Caron v Caron, 2023 ABKB 285

Court of King’s Bench of Alberta Citation: Caron v Caron, 2023 ABKB 285 Date: 20230509 Docket: 4803 152327 Registry: Edmonton Between: Hector Gaston Joseph Caron Applicant - and - Sally Marie Caron Respondent _______________________________________________________ Reasons for Decision of the Honourable Justice D.A. Yungwirth _______________________________________________________ Introduction [ 1 ] This is an application by Mr. Caron to vary spousal support arising from a long-term marriage based on his intended retirement.

He also seeks a retroactive cancellation or reduction of spousal support and a reduction or termination of ongoing spousal support. [ 2 ] Many issues are raised in an application of this type, including issues related to material change, entitlement, whether the retirement can be considered “early retirement”, the impact of pension division, whether the application must be brought before or after retirement, and obligations of the recipient spouse. [ 3 ] As with all applications of this type, the history of the matter and circumstances of each of the parties must be clearly understood.

History and Current Circumstances of the Parties [ 4 ] The parties were in a traditional marriage for approximately 34 years when they separated in early 2010. They had two children, both independent adults by the time the parties separated. [ 5 ] A Statement of Claim for Divorce and Division of Matrimonial Property was filed by Mr. Caron on February 17, 2010. A Statement of Defence and Counterclaim were filed by Ms. Caron on March 5, 2010. [ 6 ] The first application for interim relief was filed by Ms. Caron on April 16, 2010. She was seeking “pre-disclosure spousal support”.

The evidence provided in support of that application indicated that Ms. Caron had not been employed outside the home for 32 years and that Mr. Caron had worked as a welder since 1978. Ms. Caron did basic bookkeeping for Caron Welding Inc., which provided the only source of income for both parties. At the time of the Application, Ms. Caron’s evidence was that she had no marketable skills and that she also had health issues, including osteoarthritis, and back pain. She disclosed that Mr.

Caron also had some health issues, including a diagnosis of bipolar disorder in 2000. [ 7 ] On June 1, 2010, an interim Consent Order of Manderscheid J granted interim spousal support to Ms. Caron in the sum of $3,500 per month commencing June 1, 2010. Both parties had Counsel at that time. The Order does not indicate the incomes upon which the Spousal Support Order was based. [ 8 ] Though there were several other applications during the course of the divorce and property litigation, I will focus mainly on those that relate to spousal support. [ 9 ] In a February 14, 2011, Affidavit, Ms. Caron deposed that Mr.

Caron had not been paying all the spousal support that he was ordered to pay and that, at that point, he was $4,000 in arrears. [ 10 ] By March of 2011, Mr. Caron was seeking a reduction in spousal support due to his actual income being less than that on which the $3,500 per month was based. He claimed that the June 1, 2010, Spousal Support Order was based on his 2009 income of $144,896 and provided copies of his tax returns for 2007 and 2008 showing income of $123,912 and $98,179 respectively. It is not clear that Mr. Caron had disclosed those tax returns before the June 1, 2010, Order was made.

The April 1, 2011, Consent Order of Ross J addressed property issues and did not change spousal support. The August 19, 2011, Order of Macklin J also did not change spousal support. [ 11 ] On September 15, 2015, and again on February 29, 2016, Ms. Caron was given leave to

schedule the matter for trial. The trial was scheduled for March 27, 2017, for 5 days. It proceeded as scheduled before Nielsen J (as he then was). At the date of trial, Mr. Caron was in arrears in the payment of spousal support in the amount of $6,478.96 (as shown in the Maintenance Enforcement Program statement balance on March 15, 2017). [ 12 ] At the conclusion of the trial on March 31, 2017, Nielsen J divided the matrimonial property. He set Mr. Caron’s income for spousal support purposes, at $125,000 per annum. He ordered Mr. Caron to pay spousal support of $4,250 per month commencing May 1, 2017.

