2015 NBCA 38, 2015 NBCA 38

COURT OF APPEAL OF COUR D’APPEL DU NEW BRUNSWICK NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK 8-15-CA MICHELE MURDOCH APPELLANT MICHELE MURDOCH APPELANTE - and - - et - HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN RESPONDENT SA MAJESTÉ LA REINE INTIMÉE Murdoch v. R., 2015 NBCA 38 Murdoch c.

R., 2015 NBCA 38 CORAM: The Honourable Chief Justice Drapeau The Honourable Justice Deschênes The Honourable Justice Green CORAM : l’honorable juge en chef Drapeau l’honorable juge Deschênes l’honorable juge Green Appeal from a decision of the Provincial Court: January 28, 2015 (sentence) Appel d’une décision de la Cour provinciale : Le 28 janvier 2015 (prononcé de la sentence) History of Case: Historique de la cause : Decision under appeal: Unreported Décision frappée d’appel : inédite Preliminary or incidental proceedings: Court of Appeal: [2015] N.B.J.

No. 46 Procédures préliminaires ou accessoires : Cour d’appel : [2015] A.N.-B. n o 46 Appeal heard and judgment rendered: June 23, 2015 Appel entendu et jugement rendu : le 23 juin 2015 Reasons delivered: October 1, 2015 Motifs déposés : le 1 er octobre 2015

Reasons for judgment by: The Honourable Chief Justice Drapeau Motifs de jugement : l’honorable juge en chef Drapeau Concurred in by: The Honourable Justice Deschênes The Honourable Justice Green Souscrivent aux motifs : l’honorable juge Deschênes l’honorable juge Green Counsel at hearing: For the appellant: Thomas J. Burke, Q.C. and Rebecca J. Butler For the respondent: Kathryn Gregory Avocats à l’audience : Pour l’appelante : Thomas J. Burke, c.r. et Rebecca J. Butler Pour l’intimée: Kathryn Gregory LA COUR On June 23, 2015, the Court accepted the parties’ joint recommendation for disposition.

In the result, the six-month jail term imposed in Provincial Court (for the appellant’s abuse-of-trust fraud against her employer) was varied to a 73-day jail term to be served intermittently, with the existing probation order amended accordingly. The Court’s reasons for acceptance of the parties’ recommendation are set out in the text that follows. LA COUR Le 23 juin 2015, la Cour a accepté la recommandation conjointe des parties en matière de dispositif. Par conséquent, la peine d’emprisonnement de six mois infligée par la Cour provinciale (au

titre de la fraude que l’appelante avait commise contre son employeur alors qu’elle occupait un poste de confiance) a été commuée en une peine d’emprisonnement de 73 jours à purger de façon discontinue, l’ordonnance de probation existante étant modifiée en conséquence. Les motifs pour lesquels la Cour a accepté la recommandation des parties sont énoncés dans le texte qui suit. The judgment of the Court was delivered by DRAPEAU, C.J.N.B. I.

Introduction [ 1 ] It is widely accepted that the public interest is best served by emphasizing denunciation and deterrence in imposing sentence for thefts or frauds committed by employees who thereby abuse a position of trust in relation to their employers. That view has prompted this Court, and other appellate courts, to hold that, barring “exceptional circumstances”, a fit

sentence for most categories of trust thefts or trust frauds by employees is one that features a jail term: R. v. Steeves and Connors , 2005 NBCA 85 , 288 N.B.R. (2d) 1 , at para. 10 (“ Steeves (2005)”) and R. v. Chaulk , 2005 NBCA 86 , 287 N.B.R. (2d) 375 . For ease of reference, we will refer to that general approach as the abuse-of-trust sentencing guideline. [ 2 ] Over a six-week span in early 2014, and on 12 separate occasions, the appellant embezzled a relatively modest sum of money, the property of her employer. She stopped the defalcations only when confronted with proof of their occurrence.

While the funds taken did not exceed $5,000, the Crown signaled the seriousness with which it viewed the case by electing to prosecute by indictment under s. 380(1) ( b )(

i) of the Criminal Code . As a result, the appellant’s maximum liability for imprisonment purposes rose from six months (maximum jail term on

summary conviction) to two years. [ 3 ] After a fulsome debate on point, the sentencing judge found the case did not feature “exceptional circumstances”. He concluded, rightly in our judgment, that binding judicial precedents compelled the imposition of a jail term for the appellant’s systematic frauds against her employer. The judge set that term at six months, which was to be followed by unsupervised probation for a further six months.

He did not consider the option of an intermittent sentence. [ 4 ] At the hearing on appeal, we expressed the tentative view that, while the judge could not be faulted for finding “exceptional circumstances” did not percolate from the record, it appeared he had fallen into error by failing to adapt the jail term to the case’s particular factual matrix. With respect to the latter point, we suggested a judicious application of the Criminal Code ’s sentencing principles pointed to an intermittent sentence.

After considering the panel’s observations, the parties made a joint recommendation regarding disposition, the key element of which was a 73-day jail term to be served intermittently. We accepted that recommendation and, at the urging of the parties, undertook to provide detailed reasons for the views articulated hereinabove and our acceptance of their common submission. Here are those reasons. II. The Context [ 5 ] The appellant stands convicted of the indictable offence of fraud under s. 380(1) ( b )(

i) of the Criminal Code . According to the Information, the fraud was committed between January 2 and February 12, 2014, its focus was money (less than $5,000), and the victim was Mark’s Work Wearhouse. [ 6 ] The appellant pled guilty on January 22, 2015. At the hearing on sentence that immediately followed, the salient offence-related facts were not in dispute. [ 7 ] As mentioned, on 12 separate occasions during the six-week span specified in the charge, and while in the course of her employment as a cashier, the appellant diverted to her personal use funds belonging to her employer, Mark’s Work Wearhouse.

The serial misappropriations came to light after the employer discovered discrepancies in connection with refunds to customers. The follow-up investigation revealed the appellant had, on each of those 12 occasions, credited her debit card with refunds generated by fictitious returns of merchandise. In essence, the appellant used her employer’s computer system to register bogus return-of- merchandise claims and forward the resulting refunds to her own debit card.

The 12 fraudulent transactions yielded a total of $1,555.55. [ 8 ] When confronted with her misdeeds, the appellant initially attempted to shift some of the blame to fellow employees. Eventually, she accepted full responsibility. As would be expected, the appellant was dismissed from her employment, and the matter was referred to the RCMP for investigation and processing. [ 9 ] The appellant was born on July 7, 1985. She was 29 years of age and in the late stages of a first pregnancy when the underlying misappropriations took place.

She gave birth to a daughter on February 14, 2014, two days after the last fraudulent transaction covered by the charge. Within a month, and despite her dismissal by Mark’s Work Wearhouse, the appellant found another job as a cashier. The record is mute on the subject, but one might be forgiven for doubting she disclosed to her new employer the events that brought an end to her employment with Mark’s Work Wearhouse. [ 10 ] At any rate, from March 15 to May 5, 2014, the appellant worked at a Sobeys grocery store. During working hours, a relative looked after her newborn daughter.

This arrangement was less than ideal because the appellant was breastfeeding and, as one would expect, she had developed a very close bond with her child. [ 11 ] The appellant quit her job at Sobeys immediately upon qualifying for Employment Insurance maternity leave benefits.

[12] The appellant stood before the sentencing judge without having made restitution of any portionof the funds she embezzled, and without offering any proposal for reimbursement. At the time, she was in receipt of EmploymentInsurance maternity benefits, which amounted to $1,337.50 per month, and her common law spouse was employed with Canada Post,earning gross monthly income of $3,687. Thus, their joint gross income amounted to $4,824.50 per month, or close to $60,000 on ayearly basis. It is recorded in the pre-sentence report that total monthly household expenses were in the order of $3,810.00.

Those outlaysincluded $400 for recreational activities. In early 2014, the appellant’s spouse received a discharge in bankruptcy and was in the processof rebuilding his credit. Clearly, a restitution plan with periodic, albeit modest, payments was within the appellant’s means. [13] At the time of sentencing, the appellant had not been separated from her daughter since ceasingemployment at Sobeys in May 2014.

In fact, she was still breastfeeding, although it was her intention to discontinue within a shortwhile. [14] The appellant has suffered since adolescence from eating disorders, specifically anorexianervosa and bulimia. [15] The pre-sentence report was generally favourable, at least in pertinent respects. [16] Counsel for the appellant contended the record revealed “exceptional circumstances” and urgedthe sentencing judge to impose a conditional sentence of imprisonment of four months’ duration. [17] Crown counsel submitted there was nothing exceptional about the case and argued a six-monthjail term would be appropriate. [18] When invited to speak, the appellant expressed remorse for her defalcations, pointing out theywere prompted by her household’s financial difficulties.

She asserted those difficulties had been exacerbated by excessive spendingduring the previous holiday season. The appellant poignantly made the case for a non-custodial sentence by stating: “I definitely regretall of this and I need my daughter, my daughter needs me as much as I need her”. [19] After finding the case was not exceptional, the judge sentenced the appellant to jail for sixmonths. He ordered unsupervised probation for six months following the appellant’s release from custody. The judge did not orderrestitution. [20] Leave to appeal and bail were granted to the appellant on February 13, 2015.

