2017 NLCA 28, 2017 NLCA 28

ExxonMobil Canada Properties (appellant/first respondent by cross-appeal) v. Hebron Project Employers’ Association Inc. (first respondent/appellant by cross-appeal) and Resource Development Trades Council of Newfoundland and Labrador (second respondent/second respondent by cross-appeal) (14/49 and 14/57) Indexed As: ExxonMobil Canada Properties v. Hebron Project Employers’ Association 2017 NLCA 28 1 C.A.N.L.R. 651 Court of Appeal of Newfoundland and Labrador Green C.J.N.L, Rowe, White and Hoegg JJ.A. and Butler J. ( ex officio ) April 27, 2017

Summary: Three employees of a contractor working on the construction of the Hebron GBS platform at the Bull Arm Construction Site, which was leased by the appellant ExxonMobil Canada Properties [ExxonMobil] from a provincial Crown agency, were dismissed by the respondent Hebron Project Employers’ Association (HPEA), on behalf of their employer and ExxonMobil contractor, Kiewit Kvaerner Contractors (KKC), after they were permanently denied access to the site by ExxonMobil when they had consumed alcohol off site and returned to their accommodations on the site with a level of alcohol in their blood that exceeded a prescribed prohibited level.

The employees grieved their dismissal pursuant to the governing site-wide collective agreement which was entered into by HPEA and the Resource Development Trades Council of Newfoundland and Labrador (RDTC), but not ExxonMobil.

The arbitrator found the employees had not violated site policies prohibiting alcohol possession, use or consumption on the site and should be reinstated and granted access to the site, notwithstanding HPEA’s position that the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to order that the employees’ access to the site be restored since ExxonMobil was not a party to the collective agreement and had the absolute right to prohibit access to the site, leaving HPEA with no choice but to dismiss the employees.

HPEA, with ExxonMobil intevening, applied for judicial review of the jurisdictional question, which application was dismissed. ExxonMobil appealed. Held: Appeal dismissed (Butler J., ex officio , and Hoegg J.A. dissenting). Green C.J.N.L. (White and Rowe JJ.A. concurring): The project site at Bull Arm was declared a “special project” pursuant to the Special Project Order (SPO) promulgated as a regulation under

section 70 of the Labour Relations Act , RSNL 1990, c. L-1. The purpose of a special project order designation is, ______________________________ Leave to appeal to SCC refused, 37628 (December 21, 2017). among other things, to promote labour peace and stability on the project, to minimize the possibility of work sector and jurisdictional disputes and thereby reduce the possibility of work stoppages and to eliminate the need for individual employer-union, as opposed to sector-wide, bargaining. “Special” means “different from what is usual”.

Thus, the usual rules respecting labour relations and the use of the designated site do not necessarily apply. Given the legislative structure of the special project regime, HPEA and RDTC had the exclusive right to deal with collective bargaining for all employment on the site. HPEA and RDTC were expressed to be the only parties to the agreement. Although ExxonMobil is referred to therein as the “owner” of the Project, the collective agreement expressly provided that ExxonMobil was not bound by it. ExxonMobil also had no expressed role in the discipline, suspension or discharge process of employees.

Although it is clear that the

SPO-sanctioned collective agreement was intended to impose obligations to comply with arbitration decisions on persons other than its formal parties, i.e. HPEA and RDTC, its absence of specificity begged the question as to who those other obligees were intended to be and whether ExxonMobil was to be included among them. ExxonMobil and its co-venturers, the contractors engaged by them, and the unions benefitted from the SPO. To achieve these benefits, each participant had to give up something.

ExxonMobil gave up the right to manage and employ their property rights in a manner inconsistent with the operation of the regime from which they were benefitting. It was an example of the principle of “he who receives the benefit must also shoulder the associated burden”. Since ExxonMobil took no

part in the arbitration, the issue presented to the arbitrator was therefore a fairly narrow one: whether, as a preliminary matter, the arbitrator had jurisdiction to proceed with a grievance hearing as against HPEA, representing the employer KKC . The arbitrator concluded he had jurisdiction. On judicial review, the applications judge concluded that the arbitrator had jurisdiction to address whether the conduct of the employees breached their contractual obligation to their employer so as to warrant discipline.

In reality, that was sufficient to dispose of the question on judicial review as to whether the preliminary objection to the ability of the arbitrator to deal with the merits of the grievance against KKC (HPEA) was well-founded. The question of what impact any resulting arbitration award might have had on ExxonMobil was not before the arbitrator. Nonetheless, the judge was influenced by the notion that the Special Project regime had overriding impact on the rights of all participants in activities taking place on the project site.

On appeal, with the exception of the argument that ExxonMobil was denied procedural fairness because it was not present at the arbitration, all of the other grounds of appeal essentially boil down to an assertion of error on the part of the applications judge in not concluding that ExxonMobil, as owner of the site, could not be bound or otherwise legally affected by any arbitration award arising out of a collective agreement to which ExxonMobil was not a party with respect to its ability to deny the grievors access to the construction site. In Long Harbour Employers Association Inc. v.

Resource Development Trades Council of Newfoundland and Labrador , 2013 NLCA 9 , 334 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 53 , this Court upheld a dismissal of a judicial review application challenging an arbitrator’s jurisdiction on the basis that the owner of the site under an SPO, was a member of the employers’ association which was a party to the collective agreement, and who had denied two employees access to the site for engaging in an illegal strike, was not a party to the collective agreement and could not therefore be bound by any arbitration award. The Long Harbour decision (

a) did not decide that the owner was bound by the arbitration award under the collective agreement to which it was not a party; (

b) did not decide that the interconnected relationship between the owner and the employers’ association was a determining factor in its analysis; (

c) did decide that because the issue of site access following an illegal strike was a labour relations matter, the arbitrator had jurisdiction to determine whether the grievances could proceed against the employers’ association.

Long Harbour is not a controlling precedent in this case, but remains relevant, in its affirmation of the general analytical approach to resolving the tension resulting from the intersection between the need for effective operation of a labour relations regime on an SPO site and the property rights of the operator/owner of the site who is not a direct participant in the labour relations regime. The burden was on ExxonMobil to establish that it had the unfettered right to deny access to the site to anyone it wanted and for any purpose. It cannot be assumed.

The lease between Nalcor and ExxonMobil was not put in evidence. Although ExxonMobil was the “owner” of the site, this does not carry with it a definitive conclusion that an owner’s right to control site access in the context of the SPO regime was necessarily unfettered. Moreover, there was no violation of KKC’s policies or ExxonMobil’s policies which they incorporated, and site access could not be denied for that reason.

As for ExxonMobil’s remaining argument that it had the absolute right to deny site access, unless one is prepared to give primacy to the assertion of property rights regardless of how doing so would undermine a legislative policy that was being enforced for the benefit for all, one is driven to the conclusion that the rights flowing from the imposed collective agreement were intended by the legislature to have primacy over all other rights at the site.

ExxonMobil is affected by the result of the arbitration because its rights to act in a manner that would undermine the operation of the labour relations regime under the SPO were subordinated to the operation of the regime. It is not necessary to address whether the arbitrator had jurisdiction to bind ExxonMobil to undertake a positive duty. The question actually at issue was only whether, on a preliminary objection, the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the subject-matter in respect of the grievance against KKC (HPEA).

The fact that the arbitrator may have, additionally, made statements relating to the impact of the

arbitration decision on ExxonMobil does not expand the legal effect of the award. ExxonMobil need only be regarded as being “bound” by the arbitrator’s ruling in the same way as a citizen is bound by the general law and the precedents emanating from the courts. ExxonMobil argued that it could not be bound by any arbitration award because it would preclude it from ensuring that occupational health and safety legislation was observed. This issue was hypothetical and did not arise on the facts of the case. ExxonMobil also argued that it was denied procedural fairness in the arbitration hearing.

