2024 QCCS 457, 2024 QCCS 457

Syndicat de la Copropriété du 3534 Aylmer c. Reich Shechtman 2024 QCCS 457 SUPERIOR COURT CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC district of montreal No.: 500-17-079950-138 DATE: February 14, 2024 ____________________________________________________________________ PRESIDING BY THE HONOURABLE MARIE-CLAUDE LALANDE, J.S.C. ____________________________________________________________________ SYNDICAT DE LA COPROPRIÉTÉ DU 3534 AYLMER Plaintiff v.

REBECCA REICH SHECHTMAN and MARY REICH SHECHTMAN and ALLEN SHECHTMAN Defendants ____________________________________________________________________ JUDGMENT ____________________________________________________________________ [ 1 ] The Syndicat de la copropriété du 3534 Aylmer (the Syndicate) seeks authorization to sell the defendants’ unit held in co-ownership due to their refusal to obey an injunction issued in 2020. Its request is based on the second paragraph of art. 1080 CCQ. [ 2 ] Rebecca Reich Shechtman and Allen Shechtman are a couple, and Mary Reich Shechtman is their daughter.

They own a unit located at 3534 Aylmer Street in Montreal, which they have been renting out for many years. I.

BACKGROUND [ 3 ] On January 31, 2020, Stéphane Lacoste J. issued an injunction against the defendants (the Lacoste judgment) with the following conclusions: [132] ORDERS Mary Reich Shechtman, Allen Shechtman and Rebecca Reich Shechtman to comply with the Déclaration de copropriété P-2; [133] ORDERS Mary Reich Shechtman, Allen Shechtman and Rebecca Reich Shechtman to obtain a new construction permit from the City of Montreal to replace permit number 3000478279-15 issued on June 15th, 2015 and since expired; [134] ORDERS Mary Reich Shechtman, Allen Shechtman and Rebecca Reich Shechtman to complete the construction work authorized by that new permit, concerning among others, common portions of the building, under the supervision of a professional appointed by Syndicat de la copropriété du 3534 Aylmer; [135] ORDERS Mary Reich Shechtman, Allen Shechtman and Rebecca Reich Shechtman to pay to Syndicat de la copropriété du 3534 Aylmer the fees and other costs related to the construction work and the supervision of the professional appointed by the Syndicat de la copropriété du 3534 Aylmer as per paragraph 132 of this judgment; [136] ORDERS Mary Reich Shechtman, Allen Shechtman and Rebecca Reich Shechtman to not conduct or have conducted by any third party any construction work to the common portion and in their private portion (apartment No. [1]) until they have filed with Syndicat de

la copropriété du 3534 Aylmer the plans and detailed quotes and obtained the consent of Syndicat de la copropriété du 3534 Aylmer to carry out the work, as prescribed by the Déclaration de copropriété; [ 4 ] The injunction became necessary due to work carried out by the defendants in 2013, which was contrary to the declaration of co- ownership and for which no permit from the City of Montreal (the City) had been requested. [ 5 ] Under the Lacoste judgment the defendants were also condemned to pay over $120,000 to the Syndicate, including $80,000 for abuse of procedure. [ 6 ] Since the Lacoste judgment was rendered, the defendants have paid only the amounts awarded, but more than a year after that judgment was rendered.

The Syndicate had to register a legal hypothec in August 2020 [1] and serve a notice of sale under judicial authority in June 2021 to get the defendants to pay the Syndicate the amounts awarded by the judge. [ 7 ] The orders concerning the remediation work have still not been carried out. [ 8 ] In addition, the defendants have not paid their common expenses since 2020. [ 9 ] With this application to force a sale under judicial authority, the Syndicate would like to end its contractual relationship with the defendants once and for all and be compensated for its damages, including its extrajudicial fees, which can be claimed under the declaration of co-ownership.

