2019 NBCA 69, 2019 NBCA 69

COURT OF APPEAL OF COUR D’APPEL DU NEW BRUNSWICK NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK 137-18-CA D.G. APPELLANT D.G. APPELANT - and - - et - M.G. RESPONDENT M.G. INTIMÉE D.G. v. M.G., 2019 NBCA 69 CORAM: The Honourable Justice Quigg The Honourable Justice Green The Honourable Justice LeBlond D.G. c.

M.G., 2019 NBCA 69 CORAM : l’honorable juge Quigg l’honorable juge Green l’honorable juge LeBlond Appeal from a decision of the Court of Queen’sBench: November 23, 2018 and December 4, 2018 Appel d’une décision de la Cour du Banc de la Reine: le 23 novembre 2018 et le 4 décembre 2018 History of Case: Historique de la cause : Decision under appeal: 2018 NBQB 214 Décision frappée d’appel : 2018 NBQB 214 , 2018 NBBR 214 Preliminary or incidental proceedings: None Procédures préliminaires ou accessoires : aucune Appeal heard: June 11, 2019 Appel entendu : le 11 juin 2019 Judgment rendered: September 26, 2019 Jugement rendu : le 26 septembre 2019

Reasons for judgment: The Honourable Justice Quigg Concurred in by: The Honourable Justice Green The Honourable Justice LeBlond Counsel at hearing: For the appellant: Grant Ogilvie, Q.C. and Maria M. Conroy For the respondent: Shannon Doran, Q.C. and Janik Collette Motifs de jugement : l’honorable juge Quigg Souscrivent aux motifs : l’honorable juge Green l’honorable juge LeBlond Avocats à l’audience : Pour l’appellant : Grant Ogilvie, c.r., et Maria M. Conroy Pour l’intimée : Shannon Doran, c.r., et Janik Collette THE COURT The appeal is dismissed with costs of $5,000.

LA COUR L’appel est rejeté avec dépens de 5 000 $. The judgment of the Court was delivered by QUIGG, J.A. I. Introduction [ 1 ] The father appeals a decision of the Court of Queen’s Bench, made under the Divorce Act , R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2 nd Supp .). He alleges the trial judge made errors in determining custody, child support, spousal support, and costs.

He also says the trial judge made numerous (i.e., 19) errors in his findings of fact and submits that, although these errors may not be palpable and overriding when viewed individually, they cumulatively resulted in a palpable and overriding error which calls for appellate intervention. Simply put, the father contends the trial judge had such a bad impression of him based on incorrect facts, it tainted the decision. II. Background [ 2 ] The parties were married in May 2010 and separated on September 13, 2015. There are two young children of the marriage, a daughter (B.) and a son (M.).

Following separation, the father often returned to the family home to care for and spend time with the children. He also continued to pay bills and expenses. A Petition for Divorce was filed in December 2016, an interim order was issued in April 2017, and a decision was made in December 2018, with a final order in January 2019. That order granted sole

custody and primary care of both children to the mother, with access to the father. Child support, special expenses, and spousal supportwere also ordered. III. Grounds of Appeal [3] Although the father lists ten grounds of appeal, one of which contains 19 subsections regarding errors of fact,they can generally be distilled into errors regarding: 1) custody; 2) spousal support; 3) cumulative effect of errors of fact; and 4) costs.The mother concedes three of the alleged errors of fact. IV. Standard of Review [4] The Court recently reiterated the standard of review in family law cases in Gillespie v.

Gillespie, 2018 NBCA22, [2018] N.B.J. No. 77 (QL), where Larlee J.A. wrote: The applicable standard of review in a family case allows intervention by this Court only where there has been a material error, a seriousmisapprehension of the evidence, or an error of law: L.R.R. v. E.M., 2018 NBCA 2, [2018] N.B.J. No. 2 (QL); L.D.M. v. J.K.D., 2017NBCA 47, [2017] N.B.J. No. 259 (QL); Yorke v. Yorke, 2011 NBCA 79, 378 N.B.R. (2d) 141.

With respect to the standard of reviewconcerning findings of fact and discretionary orders the Court may only overturn a trial judge’s finding of fact if it is the result of apalpable and overriding error, and may only interfere with a discretionary order if it is founded upon an error of law, an error in theapplication of the governing principles or a palpable and overriding error in the assessment of the evidence: Lang v. Lang, [2007] N.B.J.No. 348 (C.A.) (QL). The order under attack in this appeal is a discretionary one. [para. 8] [5] As Baird J.A. writes in S.F.D. v. M.T., 2019 NBCA 62, [2019] N.B.J.

No. 203 (QL): It bears repeating that deference is owed to a trial judge’s assessment of evidence concerning the best interests of a child in custodymatters. This is so because the trial judge is in the best position to assess the credibility and the quality of the evidence. A trial judgebases his or her decision on that evidence, and he or she cannot speculate, or “fill in the blanks.” Neither can the Court on appellatereview.

Of course, should the Court determine the trial judge made an error of law by misapplying a legal test, or misinterpreting a legaltest, or if he or she has committed a palpable and overriding error of fact, appellate intervention may be warranted. See Van de Perre v.Edwards, 2001 SCC 60, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 1014, at para.13; P.R.H. v. M.E.L., 2009 NBCA 18, 343 N.B.R. (2d) 100, at paras. 8-9; andL.D.M. v. J.K.D., 2017 NBCA 47, [2017] N.B.J. No. 259 (QL), per Green J.A. at paras. 9-10. [para. 23] V. Analysis A.

Custody [6] The father alleges the trial judge erred in interpreting and applying the relevant caselaw pertaining to jointversus sole custody. He claims the proper application of the existing caselaw would have given rise to a joint and shared custody regime.The trial judge recognized that s. 16 of the Divorce Act applied. Section 16(8) specifies that the court shall take into consideration onlythe best interests of the child. The trial judge considered the default position of joint custody in accordance with s. 129(1) of the FamilyServices Act, S.N.B. 1980, c.

F-2.2, the definition of best interests in s. 1 of the Family Services Act, and the additional considerationssuggested by Graser J. in Rideout v. Rideout (1998), (NB BR), 201 N.B.R. (2d) 249, [1998] N.B.J. No. 233 (Q.B.)(QL) (paras. 35 and 36). A review of the decision reveals the trial judge applied the facts to appropriate caselaw. In my view, the fatherhas failed to demonstrate that an error was made.

(1) Communication [7] The father also alleges the trial judge erred in law by failing to consider the judicially recognized principlethat mere communication issues (which are not admitted by the father) are not sufficient to deny a request for shared custody.

[ 8 ] The trial judge concluded it would be in the best interests of the children for the mother to have sole custody and primary care for multiple reasons, including, but not limited to, communication issues. In his analysis, some of the judge’s findings were:

a) the mother “has been the primary care parent for the children since their birth” and that, prior to the separation, the mother “appears to have been the psychological parent” (paras. 149 and 152);

b) the father’s job starts at 7:00 a.m., and on some days he has no idea when he might finish (para. 151);

c) the father discussed the divorce and issues with their daughter and used her distress to force the mother to surrender to his demands (para. 172);

d) the father refused to negotiate with the mother to permit their daughter to attend events she clearly wanted to attend because he wanted to use the events as a bargaining chip in what was, for him, a more important dispute (para. 172);

e) the father had been unwilling to provide any significant flexibility in scheduling access visits and insisted that other members of the children’s extended family stay away from all events when he had the children (para. 173);

f) the parties had experienced some continuity problems with their daughter, there had been circumstances when she missed parties because of the dispute between the parents, and she had become a “pawn” in the dispute (para. 178);

g) the father put his best interests ahead of the interests of the children, insisting the children be dressed and waiting for him when he arrived for a transfer (para. 185);

h) it was inconceivable that the children could live in the two houses in any shared custody arrangement (para. 197). [ 9 ] To say that the trial judge denied the request for shared custody based solely on communication issues would be to underemphasize the other issues he took into consideration. Communication was just one of the considerations, albeit a significant one. The judge found the “most significant issue” between the parties related to the Auditory Brainstem Response procedure to be performed upon the younger child.

This auditory test was recommended by two experts who testified at trial, yet the father refused to consent. The trial judge found that “[t]he example of this protracted battle over what the two experts identify as a valuable procedure with minimal risk or downside makes it clear that these two parents are not capable of working together in the best interests of their two children” (para. 171). [ 10 ] The trial judge also found there was a “substantial dispute” on the issue of their daughter’s selection of a school program: core English, or French Immersion.

