Paskaran v Paskaran, 2023 ABKB 81

Court of King’s Bench of Alberta Citation: Paskaran v Paskaran, 2023 ABKB 81 Date: 20230214 Docket: 4801 193050 Registry: Calgary Between: Janarthanan Paskaran Plaintiff/Respondent - and - Shahin Paskaran Defendant/Applicant _______________________________________________________ Reasons for Decision of the Honourable Justice S.M. Bensler _______________________________________________________ Introduction [ 1 ] Mrs.

Paskaran has brought an application for interim child and spousal support, seeking the table amount of child support pursuant to the Federal Child Support Guidelines , SOR/97-175 and spousal support based on the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines . [ 2 ] Mr. Paskaran seeks to have the Consent, Interim Without Prejudice Support Order endorsed by the Court on June 15, 2022 to continue until trial, which has him paying $15,000 in monthly uncharacterized support, plus the family home housing costs, the

Children’s

section 7 expenses and the cost of the family’s nanny. [ 3 ] The salient issue in dispute between these parties is quantum for both interim child and spousal support. Background [ 4 ] Mr. and Mrs. Paskaran were married in August 2006 and separated in December 2020, a marriage of approximately 14.5 years. There are two children of the marriage, I (currently 8 years old) and K (currently 3 years old). [ 5 ] The parties provided affidavit evidence, which I have summarized here. [ 6 ] Mr. Paskaran is a corporate lawyer and partner at the law firm Torys.

He earned his law degree in 2002, joining Blakes in Calgary following graduation. From November 2006 until August 2008, the parties lived in London, England while Mr. Paskaran worked for Blakes at their London, England office. Now a partner at Tory’s, Mr. Paskaran earns approximately $2 million dollars per year. He estimates that his 2022 income will be in the range of $1.7 to $2 million dollars. [ 7 ] Mrs. Paskaran has a sociology degree and completed a college diploma in Legal and Administrative Studies in 2004. Mrs. Paskaran was employed as a junior paralegal until December 2005.

She worked various temporary contract positions in London, England before securing a full-time position at a recruitment agency. She left this position when the parties moved to Calgary for Mr. Paskaran’s work. [ 8 ] In October 2012, Mrs. Paskaran secured a full-time position with the Calgary Board of Education. After the birth of their first child, Mrs. Paskaran took a one-year maternity leave and returned to work on a part time basis. Since the birth of their second child, Mrs. Paskaran has been a stay-at-home mother, looking after the household and the Children. [ 9 ] In late 2021, after separation, Mrs.

Paskaran obtained part-time employment at Ronald McDonald House, earning $19.09 per hour. However, she has been on medical leave from work since February 2022 due to the stress of the parties’ separation and pending divorce. Her affidavit sworn August 12, 2022 includes a medical letter from her physician indicating that she continues to be unable to work until at least October 24, 2022. [ 10 ] Mrs. Paskaran submits that the Children resided primarily with her from December 2020 until July 2022, when Mr. Paskaran began having 40% parenting time with the children. Mr.

Paskaran submits that there has been shared parenting of approximately 40% since separation, and that he has made significant modifications to his work/life balance to make himself available for parenting. [ 11 ] On September 19, 2022, one week before this hearing, the parties attended a domestic special on parenting. Counsel advised that this Court ordered an increase in parenting time from 40% to 50% on a gradual basis over two years on a 5-2-2-5 schedule. [ 12 ] The parties have a full-time nanny. Since separation in December 2020, the nanny splits her time approximately 65%-35% between Mrs. and Mr.

Paskaran’s homes, respectively. [ 13 ] From separation in December 2020 until May 2022, Mr. Paskaran covered expenses for Mrs. Paskaran and the Children. He paid the cost of the nanny, all

section 7 expenses, the joint credit card (which Mrs. Paskaran had use of), Mrs. Paskaran’s legal bills and all of the costs associated with the family home where Mrs. Paskaran lived (including property taxes, insurance and utilities; the parties have no mortgage). Mr. Paskaran submits that the approximate total monthly expenses were $14,200. Mr. Paskaran also provided Mrs. Paskaran with $2,500 per month, placed into a joint bank account for discretionary expenses. [ 14 ] In May 2022, Mr. Paskaran removed Mrs. Paskaran from the joint credit card, and began paying her $15,000 a month in uncharacterized support.

