2019 NBCA 62, 2019 NBCA 62

COURT OF APPEAL OF COUR D’APPEL DU NEW BRUNSWICK NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK S.F.D. APPELLANT 13-18-CA S.F.D. APPELANT - and - - et - M.T. RESPONDENT M.T. INTIMÉE S.F.D. v. M.T., 2019 NBCA 62 S.F.D. c.

M.T., 2019 NBCA 62 CORAM: The Honourable Justice Green The Honourable Justice Baird The Honourable Justice French CORAM : l’honorable juge Green l’honorable juge Baird l’honorable juge French Appeal from a decision of the Court of Queen’s Bench: January 12, 2018 Appel d’une décision de la Cour du Banc de la Reine : le 12 janvier 2018 History of case: Decision under appeal: 2018 NBQB 7 Preliminary or incidental proceedings: N/A Historique de la cause : Décision frappée d’appel : 2018 NBBR 7 Procédures préliminaires ou accessoires : s.o.

Appeal heard: April 11, 2019 Judgment rendered: August 1, 2019 Appel entendu : le 11 avril 2019 Jugement rendu : le 1 août 2019 Reasons for judgment by: The Honourable Justice Baird Concurred in by: The Honourable Justice Green The Honourable Justice French Counsel at hearing: S.F.D. on his own behalf For the respondent: Jo-Anne Moore Motifs de jugement: l’honorable juge Baird Souscrivent aux motifs : L’honorable juge Green L’honorable juge French Avocats à l’audience : S.F.D. en son propre nom Pour l’intimée : Jo-Anne Moore THE COURT [ 1 ] The appeal is dismissed with costs of $5,000.

Paragraph 1 of the Judgment Following Hearing or Trial is amended to reflect the application judge’s reasons. LA COUR L’appel est rejeté avec dépens de 5 000 $. Le paragraphe 1 du jugement consécutif à l’audience ou au procès est modifié pour refléter les motifs de la juge saisie de la requête. The judgment of the Court was delivered by BAIRD, J.A. I. Introduction

[1] This is an appeal from a decision in which an application judge made an order granting joint custody of the four children of a relationship, with primary care and decision-making powers to the mother, and scheduled access and visitation to the father. The order was made pursuant to the Family Services Act , S.N.B. 1980, c. F-2.2 (“the Act ”). In addition, the application judge made an order concerning child and spousal support, and she ordered a division of the parties’ assets and debts, part of which is also under appeal. II. Background A.

The Issues [ 2 ] These parties started cohabiting in December 2001, and they separated in June 2016. The four children of the relationship range in age between ten to seventeen. [ 3 ] On separation, the father was employed full time with the Government of Canada, earning approximately $100,362.33 per year. In addition, he owned a small ice cream shop, and operated a freelance painting business from which he earned between $2,000 and $5,000 per year. The mother was employed full time until 2008, and thereafter she remained at home to care for the children and was the homemaker for the family.

When she filed her application in 2016, she was self-employed, part time, doing housekeeping for others, earning approximately $160 to $240 weekly. [ 4 ] The pleadings raised mutual allegations of verbal and physical abuse, directed both toward each other and the children, and these parents disagreed with respect to their levels of involvement with the parenting of the children.

The father disputed the contributions made by the mother to the home and he alleged the mother was intentionally under-reporting her income, or, alternatively, she was under-employed, and he requested the court impute income to her. [ 5 ] The mother sought a joint custody order with the primary residence of the children to be with her.

She also sought retroactive child support pursuant to ss. 3 and 7 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines , SOR/97-175 (“ Guidelines ”) , spousal support, a continuation of health and dental insurance coverage for her and the children, and a designation of the father’s life insurance to secure the child and spousal support payments.

She also sought an equal division of property acquired during cohabitation and an equitable division of the debts. [ 6 ] The father claimed joint custody of the children with the physical care to be shared equally, and that neither parent would have the “final say.” He too sought an order of child support from the mother pursuant to s. 3 of the Guidelines , an equal sharing of s. 7 expenses, and an order that the parents would equally share the jointly held home, along with the expenses associated with it.

He agreed to continue the health and dental benefits for the children and the mother; however, she was to pay her pro-rata share of the premiums. The father did not contest the mother’s entitlement to spousal support; however, he submitted the mother was able to work full time, thereby reducing the amount he would be required to pay. He agreed to maintain life insurance for the benefit of the children, naming a trustee of his choosing. Both parties requested costs. B.

Interim court orders [ 7 ] By interim court order dated September 26, 2016, the parents were granted joint and shared custody of the children, with a “nesting order,” whereby they alternated their physical presence in the home with the children on a four-and-one-half day rotation. [ 8 ] Effective October 1, 2016, the father was ordered to pay child support in the amount of $2,181 monthly, based on his employment income of $100,362. The mother’s income was assessed at $12,480. She was receiving 100% of the child tax benefits at that time.

As a result of the father’s application to receive one half of the benefits, she was required to repay $3,000 to the Government of Canada, thus reducing her income to approximately $9,400 per annum for that year. There was no order made for spousal support. Expenses that qualified for reimbursement pursuant to s. 7 of the Guidelines were prorated. The parents were ordered to designate the children as beneficiaries of their life insurance policies through a trustee of his or her choice, in an amount sufficient to cover his or her support obligations.

The father was ordered to maintain his health and dental insurance for the benefit of the mother and the children. Both parties were ordered to equally share the expenses of the home.

[ 9 ] On June 29, 2017, the mother filed a preliminary motion in which she requested an abridgement of time for the filing of a second motion. In that motion, she sought an order requiring a “[…] full parenting capacity assessment including psychological testing of both parents and of the four children […].” She alleged the father was denying her access to the children, interfering with her access, and she alleged there was parental alienation.

The mother alleged the father was $2,900 in arrears of child support at that time. [ 10 ] The father replied on July 6, 2017, with a motion of his own in which he sought a variation of the previous order for child support reducing it to $1,586 monthly, and sole custody of the children, with access and visitation to the mother. Alternatively, he sought joint custody of the children, however, with their primary residence to be with him. There were allegations of physical altercations between the mother and the father’s “friend” and a family member.

The father requested a restraining order against the mother, he sought exclusive possession of the home, an order resolving child support arrears, an order requiring the mother to pay half of the expenses of the home from the “duration of October 2016 to the present,” an order of contempt against the mother pursuant to Rule 76 of the Rules , and costs. [ 11 ] The second motion was resolved by court order effective July 10, 2017, but dated September 11, 2017.

The previous court order, dated December 6, 2016, remained in effect, subject to terms which dealt with summer access for the mother, and the following provisions were added:

a) Arrangements for the emergency care of the children were specified, dates and times for calls to the children were set, a communication strategy for the children’s health and dental appointments as well as a parental communication strategy was established;

b) The parents were ordered not to discuss the litigation with the children, nor were they to speak in a negative way about the other parent in the children’s presence;

c) The terms concerning the listing and the sale of the house were specified;

d) A parenting assessment with psychological testing was ordered;

e) Costs for the assessment were set out, and costs of the motion were in the cause. [ 12 ] Following that hearing, psychologist Robert Huot of Campbellton agreed to perform the parenting capacity assessment; however, the father preferred to engage the services of a psychologist who worked closer to the Moncton area. From the evidence, fifteen psychologists in the greater Moncton area were contacted, to no avail. Despite communication by the mother’s counsel in September 2017 to explore alternatives, the father’s counsel did not reply.

Later, in September, psychologist Robert Doucet, who had been contacted previously but stated he was too busy, agreed to do the assessment; however, he indicated there would not be sufficient time to complete a full custody assessment, given the fact the trial dates were set for November 2017. The mother then requested a Voice of the Child Assessment of the oldest child. [ 13 ] Following yet another motion hearing, an order issued effective October 13, 2017, in which the court ordered that:

a) the father’s monthly child support obligation would be $1,817.61, commencing November 1, 2017, based on his estimated income of $82,000;

b) neither party would remove any household items from the home until the conclusion of the trial;

c) the parties would share a revised list of household expenses;

d) both parties would produce current financial documents as listed in the order;

e) the father would produce his

schedule of work shifts, a record of jobs undertaken since June 1, 2016, and other financial disclosure;

f) on the consent of the parties, they would cooperate with psychologist Dr. Robert Huot for the purposes of having a full custodial assessment completed as previously ordered, on the terms set out; and

g) should he be unable to complete the full custodial assessment, there would be a Voice of the Child Assessment of the oldest child, with the terms as set out in the order. [ 14 ] As one may discern, this case is described in the family law literature as a high-conflict separation involving two major contests: 1) custody; and 2) money. It has been 35 months since the date of separation and the battles continue. This

summary of what occurred prior to the application hearing in November 2017 provides context for the following analysis. C. Order of the court [ 15 ] As noted, there were three motions between September 2016 and October 2017. The application itself was heard over three days in November 2017. The record before the court consisted of several hundred pages of documents. The court made findings of fact and credibility. Those findings fell squarely within the purview of the application judge who was in the best position to assess the evidence. See LeBlanc v.