She had spent 17days in jail before her release. [21] There is no cross-appeal by the Attorney General. Thus, the issue of the appropriateness of arestitution order is not before us. III. Analysis [22] The standard of review applicable to sentence appeals is well-known. It is summarized inSteeves v. R., 2010 NBCA 57, 360 N.B.R. (2d) 88: In sum, a court of appeal is not at liberty to substitute its view of fitness for that of the sentencing judge unless the sentence imposed isthe product of either an error of law or an error in principle, or unless it is clearly unreasonable (see R. v.

Shropshire, (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 227, [1995] S.C.J. No. 52 (QL), at paras. 46-48; R. v. Solowan, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 309, [2008] S.C.J. No. 55 (QL),2008 SCC 62, at para. 16; R. v. L.M. [2008] 2 S.C.R. 163, [2008] S.C.J. No. 31 (QL), 2008 SCC 31, at paras. 14-15; and R. v. C.A.C.(2009), 349 N.B.R. (2d) 265, [2009] N.B.J. No. 342 (QL), 2009 NBCA 68 (Bell, J.A. for the Court, at para. 4)). If the sentence at issueis the result of reversible error, the court of appeal bears the burden of prescribing the punishment that it considers fit in thecircumstances. [para. 25]

Appellate intervention is inappropriate unless one of the following questions is answered in the affirmative:

(1) Is the sentence the resultof an error of law?

(2) Did the judge commit an error in principle in the exercise of his or her discretion?

(3) Is the sentence clearlyunreasonable having regard to the principles of sentencing? In our view, the sentencing judge’s failure to consider an intermittentsentence constitutes an error in principle that compels an affirmative answer to the second question. A. The abuse-of-trust sentencing guideline

(1) General observations [23] The jurisprudence emanating from this Court, and other courts in this jurisdiction andelsewhere, espouses the view that, absent “exceptional circumstances”, the public interest requires a jail term be imposed, in most cases,for employees who abuse a position of employment-related trust by stealing from or defrauding their employers: R. v. McNamara (J.)(1992), (NB CA), 126 N.B.R. (2d) 298, [1992] N.B.J. No. 451 (C.A.) (QL), at para. 4; Steeves (2005), at para. 1;Chaulk, at para. 3; R. v Pierce, (ON CA), [1997] O.J. No. 715 (C.A.) (QL); R. v. Fulcher, 2007 ABCA 381, [2007]A.J.

No. 1323 (QL); and R. v. Hogan, 2012 PESC 11, [2012] P.E.I.J. No. 7 (QL), per Mitchell J., as he then was. [24] In most cases of trust theft or trust fraud by an employee, the need for denunciation anddeterrence arising from the abuse of trust overwhelms the typically numerous mitigating circumstances and leads inexorably to theconclusion that a jail term is the only “just” sanction that will achieve the fundamental purpose of sentencing. As is well known, thatpurpose is to “contribute […] to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society”: s. 718.

Few would quibblewith the proposition that the threat of jail is a particularly effective deterrent with “law-abiding persons, with good employment recordsand family”: R. v.

Proulx, 2000 SCC 5, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61, at para. 129. [25] In Steeves (2005), the Court held the longstanding abuse-of-trust sentencing guideline has notbeen displaced by the codification of sentencing principles effected through ss. 718-718.2 of the Criminal Code and by the instauration ofthe conditional sentence regime found in s. 742.1: In our view, the sentencing principles enunciated above stand unaffected by the enactment of ss. 718-718.2.

That legislative articulationof the fundamental purpose of sentencing and its objectives, and codification of the principles of sentencing did not render obsolete thetraditional view that the need for general deterrence will usually lead to the imposition of a jail term for any employee who, incommitting theft from his or her employer, abused a position of trust. In that regard, we note that the introductory part of s. 718 identifies the fundamental purpose of sentencing as that of contributing, interalia, “to respect for the law” and that s. 718(

b) includes general deterrence as one of the objectives of the “just sanctions” that courts aredirected to impose. We note, as well, that s. 718.2(a)(iii) calls for an increase in sentence to account for evidence that the offender, incommitting the offence, abused a position of trust in relation to the victim. That provision was considered in R. v. Matchett (H.J.) (1997), (NB CA), 188 N.B.R. (2d) 321 (C.A.), where we indicated, at para. 13, that an offence committed by abusing aposition of trust “would ordinarily command a sentence to be served in jail and not elsewhere.” Finally, we underscore that the “lessrestrictive sanctions” to which reference is made in s. 718.2(

d) can be imposed only if “appropriate in the circumstances” and that the“available sanctions other than imprisonment” targeted by s. 718.2(

e) come into play only if they are “reasonable in the circumstances”. Moreover, while no category of offence is excluded from the Criminal Code’s conditional sentence regime (see R. v. Baldwin (M.)(2000), 2000 NBCA 60 , 232 N.B.R. (2d) 240 (C.A.)), it remains that theft of an employer’s property by an employee whothereby abuses a position will usually lead to a custodial sentence. That is so because the offence in question “is one in which the effectsof incarceration are likely to have a real deterrent effect”: R. v.

Proulx, 2000 SCC 5 , [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61, at 117. [paras. 12-14] [26] On that score, Steeves (2005) is harmonious with the conclusion reached in Pierce, whereFinlayson J.A., writing for the Ontario Court of Appeal, stated: I would, however, refuse the application to permit the appellant to serve the sentence in the community. The abuse of a position of trustor authority in relation to a victim is an express aggravating circumstance set out in the sentencing guidelines under s. 718.2. This factorhas traditionally drawn a severe custodial term even with first offenders.

I do not believe that this court should exercise its discretion infavour of having the appellant serve her sentence in the community where, as here, the trial judge has clearly stated his concerns as tohow a non-custodial term would be viewed by the community. Despite the passage of s. 742.1, the principles of general deterrence and

public denunciation require a custodial term in these circumstances. [para. 48] See also R. v. Holmes, 1999 ABCA 228, [1999] A.J. No. 862 (QL), at para. 8. [27] In a nutshell, the abuse-of-trust sentencing guideline fits comfortably within the sentencingscheme elaborated in

Part XXIII of the Criminal Code. Not surprisingly, the guideline has been routinely applied by sentencing courts inthis province for trust thefts or trust frauds by employees, as more fully appears from the following sample of decisions rendered over thelast decade or so: Name Date Location Amount Notes SentenceR. v.

Evans(Glennie J.) 2003 NBQB 54Saint John $120,416 Stole fromelderly manwho he wasemployed tocare for 1 year jailterm, 1 yearof probation R. v.Philibert(NBPC,Desjardins J.(unreported) 2007 Grand Falls $373,000 $96,000 inrestitution paid,ordered to pay$277,000 more 18 months’jail R. v.Ouellette(LeBlanc J.) 2009 NBCP 32, 2009NBPC 32 Edmundston $53,127.33 Between 2002-2003 44 y/o Found guilty attrial 12 months’jail R. v.Thornton (NBPC,Mahoney J.)(unreported) 2010 Woodstock $200,000 43 y/o Plea of guilty Accountantfrom 2003-2007 18 months’jail 1 year ofprobation $220,246.74restitutionBurton (NBQB,McLellan J.)(unreported) 2010 Saint John $250,000 $243,735 paidin restitution 1 year jailterm R. v.Hamilton(NBPC,Jackson C.J.)(unreported) 2011 Woodstock >$5,000 Found guilty attrial 10 months’jail 18 months’probation Roy-Bossé (NBPC,LeBlanc J.)(unreported) 2011 Edmundston $300 30 days’ jail,on weekends R. v.

Cyr(NBPC,Duffie J.)(unreported) 2013 Grand Falls $20,000 Over the courseof severalmonths in 2011 21 y/o Plea of guilty 1st timeoffender 6 months’ jail2 years’probation $20,000restitution

R. v. Tardif(LaVigne, J.) 2014 NBBR246 ,2014 NBQB246 Edmundston Approximately.$250,000 Between 2008-2011 47 y/o Plea of guilty 2 years’ jail Lizotte(NBPC,Volpé J.)(unreported) 2014 Edmundston $800 90 days’ jail,on weekends Arbeau(NBPC,Oliver J.)(unreported) 2014 Burton $100,000 57 y/o 18 months’jail Nason (NBPC,McLean J.)(unreported) 2015 Fredericton $2,500 42 years old,financialtroubles, 3children athome 4 months’jail, 1 year ofprobation R. v.

Budden(McNally J.) 2015 NBQB 98Moncton $7,445.05 fraud, theft,forgery anduttering aforgeddocument, noexceptionalcircumstances 6 months’jail,restitutionorder of$7,545 Martin-Schedler (NBPC,RichardsA.C.J.)(unreported) 2015 Fredericton $40,000 Emotionalissues,depression,abusivechildhood donot rise to“exceptionalcircumstances” 1 year jailterm R. v.

Ing (NBPC,Arseneault,C.J.) (unreported) 2015 Moncton Approximately$75,000 Between July2011-June2012, 26 y/o 1st offender Plea of guilty 9 months’jail, $200victim finesurcharge [28] Interestingly, the same approach to sentencing for employment-related defalcations seems to beentrenched in England. The following butterfly-like foray into English jurisprudence confirms that state of affairs. [29] In R. v. Sharpe, [2000] All ER (D) 795, the accused pled guilty to defrauding his employer.

