LaFrance v LaFrance, 2023 ABKB 665

Court of King’s Bench of Alberta Citation: LaFrance v LaFrance, 2023 ABKB 665 Date: 20231123 Docket: 4814 004844 Registry: St. Paul Between: Nigel Paul LaFrance Plaintiff - and - Kandus Rayleen LaFrance Defendant _______________________________________________________ Reasons for Decision of the Honourable Justice L.K. Harris _______________________________________________________ I. Introduction [ 1 ] The parties seek a divorce and a ruling on division of certain matrimonial property. This matter proceeded to trial November 14 – 16, 2023. [ 2 ] Nigel LaFrance and Kandus LaFrance were married in 2000.

They separated in early 2016. They have three children, two of whom are in college and the third still living at home. [ 3 ] At separation, the parties jointly owned businesses and property. Over the years, they have resolved the division of some of their joint property, but there are some assets which remain undivided, including the matrimonial home. They cannot agree on the value of the home, nor can they agree on what proportion of the overall value of the remaining assets each is entitled to.

II. Background [ 4 ] In the early stages of their marriage, the parties lived in a home which Mr. LaFrance had owned prior to their relationship. Both parties worked together in a business owned by the LaFrance family – a convenience store and liquor store in Elk Point, Alberta. As the years passed, the parties started their own businesses and purchased other properties in the Elk Point/St. Paul area. The pre- marital home owned by Mr. LaFrance was sold, and the sale proceeds were put towards building the matrimonial home, which they moved into in 2010. [ 5 ] At the time of separation, the parties’ business and real property interests included the following: (

a) KEC Investments Inc. (“KECI”) which owned a residential half-duplex, a strip mall, and a commercial building out of which they operated their Guardian Drugs business; (

b) KEC Real Estate Service Ltd. (“KECRE”) which owned and operated a Coldwell Banker Real Estate Brokerage. The Coldwell Banker Brokerage rented space in the strip mall owned by KECI; (

c) KEC Pharmaceutical Services Ltd. (“KECPS”) which owned and operated the Guardian Drugs; and (

d) The matrimonial home, a two-story rural residence in the St. Paul area. [ 6 ] KECPS employed a pharmacist, Chris Letawsky, to operate the pharmacy side of Guardian Drugs. The employment agreement between KECPS and Mr. Letawsky provided that after ten years of employment, Mr. Letawsky had the option to purchase the parties’ shares in KECPS. Further, Mr. Letawsky had a right of first refusal in the event the LaFrances received an offer to purchase from a third party. [ 7 ] During the marriage, Mr. and Ms.

LaFrance each owned 50% of the shares in each corporation and were both officers and directors of each corporation. They were both employees of KECPS. While they disagree on how much time each spent working at Guardian Drugs, they both participated in the operation of the drugstore, with Ms. LaFrance managing the front of the store and Mr. LaFrance overseeing the banking and accounting. Mr.

LaFrance had also obtained his real estate license and worked at the Coldwell Banker brokerage. [ 8 ] The parties agree that their date of separation is January 1, 2016. [ 9 ] Immediately following separation, the parties came to an agreement in relation to parenting and their economic interests. They would follow a one week-on, one week-off nesting arrangement, with the children remaining in the marital home and each of the parties rotating between that residence and the duplex in Elk Point. They would continue to be business partners, working at Guardian Drugs. [ 10 ] The nesting agreement did not last long.

While the parties differ on who took the initiative to terminate the nesting arrangement, the end result was that Ms. LaFrance rented a home in St. Paul commencing February 1, 2016, while Mr. LaFrance stayed in the marital home. [ 11 ] The parties’ agreement on their finances involved KECPS paying each $750 weekly for expenses relating to the mortgage, insurance, utilities and property taxes on the marital home, Ms. LaFrance’s rent at a cost of $1,400 per month, car payments, vehicle insurance, fuel and utilities, and Mr. LaFrance’s life insurance premium.

The parties would also each receive an additional $2,500 per month to cover other living expenses. [ 12 ] The $2,500 per month was increased in March 2017 to $3,000 by agreement. [ 13 ] Eventually, the parties’ business relationship also soured, although they disagree as to why. Ms. LaFrance testified that Mr. LaFrance made it very uncomfortable for her to be in the pharmacy, citing examples of poor behavior on the part of Mr. LaFrance, and so she decided in 2017 that it was better for the business and the staff for her to not be there. Mr. LaFrance complained that Ms.