He found that “the parties spent an inordinate amount of time in discussions about the children,” “[m]any of the messages were rancorous and combative,” and “[t]he great majority of the inappropriate emails and text messages came from [the father]” (para. 144). [ 11 ] He referred to specific email messages and described them as follows: Most of the emails dealt with grievances D.G.G. had about how M.D.G. was caring for the children, instructions on what she should do or not do when the children were with her, warnings for she and her extended family to stay away from any of the children’s activities when it was his time with the children; and, demands that M.D.G. vary the regular

schedule of access if she wanted to use any of his time for B.G. or M.G. to be involved with extracurricular activities. In some of the communiques, D.G.G. expressly involves B.G. and tells of “her wishes” in the couple’s dispute. [para. 145] [ 12 ] The trial judge also stated:

[…] [The father] was clear that, since the lawyers had become involved, he did not like the way the communication has gone. He said there had been no problem with communication before the lawyers got involved. The email communications set out above together with myriad others copied in the pleadings and the books of exhibits make it clear that the communication issues between the parties were not the fault of the lawyers. D.G.G. wrote few, if any, positive emails to M.D.G. He refused to negotiate any temporary variations in the

schedule the parties had unless there was a reframe of the entire access arrangement. He discussed the principal custody issue with his daughter, B. and attempted to use her as a bargaining chip in the negotiations. Of more concern, D.G.G.’s communications with [M.D.G.] and L.M. emphasize his belief that, if M.D.G. had done as he recommended and not gone to a lawyer, they would both have saved a great deal of money and he would have been able to satisfy both his demands and hers. He has no evidence to support this position. D.G.G. went out of his way to convince M.D.G. to change lawyers.

He couched this in terms that he was only thinking of what was best for her.

Similarly, his demand that L.M. stop advising M.D.G. to stop talking with her lawyer was focused upon his position that, if M.D.G. did what he wanted, she would be much better off. [paras. 154-56] [ 13 ] The trial judge did find that some of the mother’s messages reflected frustration but, despite this, she seemed determined to communicate with the father (para. 175). [ 14 ] It is apparent, after reviewing the record, that another reason for awarding sole custody to the mother was that the father ’s communications, email or otherwise, were “generally tools of constant negotiations rather than cooperative discussions about the children and their activities.

Currently, the parents do not communicate well with respect to the children” (para. 185). [ 15 ] The trial judge also addressed the father’s attempts to discourage the mother from participating in the litigation and his antagonism toward the concept of collaborative negotiation in the best interests of the children. This suggested that any cooperation at that time was impossible (para. 185). [ 16 ] This Court dealt with the issue of communication in J.H. v. T.H. , 2017 NBCA 7 , [2017] N.B.J.

No. 16 (QL) , in which the father unsuccessfully argued the trial judge had placed too much weight on the lack of communication. Baird J.A. wrote: The application judge outlined the various custody orders available to him.

He observed joint custody orders, by their nature, require parents to share major decision making authority and responsibility in all areas that affect their children […] This requires a degree of cooperation between the parents, and at best, it presumes they have the ability to effectively communicate with each other. […] The father contends the application judge placed too much weight on the lack of communication between the parents . I n point of fact, the application judge correctly acknowledged the lack of communication between the parents was but one consideratio n.

He discussed the fact the father had not taken as active a role in maintaining the children in the same school. Following the parents' move, he did not attend parent teacher meetings, nor did he convey information from the school to the mother. He observed, as noted, the children were missing extracurricular activities and there had been an incident concerning an antibiotic prescription for one of the children. I conclude the application judge decided the “best interests” of the children from a child centered perspective, and he correctly considered the factors in the context of the evidence.

The above, along with the other problems that were identified, militated against a continuation of the shared custody arrangement. A shared parenting or a shared custody arrangement requires parents not only to have the ability to communicate in an effective manner, it also requires them to cooperate in the decision making process in order to protect the health, safety and emotional well-being of their children. [paras. 19-20] [Emphasis added .] [ 17 ] This Court found there was discretion to grant the mother decision-making authority.

Baird J.A. wrote: In child custody cases where it is clear the parents are not able to effectively communicate with each other, the pivotal factor, in my opinion, is whether the court is satisfied sufficient safeguards are in place so as to insulate the children from the parental conflict. […], they were not able to insulate their children from their conflict. […] This was not a case where the parents could share the major decisions that affect their children. […] [para. 33]

[ 18 ] Communication was also an issue in A.G. v. M.M. , 2018 NBCA 60 , [2018] N.B.J. No. 209 (QL) . In that case, the father was granted sole custody of the children at trial. The parties had previously executed a Separation Agreement to have joint custody, with the mother having primary care of the children. Larlee J.A. wrote: In his decision, the trial judge relies on A.N.H v. M.K.C. , 2010 NBQB 120 , 359 N.B.R. (2d) 1 , regarding joint custody, particularly with respect to the need for parties to communicate effectively in order for joint custody to be a viable option.

J.H. , in my view, is more pertinent given the similarities between the two situations. Just like the parties in the present case, the parents in J.H. clearly had difficulties not only in communicating between themselves, but also in cooperating with regard to their decision-making role vis-à-vis their children. It seems clear from the standpoint of lack of communication and cooperation between the parties this was an appropriate case for the trial judge to consider moving from a joint custody to a sole custody arrangement.

The case, then, became a question of who was the appropriate parent under the circumstances to have sole custody. [para. 7] [ 19 ] In L.R.R. v. E.M . , 2018 NBCA 2 , [ 2018] N.B.J. No. 2 (QL) , the father was granted sole custody of a 13-year- old child. Larlee J.A. wrote: […] By its very nature, a joint custody order requires parents to participate in major decisions in all areas that affect a child. This requires a degree of cooperation between the parents, and their ability to effectively communicate with each other: J.H. v. T.H. , 2017 NBCA 7 , [2017] N.B.J. No. 16 (QL) , at para. 8 , per Baird J.A.

Courts will order joint custody, even in high conflict cases, where they are satisfied it is in the “best interests of the child”. However, judges recognize the inappropriateness of joint custody if the communication between the parents is acrimonious and is detrimental to the well-being of the child: B.P. v. A.T. , 2014 NBCA 51 , 423 N.B.R. (2d) 99 , paras. 13-14 , and F.M. v.

T.H. , 2016 NBCA 29 , 449 N.B.R. (2d) 240 , at para. 21 . […] The application judge in her decision came to the following conclusion which, in my view, tips the balance in favour of a sole custody order in favour of the father: I have absolutely no confidence in the applicant's ability to communicate in any manner, let alone a mature and responsible manner, with the respondent. In difficult custody cases of this nature we will often see individuals who display extremely poor judgment and regrettable behaviours in the initial months or year following a difficult separation.

While the Court certainly does not condone such behaviour, perhaps we can step back and accept that as adults go through very difficult personal situations their behaviour may not be at its best. In this case, the applicant's behaviour in the first couple of years following the separation was reprehensible. However, what is particularly troubling to the Court is that despite the fact nearly a decade has elapsed the applicant's behaviour has not improved. In my view, the applicant will never, for whatever reason, be in a position to communicate in a mature or responsible manner with the respondent.

I do not doubt for a moment that at times the respondent has raised his voice and expressed extreme frustration to the applicant. I am certain that the respondent has not been a saint in all of his communications with the applicant. However, in a balancing act between the two, there is no question but that the respondent is the parent who is most prepared to communicate in a mature and responsible manner. [paras. 163-165] And further: Given all of the evidence in this case, I am not at all confident that M.G.R.M.’s emotional wellbeing can be assured in the care of the applicant.

Further, I have grave concerns that any further exposure to this relentless conflict between his parents may very well create long-term consequences for him. Regrettably, I see no alternative but to grant sole custody of M.G.R.M. to the respondent. The issue which causes me greater reflection is the appropriate access to be accorded to the applicant. [para. 190]

In my view, the application judge relied on the proper jurisprudence and conducted a thorough analysis with respect to the evidence. I cannot discern any misapprehension of the evidence with respect to the issue of custody. Quite to the contrary, there is ample evidence to support her conclusion. I would dismiss this ground of appeal. [paras. 10-11 and 14-15] [ 20 ] In the case before us, an email exchange between the parents established the father’s “rancorous” and combative communication with the mother. The mother strongly disagrees with the notion their communication was positive.

She testified the overall theme of the emails was very critical and negative toward her. The father’s attempt to highlight emails that illustrated his positive communications with the mother was an exercise in cherry-picking from the otherwise steady stream of condescending and negative directives sent to the mother.

(2) Maximum contact [ 21 ] The father alleges the trial judge erred in law in failing to apply the maximum contact principle. He submits the trial judge erred for two reasons: 1) he determined the parties had serious communication issues that acted as a bar to shared custody; and 2) he applied too much significance to the parties’ disagreement about the ABR medical procedure for their son. [ 22 ] Similarly, in J.H. , the father took the position that the trial judge’s order violated the maximum contact principle.

The trial judge altered the interim shared custody arrangement and awarded primary care to the mother. The father was granted access every second weekend from Thursday until Sunday, and alternate Thursdays from 4:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. The children were six and eight years of age. Baird J.A. wrote: […] The Supreme Court addressed the issue of maximum contact in Gordon, as follows: [...] The “maximum contact” principle, as it has been called, is mandatory, but not absolute.