Theaccused performed consultant work outside his normal duties for the benefit of his employer’s clients (contrary to his employmentcontract), and then billed his employer for the work through a sham consultant firm, the sole director of which was discovered to be theaccused’s wife. The sentencing judge noted the fundamental breach of trust on the part of the accused and sentenced him to nine months’imprisonment on each count, concurrent.

The accused appealed on the grounds that the sentence was wrong in principle and manifestlyexcessive, considering the mitigating factors of his guilty plea and previous good character. On appeal, the Court effectively echoed theCanadian approach, noting that, absent “exceptional circumstances”, an immediate custodial sentence was appropriate. The Court citedthe long and deliberate course of deceit undertaken by the accused, and determined the fact the employer had suffered no loss wasimmaterial. The Court found the sentence imposed had been neither wrong in principle nor manifestly excessive. [30] In R. v.

Austin, [2001] EWCA Crim 1972, the accused was a 31-year-old female who admittedto falsifying 153 company cheques over a period of two years and nine months, for a total of £34,000. Following arrest, she made “fulland frank admissions”. She subsequently pled guilty to 13 counts of theft, and asked for 140 further offences to be taken intoconsideration. It was revealed she suffered from psychological insecurities that led her to make purchases obsessively on credit, and, as aresult, had a significant amount of debt.

However, the stolen money had been used to make more of these purchases, and not to pay offthe debt incurred. She was sentenced to 15 months’ incarceration. On appeal, the accused asked the Court to suspend her sentence on thegrounds that she was previously of good character, and was the only able-bodied member of her family and the sole caregiver for herhusband and son. The Court referenced the “sheer scale and persistence of the defendant’s offending, and the fact that the moniesobtained dishonestly were not generally spent on reducing her debts”.

It found that, in these circumstances, there was no possibility of a

suspended sentence, and the length of the sentence imposed was not unreasonable. However, the Court considered it was in the publicinterest that the defendant be released, given her personal circumstances. The sentence was therefore reduced to nine months’imprisonment in order to bring about her immediate release. [31] In R. v. Lamb, [2004] EWCA Crim 1492, [2002] All ER (D) 292 (Jun), the accused was a 41-year-old female branch manager at a travel agency. She stole £23,000 from her employer, and pled guilty to theft.

At sentencing, thejudge noted she had been of previously good character, was married, and had three dependent children, one of whom required specialcare, before imposing a 15 month custodial sentence. On appeal, the accused submitted the sentence was “manifestly excessive in thecircumstances”. The Court observed that, due to the offence, a custodial sentence was inevitable. However, it agreed the length of thesentence was manifestly excessive. After considering R. v. Mills, [2002] All ER (D) 24 (Jan), the Court reduced the sentence to sixmonths’ imprisonment. [32] In R. v.

Nield, [2005] EWCA Crim 472, the accused was entrusted with cash-handling duties byher employer of nine years. She admitted to stealing £12,000 from her employer over a 15-month period, and pled guilty to theft. Thesentencing judge imposed a 12 month custodial sentence. On appeal, the Court took notice of her previous good character, and apsychiatric report indicating she had a significant risk of self-harm and a history of attempted suicide. After considering R. v. Kefford,[2002] 2 Cr App Rep (S) 495, [2002] All ER (D) 37 (Mar), the Court reduced the sentence to six months in custody. [33] In R. v.

Worthington, [2006] All ER (D) 49 (Aug), the accused resigned from her post as anaccounts clerk when her employer confronted her about discrepancies in its business accounts. Upon investigation, it was discoveredsignatures had been forged on 56 cheques with a total value of just under £40,000. The accused pled guilty to ten counts of theft. Thepre-sentence report revealed the accused was pregnant with her third child, and suffered from epilepsy and depression. Despite herpersonal circumstances, the trial judge found that only an immediate custodial sentence of 12 months was appropriate.

Her personalcircumstances were considered in that the sentence was reduced from the sentence that would otherwise have been imposed. Theaccused’s appeal was dismissed. The Court of Appeal agreed that 12 months’ imprisonment was appropriate. [34] In R. v. Johnson, [2007] All ER (D) 283 (Mar), [2006] EWCA Crim 3023, the accused was a24-year-old male postal worker. His employers noticed a number of postal items had gone missing, and placed his activities undersurveillance.

He was soon after arrested, and a search of his home uncovered three stolen credit cards and two ‘dummy’ items which hadbeen dispatched by his employer’s investigators the previous day as part of the investigation. Initially, the accused denied any theft, andclaimed he had forgotten to deliver the items and planned to destroy them so he would not be fired for delaying the mail. The accusedhad no criminal record. He eventually pled guilty, and told the probation officer he was experiencing personal, financial and emotionaldifficulties when he had committed the offence.

He was convicted at trial and sentenced to 15 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, heasked the Court to reduce his sentence considering his plea, his good character, the pressure he had been under at the time he hadcommitted the offence, and the absence of any actual financial gain. The Court stated that, in the circumstances, nothing but a custodialsentence was appropriate.

However, given the mitigating circumstances, and the fact that the Crown had presented its case on a verynarrow basis, the sentence was reduced to nine months’ imprisonment. [35] As is readily apparent, those cases also shed light on the approach taken by English courts to theissue of exceptionality. We will address that question in short order. However, before doing so, we think it important to underscore thelimits on the applicability of the abuse-of-trust sentencing guideline.

(2) The ambit of the abuse-of-trust sentencing guideline [36] It is universally accepted that the abuse-of-trust sentencing guideline applies to large-scalethefts or frauds (see R. v. Dobis, (ON CA), [2002] O.J. No. 646 (C.A.) (QL), R. v. Clarke, (ONCA), [2004] O.J. No. 3438 (C.A.) (QL), at para. 17, and R. v. Johnson, 2010 ABCA 392, [2010] A.J. No. 1445 (QL)). There is alsosignificant support for the application of the guideline to cases where the value of the subject-matter of the offence is relatively modest,but the thefts or frauds are: “repeated” over a significant timeframe (R. v.

Zentner, 2012 ABCA 332, [2012] A.J. No. 1179 (QL), at para.25); “numerous … [extending] over a considerable period” (Chaulk, at paras. 4 and 8); “instances of a practice of some duration”(Steeves (2005), at para. 9); or “systematic” (R. v. McKinnon, 2005 ABCA 8, [2005] A.J. No. 12 (QL), at paras. 59-63). Reasonablepeople may disagree over what combination of value and frequency, viewed contextually, triggers the application of the abuse-of-trustsentencing guideline.

In other words, that determination is largely driven by the facts of the particular case, and stands to be reviewed onappeal by the application of a deferential standard. [37] Moreover, the abuse-of-trust sentencing guideline is not concerned with cases of employee theftsimpliciter. For the guideline to be in play, the employee must have abused a position of trust (in relation to the employer) in committingthe offence. That elementary, but important point is made by Richard J.A., writing for the Court, in Veno v. R., 2012 NBCA 15, 384N.B.R. (2d) 126, at paras. 13-16:

There is ample authority for the proposition that theft by one who is entrusted with money in the course of his or her employmentconstitutes an abuse of a position of trust. In fact, most of the theft cases where s. 718.2(a)(iii) has been applied feature suchcircumstances. This was the situation in Steeves and Connors and its companion case, R. v. Chaulk, 2005 NBCA 86, 287 N.B.R. (2d)375, and is the situation in most of the reported cases (see for example: R. v. McKinnon, 2005 ABCA 8, [2005] A.J. No. 12 (QL)(embezzlement by a bookkeeper); R. v. Holmes, 1999 ABCA 228, [1999] A.J.

No. 862 (QL) (bank manager stealing from accounts); R.c. Dubreuil, [1992] J.Q. No. 1081 (C.A.) (QL) (bank employee embezzling funds); R. v. Reid, 2004 YKCA 4, [2004] Y.J. No. 3 (QL)(cashier stealing from employer); R. v. Pierce, (ON CA), [1997] O.J. No. 715 (C.A.) (comptroller stealing fromemployer); R. v. Dobis, (ON CA), [2002] O.J. No. 646 (C.A.) (fraud by accounting manager); R. v. Clarke, (ON CA), [2004] O.J. No. 3438 (C.A.) (bank telephone agent stealing from accounts); and R. v. Bowes (J.M.) (1994), (NB CA), 155 N.B.R. (2d) 321, [1994] N.B.J. No. 472 (C.A.) (QL) (lawyer stealing trust funds)).

However, the presentcase is different. Mr. Veno did not steal money that was entrusted to him in the course of his employment. He used information hegained through his employment and, just as importantly, through his friendship with his employer in order to identify the object of hiscrime and the means by which he could commit it. I note that, as an aggravating factor pursuant to s. 718.2(a)(iii), “abuse of a position of trust” is not limited to theft-type cases. There areother offences, such as sexual assault, where s. 718.2(a)(iii) has been applied. A credible argument can certainly be made that Mr.

Venobreached the trust his employer and friend placed in him when he hired him, giving him an opportunity to learn where the money waskept and how to get access to the house. However, when it comes to theft-type cases, such an argument has been rejected by this Court inAdler.

In Adler, a homemaker hired by an elderly couple through the services of the Red Cross “inveigled herself into their confidences” andgained access to the couple’s bank debit card and personal identification number, after which she “proceeded to deplete the account ofthe couple’s life savings of $27,890.00” and then forged “three cheques for a total of $1,650” (para. 2). Upon pleading guilty to hercrimes, Ms. Adler was sentenced to serve a conditional sentence of eight months. On appeal, this Court varied the sentence to eightmonths incarceration.