In addition, Mr. Paskaran continues to pay for the costs associated with the family home, the cost of the nanny, and the Children’s

section 7 expenses. In May 2022, Mr. Paskaran advanced Mrs. Paskaran $100,000 to further assist her with expenses. Positions of the Parties Mrs. Paskaran [ 15 ] Mrs. Paskaran seeks an interim order for $25,000 per month in child support and $30,000 per month in spousal support. She bases her amounts on an income of $2.1 million for Mr. Paskaran, with table child support at $27,873 per month and the range of spousal support being $33,648 to $55,098 per month based upon the SSAG calculations. [ 16 ] Mrs. Paskaran submits that she was unaware of how much money the parties had or what Mr.

Paskaran earned until she received financial disclosure as part of the litigation process. In her Affidavit, sworn May 23, 2022, Mrs. Paskaran states that she would happily take over the household expenses and her proportionate share of the nanny if she was receiving proper child and spousal support. Mr. Paskaran [ 17 ] As stated, Mr. Paskaran seeks to have the Consent Interim Without Prejudice Support Order endorsed by the Court on June 15, 2022 continue until trial, being $15,000 per month in uncharacterized support, plus all the carrying costs for the family home, the Children’s

section 7 expenses and the cost of the nanny, while also acknowledging the $100,000 advance that was paid to Mrs. Paskaran in May 2022. It is his position that this is reasonable on an interim basis. [ 18 ] In the alternative, he seeks an order granting interim child and spousal support “that fairly reflects the means, needs,

conditions and circumstances of the Children and the parties.” [19] Mr. Paskaran does not dispute that Mrs. Paskaran is entitled to spousal support. [20] In his Concise letter, Mr. Paskaran submits that if he is no longer responsible for Mrs. Paskaran’s share of the nanny (becauseMrs. Paskaran does not need the nanny for work or for school) or the carrying costs for the family home where Mrs. Paskaran is living,he is prepared to pay interim child support of $8,000 per month, plus 100% of the

section 7 expenses and tax-deductible interim spousalsupport of $12,000 per month. He states that this would be more than fair to sustain the lifestyle and reasonable needs of Mrs. Paskaranand the children. Issues [21] I am tasked with determining the quantum of interim child support and interim spousal support. I will first address interimchild support, followed by interim spousal support. A. Interim Child Support – Shared Parenting & Income over $150,000 [22]

Section 15.1(3) of the Divorce Act, RSC 1985, c 3 (2nd Supp) provides that interim child support orders shall be in accordancewith the Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175. [23] The parties have shared parenting, therefore

section 9 of the Guidelines is necessarily engaged. [24] Mr. Paskaran earns a significant income, well in excess of $150,000 per year. As Justice Rowbotham stated in Archibald vArchibald, 2007 ABQB 486 at paragraph 26, “Although s. 9 contains the complete code for determining child support in sharedparenting situations, s. 4 identifies a number of issues and principles relevant to high income earners.” While the

section 3 presumptiverule applies to incomes over $150,000,

section 4 provides discretion to the court where the table amount is inappropriate. [25] Francis v Baker, (SCC), [1999] 3 SCR 250 is the leading authority on child support for high incomeearners. Our Court of Appeal in Ewing v Ewing, 2009 ABCA 227 at paragraph 46 succinctly summarized the principles espoused inFrancis: i. There is a presumption that the Table applies to all incomes, including incomes over $150,000. A partyseeking to deviate from the Table has the onus of rebutting the presumption. (paras. 41, 43) ii.

Children can expect the Table amount on the first $150,000 and a fair additional amount for that portion thatexceeds $150,000. The closer the amount is to $150,000, the more likely it is that the Table amount will be awarded. (para. 41) iii. Where the presumption is rebutted, the Guideline figures can be increased or reduced under

section 4. (para.42) iv. The test for deviation from the Table amount is that the evidence in its entirety must be sufficient to raise aconcern that the Table amount is inappropriate. The evidence for departure from the Guidelines must be clear and compelling. A partyseeking deviation is not required to testify or adduce evidence and no unfavourable conclusion should be drawn from a failure to do so. Itis recognized that a party may not possess the required relevant evidence. (para. 43) v.