LeBlanc 2013 NBCA 22 , 401 N.B.R. (2d) 334 , where Larlee J.A. quotes from Housen v.

Nikolaisen , 2002 SCC 33 , [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235 , at para. 3 : “The appellate court must not retry a case and must not substitute its views for the views of the trial judge according to what the appellate court thinks the evidence establishes on its view of the balance of probabilities” (para. 8). [ 16 ] On January 12, 2018, the application judge rendered a decision in which she granted joint custody of the children to the parents, with their primary residence to be with the mother who was given the “last word when deciding issues relating to [their] health, education and general wellbeing.” There were additional provisions concerning access and visitation and how the children would communicate with the parents. [ 17 ] The father was ordered to pay child support in the amount of $1,834 monthly, effective January 1, 2018.

The parents were ordered to prorate the expenses that qualified for reimbursement under s. 7 of the Guidelines . [ 18 ] The court determined the mother had an entitlement to spousal support, payable in the mid-range of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (“ SSAG ”); however, no specific amount was fixed on the basis there were insufficient funds available to the father to pay spousal support, given the amount of child support he was required to pay.

The court stated that in the event the annual incomes of the parties were to change in the future, and, should the SSAG produce an amount of spousal support payable in the mid-range, that amount would be paid. [ 19 ] The court ordered the father’s pension benefits, accumulated through employment, to be divided equally from the date of cohabitation, December 1, 2001, to the date of separation, June 1, 2016. The parties were ordered to exchange copies of their income tax returns annually.

The father was required to maintain his existing health and dental insurance plan for the benefit of the children for so long as they remained eligible for coverage. He was further ordered to maintain his existing life insurance plan, naming the mother and the children as beneficiaries for so long as he was obligated to pay child and spousal support. Other provisions dealt with the disposition of assets acquired during the period of cohabitation. The father was ordered to pay costs in the amount of $5,000. III. Grounds of Appeal [ 20 ] The appellant father is self-represented.

His Notice of Appeal, dated February 5, 2018, is framed more like a submission in which he proposes alternatives to the order rendered by the application judge. The five-page document culminates with grounds of appeal, which, in my view, illustrate the major issues which continue to drive the ongoing litigation between these parents.

[ 21 ] I can do no better than to repeat the grounds as written, because, in my view, they offer a glimpse into the ongoing battleground issues in this case: CUSTODY 1) The [judge] has a misapprehension of evidence that was used to support decision-making. 2) The [judge] failed to give the proper weight to the Voice of the Child (VOC) assessment. a. The Contract by Family Plus of St. John, NB was not followed and thereby failed to protect the child from manipulation and coercion by the Respondent; b. The assessment was done by a social worker who worked part-time at Family Plus, not a psychologist; c.

The Appellant had no participation or voice in the process nor a voice in the selection of the Assessor; d. The assessor’s credentials to conduct a VOC are unknown; e. The VOC was rushed just days before the Trial allowing no opportunity to cross-examine the assessor during the Trial; f. The VOC assessment was based solely on a 2h interview with the child in St. John at the office of the assessor, and accompanied by the respondent; g. The VOC assessment, the child spoke for all four children, rather than focus on with whom the child herself would like to live; h.

The child also entered the assessment with a prepared script as noted by the Assessor. The Appellant would ask that the Voice of the Child (VOC) conducted with [A.] be discarded and a proper Custodial Assessment including all 4 kids, be ordered by the Court of Appeals, if required. A Dr. Robert Huot, a well experienced Psychologist, was identified during the process to have expertise in conducting custodial assessments, and both parties agree to such, but due to time restrictions, a VOC was rushed involving one child only, and conducted in lieu of a full Custodial Assessment.

FSOS 3) Based on an error of fact, the [judge] failed to apply the Child Support Calculation based on Line 150 of the Respondent and Appellant’s Tax return for 2016, as required by Family Law to be updated January of 2017. PENSION 4) The [judge] determined there was an entitlement to pension by the Respondent, but failed to provide a valuation of that entitlement. It is rare, in a common-law relationship for partner to be awarded 50% of the other’s pension; the average is 25 to 40%.

SPOUSAL SUPPORT 5) The [judge] failed to evaluate the overall effect of the net income per Respondent and per Appellant, if a “mid” spousal support was implemented. Both parties need to maintain a residence for the care of the children, only the Appellant is working as recognized by the Court, and if a “mid” spousal support was implemented, it would gravely affect the living standards for the Appellant and his ability to care for the children.

There is also no reason why the Respondent should not be working full time when [C.] turns 12 yrs old this October 2018, and is of legal age to care for his siblings (10 yrs old and 9 yrs old) for an hour after school, if required. IV. Standard of Review [ 22 ] The Court has recently reiterated the standard of review in family law cases. In A.D. v. A.D. , 2018 NBCA 83 , [2018] N.B.J. No. 298 (QL) , LaVigne J.A. writes:

Before analyzing the merits of the grounds raised by Mr. D., it is necessary to examine the applicable standard of review. This Court hasconsidered the standard of review to be applied in family law matters on numerous occasions; it is a standard that calls for greatdeference to be shown to the trial judge’s findings. A statement that expresses this standard clearly and succinctly was recently made byLarlee J.A. in Gillespie v. Gillespie, 2018 NBCA 22, [2018] N.B.J.

No. 77 (QL), where she states that: The applicable standard of review in a family case allows intervention by this Court only where there has been a material error, a seriousmisapprehension of the evidence, or an error of law: L.R.R. v. E.M., 2018 NBCA 2, [2018] N.B.J. No. 2 (QL); L.D.M. v. J.K.D., 2017NBCA 47, [2017] N.B.J. No. 259 (QL); Yorke v. Yorke, 2011 NBCA 79, 378 N.B.R. (2d) 141.

With respect to the standard of reviewconcerning findings of fact and discretionary orders the Court may only overturn a trial judge’s finding of fact if it is the result of apalpable and overriding error, and may only interfere with a discretionary order if it is founded upon an error of law, an error in theapplication of the governing principles or a palpable and overriding error in the assessment of the evidence: Lang v. Lang, [2007] N.B.J.No. 348 (C.A.) (QL). The order under attack in this appeal is a discretionary one. [para. 8] The Court of Appeal cannot retry a case. In Van de Perre v.

Edwards, 2001 SCC 60, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 1014, Bastarache J., writing for theSupreme Court of Canada, explains what constitutes a material error that would warrant a reconsideration of the evidence by an appellatecourt: As indicated in both Gordon and Hickey, the approach to appellate review requires an indication of a material error. If there is anindication that the trial judge did not consider relevant factors or evidence, this might indicate that he did not properly weigh all of thefactors.

In such a case, an appellate court may review the evidence proffered at trial to determine if the trial judge ignored ormisdirected himself with respect to relevant evidence. This being said, I repeat that omissions in the reasons will not necessarily meanthat the appellate court has jurisdiction to review the evidence heard at trial. As stated in Van Mol (Guardian ad Litem of) v.

Ashmore(1999), 1999 BCCA 6 , 168 D.L.R. (4th) 637 (B.C.C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2000] 1 S.C.R. vi, an omission is only amaterial error if it gives rise to the reasoned belief that the trial judge must have forgotten, ignored or misconceived the evidence in away that affected his conclusion. Without this reasoned belief, the appellate court cannot reconsider the evidence. [para. 15] [paras. 9-10] [23] It bears repeating that deference is owed to a trial judge’s assessment of evidence concerning the best interestsof a child in custody matters.

This is so because the trial judge is in the best position to assess the credibility and the quality of theevidence. A trial judge bases his or her decision on that evidence, and he or she cannot speculate, or “fill in the blanks.” Neither can theCourt on appellate review. Of course, should the Court determine the trial judge made an error of law by misapplying a legal test, ormisinterpreting a legal test, or if he or she has committed a palpable and overriding error of fact, appellate intervention may be warranted.See Van de Perre v. Edwards, 2001 SCC 60, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 1014, at para.13; P.R.H. v.

