R v. Chase, 2023 MBPC 68

CITATION: R v. Chase, 2023 MBPC 68 THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF MANITOBA BETWEEN His Majesty the King ) E. Dunsmore ) ) for the Crown – and – ) ) ) Jeremy Chase ) ) E. Brenner for the Accused ) ) Judgment delivered: ) December 12, 2023 Restriction on Publication – of victims and witnesses: Pursuant to s.486.5 of the Criminal Code Unless an order is made under

section 486.4, on application of the prosecutor in respect of a victim or a witness, or on application of a victim or a witness, a judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim or witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way if the judge or justice is of the opinion that the order is in the interest of the proper administration of justice. FREDERICKSON, P.J. INTRODUCTION [ 1 ] Following a trial, I found Jeremy Chase guilty of several offences involving violence towards his former intimate partner, R.L.

These offences were kidnapping, aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, break and enter with intent, uttering threats (against R.L. as well as against her friend and her friend’s young children) and failing to comply with his Release Order. [ 2 ] The Crown is seeking a custodial sentence of 12.5 years, reduced to 11.75 years for totality. Mr. Chase seeks a sentence of 5 years. The sentence will be served consecutively to the sentence that Mr. Chase is currently serving. [ 3 ] The background and facts underlying the offences are more fully set out in the trial decision, R v. Chase 2023 MBPC 26 .

For the purposes of this decision, a brief

summary of the salient facts for sentencing is provided. [ 4 ] In 2021, following the breakdown of their relationship and an allegation of assault – for which he was convicted following the conclusion of this trial – Mr. Chase was placed on a Release Order prohibiting contact with R.L. Despite this court order, contact between the two continued for several months, and during that period of time their daughter was born and subsequently apprehended. [ 5 ] On August 3, 2022, R.L. found the strength to leave her relationship with Mr. Chase. She and her roommate were planning a “divorce party” when Mr.

Chase arrived at her apartment, uninvited. He entered the apartment through an unlocked door and threatened to hurt the people in the house – which included two very young children – if R.L. did not leave with him. To underline the threat, he showed R.L. a knife concealed in his waistband. [ 6 ] R.L. did not want to leave with him. She told him she was not going willingly. She left some of her possessions and clothing behind, telling the Court she believed she was going to die. When they were outside of the apartment, Mr.

Chase repeated his threats, and told R.L. that he would go back and stab the people who were inside. She told him to stab her instead. [ 7 ] Mr. Chase’s friend, Paul Prezel, was waiting in the parking lot with his van. R.L. repeated that she was not going with Mr. Chase willingly. He once again made threats against those remaining in the apartment. She eventually got in the van, acting out of fear and duress, and Mr. Prezel started driving. [ 8 ] While being transported in the van, R.L. took Mr. Chase’s phone and texted her friend, to warn her that Mr. Chase intended to return to the apartment and hurt her. Mr.

Chase, who was beside her in the back of the van, demanded his phone back and began physically assaulting her. She described being repeatedly punched and hit by Mr. Chase. Neither were wearing seatbelts. At one point, when she was on the floor of the van, she struggled to breathe as Mr. Chase kneeled on her neck. [ 9 ] The van stopped at a Scotiabank. Mr. Chase got out of the van, having what R.L. described as a panic attack. She took the

opportunity to escape. She was walking away, with the intent of getting back to her apartment when Mr. Chase chased her down andbegan physical assaulting her again. The assault was witnessed by a third party, Oscar Brown, who had just finished his work shift at theSobeys next to the Scotiabank. He saw Mr. Chase lift R.L. up by the backpack she was wearing and “slam” her onto the ground severaltimes. Mr. Chase kicked her head and her body and stepped on her skull as she lay prone on the ground. He eventually stopped, took thebackpack from her and walked towards the van. [10] R.L. was transported to hospital.

She had a broken orbital bone requiring surgery and the insertion of a steel plate in her head; aconcussion; a broken nose; cuts and bruises all over her body; and a split swollen lip, among other injuries. [11] Mr. Chase was arrested a couple of days later. He has been in custody since. Subsequent to the hearing of this trial, he hasbeen tried and convicted, or pleaded guilty, for several other offences involving R.L., including assault, breaching his non-communication order, and obstructing justice. PRINCIPLES OF SENTENCING [12]

Section 718 of the Criminal Code sets out the fundamental purpose of sentencing; namely to protect society and to contribute,along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing justsanctions that have one or more of a list of enumerated objectives. Those objectives include denunciation of the offender’s conduct,deterrence, separation from society, rehabilitation, reparations for harm done and promotion of a sense of responsibility in offenders, andacknowledging the harm done to victims. [13]

Section 718.2 directs sentencing judges to take into consideration aggravating and mitigating circumstances, parity, restraintand totality. [14]

Section 718.1 sets out the fundamental principle of proportionality: the sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of theoffence and the moral blameworthiness of the offender. NATURE OF THE OFFENCES [15] Mr. Chase has been found guilty of multiple offences, the majority of which are offences of violence.

