Shumate v Patrick, 2023 ABKB 98

Court of King’s Bench of Alberta Citation: Shumate v Patrick, 2023 ABKB 98 Date: 20230222 Docket: 4803 140140 Registry: Edmonton Between: Kerrie Catherine Shumate Plaintiff - and - Kent Roy Patrick Defendant _______________________________________________________ Reasons for Decision of the Honourable Justice James T. Neilson _______________________________________________________ [ 1 ] The parties to this action married on October 22, 1988 and they separated in June 2006.

The parties had three children during the marriage, namely, Brittany Patrick, born October 28, 1989 (“Brittany”), Rebecca Shumate born March 10, 1998 (“Rebecca”) and Adam Shumate born June 14, 2000 (“Adam”) (collectively, the “children”). All of the children are adults, and Brittany and Adam are financially independent. [ 2 ] The parties were divorced pursuant to a Divorce Judgment granted by Justice Yamauchi on September 3, 2008. The

matrimonial property and corollary relief issues were severed from the divorce, so the matter proceeded by desk divorce. [ 3 ] On January 28, 2022 the Defendant Kent Roy Patrick (the “father”) filed a family application seeking the following remedy:

a) cancel his ongoing child support obligation to the respondent;

b) cancel his child support arrears to the respondent;

c) reduce his ongoing child support payments to $0 per month;

d) retroactively reduce his child support payments to $0 per month from the date he ceased employment to today;

e) retroactively reduce his child support arrears to the respondent to $0;

f) in the alternative:

i) lower his arrears, ii) lower his ongoing child support, and iii) lower his monthly support retroactively. [ 4 ] In the father’s application “child support” includes

section 3 and

section 7 support. [ 5 ] The Plaintiff, Kerrie Catherine Shumate (the “mother”) filed a family cross application on February 14, 2022 seeking the following remedy: 1. an order declaring that there is one child of the marriage pursuant to the Divorce Act (Canada) , namely: Rebecca Shumate, born March 10, 1998 (“Rebecca”) 2. an order that the father be imputed with an income in such amount as deemed appropriate by this honourable Court; 3. an order that the Defendant/Applicant father pay retroactive

section 3 child support an retroactive

section 7 expenses for Rebecca for the period commencing July 1, 2017 to present 4. an order that the father pay retroactive child support in accordance with his actual income for the period commencing January 1, 2008 to and including December 31, 2010 5. an order that the father pay ongoing

section 3 child support and

section 7 expenses for Rebecca; 6. costs Factual Background [ 6 ] After the couple separated in 2006, the mother brought an application for child support under s 3 and child care expenses under s 7 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines . [ 7 ] At a special chambers application on December 13, 2007, Justice Clackson ordered child support and s 7 expenses to be payable by the father. Justice Clackson found the mother to have a guideline income of $30,000 and the father to have a guideline income of $33,800. The father’s guideline income was imputed by the Justice.

The Court was advised that the name and birth date of each child of the marriage is as follows: Rebecca Catherine Estelle Patrick born March 10, 1998; and Adam Fred Patrick born June 14, 2000 (the “children”). [ 8 ] The following support was ordered:

a) commencing January 1, 2007 and continuing on the first day of each month thereafter, the father shall pay to the mother base child support in the amount of $489 per month. The base child support payments shall continue until each child is no longer a child of the marriage as defined by the Divorce Act or until further order of this Court. The Court further ordered that, commencing January 1, 2007, and continuing on the first day of each month thereafter, until the children are no longer children of the marriage as defined by the Divorce Act , the father shall pay to the mother

section 7 expenses of $1,091 per month calculated as follows: Child Nature of Add-on Amount of Percentage Amount Rebecca Patrick Childcare health related expenses extra curricular activities 52.98% $437.35 $158.94 $33.77 Adam Patrick Childcare extra curricular activities 52.98% $437.35 $24.28

[ 9 ] The Court furthermore ordered that all arrears of base support and s 7 expenses totalling $18,386 shall be paid by the Defendant within 60 days of this order. [ 10 ] The issue of whether the oldest child, Brittany continues to be a child of the marriage is reserved, and whether any child support should be payable by the father for her is also reserved. [ 11 ] The order of Justice Clackson, in paragraphs 8 and 9, provided as follows: 8.