Paragraph 4 of his decision provided that the spousal support should be reviewed upon Mr. Caron ceasing to be gainfully employed, and earlier if there was a change of circumstances. The Divorce and Matrimonial Property Division Judgment identified two pensions in which Mr. Caron had an interest. Those pensions were to be divided equally for the joint accrual period. [ 13 ] On June 28, 2018, Mr. Caron filed an application to stay enforcement of spousal support, cancel arrears, and terminate spousal support. He based his application on a decrease in income and a lack of adequate employment.

By that point, his drivers’ licence had been suspended by the Director of Maintenance Enforcement. Ms. Caron’s Affidavit in response to that application indicated that as of August 23, 2018, the arrears of spousal support were $81,560.79. This is an indication that following the trial, not very much of the ordered spousal support was paid, because the arrears of spousal support increased by approximately $75,000 in the 16 months following the trial. [ 14 ] In her August 29, 2018, Response Affidavit, Ms. Caron indicated that because of Mr.

Caron not paying his spousal support, she was forced to live on income security from the Government of Alberta ($614/month) and CPP ($175/month), which caused her severe financial hardship. [ 15 ] On October 4, 2018, Browne J granted an Order setting the matter for special chambers on April 12, 2019, and staying the spousal support provision of Nielsen J’s March 31, 2017, Judgment on condition that Mr. Caron pay $200 per month to Ms. Caron commencing November 1, 2018. [ 16 ] When the matter came before me on April 12, 2019, I granted an Order setting Mr. Caron’s income at $60,000 and Ms.

Caron’s income at $11,000 on a pre-disclosure basis. I continued the stay on Nielsen J’s Judgment of March 31, 2017, but increased the monthly payment amount required to be made by Mr. Caron to Ms. Caron, to $1,500. [ 17 ] I also ordered that the parties proceed with the division of Canada Pension Plan (CPP) credits and the finalization of the division of Mr. Caron’s Edmonton Pipe Industry Pension and UA Canadian Pipeline Industry National Pension, none of which had been divided in the two years since Nielsen J’s Judgment.

I remained seized with the matter and directed that the further hearing of the matter would continue in special family chambers only after Mr. Caron had provided his 2017 and 2018 tax returns and financial statements for Caron Welding Inc., and the pension division orders had been filed. Proper disclosure had been an ongoing issue in this matter. [ 18 ] The Edmonton Pipe Industry Pension Plan Division Order was granted and filed on May 1, 2019.

The Canadian Pipeline Industry National Pension Plan Division Order was granted on December 9, 2019 and filed on December 10, 2019. [ 19 ] The matter came back before me on October 23, 2020, with a request for continuation of the special chamber’s application. Both parties had Counsel at that time. I granted an Order requiring disclosure of specified financial information by both parties by

November 30, 2020 and said that once that disclosure had been provided, the continuation of Mr. Caron’s Application was to be scheduled. By that point, Mr. Caron had still not disclosed his tax returns and Notices of Assessment for 2017 and 2018. In addition, both parties were ordered to disclose their 2019 tax returns and other information, including monthly budgets, and sworn statements of income, assets, and liabilities. The Order included a provision that once the ordered disclosure was provided, the continuation of Mr. Caron’s Application could proceed. [ 20 ] On May 20, 2022, Mr.

Caron filed a Notice to Attend Family Docket Court seeking to vary spousal support. He was seeking to proceed with essentially the same application that he had originally filed on June 28, 2018. The matter was sent to family chambers on July 21, 2022, with filing deadlines set. [ 21 ] On July 11, 2022, Mr. Caron filed an Urgent Request Form, seeking a Fiat to file his Application and Affidavit. [ 22 ] In her responding Affidavit, Ms. Caron pointed out that I was seized with the matter and attached a creditor

summary from the Director of Maintenance Enforcement indicating that as of the end of 2021, Mr. Caron was in arrears of spousal support in the sum of $94,068.18. [ 23 ] On August 18, 2022, the matter came before Davidson J in family chambers, and he gave leave to

schedule a special chambers application and stayed enforcement of ongoing spousal support for 4 months. [ 24 ] A Disclosure Statement was filed by Mr. Caron on January 16, 2023. [ 25 ] Mr. Caron’s Application was finally heard by me on February 9, 2023. A new application was filed on January 16, 2023, seeking to reduce or rescind spousal support arrears and terminate or vary ongoing spousal support. A stay of enforcement was also sought. [ 26 ] For the Application, Mr. Caron filed an Affidavit on January 16, 2023, and Ms.

