r v. Harold RYAN, 2013 QCCQ 3028

Unofficial English Translation Directeur des poursuites criminelles et pénales c. Ryan 2013 QCCQ 3028 COURT OF QUEBEC CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC DISTRICT OF MONTREAL LOCALITY OF MONTREAL "Criminal and penal division" No.: 500-61-314045-114 DATE: April 8, 2013 ______________________________________________________________________ PRESIDING: Johanne White Presiding Justice of the Peace ______________________________________________________________________ DIRECTOR OF CRIMINAL AND PENAL PROSECUTIONS Prosecutor v.

Harold RYAN Defendant ______________________________________________________________________ JUDGMENT ______________________________________________________________________ [ 1 ] Harold Ryan is charged with having hindered a peace officer in the performance of duties on October 9, 2010, contrary to

section 638.1 of the Highway Safety Code. THE PROSECUTION’S CASE: [ 2 ] Luc Beausoleil, a police officer with the Sûreté du Québec, relates the events that transpired when he stopped the defendant on October 9, 2010. [ 3 ] Constable Beausoleil stopped a vehicle for excessive speeding on highway 720. When he walked over to the vehicle driven by the defendant to ask him for his papers, everything went normally. The officer wrote up a statement of offence for speeding, as well as a report for the suspension of the defendant's driver's licence. He also requested a tow truck to impound the defendant's vehicle.

When Constable Beausoleil walked up to the vehicle again to hand the defendant his statement of offence and inform him that his vehicle would be towed, the situation deteriorated: [TRANSLATION] … that's when there was an explosion on the part of Mr. Ryan, but an explosion that I would say… sometimes, you expect, you… first of all, when you deal with a person for the first time, you expect, sometimes, some aggressiveness, but in this case, things were okay and then it exploded.

So I took a step back, I tried to explain to him what was going to happen, etc., but he didn't want to listen, he remained in his vehicle, he didn't want to get out, despite my instructions that he would have to get out. [ 4 ] Constable Beausoleil explained to Mr. Ryan that, in the circumstances, he had to call for backup. The defendant's conduct was described as threatening and aggressive. [ 5 ] Constable Carl Soucy arrived as backup. At one point, Mr. Ryan let go of the steering wheel, which he had been gripping. Constable Beausoleil seized the opportunity and got him into an armlock to bring him to the ground.

Constable Soucy grabbed him from the other side, and Mr. Ryan was brought to the ground, handcuffed, and seated in the patrol car. [ 6 ] Constable Beausoleil explained to the defendant that he was under arrest for hindering a peace officer. Constable Beausoleil wondered about the defendant's reaction, however, which he considered excessive:

[TRANSLATION] I may be skipping some steps, I don't have the document in front of me, and at one point, Mr. Ryan explained to us that he was diabetic. And I've been involved several times in my career, I would say four, five times, in situations where people were, I don't know how it's called, where they were having a diabetic attack, one or the other, there are two kinds of diabetic attacks – and those people, sometimes, go into a completely different state, I mean completely different. So Mr. Ryan, he was not in a completely different state, but when he told me that, a light went off. So Mr.

Ryan said he had to take his level of ... in his blood. So we offered to let him do it in the police car, but he didn't want to. He had calmed down at that point. He became very kind afterwards. Everything calmed down. [ 7 ] Constable Beausoleil offered the defendant an ambulance service or to take him to the hospital. Mr. Ryan refused, asking instead that he be taken to the intersection of Hochelaga and Dickson streets; the police officers complied with this request. There are stores at that location. Mr. Ryan stood in a store entrance to do his blood glucose test.

Constable Beausoleil suggested that he get back into the patrol car to do his test, but Mr. Ryan refused. [ 8 ] He did his test, and before leaving the police officers made sure that everything was alright. [ 9 ] Constable Beausoleil believes that the defendant's refusal to exit his vehicle, [ translation ] "I'm not getting out, I'm leaving with my car", hindered him in the performance of his duties. [ 10 ] Considering the situation, Constable Beausoleil informed Mr.

Ryan that he would not lay criminal charges of obstruction but that he would be charged under the Highway Safety Code. [ 11 ] The supplement to the offence report contains the following: [TRANSLATION] Constable Soucy handcuffed and searched him. The driver then told us, [TRANSLATION] "I'm diabetic, I have to check my level". [ 12 ] And further on: [TRANSLATION] Five minutes later, we let him off on Hochelaga east of Dickson. Then he stood in a store entrance near the corner of Monsabré Street and refused to do his blood test in the police car. We told him we would stay until he got the results.