Each party shall provide the other with a complete copy of their income tax return and any notices of assessment and reassessment received from the Canada Revenue Agency on an annual basis, on or before June 30 of each year as long as there is a dependant child for whom child support is payable. In the event that either party has not filed an income tax return for the previous year then that party shall provide the other with copies of his or her T4, T4As and all other relevant tax slips disclosing any and all sources of income, including self-employed income. 9.

The amounts owing under this order shall be paid to the Director of Maintenance Enforcement (“MEP”) at 7 th Floor North, 10365 – 97 Street, Edmonton, Alberta T5J 3Z7... and shall be enforced by MEP upon the creditor (receipt of support) or debtor (payor of support) registering with MEP such enforcement shall continue until the party who registered gives MEP a notice in writing withdrawing the registration pursuant to

section 9 of the Maintenance Enforcement Act . [ 12 ] The mother moved to the State of Missouri in August 2008 with the three children, where she continues to reside. [ 13 ] Following the order of Justice Clackson, the father did not voluntarily make child support and expense payments to the mother. All payments that the mother received were through MEP by garnished wages, tax refunds and employment severance payments that had been payable to the father.

Also, by order dated November 18, 2008, Justice Read directed that the father’s share from the sale of the laundromat business operated by the father and mother, be attributed to the arrears, thereby reducing his arrears at that time to $13,000. [ 14 ] Justice Read also ordered that ownership of the $1,000,000 Trans America life insurance policy on the life of the father be transferred to the mother. The order irrevocably directed that the beneficiaries of the policy will be the children of the marriage and that the parties will share the monthly premium payment of $205.

In the event that the father does not pay his share, $102.50 to the Plaintiff monthly, this amount shall be enforceable as a child maintenance expense under MEP. The father did not make any payments to the mother as his share of the monthly premium, so the mother has paid the full $205 monthly premium throughout in order to keep the policy in force. [ 15 ] The father did not make income tax disclosure to the mother as required by the order of Justice Clackson.

The first disclosure that he made was in December 2021, when he filed the above noted application to eliminate or reduce his arrears. [ 16 ] As of April 21, 2022, according to the MEP records, the balance of the father’s arrears is $79,687.29. In January 2016, MEP had retroactively adjusted the father’s arrears of child support to July 1, 2012 to remove half of the child care expenses pursuant to the Clackson order, possibly because Adam turned 12 years of age on June 14, 2012. Rebecca turned 18 years old in March 2016, but she did not graduate high school until three years later.

On September 20, 2018, the father’s arrears were adjusted again by MEP, back to July 1, 2017, to stop charging the father for any s. 7 expenses, and to reduce the monthly child support amount to $212, presumably a result of MEP ceasing to enforce any expenses relating to Rebecca.

The father’s child support payment was reduced by MEP to $0.00 as of July 1, 2018 after Adam turned 18 years old. [ 17 ] The father now claims that, following financial disclosure during the course of this application and cross-application, he was charged with excessive child support and expense payments, resulting in a net balance that is, in fact, repayable to him by the mother. [ 18 ] On the other hand, the mother has learned through the father’s financial disclosure, that there were periods of time when he was earning income in excess of the $33,800 per annum that had been imputed by Justice Clackson.

Furthermore, the father has reported no income since 2014 and the mother asked the Court to impute income to the father for those years in calculating the amount of child support that is properly payable. [ 19 ] The mother has led evidence that their daughter Rebecca, who has Down’s Syndrome, continues to be dependent following her eighteenth birthday as the result of this disability, and therefore continues to be “a child of the marriage” as the result of this disability, for the purpose of determining child support, ongoing child support and expenses.

Retroactive Elimination or Reduction of Child Support and Expense Arrears [ 20 ] The father cites the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Colucci v Colucci , 2021 SCC 24 , as authority for this Court’s ability to reduce or eliminate arrears that have accumulated, payable by the father to the mother. [ 21 ] The mother takes the position that the father had ceased to work in order to avoid any further payment obligations to the mother for child support or expenses. [ 22 ] Under Colucci , the Court may consider retroactive payments for a period of three years before disclosure by the payor.

As stated, there was no disclosure by the father until December 2021. However, the father asserts that the Court should extend the retroactive period under consideration beyond the three years. As the Supreme Court stated Colucci at para 62 : The payor must have disclosed sufficient reliable evidence for the Court to determine when and how far their income fell, and to

ascertain whether the change was significant, long lasting, and not one of choice. [ 23 ] The Court further states at para 63: Of course, a payor whose income was originally imputed because of an initial lack of disclosure cannot later claim that a change in circumstances occurs when he or she subsequently produces proper documentation showing the imputation was higher than the table amount for their actual income.