Caron filed a Responding Affidavit on January 17, 2023. [ 27 ] After reading the Affidavits and hearing submissions from Counsel, it appeared clear that a decision could not be made without supplementary affidavits from each party, as the Court was not provided with the exact details of the pension income being received by each party, nor an indication of any other sources of income, nor an indication of the assets of each party. [ 28 ] In addition, though both parties claimed to have health issues, there was no direct medical evidence provided in this regard.

To address this, the parties agreed through Counsel on February 9, 2023, that they were both satisfied to have the Court rely on what had already been provided by each party for medical evidence so that they did not have to incur the additional costs of obtaining affidavits from their respective doctors. [ 29 ] In this regard, I note that Ms. Caron suffers from hypertension, chronic low back pain, knee pain secondary to generalized osteoarthritis, generalized anxiety disorder with depression, and chronic insomnia. Her doctor’s opinion is that Ms.

Caron is not capable of full-time gainful employment “now or in the foreseeable future.” (from August 27, 2017 letter attached to August 15, 2022 Affidavit) [ 30 ] Mr. Caron suffers from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, arthritis, and arrhythmia for which he takes blood thinners and heart medication. [ 31 ] Mr. Caron was directed to provide his Supplementary Affidavit and 3 pages of Submissions by March 1, 2023 and Ms. Caron was directed to provide her Supplementary Affidavit and 3 pages of Submissions by March 8, 2023.

Analysis [ 32 ] The Spousal Support Order sought to be varied, is the Judgment of Nielsen J granted March 31, 2017. All Orders related to spousal support since Mr. Caron first filed his Application were either pre-disclosure orders, or orders for stays of enforcement which required payment of set amounts of support as a condition of the continued stays of enforcement. [ 33 ] Though the March 31, 2017, Judgment itself does not indicate the basis for the spousal support granted, it appears clear from the evidence provided, that spousal support was awarded on both a compensatory and non-compensatory basis. Ms.

Caron was out of the work force for 32 years of a 34-year traditional marriage. She has health issues, and it appears that she has worked little, if any, since the separation in 2010. Mr. Caron has worked as a welder since 1978 and continues to work as a welder at the time of this application, though, as indicated above, there is evidence that he has health issues. He says that he wishes to retire but wants his spousal support application dealt with so that he can make plans in this regard. [ 34 ] Ms. Caron is 65 years of age (66 on July 26, 2023). Mr.

Caron is 69 year of age (70 on July 19, 2023) Applicable Legal Principles [ 35 ] As the parties were married, the applicable legislation is the Divorce Act , RSC, 1985, c.3 (2 nd Supp .) (the Act ). [ 36 ]

Section 17 of the Act allows a Court to make an order varying spousal support retroactively or prospectively. Subsections (4.1) and (7) must be considered. They provide:

(4.1) Before the court makes a variation order in respect of a spousal support order, the court shall satisfy itself that a change in the condition, means, needs or other circumstances of either former spouse has occurred since the making of the spousal support order or the last variation order made in respect of that order, and, in making the variation order, the court shall take that change into consideration.

(7) A variation order varying a spousal support order should (

a) recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the former spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown; (

b) apportion between the former spouses any financial consequences arising from the care of any child of the marriage over and aboveany obligation for the support of any child of the marriage; (

c) relieve any economic hardship of the former spouses arising from the breakdown of the marriage; and (

d) in so far as practicable, promote the economic self-sufficiency of each former spouse within a reasonable period of time. [37] The approach to be followed is that set out in Willick v Willick, (SCC), [1994] 3 SCR 670. One must firstdetermine if the conditions for variation exist. If they do exist, one must determine what variation of the existing order ought to be madein light of the change in circumstances.