II. positions of the parties [ 10 ] The Syndicate claims that, for over three (3) years, the defendants have been ignoring the injunction rendered by Lacoste J. in January 2020. [2] [ 11 ] The defendants continue to ignore the injunction, despite several formal notices sent asking them to comply with the orders rendered by the Court. [3] [ 12 ] The Syndicate argues that the defendants’ indifference and disregard for the Lacoste judgment, the declaration of co-ownership, and the formal notices, allows it to bring the action instituted, that is, a sale under judicial authority of the defendants’ unit. [ 13 ] The defendants argue that they started taking steps to comply with the Lacoste judgment a long time ago but could not act faster due to the public health crisis and the time it has taken the City to process this type of application. [ 14 ] Moreover, the defendants argue that they are about to comply with the Lacoste judgment because the City has now issued the permit and the work is all that remains to be done.

III. issues 1. Is the Syndicate entitled to seek a sale under judicial authority? 2 . Should the defendants be condemned for abuse of procedure? IV. analysis 1. Is the Syndicate entitled to seek a sale under judicial authority? applicable law [ 15 ] The Syndicate’s application is based on the second paragraph of art. 1080 CCQ.

That provision reads as follows: Where the refusal of a co-owner to comply with the declaration of co-ownership causes serious and irreparable injury to the syndicate or to one of the co-owners, either of them may apply to the court for an injunction ordering the owner to comply with the declaration. [ 16 ] If the co-owner violates the injunction or refuses to obey it, the court may, in addition to the other penalties it may impose, order the sale of the co-owner’s fraction, in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (chapter C-25.01 ) regarding the sale of the property of others.

It should first be noted that the sanction set out in the second paragraph of art. 1080 CCQ is only possible where the violation of an injunction issued under the first paragraph of art. 1080 CCQ causes serious and irreparable injury by. [4] [ 17 ] In Amselem c. Syndicat Northcrest , [5] Morin J.A. examined art. 1080 CCQ. While the appeal of that judgment was allowed by the Supreme Court in Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem , 2004 SCC 47 , its judgment did not address art.1080 CCQ. Therefore, the Court of Appeal’s ruling is the leading authority on that facet: [6] [87] L'interprétation donnée à cet

article par le juge de première instance, qui a répondu affirmativement à sa sixième question, est la bonne. Cet article, qui doit être lu dans son ensemble, autorise le tribunal à ordonner la vente de la fraction d'un immeuble faisant l'objet d'une copropriété divise, lorsque le propriétaire de cette fraction cause un préjudice sérieux et irréparable au syndicat ou à l'un des copropriétaires en refusant de se conformer à la déclaration de copropriété et qu'il transgresse une injonction lui enjoignant de s'y conformer . Cet

article n'a pas pour effet d'empêcher le syndicat ou les copropriétaires d'avoir droit à une injonction dans d'autres circonstances que celles que nous venons de décrire. Il ajoute tout simplement la possibilité d'une sanction plus forte, soit la vente d'une fraction, lorsque les conditions mentionnées à l'article sont constatées .

(emphasis added) [ 18 ] In Syndicat des copropriétaires du condominium Club Marin II c. Mokaddem , [7] Sheehan J. recalled the principles applicable to the second paragraph of art. 1080 CCQ: [107] La vente forcée d’une unité de copropriété a été décrite comme un « remède de cheval » qui ne devrait être prononcé que dans des circonstances exceptionnelles.

On doit l’ordonner « qu’en présence d’un préjudice sérieux et irréparable causé au Syndicat ou aux copropriétaires – sans pour autant qu’un tel préjudice doive nécessairement affecter tout un chacun des copropriétaires – dans l’éventualité où une telle ordonnance n’est pas prononcée à l’endroit du copropriétaire fautif ». [108] Cette prudence s’impose en raison des dommages significatifs que pourrait subir un copropriétaire en cas de vente forcée de son unité.

En effet, bien que la mise à prix d’un immeuble lors d’une vente en justice doive être « commercialement raisonnable », elle est néanmoins fixée pour favoriser une « vente rapide », ce qui dans plusieurs cas peut entrainer une vente à une valeur moindre que la valeur marchande. (…) (emphasis added) [ 19 ] In that case, the Court refused to order the sanction set out in the second paragraph of art. 1080 CCQ, even though the co-owner named in the motion had violated an injunction issued pursuant to the first paragraph of art. 1080 CCQ: [109] Or, les conditions requises pour ordonner la vente forcée de l’unité ne sont pas satisfaites ici. [110] Certes, monsieur Mokaddem a violé l’injonction rendue contre lui.