The payor cannot rely on their own late disclosure as a change in circumstances to ground a variation order. [ 24 ] The Court has a discretion to depart from the date of retroactivity based on four factors listed in DBS and reframed in the reduction context in Colucci , namely: 1. Whether there is an understandable reason for delay; 2. Whether the payor engaged in blameworthy conduct; 3. The circumstances of the child (or children), and 4.

Whether there will be hardship to the payor if the period of retroactivity is not lengthened beyond three years. [ 25 ] The Supreme Court in Colucci has detailed stringent requirements that the applicant payor must satisfy the Court, before the Court may eliminate or reduce the arrears payable at the time of application. [ 26 ] The application to decrease the arrears on the basis that a previous order had overstated the applicant’s income may be considered a material change in circumstances. The onus is on the applicant to establish the material change in circumstances as a threshold requirement.

The decrease in income must be significant and have some degree of continuity and it must be real and not one of choice (para 61). [ 27 ] The father claims that he has not been employed since 2014 as he has been required to stay at home to care for the two children of his new relationship with Wendy. He also cites health concerns resulting from a stroke in 2010 that required several days for recovery and a condition described as ankylosing spondylitis, which limits his ability to seek gainful employment.

However, no evidence was produced during the application demonstrating the child care costs that would have been incurred had he been otherwise employed, or medical evidence substantiating an ongoing condition or treatment that would prevent the father from obtaining gainful employment. During the course of the marriage, the father and mother operated a picture framing business for a number of years, then a laundromat business. After the separation, the father was employed at Rona, and then at Walmart, until he stopped working entirely in 2014.

He has reported no income since 2014. [ 28 ] The mother submits, and I find, that the father had no understandable reason to have delayed in bringing his application. The father engaged in significant blameworthy conduct when he failed to provide any financial disclosure to the mother between December 13, 2007 and December 16, 2021, and when he failed to make any voluntary payments of child support after separation.

The father’s Notices of Assessment from 2008 to 2020 indicate that his 2008 line 150 income was $50,462, his 2009 line 150 income was $59,266, and his 2010 line 150 income was $58,733, which were all significantly higher than the income imputed to him by Justice Clackson in 2007. [ 29 ] I also find that the father has not established satisfactory evidence of hardship.

The monthly budget of expenses submitted by the father dated December 6, 2021 is as follows: housing and lodging total $0, household expenses total $0, children direct expenses total $0, yourself direct expenses total $0, transportation total $0, medical/dental total $0, miscellaneous total $0, employment deductions total $0, debt payments total $0, income total $0. This monthly budget bears no semblance of credibility as presented. [ 30 ] The father is living with his partner Wendy who is employed as a manager. If he has no income at all, then any expenses must be covered by her.

Furthermore, he had over time during the course of the marriage received payments from his parents, who are involved in several businesses. He and Wendy and the children reside in a house in Calgary that had been purchased by the father’s parents for $514,000 and has a current assessment value of $589,000. The father testified that he pays no rent for living in this house.

In his questioning on affidavit, he was repeatedly vague or claimed no memory of payments that he may be entitled to receive, by way of dividends, or through a trust, the details of which were not produced by way of undertaking. [ 31 ] The father appears to be living a comfortable life where his financial needs are somehow provided. There is no basis to establish hardship in respect of the support and expense arrears.

Rather, he appears to be motivated to structure his affairs so that he can avoid the moral and legal obligation to support his children of the marriage with the mother. [ 32 ] As the Supreme Court stated at para 108 of Colucci : Hardship carries much less weight where brought on by the payor’s own unreasonable failure to make proper disclosure and give notice to the recipient. [ 33 ] The father seeks recission of his arrears of child support. He testifies that this would permit the reinstatement of his driver’s license so he can take to activities his two children with Wendy.

The father submits that he has actually made an overpayment of child support and expenses to the mother, depending on certain assumptions, in the range of $9,615.27 to $29,178.27. However, in his application, he is not seeking repayment of the alleged overpayment, but rather, seeks a declaration from the Court that his arrears are reduced to zero with no ongoing support payable. [ 34 ] The father must rebut the presumption against vacating any portion of the arrears by establishing on a balance of probabilities that even with a flexible payment plan, he cannot and will not ever be able to pay the arrears.