In doing so, the Court said as follows: In this case there was no aggravating factor of trust. The Crown argued that there was a breach of trust but argues it in a non legal senseof abuse of confidence rather than a recognized legal sense of vesting their finances in Ms. Adler’s hands for their benefit. The accusedwas engaged to look after the physical comfort needs of this elderly couple as a homemaker and not in any fiduciary capacity. She issimply a thief.

If she had been in a position of trust or authority and breached such position, an aggravating factor, we would consider asentence of eight months in the circumstances of this case neither fit nor proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of herresponsibility as set forth in s. 718.1. The appeal in relation to sentence is allowed. [para. 11] I find Adler indistinguishable from the present case and, in my view, the Provincial Court judge was bound to apply it. The judge simplysaid it was distinguishable because Mr.

Veno worked for the victim and learned of the existence of the funds through his employment.However, Ms. Adler worked for the elderly couple she defrauded, and it was in the course of this employment that she learned of theexistence of their bank account and how to gain access to it. There are simply no significant distinguishing features. Adler set the law onthe application of s. 718.2(a)(iii) to theft-type cases in this Province, and the failure to apply it constitutes an error of law. [paras. 13-16] [38] Additionally, it was never contemplated that the abuse-of-trust sentencing guideline wouldapply to

summary conviction offences. The Attorney General qua guardian of the public interest in criminal proceedings can be reliedupon to take appropriate action in the discharge of that critical responsibility. Accordingly, courts may rightly act upon Crown counsel’sassessment of the context, both general and specific to the case, and his or her judgment as to the course of action that will best furtherthe public interest. Thus, where it is decided to proceed summarily in an employee trust theft or trust fraud case, the abuse-of-trustsentencing guideline is not engaged (see, for illustration purposes, R. v.

MacLean, 2006 NBPC 3, 298 N.B.R. (2d) 378, Ferguson J.). [39] As well, in proceedings by indictment, Crown counsel may take actions that effectivelywithdraw the guideline’s jail requirement from the sentencing process. The obvious case is where Crown counsel recommends asentence without jail, such as a conditional sentence of imprisonment, which is what occurred in this Court in Steeves (2005) and Chaulk,in R. v. Carmichael, 2008 NBQB 369, [2008] N.B.J. No. 434 (QL) and in R. v. Nguyen, 2011 ABCA 300, [2011] A.J.

No. 1071 (QL).That is also the case where Crown counsel admits to the existence of “exceptional circumstances” (see R. v. Langille, 2006 NBQB 375,307 N.B.R. (2d) 7). [40] One last, perhaps unnecessary, observation: the inapplicability of the abuse-of-trust sentencingguideline does not necessarily mean the offender will avoid jail.

In Veno, a jail sentence was imposed even though the employee had notabused a position of trust in stealing from his employer. [41] In the case at hand, the Crown elected to proceed by indictment under s. 380(1)(b)(i).Furthermore, at the sentencing hearing, Crown counsel submitted there were no “exceptional circumstances” and she pressed the judgeto sentence the appellant to jail for six months. Clearly, Crown counsel was insisting on the application of the abuse-of-trust sentencingguideline, and she cannot be faulted for doing so.

[ 42 ] After all, although the appellant’s defalcations yielded a relatively modest financial benefit, they were repeated numerous times over a significant timespan. After each trust fraud, the appellant had an opportunity to reflect, reconsider, desist and make things right. Yet, she chose to continue along a criminal path to support a lifestyle that could not be sustained by lawful means.

And, when confronted with her crimes, the appellant did not offer prompt restitution or commit to same by way of installments. [ 43 ] In her written submission on appeal, the appellant rightly acknowledges that, in committing the 12 defalcations covered by the charge, she abused a position of trust in relation to her employer. She also acknowledges implicitly, if not explicitly – once again, rightly in our view – that the abuse-of-trust sentencing guideline is engaged.

The kernel of her case on appeal is the contention that the sentencing judge committed reversible error in failing to discern “exceptional circumstances” and in imposing a “manifestly excessive sentence”. In the appellant’s submission, a non-custodial sentence should have been imposed. Her fallback position is that, at worse, a brief jail term would have been justified. In that regard, the appellant refers to Hogan where Justice Mitchell imposed a 90-day jail term for an employee trust fraud and agreed to hear the parties on the issue of whether it should be served intermittently. B. “Exceptional circumstances”

(1) General observations [ 44 ] The parties pressed the Court to define with precision what circumstances make a case exceptional for the purposes of the abuse-of-trust sentencing guideline. In our respectful view, it would be unwise to delineate in rigid fashion the contours of the expression “exceptional circumstances”. The concept of exceptionality is somewhat elastic by design. Some circumstances may operate to make a case exceptional, but fail to do so in another. Restitution may be an example.

Where restitution entails particularly onerous sacrifices by an offender of modest means, it may, in conjunction with other compelling circumstances, justify a finding of exceptionality. However, a mere handing over of the misappropriated funds could not, by itself, tip the scales. [ 45 ] As mentioned, the sentencing judge found the case at hand was not exceptional. He came to that conclusion after considering the appellant’s submission that the following circumstances, viewed cumulatively, met the test of exceptionality:

a) She is a first offender;

b) She has an industrious work record;

c) She admitted her guilt to her employer when confronted;

d) She entered a plea of guilty at her first opportunity;

e) She expressed remorse for her actions;

f) At the time of the offence, she was under significant financial stress;

g) At the time of the offence, she was eight (8) months pregnant, was not certain if she would be eligible for maternity leave benefits and committed the crime out of need, not greed;

h) She has suffered from anorexia nervosa and bulimia since she was twelve (12) or thirteen (13) years old;

i) She is the primary caregiver for her child, who, at the time of sentence, was eleven (11) months old. [ 46 ] The appellant contends the sentencing judge committed reversible error in failing to appreciate the cumulative effect of those circumstances rendered her case exceptional. We respectfully disagree for the following reasons. [ 47 ] Any finding on the issue of exceptionality must be respected on appeal unless it is unreasonable or the product of an error of law, principle or fact.

For example, and fair warning to sentencing judges, it is a reversible error of principle to “categorize the ordinary as exceptional”: R. v. Zenari , 2012 ABCA 279 , [2012] A.J. No. 968 (QL) , at para. 8 , and R. v. Douglas, 2014 ABCA 113 , [2014] A.J. No. 312 (QL) , at paras. 14 and 16 . In our view, the sentencing judge would have committed such an error if he had found the case was exceptional.

In a nutshell, this is a run-of-the-mill case involving a relatively mature first-offender who: (1) lived beyond her means and chose to bridge the gap by defrauding her employer and, in doing so, abused a position of trust; and (2) expressed remorse, yet offered no restitution, whether immediate or by instalments.

[48] In Steeves (2005), at paragraph 1, the Court noted a finding of exceptionality would likelywithstand appellate scrutiny if it were anchored to mitigating circumstances that significantly lessened the offender’s blameworthiness.The following spring to mind as potential triggers for such a finding: (1) an offence-related mental illness that, while significant, does notmeet the test for a mental disorder defence; (2) coercion of a serious nature, commonly applied by a spouse or partner, that nonethelessfalls short of the requirements for the defence of duress; and (3) at least in theory, a criminal course of conduct prompted by the need toaccess or provide necessities of life in circumstances that do not satisfy the threshold requirement for the defence of necessity (see R. v.Burnley-Jones, 2006 ONCJ 160, [2006] O.J.

No. 1861 (QL), per R.E.W. Carr J.). Needless to say, the list does not purport to beexhaustive. Be that as it may, the jurisprudence on topic makes plain that the circumstances upon which the appellant relies to make thecase for exceptionality fall short of the mark. [49] In that respect, the Court’s observations in Chaulk bear repeating, if only for purposes ofanalogical reasoning: On the date specified in the Information, July 16, 2004, Mr. Chaulk was employed as a seasonal employee in the garden department ofthe Atlantic Superstore in Riverview, New Brunswick. He had been so employed since April of 2004. Mr.

Chaulk became the target ofsurveillance when management personnel noticed that money had gone missing during his shifts. On July 16, 2004, he was observedstealing $200. When confronted, Mr. Chaulk not only admitted to that crime, but also confessed to numerous instances of theft of fundsentrusted to him, totalling $4,210, over the course of the previous three months. Those additional funds were recovered from his home. Mr. Chaulk was charged with the indictable offence of theft (s. 334(b)(

i) of the Criminal Code). He was 20 years of age at the time andhad no criminal record. On his third appearance before a judge of the Provincial Court he pled guilty. Acknowledging that greed was thesole motive for his thefts, Mr. Chaulk recognized the seriousness of his crime and offered an apology in open court. The Provincial Courtjudge granted him a conditional discharge subject to probation for 12 months with conditions, including one that he perform 70 hours ofcommunity service work. The judge alluded to the governing sentencing principles mentioned above but found "exceptionalcircumstances" in Mr.

Chaulk's youth, the need to avoid saddling him with a criminal record, and his demonstrated "honesty" inconfessing to the theft of much more than the sum stolen ($200) on July 16, 2004. With respect, the consequences of a criminal conviction on a youthful offender do not, by themselves, constitute "exceptionalcircumstances" justifying a departure from the general rule mentioned in paragraph 3 of these reasons. There is no evidence that acriminal record will entail particularly onerous consequences for Mr. Chaulk.