M.E.L., 2009 NBCA 18, 343 N.B.R. (2d) 100,at paras. 8-9; and L.D.M. v. J.K.D., 2017 NBCA 47, [2017] N.B.J. No. 259 (QL), per Green J.A. at paras. 9-10. V. Analysis A. Motion to introduce fresh evidence [24] An appellant is not entitled to a “second kick at the can” (see Vaughan v. Vaughan, 2014 NBCA 6, 415 N.B.R.(2d) 286, at para. 7). A litigant is required to put his or her best foot forward at trial, to call the necessary evidence, and to persuasivelyargue his or her case. An appellate court is not one where re-litigation of a matter is permitted.

The Court reviews the trial record and thereasons given by the judge to support the result, and it will intervene only when error can be demonstrated.

The hearing of thisapplication occurred over three days and both parties had ample opportunity to call the evidence they believed was relevant to theirrespective claims. [25] Before this Court, the father filed a motion seeking an order permitting his mother to provide oral evidence “tovalidate her affidavit of physical assault by the respondent.” As well, he sought to introduce fresh evidence of “child abuse,” relating toan incident involving one of the children that allegedly occurred following the hearing. [26] The Court denied both requests for the reasons given at the time of the hearing.

We determined there wasnothing to be gained from allowing the oral examination of the paternal grandmother. Her affidavit was before the court and formed partof the record at trial. The application judge’s decision concerning custody did not turn on this evidence; however, a considerable amount

of trial time was spent concerning an altercation that occurred between the mother and the paternal grandmother. With respect to thefather’s allegation of child abuse following the trial, we determined we had no jurisdiction to receive this evidence on the basis it was notfresh evidence as defined in R. v. Palmer, (SCC), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 759, [1979] S.C.J. No. 126 (QL) (see MacDonald v.MacDonald, 2011 NBCA 25, 372 N.B.R. (2d) 179, per Larlee J.A. at paras. 2-3; L.T.G. v. C.J.G., 2011 NBCA 12, 369 N.B.R. (2d) 202,per Bell J.A., as he then was, at para. 9; Sangster v.

Sangster, 2014 NBCA 14, 416 N.B.R. (2d) 397, at para. 4; Brooks v. Brooks, 2014NBCA 29, 419 N.B.R. (2d) 326). B. Misapprehension of the evidence [27] The application judge introduced her 47-page decision by correctly framing the issues in dispute. The judgethen summarized the facts and identified the questions she resolved in the various interim court orders. It is clear the judge had a detailedknowledge and understanding of this file because she chronicled the history of the relationship, focusing on the parental responsibilitiesundertaken by both throughout the years, as well as their employment histories.

The judge made, in my view, a poignant conclusion. Atpara. 25, she writes: “[i]n general, the evidence shows that Mr. D. is very dependent on his mother and his sister with regards to variousaspects of parenting the children.” The “take away” from this observation is clear. Mr. D. works shift work and, should custody havebeen granted to him, the children would have been cared for by other family members on those days he was required to work nights.

Thiswas but one of many observations the judge made to buttress her ultimate decision concerning custody. [28] In her custody analysis, the judge reviewed both ss. 129 and 1 of the Act.

Section 1 in particular lists thecriteria to be considered when a court makes a custody and access order. The judge systematically reviewed the criteria in turn, and sheapplied them to the facts of this case. The following factual conclusions are relevant:

a) Prior to the nesting order, the mother was the primary caregiver of the children;

b) The father, because of his work schedule, requires the assistance of his mother and his sister to care for the children;

c) The friction between the parents was noted, and the judge stated it had to “calm down”;

d) A.’s views concerning her residence and access were observed; however, the judge stated it was “unclear” what the preferences ofthe other children were;

e) The mother was going to continue residing in the home where the children had habitually resided until it sold;

f) The children love both parents;

g) The children attend a French school, and the father is not fluent enough in the French language to assist them with their homework;and

h) The mother was historically responsible for taking the children to the Roman Catholic Church, although, since separation, thefather has been taking them to the Wesleyan Church. [29] The judge observed the father would not permit the children to telephone their mother while in his care, norcould they interact with her in public places, such as at various recreational activities, some of which the mother coached, where thefather insisted the children address her as coach.

The judge acknowledged there were mutual allegations of abuse towards the children,and she concluded that both could be prone to angry outbursts in front of them. The father takes issue with many of the judge’s factualconclusions. [30] McLachlin C.J. in R. v. R.E.M., 2008 SCC 51, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 3, writes:

While it is useful for a judge to attempt to articulate the reasons for believing a witness and disbelieving another in general or on a particular point, the fact remains that the exercise may not be purely intellectual and may involve factors that are difficult to verbalize. Furthermore, embellishing why a particular witness’s evidence is rejected may involve the judge saying unflattering things about the witness; […].

In short, assessing credibility is a difficult and delicate matter that does not always lend itself to precise and complete verbalization. [para. 49] [ 31 ] At the end of the day, assessing conflicting evidence is a weighing exercise which requires a trial judge to use his or her common sense and experience. [ 32 ] In this case, the father has not identified where there was a misapprehension of the evidence by the judge.

This ground was pleaded under the heading of “Custody” in the father’s grounds of appeal, so this analysis has been circumscribed as a result. [ 33 ] Concerning spousal support, the judge examined the employment histories of these parents. There is no dispute concerning this evidence, other than the assertion by the father the judge should have deferred to the low end of the range in the SSAG , on the basis that income should have been imputed to the mother.

The mother’s income was assessed based on her income tax returns and, following a vigorous cross-examination, the judge found there was no evidence the mother was under-reporting her income, or that she was underemployed, particularly given her obligations towards the four children. [ 34 ] The judge observed the father had been employed with the Government of Canada for about twenty years, with the exception of the one and one-half years when he worked as a security guard at the Point Lepreau Nuclear Station. He also painted houses, and, as noted, he operated an ice cream shop.

The father’s income was assessed based on his income tax returns which were averaged for the three prior years. [ 35 ] The judge took note of the assets and debts accumulated by the parties during cohabitation. She found as a fact that: “[t]hroughout the relationship, the family comingled their revenue. They had joint savings and chequing accounts, and a joint line of credit” (para. 48). [ 36 ] By agreement, the parties divided the $5,000 received from the sale of the ice cream shop and the proceeds from the sale of a Yamaha motorcycle. There was a dispute concerning the value of the home.

The father testified it was worth more than $269,000, which was the real estate listing price at the time of trial. The judge determined, that in the absence of an appraisal, this was the best evidence of its value. [ 37 ] The judge reviewed the debts outstanding and determined they were jointly owed. Aside from the father’s disagreement concerning the judge’s decision to divide his pension equally from the date of separation to the date of trial, none of the above is contested. C.

The voice of the child assessment [ 38 ] The father contends the judge gave too much weight to the Voice of the Child Assessment, suggesting it was biased, that his oldest child was “lied to” and manipulated and that the assessor was not properly qualified to conduct such an assessment. He states he had no participation in it, arguing the contract he signed required independent interviews of the parents and others, which did not occur. He states it was rushed and it should have been conducted by a psychologist.

He seeks an order from this Court requiring a “proper Custodial Assessment including all 4 kids.” [ 39 ] I turn to the judge’s treatment of the Voice of the Child Assessment. She observes it was the mother who ultimately was required to arrange for and to pay $2,000 for the assessment. The father had first withdrawn his consent to have it done; however, when he finally agreed, he kept the child out of school the day she was to be transported by the mother from school to the appointment.

Another appointment was required and the child was driven to it by her mother. [ 40 ] The Voice of the Child Assessment, dated November 16, 2017, became part of the record. The assessor was examined and she was cross-examined. The judge quoted from the report in which the child consistently complained about her father’s

“excessive anger” and that he needed to get help with his “rage” issues. The assessor concluded that this child wished to reside solelywith her mother and to visit with her father when she wanted. She stated that, although she did not speak for her siblings, she felt theirneeds would best be served if their mother had sole custody and they could have regular visits with their father. [41] A Voice of the Child Assessment can be helpful in cases where children have attained an age they can becredibly interviewed for the purposes of ascertaining their views and preferences concerning access and visitation.

The assessments maybe ordered pursuant to s. 8 of the Act or pursuant to s. 11.4 of the Judicature Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. J-2.

Article 12 of the United NationsConvention on the Rights of the Child, GA/RES/44/25, to which Canada became a signatory in 1991, states that children, to the extentthey are capable of doing so, are entitled to be heard and to participate in the processes that lead to decisions affecting them. [42] In this case, the court ordered a Voice of the Child Assessment of the oldest child, with the consent of theparties.

The order did not specify the assessor should be a psychologist; however, these assessments are routinely conducted bypsychologists, social workers, counselors or other professionals who have experience working with children. They are not binding onjudges, for the same reason that child custody assessments are not binding. A trial judge should never defer to such a report. See J.H. v.T.H., 2017 NBCA 7, [2017] N.B.J.