Cette cour l’a d’ailleurs condamné pour outrage en raison de cette violation. [111] Par ailleurs, le Syndicat n’a pas démontré qu’il subirait un préjudice sérieux et irréparable si la vente n’était pas ordonnée. [112] D’une part, monsieur Mokaddem a refait sa vie au Maroc. Il s’est marié et s’y est installé.

Depuis qu’il a quitté en avril 2022, les copropriétaires du 16e étage n’ont pas constaté d’odeur de cannabis. [113] De plus, l’unité de monsieur Mokaddem est présentement en vente. (…) [114] Dans les circonstances, ni le Syndicat ni les copropriétaires ne risquent de subir un préjudice sérieux dans l’immédiat. [115] Le Syndicat soumet qu’il demeure possible que monsieur Mokaddem décide de retirer son unité du marché et revienne s’y installer.

Or, cette possibilité lointaine ne suffit pas pour ordonner un remède aussi draconien. [116] Si monsieur Mokaddem décide de réintégrer son unité et qu’il continue de violer sans gêne les Règlements, le Syndicat pourra toujours représenter sa demande, laquelle sera évaluée selon les circonstances alors présentes. discussion [ 20 ] The Court will first examine the steps taken by the defendants to comply with the Lacoste judgment, after which the injury suffered by the Syndicate will be examined. • Steps taken to comply with the Lacoste judgment [ 21 ] On March 16, 2020, the defendants were served with the Lacoste judgment by bailiff at their home, along with a formal notice. [8] [ 22 ] The defendants mandated Joseph Cohen (Cohen) to represent them in all matters relating to their unit. [9] Therefore, all exchanges between the parties were made through Cohen and the Syndicate’s lawyers. [ 23 ] The Syndicate called three witnesses in support of its claims: Mary Reich Shechtman (MRS), a representative of the City, and a member of the Syndicate’s board of directors.

[ 24 ] In light of the mandate given to Cohen, MRS’ testimony is of little use to understand what the defendants have done since the Lacoste judgment. [ 25 ] The Court notes, however, that MRS’s behaviour following the Lacoste judgment appears to confirm Lacoste J.’s observations in his judgment.

Indeed, he was critical of the defendants, including MRS, for being in bad faith, for not reading the declaration of co- ownership, and for failing to comply with municipal by-laws when they built the mezzanine on the building’s roof. [ 26 ] MRS started her testimony via Teams by stating that she had trouble understanding the meaning of the Lacoste judgment and had to use Google Translate because she does not understand French.

Yet, after a few exchanges, MRS had to grudgingly admit that she was mistaken, since the Lacoste judgment is written in English. [ 27 ] With respect to the defendants’ numerous failures to pay the co-ownership fees, MRS acknowledged that amounts are owing, but does not know how much. [ 28 ] Clearly the issue is of little concern to her.

She tried to minimize these failures by stating that the other co-owners were also late and that as a result, she did not see why she should pay, when the others were also in default. [ 29 ] In addition, when questioned about her knowledge of the new declaration of co-ownership adopted by the board of directors, MRS simply answered that she did not recall. [ 30 ] Then, when asked to comment on the photographs of the state of the roof of the co-ownership, MRS stated that she did not recognize the place, but expressed her dissatisfaction because, despite her requests, the board of directors had not carried out the required repairs. [ 31 ] This reaction is surprising, to say the least, given that the repairs at issue were the defendants’ responsibility. [10] [ 32 ] At the end of her testimony, MRS closed Teams and did not attend the remainder of the hearing. [ 33 ] In short, the Court notes from her testimony that MRS ignored her obligations under the declaration of co-ownership or the Lacoste judgment.