The Act only obliges the judge to respect it to the extent that such contact is consistent with the child’s best interests; if other factors show it would not be in the child’s best interests, the court can and should restrict contact[.] [para. 24] In other words, the sine qua non of the principle is that maximum contact is subordinate to the best interests of a child.

The principle, although a laudable objective, is diminished in cases where there is high parental conflict, and where the trier of fact determines it is necessary to reduce access in order to immunize the children from its long term negative consequences. See B.P. v. A.T. , 2014 NBCA 51 , 423 N.B.R. (2d) 99 , per Larlee J.A., writing for the Court. [paras. 26-27] [ 23 ] In this case, the trial judge specifically referred to s. 16(10) of the Divorce Act . He found the situation was a “relatively high-conflict” case.

He also determined it inconceivable that the children could live in two houses in any shared custody arrangement. He granted access to the father every second weekend from after school Friday until Sunday at 6:30 p.m., extended weekends if Friday or Monday was a holiday, as well as every Wednesday overnight. He also granted holiday access agreed by the parties. [ 24 ] The trial judge concluded that a full, uninterrupted access weekend every two weeks provided more time and more benefit for the children and the parents, as opposed to the interrupted weekend

schedule as per the Interim Order. He considered that the access that existed under the Interim Order was not “optimum for the children.” [ 25 ] In my view, the trial judge correctly stated and applied the best interests of the children test. Despite being aware of the “maximum contact” principle, he found, on the facts before him, it was in the children’s best interest to be in the mother’s primary care. [ 26 ] In Bromm v. Bromm , 2010 SKCA 149 , [2010] S.J. No. 733 (QL) , the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal determined that the principle of maximum contact alone does not provide a sufficient basis upon which to order shared parenting:

The father argues that in determining what was in the best interests of the children the Chambers judge did not properly consider theprinciple of maximum contact. This argument cannot succeed. The Chambers judge correctly stated that s. 17(9) of the Act does notprovide that the maximum contact principle alone provides a sufficient basis upon which to order shared parenting. This comment was inthe context of the argument made by the father that he wanted a shared parenting arrangement which would provide virtually equal timeto each parent, which would have amounted to shared parenting.

In fact, the order of the Chambers judge gave the father furthersignificant time during the school holidays and on Tuesday evenings. Her treatment of the issue does not mean that she then dismissedthe issue as irrelevant. She assessed this principle in the context of the children’s best interests. [para. 24] [27] The father also alleges that the trial judge erred when he failed to give appropriate weight to the father’sactions in maintaining the status quo for the children when he first left the marital home.

Further, the father contends the trial judgefailed to apply any significance whatsoever to the mother’s several unilateral actions in restricting the father’s access during this period. [28] Once again, the trial judge did not make any palpable and overriding errors. He understood the father’sevidence to be that, although he moved to his mother’s residence, he returned to the family home every day before work to help get thechildren up and he went back every evening to help them get to bed. According to the father, this continued for about one year.

Thejudge also considered the mother’s testimony that the early morning visits were of little value as the children were sleeping at the time.The mother continued to be the children’s primary caregiver, and this was accepted by the trial judge. He also recognized that the partiesdeveloped an access

schedule that involved two afternoons per week and a half-day, either on Saturday or Sunday, and that the fatherconsidered this change from unlimited access to be a severe restriction of his access rights. This access had only occurred until theInterim Order. In my view, the trial judge made no error that would have impacted the result.

(3) Alleged cumulative effect of errors in fact [29] The standard of review with respect to findings of fact was addressed by this Court in Lang v. Lang, [2007]N.B.J. No. 348 (C.A.) (QL). Richard J.A. (as he then was) wrote as follows: The law is equally clear that the Court of Appeal cannot re-try a case.

The Court of Appeal may only overturn a trial judge’s finding offact can [sic] if it is the result of a palpable and overriding error, and may only interfere with a discretionary order if it is founded uponan error of law, an error in the application of the governing principles or a palpable and overriding error in the assessment of the evidence(see Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 CSC 33 , [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235, [2002] S.C.J. No. 31 (QL), 2002 S.C.C. 33 and H.L. v. Canada(Attorney General, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 401, [2005] S.C.J.

No. 24 (QL), 2005 SCC 25 with regard to findings of fact, and British Columbia(Minister of Forests) v. Okanagan Indian Band, 2003 CSC 71 , [2003] 3 S.C.R. 371, [2003] S.C.J. No. 76 (QL), 2003 S.C.C.71, at para. 43, with regard to discretionary orders). [para. 3] [30] A case cited by the father in his written submission, Doe v. Doe, (ON CA), [1999] O.J. No.2564 (C.A.) (QL), dealt with an application to vary spousal support, which was dismissed by the trial judge. The trial judge found thefather’s retirement from the practice of law did not give rise to a material change in circumstances.

The Court of Appeal stated that thecumulative effect of errors led it to conclude that the decision of the motion judge could not stand, and, in its view, the record supportedthe father’s retirement as a material change in circumstances. The Court of Appeal was of the opinion that certain findings of the trialjudge, such as the father’s choice to retire being sinister and designed to frustrate his support obligations, were not borne out by theevidence. The Court determined that if the trial judge had not made such obvious errors in fact, the case would have turned outdifferently.

Doe contained clear palpable and overriding errors which affected the result. That is not the case here. [31] Similarly, in S.H. v. V.B., 2007 NBCA 69, 321 N.B.R. (2d) 314, the father appealed the decision of the trialjudge to grant joint custody and primary care of the children to the mother. In dismissing his appeal, the Court stated as follows: In Van de Perre v. Edwards, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 1014, [2001] S.C.J. No. 60 (QL), 2001 SCC 60, Bastarache J. states that the scope ofappellate review in custody cases corresponds to that applied in other family law cases.

An appellate court should not disturb the trialjudgment in the absence of a material error, a serious misapprehension of the evidence, or an error of law. It is not the function of anappellate court to re-assess the evidence and substitute its own discretionary judgment for that of the application judge, where there is nomanifest error in the decision (see C.M.B.E. v. D.J.E. (2006), 304 N.B.R. (2d) 191, [2006] N.B.J. No. 364 (QL), 2006 NBCA 88;A.M.K.H. v. K.A.M (2003), 259 N.B.R. (2d) 291, [2003] N.B.J. No. 171 (QL), 2003 NBCA 33; Nouveau-Brunswick (Ministre desServices familiaux et communautaires v.

M.D. et al. (2005), 294 N.B.R. (2d) 258, [2006] N.B.J. No. 11 (QL), 2006 NBCA 7). There are no manifest errors of fact in this case. In thorough reasons, the trial judge made findings of fact that it was open to him to makeon the evidence and he came to conclusions based on the “best interests of the children” that are untainted by any reversible error. […]

[paras. 2-3] [ 32 ] In para. 66 of her written submission, the mother attempted to deal with each alleged error in fact listed at para. 98 of the father’s written submission and the Notice of Appeal (which are all the same, except one). The mother concedes there are three errors of fact, none of which constitute palpable and overriding errors. I can do no better than to reproduce the list of factual errors the father alleges were made, with the mother’s response: The father The mother

a) The learned trial judge erred in fact in finding that the Appellant had attempted to intimidate L.M., one of the witnesses, when this was not supported by the evidence.

a) See paras. 56, 67 and 68 of the decision. The evidence can be found in L.M.’s testimony (Transcript Volume 5, pp. 44-45, 60-67 and Exhibit P-8). Not an error in fact.

b) The learned trial judge erred in fact in finding that there were “substantial disagreements between the parties on fundamental issues,” when this was not borne out by the evidence.

b) The trial judge is clearly referring to the interim arrangement and his reasons for not granting shared custody at the interim stage. This is not a fact relied upon by the trial judge in his final decision, nor is it an error in fact. The mother also submits that there was in fact disagreement on fundamental issues such as the ABR test (see paras. 157 to 172 of the decision).

c) The learned trial judge erred in fact when he found that the Respondent was responsible for all appointments, visits, arrangements, or other activities for both children, and that the Appellant only “did gradually participate in some of these tasks” when this was not borne out by the facts.

c) This can be found at para. 20 of the decision II. See some of the evidence for example (paras. 86, 116 and 124 of the decision; Transcript Volume 2, pages 139, 157, 192-193 and 195; Transcript Volume 3, pp. 51, 53, 58, 124-125, 145-146, 168-169, 178-179, 188, 207, etc. Not an error in fact.

d) The learned trial judge erred in fact when he found that the Appellant had “filed a Motion to attempt to derail the process again”, referring to the Appellant’s desire to have more clarification and more information regarding the learned trial judge’s Order. He was also asking that the learned trial judge’s Order be altered to allow him to attend when [M.’s] hearing was being tested.