I find that the father has not produced sufficient evidence to meet this threshold. The Court at para 141 of Colucci stated “recission of arrears solely based on current financial incapacity should not be ordered lightly. It is a last resort in exceptional cases, such as when the payor suffers a ‘catastrophic injury’”. I find that the father has demonstrated no exceptional circumstances and no health concerns that prevent him from working any job. [ 35 ] The father’s access to family wealth is a relevant consideration in determining whether the father will ever be able to pay his arrears.

In the past, the father’s parents have paid off his credit card debt. The father testified that his parents own a minimum of seven properties. As the Supreme Court stated at para 135 of Colucci :

... the payor’s ongoing financial capacity is the only relevant factor.

The payor must therefore provide sufficient reliable evidence to enable to the Court to assess their current and prospective financial circumstances, including their employment prospects and any assets, pensions, inheritances or other potential sources of future capacity to pay. [ 36 ] The Supreme Court stated at para 138 of Colucci that the presumption against the recission of arrears “encourages payors to keep up with their support obligations rather than allowing arrears to accumulate in the hopes that the Courts will grant relief if the amount becomes sufficiently large.

Arrears are a ‘valid debt that must be paid, similar to any financial obligation, regardless of whether the quantum is significant (Bakht et al at pg 550)”. The father testified that he did not even know the amount of arrears payable until he received that information from MEP for the purposes of this application. [ 37 ] I find that the father has not met the criteria for the Court to consider retroactive payments beyond the three years before disclosure in December 2021.

However, because of the issues raised by the mother in her cross application, the Court must nonetheless re-examine the father’s history of payments toward

section 3 support and

section 7 expenses following the late disclosure. The mother asserts that the father’s payments are significantly below his legal obligation. She cites the income received by the father in the period 2008 to 2010 from Rona, and in 2011 to 2013 from Walmart, which had not been disclosed previously.

She also asserts that, although the father reports no income from 2014 onward, his income should be imputed for those years at $37,000 per annum, being a realistic evidence-based amount given his previous earning levels from 2008 to 2013. [ 38 ] The mother also applies for continued child support for Rebecca, who remains living with and in the care of the mother. The mother has produced an Individual Support Plan by Compass Health Network in Joplin, Missouri.

The report details that Rebecca continues to need support services to assist her in the community learning the skills needed in the broader community safely. The report states that Rebecca will also explore job development transitioning to supported employment once employment is obtained. She will start out with Job Development lasting no longer than six months. The goal is for Rebecca to have competitive employment within six months. Once she has obtained competitive employment Rebecca will have Supported Employment Service to assist her on the job.

The services will eventually fade out as Rebecca is able to demonstrate competencies. Rebecca is to receive targeted case management from Compass Health Network for the period January 1, 2021 to March 31, 2022. [ 39 ] I conclude that Rebecca continues to be a child of the marriage at this time. The father contested any further obligation to Rebecca, alleging that she has chosen to have no further connection with him. However, it is the father who has had very minimal to no connection with the children for many years, by his own volition.

Imputation of Income where a Spouse is intentionally under- employed or unemployed [ 40 ] In the decision of Peters v Atchooay , 2022 ABCA 347 , a five member panel of the Alberta Court of Appeal, reconsidered the previous authority established in Hunt v Smolis-Hunt , which had required evidence of deliberate evasion before income may be imputed to a payor for child support and expenses. Now, under the Peters decision, the test is the reasonableness of the imputation under s 19(1) (

a) of the Family Child Support Guidelines . This

section provides that the Court may impute such amount of income to a spouse it considers appropriate where the spouse is intentionally under-employed or unemployed, other than where the under-employment or unemployment is required by the needs of a child of the marriage or any child under the age of majority or by the reasonable educational or health needs of the spouse. [ 41 ] At para 60 of Peters , the Court stated that a person is “intentionally under-employed” for the purposes of s 19(1)(

a) where their income is less than they are capable of earning. The factors for earning capacity include qualifications such as age, education, experience, skills and health and other criteria, for example the availability of work, choice to relocate and other obligations. [ 42 ] The Court will also consider whether the under-employment or unemployment is beyond the control of the payor, that is involuntary, for example, by layoff, reduced hours and termination without cause.