However, ExxonMobil was aware of the existence of the grievance and if it had wished to intervene it could have done so. The appeal was dismissed with costs on the basis of two counsel at column 5 of the scale of costs. Butler J., ex officio (Hoegg J.A. concurring), dissenting: The standard of review is correctness. The correctness standard requires a reviewing court to undertake its own analysis of the question in order to decide whether it agrees with the outcome. The arbitrator concluded that ExxonMobil was bound by the outcome of the award.

While the majority does not regard it as helpful to pose the question at issue on this appeal as whether the arbitration award binds ExxonMobil, that was the issue before this Court. The within appeal requires this Court to address this jurisdictional question. The collective agreement between the HPEA and the RDTC is the collective agreement governing this special project. Pursuant to

section 86 of the Act , the arbitrator’s jurisdiction was constrained to resolution of differences between the HPEA and the RDTC or persons bound by the agreement or on whose behalf it was entered into. ExxonMobil was neither a party to the collective agreement, nor a person bound by the agreement or on whose behalf it was entered into and that is sufficient to dispose of the question on appeal. As the majority states, the site owner must have respect for the labour relations regime. The roles played by all of the principal parties require recognition and respect from all parties, each to the other.

That means that the owner’s proprietary rights, site absolutes and responsibility for safety must also be respected. All parties to this appeal conceded that the owner had the right to determine site access. The jurisdictional question aside, it is inappropriate for this Court to give more weight to the expectations of the HPEA and the RDTC regarding respect for the labour relations regime, than to the expectations of ExxonMobil regarding respect for its right to enforce site safety, including site access.

The evidence establishes that the owner had sole discretion to deny any project personnel access to the site anytime for any violation of the site absolutes or other conduct which the owner deemed unacceptable. While there may be some inconsistency between the terms of ExxonMobil’s safety/substance abuse policies and those of KKC, any inconsistency is irrelevant. The policies do not have to be the same because they address each party’s respective but different responsibilities.

While the impairment of an employee on site may be a labour relations issue, it does not follow that the owner cannot deny site access to a person in contravention of the owner’s separate safety policy. Ultimately, the owner denied site access and the employer (KKC) made its own decision on the termination of the grievors’ employment. The owner’s separate decision to deny access could not be addressed by the arbitrator because he lacked jurisdiction to do so under

section 86 of the Labour Relations Act and

Article 14.09 of the Collective Agreement. When an employee’s site access is denied by a third party who is not a party to the collective agreement and has not voluntarily submitted to an arbitrator’s jurisdiction, a grievance arbitrator has no jurisdiction to bind the third party to the award.

If the HPEA (on behalf of the affected employees) wished to challenge the owner’s decision to deny site access on the basis that the wording of the policy did not support a violation, was discriminatory or illegal, or on any other basis, it had the right to file an application with the Trial Division which had jurisdiction over such a question.

The majority decision that rights flowing from the imposed collective agreement were intended by the legislature to have primacy over all other rights at the site is reached without consideration of the reality that the property right in question - access based upon site safety - is also a matter that benefits all persons on the site. A special project order does not curtail the property rights of a site owner and the Labour Relations Act does not limit an owner’s property rights. The SPO does not give priority to labour relations over site safety in general.

Long Harbour decided that (

a) the owner was bound by the arbitration award because it was the controlling member of the LHEA, and aparty on whose behalf the collective agreement was entered; and (

b) the interconnected relationship between the owner and the LHEAwas a determining factor in its analysis. Long Harbour has no influence on the outcome of this appeal. The majority conclusion on the ratio of Long Harbour is disagreed with. Long Harbour is distinguishable on its facts.

It was an error forthe arbitrator to rely on Long Harbour to make his award binding on ExxonMobil, which award was upheld by the applications judge.Therefore, the applications judge’s decision upholding it must be set aside and the portions of the arbitration award in which thearbitrator held that ExxonMobil was bound by it and declared that the grievors have to be given access to the site must be struck. From the perspective of basic contract law principles, unlike Long Harbour (where LHEA represented the owner as a party), thecollective agreement in question is a contract between the HPEA and the RDTC only.

Since ExxonMobil was not a party to the collective agreement, had no control over the HPEA and had not voluntarily and expresslysubmitted to the arbitrator’s jurisdiction, ExxonMobil, as a third party, could not be legally bound by the arbitrator’s award. Thearbitrator’s declaration that the grievors were to be given site access cannot legally bind ExxonMobil. The SPO regime in this case addednothing to the arbitrator’s jurisdiction which was established in

section 86 of the Labour Relations Act and

Article 14.09 of the CollectiveAgreement. The arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction by ordering that the employees be given site access and the applications judge was incorrect inupholding those portions of his award. The appeal should be allowed. Appeal dismissed (Butler J. ex officio and Hoegg J.A. dissenting) Cases cited: Green C.J.N.L: Long Harbour Employers Association Inc. v.

Resource Development Trades Council of Newfoundland and Labrador, 2013 NLCA 9, 334Nfld & P.E.I.R. 53 Re Finning (Canada) and I.A.M.A.W., Local 99 (2005), (AB GAA), 136 L.A.C. (4th) 129 Re Bantrel Constructors Co. and U.A., Loc. 488 (2007), 162 L.A.C. (4th) 122 Bisaillon v. Concordia University, 2006 SCC 19, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 666 SM Construction v. Folmar Electric Ltd., 2000 NFCA 35, 189 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 249 Ontario Sheet Metal Workers’ and Roofers’ Conference v. Ellis-Don Ltd., 2010 ONSC 3783, 268 O.A.C. 196 (Div. Ct.) Butler J., ex officio: Long Harbour Employers Association Inc. v.

Resource Development Trades Council of Newfoundland and Labrador, 2013 NLCA 9, 334Nfld & P.E.I.R. 53 Bisaillon v. Concordia University, 2006 SCC 19, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 666 Burke v. Newfoundland and Labrador Association of Public and Private Employees, 2010 NLCA 12 Aylward v. Law Society of Newfoundland and Labrador, 2013 NLCA 68 Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 Finning (Canada) v. International Assn. of Machinists and Aerospace Workers Local Lodge 99 (2005), (AB GAA),136 L.A.C. (4th) 129 (Alta. Arb.) U.A., Local 488 v. Bantrel Constructors Co. (2007), 162 L.A.C. (4th) 122 (Alta. Arb.) Cadillac Fairview Corp.

Ltd. v. R.W.D.S.U. (1987), (ON SC), 62 O. R. (2nd) 337 (H.C.J. (Div. Ct.)) aff’g [1985]O.L.R.B. Rep. 941 (Ont. Lab. Rel. Bd.)

Counsel: Stephen Penney and Ruth Trask, for the appeallant/first respondent by cross-appeal; Darren Stratton, for the first respondent/appellant by cross-appeal; Dana Lenehan Q.C. and Kenneth Jerrett, for the second respondent/second respondent by cross-appeal. This appeal was heard on April 17, 2015 by Green C.J.N.L, Rowe, White and Hoegg JJ.A. and Butler J. ( ex officio ).

The following judgment was delivered on April 27, 2017 by Green C.J.N.L., concurred in by Rowe and White JJ.A. with separate dissenting reasons by Butler J. ( ex officio ) and Hoegg J.A. concurring. ______________________________________________________________ Green C.J.N.L.: Overview [ 1 ] This appeal addresses the jurisdiction of a labour arbitrator, acting under a collective agreement imposed by a Special Project Order made under the Labour Relations Act, RSNL 1990, c.

L-1, to make a ruling relating to access to a construction project site affecting the owner of the project who is not a party to the collective agreement. [ 2 ] Similar, though not identical, matters were considered by this Court in a recent decision, Long Harbour Employers Association Inc. v. Resource Development Trades Council of Newfoundland and Labrador , 2013 NLCA 9 , 334 Nfld & P.E.I.R. 53 .