Once the threshold is passed, if the variation application is related to spousal/partner support, theCourt must consider the four objectives of spousal support enumerated in s. 17(7) of the Divorce Act. [38] The case of LMP v LS, 2011 SCC 64 (paras 30-48), confirmed the approach set out in Willick, that a material change means achange which, if known at the time, would likely have resulted in different terms. The change must be substantial, continuing, and notconsidered in the prior order. The onus is on the party seeking a variation to establish such a change.

The use of the terms “foreseeable”or “foreseen” in reference to when the previous order was granted should be avoided. Circumstances such as retirement are alwaysforeseeable but are often not considered in the previous order. Mr. Caron was already 64 when the 2017 Judgment of Nielsen J wasmade. Issue 1: Has there been a material change in circumstances? [39] A threshold issue affecting material change, is whether the application is premature because Mr. Caron has not yet retired.This issue was considered by the Ontario Court of Appeal in the case of Schulstad v Schulstad, 2017 ONCA 95.

That case involved along-term traditional marriage. The applicant was a surgeon who was 69 years of age and applied 2.5 years before his planned retirementto reduce his spousal support obligations and terminate them at his anticipated retirement date. The Court found that there was sufficientevidence to enable the Court to conclude that the applicant’s retirement was a certainty and that there was also sufficient evidenceregarding the parties’ respective incomes and assets to enable the Court to reach a decision on whether the application was premature.

Iadopt the reasoning set out in para 21 of that decision: [21] The issue of prematurity is an issue at the first stage of the Willick analysis. In other words, prematurity is an issue impactingthe threshold question of whether or not there has been a material change in circumstances. It is well-established that any decision to varymust not be made in accordance with events which may or may not occur: Messier v. Delage, (SCC), [1983] 2 S.C.R.401, at p. 416.

An application to vary will be premature if based on speculative or uncertain changes in circumstances: Dufresne v.Dufresne, 2009 ONCA 682. [40] I also adopt the caution set out in para 28 of the decision: [28] In most cases, such an application so far in advance of the alleged material change in circumstances will run counter to thefundamental principle articulated in both legislation and jurisprudence that a material change must have already occurred in order for acourt to have jurisdiction to vary a final order.

This is because there is a real likelihood that the financial disclosure and other evidence insupport of an alleged material change in circumstances will be speculative due to its prematurity. Encouraging premature, speculativeapplications to vary, which lack the necessary solid and certain evidentiary foundation, will simply increase the already extremely highcosts of litigation in family law proceedings. [41] In this case, Mr. Caron has not retired. In fact, in 2022, he earned almost $86,000 as a welder. However, he is 69 years of ageand has health issues.

He says that these health issues are becoming worse as he gets older due to the physical demands of his work as awelder. He says that he wishes to retire but wants to know what his spousal support obligation will be if he retires. He wants to get hisaffairs in order for his retirement. [42] Mr. Caron has not set his retirement date. There is also no evidence that he has given notice to any present or prospectiveemployer regarding his intended retirement date.

Given his current circumstances and the uncertainty of his future spousal supportobligation and his obligations regarding the arrears of spousal support, this is reasonable. He did begin collecting his union pensions andold age security benefits in 2018, which would signal a move toward retirement. He has also started receiving his Canada Pension Planbenefits.

There is also evidence that his overall circumstances, including his debt load, a bankruptcy in 2018, and his spousal supportobligations (including ongoing garnishees by MEP) have required him to continue to work. [43] The Court has been provided with evidence of the parties’ respective incomes and assets at present and upon Mr. Caron’sretirement. [44] Currently, Mr. Caron’s evidence is that due to his years working as a welder, he suffers from chronic obstructive pulmonarydisease, arthritis and arrhythmia, for which he takes blood thinners and heart medications.