In those circumstances imputation would not be available. [ 43 ] The exceptions which may avoid imputation are not automatic or permanent, but dependent on the circumstances: Spring v Spring , 2022 ABCA 19 at para 18 , as cited in Peters at para 60 . [ 44 ] If under-employment or unemployment arises from voluntary choice and listed exceptions do not apply, the Court may impute income. [ 45 ] The framework for determining imputation of income applies to s 3 base child support and s 9 shared parenting child support, in both initial applications or variation applications.

The onus remains throughout on a party seeking the variation. However, once material change in circumstances is met, the party opposing imputation must prove on a balance of probabilities that: 1. The under- employment or unemployment was not voluntary; or 2. The under-employment or unemployment is as a result of one of the s 19(1)(

a) exceptions.

If neither of those two factors apply, that party must establish on a balance of probabilities that their under-employment or unemployment is reasonable having regard for all the existing circumstances. [ 46 ] The evidence should focus on the payor’s capacity to earn income at all points in the applicable timeframe: the date of the order in effect, the date of the variation application, and during the years in between for which a variation is sought. [ 47 ] At a minimum, establishing employment capacity includes evidence of: payor’s age, technical skills, education, health, work history, and realities of the labour market. [ 48 ] As the Court of Appeal stated at para 67 of Peters , under-employment or unemployment due to the payor’s health concerns would generally require medical evidence for the entire duration of time in question.

Furthermore, in considering circumstances beyond

the payor’s control, the payor must provide evidence of efforts to find alternate employment. An employment decision that results in a significant reduction of child support needs to be justified in a compelling way. [ 49 ] After discussion in Peters at paras 68 to 91 , the Court of Appeal summarized s 19(1)(

a) principles at para 92. I cite three of these principles that are particularly pertinent to the imputation of income by the Court to the father: ... 1. General Duty to Work. There is a duty to seek employment where a parent is healthy and can work. A parent’s limited work experience or job skills do not justify a failure to pursue lower skilled employment or employment in which the necessary skills can be learned on the job.

While this may mean a job at the lower end of the wage scale, parents cannot refuse to take reasonable steps to support their children simply because they cannot obtain interesting or highly paid employment. Nor can a high-earning or highly skilled parent refuse employment indefinitely by holding out for employment commensurate with their skills and previous level of earning, job title or seniority. 2. Earning Capacity Used to Assess Reasonableness. When determining whether to impute income on the basis of under-employment or unemployment, a court must consider what is reasonable in the circumstances.

The starting point is the payor’s earning capacity, which is the objective measure by which the reasonableness of the parent’s decision or conduct is assessed. Earning capacity is determined based on factors like age, education, experience, skills, and health of the payor, along with availability of work, the freedom to relocate, and other obligations. *** 4. Obligation to Support Children is the Overarching Goal. The reasons for under-employment or unemployment must be objectively scrutinized.

A parent is required to act in a manner reflective of his or her obligations and cannot be excused from support obligations in furtherance of unrealistic, unproductive or non-remunerative career aspirations. Persistence in unremunerative employment or repeated education initiatives may also entitle the court to impute income. Parental self-fulfillment is a consideration but does not trump child support requirements. [ 50 ] In the past, the father has been enrolled in colleges and at university in Calgary and Lethbridge, in general studies, and in Mount Royal College in Calgary in a financial planning course.

However, he never completed any of these courses of study to obtain a degree. Still, I find that he had and continues to have the capacity to be engaged in gainful employment, either full time or part time, at the relatively modest levels of income that he has reported since separation. He asserts that he was no longer working because he stayed at home to care for the children. However, there was no evidence led as to what expenses would need to be incurred for child care if the father continued to be employed.

There is no medical evidence of any health condition that would prevent him from pursuing gainful employment. As stated previously, the Court has no evidence as to the actual income level of Wendy, the mother of their two children, or the actual or potential financial support that could be obtained from the father’s parents. There is no concrete evidence of any job search that the father has made since 2014. I conclude that he has chosen not to be employed, in order to avoid his moral and legal obligation to pay child support.