Because disagreement by the parties to the current appeal as to the scope and import of that decision and as to whether the Court ought to reconsider and possibly modify or overturn it, and because of the general importance of the issue for the participants in special project construction regimes in the province, the Court sat as a panel of five members. [2] [ 3 ] In the current case, a labour arbitrator found that three employees of a contractor working on the construction of the Hebron GBS platform at the Bull Arm Construction Site, which was leased by the appellant ExxonMobil Canada Properties [ExxonMobil] from a provincial Crown agency, had not violated site policies prohibiting alcohol possession, use or consumption on the site when they had consumed alcohol off site and returned to their accommodations on the site with a level of alcohol in their blood that exceeded a prescribed prohibited level.

The arbitrator concluded that the employees should be reinstated in their jobs with full compensation and benefits 2 and that they were to be “granted access to the site to perform their employment duties.” [ 4 ] ExxonMobil who, as “owner” (by lease) of the site and proponent of the project, had previously denied the employees access to the site ostensibly on the basis of their alleged violation of the substance abuse policy promulgated by their contractor-employer.

ExxonMobil had declared certain prohibited site activities, including the possession, use or consumption of alcohol, to be “site absolutes” the violation of which could result in permanent banishment from the worksite.

ExxonMobil was not an express party to the governing site-wide collective agreement which was entered into between the respondents Hebron Project Employers’ Association (HPEA), representing all employers on the site, and Resource Development Trades Council of Newfoundland and Labrador (RDTC), representing all relevant unions and under which the arbitrator purported to act. [ 5 ] Notwithstanding the arbitrator’s finding that the employees had not violated the substance abuse policy, ExxonMobil took the position that it nevertheless had the right to deny the employees access to the site, and thereby bring about the effective termination of their employment.

ExxonMobil’s position was that, as a non-party, it was not bound by the decision of the arbitrator under the collective agreement and could therefore exercise its property rights as owner and controller of the site to deny access to anyone it chose. [ 6 ] Although it knew about it, ExxonMobil did not participate or seek to intervene in the arbitration hearing that was held to consider the employees’ grievance that they had been wrongfully terminated and denied site access.

HPEA, however, raised the issue of jurisdiction arguing that ExxonMobil had the absolute right to deny access to the site and that the contractor-employer had no choice but to dismiss the employees. Accordingly, it was argued, the arbitrator had no jurisdiction under the collective agreement to reverse the denial-of-site-access decision, which was a decision of ExxonMobil’s, not the employer’s.

The arbitrator rejected the challenge to his jurisdiction and proceeded to decide the substantive issue of whether the employees had violated any applicable policy, concluding that they had not. [ 7 ] While, as will become apparent, it is not clear that the intent of the arbitrator was to make a direct order against ExxonMobil to provide access to the site, it is at least apparent that the arbitrator was of the view that, having determined that the employees were entitled to reinstatement, they would necessarily have to have access to the site for that purpose and he was prepared to make a declaration to that effect.

ExxonMobil and HPEA, however, considered the arbitrator’s award as purporting directly to order ExxonMobil to provide access to the site. [ 8 ] HPEA sought judicial review of the arbitrator’s award, arguing that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority by purporting to bind ExxonMobil when he had no jurisdiction to do so. ExxonMobil sought and was granted intervenor status. 3 No challenge was made to the arbitrator’s finding that the employees had not violated any policy and that they were entitled, as against their employer, to reinstatement.

The applications judge, reviewing the award on the basis of correctness 4 , declined to set it aside.

[ 9 ] For the reasons that follow, I have concluded that the decision of the applications judge denying judicial review of the arbitration award should not be disturbed and that the appeal should, accordingly, be dismissed. The result is that the award of the arbitrator declaring that the reinstated employees should be granted access to the site to perform their employment duties stands. Background [ 10 ] ExxonMobil is the lead co-venturer in the consortium that wished to develop the Hebron and related oil fields offshore Newfoundland.

It sub-leased the Bull Arm construction site from Nalcor, a Crown agency, who in turn had leased it from the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, for the purpose of constructing, among other things, a gravity-based structure (GBS) and assembling and integrating other portions of the oil production facilities before towing them to the Hebron field.

As operator, ExxonMobil engaged contractors, among them Kiewit Kvaerner Contractors (KKC), to perform the work either directly or through subcontractors. [ 11 ] The project site at Bull Arm was made the subject of a Special Project Order (SPO) promulgated as a regulation under

section 70 of the Labour Relations Act .

Section 70 at the relevant time 5 read in pertinent part:

(1) The Lieutenant-Governor in Council may by order (

a) declare an undertaking … to be a special project under this Act …; or (b) … declare an undertaking for the construction or fabrication of works at the Bull Arm site, including all ancillary work, services and catering to be a special project and the project so declared is a special project for all purposes of this Act .

(2) The Lieutenant-Governor in Council may, with respect to an order made under subsection (1), prescribe (

a) the geographic site to which the declaration relates; (

b) that a geographic site be excluded from a project order; (

c) the employers, employer’s organizations, trade unions and councils of trade unions that may be involved in collective bargaining relating to employment on the special project; (

d) the bargaining unit for the purpose of the special project; (

e) that a collective agreement is the collective agreement for the purpose of the special project; (

f) those conditions and qualifications with respect to any aspect of the special project that the Lieutenant-Governor in Council considers necessary or desirable. [ 12 ] This provision contemplates that an undertaking on certain geographic sites, including specifically the Bull Arm site, on which certain types of large and lengthy construction projects are to be conducted are to be treated as “special” for the purpose of the application of the Act. “Special” means “different from what is usual” ( Oxford Compact Dictionary ).

Thus, the usual rules respecting labour relations and the use of the designated site do not necessarily apply.

The fact that it is a specific geographic site that is delineated (and certain geographic areas can be excluded from the operation of the Order) indicates that there is an emphasis on imposing on the designated area a special regime relating to labour relations. [ 13 ] The purpose of a special project order designation is, among other things, to promote labour peace and stability on the project, to minimize the possibility of work sector and jurisdictional disputes and thereby reduce the possibility of work stoppages and to eliminate the need for individual employer-union, as opposed to sector-wide, bargaining: James C.

Oakley, Review of Special Project Order Legislation in Newfoundland and Labrador , a report prepared for the Labour Relations Agency, 2012, pp. 80-81. In his report, Mr. Oakley observes that there is “widespread support” for special project regimes in the province (p. 81). [ 14 ] In accordance with paragraph 70(2) (

c) of the Labour Relations Act , the SPO prescribed that HPEA and RDTC could be “involved in collective bargaining in relation to employment on the special project”: Hebron Development Project Special Project Order, NLR 78/11 , s. 4. Given the legislative structure of the special project regime, that meant that these two entities had the exclusive right to deal with collective bargaining for all employment on the site. 6 They were the only ones permitted (“may” in s. 70(2)(c)) to do so. ExxonMobil was not mentioned. [ 15 ]

Section 5 of the SPO designated an agreement between HPEA and RDTC, which pre-dated the effective date of the SPO, as the collective agreement for the special project regulated by the SPO. HPEA and RDTC were expressed to be the only parties to the agreement. ExxonMobil is referred to therein, however, as the “owner” of the Project (Article 3.01(f)). Furthermore,

Article 12.01 provided that it was understood by HPEA and RDTC that “no bargaining relationship is created by ExxonMobil ... with a Local Union, [RDTC] or any affiliate of [RDTC] by voluntary recognition or by action of law”, and

Article 12.02 stipulated that any participation by ExxonMobil in the processes and administrative matters contemplated in the agreement did not create a bargaining relationship that would bind ExxonMobil to the collective agreement. [ 16 ]

Article 13.01 of the agreement acknowledged that the “exclusive function” of the main contractors, including KKC, included the right to “discipline, suspend and discharge any worker for just cause” subject to compliance with the grievance and arbitration procedure in the agreement, which by

Article 14.05 was to be final and binding on HPEA and RDTC. ExxonMobil had no expressed role in that discipline, suspension or discharge process. [ 17 ] HPEA and RDTC also recognized, by virtue of

Article 34.03, “the mutual value of improving, by all reasonable means,” safety on the jobsite. At least to that extent, safety was part of, and regulated by, the labour relations regime that was in place and endorsed by the SPO. It explains the issuance and enforcement by KKC and other contractors of site safety policies, including alcohol consumption

policies, to their employees, as discussed later in these reasons. [ 18 ] Finally,

Article 14.09 provided that HPEA and RDTC “and every person bound by this agreement and every person on whose behalf the agreement is entered into” shall comply with any arbitration decision issued pursuant to the process envisioned by the agreement “and shall do or abstain from doing anything required by that decision.” Although it is clear that the SPO-sanctioned collective agreement was intended to impose obligations to comply with arbitration decisions on persons other than its formal parties, i.e.