He says that he will not be able to work as awelder much longer due to his age and health issues. [45] I find that Mr. Caron’s advancing age, his worsening health issues, and his desire to retire, when considered together,constitute a material change in circumstances. I am satisfied that Mr. Caron has provided sufficient evidence to allow the Court toconclude that his retirement is a certainty and to permit the Court to make a proper analysis of the circumstances of the parties in light ofthat retirement. [46] Accordingly, the Court is satisfied that there has been a material change in Mr.

Caron’s circumstances since the granting of

the March 31, 2017, Spousal Support Order. Issue 2: What variation of the existing order ought to be made in light of the change in circumstances? [ 47 ] When considering spousal support principles, including those listed in subsection 17(7) of the Act , there can be no doubt that Ms. Caron continues to be entitled to spousal support on both a compensatory and non-compensatory basis. Though the parties separated about 13 years ago in 2010, she continues to suffer the economic disadvantages of having been out of the work force for 32 of the 34 years that the parties were married. In addition, because Mr.

Caron did not pay the spousal support that had been ordered (he paid only $1,856.48 in 2018 and $9,978 in 2019), Ms. Caron has also continued to suffer the economic disadvantages arising from the breakdown of the marriage. She continues to remain in financial need. [ 48 ] The Court’s focus will therefore turn to the circumstances of the parties. [ 49 ] From his T1General Total Income amounts, Mr.

Caron’s income was as follows: 2017 indicates total income of $48,319 ($47,981 employment income) 2018 indicates total income of $54,767 ($45,307 from employment income with balance from CPP, OAS and pensions) 2019 indicates total income of $90,079 ($53,089 from employment income and balance from CPP, OAS and pensions) 2020 indicates total income of $107,574 ($59,121 from employment income, $20,000 from Covid benefits, and balance from CPP, OAS, and pensions) 2021 indicates total income of $68,705 ($23,500 from employment income, $17,400 from Covid benefits, and balance from CPP, OAS, and pensions) In 2022, Mr.

Caron earned $115,402 ($85,792 from employment, and balance from CPP, OAS, and pensions) [ 50 ] In his Disclosure Statement sworn January 9, 2023, Mr. Caron says he expects his income this year to be $25,000. He says that his income consists of CPP, Old Age Security, Union Pension, and his work with Priority Projects. [ 51 ] Regarding his work history since separation and the decrease in his income since the March 2017 trial, Mr.

Caron’s evidence is that: - He Operated under Caron Welding Inc from 2005 to 2010; - His welding truck was stolen in 2018; - After his truck was stolen, he worked as a salaried employee on a contract basis; - 2018, he started collecting his CPP, OAS and union pension; - He had difficulty maintaining steady employment due to his age and the Alberta economy over last several years; and - He had a good year in 2020, due to his name coming up in rotation through the registered union members, but this only happens once every 3 to 4 years. [ 52 ] Ms.

Caron’s income as indicated in her T1General Total Income amounts was as follows: 2017 - $16,937 ($14,037.09 support, $344.88 CPP, $2,454 Social Assistance, $101.30 other) 2018 - $7,968.05 ($1,856.48 support, $1,400.24 CPP, $4,711.33 Social Assistance) 2019 - $23,580 ($9,978.11 support, $6,747.72 RRSP’s, $4,906.42 CPP, $1,948 Social Assistance) 2020 - $44,974 ($20,568.74 support. $6,749 RRSP’s and $12,000 “other”) 2021 - $31,581 ($13,268.77 support and $12,600 RRSP’s, $5,713 CPP) 2022 - $9,902 (OAS, CPP, and LIF plus $24,723 support) [ 53 ] The incomes, amount paid and amounts that should have been paid since 2017, based on the actual incomes of the parties is set out in the chart below.