She appears completely uninterested in the situation. [ 34 ] The Syndicate called Mathias Losco (Losco), an architect by training, and a representative of the City, to provide details on the defendants’ application regarding the work to be carried out following the Lacoste judgment. Part of Losco’s job is to assess the quality of projects submitted to the City. Although he only started working on the defendants’ project in 2022, after verification, he confirmed that the first application was registered in the City’s system in December 2020. [11] [ 35 ] His testimony is largely based on a

summary document prepared by a member of his team who collated all the entries in their computer system.

Without repeating the entire timeline, it shows the various steps taken by any party. [ 36 ] It shows several exchanges between the City, Cohen, and Madiros Baygin (Baygin), the architect hired by the defendants. [ 37 ] Last, although the file was closed in September 2021, apparently because the defendants failed to provide certain documents, the application was reactivated shortly thereafter, in December 2021, and the permit authorizing the work was issued on April 27, 2023. [12] [ 38 ] Losco explained that authorization for this type of work generally takes approximately 12 months.

As a result, he considers the 17- month delay for this type of permit application as atypical. [ 39 ] One of the directors of the Syndicate, Paul Batho (Batho), completed the plaintiff’s proof and explained how the defendants have behaved since the Lacoste judgment. [ 40 ] Although they were duly served with the Lacoste judgment in 2020, the defendants did practically nothing to keep the Syndicate apprised of the progress of their permit application and the performance of the work.

He acknowledges that Cohen contacted him to organize a meeting, which never took place. [ 41 ] The Syndicate decided to go ahead with this proceeding because the defendants were unwilling to comply with the Lacoste judgment or- pay the co-ownership fees. [ 42 ] After hearing the plaintiff’s witnesses, Cohen was called to explain the steps taken following the Lacoste judgment. [ 43 ] The various emails exchanged suggest that the defendants were trying to negotiate the conclusions of the Lacoste judgment, or at very least, delay payment for as long as possible. [ 44 ] Moreover, other than the fact that Cohen began his testimony by stating that he also had to use Google Translate to read the Lacoste judgment, the timeline with respect to the permit application submitted to the City is logical and easy to understand. [ 45 ] The Court accepts from this testimony that Cohen supervised the steps for obtaining the permit from the City and hired an architect to help with the process. [ 46 ] He stated that the work could have started in the fall of 2023, but the Syndicate insisted on having all the planned work reviewed by an architect of its choice. [ 47 ] It must be added here that the Lacoste judgment specifically allows the Syndicate to do so. [ 48 ] The Syndicate has now given its approval and the parties have agreed that if this proceeding fails, the work can begin in early spring 2024.

[ 49 ] Cohen does not deny that the process took a long time, but he attributes some of the delay to the public health crisis, the fact that the architect hired was temporarily unavailable due to health problems, and finally, the City’s analysis process itself. [ 50 ] Architect Baygin explained his involvement in the file and the steps he took with the City to obtain the permit. [13] [ 51 ] His testimony was nuanced and credible. [ 52 ] He does not deny that he was responsible for some of the delays in the handling of the file. At one point, he had to have surgery, which meant he was unavailable for a few weeks.

Another time, he failed to reply to a request from the City within the deadline, so the file was closed, and a new application had to be submitted. [ 53 ] Weighing the testimony of the City’s representative against that of Baygin, the Court concludes that although the defendants can attribute a few months’ delay to the architect’s health problems and to his failure to provide information to the City on time, the fact remains that the defendants were slow to comply with the Lacoste judgment. [ 54 ] Even if the defendants’ version is accepted and a 6-month suspension due to the public health crisis and a 5-month delay that appears to be attributable to the City are taken into account, the fact remains that it took over 23 months for the defendants to obtain the permit, whereas the average time required for this type of project is closer to 12 months. [ 55 ] In light of all the evidence and of the applicable legal principles, there is no doubt that the defendants were at fault in their steps to comply with the Lacoste judgment. [ 56 ] First, MRS’s reluctance to take an interest in the content of the judgment is blatant.