HPEA and RDTC, its absence of specificity begged the question as to who those other obligees were intended to be and whether ExxonMobil was to be included among them. [ 19 ] “Collective bargaining” referred to in the SPO is defined in paragraph 2(1) (

g) of the Labour Relations Act as “negotiating with a view to the conclusion of a collective agreement or the renewal or revision of the agreement” and “collective agreement” is defined in paragraph 2(1)(

f) as: A written agreement between an employer or an employers’ organization acting on behalf of employers, and a bargaining agent of employees acting on behalf of a unit of employees containing provisions respecting terms and conditions of employment and related matters . (Underlining added.) [ 20 ] The scope of the role of HPEA and RDTC therefore extended to all matters “respecting terms and conditions of employment” as well as all “related matters.” Those matters included site safety, as recognized in

Article 34.03 of the Collective Agreement. The corollary is that no other party was permitted to intrude into or interfere with these areas in relation to employment on the special project site. [ 21 ] By the time the SPO was drafted and enacted, the basic structure of the project regime would have already been worked out among all the main participants. Indeed, as noted already, the collective agreement pre-dated the SPO. ExxonMobil and its co-venturers were the ultimate beneficiaries of the project. They needed access to a project site at which their contractors could carry out the required work.

The SPO gave them that along with the prospect of labour peace throughout the project. In that way, they had some guarantee that the project could proceed as contemplated. The contractors engaged by ExxonMobil also benefitted because they had a guarantee of relative labour peace and had access to the site to carry out their contracted work. The unions also had the benefit of a regime that eliminated jurisdictional disputes within their own ranks and a site-wide regime for resolving job disputes between employees and their individual employers.

To achieve these benefits, each participant had to give up something: the unions, their right to bargain collectively on a union-employer basis; the contractors, the right to exercise management rights individually in respect of their own employees and the individual unions (subject to the grievance arbitration process); and ExxonMobil, the right to manage and employ their property rights in a manner inconsistent with the operation of the regime from which they were benefitting. It was an example of the principle of “he who receives the benefit must also shoulder the associated burden” (See Halsall v.

Brizell , [1957] Ch 169 ). The process only worked because each participant became part of an integrated benefit-burden whole. The Arbitrator’s Award [ 22 ] The employees’ grievance as submitted to their employer, KKC, asserted that they were “wrongfully terminated from employment and wrongfully denied site access.” They were represented by RDTC at the arbitration hearing. The only responding party was HPEA on behalf of the employer. ExxonMobil did not appear at or seek to intervene at the hearing.

HPEA nevertheless raised a preliminary objection to the ability of the arbitrator to deal with the substance of the grievance based on the denial of site access to the grievors by ExxonMobil as owner of the site. [ 23 ] HPEA submitted that denial of access to the site by ExxonMobil brought the employment of the grievors to an end, thereby obviating the necessity of dealing with the question of whether the employees should be disciplined for breach of the alcohol abuse policy.

Because ExxonMobil was not a party to the collective agreement it was not bound by it and no order could be made against it, so HPEA argued. Thus, even if the grievors were entitled under the collective agreement to be reinstated, this could not occur without the agreement of ExxonMobil. [ 24 ] RDTC, for the union, argued in response that the only reason the grievors were at the site was that they were expected to work and their activities are completely governed by the collective agreement.

Regardless of who was the original author of the site absolutes, it was the employer who provided a copy of them to the union and thereby incorporated them into the employment relationship. Accordingly, submitted RDTC, the site absolutes became part of the terms and conditions of employment which is to be regulated by the collective agreement. Because the issue involves the

interpretation and application of the collective agreement, the matter was arbitrable. [ 25 ] The issue presented to the arbitrator was therefore a fairly narrow one: whether, as a preliminary matter, the arbitrator had jurisdiction to proceed with a grievance hearing as against HPEA, representing the employer KKC .

That was the only preliminary issue that in reality could have arisen, given the fact that the grievance had only been asserted against KKC and not ExxonMobil. [ 26 ] The arbitrator dealt with the preliminary objection and rejected it, concluding that he had subject-matter jurisdiction and in personam jurisdiction over HPEA. He then proceeded to deal with the merits of the grievance.

For the purposes of this appeal, it is only the ruling on the preliminary objection that needs be considered. [ 27 ] At the start of his written considerations, the arbitrator nevertheless initially stated the issue more broadly as “whether an arbitrator, acting pursuant to the terms of the collective agreement between the parties, has authority and jurisdiction to make an order binding the owner of the project, who is not a party to that collective agreement.” However, as will be seen, in reaching his conclusions, he did not address the issue in the same manner. [ 28 ] After reviewing the legislative and regulatory context in which labour relations occur on special project sites, he concluded that there was “a special labour relations relationship” in existence and that “[t]he regulatory scheme is meant to include all areas of labour relations including the right to discipline employees who transgress various rules established for their conduct.” After describing the

labour relations regime as a “unique relationship,” he concluded: There is no room in that relationship for the owner with respect to labour relations. It is for these two parties [HPEA and RDTC] todictate the conditions of employment of the workforce at that site … To insert the owner into this equation with an overall authority to thwart the process by determining who, for labour relations purposes,can attend upon the site does not make sense. To provide the owner with such powers would be to circumvent the entire labour relationsprocess established by the special project order and the collective agreement.

There would, in essence, be a party independent of thatprocess with a veto to all actions of the parties who are legitimately exercising the rights given to them in the special project order. [29] In adopting this approach, the arbitrator placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the Long Harbour case which, amongstother things, stated that to allow a third party to deny access to a work site governed by a special project order “would have the effect ofundermining the labour relations regime that was contemplated by the [special project order]” (paragraph 17).

He rejected argumentsthat Long Harbour was distinguishable because the owner (the non-party) and the employer’s council (the party) were connected andcould be regarded as one and the same entity. He further refused to rely on other arbitral jurisprudence (notably Re Finning (Canada) and I.A.M.A.W., Local 99 (2005), (AB GAA), 136 L.A.C. (4th) 129 and Re Bantrel Constructors Co. and U.A., Loc. 488 (2007), 162 L.A.C. (4th) 122) which had held that an arbitrator has no jurisdiction over the actions of third parties who are not partyto the relevant collective agreement.

He distinguished those cases on the basis that the employment relationships there were not subjectto a special project order as in the current case. [30] The arbitrator concluded that he had jurisdiction to consider the grievance. He again relied on Long Harbour, quoting thestatement from that case: “The arbitrator had subject matter and in personam jurisdiction to determine whether denial of site access was aviolation of the collective agreement by [the employers’ association]” (paragraph 21).

He then went on to determine whether thegrievors’ actions justified termination and concluded that they did not. [31] His ruling is summed up in the following paragraph: … the dismissal of the grievors in these circumstances cannot be justified and they are to be re-instated with full compensation andbenefits from the date of termination to the date of re-instatement less any mitigation. [32] The most controversial aspect of the arbitrator’s ruling, for present purposes, is how he dealt with the impact of the order for re-instatement on ExxonMobil and the actions it had taken to bar the grievors from the site.