Mr. Caron’s income Ms. Caron’s income (excluding support) Amount of support paid Amount of support that should have been paid* Balance owing

2017 125,000 (set by order) Actual $48,319 2,900 14,037.09 1,594/mo for 12 mos $19,128 less $14,037.09 is $5,091 2018 $54,767 6,111 1,856.48 1,753/mo for 12 mos $21,036 less $1,856.48 is $19,180 2019 90,079 6,854 (excludes RRSP’s) 9,978 2,997/mo for 12 mos $35,964 less $9,978 is $25,986 2020 87,574 (excludes Covid benefits) 17,656 (excludes RRSP’s) 20,468 2,523/mo for 12 mos $30,276 less $20,468 is $9,808 2021 51,305 (excludes Covid benefits) 5,713 13,268 1,643/mo for 12 mos $19,716 less $13,268 is $6,448 2022 115,402 9,902 24,723 3,754/mo for 12 mos $45,048 less $24,723 is $20,325 *mid-point of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines [ 54 ] Over the years (both before and after the 2017 trial), Mr.

Caron has not been diligent in providing his disclosure and this may have been why his income at trial was set at $125,000 at trial. [ 55 ] The total amount that should have been paid less the amounts paid for the years 2017 through 2022 is $86,838 . This is only slightly less than the arrears amount indicated with the Director of Maintenance Enforcement. However, the MEP statements reflect what was ordered as conditions of the stays granted and not the accumulation of support required by the Order of Nielsen J.

The amount that he should have paid under the Order of Nielsen J is $4,250 for 71 months (to and including March 2023). This equals $301,750 less what he paid ($84,330.57) for a balance of $217,419.43 owing. If one adds the arrears that he had at the date of trial ($6,478.96), that amount increases to $223,898.39.

So, the effect of setting the arrears at $86,838 is that the actual arrears of support pursuant to the Judgment of Nielsen J are being reduced by $137,060.39. [ 56 ] The $86,838 referenced above is therefore a considerable reduction from the amount ordered in 2017 and it reflects a fair amount that should have been paid since the beginning of 2017. [ 57 ] This amount would have been received by Ms. Caron and improved her circumstances had it been paid. [ 58 ] Mr.

Caron can not have the benefit of reducing the amount of spousal support he was ordered to pay while not considering what he should have paid throughout this period. [ 59 ] There was not one year since 2017 when Mr. Caron paid what he should have paid to Ms. Caron for spousal support, given this long-term traditional marriage. [ 60 ] I point out that Mr.

Caron has been given a benefit by using the mid-range of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, because with a marriage of this length, an argument could be made that the high range of those Guidelines should be used. [ 61 ] It is not appropriate to cancel the spousal support because of Mr. Caron’s obligation to Ms. Caron arising from this 34-year traditional marriage. Therefore, I set his retroactive spousal support amount at $86,838. As long as he is employed, he will contribute $500 per month to these arrears in addition to any ongoing spousal support payment.

When he is no longer working at all, he will pay $75 per month to these arrears in addition to any ongoing spousal support payment he may have. The obligation to pay the arrears of spousal support will be binding on his estate. [ 62 ] The Court moves now to a consideration of the ongoing spousal support amount, commencing January 1, 2023. [ 63 ] The parties have no property to speak of. The pensions were the main asset remaining from the marriage at the time Mr. Caron filed the current application. Mr. Caron has alleged in his various affidavits, that Ms.

Caron took money from the marriage accounts, but she denies this, and Mr. Caron has provided no evidence to substantiate the allegation. [ 64 ] Now that the CPP credits and the two pensions of Mr. Caron have been divided between the parties, the pension incomes to be received by each party are as follows: [ 65 ] Mr. Caron receives CPP of $844.62, pension income of $487.86, OAS of $685.50/month (based on Mr. Caron’s evidence that he gets a similar amount to that received by Ms. Caron), for a total of $2,017.98/month or $24,215.76 annually. [ 66 ] Ms.

Caron receives $60.04/month from her LIF (set up when she received her share of Mr. Caron’s union pension), $476.10 per month from CPP, and $685.50 from her OAS. These total $1,234.49 per month or $14,813.88 annually.