d) The motion is not before this Court, it is our position that we must rely on the trial judge’s comments in his decision as this is the only evidence before the Court of Appeal. See paras. 165, 167, 169 and 170 of the decision. Not an error in fact, and even if it was, not palpable and overriding error.

e) The learned trial judge erred in fact when he found that it was around October 2016, when his access to his son was limited to six hours per week, when the fact established that it was in December 2016, and only after the Respondent changed the locks on the door of the home, and after she found out about the Appellant’s intention to make public his relationship with his new partner.

e) The trial judge found as follows: the father “said that in October 2016, he asked for a divorce and then, shortly thereafter, he received correspondence limiting his access to his son to six-hours per week” (para. 17 of the decision). The trial judge also found that “On December 3, 2016, she [the mother] changed all the locks on the doors of the house” (para. 12 of the decision). He did not find that it was in October 2016 that the father ’s access to his son was limited to six hours, but rather “[s]hortly thereafter,” which could easily mean in December of 2016. Not an error in fact, and even if it was, not palpable and overriding error.

f) The learned judge erred in fact when he inferred that the parties had agreed to the

schedule of the Appellant having access two afternoons per week, and a half day on either Saturday or Sunday, when the evidence bore out that this was a

schedule imposed by the Respondent on the Appellant. The Appellant never agreed to this.

f) The trial judge summarized the mother’s evidence at para. 32 of the decision. The mother testified that they had developed a schedule; at no point does the trial judge make an inference that the father agreed. See mother’s testimony at Transcript Volume 3, pp. 137 to 143 and evidence of said

schedule can be found at Exhibit R-2. Not an error in fact, and even if it was, not palpable and overriding error.

g) The learned trial judge erred in fact, and contradicted himself, when he found that the Appellant asked to have his access occur outside the marital home, and then found that the Appellant was angry because the Respondent insisted that the access be exercised outside the marital home.

g) The mother testified that the father asked to have his access outside the marital home, and that he was angry when she asked him to do this because she believes he felt he was going to be spending his time with the children outside the home and still come to the home. See Transcript Volume 3, pp. 137 to 143. This is not an error in fact.

h) The learned trial judge erred in fact when he referred to the access regime in place in 2016, as an agreement, when in fact it was based on terms imposed by the Respondent. Furthermore, the learned trial judge erred in fact in this same finding when he determined that the parties’ “agreement” included a provision that the access

schedule would be adjusted when either parent was not available for their time with the children. There was no evidence to establish that finding.

h) See Exhibit R-2. See also Transcript Volume 3, pp. 137 to 143. The mother submits that the trial judge did not err in fact because R-2 supports that there was such a provision and, furthermore, the father seemed quite content with it. Exhibit R-1, page 57 shows the numerous adjustments made by the mother from 2016 onward. These are not errors in fact.

i) As referenced above, the learned trial judge erred in fact when he found that the parents, “disagreed on M.G.’s health care,” when this was not borne out by the evidence. The only disagreement regarding [M.G.’s] health care was relating to the scheduling and other aspects of the ABR procedure for [M.] and the timing of one of his speech therapy sessions.

i) The trial judge found that the mother said the parents disagreed on M.G.’s health care (para. 35 of the decision), that was not his finding of fact, but rather his

summary as to what the mother said. Further, two experts testified as to the necessity and importance of speech therapy as well as ABR testing being completed and both being done in a timely fashion without delays. See paras. 157 to 172 of the decision. Not an error in fact.

j) The learned trial judge erred in fact when he found that the witness, Ms. [S.], “was instrumental in teaching M.D.G. how to help M.G. with his hearing problems,” when in fact Ms. [S.] had played no role in dealing with [M.G.’s] hearing problems.

j) This was taken out of context. See para. 39 of the decision. The judge actually talks about M.G’s rudimentary sign language to communicate. This is what Ms. [S.] (the speech therapist) helped the mother with and it was related to M.G’s hearing issues. The father acknowledges the connection between the hearing and speech issues in his testimony (Transcript Volume 3, p. 56). Not an error in fact.

k) The learned trial judge erred in fact when he found that the Appellant was requesting shared custody of his children because, “he is a better parent for them than she is.” This was not stated by the Appellant, nor is it his view.

k) We agree that this constitutes an error in fact, but it is not a palpable and overriding error. The mother submits that the nature of his communication certainly supports the father thinking he is the “better parent.”

l) The learned trial judge erred in fact when found that the Appellant’s partner, A.K. acknowledged that the Appellant’s work

schedule would complicate any fixed

schedule of access. This was not evidence before the Court.

l) See Transcript Volume 3, pp. 77-78. It is not relevant whether it is a work

schedule or an access schedule. It is an error in fact, but it is not a palpable and overriding error.

m) The learned trial judge erred in fact when he determined that the Interim Order provided the Appellant with midweek daytime access on Wednesday of every week, which it is respectfully summitted is evidence of the learned trial judge’s diminished appreciation of the amount of time the Appellant was actually having with the children by way of the Interim Order.

m) See para. 198 of the decision. The access

schedule is set out, and the mother submits that the trial judge was obviously aware of the

schedule as per the Interim Order. The father is referring to a short

summary by the trial judge at para. 137 of the decision. This is not an error in fact.

n) The learned trial judge erred in fact when he found that the Appellant generally starts work at about 7:00 a.m., when in fact the evidence was that he generally starts work around 8:15 a.m., nor did the Appellant acknowledge that it was not always easy for him to always be there for his children, although he was making a “sincere effort.”

n) These findings are at para. 151 of the decision. There was a discrepancy in the evidence of the parties. The mother testified that the father would leave for work by 7:00 am in the morning (Transcript Volume 3, p. 151). She also testified that she went to work for 8:15 am (Transcript Volume 3, p. 151). The father denied going to work for 7:00 am on cross-examination (Transcript Volume 2, p. 229) but did not say what time he went to work in his evidence. This is not an error in fact, and even if it is, it is not a palpable and overriding error.

The mother agrees that the trial judge made an error in fact at para. 151 when he said “he acknowledges that it is not always easy for him to always be there for his children, he is making a sincere effort.” Although he did not say this, the evidence supports it. However, this is not a palpable and overriding error.

o) The learned trial judge erred in fact when he found that the Appellant wrote “few, if any, positive email messages to M.D.G.” when in fact the evidence established that there were several positive email messages from the Appellant to the Respondent.

o) The Appellant did put a few emails in that were “positive.” Most were negative correspondence, for example Exhibit R-8, R- 7, R-4, R-1 at pp. 65, 70, 78, 83, 89, 91, 93, 96, 98, 103-104, 109 and 129. These are not all the negative emails but only some examples. This is not an error in fact.

p) The learned trial judge erred in fact when he found that the Appellant, “remains absolutely opposed” to the A.B.R. procedures, when in fact he testified that he was not opposed to the procedure, but expressed concerns, and worries, and asked questions about the associated sedation.

p) The father is opposed, and actually cancelled the ABR in March 2018 as he was opposed to it. Although he says he was not opposed, after hearing two experts and substantial evidence at trial he still refused to agree to the procedure. The father filed a motion to block the test again after the hearing and before the decision (paras. 60-70 of the decision II, para. 169 of the decision, Transcript Volume 2 page 141 and Exhibit R- 1 p. 70).

q) The learned trial judge erred in fact when he found that the Appellant filed a Motion to “block” the test again, when in fact the Motion was not requesting that the testing be blocked. The substance of the Motion was the request of the Appellant to be present when [M.’s] hearing was tested.

q) See explanation at para.

d) above.

r) The learned trial judge erred in fact when he found that the Appellant had been unwilling to provide any significant flexibility in the scheduling of access visits, when in fact, the evidence before the Court was the opposite in that the Respondent was inflexible regarding varying the access regime, and that she usually defaulted to insisting on sticking to the Interim Order exactly.

r) See Exhibit R-1, p. 57 demonstrating the mother’s flexibility in scheduling access. See Exhibit R-1, Tab 8(c), p. 83, as quoted by the trial judge at para. 146 of the decision. The mother submits that this was not an error in fact.

s) The learned trial judge erred in fact when he found that the Appellant refused to permit the testing under any circumstances. The evidence established that the Appellant cancelled the initial procedure because he could not get communication from the Respondent about particulars and details of the procedure in advance.

s) The Court made this finding in its justification for costs. The father had access to all doctors that he wanted with respect to the procedure, but he chose not to attend appointments. See Exhibit R-1, pp. 65 and 70. The evidence established he felt his child did not have a hearing problem, and he did not want him to be sedated. This is not an error in fact and even if it was it is not a palpable and overriding error. [ 33 ] I have reviewed all of the alleged errors of fact.