The maximum sentencesas expressed in the Criminal Code range from life imprisonment (kidnapping; break and enter with intent), fourteen years (aggravatedassault), ten years (assault with a weapon), five years (uttering threats) and two years (failing to comply with a Release Order). [16] All of the offences were committed in the context of an intimate partner relationship, which is statutorily aggravating.Denunciation and deterrence are the primary sentencing objectives (see R. v. Lavallee, (SCC), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852; R v.Wishlow 2013 MBCA 34).

As noted more recently, violence perpetrated in the context of intimate relationships requires “emphaticdenunciation” (see R v. Butcher, 2020 NSCA 50; leave to appeal refused 2020 SCCA No. 310). [17] Intimate partner violence also involves a breach of trust. The Court in Butcher noted the following from R v. Pereira 2019ONSC 6751 (at paras 6-8): Breach of trust in the context of intimate partner violence requires additional weight be given to the sentencing principles of denunciationand, to a lesser extent, general deterrence. There are two essential reasons which lead to this conclusion.

First, it is a notorious fact that adisproportionate number of acts of violence are committed in a domestic context. There are powerful emotional and social bonds fosteredin intimate relationships. When the love, affection and interdependence go awry, emotions may turn with tragic consequences.Historically, there are also cases in which violence and abuse is common with weak and cowardly partners, almost always men.

For both the affirmation of our core values and to ensure that there be no mistake about society's abhorrence of domestic violence, theprevalence and persistence of the problem requires firm and resolute sentences. Second, it is part of our social compact [sic] that partners will support one another and nurture each other. There is a trust relationshipbetween partners, a mutual reinforcement. Violence is a total repudiation of this trust.

A breach of this trust requires sentences reflectiveof denunciatory objectives. [18] Although Butcher and Pereira both involved the murder of an intimate partner, the principle – that intimate partner violenceinvolves a breach of trust – has been held to apply to other forms of intimate partner violence (see for example R v. Cunningham 2023ONCA 36 (attempted murder); R v. P.M. 2022 ONCA 408 (sexual assault); R v. S.S. 2023 BCCA 207 (sexual assault)). [19] Where denunciation and deterrence are the primary sentencing principles, the focus must be on the offence committed, not theoffender.

While other sentencing principles, such as rehabilitation, apply they must not be elevated above denunciation and deterrence(see R v. KNDW 2020 MBCA 52). CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENDER [20] Mr. Chase comes before the court at 32 years old. Prior to 2022, he only had one entry on his criminal record, for impaireddriving in 2011. [21] The Pre-sentence Report filed with the Court provides insight into his formative teenage years and family dynamics. He grewup witnessing alcohol misuse by his mother and experienced emotional abuse from his father.

At 16 years of age, he discovered that aman other than his father, was his biological dad. [22] There was little supervision or rules at home for Mr. Chase to follow as a teenager. His parents separated and their attentionwas focussed on his sister, who was hospitalized with an eating disorder.

[ 23 ] Mr. Chase started to use alcohol, cannabis and cigarettes at the very young age of 11. He started using cocaine at 13. His substance abuse increased until he was 21, when he was convicted of driving under the influence. Following attendance at an outpatient program at the Addictions Foundation of Manitoba, Mr. Chase stopped drinking alcohol. He continued to use cocaine and other drugs on the weekends. [ 24 ] Mr. Chase’s world started to collapse when he began using crack cocaine in 2022.

This generally corresponds with the breakdown of his relationship with R.L., his use of alcohol after many years of sobriety, and his escalating violent behaviour. [ 25 ] His substance abuse became unmanageable, resulting in the loss of two close friendships. [ 26 ] After years of pro-social living, Mr. Chase spiralled down into drug addiction. It is not clear what, if anything, precipitated his use of crack cocaine. What is clear is that he chose to exert whatever power and control he could over R.L. He continued contact with her despite being bound by court orders not to. He assaulted her.