No. 16 (QL), where this Court writes: An application judge is required to assess the evidence and to give the appropriate weight to a child custody assessment as is appropriatein the facts of the case and in accord with legal principles. An application judge’s role as gatekeeper requires him or her to consider all ofthe evidence, and to render an independent decision. In P.R.H., at para. 16, Larlee J.A. concluded a “court should not delegate its duty todetermine what parenting arrangement is in a child’s best interests to an assessor”. I agree.

If the application judge omitted considerationof a factor integral to the conclusion, appellate intervention is warranted. […]” [para. 23] [43] In L.R.R. v. E.M., 2018 NBCA 2, [2018] N.B.J. No. 2 (QL), Larlee J.A. reviewed a trial judge’s decisionconcerning the custody of a child born in 2004. The parents had been embroiled in a ten-year custody battle at the time of the hearing.She writes: The perspective of a child of this age is important. An application judge cannot defer to it, but must take it into consideration with theother factors.

In the “voice of the child assessment” the psychologist described MGRM as a charming, sensitive and courageous youngman”. He made clear his wishes; he wants to live with his father and visit his mother. He expressed security and stability in the care ofhis father and preferred the routine of his father’s home to the routine at his mother’s. [para. 13] [Emphasis added.] [44] Although Voice of the Child Assessments may shed a spotlight on the child’s preferences, they are notdefinitive.

Larlee J.A., in P.R.H., writes: Furthermore a court should not delegate its duty to determine what parenting arrangement is in a child's best interests to an assessor:Johnson v. Cleroux (2002), (ON CA), 156 O.A.C. 197, [2002] O.J. No. 964 (QL); additional reasons at [2003] O.J.No. 981 (C.A.) (QL). See also Snoddon v. Snoddon, [2004] O.J. No. 1987 (QL), 2004 ONCJ 39 (C.J.). However, courts typically willgive substantial weight to the recommendations of an assessor, but these must be only one factor to consider in the determination.

Acourt may also choose to ignore the recommendations of an assessor, as in Steeves v. Robinson (2005), 278 N.B.R. (2d) 38, [2005] N.B.J.No. 52 (QL), 2005 NBQB 46. In the present case the lawyer for the appellant put it like this: “psychologists do not decide custodyissues, judges do”. I agree. [para. 16] See A.F.G. v. D.A.B., 2011 NBCA 100, [2011] N.B.J. No. 401 (QL) per Quigg J.A. [45] One of the criteria set out in s. 1 of the Act, is a consideration of the views and preferences of a child, whenthey can be reasonably ascertained.

Ultimately, it is a question of what weight the trial judge assigns to the child’s views (see F.F.R. v.K.F., 2013 NLCA 8, [2013] N.J. No. 26 (QL); and Stav v. Stav, 2012 BCCA 154, [2012] B.C.J. No. 673 (QL)). In this case, the partiesagreed that the oldest child, who was aged fifteen, was mature enough to be interviewed for this purpose. The other children were eleven,nine and eight years of age respectively. [46] The father takes issue with the process and asserts that the oldest child’s views were manipulated. It was the

father’s burden to prove these assertions, and he failed to do so. The assessor was cross-examined concerning the report, and the judgedetermined her evidence did not support the father’s allegations. The father states the contract he signed with the assessor was notfollowed; however, the document starts by stating the protocols set out would be followed in “most cases,” thus leaving flexibility to theassessor to determine whether parents or other third parties would be interviewed.

The assessor advised that because of the child’s age,she did not believe that interviews with the parents or others were necessary. [47] The order did not require the assessment to be conducted by a psychologist, as submitted by the father. Thedelay in having the assessment done was caused by the father’s failure to have the child available for the first interview with theassessor.

I note that, had the father allowed the child custody assessment to proceed when there was a psychologist available to conductit months earlier, a Voice of the Child Assessment would not have been needed; however, it was the father who insisted a psychologistfrom the Moncton area be retained, thus creating the inevitable alternative in this case. [48] It is apparent from the judge’s reasons that she did not limit her custody analysis to the Voice of the ChildAssessment. The judge thoroughly examined the whole body of evidence. She referred to s. 1 of the Act where the “best interests of thechild” is defined.

She applied the criteria to the evidence concluding, as observed, the mother “was the primary caregiver of the childrenfor most of their young lives” (para. 64). It was her view that it was in the best interests of the children that their mother “continue” to betheir primary caregiver. [49] The access and visitation

schedule mapped out by the judge was within the norm. Given the level of conflictbetween these parents, it was not unreasonable for the judge to decide the mother would have the “last word” regarding issues pertainingto the children’s well-being, health, education and recreational activities. As the Supreme Court has observed in Young v. Young, (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3, [1993] S.C.J. No. 112 (QL), there are imperatives that animate the decisions concerning theplacement of children.

Those decisions should safeguard the child’s needs for the continuity in relationships, reflect the child’s, not theadult’s sense of time, and take into account the law’s inability to supervise interpersonal relationships and the limits of knowledge tomake long-range predictions. [50] Joint custody orders enable parents to equally participate in the major decisions that affect their children.

Inthose cases where the parents are not able to effectively communicate, measures must be taken to ensure that the children are insulatedfrom their conflict. [51] In J.H. this Court writes: The father contends the application judge placed too much weight on the lack of communication between the parents. In point of fact,the application judge correctly acknowledged the lack of communication between the parents was but one consideration. He discussedthe fact the father had not taken as active a role in maintaining the children in the same school.

Following the parents' move, he did notattend parent teacher meetings, nor did he convey information from the school to the mother. He observed, as noted, the children weremissing extracurricular activities and there had been an incident concerning an antibiotic prescription for one of the children. I concludethe application judge decided the “best interests” of the children from a child centered perspective, and he correctly considered thefactors in the context of the evidence. The above, along with the other problems that were identified, militated against a continuation ofthe shared custody arrangement.

A shared parenting or a shared custody arrangement requires parents not only to have the ability tocommunicate in an effective manner, it also requires them to cooperate in the decision making process in order to protect the health,safety and emotional well-being of their children. […] In child custody cases where it is clear the parents are not able to effectively communicate with each other, the pivotal factor, in myopinion, is whether the court is satisfied sufficient safeguards are in place so as to insulate the children from the parental conflict.

Suchhas not been the case in these proceedings as the application judge observed. The parents were given the opportunity to share thecustodial care of their children over a period of approximately seventeen months, and as stated in paras. 15 and 18 of these reasons, theywere not able to insulate their children from their conflict. On balance, the application judge made an assessment of credibility, findingthe mother more credible than the father, and he made a judgment call which was his to make. This was not a case where the parentscould share the major decisions that affect their children.

The application judge devoted five paragraphs to the issue of credibility and heconcluded the father’s testimony was not as credible as the mother’s. In fact, the father's testimony was described by the applicationjudge as being “vague and cynical”. This was a consideration in the overall result. In M.C. v. T.C., 2010 NBQB 192, [2010] N.B.J. No. 187 (QL), Walsh J. correctly observed “an award of 'joint custody' can also include

the right of one parent to have final decision making authority, most often given to the parent who has the day to day care of the child” (para. 14). See also Lamont-Daneault v. Daneault , 2003 MBCA 111 , [2003] M.J. No. 318 (QL) , at paras. 18-19 , on this point. [paras. 20, 33-34] [ 52 ] The father’s complaint that his oldest child does not have the right to speak for her siblings was dealt with by the assessor. The application judge correctly observed: “[a]s to the views and preferences of the children, it is clear that [the child] wants to live with Ms. T.

Regarding the three other children, it is unclear what their views and preferences are” (para. 63). Finally, the father states that the child had to have been coached, as she had prepared notes with her when she was interviewed. The assessor, on this point noted in her report: “[the child] had made some notes so as not to forget to identify any of the concerns she held and was eager to talk about the situation.” [ 53 ] I find no error in this analysis.

Given the discretionary nature of custody orders, this Court is loath to tinker with, or to interfere with, a judge’s reasoned decision concerning custody and access, absent palpable and overriding error, which is not evident here. [ 54 ] The application judge had the benefit of hearing the witnesses, of assessing the evidence globally, and she made her own findings. She was in the best position to conclude what would be in the long term best interests of these children.

The appellant does not agree with her decision; however, it is his burden to prove error in the judge’s assessment of the evidence, or her treatment of legal principles. He has failed to do so. [ 55 ] The father seeks an order from the Court requiring that a full Custody Assessment be conducted. This Court cannot make the order requested, nor can it set aside the Voice of the Child Assessment which was conducted on the consent of the parties. [ 56 ] There is no merit to this ground of appeal. D.