The actual situation of the children is central, and the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of thechildren must be considered in the assessment of the initial determination of inappropriateness and the determination of appropriatesupport. (para. 44) No single element of legislative purpose is to be given more weight than the actual circumstances of the children(para. 39). A proper construction of

section 4 requires that the objectives of predictability, consistency and efficiency on the one hand, bebalanced with those of fairness, flexibility and recognition of the actual “condition, means, needs and other circumstances of thechildren” on the other. (para. 40) vi. To determine appropriateness the court must be armed with sufficient information, and trial judges havediscretion to determine on a case-by-case basis whether a child expense budget is required to provide that information and they have thepower to order it. (para. 45) Custodial parents are not required to produce child expense budgets in all cases under

section 4. vii. Although frequently child support results in a benefit to the wife, the legislative objective is maintenance forthe children rather than household equalization or spousal support. (para. 41) viii. While standard of living can be considered in assessing need, at some point support payments will meet even awealthy child’s reasonable needs. When the Table amount is so in excess of the child’s reasonable needs it must be considered afunctional wealth transfer to a parent, or de facto spousal support. (para. 41) ix.

The test for whether expenses are reasonable will be met by the paying parent if the budgeted expenses are sohigh as to “excee[d] the generous ambit within which reasonable disagreement is possible”: Bellenden v. Satterthwaite, [1948] 1 All E.R.343 at 345. (para. 49) [26] Sheer size of a guideline amount is an insufficient reason to make a different award: Francis at paragraph 52.

While there isoften an indirect benefit to the recipient parent, Francis cautions that the court should not be too quick to presume a wealth transfer:Francis at paragraph 41, cited in Russell v Ullett Russell, 2021 ABQB 769. [27] Francis also cautions that the inherent imprecision of budgets must be kept in mind, given that they can be prone to

overestimating or underestimating the amounts. The unique economic situation of high income earners must be acknowledged: at paragraphs 48, 49. [ 28 ] Sections 4 and 9 require the court to consider the condition, means, needs and other circumstances, albeit slightly differently.

Section 4 requires the Court to consider the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of the children who are entitled to support and the financial ability of each spouse to contribute to the support of the children.

Section 9 requires the court to consider the conditions, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse/parent and of any child for whom support is sought, emphasizing fairness and flexibility and assessing the economic circumstances of each parent and their ability to meet the needs of the children. [ 29 ] Contino v Leonelli-Contino , 2005 SCC 63 is the leading authority on child support in shared parenting, and was followed by our Court of Appeal in MacDonald v Brodoff , 2020 ABCA 246 : [12] The calculation of basic child support under the Guidelines is premised on the number of children and only the payor’s annual Guidelines income, thus promoting predictability and efficiency.

In contrast, s 9 emphasizes fairness and flexibility and adopts a more holistic approach in assessing the economic circumstances of each parent and their ability to meet the needs of the children. Contino provides an analytical framework for interpreting the s 9 factors and identifies key principles that are summarized as follows: • The language of s 9 is imperative.

The courts must determine child support in accordance with all three factors; • No one factor should prevail, but the weight to be given to each factor depends on the particular facts of the case; • There is no presumption that the Guidelines Table amount, or the set-off amount calculated under the Tables will be awarded. Similarly, there is no presumption that something other than the set-off amount should be awarded; • The analysis is necessarily contextual, so a sound evidentiary foundation, including the parties’ budgets and actual expenses of both parents, is critical to the court’s analysis.

Courts cannot and should not make assumptions about the parties’ situation, and courts should demand information relating to s 9(

b) and (

c) when the evidence filed is deficient; • The analysis under s 9 reflects a stated objective of the Guidelines : to establish a fair standard of support for children that ensures that they continue to benefit from the financial means of both spouses after separation; • A critical inquiry is whether the children experience a difference in the standard of living as they move between the two households, as one of the overall objectives of the Guidelines is, to the extent possible, to avoid great disparities between households; • The goal under s 9(

b) is to apportion actual expenses between the parents in accordance with their respective incomes; • In shared parenting arrangements, the court has great discretion when assessing the three factors. In particular, the court has full discretion under s 9(

c) to consider “other circumstances”. [13] Contino informs us that a simple set-off of each parent’s Guidelines Table amount of support payable is an appropriate starting point: paras 41 and 49.