Of the 19 alleged errors of fact, I agree three were made; however, I do not agree that these, individually or cumulatively, resulted in a palpable and overriding error. The standard of review has not been met; thus, there is no reason for this Court to intervene.

B. Spousal Support

(1) Assessment [34] The father seeks to pay spousal support for six years in the amount of $873 per month as opposed to theamount of $1,432 per month awarded by the trial judge. He says the trial judge erred in law in his

interpretation and application of therelevant caselaw and legislation in awarding mid-range support. [35] Although not in his Notice of Appeal, the father also argues in his written submission that the trial judge madean error in law by not fixing a review date. The trial judge did in fact order a review of the quantum of support to occur on January 1,2024 (in five years). [36] The standard of review respecting spousal support was set out by L’Heureux-Dubé J. in Hickey v. Hickey, (CSC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 518, [1999] S.C.J. No. 9 (QL).

Spousal support orders will not be overturned unless the reasonsdisclose an error in principle, a significant misapprehension of the evidence, or unless the award is clearly wrong (para. 11). [37] This Court confirmed that such decisions must be given considerable deference in Smith v. Smith, 2011 NBCA66, 375 N.B.R. (2d) 208: A trial judge's application of

section 15.2 of the Divorce Act involves broad discretion. In order to avoid the appearance of arbitrarydecision-making, reasons must be given when exercising discretion. However, as the Supreme Court noted in Hickey: When family law legislation gives judges the power to decide on support obligations based on certain objectives, values, factors, andcriteria, determining whether support will be awarded or varied, and if so, the amount of the order, involves the exercise of considerablediscretion by trial judges.

They must balance the objectives and factors set out in the Divorce Act or in provincial support statutes with anappreciation of the particular facts of the case. It is a difficult but important determination, which is critical to the lives of the parties andto their children. Because of its fact-based and discretionary nature, trial judges must be given considerable deference by appellate courtswhen such decisions are reviewed. [para. 10] [para. 41] [Emphasis in original.] [38] The Divorce Act specifies the factors (s. 15.2(4)) and objectives (s. 15.2(6)) the court shall take intoconsideration.

In this case, the following factors were considered: • Condition, means and needs of each spouse – the mother has a “reasonable income for someone with her qualifications butthere is only limited room for advancement.” The father “has the financial ability to pay support.” The mother “will not have the latitudeto provide appropriately for her children with current family household income and expenses.” The father’s combined household incomeis $300,000.

The mother’s imputed income was determined to be $60,432; • Length of time the spouses cohabited – this was a short to medium term marriage; • The functions performed by each spouse during cohabitation – the mother has a relatively strong compensatory claim basedupon both the secondary earner role and the primary children’s care role on an on-going basis. [39] In B.P. v. A.T., 2014 NBCA 51, 423 N.B.R. (2d) 99, this Court did not overturn a trial judge’s decision toaward mid-range support.

Larlee J.A. wrote, “the trial judge, after finding there was entitlement to support, exercised his discretion inassessing the quantum and duration of spousal support. As to quantum, there was evidence to support his decision and he made no error

in fixing the quantum of support” (para. 27). [ 40 ] In this case there was evidence to support the trial judge’s conclusions. No error was made in the spousal support assessment.

(2) Duration [ 41 ] In determining duration of spousal support, the length of the relationship is only one of the factors to be considered pursuant to s. 15.2(4) of the Divorce Act . According to s. 8.5 of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines , there are two tests that establish the range for duration in the basic “with child support” formula: 1) the “length-of-marriage” test; and 2) the “age-of- children” test. [ 42 ] The first test for duration, namely the length-of-marriage test, is the same as the test for duration under the “without child support” formula.

Given the parties were married for eight and a half years, support on the upper end would be eight and a half years; support on the lower end would be four years and one quarter. [ 43 ] The second test for duration is governed by the age of the children. It operates where the number of years until the youngest child finishes high school is greater than the length of the marriage. In this case, the length of time until the youngest child would finish high school, at the date of separation, was 18 years, while the length of the marriage was eight and a half years.

The upper end of the range under this test is the date when the youngest child finishes high school, and the lower end of the range is when the youngest child starts attending school full-time. [ 44 ] This Court confirmed the “age-of-children” test in Doucet v. Doucet , 2014 NBCA 63 , 426 N.B.R. (2d) 196 , at paras. 5-8 . In that case, the parties had lived together for less than 10 years. The father submitted that support should be paid for six years, and the mother argued it should be based on the date on which the younger of the two children would finish high school — eight years.

This Court ruled that eight years was appropriate in those circumstances. [ 45 ] Although not binding on this Court, the age-of-children test was also used in G.M. v. M.R. , 2015 NBQB 79 , 434 N.B.R. (2d) 277 . This decision was appealed, but not with respect to spousal support. In that case the parties were married for 12 years.

There were two children, and the trial judge ordered that spousal support would be paid until the youngest child was 15 years of age, for a total of eight years. [ 46 ] The father also submits the trial judge misapplied s. 15.2 of the Divorce Act and did not stress the self- sufficiency of the mother. The trial judge did in fact encourage the mother’s self-sufficiency by incorporating a review period of five years. In M.R. v. J.R. , 2018 NBCA 12 , [2018] N.B.J.

No. 104 (QL) , Baird J.A. confirmed a review for self-sufficiency was appropriate and wrote: Larlee J.A. concludes the following in S.C .: “I favour the approach taken in the most recent cases to review the self-sufficiency of the payee after three years” (para.15). I agree. The parameters for such a review were discussed in Arsenault v. Arsenault , 2002 NBCA 101 , 254 N.B.R. (2d) 190; and, Bourque v.

Bourque , 2004 NBCA 60 , 274 N.B.R. (2d) 72. […] [para. 66] [ 47 ] In this case the spousal support is to be reviewed in five years. [ 48 ] In my view, on this point, the trial judge’s decision is not tainted by an error in principle or a significant misapprehension of evidence, nor is it clearly wrong. The mother was awarded spousal support on both a non-compensatory and compensatory basis. Utilizing the “length-of-marriage” test, the lower range would be four years and a quarter. The lower range under the “age-of-children” test is five years. [ 49 ] The father submitted jurisprudence with regard to this issue.

Most of the cases are of little jurisprudential value in this case as they all occurred in the 1990s, and are, therefore, pre- Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines . The case of S.C. v. J.C. , 2006 NBCA 46 , 299 N.B.R. (2d) 334 , can be distinguished from this case. The most obvious distinction is the fact that, in S.C. , the parties had

no dependent children. In that case, the Court refused to interfere with the trial judge’s order for a duration of five years as it was withinthe trial judge’s discretion (para. 17). [50] Here, the judge did not err in law with respect to duration of spousal support. Although he did award spousalsupport at the higher end of the duration (when the youngest child finishes high school), he had discretion to do so in accordance with theSpousal Support Advisory Guidelines, which, although not law, are based on common law principles and this approach has beenapproved on many occasions by this Court. C.

Costs [51] In his written submission, the father submits the trial judge awarded “unusually high” costs ($10,000), whichare inconsistent with the jurisprudence of this Province. The father filed the Petition for Divorce. The issues to be resolved by the trialjudge were custody, child support, special expenses, insurance to secure support payments, arrears, spousal support, and costs.

Initiallythe parties sought a division of marital property and debts, but this was resolved by a Consent Order. [52] This Court has confirmed that a cost award is in the discretion of the trial judge, and it will not intervene unlessit is satisfied that the exercise of discretion was manifestly wrong. In M.R. v. J.R., Baird J.A. wrote as follows: I conclude the trial judge erred when she failed to order costs. Many of the delays were the result of J.R.'s failure to comply with hisundertakings and disclosure obligations.

In spite of M.R.'s repeated requests for interim costs, they were deferred to be determined attrial. Rule 59 enumerates the criteria a court should consider when making an award of costs. In D.E. v. L.E., 2014 NBCA 67, [2014]N.B.J. No. 289 (QL), Larlee J.A. writes: According to Rule 59 of the Rules of Court, the costs of a proceeding are in the discretion of the court, which may determine by whomand to what extent costs shall be paid. I reiterate the comments of Drapeau J.A. (as he then was) in Acadia Marble, Tile & Terrazzo Ltd.v.

Oromocto Property Developments Ltd. (1998), (NB CA), 205 N.B.R. (2d) 358, [1998] N.B.J. No. 412 (C.A.)(QL) on the issue of the awarding of costs following an event: It is undoubtedly true that, where the trial judge has exercised his or her discretion as to costs, this Court will not intervene unless it issatisfied that the exercise of discretion was manifestly wrong. See Williams et al. v.

Saint John, New Brunswick and Chubb IndustriesLtd. (1985), (NB CA), 66 N.B.R. (2d) 10 (C.A.). [...] [para. 34] The party who recovers judgment is normally entitled to costs, although a judge may exercise his or her discretion by refusing to makesuch an award: Flieger v. Adams, 2012 NBCA 39, 387 N.B.R. (2d) 322. [paras. 23-24] [para. 100] [53] This Court has also stated that “[c]osts awards are indisputably squarely within the purview of the trial judge,and should not be lightly interfered with by the appellate court.