He monitored her movements. [ 27 ] On August 3, 2022, he deliberately sought her out. He went to her home, despite her colloquially telling him not to. He used threats of violence towards her and the young children in the apartment. He backed up these threats by showing her a knife concealed in his waistband. [ 28 ] He physically assaulted her during the kidnapping and in the presence of his friend. He then chased her down in the parking lot and continued the physical assault. [ 29 ] While not the subject matter of the charges before the Court, it is concerning that Mr.

Chase continued to contact R.L. after the events of August 3, 2022, telling her that what happened was her fault and telling her to drop the charges. Mr. Chase has since been convicted for these offences of breaching the no contact order and obstructing justice. I do not use these prior convictions as aggravating factors, but they do provide a window into Mr. Chase’s normative character. [ 30 ] It was entirely foreseeable that in taking the actions he did, Mr. Chase would cause harm to R.L. He knew she was vulnerable following the apprehension of their daughter and her subsequent suicide attempt.

He knew she wanted to end the relationship. He knew that she did not want to leave with him. And he knew he could overpower her with physical force. [ 31 ] The consequential harm suffered by R.L. was immediate and will continue in the future. Following the assault she spent two days in hospital and required ongoing care for her physical injuries once discharged. She has since undergone medical procedures and will need to undergo more in the future. [ 32 ] She declined to provide a victim impact statement, referring the Court to her testimony at trial.

At trial, she indicated that when the relationship ended and the physical abuse first started, she felt sad. She tried to find the person she used to love. Despite the no contact order, she stayed with him out of fear. She had no other support network. She was isolated from her family and friends, had her movements monitored, and was belittled.

She has suffered emotionally. [ 33 ] She has also had to miss work due to ongoing medical appointments and having to attend court on several different occasions. [ 34 ] Their shared daughter has and will continue to suffer harm, through the lack of relationship with her father. She will grow up and come to learn that her father hurt her mother. [ 35 ] Having grown up witnessing alcohol misuse, combined with little supervision or consequences, it is perhaps unsurprising that Mr. Chase also misused substances, starting from a young age.

However, he demonstrated an ability to control his use, abstaining from alcohol for many years and, despite continuing to use drugs on the weekends, maintaining employment and pro-social relationships. [ 36 ] While Mr. Chase’s personal circumstances are sympathetic, they do not reduce his moral culpability. His moral blameworthiness is high. AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES [ 37 ] There are several aggravating factors present in this case: - It is statutorily aggravating that Mr.

Chase committed these offences against his intimate partner; - It is also statutorily aggravating that, when he broke into R.L.’s apartment he did so knowing or being reckless to the fact that that the home was occupied; - The offences involve a breach of trust, given the nature of the relationship; - The viciousness of the assaultive behaviour, escalating at each location; and - He was breaching a court order, which prohibited contact with R.L. [ 38 ] As for mitigating factors, Mr.

Chase has demonstrated the ability to lead a mainly pro-social life and was gainfully employed for many years. [ 39 ] He has the support of his family. [ 40 ] He is a good candidate for rehabilitation, showing insight in the Pre-sentence Report regarding how drugs and alcohol have negatively affected him, and his plans to abstain from use going forward. [ 41 ] During sentencing submissions, counsel for Mr. Chase indicated that there is “some” Indigenous background in the family of

Mr. Chase’s father. Details were sparse. Mr. Chase did not raise the issue with the Pre-sentence Report writer. Given the seriousness of the charges, Mr. Chase’s high moral blameworthiness and the limited information provided, I do not give any effect to any Gladue factors that may be present. CONSECUTIVE AND CONCURRENT SENTENCES [ 42 ] The first step a sentencing judge must take when required to sentence on multiple offences is to determine whether any or all of the sentences are to be served concurrently or consecutively. This question and the decision does not relate to the overall length of sentence.

Rather, it pertains to the nature and circumstances of the criminal activity under consideration and the connectedness of two or more offences to each other ( R v. Wozny 2010 MBCA 115 at para 45 ). [ 43 ] The general rule is that if the offences are sufficiently interrelated to form part of one single, continuous criminal transaction, a concurrent sentence is called for.