However, a court, in taking the second two factors into consideration, “retains the discretion to modify the set-off amount where, considering the financial realities of the parents, it would lead to a significant variation in the standard of living experienced by the children as they move from one household to another”: Contino at para 51 . [ 30 ] In KMR v IWR , 2020 ABQB 77 , the court adopted the approach to high income shared parenting situations as set out in Archibald , and reiterated the importance of keeping in mind the avoidance of disparities between households. [ 31 ] Mrs.

Paskaran refers to the case Volken v Volken , 2001 BCSC 970 , referencing paragraph 38 where the chambers judge imputed annual income of $2 million to the father, and referred to the father’s “formidable onus” of showing that the presumptive table amount could not be useful to the children having regard to the standard of living of other children of very wealthy parents.

In this case, the court accepted the husband’s proposal of $22,500 of monthly child support, and awarded $15,000 in monthly spousal support and a lump sump payment of $10,000. [ 32 ] It is important to note that our Court of Appeal in Ewing v Ewing , 2009 ABCA 227 , specifically rejected the description of the onus as “formidable” because it sets the evidentiary bar too high. This defeats the purpose of the Guidelines , which is to provide a discretion to vary support when dealing with incomes above $150,000 in appropriate circumstances: see Ewing at paragraph 52 .

As directed in Francis , the party seeking to deviate from the table amount has the onus of rebutting that presumption. The test for deviation is that the evidence in its entirety must be sufficient to raise a concern that the table amount is inappropriate. The evidence must be clear and compelling: see Francis as summarized in Ewing at paragraph 46 . [ 33 ] In SSG v SKG , 2002 ABQB 130 , Justice Devlin considered

section 9 child support in the context of high-income earning family, stating at paragraph 302 that “child support must not become a form of de facto spousal support or property equalization.

While an increase in the recipient parent’s standard of living may inevitably flow from achieving similar standards of living for the children, the child support amount must not be so excessive as to constitute a functional wealth transfer from one parent to the other.” [ 34 ] At the same time, it is important to keep in mind the caution set out in Francis at paragraph 41 that “the court should not be too quick to find that Guideline figures enter the realm of a wealth transfer or spousal support.” B.

Analysis: Interim Child Support – Shared Parenting and Income over $150,000 [ 35 ] The parties do not dispute that Mr. Paskaran’s income is in the $2 million range. In her submissions, Mrs. Paskaran suggests it is $2 to 2.1 million. Mr. Paskaran submits that he expects his 2022 income to be $1.7 to $2 million. For the purposes of determining the

table amount, I set Mr. Paskaran’s guideline income at $2 million. As such, the table amount is $26,553 per month. [ 36 ] Mrs. Paskaran’s evidence provides that in 2022 she earned $461 before being placed off work by her physician. At the time of this application, she remained off work until at least October 2022. At present, Mrs. Paskaran’s only source of income is the monthly uncharacterized support payments being provided by Mr. Paskaran. Given the foregoing, for the purposes of this interim application, I set her guideline income for 2022 at $0.

Therefore, the table amount is $0, and there is no set off at this time. [ 37 ] Turning to the circumstances in the application before me, Mr. Paskaran has the onus to rebut the presumption that the table amount of child support applies by “raising a concern” that the support amount is inappropriate. [ 38 ] Mr. Paskaran submits that he has provided sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption in favour of the table amount. To support his position, he refers to the monthly

summary of expenses incurred by Mrs. Paskaran and the Children since separation in December 2020 included in his Affidavit sworn May 27, 2022. This

summary of expenses shows an average monthly spend of $14,200 per month, including 100% of the costs of the nanny, and Mrs. Paskaran’s credit card bills, with monthly amounts ranging from $9,383 to $21,648. His Affidavit states that the supporting documents to this expense

summary were provided in financial disclosure. [ 39 ] Mr. Paskaran further argues that while married, the family lived a modest lifestyle with occasional travel. He submits that the family’s material expenses ranged from $10,000 to $20,000 per month. His affidavit evidence was that the parties do not spend lavishly on themselves or the Children. The Children attend public school and participate in community activities. Conversely, Mrs. Paskaran’s affidavit evidence indicated that the parties lived a high-end lifestyle both pre and post children.