If the effect of a criminal record, without more, constitutedan "exceptional circumstance", the exception would become the norm for all first offenders and the quest for general deterrence wouldbe in vain. R. v. Little (1981), (NB CA), 34 N.B.R. (2d) 503 (C.A.), R. v. Roy-Richard (M.) (1992), (NB CA), 129 N.B.R. (2d) 296 (C.A.) and R. v. Dickinson (D.T.) (1996), (NB CA), 173 N.B.R. (2d) 296 (C.A.) areall cases involving first offenders who were sentenced to terms of imprisonment for offences involving the abuse of a position of trust. InR. v.

McNamara (J.) (1992), (NB CA), 126 N.B.R. (2d) 298 (C.A.), the general principle was reiterated and our Courtspecifically held that even for a young first offender, who had made full restitution and who had a very favourable pre-sentence report, aconditional discharge, together with community service work, was not a fit sentence for the theft of $4,126.01 from the offender'semployer.

As well, we are of the view that "honesty" is hardly an appropriate characterization of the conduct of a person who, while holding aposition of trust, has systematically stolen from his employer over a 3-month period solely to satisfy his greed. A full confession, helpfulcooperation with the authorities and the return of the stolen property argue in favour of some leniency but they should not, without more,lead to a sentence that does not feature imprisonment in jail. Not surprisingly, courts have not attempted to catalogue what features constitute "exceptional circumstances" justifying a non-custodialsentence.

However, it is safe to say that they usually relate to mitigating factors that tend to lessen guilt or the seeming seriousness of theoffence charged and that, more often than not, they have to do with the offender's motive for committing the offence. A finding of"exceptional circumstances" has rarely, if ever, been made where, as here, the offender is driven solely by greed and his or herdishonesty and abuse of trust extend over a considerable period of time. See, generally, R. v. John (R.C.) (1995) 1995 ABCA 82, 162 A.R. 238 (C.A.) and R. v. McIvor (C.M.) (1996), 1996 ABCA 154 , 181 A.R. 397 (C.A.).

The record does notreveal circumstances that, having regard to the jurisprudence on point, might arguably justify a non-custodial sentence. [paras. 4-8] [50] Our Court’s historically narrow approach to the issue of exceptionality mirrors that of theAlberta Court of Appeal, notably in R. v. Miles, 2011 ABCA 133, [2011] A.J. No. 455 (QL), at para. 32; Zenari, at para. 8; R. v. Magas,2012 ABCA 61, 2012 A.J. No. 182 (QL), at para. 11; and Nguyen.

(2) Misappropriations to support a lifestyle and relatives [51] It should go without saying but, apparently, a reminder may be in order: the suggestion that acase might be exceptional because the crimes were actuated by lifestyle “needs” borders on the preposterous. Not surprisingly, it has notraction in the jurisprudence. [52] In R. v. Ross (1985), (NB CA), 61 N.B.R. (2d) 65, [1985] N.B.J. No. 145(C.A.) (QL), a 53-year-old cashier, with no record, misappropriated a large sum of money over the course of several years. She did so, atleast in part, to provide “needed” financial relief to her adult children.

The Court intervened, and replaced a suspended sentence with a12-month jail term. [53] In Zenari, the Court rejected the notion that a case could be considered exceptional because themisappropriations served to support the lifestyle of members of the offender’s family.

The Court expressed the following views, whichwe unreservedly endorse: The consequences of a fraud conviction for a person of previous apparently good character are often the same: loss of reputation; loss ofjob; shame; financial ruin; loss of house; negative repercussions for the family; letters of surprise but continuing support from friends andfamily; concerns about who will support the family while the accused is in jail, etc.

These are common features of many of the otherreported decisions, and cannot be considered to be exceptional. [para. 8] The Court acknowledged some mitigating factors, including the offender’s confession, his early guilty plea and his expression ofremorse, but concluded the case was not exceptional. In the result, the conditional sentence of imprisonment imposed in first instancewas replaced by a jail term. [54] In Magas, the offender alleged she had stolen from her employer to provide financial assistanceto her daughter.

The Court found the sentencing judge had correctly concluded no exceptional circumstances were present.

The acceptedmitigating factors included: [T]he appellant was remorseful; she pled guilty; she gave a statement to police in which she accepted responsibility and acknowledgedher crime; she was cooperative; there was a generally positive presentence report; she had no prior record; and, she was willing to paysome restitution. [para. 11] With respect to “exceptional circumstances”, the Court noted, with approval, the sentencing judge’s rejection of the submission “that theabsence of a prior record and the appellant’s family circumstances and motive for taking the money were exceptional” (para 12). [55] In Miles, the offender was, at all times material to the charge, “providing financial aid to hermother and siblings”.

She acknowledged “a history of unwise spending involving taking care of family member debts and using moneyfrom this crime to supplement her income” (para. 10). The Court rejected the submission that the case was “exceptional” because theoffender pled guilty, had no criminal record and was making partial restitution. The Court noted it is common for abuse-of-trustoffenders to plead guilty once discovered, and to offer some kind of restitution.

Moreover, most offenders of this ilk do not have acriminal record, since a criminal record would, in most circumstances, preclude the individual from acquiring a position of trust (para.32). [56] In Nguyen, the offender was a 26-year-old pharmacy technician who, over an 8-month period,stole a total of $8,938.15 from the drugstore where he was employed. When confronted with evidence of his misdeeds, he made a fullconfession and produced a diary in which were recorded the dates of the thefts and the amounts stolen.

He pled guilty, offered fullrestitution and informed the sentencing judge he had taken the money to help support his mother and two younger brothers. He had nocriminal record. The sentencing judge ordered a conditional discharge. At trial, and again on appeal, the Crown sought a 12 monthconditional sentence. The Court of Appeal found the case did not rise to the level of “exceptional”. It remarked that many offenders needmoney for their family, and say they intend to pay it back.

The Court found no precedent that would support a discharge in thesecircumstances, and a conditional sentence was ordered, as urged by the Crown. [57] The appellant’s allegation that she “committed the crime out of need, not greed” is without

evidential foundation. In any event, the “need” in question cannot lift her case to the level of “exceptional”.

(3) Health issues [58] A case may be considered “exceptional” where the bundle of mitigating circumstances includesevidence the offender suffers from mental illness. In that regard, we share the views expressed by Green J.A., as he then was, in R. v.Peters, 2000 NFCA 55, [2000] N.J. No. 287 (QL): Deterrence and punishment assume less importance in cases of mentally ill offenders. See R. v. Hynes (1991), (NLCA), 89 Nfld & P.E.I.R. 316 (NF CA). In R. v.

Robinson (1974), (ON CA), 19 C.C.C. (2d) 193 (Ont CA) the Courtemphasized that in cases where offenders commit crimes while they are out of touch with reality due to mental illness, specificdeterrence is meaningless to them. Further, general deterrence is unlikely to be achieved either since people with mental illnesses thatcontribute to the commission of a crime will not usually be deterred by the punishment of others. As well, severe punishment is lessappropriate in cases of persons with such mental illnesses since it would be disproportionate to the degree of responsibility of theoffender.

This decreased emphasis on punishment and deterrence in these circumstances is consistent with the proportionality principlein s. 718.1 of the Criminal Code. [para. 18] See, as well, R. v. Edmunds, 2012 NLCA 26, [2012] N.J. No. 177 (QL), at paras. 21-23, per C.W. White J.A., for the Court. [59] In R. v. Fraser, 2007 ABCA 386, [2007] A.J. No. 1528 (QL), Watson J.A., who deliveredjudgment on behalf of the Court, agreed the offender’s longstanding mental illness formed part of the “unusual facts” giving rise to therequisite “exceptional circumstances”.

The trust theft in question was directly related to the illness, the offender had made full restitutionand the Crown had put off charging her for four years. The delay was highly prejudicial to the offender’s personal situation in that itcontributed to the termination of her marriage. A conditional sentence was ordered. [60] The record shows the appellant was not suffering from any mental illness during the timeframecovered by the charge.

Suffice it to reproduce the following observations on point in the pre-sentence report: [Michele Murdoch] reports that she has experienced an eating disorder, “anorexia nervosa and bulimia, back and forth between the two,”for many years, since grade seven (approximately twelve or thirteen years of age). [Ms. Murdoch] advises that she has seen manycounsellors over the years, and that she was hospitalized for an eating disorder twice in her lifetime: once, at age sixteen (Dr. ChalmersHospital, Fredericton), for three months; and again, at age eighteen (Guelph, ON), for three weeks. [Ms.

Murdoch] reports that she is “doing much better” with regards to her eating disorder, maintaining her desired weight, which shedescribes as “fairly healthy” and notes positive changes with eating disorder symptoms and behaviours since her daughter was born. [Ms. Murdoch] advises that she is not currently seeing a counsellor, that she has been “on and off medication” throughout the years, andthat she is not taking any prescribed medication.

(4) Conclusion regarding the issue of exceptionality [61] In the case at bar, the crimes yielded a relatively modest financial benefit, but were repeatednumerous times over a significant timespan. As underscored, after each defalcation, the appellant had an opportunity to reflect,reconsider, desist and make things right, but she persisted in defrauding her employer to maintain a lifestyle she could not afford bylawful means. The sentencing judge’s finding that the case does not feature “exceptional circumstances” is neither unreasonable nor theproduct of any error of law, principle or fact.