LaFrance simply did not attend work, which compelled him to assume her usual duties, spending upwards of 120 hours per month at the store. He noted one instance of Ms. LaFrance not signing corporate cheques when asked until late in the day. In September 2019, Ms. LaFrance took employment as an Educational Assistant and held that position until it was terminated in June 2023. [ 14 ] Ms. LaFrance alleges that commencing January 1, 2021, Mr. LaFrance began taking increased monthly draws from KECPS of $5,500 without her consent. [ 15 ] By 2021, Mr. LaFrance realized that Mr.

Letawsky’s option to purchase was coming due. The parties agreed that it would be in their interest to solicit an offer from a third party to purchase KECPS. They retained a broker, who brought them an offer to purchase the shares of KECPS. Mr. Letawsky exercised his ROFR and purchased the shares of KECPS, as well as the Guardian Drugs building (which was owned by KECI).

The proceeds of sale amounted to $2.582 million (rounded). [ 16 ] The shares of KECPS were sold effective October 1, 2021, and the weekly and monthly draws each party was receiving from that business stopped. [ 17 ] The parties agreed to distribute the sale proceeds as follows: (a) $269,674.88 was used to retire the mortgage against the marital home; (b) $490,070.58 was used to retire a joint line of credit secured by the marital home;

(

c) On January 31, 2022, $100,000 was distributed to each of the parties; (

d) On June 21, 2022, $125,380.48 was distributed to each of the parties; (

e) On June 6, 2023, $80,000 was distributed to Ms. LaFrance to equalize the transfer of title of a number of jointly ownedvehicles to Mr. LaFrance; and (

f) On November 8, 2023, the remaining amount of $234,296 was distributed equally between the parties. [18] In January 2022, KECRE was amalgamated with KECI. One effect of that amalgamation was to eliminate a debt of $65,000owed by KECRE to KECI. Those funds had been advanced to KECRE to assist with the operation of Mr. LaFrance’s real estatebrokerage. [19] In 2022, the parties took steps needed to sell the duplex and the strip mall (owned by KECI). They obtained appraisals ofeach property. Mr. LaFrance negotiated the inclusion of a ROFR into the listing agreements for both properties.

Once offers werereceived, he exercised his ROFRs. The parties then reached an agreement in relation to their shares of KECI, which resulted in Mr.LaFrance retaining all of the shares of KECI and transferring half of the value of those shares, or $512,500, to a new corporation ownedby Ms. LaFrance, in a tax deferred manner. In this way, he retained ownership of both the duplex and the strip mall through KECI. [20] The only real property that remained to be divided at the time of trial was the marital home. There also remained a variety ofinvestments held by each party to be equalized.

Further, each party has debt, and it must be determined if that debt is matrimonial debtto be considered during the division of property. The parties disagree on the value of the marital home and disagree on their respectiveentitlements. Each takes the position that they are entitled to disproportionately more than the other. III. Legal Framework [21] Sections 7 and 8 of the Family Property Act, RSA 2000, c F-4.7 apply.

The relevant portions of s 7 are as follows: 7(1) The Court may, in accordance with this section, make a distribution between the spouses or adult interdependent partners of all theproperty owned by both spouses or adult interdependent partners and by each of them. …

(4) If the property being distributed is property acquired by a spouse during the marriage or during a relationship of interdependencewith the other spouse immediately before the marriage and is not property referred to in subsections (2) and (3), the Court shall distributethat property equally between the spouses unless it appears to the Court that it would not be just and equitable to do so, taking intoconsideration the matters in

section 8. [22]

Section 8 of the FPA sets out the many factors I must consider in making a distribution of family property under s 7 of theFPA and concludes by providing that I may consider any other fact or circumstance that is relevant. There is no formula for applying thes 8 factors: Jensen v Jensen, 2009 ABCA 272 at para 8. In short, I have wide discretion to determine if there should be an unequaldivision of matrimonial property between the spouses. Having said that, the courts are properly reluctant to interfere with the principleof equality on s 7(4) property.

It is open to the trial judge to do so, however, where equal division would be unjust and inequitable. Putanother way by Marion, J in Kuzuchar v Kuzuchar, 2023 ABKB 135 at para 33: Displacing the presumption of equal distribution through the court’s discretionary function is not reached lightly and should only berebutted in the “clearest of cases”.