Was the child support calculation correct? [ 57 ] Although not a specific ground of appeal, both the appellant and the respondent raised the issue of retroactivity in their submissions. Concerning the father’s request for a retroactive adjustment of child support, the judge writes: Mr. D. is requesting a retroactive decrease of child support from January 1, 2017 to October 1, 2017. Taking a holistic view of the matter, I am not inclined to reduce the previously ordered child support. This argument was raised during the last months of the year. As well, considering that Mr.

D. averaged an annual income of $112,534 for the three previous years, I decline to reduce the child support previously ordered for the period of January 1, 2017 to October 1, 2017. [para. 70] [ 58 ] The Guidelines allow a court to take an average of the payor’s prior three years of income for the purpose of assessing income for child support purposes ( ss. 15 - 17 ). In this case, the father not only received employment income reported on line 150 of his T1 General Income Tax returns, he also received income from his ice cream business, later sold, and from working as a freelance painter.

Bearing in mind the multiplicity of interim motions where clearly the issue of child support had been dealt with, it was not unreasonable for the judge to defer to a three-year average income instead. [ 59 ] This was a reasoned, discretionary decision which would not warrant appellate intervention absent a palpable and overriding error, which is not apparent. I discern no error in her decision in this regard.

The order requiring the father to pay $1,834 monthly, commencing January 1, 2018, was based on the father’s income of $82,000 per annum , which, as the application judge noted, was “agreed” by the mother as reflecting the amount of annual income to be used for the father. Historically, the father’s income was in excess of $100,000 per year. The mother’s income was in excess of $12,000 per year; however, as noted, she was required to pay back $3,000 to the Government of Canada.

As the mother was granted primary care of the four children, her expected income should be higher because of the child tax benefit she would receive for the 2018 taxation year. [ 60 ] The father’s Notice of Appeal raises the issue of the calculation of the mother’s income for the purposes of assessing his child support obligation, arguing the judge used 2016 annual income figures and did not consider year to date annual

income for 2017. If he is correct, this constitutes reversible error. On this point the judge writes: “[t]he income to be used for Ms. T. for the purposes of support is $9,682 per year. This is the net business income earned by her according to her 2016 income tax return” (para. 74). [ 61 ] The mother’s Financial Statement, filed September 13, 2016, showed net income from housekeeping at $7,780 per year. The father’s Financial Statement, filed September 23, 2016, showed income from employment at $100,000 per year.

The interim order, dated December 6, 2016, was based on the mother’s income of $12,480 per year, which included the full amount of the child tax benefit.

The father’s income was assessed at $100,362 per year. [ 62 ] The Amended Record on Application, filed November 17, 2017, shows the father’s Line 150 income, as assessed by Canada Revenue Agency, at $103,996 annually; however, on November 1, 2017, his child support obligation was reduced to $1,817.61 monthly, due to the fact he anticipated a reduction in his income to $82,000 that year. [ 63 ] Because there is a requirement in the order for these parents to exchange their T1 General Income Tax Returns on an annual basis, including their Notices of Assessment, the parties are in the best position to adjust the s. 3 basic monthly amount of child support to be paid on an annual basis, retroactive to January 1 in any given year.

They will be able to readjust the pro-rata sharing of eligible s. 7 expenses pursuant to the Guidelines as well. This was clearly intended in the judge’s decision, and it is contemplated in the Guidelines . [ 64 ] I see no error in the judge’s reasoning on this issue. Given the historical income claimed by the father, should his annual income have increased since the date of the decision, the amount of his monthly child support payments will have increased from the amount assessed by the judge at the hearing.

The assessment of both of their incomes in November 2017, was based on the best evidence the application judge had before her. E. The spousal support order [ 65 ] The father argues the judge erred by failing to “evaluate the overall effect of the net income per respondent and per appellant, if a mid-range spousal support was implemented,” which it was in this case. [ 66 ] The father is suggesting the mother did not fully declare her income from cleaning houses, or alternatively, he argues she is intentionally underemployed and that income should have been imputed to her.

The mother was examined and cross- examined concerning her work. She produced her income tax returns. As noted, there was no evidence to support the father’s assertions the mother under-reported her income, or that she was intentionally underemployed and the judge made no findings on this point, other than to conclude she was being truthful. [ 67 ] The father does not contest the judge’s findings that the mother has an entitlement to spousal support. His issue relates to the quantum.

The judge’s analysis on this point is found at paras. 79-80 where she writes: […] The New Brunswick Court of Appeal has stated that once entitlement to spousal support is established, then the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines , prepared by Professor Carol Rogerson and Professor Rollie Thompson, Department of Justice Canada, should be used to establish the quantum of spousal support. […] The formula results in a range for spousal support of $0 to $0 per month for an indefinite (unspecified) duration, subject to variation and possibly review, with a minimum duration of 7.5 years and a maximum duration of 15 years from the date of separation. [ 68 ] The application judge had the benefit of reviewing the parties’ financial statements; she was aware of their respective incomes as well as their monthly expenses.

Considerable deference will be given to the decision of a trial judge concerning spousal support orders. The Court will not overturn a spousal support order unless the reasons disclose an error in principle, a significant misapprehension of the evidence or the award is clearly wrong ( see MacLean v. MacLean , 2004 NBCA 75 , 274 N.B.R. (2d) 90 , at para.

18 ; LeBlanc v. LeBlanc , 2013 NBCA 22 , 401 N.B.R. (2d) 334 , at para. 10 ). [ 69 ] In this case, the judge decided the mid-range of spousal support set out in the Guidelines was appropriate. The decision on this point was not vacuous. It was reasoned, and Mr. D. has not convinced me there was a misapplication of the legal test concerning it. This ground of appeal has no merit. F. The pension division [ 70 ] The father accumulated pension benefits incident to his employment with the Government of Canada. The mother sought an equal division of those benefits during the period of cohabitation.

The application judge decided she would resolve this issue by applying the principles of unjust enrichment set out by the Supreme Court in Kerr v. Baranow , 2011 SCC 10 , [2011] 1 S.C.R. 269 . Following a thorough review of the facts of this case and linking them to the principles established in Kerr , she divided the father’s pension in equal shares.

The father argues the application judge erred by attributing too much weight to the mother’s contributions to the family unit, and therefore, an equal division of the pension was not appropriate. [ 71 ] The application judge observed that once the house was sold and the debts paid, the mother would retain a 2009 van and RRSPs valued at $34,102. Prior to any division, the father would retain a 2003 Corolla, $12,000 in RRSPs and in excess of $350,000 in his pension fund. She concluded this was a joint family venture of fifteen years where the parties had joint bank accounts, joint debts and joint real estate.

They conducted themselves as a married couple and both had “made contributions linked to the generation of wealth” (para. 104). [ 72 ] The judge found these parties were in a partnership, where the priority was the raising of four children while accumulating wealth through a joint effort. She found there was economic integration and they were financially interdependent.

The father disputes these findings by pointing to the fact there were assets held separately by each of them; however, at the end of the day, the judge, on the totality of the evidence, decided this was an integrated family unit where the parties shared financial and child rearing duties. I would not interfere with her decision. [ 73 ] The Government of Canada has been consistent in its treatment of the division of pension benefits for common-law partners as between the Canada Pension Plan , R.S.C. 1985, c. C-8 , and the Pension Benefits Division Act , S.C. 1992, c. 46, Sch.

II , following amendments to both. [ 74 ] The Pension Benefits Standards Act , R.S.C., 1985, c. 32 (2 nd Supp .) states: common-law partner , in relation to an individual, means a person who is cohabiting with the individual in a conjugal relationship, having so cohabited for a period of at least one year[.] conjoint de fait La personne qui vit avec la personne en cause dans une relation conjugale depuis au moins un an. [ 75 ] The Pension Benefits Division Act defines a common-law partner as: common-law partner means a person who establishes that the person is cohabiting with a member of a pension plan in a relationship of a conjugal nature, having so cohabited for a period of at least one year[.] conjoint de fait La personne qui établit qu'elle cohabite avec le participant dans une union de type conjugal depuis au moins un an. [ 76 ] Pensions that qualify for division are governed by a process set out in the Public Service Superannuation Act , R.S.C., 1985, c.

P-36 , which applies in this case. The division of the father’s pension is governed by the Pension Benefits Division Act , which deals explicitly with the division of pensions for federal employees who are members of a qualifying plan and which permits common-law partners to apply for up to an equal division of pension benefits accumulated during the period of cohabitation, provided the period of cohabitation exceeds one year.