That being so, it must stand. It follows that the judge did not err in concluding a jail termwas required. [62] However, and as indicated, the judge committed reversible error in failing to tailor the jail termto the appellant’s particular circumstances.

C. An intermittent sentence [ 63 ] Once the judge determined a jail term was required, he was duty bound to consider all available jail options under the Criminal Code . One of those was an intermittent sentence. Section 732(1) reads as follows: 732.

(1) Where the court imposes a sentence of imprisonment of ninety days or less on an offender convicted of an offence, whether in default of payment of a fine or otherwise, the court may, having regard to the age and character of the offender, the nature of the offence and the circumstances surrounding its commission, and the availability of appropriate accommodation to ensure compliance with the sentence, order (

a) that the sentence be served intermittently at such times as are specified in the order; and (

b) that the offender comply with the conditions prescribed in a probation order when not in confinement during the period that the sentence is being served and, if the court so orders, on release from prison after completing the intermittent sentence. 732.

(1) Le tribunal qui déclare le délinquant coupable d’une infraction et le condamne à un emprisonnement maximal de quatre-vingt- dix jours pour défaut de paiement d’une amende ou pour un autre motif, peut, compte tenu de l’âge et de la réputation du délinquant, de la nature de l’infraction, des circonstances dans lesquelles elle a été commise et de la disponibilité d’un établissement adéquat pour purger la peine, ordonner :

a) que la peine soit purgée de façon discontinue aux moments prévus par l’ordonnance;

b) au délinquant de se conformer aux conditions prévues par l’ordonnance pendant toute période où il purge sa peine hors de la prison et de s’y conformer dès sa sortie de prison. [ 64 ] Although courts commonly resort to this option to allow an offender to maintain or secure employment, it may also be used “to enable a spouse to care for children”: Clayton C. Ruby, Sentencing , 8 ed. (Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis, 2012). On occasion, an intermittent sentence will meet the need for an exemplary disposition. [ 65 ] The appellant spent 17 days in jail prior to being released on bail pending appeal.

The maximum term for s. 732(1) purposes is 90 days. Taking into account all of the pertinent circumstances, a sentence of 73 days in jail to be served on weekends is appropriate. It conforms to the abuse-of-trust sentencing guideline and the jail component is tailored to the appellant’s personal and familial situation. Indeed, the appellant will be able to look after her infant daughter during her husband’s working week and he will be able do so on weekends. IV.

Conclusion [ 66 ] The public interest is best served by emphasizing denunciation and deterrence in imposing sentence for thefts or frauds committed by employees who thereby abuse a position of trust in relation to their employers. Barring “exceptional circumstances”, a fit sentence for most of those crimes is one that features a jail term. That approach stands to be applied even where, as here, the total value of the property taken is relatively modest but the underlying instances of embezzlement occur numerous times over several weeks.

On occasion, and the case at hand fits the bill, an intermittent sentence will best reflect the Criminal Code ’s sentencing objectives. [ 67 ] It is for those reasons, which are detailed in the preceding text, that we accepted the parties’ joint recommendation regarding disposition. In the result, the sentence imposed for the appellant’s repeated abuse-of-trust frauds was varied from a six-month jail term (followed by unsupervised probation for six months) to a 73-day jail term to be served intermittently, with the probation order amended accordingly.

____________________________________ J. ERNEST DRAPEAU, CHIEF JUSTICE OF NEW BRUNSWICK WE CONCUR: ___________________________________ ALEXANDRE DESCHÊNES, J.A. ____________________________________ BRADLEY V. GREEN, J.A. Version française de la décision rendue par LE JUGE DRAPEAU, J.C.N.-B. I. Introduction [1] Il est largement accepté que l’intérêt public est mieux servi en reconnaissant l’importance de la dénonciation et de la dissuasion lorsque l’on inflige une peine pour sanctionner des vols ou des fraudes commis par des employés qui abusent ainsi de leur situation de confiance vis-à-vis de leur employeur.

Ce point de vue a amené notre Cour, comme d’autres tribunaux d’appel, à déterminer que, sauf « circonstances exceptionnelles », une peine convenable pour la plupart des catégories de vols ou de fraudes commis par des employés qui occupent un poste de confiance est l’infliction d’une peine d’incarcération : R. c. Steeves and Connors , 2005 NBCA 85 , 288 R.N.-B. (2 e ) 1 , au par. 10 (« Steeves (2005) ») et R. c. Chaulk , 2005 NBCA 86 , 287 R.N.-B. (2 e ) 375 .

Pour plus de commodité, nous nous référerons à cette approche générale en la qualifiant de ligne directrice sur la détermination de la peine sanctionnant l’abus de confiance. [2] Au cours d’une période de six semaines qui remonte au début de l’année 2014, et à douze occasions distinctes, l’appelante a détourné une somme d’argent relativement modeste qui appartenait à son employeur. Elle a mis fin aux détournements uniquement lorsqu’on lui a montré la preuve qu’ils s’étaient produits.

Les fonds détournés ne dépassaient pas 5 000 $, mais le ministère public a montré l’importance qu’il attachait à l’affaire en choisissant de poursuivre par acte d’accusation au

titre du sous-alinéa 380(1) b )(

i) du Code criminel . De ce fait, la peine d’emprisonnement maximale dont l’appelante était passible est passée de six mois (l’emprisonnement maximal en cas de déclaration de culpabilité par procédure

sommaire) à deux ans. [3] À l’issue d’un débat approfondi sur la question, le juge qui a prononcé la peine est arrivé à la conclusion que l’affaire ne comportait pas de « circonstances exceptionnelles ». Il a conclu, à bon droit selon nous, que des précédents faisant autorité exigeaient l’infliction d’une peine d’incarcération pour sanctionner les fraudes systématiques de l’appelante à l’endroit de son employeur. Le juge a fixé cette peine à six mois, peine qui devait être suivie d’une période de probation non surveillée de six mois. Il n’a pas envisagé l’option d’une peine discontinue. [4] Lors de l’audition de l’appel, nous avons formulé l’hypothèse que même si on ne pouvait

reprocher au juge de s’être trompé en concluant que des « circonstances exceptionnelles » ne ressortaient pas du dossier, il semblait bien qu’il eût commis une erreur en omettant d’adapter la peine d’incarcération aux faits de l’affaire. Sur ce point, nous avons suggéré qu’une application judicieuse des principes de détermination des peines énoncés dans le Code criminel laissait entrevoir une peine discontinue.

Après avoir examiné les observations de la formation, les parties ont présenté une recommandation conjointe en matière de dispositif dont l’élément clé était une peine d’emprisonnement de 73 jours à purger de façon discontinue. Nous avons accepté cette recommandation et, à l’invitation des parties, nous avons entrepris d’expliquer de façon détaillée les motifs sur lesquels se fondent les opinions exprimées plus haut et notre acceptation de leurs observations conjointes. Voici ces motifs. II. Contexte [5] L’appelante a été déclarée coupable de l’acte criminel de fraude prévu au sous-alinéa 380(1) b ) (

i) du Code criminel . Selon la dénonciation, la fraude a été commise entre le 2 janvier et le 12 février 2014; elle portait sur une somme d’argent (moins de 5 000 $) et la victime était Mark’s Work Wearhouse. [6] L’appelante a plaidé coupable le 22 janvier 2015.

Lors de l’audience de détermination de la peine qui a immédiatement suivi, les principaux faits relatifs à l’infraction n’ont pas été contestés. [7] Comme nous l’avons indiqué précédemment, à douze reprises distinctes pendant la période de six semaines dont fait état l’acte d’accusation, alors qu’elle occupait un emploi de caissière, l’appelante a détourné pour son usage personnel des fonds qui appartenaient à son employeur, Mark’s Work Wearhouse. Ces détournements en série ont été découverts après que l’employeur eut constaté des écarts dans les remboursements à la clientèle.

L’enquête complémentaire a révélé qu’à chacune de ces douze occasions, l’appelante avait porté au crédit de sa carte de débit des remboursements générés par des retours de marchandises fictifs. Essentiellement, l’appelante utilisait le système informatique de son employeur pour enregistrer de fausses demandes de retour de marchandises et porter les remboursements qui en résultaient au crédit de sa propre carte de débit. Les douze transactions frauduleuses lui avaient permis de détourner la somme de 1 555,55 $. [8] Lorsqu’on lui a reproché ses méfaits, l’appelante a commencé par essayer de rejeter une

partie du blâme sur des collègues. Elle a fini par en accepter la pleine responsabilité. Comme on pouvait s’y attendre, l’appelante a été congédiée de son emploi et l’affaire a été renvoyée à la GRC pour enquête et traitement. [9] L’appelante est née le 7 juillet 1985. Elle avait 29 ans et était à un stade avancé de sa première grossesse lorsque les détournements sous-jacents se sont produits. Elle a donné naissance à une fille le 14 février 2014, deux jours après la dernière transaction frauduleuse faisant l’objet de l’acte d’accusation.

En moins d’un mois, et malgré son congédiement par Mark’s Work Wearhouse, l’appelante a trouvé un autre emploi de caissière. Bien que le dossier soit muet sur la question, il n’est pas interdit de douter qu’elle ait révélé à son nouvel employeur les événements qui lui ont fait perdre l’emploi qu’elle occupait à Mark’s Work Wearhouse. [10] Quoi qu’il en soit, du 15 mars au 5 mai 2014, l’appelante a travaillé dans un magasin d’alimentation Sobeys. Pendant ses heures de travail, un membre de la famille s’occupait de sa fille qui venait de naître.