Like her mandatory Cohen, to this day she was unaware that the Lacoste judgment is written in English. [ 57 ] In addition, although some delay in obtaining the construction permit can be attributed to the City’s procedure or to the public health crisis, which the City denies because it continued to process applications during this period, the Court notes that the Syndicate has established, on a balance of probabilities, that the defendants’ behaviour since the Lacoste judgment violates that injunction.

As is the failure to pay the co-ownership fees since the Lacoste judgment when that judgment ordered them to comply with the declaration of co- ownership. • Injury suffered by the Syndicate [ 58 ] That said, to be entitled to the conclusion sought, the Syndicate must also establish serious and irreparable injury. [ 59 ] The Syndicate essentially raises three grievances: • the unpaid co-ownership fees • the failure to maintain the unit • the delay in obtaining the permit [ 60 ] The defendants paid the co-ownership fees in full before the trial began, with 24% annual interest, as provided in the declaration of co-ownership. [14] [ 61 ] With respect to the defendants’ failure to keep the Syndicate apprised of their steps with the City to comply with the Lacoste judgment, the Court notes from reading that judgment that the defendants’ obligations towards the Syndicate instead appear to require them to notify the Syndicate before any construction work authorized by the City begins so that it can mandate a professional to supervise everything.

Nevertheless, the fact that they took their time complying with the spirit of the Lacoste judgment constitutes a violation. [ 62 ] Last, with respect to the maintenance of the defendants’ unit, the evidence establishes that the damaged windows will be repaired or changed when the work covered by the City permit is performed. [ 63 ] Furthermore, on account of a clause in the declaration of co-ownership, the defendants paid all of the Syndicate’s extrajudicial fees incurred since the Lacoste judgment, with annual interest of 24%. [15] [ 64 ] In the circumstances, and even though the Syndicate claims to have suffered injury due to the defendants’ slow response to the conclusions of the Lacoste judgment, the application for a sale under judicial authority appears too drastic. [ 65 ] In this case, the Court is of the view that the Syndicate of co-ownership has not suffered serious and irreparable injury, insofar as the defendants have finally paid the amounts they owed to the Syndicate. [ 66 ] This situation can be distinguished from the judgment rendered by Pinsonnault J., where the defendants’ multiple violations of the declaration of co-ownership were a danger to the safety and well-being of the co-owners and to the integrity of the heritage building. [16] [ 67 ] Furthermore, as stated by Sheehan J. in Syndicat des copropriétaires du condominium Club Marin II c .

Mokaddem , [17] cited above, the Syndicate could always apply again if the defendants’ behaviour continues. 2. Should the defendants be condemned for abuse of procedure? applicable law [ 68 ] Abuse of procedure is codified in arts. 51 to 54 of the Code of Civil Procedure . The relevant articles read as follows:

51. The courts may, at any time, on an application and even on their own initiative, declare that a judicial application or a pleading is abusive. Regardless of intent, the abuse of procedure may consist in a judicial application or pleading that is clearly unfounded, frivolous or intended to delay or in conduct that is vexatious or quarrelsome. It may also consist in a use of procedure that is excessive or unreasonable or that causes prejudice to another person, or attempts to defeat the ends of justice, particularly if it operates to restrict another person’s freedom of expression in public debate. 52.

If a party summarily establishes that a judicial application or pleading may constitute an abuse of procedure, the onus is on the initiator of the application or pleading to show that it is not excessive or unreasonable and is justified in law. …. 54.

On ruling on whether a judicial application or pleading, including one presented under this division, is abusive, the court may order a provision for costs to be reimbursed, order a party to pay, in addition to legal costs, damages for any injury suffered by another party, including to cover the professional fees and disbursements incurred by that other party, or award punitive damages if warranted by the circumstances.

If the amount of the damages is not admitted or cannot be easily calculated at the time the application or pleading is declared abusive, the court may summarily determine the amount within the time and subject to the conditions it specifies or, in the case of the Court of Appeal, refer the matter back to the court of first instance for a decision. [ 69 ] In her comments on the new Code of Civil Procedure , the Minister of Justice summarized the Court’s role as guardian of procedure as follows: [18] Le pouvoir de sanctionner les abus s’inscrit dans la mission des tribunaux d’assurer une saine gestion des instances et il constitue une application du principe de proportionnalité.