[ 77 ] On the pension division question, the judge writes: The parties agreed that Ms. T. would leave her employment after giving birth to the third child in order to give priority to the family’s need and the raising of the children. In my view, Ms. T. is entitled to a share of the pension. More specifically, she is entitled to 50% of the pension accumulated by Mr.

D. from the date of commencement of cohabitation, December 1, 2001, to the date of separation, June 1, 2016. [para. 105] [ 78 ] The application judge conducted a thorough analysis, applying the principles of unjust enrichment to the facts, and she concluded the mother was entitled to an equal share of the accumulated pension benefits. I discern no error in the application judge’s analysis. I do discern an error, however, in the wording of the Judgment Following Hearing or Trial (Form 60A).

Paragraph 1 of that document reads: “[t]he Respondent pay to the Applicant the sum of 50% of the commuted value of his employment pension with the Government of Canada in the amount of $162,337.93.” [ 79 ] This wording does not reflect the order of the court. The commuted value is an actuarial calculation of the value of a pension at a certain date; however, in the case where the pension benefits are to be divided in equal shares, as in this case, the value of the recipient’s portion attracts per diem interest to the date when the benefits are actually rolled over.

The judge’s order merely specified an equal division of the benefits from the date of cohabitation to the date of separation. There was no amount specified, and correctly so, as the judge could not calculate the per diem interest. The judgment following this hearing must be corrected to reflect the actual wording in the judge’s reasons that the mother is entitled to one half of the commuted value of the father’s pension benefits from the date of cohabitation, December 1, 2001, to the date of separation, June 1, 2016. VI. Costs [ 80 ] The appellant does not ask for costs.

The respondent seeks considerable costs, arguing this appeal was another attempt by the father to relitigate matters previously decided. She also draws our attention to the fact the father unnecessarily complicated the appeal, by typing excerpts from the trial transcripts as part of his submissions, and by taking those excerpts out of context: “cherry picking them,” and generally distorting them to his favour. [ 81 ] The appellant filed a motion to introduce fresh evidence.

He also filed an Amended Submission with numerous corrections, requiring the respondent’s solicitor to spend additional time preparing for the appeal. I agree with the respondent there was an unnecessary and additional burden placed upon her to correct the record filed by the appellant and to prepare for the appeal hearing. [ 82 ] Given the appellant has failed on all grounds of his appeal, as well as the fact he unnecessarily complicated this appeal, I would order costs in the amount of $5,000. VII. Disposition [ 83 ] I would dismiss the appeal in all respects.

I would amend paragraph 1 of the Judgment Following Hearing or Trial as noted. I would award costs of $5,000. Version française du jugement de la Cour rendu par LA JUGE BAIRD I. Introduction

[1] Il s’agit d’un appel d’une décision dans laquelle la juge saisie de la requête a rendu une ordonnance accordant la garde conjointe des quatre enfants issus d’une relation, la mère pourvoyant principalement aux soins des enfants et ayant le pouvoir de prendre les décisions à leur égard et le père bénéficiant d’un droit d’accès et de visite selon un calendrier. L’ordonnance a été rendue en vertu de la

Loi sur les services à la famille , L.N.-B. 1980, ch. F-2.2 ( la Loi ). De plus, la juge saisie de la requête a rendu une ordonnance relative à la prestation alimentaire pour enfants et à la prestation alimentaire matrimoniale et elle a par ailleurs ordonné le partage de l’actif et des dettes des parties, une

partie de cette ordonnance étant également portée en appel. II. Contexte A. Les questions en litige [2] Les parties en cause ont commencé à cohabiter en décembre 2001 et elles se sont séparées en juin 2016. Les quatre enfants issus du mariage ont de dix à dix-sept ans. [3] Au moment de la séparation, le père travaillait à plein temps pour le gouvernement du Canada et gagnait environ 100 362,33 $ par an. Il était par ailleurs propriétaire d’un bar laitier et exploitait une entreprise indépendante de peinture en bâtiment qui lui rapportait de 2 000 $ à 5 000 $ par an.

La mère a occupé un emploi à plein temps jusqu’en 2008; par la suite, elle est restée à la maison pour prendre soin des enfants et a assuré le rôle de personne au foyer. Lorsqu’elle a déposé sa requête en 2016, elle effectuait des travaux ménagers pour autrui à son propre compte, à temps partiel, et gagnait environ 160 $ à 240 $ par semaine . [4] Les plaidoiries ont soulevé des allégations mutuelles de violence verbale et physique aussi bien entre les parents qu’envers les enfants et les parents étaient en désaccord au sujet du niveau respectif de leur participation à l’éducation des enfants.

Le père a contesté les contributions de la mère aux tâches domestiques et il a allégué que la mère déclarait intentionnellement un revenu inférieur à la réalité ou, subsidiairement, qu’elle était sous-employée; il a donc demandé à la cour de lui attribuer un revenu. [5] La mère a sollicité une ordonnance de garde conjointe des enfants, leur résidence principale étant son domicile.

Elle a également demandé une ordonnance alimentaire rétroactive au profit des enfants sous le régime des articles 3 et 7 des Lignes directrices fédérales sur les pensions alimentaires pour enfants , DORS/97-175 (les Lignes directrices ) , une prestation alimentaire matrimoniale et le maintien de l’assurance de soins médicaux et dentaires dont elle-même et les enfants bénéficiaient, et elle a demandé que le père désigne ses enfants comme bénéficiaires de son assurance-vie pour garantir le versement de la prestation alimentaire pour enfants et de la prestation alimentaire matrimoniale.

Elle sollicitait également le partage en parts égales des biens acquis pendant leur cohabitation et un partage équitable des dettes. [6] Le père revendiquait la garde conjointe des enfants et le partage en parts égales de leur garde physique, et il demandait qu’aucun des parents n’ait le [TRADUCTION] « dernier mot ».

Il demandait, lui aussi, que la mère verse une prestation alimentaire au profit des enfants sous le régime de l’art. 3 des Lignes directrices , le partage en parts égales des dépenses visées à l’ art. 7 et une ordonnance enjoignant aux parents de partager de façon égale la jouissance du domicile familial ainsi que les dépenses connexes. Il a accepté de maintenir l’assurance de soins médicaux et dentaires dont bénéficiaient les enfants et la mère à condition qu’elle acquitte sa part proportionnelle des primes.

Le père n’a pas contesté que la mère avait droit à une prestation alimentaire, mais il a fait valoir qu’elle pouvait occuper un emploi à temps plein, ce qui aurait pour effet de réduire la somme qu’il serait tenu de payer. Il a convenu de conserver sa police d’assurance-vie au profit des enfants en nommant un fiduciaire de son choix. Les deux parties ont réclamé les dépens. B.

Les ordonnances provisoires [7] Dans une ordonnance provisoire datée du 26 septembre 2016, les parents ont obtenu la garde conjointe et partagée des enfants moyennant une ordonnance [TRADUCTION] « parents-valises » selon laquelle ils séjournaient à tour de rôle au foyer avec les enfants selon une rotation de quatre jours et demi. [8] À partir du 1 er octobre 2016, il a été ordonné au père de verser une prestation alimentaire pour enfants de 2 181 $ par mois sur la base d’un revenu annuel de 100 362 $. Le revenu de la mère a été évalué à 12 480 $. Elle recevait alors 100 % des prestations fiscales pour enfants.

Le père ayant présenté une demande pour obtenir la moitié de ces prestations, elle a dû rembourser la somme de 3 000 $ au gouvernement du Canada, ce qui a ramené son revenu annuel à environ 9 400 $ pour l’année en question.

Aucune prestation alimentaire matrimoniale n’a été accordée. Les dépenses susceptibles de remboursement visées à l’art. 7 des Lignes directrices ont été réparties entre les parties en proportion de leurs revenus respectifs. Il a été ordonné à chaque parent de désigner les enfants comme bénéficiaires de sa police d’assurance-vie en nommant un fiduciaire de son choix, le montant de l’assurance devant être suffisant pour couvrir ses obligations alimentaires. Il a été ordonné au père de conserver le régime de soins médicaux et dentaires qui couvrait la mère et les enfants.

La cour a ordonné aux deux parties de se partager en parts égales les dépenses du foyer. [9] Le 29 juin 2017, la mère a déposé une motion préliminaire dans laquelle elle demandait un abrégement du délai prescrit pour déposer une seconde motion. Dans cette motion, elle demandait à la cour d’ordonner une [TRADUCTION] « […] évaluation complète de la capacité de parentage comprenant notamment des tests psychologiques des deux parents et des quatre enfants […] ».