After he got his results, he told us everything was okay, and we left. [ 13 ] In response to a question from the defendant's lawyer, Constable Beausoleil is categorical: the defendant did not tell him about his diabetes before he was in the patrol car. THE DEFENDANT'S CASE [ 14 ] Harold Ryan, represented by Mtre Erika Kastagnotis, provides his version of the facts. [ 15 ] On October 9, 2010, he was driving his truck in the left lane behind a Mercedes.

In the right lane, a Lexus was travelling next to the Mercedes. [ 16 ] When he arrived at a fork in the road, a police officer standing at the fork signaled him to stop. Mr. Ryan did not want to pull over where the police officer asked him to, preferring to stop 200 metres further ahead, but he ended up complying. [ 17 ] The police officer walked up to his vehicle and told him he had been stopped for speeding. Mr. Ryan describes his reaction as follows: So, I said to him, I said: "What about the cars, two cars that were in front of me".

So I said something to the effect that it's me that he was pulling over. [ 18 ] Mr. Ryan handed the police officer his driver's licence and his registration. Constable Beausoleil returned to his vehicle to write up the ticket, and the defendant relates the ensuing events as follows: At that point, I had a hypoglycemia reaction that the officer didn't know cause he wasn't there. I found myself being irritable and that's one of the signs of being diabetic. When you're irritable, but you're not violent, you're irritable.

So when I decided that I was… found out that I was irritable, I decided to take my blood test. My blood test I took was at 1.9. That's a real bad reaction. [ 19 ] Mr. Ryan explains that he always carries a bag containing juice. He drinks two juices and eats a sandwich to raise his blood glucose level. He explains that he has to wait ten minutes to redo his blood test. He says that one of the symptoms of hypoglycemia is fainting: So what happened was I went out and then next thing I knew, I hear a tow truck backing up. When I came out through, I was disoriented.

So then, when I was disoriented, the police officer came and he opened up my door. So I said "what the hell are you doing? You can't open my door". So then, he says to me that I'm going to have to get out. So I said "no, I need to get my food, I need to get my medication, my valuables and my jacket" cause it was cold outside. But I said: "let me take my blood test". He said: "no, you gotta get out". I said: "no, I have to take my blood test". [ 20 ] Mr. Ryan says that Constable Beausoleil became aggressive. As for him, his condition made him weak, he was trembling and perspiring.

He took his cell phone and called his daughter, but his daughter's mother answered. She remained on the line with the defendant. Mr. Ryan was disoriented, continued his conversation on the telephone, and tried to redo his blood test. He noticed Constable Beausoleil taking out his extendible baton and gave him the following warning: If you hit me with that, they're going to know, I said: "because I just got out of the hospital", cause I was talking to my daughter's mother at the same time.

I just got out of the hospital, if there's any marks on me or if I pass out or something [ inaudible ] in my head, then, at least, somebody will know something about it". [ 21 ] Mr. Ryan explains that Constable Beausoleil became agitated and aggressive. He heard him make a call, say a code, and heard the words [TRANSLATION] "resisting arrest". He then said to the police officer: Am I resisting arrest ? … let me take my blood test, I'll get out of my car, you can handcuff me and put me back in the car and arrest me. [ 22 ] Constable Beausoleil told him that he was not under arrest.

The defendant therefore asked him to close the door of his vehicle and let him redo his blood test. He says that if he needs to take insulin, he needs his privacy. [ 23 ] Mr. Ryan explains that he heard another patrol car approaching quietly. He told himself that this was the time to do his blood test. When the other police officer arrived, he told him that he was not resisting arrest, but that he wanted to collect his bag, his medication and his coat. [ 24 ] Mr. Ryan was still disoriented, but not completely.

He says that he has become conditioned over the years to follow the steps he has to take when he is in a hypoglycemic state: Nothing could stop me from doing those things. [ 25 ] He says that he was yanked out of his vehicle: I'm assuming that he gave the other officer a sign, the other officer grabbed my arm and yanked me out of my truck. Okay? And he put his knee in the middle of my back. And he grabbed my arm and he twisted it behind. And he was trying to put the handcuffs on. At this time, I'm yelling and screaming, they bang my head against the cement and I'm yelling and screaming.