I conclude that income must be imputed to the father in the amount of $37,000 from 2014 to 2022. [ 51 ] With respect to the

section 7 expenses being claimed by the mother, the father asserts that he has not received receipts to verify the amounts being claimed. However, at no point before his application did he request copies of

section 7 expense receipts. The mother states that she has not retained receipts going back over the 15 years of separation from the father. She submits, and I agree, that she should not be penalized for failing to retain copies of this documentation over this span of years. The father cannot, in this regard, take advantage of his failure to ever request

section 7 documentation, and the delay in bringing his application in December 2021. The fact is that the mother has incurred

section 7 expenses in relation to the children throughout the period of separation, and these must be taken into account in quantifying the arrears. Calculation of Arrears [ 52 ] The mother has made a detailed calculation of the retroactive

section 3 child support and

section 7 expenses owed by the father, which is appended to these reasons for decision as

Schedule A. I find that the data supporting these calculations are supported by the evidence. The calculations conclude as follows: Father’s

Section 3 Payments $ 95,338.00 Father’s Proportionate Share of

Section 7 expenses $113,164.74 Father’s Payments of

Section 3 &

Section 7 expenses $104,647.05 Balance Payable to the mother $103,856.13 [ 53 ] This total does not include interest or penalties as assessed by MEP. Conclusion [ 54 ] In conclusion, the application by the father, Kent Roy Patrick, is dismissed. The cross-application by the mother, Kerrie Catherine Shumate, is allowed. I find that the total arrears, from the date of separation to the first six months of 2022, for

section 3 and

section 7 expenses payable by the father to the mother, is $103,856.13.

[ 55 ] I also order that Rebecca continues to be a “child of the marriage” as defined by s 2(1)(

b) of the Divorce Act . The sum of $302 per month for

section 3 child support from August 2022 are payable to the mother by the father together with 55.22% of ongoing

section 7 expenses relating to Rebecca. [ 56 ] The mother is entitled to the costs of the application by the father as well as the costs of her cross-application, under Column 2 of

Schedule C of the Rules of Court . These costs are to be assessed upon appointment by the assessment officer, pursuant to R 10.36 and 10.37. Heard on the 28 th day of June, 2022. Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 22 nd day of February, 2023. James T. Neilson J.C.K.B.A. Appearances: Deborah L. Baradziej for the Plaintiff, Cross-Applicant Nicholas Urie for the Defendant/Applicant

Schedule “A” CALCULATIONS OF RETROACTIVE

SECTION 3 CHILD SUPPORT AND

SECTION 7 EXPENSES OWED BY FATHER Retroactive

section 3 child support based on Father's actual income for 2008-2010 and imputing income to the Father from 2014 to present: *2007, and 2011-2013 are calculated in accordance with the Clackson Order, and are in grey. Line 150 Income Monthly s.3 S. 3 payable for the year by the Father 2007 $33,800.00 $489.00 $5.868.00 2008 $50,462.00 $726.00 $8,712.00 2009 $59,266.00 $855.00 $10,260.00 2010 $58,733.00 $848.00 $10,176.00

2011 $33,800.00 $489.00 $5,868.00 2012 $33,800.00 $489.00 $5,868.00 2013 $33,800.00 $489.00 $5,868.00 2014 $37,000.00 $519.00 $6,228.00 2015 $37,000.00 $519.00 $6,228.00 2016 $37,000.00 $519.00 $6,228.00 2017 $37,000.00 $519.00 x 11 $547 x 1 $6,256.00 2018 – 6 months 2 children $37,000.00 $547.00 x 6 $3,282.00 2018 - 6 months 1 child $302.00 x 6 $1,812.00 2019 $37,000.00 $302.00 $3,624.00 2020 $37,000.00 $302.00 $3,624.00 2021 $37,000.00 $302.00 $3,624.00 2022 – 6 mons. $37,000.00 $302.00 $1,812.00 Total s. 3 arrears $95,338.00

Section 7 expenses incurred by the Mother - adjustments to childcare as done by MEP *Rebecca's extracurricular activities were set at $763.56 and Adam's were set at $549.96 per year. *Nanny expenses for Adam until June 30, 2012, and for Rebecca until June 30, 2017 as assessed by MEP.