Les actes doivent, quant à leur coût et au temps exigé pour les traiter, être proportionnés à leur nature et à leur finalité . Il ressort de la jurisprudence que les tribunaux sont très prudents dans l’exercice de ce pouvoir afin de ne pas brimer l’exercice des droits et de préserver notamment celui à une défense pleine et entière, mais il est aussi nécessaire, dans l’intérêt même de la justice, de réprimer ou de limiter les abus de la procédure.

L’article est une application en matière de procédure civile des principes posés par les articles 6 et 7 du Code civil , lesquels permettent de considérer que si l’abus peut résulter d’une intention de nuire, donc répréhensible, il peut aussi résulter de l’exercice déraisonnable ou excessif d’un droit qui rompt l’équilibre des droits entre les parties ou qui détourne le droit, ou ici la procédure, de sa fin sociale intrinsèque, l’administration de la justice telle que la disposition préliminaire du Code de procédure civile la circonscrit .

Outre l’abus prévu par ces articles du Code civil , le second alinéa de l’article regroupe sous la notion générale d’abus plusieurs cas ou situations similaires qui constituent des manifestations d’un exercice abusif du droit . Ainsi, sont considérés comme des abus, les demandes ou les actes manifestement mal fondés, frivoles ou dilatoires et les comportements vexatoires ou quérulents .

Afin de contrer la tendance jurisprudentielle d’exiger de rechercher l’intention d’abuser de la procédure et de ne percevoir l’abus que s’il y a un geste répréhensible indiquant une volonté de nuire, il a semblé opportun, pour maintenir la portée que le législateur a voulu donner en 2009 aux dispositions sur l’abus de procédure, d’indiquer clairement qu’il peut y avoir abus « sans égard à l’intention » d’abuser, comme cela ressort des articles 6 et 7 du Code civil . (Emphasis added) [ 70 ] Author Charles Belleau sets the parameters of the notion of abuse referred to in this provision as follows: [19] 1.

La notion d’abus En vertu de l’article 51, l’abus peut résulter, sans égard à l’intention:

a) d’une demande en justice ou d’un autre acte de procédure manifestement mal fondée, frivole ou dilatoire;

b) d’un comportement vexatoire ou quérulent;

c) de l’utilisation de la procédure de manière excessive ou déraisonnable ou de manière à nuire à autrui;

d) du détournement des fins de la justice, entre autres si cela a pour effet de limiter la liberté d’expression d’autrui dans le contexte de débats publics. La première de ces facettes de l’abus de la procédure vise les demandes et les procédures qui sont vouées à l’échec. Il en est ainsi de la demande en passation de

titre au sujet d’un immeuble lorsqu’un interrogatoire oral du demandeur tenu avant l’instruction (art. 221 et 226) démontre qu’il ne jouit même pas de la capacité financière pour acquérir le bien et qu’il n’est donc pas en mesure d’assumer son obligation corrélative à celle du défendeur. Les tribunaux doivent toutefois faire preuve de prudence avant de constater un tel abus.

Le deuxième volet de la définition englobe le phénomène dit de la quérulence qui englobe ces plaideurs qui s’acharnent contre des personnes et organismes en déposant régulièrement devant le tribunal des demandes et procédures mal fondées ou qui affichent un comportement irrespectueux à l’égard de ce dernier .

À la différence du premier volet de la définition de l’abus de la procédure, celui de l’utilisation de la procédure de manière excessive ou déraisonnable, implique un comportement davantage subjectif de son auteur, marqué par la témérité, pouvant aller jusqu’à une intention malicieuse, soit celle de causer du tort à la

partie adverse ou à d’autres personnes impliquées dans le litige . Il peut aussi recouper celui de la quérulence, bien qu’il ne soit pas nécessaire que l’auteur de l’abus se soit dans le passé constamment comporté de cette façon.