So the other officer says "stop yelling and screaming". I said: "well listen, I can't". I said: "if you lighten up, I will help you the cuffs on”. [ 26 ] After searching him, the police officer seated him in the back of the patrol car and returned to the defendant's truck to get his blood test kit and his insulin. In the meantime, Constable Beausoleil spoke to him, but the defendant explains: But one of the other symptoms of being diabetic is that when you go too high, you become in a daydream. You could stare at people, look through but you don't see. You're not… you're there but it's like daydreaming.

You're there, but you're not. And… so he's talking to me, saying all kinds of stuff, and I'm not coherent on what's going on. [ 27 ] Mr. Ryan says he asked to be taken to the corner of Hochelaga and Dickson streets or to the hospital. The police officers agreed to let him off at the corner of Hochelaga and Dickson, where he did his blood test, which showed 25.9. Mr. Ryan injected himself with insulin under the supervision of the police officers. They asked him if he was better, to which Mr. Ryan replied, "Leave me alone, you did enough. Either take me to a hospital or leave me here". The officers left the scene.

It was at that point that the defendant realized that his coat and his money were still in his truck. He says he had to walk 17 kilometres to return home, without a coat, in the cold. He did not go to the hospital. [ 28 ] On cross-examination, Mr. Ryan maintained that he had never, at any time during the police intervention, been aggressive, and that he spoke to the police officer in the same tone of voice as the one he used in Court during his testimony.

He says that he was not frustrated when he was stopped; rather, he was irritable because of his diabetic reaction. [ 29 ] He explains that if Constable Beausoleil had told him at the outset that his vehicle would be towed, he would have prepared himself accordingly: … Sorry, that I would have had all my stuff. My jacket, I would have had my machine, I would have had my blood test, I would have taken my medication, it would have been done already so that when the tow truck came, I would have been ready.

[ 30 ] Concerning his ticket for speeding, which was the reason he was stopped, he says that he has never in his life driven his vehicle 50 kilometres above the speed limit. Therefore, if he was speeding that day, so were the two other vehicles ahead of him. THE DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENTS [ 31 ] Mtre Erika Kastagnotis, counsel for the defendant, notes that the testimonies given were very contradictory. [ 32 ] She says that at no time did the defendant actually refuse to exit his vehicle or resist arrest.

He only asked for a few minutes to do his blood test. [ 33 ] Mtre Kastagnotis stated that during his testimony, her client clearly explained that he had acted on instinct: At that moment, he was following instinct and his health came first. THE PROSECUTION'S ARGUMENTS [ 34 ] Mtre Simon Lavoie states that the offence alleged against Mr. Ryan is one that requires proof of intent to hinder a police officer in the performance of his duties. Drawing a parallel with

section 16 of the Criminal Code , Mtre Lavoie argues that the defendant had a burden of proof to meet to establish absence of a guilty mind. For example, if a person wants to show that his condition prevents him from forming the intent to commit an offence, medical evidence to this effect must be adduced. No medical evidence was presented in defence. [ 35 ] Mr. Ryan has never said that his medical condition prevented him from forming the intent to commit the offence alleged against him. Rather, he explains that his condition makes him irritable and that, consequently, he became [ translation ] "irritated".

However, he claims that he spoke calmly to the police officers, in the same tone that he used during his testimony in Court. [ 36 ] The defendant's testimony is implausible. If, as he said, the police officers did not treat him properly, why did he not file a police ethics complaint? [ 37 ] By refusing to exit his vehicle, Mr. Ryan hindered the police officers in the performance of their duties, and he must be found guilty of this offence. APPLICABLE LAW [ 38 ] According to the Supreme Court in City of Lévis v.

Tétreault ; City of Lévis v. 2629-4470 Québec Inc., [1] absent a clear indication of legislative intent, an offence must be categorized as one of strict liability. [ 39 ] In P.G.Q. v. Desrochers , [2] Louise Gallant J. stated that the offence of obstruction alleged against Alain Desrochers was a strict liability offence. [ 40 ] The following Municipal Court decisions are to the same effect: - Ville de Québec v. Chantal , [2011] J.Q. No. 1905 (para. 91 ). - Ville de Laval v. Paquin , [2009] J.Q. No. 14258 (para. 51 ). - Ville de Montréal v. Ianni , [2009] J.Q.

No.7204 (para. 22 ). [ 41 ] In statutory matters, the offence of obstructing an inspector or a person responsible for enforcing the law has consistently been characterized as a strict liability offence. [3] [ 42 ] The Court can only conclude that the offence with which the defendant is charged is a strict liability offence. ANALYSIS [ 43 ] The nature of the defence presented by the defendant was not specified by his lawyer. [ 44 ] It is clear that the defendant's explanations were not aimed at establishing a defence of due diligence.