She referenced high-end international travel pre-children, as well as trips to Scottsdale, England, Italy, and various trips to Toronto to visit family post children. She also relies on Mr. Paskaran’s affidavit evidence that material spending was in the $10,000 to $20,000 range, suggesting that this amount is before factoring in discretionary spending. [ 40 ] Mrs. Paskaran submits that she was never privy to the parties’ monthly expenses during the marriage and that she was unaware of the parties’ spending or income until financial disclosure in the litigation.

Her affidavit sworn September 2, 2022 states that she has been “very cautious about spending money post separation”, refraining from savings and vacations because of financial uncertainty. [ 41 ] Mrs. Paskaran provided an estimated monthly budget totalling $20,114.83. Expenses listed generally included household costs, transport, health and medical, recreation and education, direct expenses for herself and the Children, and legal fees. This includes $3,400 for a babysitter, and $542 for K’s daycare. Mrs.

Paskaran submits that her budget includes only $4,000 for legal fees and no savings or funds to pay the income tax that will be payable on an award of spousal support. [ 42 ] Mrs. Paskaran states that Mr. Paskaran has full control over any finances that she and the Children have access too. She argues that a higher end interim child support order can be remedied at trial, whereas if it is a too low amount, it will have a negative impact on the Children’s standard of living. [ 43 ] Mr. Paskaran submits that Mrs.

Paskaran has not provided a budget that shows the Children’s needs or lifestyle approach the table amount. He argues that the table amount “would be so grossly in excess of the Children’s reasonable needs it would result in a wealth transfer.” Mr. Paskaran argues that Mrs. Paskaran will be well-placed financially when the litigation is over, and that all of the Children’s needs are met. [ 44 ] While I acknowledge Mr.

Paskaran’s concern about a potential wealth transfer should sizeable interim support be awarded, I am guided by Francis that the court should not be too quick to presume a high child support order results in such a transfer. As stated in Russell at paragraph 81 , “The purpose of child support is not merely to pay the living expenses of the child, it is to provide reasonable financial support for the child based on each party’s income.” [ 45 ] I am also guided by the case law providing direction on interim support applications generally: see for example Maurier v Maurier , 2022 ABKB 856 .

As stated in HB v JB , 2019 ABQB 321 at paragraph 31 , it is not the court’s function to perform a substantive analysis, which would necessarily fall to the trial judge. [ 46 ] Based on the evidence before me, I am satisfied that Mr. Paskaran has met the onus to rebut the presumption in favour of the table amount of child support. In my view, an award of $25,000 per month in child support as sought by Mrs. Paskaran is inappropriate in these circumstances on an interim application. However, I do not accept the amounts proposed by Mr. Paskaran. A review of Mrs.

Paskaran’s estimated budget does not demonstrate a monthly amount excessively beyond what is reasonable given Mr. Paskaran’s income and the affidavit evidence. Her budget does not contain a significant number of discretionary expenses. While some of the categories may be overestimated, others appear to be underestimated, particularly in light of the current rate of inflation and increased costs of most items. As the Children get older, it is likely that their expenses will increase, including for activities, transport and vacations. Further, Mrs.

Paskaran has no source of income to contribute at this point in time. [ 47 ] Looking at all of the circumstances of this family on this interim application, I set interim child support at $10,000 per month, with Mr. Paskaran continuing to pay for the nanny, and the Children’s

section 7 expenses. C. Interim Spousal Support [ 48 ] There is no dispute between the parties that Mrs. Paskaran is entitled to spousal support. Mrs. Paskaran submits that the affidavit evidence establishes entitlement on both a compensatory and non-compensatory basis. Mr. Paskaran’s submissions indicated that he does not dispute Mrs. Paskaran’s standing or entitlement to “some level and duration of spousal support”. The issue in dispute between the parties is quantum on an interim basis pending trial. [ 49 ] Entitlement to spousal support can be based on compensatory and/or non-compensatory grounds.