Cet arrangement était loin d’être idéal étant donné que l’appelante allaitait et, comme on pouvait s’y attendre, avait développé des liens affectifs très étroits avec son enfant. [11] L’appelante a quitté son travail chez Sobeys dès qu’elle est devenue admissible aux prestations de maternité au

titre du régime d’assurance-emploi. [12] L’appelante s’est présentée devant le juge chargé de prononcer la peine sans avoir restitué une

partie quelconque des fonds qu’elle avait détournés et sans présenter aucune proposition de remboursement. À l’époque, elle touchait des prestations de maternité au

titre du régime d’assurance-emploi dont le montant s’élevait à 1 337,50 $ par mois, et son conjoint de fait qui travaillait pour Postes Canada avait un revenu mensuel brut de 3 687 $. Leur revenu brut conjoint s’élevait donc à 4 824,50 $ par mois, soit près de 60 000 $ par année. Il est indiqué dans le rapport présentenciel que les dépenses mensuelles totales du ménage étaient de l’ordre de 3 810 $. Ces dépenses comprenaient 400 $ pour les activités récréatives. Au début de l’année 2014, le conjoint de l’appelante a bénéficié d’une libération comme failli et était en train de rétablir son crédit.

Manifestement, un plan de restitution assorti de versements périodiques, même modestes, était dans la limite des moyens de l’appelante. [13] Au moment du prononcé de la peine, l’appelante n’avait pas été séparée de sa fille depuis qu’elle avait mis un terme à son emploi chez Sobeys en mai 2014. De fait, elle l’allaitait toujours, même si elle avait l’intention de cesser

de le faire à brève échéance. [14] L’appelante souffre depuis l’adolescence de troubles de l’alimentation, plus particulièrementd’anorexie mentale et de boulimie. [15] Le rapport présentenciel était généralement favorable, du moins aux égards pertinents. [16] Les avocats de l’appelante ont soutenu que le dossier révélait l’existence de « circonstancesexceptionnelles » et ont invité le juge chargé de déterminer la peine à lui imposer une peine d’emprisonnement de quatre mois avecsursis. [17] L’avocate du ministère public a fait valoir que l’affaire n’avait rien d’exceptionnel et a plaidéqu’une peine d’incarcération de six mois conviendrait. [18] Lorsqu’elle a été invitée à prendre la parole, l’appelante a exprimé des remords pour sesdétournements de fonds, soulignant qu’ils avaient été provoqués par les difficultés financières auxquelles faisait face son ménage.

Elle aaffirmé que ces difficultés avaient été exacerbées par des dépenses excessives pendant les dernières fêtes de fin d’année. C’est avecbeaucoup d’émotion que l’appelante a sollicité l’infliction d’une peine non privative de liberté en déclarant : [TRADUCTION] « Jeregrette vraiment tout cela et j’ai besoin de ma fille; ma fille a autant besoin de moi que j’ai besoin d’elle ». [19] Après avoir conclu que l’affaire n’avait rien d’exceptionnel, le juge a condamné l’appelante àsix mois de prison.

Il a également condamné l’appelante à une période de probation non surveillée de six mois après sa mise en liberté.Le juge n’a pas ordonné de restitution. [20] L’autorisation d’interjeter appel et une libération sous caution ont été accordées à l’appelante le13 février 2015. Elle avait passé 17 jours en prison avant sa remise en liberté. [21] Le Procureur général n’a pas interjeté d’appel incident. Par conséquent, nous n’avons pas àstatuer sur la question de savoir si une ordonnance de restitution serait appropriée en l’espèce. III.

Analyse [22] La norme de contrôle applicable à un appel d’une peine est bien connue. Elle est résumée comme suit dans l’arrêt Steeves c. R., 2010 NBCA 57, 360 R.N.-B. (2e) 88 : En somme, une cour d’appel n’est pas libre de substituer ses vues sur la justesse de la peine aux vues du juge qui était chargé de ladéterminer, à moins que la peine ne résulte d’une erreur de droit ou d’une erreur de principe, ou qu’elle ne soit nettement déraisonnable (R. c. Shropshire, (SCC), [1995] 4 R.C.S. 227, [1995] A.C.S. no 52 (QL), par. 46 à 48; R. c.

Solowan, [2008] 3 R.C.S. 309, [2008] A.C.S. no 55 (QL), 2008 CSC 62, par. 16; R. c. L.M., [2008] 2 R.C.S. 163, [2008] A.C.S. no 31 (QL), 2008 CSC 31, par. 14 et 15; R. c. C.A.C. (2009), 349 R.N.-B. (2e) 265, [2009] A.N.-B. no 342 (QL), 2009 NBCA 68 (le juge d’appel Bell, au nom de la Cour,par. 4)). Si la sentence est le fruit d’une erreur qui justifie de l’infirmer, il incombe à la cour d’appel de prescrire le châtiment qu’elleestime juste dans les circonstances. [par. 25] L’intervention en appel ne convient que si l’on répond par l’affirmative à l’une des trois questions suivantes :

(1) La sentence est-elle lefruit d’une erreur de droit?

(2) Le juge qui a déterminé la peine a-t-il commis une erreur de principe dans l’exercice de son pouvoirdiscrétionnaire?

(3) La peine est-elle clairement déraisonnable compte tenu des principes de détermination de la peine? À notre avis,l’omission du juge qui a prononcé la peine d’envisager une peine discontinue constitue une erreur de principe qui nous oblige à répondrepar l’affirmative à la deuxième question. A. Ligne directrice sur la détermination de la peine sanctionnant l’abus de confiance

(1) Observations générales [23] La jurisprudence de notre Cour ainsi que d’autres tribunaux de notre province et d’ailleurssouscrit à l’opinion voulant qu’en l’absence de « circonstances exceptionnelles », l’intérêt public commande, dans la plupart des cas,l’infliction d’une peine d’incarcération aux employés qui, alors qu’ils occupent un poste de confiance, volent ou fraudent leur employeur : R. c. McNamara (J.) (1992), (NB CA), 126 R.N.-B. (2e) 298, [1992] A.N.-B. no 451 (C.A.) (QL), aupar. 4; Steeves (2005), au par. 1; Chaulk, au par. 3; R. c. Pierce, (ON CA), [1997] O.J.

No. 715 (C.A.) (QL); R. c.Fulcher, 2007 ABCA 381, [2007] A.J. No. 1323 (QL); et R. c. Hogan, 2012 PESC 11, [2012] P.E.I.J. No. 7 (QL), motifs du jugeMitchell (tel était alors son titre). [24] Dans la majorité des cas de vol ou de fraude par un employé occupant un poste de confiance, lebesoin de dénonciation et de dissuasion qu’entraîne l’abus de confiance l’emporte sur les circonstances atténuantes habituellementnombreuses et mène inexorablement à la conclusion qu’une peine d’incarcération est la seule sanction [TRADUCTION] « juste » quipermettra de réaliser l’objectif essentiel du prononcé des peines.

Il est bien connu que cet objectif est de « contribuer [...] au respect de laloi et au maintien d’une société juste, paisible et sûre » : art. 718. Rares sont les personnes qui contesteraient la proposition selon laquellela menace d’une peine de prison est particulièrement dissuasive auprès de « citoyens qui respectent par ailleurs la loi, qui sont de bonstravailleurs et qui ont un conjoint et des enfants » : R. c.

Proulx, 2000 CSC 5, [2000] 1 R.C.S. 61, au par. 129. [25] Dans l’arrêt Steeves (2005), la Cour a déterminé que la ligne directrice sur la détermination dela peine sanctionnant l’abus de confiance, qui est en vigueur depuis longtemps, n’a pas été écartée par la codification des principes dedétermination de la peine du fait de l’entrée en vigueur des art. 718 à 718.2 du Code criminel et de l’adoption du régime d’octroi dusursis à l’emprisonnement qui est énoncé à l’art. 742.1 : À notre avis, les principes de détermination de la peine mentionnés ci-dessus restent entiers malgré l’adoption des articles 718 à 718.2.Cet énoncé, dans la loi, de l’objectif essentiel de la détermination de la peine et de ses autres objectifs ainsi que la codification desprincipes de détermination de la peine n’ont pas rendu caduque l’opinion traditionnelle voulant que l’impératif de dissuasion généraledonne généralement lieu à l’infliction d’une peine d’incarcération dans le cas d’un employé qui, en commettant un vol auprès de sonemployeur, a abusé de la confiance de ce dernier.

À cet égard, nous soulignons que la

partie introductive de l’article 718 précise que le prononcé des peines a pour objectif essentiel decontribuer, entre autres, « au respect de la loi » et qu’à l’alinéa 718b) il est précisé que la dissuasion générale est un des objectifs des« sanctions justes » que les tribunaux ont l’obligation d’infliger. Nous soulignons également que le sous-alinéa 718.2a)(iii) prescritl’adaptation de la peine aux circonstances aggravantes étayées par des éléments de preuve établissant que l’infraction perpétrée par ledélinquant constitue un abus de la confiance de la victime. Cette disposition a été examinée dans l’arrêt R. c.