The use of the words "he was following instinct and his health came first" echo the observations of Dickson J. in Perka : [4] Conceptualized as an “excuse”, however, the residual defence of necessity is, in my view, much less open to criticism.

It rests on a realistic assessment of human weakness, recognizing that a liberal and humane criminal law cannot hold people to the strict obedience of laws in emergency situations where normal human instincts, whether of self-preservation or of altruism, overwhelmingly impel disobedience . [ 45 ] First, the Court will consider the defence put forward by the defendant to be a defence of necessity. Second, it will assess the credibility of the witnesses' testimony.

A) The defence of necessity: [ 46 ] For this defence to succeed, the defendant must show three things: [5] 1. The urgency of acting to avoid a situation of unforeseeable and imminent peril; 2. The absence of another reasonable legal solution; 3.

Proportionality between the harm avoided and the harm caused. [ 47 ] When the elements of the defence give the defence of necessity an air of reality, it is up to the prosecution to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defence cannot be accepted. [ 48 ] Many judgments in cases involving statutory offences have applied these principles. [6] [ 49 ] A recent decision, however, opines that in statutory matters, the defence of necessity must be established on a balance of probabilities. [7] This conclusion is based on the following premise: [ translation ] In the case of a strict or absolute liability offence, the accused must establish his or her defence on a balance of probabilities … [ 50 ] While there can be no doubt that this is a general principle, there are exceptions to that the above-cited decision failed to mention.

The Court of Appeal of Quebec has clearly defined the nature of a defendant's burden of proof in speeding cases: [8] [TRANSLATION] In short, the demonstration that the operator is qualified, that his device was tested before and after being used, and that the test shows that the instrument is accurate, establishes prima facie evidence, subject, of course, to the reasonable doubt that the accused may raise . [ 51 ] Recently, in a detailed decision summarizing all the principles concerning the notion of "contrary evidence", the Superior Court concluded that, in speeding cases, the defendant bears no persuasive burden. [9] [ 52 ] Unless a judgment can be distinguished from rulings made by the higher courts, stare decisis must apply.

The general principle that in statutory matters a defendant must establish his or her defence on a balance of probabilities must therefore be qualified. [ 53 ] In addition, Wholesale Travel Group , [10] upon which Benoit J. relied in Lewinshtein to support her conclusion, is of no help in resolving the issue of the burden of proof when a defence of necessity is presented. That judgment, which concerns the federal Competition Act , applies specifically to cases where the shifting of the burden of proof is statutory.

This has nothing to do with the defence of necessity. [ 54 ] In the opinion of the Court, the conclusion that a defence of necessity must be proven on a balance of probability results from an unfortunate confusion between excuses and justifications provided for by law and common law excuses and justifications. [ 55 ]

Article 64 of the Code of Penal Procedure reads as follows: 64. The prosecutor is not required to allege in the statement of offence that the defendant does not have, with respect to the offence, the benefit of an exception, exemption, excuse or justification provided for by law.

It is incumbent upon the defendant to establish that he has the benefit of an exception, exemption, excuse or justification provided for by law . [ 56 ] The expression "provided for by law" refers to a defendant's obligation to prove, for example, the existence of a permit, licence or certificate. [ 57 ] A defence of necessity is not an excuse "provided for by law". The Supreme Court states this clearly in Perka : [11] The Crown argues, however, that s. 7(2) of the Narcotic Control Act shifts the burden of persuasion to the accused. Section 7(2) provides: 7. (1) …

(2) In any prosecution under this Act the burden of proving that an exception, exemption, excuse or qualification prescribed by law operates in favour of the accused is on the accused, and the prosecutor is not required, except by way of rebuttal, to prove that the exception, exemption, excuse or qualification does not operate in favour of the accused, whether or not it is set out in the information or indictment.

The Crown contends that the defence of necessity is an “exception, exemption, excuse or qualification prescribed by law”. I find no merit in this contention . (Emphasis added.) The Narcotic Control Act provides for several statutory exceptions to its broad prohibitions against importation, sale, manufacture, and possession. The offences created by the Act are generally subject to the proviso that the accused not have been acting under the authority of the Act or the regulations thereunder. See sections 3(1) (possession), 5(1) (importation), 6(1) (cultivation).