Elle alléguait que le père lui interdisait d’exercer son droit d’accès auprès des enfants et s’ingérait dans son droit de visite, et elle affirmait être victime d’aliénation parentale. La mère alléguait que le père avait un arriéré de prestation alimentaire de 2 900 $. [10] Le père a répliqué le 6 juillet 2017 en déposant sa propre motion dans laquelle il sollicitait la modification de la précédente ordonnance alimentaire au profit des enfants pour la ramener à 1 586 $ par mois, ainsi que la garde exclusive des enfants et l’octroi de droits d’accès et de visite à la mère.

Subsidiairement, il sollicitait la garde conjointe des enfants dont la résidence principale serait cependant la sienne. Il était allégué que la mère, l’[TRADUCTION] « amie » du père et un membre de la famille en étaient venus aux mains.

Le père demandait à la cour de rendre une ordonnance interdictive contre la mère et il sollicitait la possession exclusive du foyer, une ordonnance réglant la question de l’arriéré alimentaire au profit des enfants, une ordonnance enjoignant à la mère de payer la moitié des dépenses du foyer pendant [TRADUCTION] « la période allant du mois d’octobre 2016 à aujourd’hui », une ordonnance pour outrage contre la mère sous le régime de la règle 76 des Règles de procédure et les dépens. [11] La seconde motion a été tranchée par une ordonnance entrant en vigueur le 10 juillet 2017, mais rendue en date du 11 septembre 2017.

L’ordonnance précédente datée du 6 décembre 2016 est restée en vigueur, sous réserve des modalités prévues concernant le droit d’accès de la mère pendant l’été et de l’adjonction des dispositions suivantes :

a) les arrangements relatifs aux soins d’urgence apportés aux enfants ont été précisés, les dates et les heures des appels téléphoniques aux enfants ont été fixées et une stratégie de communication pour les rendez-vous des enfants chez le médecin ou le dentiste ainsi qu’une stratégie de communication parentale ont été arrêtées;

b) les parents ont reçu l’ordre de ne pas discuter du litige avec les enfants et de ne tenir aucun propos négatif au sujet de l’autre parent en leur présence;

c) les conditions d’inscription et de vente de la maison ont été précisées;

d) la tenue d’une évaluation de la capacité de parentage assortie de tests psychologiques a été ordonnée;

e) les coûts de l’évaluation ont été fixés et il a été décidé que les dépens afférents à la motion suivraient l’issue de l’instance. [12] Après cette audience, le psychologue Robert Huot de Campbellton a accepté d’effectuer l’évaluation de la capacité de parenter, mais le père a préféré retenir les services d’un psychologue qui travaillait plus près de la région de Moncton. La preuve indique qu’on a communiqué avec quinze psychologues de la région du Grand Moncton, en vain. Bien que l’avocate de la mère ait communiqué avec lui en septembre 2017 pour explorer d’autres solutions, l’avocat du père n’a pas répondu.

Par la suite, en septembre, le psychologue Robert Doucet, avec qui avait déjà communiqué, mais qui avait déclaré qu’il était trop occupé, a accepté d’effectuer l’évaluation, en indiquant cependant qu’il ne restait pas assez de temps pour procéder à une évaluation complète en matière de garde étant donné que des dates avaient été retenues en novembre 2017 pour la tenue du procès. La mère a alors demandé une évaluation relative à la parole de l’aînée des enfants. [13] À l’issue de l’audition d’une nouvelle motion, la cour a rendu une ordonnance entrant en vigueur le 13 octobre 2017 dans laquelle elle ordonnait :

a) que l’obligation alimentaire mensuelle du père au profit des enfants soit de 1 817,61 $ à partir du 1 er novembre 2017, sur la base d’un revenu estimé à 82 000 $;

b) que ni l’une ni l’autre des parties ne retire un

article de maison quelconque du foyer avant la conclusion du procès;

c) que les parties fournissent une liste révisée de dépenses du ménage;

d) que les deux parties produisent les documents financiers à jour énumérés dans l’ordonnance;

e) que le père produise son calendrier de quarts de travail et un relevé des contrats exécutés depuis le 1 er juin 2016 et divulgue d’autres renseignements financiers;

f) du consentement des parties, qu’elles collaborent avec le psychologue Robert Huot pour obtenir une évaluation complète en matière de garde dans le délai fixé dans l’ordonnance déjà rendue, aux conditions qui étaient précisées;

g) advenant qu’il soit incapable d’effectuer l’évaluation complète en matière de garde en question, qu’il soit procédé à une évaluation relative à la parole de l’aînée des enfants, selon les modalités prescrites dans l’ordonnance. [14] Comme on peut le constater, il s’agit d’une instance que les écrits juridiques en droit de la famille qualifient de séparation fortement conflictuelle portant sur deux principales questions en litige : 1) la garde et 2) l’argent. Cela fait maintenant 35 mois que les parties sont séparées et la guerre continue.

Le résumé des faits qui se sont déroulés avant l’audition de la requête en novembre 2017 sert de contexte à l’analyse suivante. C. L’ordonnance judiciaire [15] Comme je l’ai indiqué, trois motions ont été introduites entre les mois de septembre et d’octobre 2017. En ce qui concerne la requête, elle a fait l’objet de trois jours d’audience en novembre 2017. Le dossier présenté à la cour se composait de plusieurs centaines de pages de documents. La cour a tiré des conclusions de fait et des conclusions sur la crédibilité.

Ces conclusions relevaient tout à fait de la compétence de la juge saisie de la requête qui était la mieux placée pour évaluer la preuve. Voir l’arrêt LeBlanc c. LeBlanc , 2013 NBCA 22 , 401 R.N.-B. (2 e ) 334 , dans lequel la juge d’appel Larlee cite un passage du par. 3 de l’arrêt Housen c.

Nikolaisen , 2002 CSC 33 , [2002] 2 R.C.S. 235 : [TRADUCTION] « La cour d’appel ne doit pas juger l’affaire de nouveau, ni substituer son opinion à celle du juge de première instance en fonction de ce qu’elle pense que la preuve démontre, selon son opinion de la prépondérance des probabilités » (par. 8). [16] Le 12 janvier 2018, la juge saisie de la requête a rendu une décision dans laquelle elle accordait la garde conjointe des enfants aux parents, leur résidence principale étant le domicile de la mère, qui devait avoir le « dernier mot sur les questions concernant la santé, l’éducation et le bien-être général des enfants ».

Des dispositions supplémentaires régissaient les droits d’accès et de visite et la façon dont les enfants communiqueraient avec leurs parents. [17] Il était ordonné au père de verser une prestation alimentaire mensuelle de 1 834 $ au profit des enfants à partir du 1 er janvier 2018.

Les parents devaient par ailleurs partager, en proportion de leurs revenus annuels, les dépenses susceptibles de remboursement visées à l’art. 7 des Lignes directrices . [18] La cour a déterminé que la mère avait droit à une prestation alimentaire matrimoniale dont le montant devait se situer au milieu de la fourchette que prévoient les Lignes directrices facultatives en matière de pensions alimentaires pour époux (les Lignes directrices facultatives ); toutefois, aucun montant précis n’a été fixé au motif que le père ne disposait pas de ressources financières suffisantes pour verser une prestation alimentaire matrimoniale, compte tenu du montant de la prestation alimentaire qu’il était tenu de verser au profit des enfants.

La cour a déclaré que si les revenus annuels des parties devaient changer à l’avenir et qu’il résulte de l’application des Lignes directrices facultatives un montant de prestation alimentaire matrimoniale payable au milieu de la fourchette, ce montant devrait être payé.

[19] La cour ordonnait que la pension que le père avait accumulée dans le cadre de son emploi entre le 1 er décembre 2001, date du début de la cohabitation, et le 1 er juin 2016, date de la séparation, soit partagée également entre les parties. Il leur était également ordonné de se communiquer chaque année des copies de leurs déclarations de revenus respectives. Le père était tenu de maintenir son régime d’assurance de soins médicaux et dentaires existant couvrant les enfants, tant qu’ils y seraient admissibles.

Il lui était en outre ordonné de maintenir sa police d’assurance sur sa vie désignant la mère et les enfants comme bénéficiaires aussi longtemps qu’il serait tenu de verser une prestation alimentaire au profit des enfants et de la conjointe. D’autres dispositions traitaient de la disposition de l’actif acquis pendant la période de cohabitation. Enfin, l e père était condamné aux dépens, qui étaient fixés à 5 000 $. III. Moyens d’appel [20] Le père appelant assure sa propre représentation.