However, if the offences are separate and distinct, then a consecutive sentence is to be imposed. [ 44 ] Whether imposing a concurrent sentence, a consecutive sentence or a combination of both, the principle of proportionality must be considered. [ 45 ] If concurrent sentences are imposed, the sentencing judge will determine a fit sentence for the most serious offence, and make the other sentences lesser in length, ensuring that the length of sentence does not give the offender a ‘free ride’ for the lesser concurrent sentences. [ 46 ] If consecutive sentences are imposed, the sentencing judge will determine a fit sentence for each offence, following which a last look for totality will be considered. [ 47 ] If both concurrent and consecutive sentences are imposed, the approach outlined above for each set of offences is used, following which a last look for totality is considered. [ 48 ] The Crown and defence counsel argue that both concurrent and consecutive sentences should be imposed.

Their approach, however, is very different. [ 49 ] The Crown argues that the assault with a weapon and uttering threats offences should be sentenced concurrently with the kidnapping offence. The nexus between these offences involves the interaction between R.L. and Mr. Chase at her home, while walking to the van and while in the van. After breaking and entering, Mr.

Chase threatened to harm those in the house if R.L. did not leave with him (uttering threats) and threatened violence against her and others after showing her the knife concealed in his waistband, subsequently making good on the threat by physically assaulting her in the van (assault with weapon). [ 50 ] The Crown says a six year sentence for kidnapping is fit and appropriate, with one year for the assault with weapon concurrent and one year for the three charges of uttering threats, concurrent to each charge and concurrent to the kidnapping charge. [ 51 ] They say offence of break and enter with intent should stand on its own and receive a sentence of 18 months consecutive. [ 52 ] The Crown says the aggravated assault charge should be consecutive to the kidnapping.

When R.L. exited the van and walked away for Mr. Chase, the kidnapping ended.

Accordingly, the Crown argues for a four year sentence, consecutive to the kidnapping. [ 53 ] Finally, it’s argued the two charges of failing to comply with the Release Order should attract a sentence of one year concurrent to each other, but consecutive to the other charges. [ 54 ] For totality, the Crown proposes reducing the break and enter sentence to one year, and the fail to comply charges to nine months each, for a total sentence of 11.75 years. [ 55 ] Defence counsel takes a different approach in arguing for a five year sentence.

She agrees that four years is appropriate for the aggravated assault charge, but that the kidnapping charge should be three years concurrent. [ 56 ] She argues the remaining charges should be concurrent to each other, but consecutive to the aggravated assault and kidnapping charges. She proposes one year concurrent on the break and enter and assault with a weapon charge, six months each on the utter threats charges and three months each on the failing to comply charges. [ 57 ] There is no proposed reduction for totality.

CASE LAW AND ANALYSIS [ 58 ] Both counsel filed case books, focussing on sentencing ranges and principles for the kidnapping and aggravated assault charges. i. Kidnapping [ 59 ] In R v. Blair 2007 MBQB 287 , the Court noted the range of sentences for kidnapping, extortion and aggravated assault are wide, due to the wide range of possible circumstances and seriousness of circumstances that can occur in the course of committing the offences (see para 19). [ 60 ] The Court outlined several factors to be considered in determining a fit sentence. An almost-identical list of factors were set out in the case of R v.

Brar 2014 BCCA 175 . [ 61 ] In Blair , Beard, J. (as she then was) determined that a range of four to ten years was appropriate for the offence of kidnapping, where there is evidence of planning and premeditation, relate to a criminal organization, involve the use of violence and result in physical

serious injuries. [ 62 ] Neither Blair nor Brar involved domestic violence. The illegal drug trade and money was at the heart of both. [ 63 ] In R v. Cook (N.), 2014 MBCA 29 , the focus for the Court was consistency in approach to assessing proportionality where the victim had been kidnapped and then sexually assaulted. [ 64 ] In Cook , the Court noted that a pigeonhole approach to kidnapping sentencing should be avoided. The Court stated that there should not be one range of sentence for premeditated kidnappings for ransom, and then a lower range for all others.

Where kidnapping arises out of a domestic dispute, it was noted that the sentences vary greatly and do not resemble a premeditated kidnapping for ransom. [ 65 ] The Supreme Court of Newfoundland decision of R v. Templeman , 2016 NLTD(G) 114, provides a helpful review of kidnapping in a domestic violence context, where sentences were noted to range from 34 months to five years. A list of non-exhaustive factors, gleaned from sentencings in domestic kidnappings include (see para 76): 1. Duration of the kidnapping; 2. The degree of planning involved in the successful execution of the offence; 3.