Section 12 of the Act implements this scheme by providing for a set of regulations governing the issuance of licences for, inter alia, the importation, sale, manufacture, or possession of narcotics. One who sells, imports, manufactures or possesses narcotics pursuant to such authority does not commit an offence. It seems clear that it is to these statutory exceptions that s. 7(2) refers, and not to common law defences such as necessity .

One who wishes to plead the possession of a licence or other lawful authority in response to a charge of importation bears, under s. 7(2), the burden of persuading the trier of fact that such licence exists. One who pleads necessity bears no such burden . Section7(2) does not place a persuasive burden as to the defence of necessity on the accused. (Emphasis added.) [ 58 ] The similarity in the vocabulary used in section 7(2) of the Narcotic Control Act , analyzed by Dickson J., and that of

article 64 of the Code of Penal Procedure is remarkable. There is no reason the distinction the Supreme Court makes between excuses and justifications provided for by law and those established in the common law cannot apply in statutory matters. [ 59 ] This is, moreover, the opinion expressed by the authors Letourneau and Robert: [12] [TRANSLATION] To conclude in this highly confusing area of law based on capricious logic, it seems that a distinction must be made between special excuses for

summary and regulatory offences and general excuses in the common law. Only the former require of the defendant proof on a balance of probabilities. [ 60 ] Lastly, to determine the nature of the burden of proof in a necessity defence, the observations of the Supreme Court in Latimer concerning the standard applicable to this defence must be considered: [13] [32] Before applying the three requirements of the necessity defence to the facts of this case, we need to determine what test governs necessity. Is the standard objective or subjective?

A subjective test would be met if the person believed he or she was in imminent peril with no reasonable legal alternative to committing the offence. Conversely, an objective test would not assess what the accused believed; it would consider whether in fact the person was in peril with no reasonable legal alternative. A modified objective test falls somewhere between the two. It involves an objective evaluation, but one that takes into account the situation and characteristics of the particular accused person.

We conclude that, for two of the three requirements for the necessity defence, the test should be the modified objective test. [33] The first and second requirements — imminent peril and no reasonable legal alternative — must be evaluated on the modified objective standard described above. … [ 61 ] And further on: While an accused’s perceptions of the surrounding facts may be highly relevant in determining whether his conduct should be excused, those perceptions remain relevant only so long as they are reasonable.

The accused person must, at the time of the act, honestly believe, on reasonable grounds, that he faces a situation of imminent peril that leaves no reasonable legal alternative open. There must be a reasonable basis for the accused’s beliefs and actions, but it would be proper to take into account circumstances that legitimately affect the accused person’s ability to evaluate his situation.

The test cannot be a subjective one, and the accused who argues that he perceived imminent peril without an alternative would only succeed with the defence of necessity if his belief was reasonable given his circumstances and attributes. [ 62 ] For the trial judge to assess the first two requirements of a necessity defence according to the modified objective standard, he must first hear the defendant's explanations. How can a defendant establish, on a balance of probabilities, that his belief that he was in a situation of imminent peril was sincere and reasonable, given his circumstances and his attributes?

How can he prove, on a balance of probabilities, his perception of the facts so that the judge can determine whether this perception was reasonable? [ 63 ] A belief or a perception, even when it must be reasonable, is not a fact that can be established on a balance of probabilities.

This is probably why the Supreme Court wisely concluded that a person who raises a necessity defence need only show that there is an air of reality with respect to all three requirements. [ 64 ] The defence of necessity is a defence of exception that is strictly controlled and scrupulously limited to situations that correspond to its underlying rationale. Its application is restricted and very circumscribed.

This defence rarely succeeds because it is very difficult for a defendant to establish an air of reality for all three requirements. [ 65 ] With respect for the contrary opinion, requiring a defendant who raises the defence of necessity to establish the requirements on a balance of probabilities because this is the usual burden of proof in statutory cases appears to me to be exorbitant and impracticable. [ 66 ] Interpreting the law is first and foremost a matter of nuances. Judges must be careful to resist applying the same reasoning to

the different situations they are asked to rule on, just like a chef should not use the same sauce for all his recipes. [ 67 ] We shall now examine the air of reality to the defence put forward by the defendant.

B) Assessment of the defence put forward by the defendant: [ 68 ] Mr. Ryan had to establish that he had no choice but to disobey the law. It should be pointed out that the defendant's refusal to exit his vehicle occurred after the first test and after he had eaten a snack to raise his blood glucose level. It was likely important to do a second test to check if his blood glucose level had improved after the snack. But the first condition is emergency. The situation must be so emergent and the peril must be so pressing that normal human instincts cry out for action.