La façon dont son avis d’appel, daté du 5 février 2018, est libellé ressemble plus à un mémoire dans lequel il propose des solutions de rechange à l’ordonnance rendue par la juge saisie de la requête.

Ce document de cinq pages culmine avec les moyens d’appel qui, selon moi, illustrent les principales questions qui continuent à opposer ces parents. [21] Je ne peux que reprendre le libellé des moyens d’appel, car, selon moi, il donne un aperçu de la bataille qui fait rage dans la présente instance : [TRADUCTION] GARDE 1) La [juge] a fait une interprétation erronée de la preuve sur laquelle sa décision est fondée. 2) La [juge] a omis d’accorder le poids voulu à l’évaluation relative à la parole de l’enfant. a.

Le contrat passé avec Family Plus de Saint John, au N.-B., n’a pas été honoré et l’enfant n’a donc pas pu être protégée contre la manipulation et la coercition de l’intimée. b. L’évaluation a été effectuée par une travailleuse sociale qui occupait un emploi à temps partiel auprès de Family Plus, et non par un psychologue. c. L’appelant n’a joué aucun rôle et n’a eu aucun mot à dire dans le processus et il n’a pas été consulté dans le choix de l’évaluateur. d. Les références professionnelles qui permettent à l’évaluatrice de procéder à une évaluation relative à la parole de l’enfant sont inconnues. e.

L’évaluation relative à la parole de l’enfant a été effectuée dans l’urgence quelques jours avant l’ouverture du procès de sorte qu’il a été impossible de soumettre l’évaluatrice à un contre-interrogatoire lors de l’instruction. f. L’évaluation relative à la parole de l’enfant était fondée uniquement sur une entrevue de deux heures avec l’enfant tenue à Saint John, au bureau de l’évaluatrice, et l’enfant était accompagnée de l’intimée. g.

Lors de l’évaluation relative à la parole de l’enfant, l’enfant a parlé au nom des quatre enfants au lieu de se concentrer sur celui des parents avec lequel elle aimerait vivre. h. Lors de l’évaluation, l’enfant disposait d’un texte préparé comme l’a noté l’évaluatrice. L’appelant demande que l’évaluation relative à la parole de l’enfant effectuée auprès de l’enfant [A.] soit rejetée et que la tenue d’une évaluation en matière de garde en bonne et due forme portant sur les quatre enfants soit ordonnée par la Cour d’appel, si besoin est. Au cours du processus, il a été établi que M.

Robert Huot, un psychologue expérimenté, possédait l’expertise voulue pour effectuer des évaluations en matière de garde, et les deux parties ont convenu de retenir ses services, mais les contraintes de temps étaient telles que c’est finalement une évaluation relative à la parole de l’enfant plutôt qu’une évaluation en matière de garde qui a été effectuée dans l’urgence, auprès d’un seul enfant. SOSF

3) En raison d’une erreur de fait, la [juge] a omis d’effectuer le calcul de la prestation alimentaire pour enfants en se fondant sur lesmontants de la ligne 150 des déclarations de revenus de l’intimée et de l’appelant pour l’année 2016 comme le prescrit le droit de lafamille qui doit être mis à jour en janvier 2017. PENSION 4) La [juge] a déterminé que l’intimée avait le droit de toucher une pension, mais elle a omis d’en fixer le montant. Dans une union defait, il est rare que l’un des partenaires obtienne 50 % de la pension de l’autre partenaire; la moyenne est de 25 à 40 %.

PRESTATION ALIMENTAIRE MATRIMONIALE 5) La [juge] a omis d’évaluer quel serait l’effet des revenus nets rajustés pour l’intimée et l’appelant si le versement d’une prestationalimentaire matrimoniale d’un montant situé dans le « milieu de la fourchette » était imposé.

En effet, les deux parties doivent avoir unlieu de résidence pour prendre soin des enfants; l’appelant est le seul à travailler comme la cour l’a reconnu et, si le versement d’uneprestation alimentaire matrimoniale d’un montant situé dans le « milieu de la fourchette » était imposé, cela porterait gravement atteinteau niveau de vie de l’appelant et à sa capacité de prendre soin des enfants.

Rien ne s’oppose par ailleurs à ce que l’intimée travaille àplein temps une fois que [C.] aura 12 ans en octobre 2018 et atteindra l’âge légal pour s’occuper de sa sœur et de son frère(respectivement âgés de 10 et 9 ans) pendant une heure après l’école, si nécessaire. IV. Norme de contrôle [22] Notre Cour a récemment réitéré la norme de contrôle applicable dans les affaires relevant du droit de la famille. Dans l’arrêt A.D. c.

A.D., 2018 NBCA 83, [2018] A.N.-B. no 298 (QL), la juge d’appel LaVigne écrit ce qui suit : Avant d’analyser le bien-fondé des moyens invoqués par Monsieur D., il incombe d’examiner la norme de contrôle qui s’applique. NotreCour s’est penchée à maintes reprises sur la norme de contrôle applicable dans les affaires relevant du droit de la famille; il s’agit d’unenorme exigeant une grande retenue envers la décision du juge de première instance. Un énoncé qui exprime clairement et succinctement cette norme a été formulé récemment par la juge d’appel Larlee dans l’arrêt Gillespie c.

Gillespie, 2018 NBCA 22, [2018] A.N.-B. no 77(QL), où elle affirme ce qui suit : Selon la norme de contrôle applicable dans une instance ressortissant au droit de la famille, l’intervention de notre Cour n’est justifiéeque s’il y a une erreur importante, une erreur significative dans l’interprétation de la preuve ou une erreur de droit : L.R.R. c. E.M., 2018 NBCA 2, [2018] A.N.-B. no 2 (QL); L.D.M. c. J.K.D., 2017 NBCA 47, [2017] A.N.-B. no 259 (QL); Yorke c. Yorke, 2011 NBCA 79, 378 R.N.-B. (2e) 141.

En ce qui concerne la norme de contrôle applicable aux conclusions de fait et aux ordonnances discrétionnaires, laCour ne peut infirmer une conclusion de fait du juge du procès que si celle-ci résulte d’une erreur manifeste et dominante et ne peutmodifier une ordonnance discrétionnaire que si celle-ci est fondée sur une erreur de droit, une erreur dans l’application des principes directeurs ou une erreur manifeste et dominante dans l’appréciation de la preuve : Lang c.

Lang, [2007] A.N.-B. no 348 (C.A.) (QL).L’ordonnance portée en appel est une ordonnance discrétionnaire. [par. 8] La Cour d’appel ne peut juger une affaire de nouveau. Dans l’arrêt Van de Perre c. Edwards, 2001 CSC 60, [2001] 2 R.C.S. 1014, lejuge Bastarache, qui s’exprimait au nom de la Cour suprême du Canada, explicite en quoi consiste une erreur importante qui pourraitjustifier qu’une cour d’appel réexamine la preuve : Comme l’indiquent les arrêts Gordon et Hickey, la révision en appel exige l’indication d’une erreur importante.

S’il existe uneindication que le juge de première instance n’a pas pris en considération des facteurs ou des éléments de preuve pertinents, cela peutvouloir dire qu’il n’a pas dûment apprécié tous les facteurs. Dans ce cas, la cour d’appel peut revoir la preuve produite au procès pourdéterminer si le juge a négligé d’examiner ou mal interprété des éléments pertinents de la preuve. Cela dit, je répète que des omissionsdans les motifs ne signifieront pas nécessairement que la cour d’appel a compétence pour examiner la preuve entendue au procès. Comme le dit l’arrêt Van Mol (Guardian ad Litem of) c.

Ashmore (1999), 1999 BCCA 6 , 168 D.L.R. (4th) 637 (C.A.C.-B.),autorisation d’appel refusée [2000] 1 R.C.S. vi, une omission ne constitue une erreur importante que si elle donne lieu à la convictionrationnelle que le juge de première instance doit avoir oublié, négligé d’examiner ou mal interprété la preuve de telle manière que saconclusion en a été affectée. Faute d’une telle conviction rationnelle, la cour d’appel ne peut pas réexaminer la preuve. [par. 15]

[Par. 9 et 10] [23] Il convient de réitérer qu’il faut faire preuve de retenue à l’égard de l’évaluation que le juge de premièreinstance a faite de la preuve concernant l’intérêt supérieur d’un enfant dans les affaires de garde. Cela vient du fait que le juge depremière instance est le mieux placé pour évaluer la crédibilité et la qualité de la preuve. Le juge de première instance fonde sa décisionsur cette preuve et il lui est interdit d’émettre des hypothèses ou de « combler les vides ». La Cour siégeant en révision ne le peut pas nonplus. Bien entendu, si la Cour détermine que le juge de premiè

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