Spousal support on compensatory grounds analyzes the economic advantages and disadvantages that flow from the roles of each spouse adopted in the

marriage, with common indicators being staying home with children, being the secondary earner in the family and having primary care of children after separation. Non-compensatory grounds assess the needs and means of each spouse, looking at the economic disadvantages that flow from marriage breakdown. Indicators include length of the marriage, a drop in the standard of living of a spouse, economic hardship, and lack of access to the income of the other spouse. [ 50 ]

Section 15 of the Divorce Act provides the authority and discretion to award spousal support, with

section 15.2 addressing interim spousal support orders. An application for spousal support requires an assessment of the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse:

section 15.2(4). The factors to consider include age, health, needs, obligations, dependents, education and career, pecuniary resources, ability of payor to pay, the length of time of cohabitation or marriage, and the functions performed by each spouse during the marriage. [ 51 ]

Section 15.2(6) of the Divorce Act provides that a spousal support order, including an interim order should: (1) recognize any economic advantages and disadvantages to the spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown; (2) apportion between the spouses any financial consequences arising from the care of any child of the marriage over and above any obligation for child support; (3) relieve any economic hardship of the spouse arising from the breakdown of the marriage; and, (4) insofar as practicable, promote the economic self sufficiency of each spouse within a reasonable period of time. [ 52 ] The SSAG Revised User’s Guide provides direction for high income earners.

Chapter 11- Ceilings and Floors provides a “ceiling” of $350,000. Where the payor’s income exceeds the $350,000 ceiling, the formula is no longer presumptive. While it is not a hard cap and it is not necessarily an error to set an amount in the SSAG range, the formulas are not to be applied automatically above the ceiling. Rather, the analysis requires an individualized, fact specific analysis. Where a payor’s income is “far” above the ceiling, the amount of support ordered will usually be below the low end of the SSAG range.

See for example Sorensen v Sorensen , 2010 ABQB 737 at paragraph 143 . [ 53 ] Our Court of Appeal in Anand v Anand , 2016 ABCA 23 at paragraph 57 provides guidance for interim applications for spousal support: [57] Although other s 15.2(4) factors and s 15.2(6) objectives must be taken into account, the needs of the dependent spouse and the ability of the payor spouse to pay take on greater significance in interim applications. The ultimate question for the court on an interim application is to determine what is reasonable on a temporary basis pending trial...

This Court has recognized that interim orders are often made on an incomplete record and chambers judges do the best they can to set an interim balance between the parties until the matter can go to trial. [ 54 ] Anand also notes the “inherent frailties” of interim spousal support orders, and that “the evidentiary record is inevitability incomplete”: at paragraph 66. Needs and means are the two key components of an interim spousal support analysis.

With respect to needs, Anand states: [61] When considering “needs” the court must consider need relative to the station in life the parties have achieved before collapse of the marriage. Through this prism, where there is an ability to pay, the court must determine a reasonable standard of living. [citations omitted] [ 55 ] In Maurier , Justice Renke highlighted guidance from the Alberta Court of Appeal regarding interim orders: [244] Our Court of Appeal has provided litigants with guidance respecting interim orders.

In Leontowicz v Leontowicz , 2020 ABCA 324 , at para 9 we read the following: [9] Interim support orders are intended to be temporary; they are often made on an imperfect record and are intended to strike an interim balance between the parties. It is expected that the matter will proceed to trial, at which time the trial judge can make necessary adjustments : see Durocher v Klementovich , 2013 ABCA 115 at para 20 ; Davies v Davies , 2015 ABCA 17 at paras 5 and 6 . For this reason, this court has repeatedly discouraged parties from appealing interim orders.

The resources thus used can be “better spent achieving an equitable settlement , or getting a final determination at trial of all matters in issue”: Anand v Anand , 2016 ABCA 23 at para 67 .

Similarly, proceedings to vary interim support orders should not be encouraged, and should not become the focus of the parties’ litigation: Damaschin-Zamfirescu v Damaschin-Zamfirescu , 2012 ONSC 6689 at paras 18-20 . “As long as an interim order provides for an adequate level of support, parties should put their efforts into resolving matters on a final basis, whether by agreement or at trial” : VLN v SRN , 2019 ABQB 849 [, Lema J] at para 17. [emphasis added in original] See also Malazdrewicz v Malazdrewicz , 2020 ABCA 423 at para 27 . [245] The advice of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in Merrifield v Merrifield , 2021 SKCA 85 at para 29 is also apt: [29] The following comments by Wilkinson J. [ ad hoc ] in [ Potzus v Potzus , 2017 SKCA 15 ] also stress the significance of the fact these are interim orders, particularly in cases involving high-income earners and families with high net worth: [111] Where a trial is pending, it is not the function of a Chambers judge to make “bell-weather orders” predicting, to a nicety, the outcome at trial: see Dyck v Dyck , 2008 MBCA 135 at para 30 , 77 RFL (6th) 70.