That said, when circumstances warrant, appellate intervention isappropriate” (see Knowles Estate v. Knowles, 2016 NBCA 62, [2016] N.B.J. No. 235 (QL), at para. 28). This Court has also determinedthat “[t]he trial judge is vested with a very broad discretion in relation to the assessment of costs”: L.T.G. v. C.J.G., 2011 NBCA 12, 369N.B.R. (2d) 202, at para. 14. [54] In L.R.R., this Court considered the trial judge’s award of costs in the amount of $12,500.

Larlee J.A. wrote “itwas within the application judge’s discretion to interpret the result at trial as one favourable to the respondent on the most contentiousissue of custody. She granted him sole custody of the child and, therefore, awarded him costs” (para. 21). That is very similar to the caseat bar. The father’s submission that the cost award in this case is unusually high and inconsistent with the state of the law cannotsucceed. I would not interfere with the amount awarded. VI. Disposition

[ 55 ] I would dismiss the appeal with costs of $5,000. Version française du jugement de la Cour rendu par LA JUGE QUIGG I. Introduction [1] Le père interjette appel d’une décision rendue par la Cour du Banc de la Reine sous le régime de la

Loi sur le divorce , L.R.C. 1985, ch. 3 (2 e suppl .). Il affirme que le juge du procès a commis des erreurs lorsqu’il a statué sur la garde, la prestation alimentaire pour enfants, la prestation alimentaire matrimoniale et les dépens. Il soutient aussi que les conclusions de fait du juge du procès étaient entachées de nombreuses erreurs (dix-neuf plus précisément) et que, s’il est possible que ces erreurs ne soient pas manifestes et dominantes considérées individuellement, elles constituaient, considérées cumulativement, une erreur manifeste et dominante qui justifie l’intervention en appel.

Autrement dit, le père soutient que le juge du procès avait une si mauvaise opinion de lui, fondée sur des faits inexacts, que sa décision s’en est trouvée viciée. II. Contexte [2] Les parties se sont mariées en mai 2010 et se sont séparées le 13 septembre 2015. Elles ont deux jeunes enfants à charge, une fille (B.) et un garçon (M.). Après la séparation, le père est souvent revenu au foyer familial pour prendre soin des enfants et passer du temps avec eux. Il a aussi continué à payer des factures et des dépenses.

Une requête en divorce a été déposée en décembre 2016 et une ordonnance provisoire a été rendue en avril 2017; une décision a été prononcée en décembre 2018, une ordonnance définitive étant rendue en janvier 2019. Cette ordonnance accordait la garde exclusive et la responsabilité principale des deux enfants à la mère, le père obtenant un droit d’accès. Le paiement d’une prestation alimentaire pour enfants, de frais spéciaux et d’une prestation alimentaire matrimoniale était aussi ordonné. III.

Moyens d’appel [3] Bien que le père énumère dix moyens d’appel, dont l’un est exposé en dix-neuf subdivisions traitant des erreurs de fait, on peut ramener généralement le tout en erreurs concernant 1) la garde; 2) la prestation alimentaire matrimoniale; 3) l’effet cumulatif des erreurs de fait; 4) les dépens. La mère concède trois des erreurs de fait alléguées. IV. Norme de contrôle [4] La Cour a réaffirmé la norme de contrôle applicable dans une instance ressortissant au droit de la famille dans le récent arrêt Gillespie c.

Gillespie , 2018 NBCA 22 , [2018] A.N.-B. n° 77 (QL), dans lequel la juge d’appel Larlee a écrit ce qui suit : Selon la norme de contrôle applicable dans une instance ressortissant au droit de la famille, l’intervention de notre Cour n’est justifiée que s’il y a une erreur importante, une erreur significative dans l’interprétation de la preuve ou une erreur de droit : L.R.R. c. E.M. , 2018 NBCA 2 , [2018] A.N.-B. n° 2 (QL); L.D.M. c. J.K.D. , 2017 NBCA 47 , [2017] A.N.-B. n° 259 (QL); Yorke c. Yorke , 2011 NBCA 79 , 378 R.N.-B. (2 e ) 141 .

En ce qui concerne la norme de contrôle applicable aux conclusions de fait et aux ordonnances discrétionnaires, la Cour ne peut infirmer une conclusion de fait du juge du procès que si celle-ci résulte d’une erreur manifeste et dominante et ne peut modifier une ordonnance discrétionnaire que si celle-ci est fondée sur une erreur de droit, une erreur dans l’application des principes directeurs ou une erreur manifeste et dominante dans l’appréciation de la preuve : Lang c. Lang , [2007] A.N.-B. n° 48 (C.A.) (QL). L’ordonnance portée en appel est une ordonnance discrétionnaire. [Par. 8]

[5] Dans S.F.D. c. M.T., 2019 NBCA 62, [2019] A.N.-B. n° 203 (QL), la juge d’appel Baird apour sa part écrit ce qui suit : Il convient de réitérer qu’il faut faire preuve de retenue à l’égard de l’évaluation que le juge de première instance a faite de la preuveconcernant l’intérêt supérieur d’un enfant dans les affaires de garde. Cela vient du fait que le juge de première instance est le mieuxplacé pour évaluer la crédibilité et la qualité de la preuve. Le juge de première instance fonde sa décision sur cette preuve et il lui estinterdit d’émettre des hypothèses ou de « combler les vides ».

La Cour siégeant en révision ne le peut pas non plus. Bien entendu, si laCour détermine que le juge de première instance a commis une erreur de droit en appliquant erronément un critère juridique ou en enfaisant une interprétation erronée, ou s’il a commis une erreur de fait manifeste et dominante, une intervention en appel peut se justifier. Voir Van de Perre c. Edwards, 2001 CSC 60, [2001] 2 R.C.S. 1014, au par. 13; P.R.H. c. M.E.L., 2009 NBCA 18, 343 R.N.-B. (2e) 100,aux par. 8 et 9; et L.D.M. c. J.K.D., 2017 NBCA 47, [2017] A.N.-B. n° 259 (QL), motifs du juge d’appel Green, aux par. 9 et 10.[Par. 23] V.

Analyse A. Garde [6] Le père affirme que le juge du procès a interprété et appliqué erronément la jurisprudencepertinente concernant l’octroi soit de la garde conjointe, soit de la garde exclusive. Correctement appliquée, soutient-il, la jurisprudenceexistante aurait donné lieu à la mise en place d’un régime de garde conjointe et partagée. Le juge du procès a reconnu l’applicabilité del’art. 16 de la

Loi sur le divorce. Le paragraphe 16(8) précise que le tribunal ne doit tenir compte que de l’intérêt de l’enfant. Le juge duprocès a pris en compte le fait qu’en application du par. 129(1) de la

Loi sur les services à la famille, L.N.-B. 1980, ch. F-2.2, la gardeconjointe constituait la solution par défaut, ainsi que la définition donnée à l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant à l’art. 1 de la

Loi sur lesservices à la famille et les facteurs additionnels que le juge Graser a suggéré de considérer dans la décision Rideout c. Rideout (1998), (NB BR), 201 R.N.-B. (2e) 249, [1998] A.N.-B. n° 233 (QL) (C.B.R.) (par. 35 et 36). L’examen de la décisionpermet de constater que le juge du procès a appliqué les faits à la jurisprudence pertinente. À mon avis, le père n’a pas démontré qu’uneerreur avait été commise.

(1) Communication [7] Le juge du procès aurait aussi commis une erreur de droit, affirme le père, en faisantabstraction du principe reconnu en jurisprudence selon lequel de simples problèmes de communication (dont le père n’admet pasl’existence) ne sont pas un motif suffisant pour rejeter une demande de garde partagée. [8] Le juge du procès a conclu pour de nombreux motifs, entre autres des problèmes decommunication, qu’il serait dans l’intérêt supérieur des enfants que la mère en ait la garde exclusive et la responsabilité principale. Dansson analyse, le juge a notamment tiré les conclusions suivantes :

a) la mère [TRADUCTION] « est le parent pourvoyeur principal de soins des enfants depuis leur naissance » et, avant laséparation, elle [TRADUCTION] « semble avoir été le parent psychologique » (par. 149 et 152);

b) le père commence à travailler à 7 h et, certains jours, il n’a pas la moindre idée de l’heure à laquelle il pourra s’arrêter (par.151);

c) le père a parlé du divorce et d’autres problèmes avec la fille des parties et il s’est servi de sa détresse pour faire céder lamère à ses demandes (par. 172);

d) le père a refusé de négocier avec la mère en vue de permettre à leur fille de participer à des événements qui l’intéressaientmanifestement, pour utiliser ceux-ci comme monnaie d’échange dans un différend à ses yeux plus important (par. 172);

e) le père a refusé de faire preuve de souplesse dans l’établissement du calendrier des visites et il a insisté pour que d’autres membres de la famille élargie se tiennent à l’écart de toute activité des enfants lorsqu’il les avait avec lui (par. 173);

f) les parties ont vécu certains problèmes de continuité des activités avec leur fille, qui n’a pu assister à certaines fêtes en raison de leur différend et du rôle de [TRADUCTION] « pion » qu’elle y jouait (par. 178);

g) le père a fait passer son intérêt avant celui des enfants, en insistant pour qu’ils soient habillés et l’attendent lorsqu’il arrivait pour procéder à un transfert (par. 185);

h) il n’était pas concevable que les enfants puissent habiter dans les deux maisons dans le cadre d’un arrangement de garde partagée (par. 197). [9] Dire que le juge du procès a rejeté la demande de garde partagée en raison uniquement de problèmes de communication reviendrait à sous-estimer les autres problèmes dont il a tenu compte.