He made only two statements on this issue. [33] The first, made at the conclusion of his ruling on the jurisdiction issue, was to the following effect: “The owner of the project isbound by the outcome of the award.” The second, following the order for re-instatement against HPEA stated: “They [the grievors] areto be granted access to the site to perform their employment duties.” The two statements do not necessarily mean the same thing. Theirmeaning and scope and what legal effect they could have on ExxonMobil however, figure significantly in this appeal.

The Judicial Review Application 2014 NLTD (G) 163; 359 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 306 [34] HPEA sought judicial review of the arbitrator’s decision. The issue on the review was technically, whether the arbitrator wascorrect in concluding that he had jurisdiction to address the grievance that had been made against KKC, as represented by HPEA. Asnoted, ExxonMobil sought and obtained intervenor status. It is important to appreciate, however, that the conferral of intervenor statusdoes not entitle the intervenor to engraft its own claims onto the existing proceeding or to refashion it.

The intervenor is generally limitedto making submissions in respect of the existing issues in the original proceeding. Thus, ExxonMobil’s submissions would have to havebeen directed to the issue of whether the arbitrator was correct in concluding that he had jurisdiction to address the grievance that hadbeen made against KKC (HPEA). [35] ExxonMobil took an active

part in the challenge to the arbitrator’s decision. It characterized the ruling as one that determined thatExxonMobil was bound by the award. In submitting that the award should be set aside on the basis that ExxonMobil could not be boundby the award, it focused on its status as a non-party to the collective agreement and its rights as owner of the special project site. [36] Although HPEA and ExxonMobil expressed their positions differently, the claim to quash the decision was essentially based onthe submissions that (

i) the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to bind ExxonMobil to the effects of the award because it was not a party to thecollective agreement; (ii) the arbitrator had no jurisdiction over the dispute at all because the ability of the grievors to work was takenaway by the refusal of ExxonMobil to allow them access to the site; (iii) the arbitrator misapplied the Long Harbour decision; and (iv)the arbitrator erred in finding that site access was a matter of labour relations within the collective agreement. In addition to theseoverlapping arguments, ExxonMobil also submitted that (

i) a decision of an arbitrator that bound ExxonMobil prevented ExxonMobilfrom meeting its statutory obligations under occupational health and safety legislation; and (ii) ExxonMobil was denied proceduralfairness because the arbitrator did not hear from ExxonMobil before purporting to bind ExxonMobil to the effects of the award. [37] The applications judge considered the fundamental question at issue to be the validity of the arguments that the arbitrator had nojurisdiction to make an order affecting ExxonMobil on the issue of site access.

He described the “relief” (a generally inappropriate termwhen describing the role of an intervenor) sought by ExxonMobil as “that the decision that ExxonMobil is bound by the Arbitrator[‘s]Award be set aside.” [38] In addressing the issues as he saw them, the judge quoted extensively from the Long Harbour decision and consideredsubmissions that it could be distinguished from the current case. He concluded that while there were factual and other differencesbetween the two cases, the rationale underlying Long Harbour was nevertheless applicable with respect to resolving the fundamentalissues in dispute.

He stated: [8] The applicant and the intervenor note the closer relationship in [Long Harbour] between Vale Inco and the Long Harbour EmployersAssociation and the provision in the Long Harbour Employers Association articles of incorporation assigning bargaining rights to the

Employers Association and the directors’ control of the association by Vale-appointed directors. In my view, these distinguishing features do not overcome the apparent distinct legal entities of these parties, the provisions of the Special Project Orders and the similar labour relations regime to which the Court of Appeal decision in [ Long Harbour ] was directed .

In fact, … the Court of Appeal noted it was unnecessary for the applications judge to address the corporate affiliations or that Vale would be bound by the ruling. (Emphasis added.) [ 39 ] With respect to the submission that the Long Harbour case could be distinguished because it dealt only with a preliminary objection and did not directly address whether an owner of a special project site could be bound by an arbitration award where the owner was not party to the governing collective agreement, he observed: [9] The applicant and intervenor also note that the Court of Appeal in [ Long Harbour ] dealt with the issue as a preliminary objection before the arbitrator.

The intervenor notes in particular that at paragraph 21 the Court of Appeal directed itself to the preliminary objection and left open the question of whether the arbitrator could legally or effectively bind Vale. With respect, I do not see that conclusion following from the rationale developed by the Court of Appeal in [ Long Harbour ] . The Court of Appeal is clear that the arbitrator had jurisdiction to determine whether denial of site access was a violation of the collective agreement in its analysis and in its statement at paragraph 21.

Consistent with that determination, the Court of Appeal then continued on at paragraph 21 to confirm that the remedy (and I note not the jurisdiction), including whether Vale would effectively be bound by it was a matter for the arbitrator. (Emphasis added.) [ 40 ] In response to the submissions of HPEA and ExxonMobil that the ratio of the Long Harbour decision with respect to the special project regime trumping third party property rights was limited to its effect on labour relations only, and that in this case site access was not a labour relations matter, the applications judge ruled: [12] In my view, the intentions of ExxonMobil to exercise prerogative based upon proprietary rights and to refuse access to employers [sic] where positions at the site have become reinstated by the arbitrator is an apparent instance where its ownership rights are subordinated to a legitimate labour relations outcome.

To find otherwise, in my view, would materially affect the outcome of the determination effected under a legitimate labour relations scheme... [16] The intervenor argues that dismissal from employment and banishment from the job site, as the arbitrator phrased each, are legally and practically two functions carried out by distinct entities. In the employment context, however, the fact of employment, the place of engagement of work and the conduct of work are [integral] features. In that context it is difficult to engage in jurisdictional separations within this regime.

In fact, the workers’ presence at the work site is [integral] and fundamental to the contract of employment. To the extent that the arbitrator exercises jurisdiction over subject-matter governed by the collective agreement, the outcome then prevails. The Special Project Order

section 4 subscribes the parameters within which the collective bargaining operates.

While ExxonMobil may not be a party, it may be affected by outcomes properly found within those parameters. … [17] … Because of the unique circumstance engaged by the Special Project Orders and the resulting Collective Agreement, this arbitrator had full jurisdiction over the employees’ entitlement or not to work in the position for which they were terminated. (Emphasis added.) [ 41 ] ExxonMobil also argued that, as owner of the site, it was bound by its statutory obligations under occupational health and safety legislation and had to have flexibility to manage and operate the site to enable it to comply with those obligations.

Accordingly, it submitted, it could not be bound by an arbitration award which, if it were to bind ExxonMobil, might require it to act contrary to its obligations under the occupational health and safety regime. The applications judge dealt with these arguments in the following manner: [13] … The intervenor argues that its obligations pursuant to the Occupational Health and Safety Act ought to be assessed as impacting on the reasonableness of the arbitrator’s view of its obligations under that regime. It has not been determined that ExxonMobil may have been in breach of those obligations in this instance .

An initial review of the Act governing that regime, … confirm[s] that the person primarily responsible for carrying out a project including but not limited to the owner and supervisors and employees are mandated with a generally stated responsibility for health and safety. [14] The intervenor argues that its site absolute policy is directed to site safety protocols which are not principally directed through traditional labour related topics that include alcohol and drug related restrictions.

However, to the extent that the site’s absolute [sic] policy enters into areas governed by the labour contract, the outcome of policies may be affected coincidentally by the application of that labour regime. [15] I am not presented here with a circumstance where the owner is bound by a legal obligation or outcome that mandates it to do something that is in direct conflict with the arbitrator’s decision.

If that occurred, the conflict, presumably binding the owner to comply with two conflicting legal mandates would have to be addressed by the parties affected and reasonable outcomes then sought . (Emphasis added.) [ 42 ] Finally, with respect to ExxonMobil’s argument that it had been denied procedural fairness before the arbitrator in being able to address the issue of jurisdiction of the arbitrator to bind ExxonMobil to the result of the award, the applications judge responded: [18] … ExxonMobil was aware of this grievance and it going to arbitration, however, it objects to not having notice of an intention to have it bound by a finding against it.