Thereafter, Rebecca's childcare is set at $250.00 per month for supervision while the Mother is not present Childcare per year Health related expenses per year Extracurricular expenses per year Total s.7 expenses for the year 2007 $19,812.00 $300.00 $1,313.52 $21,425.52 2008 $19,812.00 $300.00 $1,313.52 $21,425.52 2009 $19,812.00 $300.00 $1,313.52 $21,425.52 2010 $19,812.00 $300.00 $1,313.52 $21,425.52 2011 $19,812.00 $300.00 $1,313.52 $21,425.52 2012 – first 6 months $9,906.00 $150.00 $656.76 $10,712.76 2012 – last 6 months Adam is 12 $4,954.00 $150.00 $656.76 $5,760.76 2013 $9,906.00 $300.00 $1,313.52 $11,519.52 2014 $9,906.00 $300.00 $1,313.52 $11,519.52 2015 $9,906.00 $300.00 $1,313.52 $11,519.52 2016 $9,906.00 $300.00 $1,313.52 $11,519.52 2017 – first 6 months $4,954.00 $150.00 $656.76 $5,760.76 2017 – no more nanny $1,500.00 $150.00 $656.76 $2,306.76 2018 – 6 months - 2 children $1,500.00 $150.00 $656.76 $2,306.76 2018 - 6 months 1 child $1,500.00 $150.00 $381.78 $2,031.78 2019 $3,000.00 $300.00 $1,313.52 $4,063.56 2020 $3,000.00 $300.00 $1,313.52 $4,063.56 2021 $3,000.00 $300.00 $1,313.52 $4,063.56 2022 – 6 months $1,500.00 $150.00 $381.78 $2,031.78 Total $196,307.72 Father's proportionate share of

section 7 expenses based on Father's actual income for 2008-2010 and imputing income to the Father from 2014 to present-adjustments to childcare as done by MEP *Proportionate share as set out in Clackson Order used in 2007, and 2011-2013.

*Nanny expenses for Adam until June 30, 2012, and for Rebecca until June 30, 2017 as assessed by l\IBP. Thereafter, Rebecca's childcare is set at $250.00 per month for supervision while the Mother is not present Father’s % share Total

Section 7 expenses Father’s proportionate share 2007 52.98% $21,425.52 $11,351.24 2008 62.72% $21,425.52 $13,438.09 2009 66.39% $21,425.52 $14,224.40 2010 66.19% $21,425.52 $14,181.55 2011 52.98% $21,425.52 $11,351.24 2012 – 6 months 52.98% $10,712.76 $5,675.62 2012 – Ais 12 52.98% $5,760.76 $3,052.05 2013 52.98% $11,519.52 $6,103.04 2014 55.22% $11,519.52 $6,361.08 2015 55.22% $11,519.52 $6,361.08 2016 55.22% $11,519.52 $6,361.08 2017 – first 6 months 55.22% $5,760.76 $3,181.09 2017 – no more nanny 55.22% $2,306.76 $1,273.79 2018 2 children 55.22% $2,306.76 $1,273.79 2018 1 child 55.22% $2,031.78 $1,121.95 2019 55.22% $4,063.56 $2,243.90 2020 55.22% $4,063.56 $2,243.90 2021 55.22% $4,063.56 $2,243.90 2022 – 6 mos. 55.22% $2,031.78 $1,121.95 Total $113,164.74 Total

Section 3 and

Section 7 expenses payable minus amounts paid by the Father Father’s

section 3 payments Father's proportionate share amount of

section 7 expenses Father's payments of

section 3 and

section 7 expenses Balance payable to the Mother 2007 $5,868.00 $11,351.24 $5,386.00 $11,833.24 2008 $8,712.00 $13,438.09 $11,627.95 $10,522.14 2009 $10,260.00 $14,224.40 $21,717.24 $2,767.16 2010 $10,176.00 $14,181.55 $22,120.99 $2,236.56 2011 $5,868.00 $11,351.24 $10,051.17 $7,168.24 2012 – 6 months $5,868.00 $5,675.62 $8,459.27 $3,084.62 2012 – Ais 12 $3,052.05 $3,052.05 2013 $5,868.00 $6,103.04 $20,471.48 ($8,500.44) 2014 $6,228.00 $6,361.08 $3,110.79 $9,478.29 2015 $6,228.00 $6,361.08 0 $12,589.08 2016 $6,228.00 $6,361.08 $l,702.16 (garnisheed) $10,886.92 2017 – first 6 months $6,256.00 $3,181.09 $9,437.09 2017 – no more nanny $l,273.79 $1,273.79 2018 2 children $3,282.00 $l,273.79 $4,555.79 2018 1 child $1,812.00 $1,121.95 $2,933.95 2019 $3,624.00 $2,243.90 $5,867.90 2020 $3,624.00 $2,243.90 $5,867.90 2021 $3,624.00 $2,243.90 $5,867.90 2022 – 6 mos. $1,812.00 $1,121.95 $2,933.95 Total arrears $95,338.00 $113,164.74 $104,647.05 $103,856.13* *Total does not include interest or penalties as assessed by MEP.