privileges and obligations of citizens.

On an application for judicial review it is the s. 96 courts’ role to ensure “the legality,the reasonableness and the fairness of the administrative process and its outcomes” (Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at para28, [2008] 1 SCR 190 [Dunsmuir] The scope of administrative decision-making which may give rise to judicial review is extensive.Judicial review may come about in a wide variety of circumstances including review of an administrative tribunal’s adjudication of a

matter; the exercise of a ministerial discretion; the making of political and policy decisions, or non-adjudicative (purely administrative)decisions. Accordingly, what constitutes the “record” for the purpose of judicial review will vary considerably depending on thecontext in which the decision arises.

For this reason, in my view, there can be no “one size fits all” rule with respect to whatamounts to the record for judicial review purposes or when that record should be supplemented. [42] Denning L.J.’s comments in Northumberland set out the general rule relating to supplementing the record where there has beenan adjudication i.e., after a hearing.

The rule in that context makes sense because in such circumstances there is usually an “officialrecord” consisting of the transcript of the proceedings, the documents filed and arguments made before the administrative tribunal.Hartwig and SELI demonstrate that the record relating to administrative adjudications may sometimes be deficient requiring it to besupplemented so that the reviewing court has before it the necessary material to do its job.

Many provinces (Saskatchewan is not one ofthem) and the Federal Court have legislation which defines the record for judicial review purposes, at least where the review relates toadjudicative matters. Determining what constitutes the “record” when reviewing other types of administrative decisions can be morechallenging. Many non-adjudicative actions by administrative bodies have no “official record” and purely administrative decisions arerarely accompanied by reasons. [43] In the journal

article “Evidentiary Rules in a Post-Dunsmuir World: Modernizing the Scope of Admissible Evidence onJudicial Review” (2015) 28 Can J Admin L & Prac, Lauren J. Wihak and Benjamin J. Oliphant examined the need to modernize the rulesof evidence pertaining to judicial review. When addressing the record with respect to administrative decisions, as opposed to decisionsfrom a tribunal, they stated at 339-340: In our view, applying strict limitations on the admissibility of evidence on judicial review of these non-adjudicative or legislativedecisions carries important consequences.

A restrictive view of the record and of admissible evidence may frustrate the courts’application of Dunsmuir, and in particular the determination of whether the outcome is “defensible” in light of the facts and the law.Moreover, if the information available to a court on judicial review remains as limited as was suggested in caseslike Northumberland and Nat Bell Liquor, not only will this potentially frustrate the court’s task on judicial review, but may alsooccasion considerable unfairness to affected parties; many would be permitted to argue that a decision falls belowthe Dunsmuir standard, but unable to file the evidence necessary to establish why this is so.

I agree with these comments. [74] The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in Gjerde, supra then identified certain instances where the record could appropriatelybe supplemented on judicial review: [44] In my view, the appropriate approach to when the “record” should be supplemented on judicial review was set out by StratasJ.A. of the Federal Court of Appeal in Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada v Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency,2012 FCA 22 at paras 19 and 20, 428 NR 297.

After acknowledging the general rule that judicial review should be restricted to theevidentiary record that was before the Board when it made its decision, Stratas J.A. went on to recognize there will be exceptions to thatgeneral rule, including evidence (

i) that provides general background (as opposed to addressing the merits) in circumstances where thatinformation might assist in understanding the issues for judicial review, (ii) to bring to the attention of the judicial review courtprocedural defects that cannot be found in the evidentiary record such as fraud, bribery, or bias, and (iii) to highlight the completeabsence of evidence before the administrative decision maker when making a particular finding. (See also Keeprite Workers’Independent Union and Keeprite Products Ltd. (1980), (ON CA), 29 OR (2d) 513 (CA); Mr.

Shredding WasteManagement v New Brunswick (Minister of Environment and Local Government), 2004 NBCA 69 at para 64, 274 NBR (2d) 340;Connolly v Canada (Attorney General), 2014 FCA 294 at para 20, 466 NR 44.) To these I would add the exception highlighted byHartwig and SELI [SELI Canada Inc. v Construction and Specialized Workers’ Union Local 1611, 2011 BCCA 353, 336 DLR (4th)577] where, in appropriate circumstances, evidence may be received by a reviewing court to elucidate the record upon which theadministrative body’s reasons were based. [75] In Pimicikamak et al v Manitoba, 2018 MBCA 49 , the Manitoba Court of Appeal heard an appeal from anevidentiary ruling in which the reviewing judge struck 11 affidavits filed in support of the application for judicial review.

The Court ofAppeal stated at paragraphs 72-73 that extrinsic evidence may be accepted on review to demonstrate that the record filed by the decision-maker was incomplete or contained gaps in addition to showing procedural unfairness, jurisdictional error or where there is an allegationof a breach of the duty to consult.

The Court of Appeal explained the gap exception at paragraph 77: [77] The gap exception allows for situations wherein the record filed by the decision-maker is incomplete to the extent that thecourt has not been presented with a complete picture of the evidence that was before the decision-maker, or there was a lack of evidenceon which the decision-maker could base a finding of fact... [76] It is against this jurisprudential backdrop that I will now analyze the nature of the impugned evidence to determine if it is“new evidence” and ultimately whether it is admissible in whole, or in part.

A determination of the admissibility of evidence should beconsidered on a case-by-case basis. A contextual analysis is required to determine the purpose for which the impugned evidence hasbeen presented.

[ 77 ] The Applicant sheds some light on the context that drives its desire to put the impugned evidence before the Court in it Reply Brief on Motion at paragraphs 22 to 29: Throughout is Brief on Motion, the Respondent appears to assert that if an issue was no

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