This position, again, has to be considered in the overall context of the relationship between the

parties in these Special Project Orders. The regime has the effect of having matters of legal relations specifically mandated and circumscribed as noted, and ExxonMobil has to be taken as having to have subscribed to those presubscribed parameters. In the context of labour relations and this circumstance, matters of labour within that framework may impact on ExxonMobil. [ 43 ] The applications judge concluded that “the arbitrator was correct in his assumption and exercise of jurisdiction” (Judgment, paragraph 20) and dismissed the judicial review application.

He stated: [16] … In the end, it is the conduct of the employees on site at the workplace that was subject to discipline and arbitral review. [17] Consequently, the question is whether the Arbitrator had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the dispute rather than whether denial of site access by the owner of the site was disregarded and in personam jurisdiction over ExxonMobil exercised ….

Because of the unique circumstance engaged by the special project orders and the resulting Collective Agreement, this Arbitrator had full jurisdiction over the employees’ entitlement or not to work in the position from which they were terminated. [ 44 ] In fact, the applications judge need not have gone so far as to rely on the unique aspects of the special project regime to reach his conclusion that the arbitrator had jurisdiction to deal with the grievances.

Given the fact that the issue on the judicial review was whether the arbitrator was correct in assuming jurisdiction over the dispute as against HPEA , once he concluded that the subject matter of the dispute related to matters arising out of the employment relationship governed by the collective agreement it followed that he had jurisdiction, as against HPEA, to deal with the merits. That was enough for him to proceed.

This view becomes clearer in his reasons in a later paragraph: [19] The subject matter of the dispute before the Arbitrator was the conduct of employees and their work, that is, had their conduct breached their contractual obligation to warrant discipline. The terms and conditions of employment are governed by the Collective Agreement of August 31, 2011. It cannot be questioned then that the Arbitrator had jurisdiction over that subject matter.

So long as the subject matter is within the Arbitrator’s jurisdiction, the outcome of the merits of the dispute is in his hands within this regime … [ 45 ] In reality, that was sufficient to dispose of the question on judicial review as to whether the preliminary objection to the ability of the arbitrator to deal with the merits of the grievance against KKC (HPEA) was well-founded.

The question of what impact any resulting arbitration award might have had on ExxonMobil was not really before the arbitrator except, in the subsidiary sense, as part of HPEA’s argument that ExxonMobil’s ability to deny site access as owner of the site and non-party to the collective agreement superseded any rights flowing from the arbitration award. [ 46 ] Consistent with this view, the applications judge in fact made no explicit finding as to whether the arbitrator was correct in his statements that ExxonMobil was “bound by the outcome of the award” and that the grievors were to be “granted access to the site to perform their employment duties.” For the reasons that follow, he did not need to do so.

That said, he did discuss, as indicated, the impact of the SPO regime on the relationships of the participants, including ExxonMobil, as to whether it “resulted in what could be termed additional or extra-jurisdictional authority” (Judgment, paragraph 6) with respect to ExxonMobil.

It is that, of course, which is of the prime concern to ExxonMobil. [ 47 ] It can be seen throughout the reasoning of the applications judge that, consistent with some statements in the Long Harbour decision, the judge was influenced by the notion that the Special Project regime had overriding impact on all activities that were being carried out at the site in relation to the construction of the GBS and that the rights of all participants in those activities, no matter what their role, were subordinated to ensuring that the effective operation of the labour relations regime, which was the purpose of the SPO designation in the first place, was not frustrated.

It can therefore be said that, at least implicitly, the applications judge did not ultimately disagree with the view of the arbitrator that the grievors were entitled to continued access to the site. [ 48 ] It is disagreement with these fundamental notions that is central to all of the arguments on appeal. The Appeal and Cross Appeal [ 49 ] ExxonMobil (the appellant) and HPEA (the cross-appellant) advanced the same points on appeal. They each asserted that the applications judge erred: 1. In concluding that the arbitrator had in personam and subject-matter jurisdiction to “bind” ExxonMobil; 2.

In concluding that the grievance and arbitration procedure was the “proper forum” to determine the site access issue; 3. In misapplying and misstating the limitations of jurisdiction granted to an arbitrator by the collective agreement; 4. In concluding that ExxonMobil’s site absolutes rules constituted a labour relations matter; 5.

In concluding that the Special Project Order superseded the rights and obligations of ExxonMobil to control access to the site; [ 50 ] In addition, ExxonMobil also asserted that the applications judge erred in law in concluding that the hearing in front of the arbitrator – at which ExxonMobil was not present – satisfied the requirements of procedural fairness to ExxonMobil. [ 51 ] With the exception of the procedural fairness argument, all of the other grounds of appeal essentially boil down to an assertion of error on the part of the applications judge in not concluding that ExxonMobil, as owner of the site, could not be bound or otherwise legally affected by any arbitration award arising out of a collective agreement to which ExxonMobil was not a party with respect to its ability to deny the grievors access to the construction site.

In other words, ExxonMobil’s proprietary interests in the site took precedence over all rights arising under the labour relations regime imposed by the Special Project Order. [ 52 ] Inasmuch as this tension between property rights and labour relations rights was dealt with extensively in the Long Harbour case,

it is necessary to examine it carefully to determine what it actually decided and, if necessary, to consider whether, if it applies to the current case, this Court ought to consider overturning or modifying it.

The Long Harbour Decision [ 53 ] In the Long Harbour decision, this Court unanimously upheld a dismissal of a judicial review application challenging an arbitrator’s decision which had rejected a preliminary objection to the arbitrator’s jurisdiction on the basis that the owner of the site under an SPO, who had denied two employees access to the site for engaging in an illegal strike, was not a party to the collective agreement and could not therefore be bound by any arbitration award. [ 54 ] Unlike in the current case, the owner of the site, Vale Inco, was a member of the employers’ association which was a party to the collective agreement.

The association was structured in such a way that Vale retained control over the association. [ 55 ] Vale denied the two employees in question access to the site. The employees’ site-employer thereafter terminated them, claiming that the employees could no longer make themselves available for work. In response to their grievance, the employer claimed the matter was not arbitrable because the dispute did not arise out of the

interpretation, application, administration or violation of the collective agreement, but instead resulted from the exercise of the property rights of a non-party to the agreement. [ 56 ] The arbitrator rejected the preliminary objection and, on judicial review, the applications judge refused to interfere with that ruling. The arbitrator ruled that the essential nature of the dispute was a labour relations one and that the arbitrator therefore had subject- matter jurisdiction.

He also held that, on the facts, Vale and the employers’ association were one and the same entity and because of Vale’s control over the association, the association therefore could be said to have a degree of control over the site which, as a party to the agreement, made the site access issue subject to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator. [ 57 ] The appeal to this Court was dismissed. The Court agreed with the applications judge. In reaching its conclusion, this Court was influenced by the following considerations: 1 .

To accede to the argument of the employers’ association, “would have the effect of undermining the labour relations regime that was contemplated by the SPO” (paragraph 17). The SPO, which applied to a specific geographic location, … was superimposed on Vale’s property at Long Harbour.

In respect of labour relations matters it takes preeminence over other interests pertaining to the site, even owner’s property rights, where the exercise of those property rights would materially affect or undermine the labour relations regime. (Paragraph 18) By attempting to retain control over the labour relations environment without subjecting itself to the obligations imposed by the collective agreement, Vale was employing “a colourable attempt to interfere with the proper operation of the labour relations regime (paragraph 17). 2 .

The evidence with respect to the relationship between Vale and the employers’ association demonstrated that Vale “had effectively delegated authority to [the employers’ association] to control access to the site for labour relations purposes” (paragraph 19) and a finding by the arbitrator that denial of site access because of an allegedly illegal strike was a labour relations matter over which the arbitrator had jurisdiction (paragraph 20). 3 .