Matchett (H.J.) (1997), (NB CA), 188 R.N.-B. (2e) 321 (C.A.), où nous avions indiqué, au paragraphe 13, qu’une infraction commise aumoyen d’un abus de confiance « entraînerait normalement une peine à purger en milieu carcéral et non ailleurs ». Finalement, soulignonsque les « sanctions moins contraignantes » dont il est question à l’alinéa 718.2d) ne peuvent être infligées que si « les circonstances lejustifient » et que les « sanctions substitutives applicables » visées à l’alinéa 718.2e) ne sont envisageables que si elles sont « justifiéesdans les circonstances ».

En outre, bien qu’aucune catégorie d’infractions ne soit exclue du régime d’octroi du sursis à l’emprisonnement prévu au Code criminel (voir l’arrêt R. c. Baldwin (M.) (2000), 2000 NBCA 60 , 232 R.N.-B. (2e) 240 (C.A.)), il n’en demeure pas moins que le vol desbiens d’un employeur par un employé qui, pour ce faire, profite du poste qu’il occupe, donnera habituellement lieu à une peined’incarcération. Il en est ainsi parce que l’infraction en question est « une infraction pour laquelle les conséquences de l’incarcérationsont susceptibles d’avoir un effet dissuasif réel » : R. c.

Proulx, 2000 SCC 5 , [2000] 1 R.C.S. 61, à la page 117. [par. 12 à 14] [26] À ce propos, l’arrêt Steeves (2005) concorde avec la conclusion qui a été tirée dans l’arrêtPierce dans lequel le juge d’appel Finlayson, au nom de la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario, a déclaré ce qui suit : Je refuserais toutefois de faire droit à la requête visant à permettre à l’appelante de purger sa peine au sein de la collectivité.

L’usageabusif d’un poste de confiance ou d’autorité en rapport à une victime constitue une circonstance aggravante expresse énoncée dans leslignes directrices en matière de détermination de la peine que prévoit l’article 718.2. Ce facteur a traditionnellement entraîné une lourdepeine d’incarcération, même quand il s’agissait de délinquants primaires.

Je ne crois pas que notre Cour devrait exercer son pouvoirdiscrétionnaire de façon à permettre à l’appelante de purger sa peine au sein de la collectivité lorsque, comme c’est le cas en l’espèce, lejuge du procès a clairement exprimé ses craintes au sujet de la façon dont la collectivité pourrait percevoir une peine autre que

l’emprisonnement.

Malgré l’adoption de l’art. 742.1, les principes de dissuasion générale et de dénonciation publique exigentl’imposition d’une peine d’emprisonnement dans de telles circonstances. [par. 48] Voir également R. c. Holmes, 1999 ABCA 228, [1999] A.J. No. 862 (QL), au par. 8. [27] En un mot, la ligne directrice sur la détermination de la peine sanctionnant l’abus de confiances’inscrit bien dans le cadre du régime de détermination de la peine énoncé à la

partie XXIII du Code criminel. Il n’est guère surprenantque la ligne directrice ait été appliquée dans notre province par les tribunaux chargés de déterminer la peine pour sanctionner les vols oules fraudes commis par des employés occupant un poste de confiance, comme il ressort de l’échantillon suivant de décisions rendues aucours des dix dernières années environ : Nom/Intitulé Date Lieu Montant Notes PeineR. c. Evans(Juge Glennie) 2003NBQB 54,2003NBBR 54 Saint John 120 416 $ Vol auprès d’unhomme âgé dont ildevait s’occuper un an de prison, unan de probation R. c.

Philibert(NBCP, jugeDesjardins(inédite) 2007 Grand-Sault 373 000 $ 96 000 $ versés àtitre de restitution,condamné à payer277 000 $ de plus 18 mois de prison R. c. Ouellette(Juge LeBlanc) 2009NBCP 32Edmundston 53 127,33 $Entre 2002 et 2003 Âgée de 44 ans Déclarée coupableà l’issue du procès 12 mois de prison R. c. Thornton (NBCP, jugeMahoney)(inédite) 2010 Woodstock 200 000 $ Âgé de 43 ans Plaidoyer deculpabilité Comptable de 2003à 2007 18 mois de prison un an de probation 220 246,74 $versés à

titre derestitutionBurton (NBBR, jugeMcLellan)(inédite) 2010 Saint John 250 000 $ 243 735 $ versés àtitre de restitution un an de prison R. c. Hamilton(NBCP, jugeen chefJackson)(inédite) 2011 Woodstock >5 000 $ Déclarée coupableà l’issue du procès 10 mois de prison 18 mois deprobation Roy-Bossé (NBCP, jugeLeBlanc)(inédite) 2011 Edmundston 300 $ 30 jours de prisonpurgés les fins desemaine R. c. Cyr(NBCP, jugeDuffie)(inédite) 2013 Grand-Sault 20 000 $ Sur plusieurs moisen 2011 Âgée de 21 ans Plaidoyer deculpabilité Délinquanteprimaire 6 mois de prison 2 ans de probation 20 000 $ versés àtitre de restitution R. c.

Tardif(juge LaVigne) 2014NBBR 246Edmundston Environ250 000 $ Entre 2008 et 2011 Âgé de 47 ans Plaidoyer deculpabilité 2 ans de prison

Lizotte (NBCP, juge Volpé) (inédite) 2014 Edmundston 800 $ 90 jours de prison purgés les fins de semaine Arbeau (NBCP, juge Oliver) (inédite) 2014 Burton 100 000 $ Âgée de 57 ans 18 mois de prison Nason (NBCP, juge McLean) (inédite) 2015 Fredericton 2 500 $ Âgée de 42 ans, problèmes financiers, 3 enfants au foyer 4 mois de prison, un an de probation R. c.

Budden (Juge McNally) 2015 NBBR 98 Moncton 7 445,05 $ fraude, vol, faux et emploi d’un document contrefait, aucune circonstance exceptionnelle 6 mois de prison, ordonnance de restitution de 7 545 $ Martin- Schedler (NBCP, juge en chef adjoint Richards) (inédite) 2015 Fredericton 40 000 $ Les problèmes affectifs, la dépression, une enfance maltraitée ne constituent pas des « circonstances exceptionnelles » un an de prison R. c.

Ing (NBCP, le juge en chef Arseneault) (inédite) 2015 Moncton Environ 75 000 $ Entre juillet 2011 et juin 2012 Âgé de 26 ans Délinquant primaire Plaidoyer de culpabilité 9 mois de prison, suramende compensatoire de 200 $ [28] Il est intéressant de constater que la même démarche en matière de détermination de la peine pour sanctionner des détournements dans le contexte d’un emploi semble enracinée en Angleterre. L’incursion « papillonnante » suivante dans la jurisprudence anglaise confirme cette situation. [29] Dans R. c.

Sharpe , [2000] All ER (D) 795, l’accusé avait plaidé coupable à une accusation de fraude à l’endroit de son employeur. L’accusé effectuait du travail de consultant pour des clients de son employeur en dehors de ses fonctions normales (en violation de son contrat de travail), et facturait ensuite le travail en question à son employeur par l’entremise d’une société d’experts-conseils fictive dont on a découvert que l’unique administratrice était l’épouse de l’accusé.

Le juge chargé de la détermination de la peine a constaté l’abus de confiance commis par l’accusé et l’a condamné à neuf mois de prison pour chacun des chefs d’accusation, les peines devant être purgées concurremment. L’accusé a interjeté appel en invoquant le fait que la peine était fondamentalement erronée et manifestement excessive compte tenu des circonstances atténuantes que constituaient son plaidoyer de culpabilité et la bonne moralité dont il avait fait preuve auparavant.

En appel, la Cour a effectivement repris la démarche canadienne, notant qu’à moins de « circonstances exceptionnelles », une peine d’emprisonnement immédiate s’imposait. La Cour a invoqué la tromperie longue et délibérée à laquelle avait recouru l’accusé et conclu que le fait que son employeur n’avait essuyé aucune perte n’était pas pertinent. La Cour a conclu que la peine infligée n’était ni fondamentalement erronée, ni manifestement excessive. [30] Dans R. c.

Austin , [2001] EWCA Crim 1972, l’accusée était une femme âgée de 31 ans qui avait reconnu avoir falsifié 153 chèques d’entreprise sur une période de deux ans et neuf mois, pour un total de 34 000 £. Une fois arrêtée, elle avait fait des [TRADUCTION] « aveux complets et francs ». Elle avait par la suite plaidé coupable à 13 chefs de vol et demandé que 140 autres infractions soient prises en considération. Il avait été révélé qu’elle souffrait d’une insécurité psychologique qui l’amenait à effectuer des achats à crédit de manière obsessionnelle et que, de ce fait, elle avait des dettes élevées.

Toutefois, l’argent volé avait été utilisé pour effectuer d’autres achats de ce type, et non pour rembourser ses dettes. Elle avait été condamnée à une peine d’incarcération de 15 mois. En appel, l’accusée a demandé à la Cour de surseoir au prononcé de la peine d’emprisonnement au motif qu’elle avait fait preuve jusque-là d’une bonne moralité et était le seul membre non handicapé de sa famille et la seule fournisseuse de soins pour son époux et son fils.

La Cour a invoqué [TRADUCTION] « l’ampleur et la durée des infractions commises par la défenderesse et le fait que, de façon générale, les sommes obtenues malhonnêtemen

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