Malgré son importance, la communication n’était qu’un des facteurs pris en considération par le juge. Le juge a conclu que le [TRADUCTION] « problème le plus sérieux » entre les parties avait trait à la procédure de test des réponses évoquées auditives du tronc cérébral (ABR) que devait subir leur plus jeune enfant. Deux experts qui ont témoigné lors du procès ont recommandé qu’on fasse passer ce test auditif, mais, malgré cela, le père a refusé d’y consentir.

Le juge du procès a conclu qu’il ressortait [TRADUCTION] « clairement de l’exemple apporté par cette longue bataille au sujet d’une procédure jugée valable par deux experts, les risques ou inconvénients étant minimes, que les deux parents ne sont pas en mesure de collaborer dans l’intérêt supérieur de leurs deux enfants » (par. 171). [10] Le juge du procès a aussi conclu à l’existence d’un [TRADUCTION] « différend important » quant au choix d’un programme scolaire – anglais de base ou immersion française – pour la fille des parties.

Il a tiré les diverses conclusions suivantes : [TRADUCTION] « les parties ont passé énormément de temps à discuter au sujet des enfants »; « [b]on nombre des messages étaient acrimonieux et agressifs »; « [l]a grande majorité des courriels et messages texte inopportuns provenaient [du père] » (par. 144). [11] Le juge a mentionné expressément certains messages électroniques, qu’il a décrits en ces termes : [TRADUCTION] Dans la plupart des courriels, D.G.G. se plaignait des soins apportés par M.D.G. aux enfants, lui donnait des directives quant à ce qu’elle devait faire ou ne pas faire lorsque les enfants étaient avec elle, les avertissait, elle et les membres de sa famille élargie, de se tenir à l’écart de toute activité des enfants lorsqu’il les avait avec lui, ou lui demandait la modification du calendrier habituel des visites si elle voulait que B.G. ou M.G. participent à des activités parascolaires pendant son temps de visite.

Dans certaines communications, D.G.G. mêle B.G. expressément au différend du couple et indique quels sont « ses désirs » à ce sujet. [Par. 145] [12] Le juge du procès a aussi déclaré ce qui suit : [TRADUCTION] […] [Le père] a clairement indiqué qu’il n’aimait pas le tour que les communications avaient pris depuis l’entrée en scène des avocats. Il a affirmé qu’il n’y avait pas de problème de communication auparavant.

Il ressort manifestement des communications électroniques évoquées ci-dessus, ainsi que d’une multitude d’autres reproduites dans la plaidoirie et les cahiers des pièces, que les problèmes de communication des parties n’étaient pas imputables aux avocats. D.G.G. a écrit peu de courriels positifs à M.D.G., voire aucun. Il a refusé de négocier toute modification temporaire du calendrier des parties, faute d’une reformulation globale des arrangements d’accès. Il a discuté de la garde principale avec sa fille, B., et a tenté de l’utiliser comme monnaie d’échange dans les négociations.

Plus inquiétant encore, D.G.G. a insisté dans ses communications avec M.G.G. [ sic ] et L.M. sur sa conviction que, si M.D.G. avait fait comme il l’avait recommandé et n’avait pas consulté un avocat, tous deux auraient épargné beaucoup d’argent et il aurait pu répondre à

ses demandes autant qu’aux siennes. Or, il ne dispose d’aucune preuve étayant cette assertion. D.G.G. s’est évertué à convaincre M.D.G.de changer d’avocats. Il l’a formulé de manière à laisser entendre qu’il ne songeait qu’à l’intérêt de M.D.G.

De même, en demandant àL.M. de ne plus conseiller à M.D.G. de ne pas parler à son avocat, D.G.G. insistait sur le fait que, si M.D.G. agissait comme il lesouhaitait, cela serait beaucoup plus avantageux pour elle. [Par. 154 à 156] [13] Le juge du procès a bien conclu que certains messages de la mère dénotaient de la frustration,mais, malgré cela, celle-ci semblait résolue à communiquer avec le père (par. 175). [14] Il est manifeste, après examen du dossier, qu’un autre motif de l’octroi de la garde exclusive àla mère venait du fait que les communications, par courriel ou autrement, constituaient [TRADUCTION] « généralement des outils denégociation constante plutôt que des discussions empreintes de coopération à propos des enfants et de leurs activités.

Actuellement, lesparents ne communiquent pas bien entre eux au sujet des enfants » (par. 185). [15] Le juge du procès a aussi abordé les tentatives menées par le père pour décourager la mère deprendre part au litige et son opposition à l’idée d’une négociation collaborative dans l’intérêt supérieur des enfants. Cela donnait à croireque toute coopération était alors impossible (par. 185). [16] La Cour a examiné la question de la communication dans l’arrêt J.H. c.

T.H., 2017 NBCA 7,[2017] A.N.-B. n° 16 (QL), une affaire dans laquelle le père avait soutenu, sans succès, que le juge du procès avait accordé tropd’importance au manque de communication entre les parents. La juge d’appel Baird s’est exprimée ainsi : Le juge saisi de la requête a fait état des différentes ordonnances de garde qu’il pouvait rendre. Il a fait observer que les ordonnances degarde conjointe, de par leur nature, obligent les parents à partager la responsabilité des décisions majeures dans tous les domaines quitouchent les enfants […].

Cela exige une certaine coopération entre les parents et suppose, au mieux, qu’ils ont la capacité decommuniquer de façon efficace l’un avec l’autre. […] Le père prétend que le juge saisi de la requête a accordé une trop grande importance au manque de communication entre les parents. Enfait, le juge saisi de la requête a reconnu, à bon droit, que le manque de communication entre les parents n’était qu’un des facteurs àprendre en considération. Il a examiné le fait que le père n’avait pas joué un rôle aussi actif que la mère afin que les enfants continuentde fréquenter la même école.

Après le déménagement des parents, il ne s’était pas présenté aux rencontres entre les parents et lesenseignants et il n’avait pas communiqué à la mère certains renseignements fournis par l’école. Il a fait observer, comme nous l’avonsvu, que les enfants ne se présentaient pas à certaines activités parascolaires et qu’il y avait eu un incident concernant une ordonnanced’antibiotique pour une des enfants.

Je conclus que la décision du juge saisi de la requête relativement à l’« intérêt supérieur » desenfants a été avant tout axée sur les enfants et qu’il a correctement pris les facteurs applicables en considération dans le contexte de lapreuve produite. Les éléments susmentionnés, ajoutés aux autres problèmes qui ont été recensés, militaient contre le maintien en vigueurde l’entente de garde partagée.

Un arrangement de parentage partagé ou de garde partagée n’exige pas seulement que les parents aient lacapacité de communiquer d’une façon efficace, il les oblige aussi à coopérer dans le contexte du processus décisionnel afin de protéger lasanté, la sécurité et le bien-être de leurs enfants. [Par. 19 et 20] [Le soulignement est de moi.] [17] La Cour a conclu que le juge avait le pouvoir discrétionnaire voulu pour accorder le pouvoirdécisionnel final à la mère.

La juge d’appel Baird a écrit ce qui suit : Dans les affaires se rapportant à la garde d’enfants où il est clair que les parents ne sont pas capables de communiquer l’un avec l’autred’une façon efficace, le facteur déterminant consiste, à mon avis, à savoir si la Cour est convaincue que des précautions suffisantes sontprises afin d’isoler les enfants du conflit parental. […], ils n’ont pas su isoler les enfants du conflit qui les oppose. […] Il ne s’agissait pasd’un cas où les parents pouvaient prendre conjointement les décisions importantes qui touchent leurs enfants. […] [Par. 33] [18] La communication était aussi un enjeu dans A.G. c.