The fact that Vale was not a party to the collective agreement was irrelevant, since the issue was not whether Vale was bound by an arbitrator’s determination but whether the arbitrator had jurisdiction to determine whether the grievances could proceed against the employers’ association for breach of the agreement (paragraph 20). 4 .

It was not necessary for the arbitrator or the applications judge to have made any comment or ruling that either Vale and the employers’ association were effectively one and the same entity or that Vale would in effect be bound by the arbitrator’s ruling (paragraph 21). [ 58 ] I therefore conclude that the Long Harbour decision: (

a) did not decide that Vale was bound by the arbitration award under the collective agreement to which it was not a party; (

b) did not decide that the interconnected relationship between Vale and the employers’ association was a determining factor in its analysis; (

c) did decide that because the issue of site access following an illegal strike was a labour relations matter, the arbitrator had jurisdiction to determine whether the grievances could proceed against the employers’ association. [ 59 ] In light of these conclusions, Long Harbour is not a controlling precedent with respect to resolution of the issue presented in this case. Where Long Harbour remains relevant, however, is in relation to its affirmation of the arbitrator’s and the applications judge’s general analytical approach to resolving the tension resulting from the intersection between the need for effective operation of a labour

relations regime on an SPO site and the property rights of the operator/owner of the site who is not a direct participant in the labour relations regime. [ 60 ] In the end, the resolution of the current issue depends on a policy decision as to how this tension should be resolved. It is to that issue that I now turn.

What this Case is Really About [ 61 ] It is the assertion of the primacy of property rights that provides the justification for ExxonMobil’s argument that it may, outside of the SPO-imposed labour regime, regulate site access related to employees working on the site, in the interests of safety regardless of whether safety is also a matter that is relevant to labour relations (as it would appear to be by virtue of

Article 34.03 of the collective agreement, and the issuance of safety-related policies by KKC and the other employers to their workers on site). [ 62 ] The obligations of employees working on the site to observe imposed safety standards (in the absence of directly applicable minimum standards legislation) can logically arise in only two ways: (

i) by imposition pursuant to the labour relations regime created by the applicable collective agreement, i.e. by standards imposed by the employer as employment obligations; or (ii) by some other authority, operating outside of the labour relations regime, which as a matter of law supersedes the rights and obligations existing in the labour regime. [ 63 ] ExxonMobil of necessity must eschew reliance on the first method because enforcement would have to be dealt with under the grievance-arbitration system found in the collective agreement, with the ultimate decision resting with the arbitrator.

To be successful on this appeal, therefore (and assuming it is necessary to decide it), ExxonMobil must necessarily have to rely on the second method, if it wishes to control the result of the dispute. [ 64 ] While the argument may be packaged in the wrapping of enforcing site safety, it is important to note that a right to protect site safety does not exist in and of itself; it flows from the proprietary right of an owner to control site access as it sees fit.

Site safety may be the motivation for acting in this case, but the right being argued for would be equally applicable whenever ExxonMobil disagrees with any arbitration decision, whether related to site safety or not. [ 65 ] That is why I regard the issue in this case as whether ExxonMobil may, by flexing its proprietary muscles, deny site access on any ground (except perhaps a ground prohibited by human rights legislation) and thereby disregard the effects on the operation of the labour relations regime of which it, like all others involved with the site, is a beneficiary.

ExxonMobil’s “Ownership” Interest [ 66 ] The lease between Nalcor and ExxonMobil was not put in evidence. We therefore do not know, for example, what restrictions, if any, were placed on ExxonMobil with respect to the use occupation and control of the site. It would be reasonable to assume, however, that, as in any lease which is granted for a specific purpose, there would be requirements that the lessee use the property in accordance with the purpose for which it was granted.

In this case, that might mean, for example, that the use would have to be in accordance with the purpose of constructing a GBS platform which, in turn, might further implicitly require enabling those performing that work to carry out their jobs in compliance with the SPO regime. [ 67 ] What is fair to assume, however, is that ExxonMobil was not a fee simple owner with unfettered right to use the property as it saw fit; otherwise they would have been provided with a fee simple grant or at least a fee terminable on the happening of a condition subsequent (the completion of the project). [ 68 ] It was ExxonMobil that asserted, supported by KKC, that it had the unfettered right to deny access to the site to anyone it wanted and for any purpose, however unrelated to the work on the site.

As such, the burden was on them to establish that that unfettered right existed. It cannot be assumed.

The other parties’ acceptance for the purpose of the arbitration and judicial review application that ExxonMobil was the “owner” of the site does not carry with it a definitive conclusion that an owner’s right to control site access in the context of the SPO regime that existed, was necessarily unfettered. [ 69 ] What can be inferred from the business connections between ExxonMobil, the contractors and the unions is that they were all present at or had an interest in the site to achieve a common objective, the construction of a GBS platform.

That objective was to be achieved through the framework of an SPO, which involved the designation of the construction site as a special project. As such all participants can be presumed to be in accord with (or at least did not object to) the imposition of the restrictions contemplated by the SPO regime in order to achieve the ultimate objective.

ExxonMobil cannot be considered a peripheral or bit-player in the activities performed on the site and, in fact, was involved in interactions with the contractors, including KKC, with respect to promulgation of site policies concerning behavior on the job and on the site.

Indeed, it was the ultimate beneficiary of those activities and the labour peace that the SPO was designed to promote. [ 70 ] The question for consideration in this case is whether ExxonMobil can nevertheless, when it suits them, take a position that is inimical to or undermining of the labour relations regime it was interested in and indirectly influencing.

The Interrelations and Effect of Relevant Site Policies [ 71 ] Another document that was not placed in evidence at the arbitration hearing or the judicial review hearing was the contract between ExxonMobil, as the owner of the site and party for whom the project was being conducted, and the prime contractors (e.g. KKC) who were engaged to actually perform the work.

It is not clear therefore whether there were any provisions in that contract which required the prime contractors to make it a term of employment of its employees that they comply with any policies issued by ExxonMobil relating to site access. [ 72 ] What is clear, however, is that KKC issued to its employees a “Bull Arm Worksite Substance Abuse Policy” dated October 1, 2012 which, after stating that both ExxonMobil and KKC had a responsibility “to provide a safe, productive and healthy work

environment,” stipulated that the possession, concealment, transportation, supply and consumption of prohibited substances, including alcohol or drugs, at the site was “strictly forbidden” and that reporting to or performing work with alcohol levels above a certain defined limit was an offence under the policy.

The result of a violation was stipulated to “result in removal from and loss of worksite privileges/access.” [ 73 ] Two weeks later KKC issued another policy, denominated the “Bull Arm Worksite Site Absolutes Policy SOP,” the stated purpose of which was “to encourage safe behavior … at the work place” and which, if violated “ may result in denial of site access”. The “Site Absolutes” were defined as a set of rules established by ExxonMobil which “if violated, will result in denial of site access.” This statement is inconsistent with the earlier statement that violations may result in denial of site access.

The term “denial of site access” was defined as refusal or revocation of site access privileges “for violating the Hebron Project Site Absolutes or other unacceptable conduct as deemed by [ExxonMobil].” One of the Site Absolutes stipulated: “No use or possession of alcohol or illegal drugs or noncompliance with the site substance abuse policy.” By incorporating into the Site Absolutes an obligation to comply with employer-issued substance abuse policies, and conversely, by incorporating into the KKC – issued policy an obligation to comply with ExxonMobil’s site absolute policy, ExxonMobil’s admonitions become intertwined with the labour relations policies being enforced by HEPA and RDTC at the site. [ 74 ] Though issued by KKC, the Policy stated that it was the responsibility of KKC and ExxonMobil to educate all personnel about the site absolutes.