There must be some real imbalance in each party’s contribution or as found in the factors listed, or aclear case of inequity because unequal distribution is the exception not the rule: Stuve at para 13; Jensen at paras 18-23; Mazurenko vMazurenko, 1981 ABCA 104 at para 20; LeBlanc v LeBlanc, (SCC), [1988] 1 S.C.R. 217, 47 D.L.R. (4th) 1 at 222-223. [23] It is well established in Alberta that matrimonial property is to be valued at the date of trial, not the date of separation:Hodgson v Hodgson, 2005 ABCA 13 at paras 9 and 10.

In determining matrimonial property, it is net matrimonial property that isconsidered, such that matrimonial assets are determined, matrimonial debts are determined, and the net amount is then distributed:Carmichael v Carmichael, 2007 ABCA 3 at para 21. [24] In Hodgson at para 18-21, the Alberta Court of Appeal summarized the four-step process to be followed to achieve a just andequitable division of the matrimonial property owned by the parties at the date of trial: • Step One: Determine all the property owned at the date of trial; • Step Two: Determine what property falls under s 7(2) (in this case, the parties have agreed that Mr.

LaFrance is entitled to a$50,000 exemption for the home owned prior to marriage, although there remains the question of some RRSPs of $30,328 which Mr.LaFrance alleges should also be exempt); • Step Three: Determine what property falls under s 7(3) (see above); and • Step Four: Divide the balance of the remaining property equally unless it would be unjust and inequitable to do so considering thefactors set out in s 8. [25] In addition to the matrimonial assets, I must consider the parties’ matrimonial debt, including post-separation debt, indetermining an equitable distribution of property.

In cases where there is post-separation debt, the treatment of such debt depends uponwho or what it benefited; if it did not benefit the other party, the matrimonial property, or the family, it is not divisible as matrimonial

debt: Boelman v Boelman , 2023 ABKB 159 at para 218 and cases cited. The Alberta Court of Appeal stated in Stuve v Stuve , 2019 ABCA 142 at para 34 : …The onus is on the party incurring debt after separation to demonstrate that the debt was used for the benefit of the family unit and not solely for the debtor's own purposes. If that cannot be established, s 8 of the MPA permits unequal distribution of the debt, including sole responsibility for the debt falling to the party that incurred it: Busenius v Busenius , 2006 ABQB 162 at paras 2 , 27, 29 ; Esquirol v Esquirol , 2018 ABQB 487 at para 39 . IV. Analysis a.

Divorce [ 26 ] I conclude that the parties are eligible for a divorce, having satisfied the requirements of s 8 of the Divorce Act , RSC 1985 c 3. There are no objections to a divorce judgment by the parties. I therefore grant them a divorce judgment on the ground that there has been a breakdown of their marriage. b. Matrimonial Home [ 27 ] Upon separation, the parties had a relatively complex financial picture with various corporate and real property holdings. At the time of trial, they had resolved a fair portion of the dispute over the division of matrimonial property.

The only remaining major asset to be divided was the matrimonial home. [ 28 ] The parties disagree as to the value of the matrimonial home for division purposes. [ 29 ] The home was built by the parties in 2009 – 2010. They agree that to replace the home now would cost in the range of $1.89 million. [ 30 ] After Ms. LaFrance moved out of the home, she resided in a series of rental accommodations, all of which were much smaller and older than the matrimonial home.

She struggled in finding appropriate accommodation that could also house the three children when they were with her and that was a reasonable distance from the children’s schools. She worried that the children would not want to live with her given the disparity in homes between her and Mr. LaFrance. She was forced to move several times due to the property owners either listing the properties for sale or deciding to move into the property themselves. While Ms.

LaFrance was receiving $1,400 per month from KCEPS prior to its sale in 2021 for the purposes of rent payments, she testified that her rent was usually higher. [ 31 ] Ms. LaFrance has re-partnered, and her boyfriend moved in with her for several months in 2019. She has recently moved into his home. While he was living with her, he paid for half of the rent. [ 32 ] Mr. LaFrance has lived continuously in the matrimonial home since February 1, 2016. Upon the sale of KCEPS, both parties agreed that some of the proceeds of sale would be used to retire the mortgage and line of credit secured by the property.

Since then, Mr. LaFrance has lived in the home mortgage-free, although he has continued to pay utilities, insurance, and property taxes on his own. He also provided some evidence that he has paid for certain maintenance items. [ 33 ] Mr. LaFrance has also re-partnered, and his girlfriend and her children have moved into the home although, it is not clear when this occurred. There is no evidence addressing whether she contributes to the household expenses or the upkeep of the home. [ 34 ] Ms. LaFrance testified that she has been pressing for the listing and sale of the home, however, Mr.