Whether a weapon was used; 4. The degree of force involved and whether restraints were used in carrying out the offence; 5. Injuries to the victim, physical and psychological; and 6. Whether threats were used in the commission of the offence. [ 66 ] The factors set out in Templeman are more applicable to the fact situation of this case, as opposed to factors for kidnapping for ransom. [ 67 ] In applying these factors, I find that the duration of the kidnapping was not defined with precision. Oscar Brown left work at Sobey’s shortly after 10:00 pm and witnessed the assault in the parking lot.

R.L.’s confinement ended moments before this. R.L. testified that it was dusk, with the sun starting to go down, when the divorce party was getting underway. In Winnipeg, Manitoba at the beginning of August, the sun sets shortly after 9:00 pm. Based on these two reference points, the confinement lasted anywhere from an hour to two. [ 68 ] There was a degree of planning involved. Mr. Chase showed up with a driver and van. Paul Prezel did not drop Mr. Chase off and leave; he was waiting in the parking lot. In the trial decision, I found that Mr. Chase was not asking R.L. to leave with him; he demanded it.

It was his intention, after breaking into her home and threatening her and the others that she leave with him. He made that clear when he showed her the knife concealed in his waistband. His words and actions were used as a means of intimidation and control. I reject the suggestion made during sentencing submissions that he was merely reacting to R.L. [ 69 ] Unlike some cases where the individual is physically restrained and moved, in this case R.L. was moved under duress. Violence was threatened in the apartment, during the walk to the van, and immediately before entering the van.

Once in the van, the physical assault began when R.L. took Mr. Chase’s phone to warn the others at the apartment. [ 70 ] While the physical assault in the van undoubtedly led to injuries to R.L., it is impossible to discern which were inflicted while in the van, as opposed to those inflicted in the parking lot. I do find, however, that there were physical injuries sustained by R.L. as a result of the hitting, punching and kneeling on her neck. [ 71 ] The threats made to harm R.L., her friend and the children were used for Mr. Chase to get what he wanted – namely control of R.L. She took the threats seriously.

She subjected herself to the physical assault in the van so that Mr. Chase could not retrieve his phone and use it to text other people, to have them carry out his threat against those remaining at the apartment. [ 72 ] In balancing all of these factors, while the duration of confinement was not lengthy, and it ended in a public place from which she could free herself, the threats, and the physical violence inflicted following the threatened use of the knife place the kidnapping at the middle end of the spectrum in terms of seriousness. ii.

Aggravated Assault [ 73 ] As with kidnapping, the cases reflect a broad range of sentences for aggravated assault, which reflect the diverse fact situations that underlie the offence. [ 74 ] A sentencing range of four to eight years was established by the Manitoba Court of Appeal in R v. Kravchenko 2020 MBCA 30 , for a specific category of aggravated assault. This category – an unprovoked random attack on a stranger with a weapon – does not align with the facts of this case.

However, in its analysis, the Court provided helpful instruction to sentencing judges when considering a sentence for aggravated assault (at paras 52-55): Regardless of whether or not there is a range or ranges for aggravated assault, there are considerations a sentencing judge must keep in mind, in each case of aggravated assault, when weighing the circumstances of the case in light of the sentencing principles and objectives set out in sections 718-718.2 of the Code. First, like a manslaughter, an aggravated assault has a spectrum of moral culpability as to whether the assault is near accident or near murder.

The task of a sentencing judge is to “determine the extent to which the harm was foreseeable, the risk or likelihood that the offender’s conduct would give rise to the harm, as well as the offender’s state of mind or state of awareness” (R v Nickel, 2012 ABCA

158 at para 35 ). Often, the nature of the violence used and the offender’s state of mind will be telling in this assessment. Second, the concepts of wounding, maiming, disfiguring or endangering life cover a wide variety, and different durations, of harm, unlike manslaughter where the consequence of that offence is clear—death. The consequences of the assault are central to the section 268(1) offence. As Binnie J explained in R v Williams, 2003 SCC 41 , “The ‘aggravation’ in aggravated assault thus comes from the consequences” (at para 45).

Therefore, aggravated assault sentences must take into consideration the nature and degree of the consequences to the victim, both proximate to the occurrence of the offence and in the long term. In making assessments of consequential harm, sentencing judges should be careful before making too much of dark analogies comparing and contrasting the harm suffered by victims in other cases ( see R v Kanthasamy, 2007 ONCA 90 at para 5 ). Sentencing must always remain an individualised process.