The Policy also stated that “decisions for site access are made by Operator (ExxonMobil) and such decisions could be permanent through Project duration and cannot be challenged through grievance or arbitration.” With respect to this latter statement, it was arguably not within the power of KKC unilaterally to withdraw from grievance arbitration decisions based on site absolute rules designed to encourage safe behavior at the work place. That was arguably a matter of labour relations. The Labour Relations Act requires grievance arbitration in relation to all differences arising out of the

interpretation, application, administration or alleged violation of a collective agreement (section 86(1)) and, as noted previously, a collective agreement is defined to encompass provisions respecting “terms and conditions of employment and related matters” (section 2(1)(f)).

Alleged violations of policies designed to promote safety at the work place certainly fall within matters “related” to employment at the site if not directly within terms and conditions of employment itself. [ 75 ] In addition to the foregoing employer-issued policies, ExxonMobil itself issued a “Bull Arm Site Absolutes Policy” dated March 5, 2013, with the same stated objective as the KKC policies and in essentially the same language as the KKC Site Absolutes Policy except in one respect: in defining “site absolutes” ExxonMobil described them as a set of rules “which, if violated, may result in denial of site access,” while still emphasizing that the decision regarding site access remained that of ExxonMobil. [ 76 ] What is clear from a reading of these three sets of policies is that they were all designed to achieve the same objective of safety at the work site and that their subject-matter and manner of implementation were interrelated.

KKC and ExxonMobil effectively undertook joint responsibility with respect to administration and enforcement of the site absolutes regardless of what was formally stated in

Article 12 of the applicable collective agreement. [ 77 ] While ExxonMobil purported to reserve onto itself the unilateral right to deny site access to both employees and visitors, the actions that could give rise to such denial as a penalty were, at least in relation to workers on the site, actions that were very much related to work at the site. KKC, by issuing its own policies, incorporated ExxonMobil’s Site Absolute Policies into the work relationship as part of the labour relations environment.

To that extent, violations of those policies were subject to the grievance and arbitration scheme contemplated by the SPO. [ 78 ] The net result of these interrelated policies was that through the KKC-issued “Bull Arm Worksite Absolutes SOP” (the “KKC policy”), the employees were, as part of their employment relationship governed by the collective agreement, made subject to the ExxonMobil-issued “Bull Arm Site Absolutes Policy” (the “ExxonMobil policy”). Under the KKC policy, employees could be denied site access for violating the ExxonMobil policy (or for “other conduct deemed unacceptable by [ExxonMobil]”).

The “site absolutes” under both policies included: (

i) no use or possession of alcohol or drugs; and (ii) non-compliance with the site substance abuse policy. [ 79 ] Thus, a grievance against KKC (HPEA) challenging discipline or worksite access for improper alcohol use would, of necessity, involve consideration of whether there was in fact a violation of the ExxonMobil policy because that policy was incorporated by reference into the KKC policy, the alleged violation of which would be central to any grievance/arbitration process.

Accordingly, the arbitrator would have to have subject matter jurisdiction to determine whether the site absolutes defined in the KKC policy and, by extension, in the ExxonMobil policy, were violated and whether denial of site access was an appropriate remedy. It follows that the arbitrator was correct to reject HPEAs preliminary jurisdictional objection to his dealing with the grievance.

Furthermore, the applications judge was correct not to set aside that jurisdictional ruling on judicial review. [ 80 ] The site absolutes stated in identical terms in both policies read: No use or possession or [sic] illegal drugs or non-compliance with the site substance abuse policy. (Emphasis added.) The arbitrator addressed both aspects of this prohibition. He made the finding that “the evidence does not reveal that the grievors used or possessed alcohol or any other illegal drugs while on site or while at camp” (Award, p. 28).

With respect to non-compliance with KKC’s site substance abuse policy he referred to the specific prohibitions therein (which provided that “personnel shall not report for work or perform work with alcohol levels equal to or in excess of [certain stipulated standards]”) and concluded that there was no violation because the grievors did not report for work nor did they perform any work.

They were not on work duty but simply returned to their living quarters on site to spend the night, nor did they consume any alcohol on site (Award, p. 27). [ 81 ] The result of these findings of fact, which involved application of the site absolute prohibitions contained in the identically- worded KKC and ExxonMobil policies, effectively deprived any decision to refuse the grievors access to the site, based on their behavior, of any legitimacy.

[ 82 ] The only remaining basis upon which ExxonMobil could therefore maintain that it could nevertheless revoke site access privileges was to assert the primacy of their proprietary rights as “owner”. There not being a violation of the ExxonMobil policy (as found by the arbitrator) and no “other unacceptable conduct as deemed by [ExxonMobil]” having been alleged, the assertion of the ability of unrestrained property rights is all that ExxonMobil is effectively left with. The Nature of the Legal Regime Created by the Special Project Order [ 83 ]

Section 70 of the Labour Relations Act allows the Lieutenant-Governor in Council to declare an undertaking for the construction or fabrication of works at the Bull Arm site to be a special project and to prescribe the geographic site or scope of work to which the declaration relates.

It also permits a designation of the employers, employers associations, unions and councils of trade unions that are permitted to be involved in collective bargaining related to “employment on the special project” and to designate any collective agreement that is to govern work in relation to the project. [ 84 ] By virtue of the Hebron Development Project Special Project Order , the Hebron development project at the Bull Arm site was so designated as a special project.

Section 4 of the Order specifically limited the parties that could be involved in collective bargaining “in relation to employment on the special project” to HPEA and RDTC and

section 5 designated the specific collective agreement “for the purpose of the special project.” [ 85 ] The arbitrator characterized the nature of this regime as follows: … it can be seen that there is a special labour relations relationship between the employer [represented by HPEA] and the union [represented by RDTC]who are parties to this arbitration.

The special project declaration deals with all matters of labour relations at the subject site and contains no provision for the involvement of the owner of the project, in this case ExxonMobil Canada Properties. … The regulatory scheme is meant to include all areas of labour relations including the right to discipline employees who transgress various rules established for their conduct. … In short, the collective agreement is replete with sections and subsections which refer to the unique relationship between the employer and this union.

There is no room in that relationship for the owner with respect to labour relations. It is for these two parties to dictate the conditions of employment of the workforce at that site. (Emphasis added.) [ 86 ] I agree with this characterization. As quoted earlier, the arbitrator went on to observe that “to insert the owner [ExxonMobil] into this equation with overall authority to thwart the process by determining who, for labour relations purposes, can attend at the site” made no sense.

It would effectively give ExxonMobil a “veto” over labour relations matters that were specifically consigned to other persons by the SPO. [ 87 ] Unless one was prepared to give primacy to the assertion of property rights regardless of how doing so would undermine a legislative policy that was being enforced for the benefit for all, one is driven to the conclusion that the rights flowing from the imposed collective agreement were intended by the legislature to have primacy over all other rights at the site that impacted on collective bargaining, which in accordance with section 2(1) (

f) of the Act , relates to “terms and conditions of employment and related matters ” (emphasis added). The jurisprudence based on notions of privity of contract that has had some currency in some other labour relations contexts is irrelevant in the current context where the regime is subject to an SPO. [ 88 ] Counsel for ExxonMobil placed considerable reliance upon the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Bisaillon v.

Concordia University , 2006 SCC 19 , [2006] 1 S.C.R. 666 in support of his submission that ExxonMobil, as a non-party to the collective agreement, could not be “bound” or affected by the arbitration decision.

In particular, he relied on the following passages from the judgment of LeBel J.: [40] When a grievance arbitrator finds it impossible to resolve a dispute or part of a dispute because he or she does not have jurisdiction over the parties, the ordinary courts retain jurisdiction over the dispute. … Such situations are likely to arise where the grievance arbitrator cannot claim to have authority over persons considered to be third parties in relation to the collective agreement and cannot render decisions against them … [41] The inherent limits on their in personam jurisdiction do not mean that grievance arbitrators have to ensure that their decisions have no effect on third parties.

It is possible for third parties who do not belong to the bargaining unit, such as company managers, to be directly or indirectly affected by an arbitration award. However, these third parties will not be legally bound by the award. … As we shall see, the mere fact that the same issue arises in

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