LaFrance has not been cooperative in that regard. [ 35 ] In 2016, Mr. LaFrance obtained an appraisal of the matrimonial home from Paul Vallee of Val Appraisals. Mr. Vallee attended the property and prepared a report examining the nature of the neighbourhood, the condition of the site and the building, any improvements as well as the fact that the stonework done on the home at the time of construction was faulty. After considering six comparables, Mr. Vallee concluded that the adjusted value range for the home was $957,100 to $1,284,500 and had a market value of $950,000. Mr.

Valee pointed out that although the cost to replace the home was in the range of $1.89 million, the home was an “over- sized, over-improved development” and that the costs of the home are difficult to recapture in market value being that the scope of buyers for the home are extremely limited. Mr. Vallee estimated a marketing period of one year. [ 36 ] No steps were taken to list the home at that time. Although Ms. LaFrance testified that she thought the house would be sold around the time that the mortgage and line of credit were paid out from the proceeds of the sale of KECPS, that did not happen.

The parties did agree to jointly retain MIT Appraisals Ltd. to prepare an appraisal for the property. That report, dated February 3, 2022, assessed the property as having a market value of $1,080,000. [ 37 ] Mr. LaFrance took issue with the methodology used by MIT to reach its conclusions. He requested that Paul Vallee prepare another appraisal. At the time of his second appraisal in October 2022, Mr. Vallee reached the conclusion that the appropriate adjusted value range was $810,000 - $959,000 with a market value of $850,000, citing the deficient stonework and multiple areas of disrepair. [ 38 ] Ms.

LaFrance testified that in 2023, the parties seemed to reach an agreement that the home would be sold along with the duplex and the strip mall, but no steps forward were taken. Ms. LaFrance brought an application for an order directing the sale of the properties which she says resulted in a Consent Order, however the Order was not signed, despite Mr. LaFrance’s representations in court that he agreed to listing the properties for sale. Ms. LaFrance retained a realtor who prepared listing agreements. Mr. LaFrance signed the listing agreements for the duplex and the strip mall, but not the matrimonial home. Mr.

LaFrance testified that he did not sign the listing agreement for the home because he had concerns that the property’s deficiencies were not listed in the agreement and that he

wanted to have a right of first refusal. [ 39 ] As noted above, the parties eventually reached an agreement whereby Mr. LaFrance, through KECRE, would retain ownership of the duplex and strip mall. [ 40 ] Mr. LaFrance’s position is that the matrimonial home should be valued at $850,000, and he proposes to buy out Ms. LaFrance’s share. [ 41 ] Ms. LaFrance’s position is that the property should be valued at the proposed list price of $999,900. She points to the fact that Mr. Vallee had appraised the property in 2016 higher than he did in 2022, even though he knew in 2016 about the deficient stonework.

Further, she argues that Mr. Vallee’s reliance upon Mr. LaFrance’s subjective list of other deficiencies with the property should not depress the property’s value as Mr. Vallee did nothing to confirm that these deficiencies actually affected the value of the home. She argues that except for the stonework, the deficiencies are the responsibility of Mr. LaFrance, as he has allowed the property to deteriorate to her detriment. [ 42 ] I do not accept the valuation of MIT. In my opinion, that valuation is flawed due to the use of inappropriate comparables which inflated the end result.

In particular, two of the comparables are located in Strathcona County, located immediately adjacent to the City of Edmonton (a location not comparable to St. Paul), which had adjusted values in excess of $1.0 million, and one comparable was a property listed for sale with a list price in excess of $1.0 million (generally, active listings are not seen as reliable comparables for appraisal purposes). Darren Ingram, the MIT appraiser who testified at trial, indicated there was difficulty in finding comparables in St.

Paul due to the size of the matrimonial home, and in such cases, it is necessary to expand the search for comparables and include properties which ordinarily might not be used. This issue only highlights the difficulty with the property; the parties spent more money building it than they could ever expect to receive by way of sale on the open market, and its location renders it an overdeveloped property for the area with a very limited pool of potential buyers. Any valuation of the matrimonial home must be viewed in that light. [ 43 ] Having said that, I am also of the view that Mr.