Nor is it a Chambers judge’s task to find the right number for the long term, especially where there are complex issues in relation to income attribution from corporate earnings and the support obligations for high-income earners. An individual earning annual income in excess of $150,000 is more capable than most of tolerating margins of error in interim, stop-gap orders. Where the family property falls into the multi-million dollar range, there is considerable malleability when it comes to making equitable adjustments in the final outcome . To front-end load every conceivable

argument onto a Chambers judge in an interim support application pre-empts the investigation that is properly the function of the trial judge. A trial is the natural forum for arguments of the kind that were advanced here. There, testimony can be scrupulously examined and issues explored with the benefit of a full and complete evidentiary foundation.

Decisions as to interim support are always modifiable at trial, where they can be assessed based on the entirety of the evidence: Linn v Frank , 2014 SKCA 87 , [2014] 10 WWR 215; and Ford v Ford , 2015 SKCA 23 , 457 Sask R 19. [emphasis added in original] See also Rolinger v Rolinger , 2021 ABQB 474 , Lema J at paras 23-24. [ 56 ] Mr. and Mrs. Paskaran were married for approximately 14.5 years. It was generally a traditional marriage. The work history of each and their respective roles during the marriage shows Mr. Paskaran being the primary income earner both pre- and post-children. While Mrs.

Paskaran worked at various jobs before the Children were born, the affidavit evidence before me indicates that when she was working, she earned significantly less that Mr. Paskaran. Mrs. Paskaran also relocated with Mr. Paskaran as he pursued his successful legal career. This disparity between their incomes grew larger throughout the marriage. After the birth of their second child, Mrs. Paskaran was a full-time stay at home mother. [ 57 ] The parties had a very comfortable lifestyle during the marriage, with both of them and their children benefitting from Mr. Paskaran’s significant income.

I acknowledge and consider that Mr. Paskaran advanced $100,000 to Mrs. Paskaran in May 2022 to assist with expenses. I am also mindful of the affidavit evidence indicating that the parties have a home without a mortgage, and likely sizeable matrimonial property that will ultimately be divided as between them at trial.

However, on an interim application, the property available is less relevant: see Lakhoo v Lakhoo , 2015 ABQB 357 at paragraph 27 referring to Hughes v Hughes , 2009 ABQB 154 : [27] ...The depth of the inquiry on an interim application is much less rigorous since interim orders are intended to provide income for the dependent spouse from the beginning of the proceedings until the trial can be held.

He explained that the focus of the application should be on the means and needs of the parties so that there can be a fair order to bridge the time until trial to guarantee that the standard of living of both parties remains close to what it was prior to separation. [ 58 ] Mrs. Paskaran is currently on medical leave from her part-time casual position at Ronald McDonald house where she was earning approximately $19 per hour. The family physician letter indicated that she would be off work at least until the end of October 2022. Mr. Paskaran continues to work full time as a successful partner at Tory’s.

He has full access to any funds he should need, and can continue his lifestyle as he sees fit, and as he did during the marriage. Mrs. Paskaran does not have the same type of access. While she enjoyed financial security during the marriage, after separation, and at this point in time, she is entirely reliant on Mr. Paskaran. In light of all of the circumstances of these parties, and considering the condition, means, needs and other circumstances and the objective of spousal support, I set interim spousal support payable by Mr. Paskaran to Mrs. Paskaran at $15,000 per month.

Costs [ 59 ] If the parties are unable to agree on costs for this application, they may provide written submissions to me within 30 days of the receipt of this Judgment. Heard on the 26 th day of September, 2022. Dated at the City of Calgary, Alberta this 14 th day of February, 2023. S.M. Bensler J.C.K.B.A. Appearances: Laurie E. Allen for the Plaintiff/Respondent Stacey Lee and Kendra Barlow (Student at law) for the Defendant/Applicant