M.M., 2018 NBCA 60, [2018] A.N.-B. n° 209 (QL). Dans cette affaire, le père s’est vu accorder la garde exclusive des enfants lors du procès. Les parties avaient souscritauparavant un accord de séparation prévoyant la garde conjointe, la mère devant être la pourvoyeuse principale des soins des enfants. Lajuge d’appel Larlee a écrit ceci : Dans sa décision, le juge du procès se fonde sur la décision rendue dans l’affaire A.N.H c. M.K.C., 2010 NBQB 120 , 2010

NBBR 120 , 359 R.N.-B. (2 e ) 1 , en ce qui concerne la garde conjointe, surtout la nécessité d’une communication efficace entre les parties pour que la garde conjointe constitue un choix valable. À mon avis, l’ affaire J.H. est plus pertinente en raison des similitudes qui existent entre les deux situations . Tout comme les parties en l’espèce, les parents dans l’affaire J.H. éprouvaient manifestement de la difficulté non seulement à communiquer l’un avec l’autre, mais aussi à coopérer dans le contexte du processus décisionnel à l’égard de leurs enfants.

Du point de vue d’un manque de communication et de coopération entre les parties, il semble évident qu’il convenait en l’espèce que le juge du procès envisage le passage d’un arrangement de garde conjointe à un arrangement de garde exclusive. Il s’agissait alors de déterminer à quel parent, eu égard aux circonstances, il convenait d’accorder la garde [exclusive]. [Par. 7] [19] Dans l’affaire L.R.R. c.

E.M. , 2018 NBCA 2 , [ 2018] A.N.-B. n° 2 (QL), où le père avait obtenu la garde exclusive d’un enfant de 13 ans, la juge d’appel Larlee a écrit ce qui suit : […] De par sa nature même, une ordonnance de garde conjointe exige des parents qu’ils prennent part aux décisions importantes dans tous les domaines qui touchent un enfant. Cela nécessite une certaine coopération entre les parents et suppose qu’ils ont la capacité de communiquer de façon efficace l’un avec l’autre : J.H. c. T.H. , 2017 NBCA 7 , [2017] A.N.-B. n o 16 (QL) , au par. 8 , la juge d’appel Baird.

Les tribunaux ordonnent la garde conjointe, même dans les cas de conflit important, lorsqu’ils sont convaincus que cela est dans « l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant ». Toutefois, les juges reconnaissent que la garde conjointe est inappropriée si la communication entre les parents est empreinte d’acrimonie et est préjudiciable au bien-être de l’enfant : B.P. c. A.T. , 2014 NBCA 51 , 423 R.N.-B. (2 e ) 99 , aux par. 13 et 14 , et F.M. c.

T.H. , 2016 NBCA 29 , 449 R.N.-B. (2 e ) 240 , au par. 21 . […] Dans sa décision, la juge saisie de la requête en est arrivée à la conclusion suivante qui, à mon avis, fait pencher la balance en faveur d’une ordonnance attribuant la garde exclusive au père : [TRADUCTION] Je n’ai absolument aucune confiance en la capacité de la requérante à communiquer de quelque manière que ce soit, ne serait-ce qu’avec maturité et de façon responsable, avec l’intimé.

Dans les affaires de garde difficiles de cette nature, nous sommes souvent confrontés à des personnes qui font preuve d’un piètre jugement et qui ont un comportement regrettable dans les premiers mois ou l’année qui suivent une séparation. Sans approuver un tel comportement, la Cour est en mesure de prendre un peu de distance et d’accepter le fait que lorsque les adultes vivent des situations personnelles difficiles, leur comportement peut s’en ressentir. Dans la présente affaire, le comportement de la requérante au cours des deux premières années qui ont suivi la séparation a été répréhensible.

Cependant, la Cour trouve particulièrement troublant le fait qu’au terme de près d’une décennie, le comportement de la requérante ne s’est pas amélioré. À mon avis, la requérante ne sera jamais en mesure, quelle qu’en soit la raison, de communiquer avec l’intimé de façon responsable et empreinte de maturité. Je ne doute pas un seul instant que l’intimé ait pu parfois lever la voix et exprimer une extrême frustration à l’endroit de la requérante. Je suis certain que l’intimé n’a pas été un saint dans toutes ses communications avec la requérante.

Cependant, si l’[on] fait la part des choses entre les deux, il ne fait aucun doute que l’intimé est le parent qui est le plus prêt à communiquer de façon responsable et empreinte de maturité. [par. 163 à 165] Puis ceci : [TRADUCTION] À la lumière de la preuve dont je suis saisie dans la présente affaire, je ne suis pas persuadée que le bien-être affectif de M.G.R.M. peut être assuré entre les mains de la requérante. De plus, je crains beaucoup que toute autre exposition de celui-ci à ce conflit sans fin entre ses parents ait des conséquences à long terme pour lui.

Malheureusement, je ne vois pas d’autre solution que de confier la garde exclusive de M.G.R.M. à l’intimé. La question qui demande davantage de réflexion est de savoir quel accès approprié accorder à la requérante. [par. 190]

J’estime que la juge saisie de la requête s’est appuyée sur la jurisprudence pertinente et a mené une analyse approfondie en ce qui concerne la preuve. Je ne constate aucune erreur dans l’interprétation de la preuve en ce qui concerne la question de la garde. Au contraire, il existe suffisamment d’éléments de preuve à l’appui de sa conclusion. Je suis d’avis de rejeter ce moyen d’appel. [Par. 10 et 11 et 14 et 15] [20] En l’espèce, un échange de courriels entre les parents a permis d’établir le ton [TRADUCTION] « acrimonieux » et agressif des communications du père avec la mère.

La mère réprouve totalement l’idée selon laquelle les communications entre les parties étaient positives. D’après son témoignage, le contenu des courriels était généralement très critique et défavorable envers elle. En tentant de faire ressortir les courriels qui témoignaient de communications positives entre la mère et lui, le père a choisi à la pièce ce qui lui convenait parmi un flot continu de directives condescendantes et négatives données à la mère.

(2) Contact maximum [21] Le juge du procès aurait commis une erreur de droit, affirme le père, du fait qu’il n’a pas appliqué le principe du contact maximum. Le père invoque les deux motifs d’erreur suivants : 1) le juge du procès a conclu que les parties avaient de graves problèmes de communication qui faisaient obstacle à la garde partagée; 2) il a accordé trop d’importance au désaccord des parties au sujet de l’intervention médicale ABR prévue pour leur fils. [22] Dans l’arrêt J.H. , le père avait également soutenu que l’ordonnance du juge du procès enfreignait le principe du contact maximum.

Le juge du procès avait modifié l’arrangement provisoire de garde partagée et attribué à la mère la responsabilité principale des enfants. Le père avait obtenu un droit d’accès une fin de semaine sur deux, du jeudi au dimanche, ainsi que les autres jeudis, de 16 h à 19 h. Les enfants étaient âgés de six et huit ans. La juge d’appel Baird a écrit ce qui suit : […] La Cour suprême a examiné la question de la maximisation des contacts dans l’arrêt Gordon où elle a dit ce qui suit : […] S’il est impératif, le principe du « contact maximum », comme on l’a appelé, n’est toutefois pas absolu.

La Loi se contente d’obliger le juge à ne le respecter que dans la mesure où le contact est compatible avec l’intérêt de l’enfant; si d’autres éléments révèlent que l’application du principe ne serait pas dans l’intérêt de l’enfant, le tribunal peut et doit limiter le contact […] [par. 24] Autrement dit, ce principe a pour préalable absolu que la maximisation des contacts est subordonnée à l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant.

Le principe, bien qu’il constitue un objectif souhaitable, perd de son importance dans les instances où il existe un important conflit parental et où le juge des faits estime qu’il est nécessaire de réduire l’accès afin de soustraire les enfants aux conséquences négatives à long terme de ce conflit. Voir l’ arrêt B.P. c. A.T. , 2014 NBCA 51 , 423 R.N.-B. (2 e ) 99 , la juge d’appel Larlee, qui rendait jugement au nom de la Cour. [Par. 26 et 27] [23] Dans la présente affaire, le juge du procès a renvoyé expressément au par. 16(10) de la

Loi sur le divorce . Il a conclu que la situation des parties était [TRADUCTION] « assez hautement conflictuelle ». Il a aussi jugé inconcevable que les enfants puissent vivre dans deux foyers dans le cadre d’un arrangement de garde partagée. Il a octroyé au père un droit d’accès une fin de semaine sur deux, du vendredi après l’école jusqu’à 18 h 30 le dimanche, la fin de semaine étant prolongée lorsque le vendredi ou le lundi était un jour férié, ainsi que la nuitée tous les mercredis.

Il a aussi attribué un droit d’accès pendant les fêtes, de la manière convenue par les parties. [24] Le juge du procès a conclu qu’un droit d’accès non interrompu, une fin de semaine entière sur deux, accordait plus de temps et d’avantages aux enfants et aux parents que le ca

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