Vallee’s 2022 appraisal was overly influenced by Mr. LaFrance’s assertions about the condition of the home. Mr. Vallee did not do any independent research into the cost to rectify the deficiencies that Mr. Vallee noted, including the quotation received with respect to rectifying the stonework. Instead, Mr. Vallee simply relied upon Mr. LaFrance’s views and research. Further, Mr. Vallee gave no explanation for his different treatments of the cost to rectify the deficient stonework between his 2016 and his 2022 appraisals.

As such, I find, his 2022 valuation of $850,000 to be artificially low. [ 44 ] I am not prepared to simply accept the listing price proposed by the realtor in June 2023, given that there was no evidence to support why that price was chosen. [ 45 ] One further point to consider is that Mr. LaFrance was living in the home mortgage free since the sale of the KECPS shares.

Despite that, he has provided a list of deficiencies with the property, some being larger issues, such as rotting to the front and rear decks, and windows with broken seals, but other items that seem comparatively minor, such as dishwashers, oven, a missing smoke detector, faulty remote controls, etc. He has provided no explanation as to why those items have not been repaired, despite listing other things that have been repaired. I conclude that the list of deficiencies was provided to Mr. Vallee by Mr. LaFrance for the purpose of reducing the appraised value to the detriment of Ms.

LaFrance. [ 46 ] The expert appraisers all agreed that generally they have observed a downward pressure on residential property values in the St. Paul area since 2016, although they are not economists and there is no evidence to establish exactly what effect time has had on the overall value of the property. However, I am satisfied that their observations in this regard can generally be relied upon. This renders the higher end of the range, and even the appraisal of $950,000 estimated by Mr. Vallee in 2016 unlikely. [ 47 ] I have concluded that the appropriate valuation for the matrimonial home is $925,000.

I reach this conclusion because this figure falls within the 2022 adjusted value range provided before Mr. Vallee’s reductions for deficiencies and also takes into account the downward pressure on property values since 2016. c. Other Matrimonial Property/Debts/Exemptions [ 48 ] The parties have put forth evidence of some other assets and debts within their Agreed Statement of Facts which have not been divided and should be considered for the purposes of assessing the appropriate division. i. Other Assets [ 49 ] They have agreed that as of November 3, 2023, Ms.

LaFrance has RRSPs and a TFSA worth a total of $129,046, and that over the years, she has cashed in RRSPs totalling $62,053.75. [ 50 ] Mr. LaFrance has RRSPs as of September 30, 2023, totalling $109,839.26, and over the years, has cashed in a total of $57,143. [ 51 ] Neither party has cash or debts of significance in their bank accounts. [ 52 ] Ms. LaFrance owns a Ford Explorer worth $43,000 on which she owes $39,500. She also owns a 2006 Polaris but there is no evidence as to its value and I have chosen to disregard it. Mr. LaFrance owns an Acura worth $15,000 on which he owes $12,800.

Given the relatively little equity in the motor vehicles and the fact that they were purchased well after separation, I have chosen to disregard them for the purposes of marital property division. [ 53 ] In June 2023, Mr. LaFrance redeemed a life insurance policy for $22,483. Ms. LaFrance argues that he has also received a higher monthly draw from KECPS between January 1 and September 30, 2023, without her consent, amounting to $22,500 (9 months x $2,500). She also states that Mr. LaFrance withdrew $27,500 in two lump sums from KECPS and KECI in September 2021, without her

consent. At trial, this was not denied by Mr. LaFrance. ii. Debts [ 54 ] Mr. LaFrance owes $4,900 on a credit card and $24,671 on a line of credit. Ms. LaFrance owes a total of $29,000 on credit cards and $30,983 on a line of credit. [ 55 ] Mr. LaFrance owes $34,376.20 deferred tax for cashing RRSPs. Ms. LaFrance owes $25,772.60 for the same reason. [ 56 ] There was not a great deal of evidence on the nature of the parties’ debt – particularly on when it was incurred and the purpose for which it was incurred.

Although each party produced a Statement of Income and Liabilities at trial, which was attached to an Agreed Statement of Facts, I do not take that to mean that I should simply accept what each has included in their Statements. Rather, I conclude that their Statements simply set forth their positions on their assets and liabilities, and the ultimate disposition of marital property. I say this because it is clear from the questions asked of Ms. LaFrance that Mr. LaFrance did not agree with some of Ms. LaFrance’s debt as being marital property. It is also clear from Ms.