Third, a sentencing judge cannot treat an accused as having committed an attempted murder, even if the facts support that is what occurred, as that would be contrary to the rule that an offender cannot be sentenced for a crime which he or she has not been convicted of (see Suter at para 35; and Giesbrecht at para 177). [ 75 ] A three-year sentence for aggravated assault in a domestic violence context was imposed in the case of R v. K. S.S. , 2022 MBPC 22 .

Citing the considerations from Kravchenko set out above, the Court in K.S.S. focussed on cases with similar facts to its own – an impulsive stabbing after a verbal dispute. Associate Chief Judge Martin noted that while substance abuse played a role, there was no indication of longstanding intimate partner violence, and there were several mitigating circumstances that are not present in the case before me. [ 76 ] Here, the offences took place in the context of a history of intimate partner violence.

It has been recognized that the end of a relationship fraught with such violence is often the most dangerous time for the victim. [ 77 ] It was not an impulsive act. The harm that was inflicted by Mr. Chase was entirely foreseeable. There was a physical size difference between him and R.L. He was able to pick her up by the backpack straps and drop her on the ground multiple times.

She was prone on the ground as he continued the attack in a standing position. [ 78 ] He may have been under the influence of drugs, but he was not so intoxicated that he did not know who he was attacking or why. [ 79 ] This was not a continuation of the assault in the van over his cell phone, as that had been returned when R.L. left the van. [ 80 ] As has been previously noted, there were immediate consequences to R.L. in terms of physical harm and follow up medical treatments. These continued for months following the attack. She missed work.

She was subjected to contact from him after the assault and even after his arrest. She has suffered emotional harm. [ 81 ] This was not, as pointed out by the Court in Kravchenko , an attempted murder. It was, however, a gratuitous and violent attack on a vulnerable woman in a public place. SENTENCE [ 82 ] The 11.75 year sentence advocated by the Crown would be crushing. While no longer a youthful offender, Mr. Chase is still a relatively young man, with good prospects for rehabilitation. He has expressed insight into his need to abstain from drugs and alcohol.

He has an employment history and prospects for employment once released. [ 83 ] The five year sentence put forward by defence does not adequately address the gravity of the offences and Mr. Chase’s moral blameworthiness. What occurred on August 3, 2022, was not an impulsive, fleeting event. The violence was inflicted in three separate locations and increased in intensity throughout the interaction. I do not accept that Mr. Chase was simply reacting to R.L. He was deliberate in his actions. [ 84 ] The sentence will be as follows. For kidnapping, 4 years.

As noted, the facts of this kidnapping place it in the middle range suggested for domestic kidnappings. [ 85 ] For uttering threats and assault with a weapon, one year, concurrent on all and concurrent to the kidnapping. I agree with the Crown that the threats to R.L., her friend and the children, along with the assault in the van following the threatened of use of the knife, are connected to the kidnapping charge. [ 86 ] For the break and enter with intent, one year consecutive. After breaking in, Mr.

Chase could have taken the backpack, which he was intent on retrieving from R.L. during the assault in the parking lot, and left. He did not. Instead, he continued with his plan to take R.L. away from her residence. [ 87 ] For the aggravated assault, 4 years consecutive. I agree with the Crown that this was a separate offence, as the confinement – a critical aspect of kidnapping – had ended. It was vicious assault and the harms suffered by R.L. are serious. [ 88 ] For the breaches of the Release Order, one year concurrent on both, consecutive to the other charges. [ 89 ] This is a total sentence of 10 years.

In taking a last look back for totality, I find that a 10 year sentence is disproportionate. The one year sentence for the break and enter will become concurrent to the kidnapping charge, as there is a direct connection between this offence and the offences that followed. The one year sentence for the breaches will each be reduced to six months each for totality. Which leaves a total custodial sentence of eight years and six months.

[ 90 ] This sentence will be served consecutively to the sentence that Mr. Chase is currently serving. [ 91 ] In terms of ancillary orders, aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, kidnapping and break and enter with intent are all primary designated offences. A DNA order pursuant to s.487.051 of the Criminal Code will attach to each of these charges. [ 92 ] A ten year weapons prohibition pursuant to s.109 of the Criminal Code will also attach to each of these charges. [ 93 ] While he is in custody, I am ordering a non-communication order with R.L. pursuant to s.743.21(1) of the Criminal Code .

This prohibition includes both direct and indirect communication. I particularly note this given R.L.’s concerns that he is having others watch or follow her. [ 94 ] Costs and surcharge are waived. “Original signed by:” FREDERICKSON, P.J.