[ 67 ] If the parties have no employment income and the above total income amounts are used, the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines indicates a monthly payment at the mid-range, of $328. [ 68 ] The issue of “double dipping has been raised by Mr. Caron because his pensions have been divided and his share of the pension income has been considered in the ongoing spousal support calculations. In this regard, I note the following: [ 69 ] For Mr.

Caron’s Edmonton Pipe Industry Pension interest, as of November 1, 2019, his gross payment was reduced from $563.70 to $473.65 (it was then increased in March 2020 to $487.86). This results in a reduction of only 15.97% of his monthly benefit as a result of the division with Ms. Caron. Mr. Caron’s CPP benefits were reduced from $1,091.99 to $844 as a result of the division of CPP credits with Ms. Caron. This is a reduction of about 23%. It appears from the evidence provided by Mr. Caron, that Ms. Caron did not receive half of his total CPP and pension benefits. [ 70 ] For Ms.

Caron, she received $18,660.89 from one pension and it went into a LIF that is generating $60.04 per month. She received $18,653.64 in RRSP’s from the other pension, and she withdrew $12,600 from that RRSP on November 26, 2021, for living expenses. Had Mr. Caron paid the spousal support that he should have paid, this withdrawal may not have been necessary. [ 71 ] To the extent that there may be double recovery in this case, it is justified based on Ms. Caron’s ongoing need.

This is one of the exceptions recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada in Boston v Boston , 2001 SCC 43 , at para 65 and confirmed by the Alberta Court of Appeal in Bone v Bone , 2020 ABCA 323 , at para 31 . [ 72 ] Another argument made by Mr. Caron is that his skills and choice to continue to work beyond age 65 are not related to any contribution made by the recipient during the marriage and therefore, his continued income from employment should not be considered as a basis for continued compensatory spousal support.

This argument fails to recognize that in a long-term traditional marriage like this one, the circumstances of the parties as related to the contributions that each made during the marriage, are intertwined. They each benefited from the contributions made by the other and continue to do so. It is therefore not reasonable for Mr. Caron to say that his ongoing ability to earn income is not related to the contributions that Ms. Caron made during the marriage. [ 73 ] As Mr.

Caron had not yet retired at the time that I heard this application, I must address the amount of ongoing spousal support he should pay if he continues to work after January 1, 2023, and following his receipt of this decision. It is too difficult to predict what he will earn, but he did indicate in his January 9, 2023, Disclosure Statement that he expects to earn income this year from his work with Priority Projects. [ 74 ] As indicated above, Mr. Caron’s income without any employment will be $24,215.76 annually.

He would have to earn less than $20,000 from employment before a mid-range spousal support payment of $1,000 per month would be unfair. [ 75 ] In

summary, for as long as he is working, Mr. Caron will pay spousal support of $1,000 per month, commencing January 1, 2023, and continuing on the first day of each month thereafter. In addition, he will pay the $500 per month toward arrears as indicated above. [ 76 ] When Mr. Caron retires and no longer has any employment income, his monthly spousal support obligation will drop to $328 per month commencing on the first day of the month after he retires from any employment and continuing on the first day of each month thereafter.

In addition, he will pay $75 per month toward his spousal support arrears commencing on the first day of the month after he retires from any employment and continuing on the first day of each month thereafter. [ 77 ] As indicated above, the spousal support arrears are set at $86,838. As long as Mr.

Caron pays his ongoing spousal support plus $500/month toward those arrears when he is working and $75/month toward those arrears when he is no longer working at all, there will be no enforcement proceedings taken on the support arrears amount. [ 78 ] I will remain seized with this matter only for the purpose of dealing with any mathematical errors that I may have made and to address costs. [ 79 ] Failing agreement on the issue of costs, costs may be spoken to within 45 days of the date of this decision. Heard on the 9 th day of February, 2023. Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 9th day of May, 2023.

D.A. Yungwirth J.C.K.B.A. Appearances: Robert M. Kassian for Mr. Caron

Chikwado Ezea for Ms. Caron