LaFrance’s statement that she did not agree with the entirety of an exclusion claimed by Mr. LaFrance for an RRSP. From that I conclude that I may examine the nature of each parties’ claim and determine for myself if it should be included as marital property or debt. [ 57 ] Mr. LaFrance did not address his debt at all in evidence and I cannot conclude that it was used for the benefit of the family unit and not solely for Mr. LaFrance’s own purposes, as required by Stuve . As such, I conclude that Mr. LaFrance’s debt should be born by him alone as opposed to shared with Ms. LaFrance. [ 58 ] Ms.

LaFrance testified that from time to time, after receiving cash distributions from the KECPS sale proceeds, she would use some of that cash to pay down her debt. She indicated that she generally was not receiving enough cash from the monthly draws paid by KECPS to cover all of her expenses. She also indicated that she had chosen not to pursue Mr. LaFrance for spousal support, but that this has resulted in a shortfall causing her to incur debt. Ms. LaFrance points to the fact that Mr.

LaFrance has managed to maintain ownership of the duplex and strip mall, and to live in the family home, even mortgage-free since the sale of KECPS, and had withdrawn a disproportionately higher amount of money from KECPS prior to its sale. She confirms that she pays some of her children’s expenses notwithstanding that the two oldest are out of the home in college. She required a significant amount of funds to pay taxes following the sale of KECPS as well as her legal fees (which are not included in marital debt). [ 59 ] On the other hand, Mr. LaFrance points to the amount of money that Ms.

LaFrance has received from KECPS and its sale and argues that she simply is guilty of poor money management. He also points to the fact that her boyfriend paid some of her rent, and that she should have been able to live with the funds paid to her. [ 60 ] Without a detailed examination of Ms. LaFrance’s financial affairs, it is difficult to come to any conclusion as to exactly why she bears a disproportionate amount of debt as compared to Mr. LaFrance.

I am satisfied, considering all of the circumstances of the parties’ post-separation financial affairs, that it is likely due in part because she was not receiving funds sufficient to cover her expenses through an equal share of the income from KECPS prior to its sale. I say this because I have concluded that Mr. LaFrance himself felt it necessary to increase his income over time to cover his expenses. The difference between his position and that of Ms. LaFrance’s position however, was that Mr. LaFrance took advantage of his control over the parties’ finances and was able to supplement his income.

Some examples of that include: • increase his monthly draws from KECPS between January 1, 2023 – September 30, 2023, without Ms. LaFrance’s knowledge or consent; • withdrawing $27,500 from KECPS and KECI in September 2021, without Ms. LaFrance’s knowledge or consent; • occupying the matrimonial home mortgage free since October, 2021, after obtaining Ms.

LaFrance’s agreement to use some of her share of the sale proceeds to retire the mortgage and line of credit; and • arranging for a corporate reorganization between KECRE and KECI which resulted in the retirement of a $65,000 debt owed by KECRE to KECI. [ 61 ] Accordingly, I conclude that some portion of Ms. LaFrance’s debt is matrimonial debt to be divided between the parties. Some of that debt was used to cover her living expenses and those of the children, made necessary because she was not receiving sufficient funds from the parties’ corporate interests.

I conclude that 50% of her debt ought to be included as marital debt. [ 62 ] Finally, Mr. LaFrance put forward a loan he has received from his parents in the amount of $108,000. No evidence whatsoever was provided about the timing and purpose of the loan, or its terms. I therefore decline to consider it a matrimonial debt. iii. Exemptions [ 63 ] Mr. LaFrance claims an exemption of $50,000 for the value of his pre-marital home. Ms. LaFrance agrees with that figure. [ 64 ] Mr. LaFrance claims an exemption of $30,328 for the value of his pre-marital RRSP. Ms.

LaFrance has disputed that in her evidence, and states that she has agreed that the value is actually $15,834. Mr. LaFrance did not provide any explanation or evidence supporting his claim. I conclude that he is entitled to this exemption as per Ms. LaFrance’s agreement in the amount of $15,834. d.