The peril must not only be foreseeable and likely, it must be virtually certain that it will occur. [ 69 ] In the situation described by Mr. Ryan, the Court does not see any immediate peril after the snack was eaten. The Court does not take judicial notice of the effects of diabetes, but if there was an emergency and a pressing peril justifying the defendant's refusal to exit his vehicle after his first blood glucose test, this should have been entered into evidence. [ 70 ] The absence of another reasonable legal solution was not established by Mr. Ryan's testimony.

He certainly could have done the second test in the patrol car. In addition, since he had a cell phone, if his condition had really deteriorated as he said it had, he could have called an ambulance instead of speaking with his daughter's mother or he could have asked her to do so. [ 71 ] The Court concludes that the defence of necessity must fail.

C) Assessment of the contradictory versions: [ 72 ] The Court has heard contradictory versions of the events surrounding the issuing of the statement of offence. [ 73 ] In criminal matters, the Supreme Court has set out the formula to follow in cases of contradictory evidence: [14] [TRANSLATION] First, after considering all the evidence, and not only the accused's testimony, if the Court believes the accused's deposition, it must acquit him; Second, after considering all the evidence, if the Court does not believe the accused's testimony, but it nevertheless raises a reasonable doubt, it must acquit him; Third, if the accused's testimony does not raise any doubt in the mind of the Court, it must examine all the evidence and determine whether the prosecution has proven the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. [ 74 ] In Dinardo v .

R , [15] the Court of Appeal recently observed: [TRANSLATION] … Testimony must be assessed as a whole. In this area, which falls under the sovereign jurisdiction of the trier of fact, a particular element can cause a judge to believe or disbelieve a witness. [ 75 ] The case at bar hinges on a question of credibility.

As Charron J. observed: In a case that turns on credibility, such as this one, the trial judge must direct his or her mind to the decisive question of whether the accused’s evidence, considered in the context of the evidence as a whole, raises a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. [16] [ 76 ] It is possible that Mr. Ryan's blood glucose level fell after he was stopped for speeding. The Court can only conclude, however, that from the time the police officer signalled him to stop, Mr.

Ryan exhibited an attitude of resistance. [ 77 ] First, he did not want to stop where the police officer asked him to but rather 200 metres further ahead. He ended up complying, but when Constable Beausoleil told him the reason he had been stopped, the defendant asked him why the cars in front of him had not been stopped. [ 78 ] When Constable Beausoleil returned and asked him to exit of his vehicle, which was about to be towed, Mr. Ryan responded as follows: "What the hell are you doing? You can't open my door".

[ 79 ] His testimony is contradictory. He maintains that he always spoke calmly throughout the police intervention.

Yet, in addition to the way he answered when Constable Beausoleil asked him to exit his vehicle, he himself said that he was yelling and screaming when the police officers wanted to handcuff him. [ 80 ] Lastly, although he explains that his refusal to exit his vehicle was due to a medical situation, he states that if Constable Beausoleil had told him at the outset that his vehicle would be towed, he would have prepared himself accordingly … [ 81 ] In short, the Court does not believe that the version given by the defendant reflects what happened that day. Mr.

Ryan's testimony raises no doubt in the mind of the Court. [ 82 ] Has the Director of Criminal and Penal Prosecutions proved beyond a reasonable doubt the offence with which the defendant is charged? Mr.

Ryan admits that he did not comply with Constable Beausoleil's request to exit his vehicle so that it could be towed. [ 83 ] The explanations given by the defendant to justify his conduct do not constitute a valid defence. [ 84 ] His refusal to exit his vehicle constitutes hindering a police officer in the performance of his duties. [ 85 ] Constable Beausoleil's testimony is accurate and has an air of reality, and his assessment of the facts is nuanced. After the intervention, the police officers offered to drive Mr. Ryan where he wanted, thus demonstrating an intention to help the defendant.

This conduct is inconsistent with the aggressive attitude that Mr. Ryan attributed to the police officers in his testimony. [ 86 ] The Court finds that the offence with which the defendant is charged is proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT: CONVICTS the defendant of the offence with which he is charged; SENTENCES HIM to pay a fine of $300, but without costs given that the hearing of this case was postponed due to a crowded trial calendar. _____________________________________ Johanne White, Presiding Justice of the Peace Me Simon Lavoie For the prosecutor Director of Criminal and Penal Prosecutions Me Érika Kastagnotis For the defendant, Harold Ryan Hearing date: October 16, 2012