Enfin, le dernier volet de la définition de l’abus englobe surtout les demandes en justice, la plupart en dommages-intérêts pour atteinte à la réputation, instituée par des personnes dans le but d’intimider et de faire taire, pour cause d’épuisement financier et psychologique, d’autres personnes qui, par exemple, auraient critiqué en toute bonne foi leurs projets de développement ou leur gestion d’une entreprise ou d’un établissement.

L’on désigne communément ce genre de demande par l’appellation poursuite-bâillon'. (references omitted and emphasis added) [ 71 ] In Elmaraghi , [20] the Court of Appeal wrote: Un comportement blâmable dans l’exercice d’un recours, c’est , même sans mauvaise foi ou intention de nuire, faire preuve de témérité, par exemple en formulant des allégations qui ne résistent pas à une analyse attentive et qui dénotent une propension à une surenchère hors de toute proportion avec le litige réel entre les parties . ( Emphasis added) [ 72 ] As the Court of Appeal stated, to be characterized as abusive, the wrongful judicial conduct must reach a high threshold of severity, [21] to avoid trivializing abuse of procedure: [22] [126] L’

article 51 C.p.c. couvre une panoplie de situations et le spectre de ces situations est large, mais, dans tous les cas, la barre est haut placée et elle doit le demeurer au risque de banaliser ce qu’est une procédure abusive et de constituer un frein à l’accès à la justice, les procédures manifestement mal fondées et celles qui ne visent qu’à faire taire l’autre

partie doivent être sanctionnées. Il en va de même de la

partie qui utilise la procédure de manière excessive ou déraisonnable ou de manière à nuire à autrui. Mais, je le répète, la barre de l’abus de procédure doit demeurer haut placée. discussion [ 73 ] Even though the Court concludes that the application for a sale under judicial authority is not the appropriate remedy, it is not akin to saying that the defendants’ conduct is above reproach.

The dismissiveness with which the defendants treated the Lacoste judgment and their contractual obligations arising from the declaration of co-ownership must be sanctioned. [ 74 ] On numerous occasions, the defendants, through their silence [23] or their dismissive reactions, showed that they have no respect for the judicial system and their contractual obligations towards the Syndicate. [ 75 ] This was obvious to the Court at the hearing.

Without repeating the details of the evidence in this regard, here is what the Court noted: • MRS acknowledged that she received the Lacoste judgment, but stated more than once that she had to use Google Translate because she cannot read French, whereas the judgment is written in English; • Cohen, who heard the testimony of all the other witnesses, repeated the same thing when he knew full well that the document was written in English; • Despite receiving several formal notices, the defendants waited more than one year to pay the amounts they were condemned to pay in the Lacoste judgment; • Since the Lacoste judgment, that is, for over three years, the defendants failed to pay the co-ownership fees and chose to wait until this hearing began to remedy the situation. [ 76 ] Even though Lacoste J. noted this behaviour and condemned the defendants to pay the Syndicate’s extrajudicial fees as damages, the Court notes today that the defendants’ behaviour has not changed.

They continue to dismiss the judicial system and their contractual undertakings, thereby forcing the Syndicate to resort to the courts to enforce its rights. [ 77 ] The Court finds that the appropriate remedy is to condemn the defendants to punitive damages. [24] [ 78 ] In the circumstances, the defendants will be condemned to pay $25,000 in punitive damages. [ 79 ] Legal costs will not be awarded given the circumstances of the matter.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT: [ 80 ] DISMISSES the amended application to order the sale of the defendants’ unit; [ 81 ] CONDEMNS the defendants to pay the plaintiff $25,000 in punitive damages; [ 82 ] THE WHOLE , without legal costs.

__________________________________ Marie-claude lalande, j.S.C. Mtre Ludovic Le Draoullec / Mtre Anissa Yahlaoui DE GRANDPRÉ JOLICOEUR, LLP Counsel for the plaintiff Mtre Laurent Bernier DUNTON RAINVILLE, LLP Counsel for the defendants Date of hearing: November 23, 2023