Summary of Assets and Liabilities [ 65 ] Given the above conclusions, I summarize the parties’ marital property and debt as follows, and calculate the equalization payment owed to Ms. LaFrance by Mr. LaFrance, if they are each entitled to an equal amount (which will be addressed further below):

Assets Mr. LaFrance Ms. LaFrance Total Matrimonial Home $925,000 $925,000 RRSPs/TFSA $109,839.26 $129,046 $238,885.26 Cashed Investments $57,143 $62,053.75 $119,196.75 Life Ins. Redemption $22,483 $22,483 KECPS Withdrawals $22,500 $22,500 $27,500 $27,500 Total Assets $1,164,465.26 $191,099.75 $1,355,565.01 Liabilities Mr. LaFrance Ms. LaFrance Total Credit Cards 0 $14,500 (50%) $14,500 Lines of Credit 0 $15,491.50 (50%) $15,491.50 Deferred Tax $34,376.20 $25,772.60 $60,148.80 Total Liabilities $34,376.20 $55,764.10 $90,140.30 Exemptions Mr. LaFrance Ms.

LaFrance Total Property Exemption $50,000 $50,000 RRSP Exemption $15,834 $15,834 Total Exemptions $65,834 $65,834 Total Assets Less Liabilities and Exemptions $1,064,255.06 $135,335.65 $1,199,590.71 Equalization Payments ($464,459.71) $464,459.71 V. Unequal Division of Assets [ 66 ] Notwithstanding their agreements, the parties both argued that the manner and circumstances under which their agreed-upon division of property had taken place ought to be taken into account when considering how to divide the parties’ remaining matrimonial property. [ 67 ] Mr. LaFrance argues that because Ms.

LaFrance was not working much at the drug store, he was compelled to put in significant hours and take on her regular responsibilities. He says he should be compensated for that by receiving a disproportionate share of the remaining matrimonial property. I do not accept this argument, primarily because he has not provided any evidence to support his assertions in this regard or to support what an appropriate amount of compensation might be. I also note Ms. LaFrance’s evidence about why she ceased her work at the drug store, which Mr. LaFrance didn’t seriously dispute.

Given those circumstances, I decline to award Mr. LaFrance a greater proportion of the matrimonial assets on this basis. [ 68 ] Ms. LaFrance argues that Mr. LaFrance’s behaviour ought to result in a disproportionate award in her favour. For example, she points to what she says is his delay in listing the matrimonial home for sale, to her detriment. She argues that Mr. LaFrance insisted on a ROFR during the sale of the duplex and strip mall, which worked in his favour as he now owns those properties, having purchased them for amounts less than their appraised amounts.

She argues that he removed cash from the businesses without her knowledge or consent. [ 69 ] As noted above, Courts should be hesitant to depart from the presumption that matrimonial property ought to be divided equally. While Mr. LaFrance’s behavior may lead to the conclusion that he mistakenly believed the parties’ business interests to be his alone to manage as he liked, and that he took advantage of his control over the parties’ finances, I have adjusted for those concerns by including a portion of Ms. LaFrance’s credit card and line of credit debt and excluding Mr.

LaFrance’s credit card and line of credit debt, as well as including the cash he withdrew from the corporations without Ms. LaFrance’s consent in his column in the statement of property. I also have a concern that some of the factors raised by Ms. LaFrance would require me to go behind the agreement reached between the parties in relation to matrimonial assets which were not part of the issue before the Court – an unappetizing prospect given that parties ought to be entitled to certainty and finality once an agreement is reached on those issues. [ 70 ] In these circumstances, I find that Ms.

LaFrance’s arguments have been appropriately addressed without requiring an unequal division of property. I therefore conclude that the parties are each entitled to an equal division.

VI. Conclusions [ 71 ] The parties are hereby granted a divorce judgment pursuant to s 8 of the Divorce Act . [ 72 ] Mr. LaFrance owes Ms. LaFrance a final equalization payment of $464,459.71. While the parties made general submissions on the timing of any equalization payment based upon their respective positions on what was owed, I do not have enough evidence to determine the feasibility of Mr. LaFrance paying that amount in short order, or whether he should be given time to pay.

Much depends on whether he intends to remortgage the family home or other assets he owns, or list assets for sale. [ 73 ] If the parties cannot agree on the timing of the equalization payment to Ms. LaFrance, they may make written submissions to me on that issue within 60 days. [ 74 ] The parties also requested that they be given the opportunity to speak to costs. Again, if the parties cannot agree on costs, then they may contact the St. Paul Court Coordinator to

schedule a further hearing before me to address that issue. Heard on the 14 th day of November, 2023. Dated at the Town of St. Paul, Alberta this 23 rd day of November, 2023. L.K. Harris J.C.K.B.A. Appearances: Hu Eliot Young Hu Young Law for the Plaintiff Dale E. Tumbach TC Family Law Group for the Defendant