2021 QCCA 20, 2021 QCCA 20

Daniel c. Ville de Mont-Saint-Hilaire 2021 QCCA 20 COURT OF APPEAL CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC REGISTRY OF MONTREAL No.: 500-09-029211-208 (750-17-003691-205) DATE: January 8, 2021 BEFORE THE HONOURABLE MARIE-FRANCE BICH, J.A. RAMZI DANIEL APPLICANT – Plaintiff v. VILLE DE MONT-SAINT-HILAIRE WSP CANADA INC. P. TALBOT INC. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF QUEBEC RESPONDENTS – Defendants and REGISTRAR OF THE REGISTRATION DIVISION OF ROUVILLE IMPLEADED PARTY – Impleaded Party JUDGMENT [ 1 ] The applicant seeks leave to appeal the judgment rendered on October 14, 2020 by the Superior Court, District of St-Hyacinthe (Mr.

Justice Louis-Paul Cullen), [1] ruling in the following manner on his various requests: [2] [128] REJETTE le pourvoi en récusation du soussigné par le demandeur, sans frais de justice; [129] REJETTE le pourvoi du demandeur en rétractation du jugement du 27 juillet 2020, avec frais de justice contre lui; [130] REJETTE la demande du demandeur de communication de documents, avec frais de justice contre lui; [131] REJETTE la demande du demandeur de suspension du dossier SAI-M-132140-0705 présentement pendant devant le Tribunal administratif du Québec, avec frais de justice contre lui; [132] REMET le présent dossier pour l’audition des demandes des parties en déclaration d’abus de la procédure et les condamnations s’y rapportant au 22 octobre 2020 à 14h, et ce, afin d’accommoder le demandeur en raison du décalage horaire entre le Québec et la Californie. * * [ 2 ] Right to appeal – Appeal as of right or with leave?

Cullen, J. was seized of and ruled on the following incidental applications: - application for recusation (art. 204 C.C.P. ); - application (1) for revocation of the judgment rendered on July 27, 2020 by the Superior Court, District of Saint-Hyacinthe (Madam Justice Johanne Brodeur), dismissing, with legal costs, his application to disqualify the law firm Sylvestre & Associés from representing respondent P.

Talbot inc. (art. 193 C.C.P. ) (the “Brodeur judgment”), and (2) to obtain documents (phone records) from a third party (this application being closely related to the previous one); - application to stay the expropriation proceedings pending before the Administrative Tribunal of Québec (“ATQ”) while awaiting the applicant’s judicial review proceeding (arts. 529 and ff. C.C.P. ) brought before the Superior Court in January 2020, seeking the nullity of said expropriation proceedings. [ 3 ] Leave to appeal is required in all three respects.

[ 4 ] As far as recusation is concerned, art. 205, para. 1 C.C.P. expressly provides that such decision “may be appealed by leave of a judge of the Court of Appeal / peut faire l’objet d’un appel sur permission d’un juge de la Cour d’appel . ” [3] [ 5 ] As far as the other applications are concerned (revocation of the Brodeur judgment, disclosure of documents, stay the proceedings before the ATQ), the Cullen judgment falls within the purview of art. 31, para. 2 C.C.P. : 31.

Le jugement de la Cour supérieure ou de la Cour du Québec rendu en cours d’instance , y compris pendant l’instruction, peut faire l’objet d’un appel de plein droit s’il rejette une objection à la preuve fondée sur le devoir de discrétion du fonctionnaire de l’État, sur le respect du secret professionnel ou sur la protection de la confidentialité d’une source journalistique. 31.

A judgment of the Superior Court or the Court of Québec rendered in the course of a proceeding , including during a trial, is appealable as of right if it disallows an objection to evidence based on the duty of discretion of public servants, on professional secrecy or on the protection of the confidentiality of a journalistic source. Il peut également faire l’objet d’un appel sur permission d’un juge de la Cour d’appel, si ce dernier estime que ce jugement décide en

partie du litige ou cause un préjudice irrémédiable à une partie, y compris s’il accueille une objection à la preuve . Such a judgment may be appealed with leave of a judge of the Court of Appeal if the judge considers that it determines part of the dispute or causes irremediable injury to a party, including if it allows an objection to evidence . Le jugement doit être porté en appel sans délai.

L’appel ne suspend pas l’instance à moins qu’un juge d’appel ne l’ordonne; cependant, si le jugement est rendu en cours d’instruction, l’appel ne suspend pas celle-ci; le jugement au fond ne peut toutefois être rendu ou, le cas échéant, la preuve concernée entendue avant la décision de la cour. The judgment must be appealed without delay. The appeal does not stay the proceeding unless a judge of the Court of Appeal so orders.

If the judgment was rendered in the course of the trial, the appeal does not stay the trial; however, judgment on the merits cannot be rendered nor, if applicable, the evidence concerned heard until the decision on the appeal is rendered. Tout autre jugement rendu en cours d’instruction, à l’exception de celui qui accueille une objection à la preuve, ne peut être mis en question que sur l’appel du jugement au fond.

Any other judgment rendered in the course of a trial, except one that allows an objection to evidence, may only be challenged on an appeal against the judgment on the merits. (Emphasis added.) [ 6 ] Pursuant to this provision (in force since January 1, 2016), the general rule, as expressed in its second paragraph, is the following: all judgments rendered “in the course of a proceeding / en cours d’instance ”, i.e. between the introduction of a lawsuit and the final judgment thereon (namely a judgment that grants or dismisses, and thus terminates, a lawsuit) are to be appealed with leave only. [4] The rule is clear and simple, and eliminates all prior byzantine distinctions between “final judgments” and “interlocutory judgments.” [ 7 ] There are a few exceptions to this rule (for instance, the exception arising out of art. 31, para. 1 C.C.P. ), none of which applies to the present case. [ 8 ] Leave is thus required, the Cullen judgment on revocation, the disclosure of documents and the stay of the expropriation proceedings having been “rendered in the course of a proceeding / rendu en cours d’instance ,” that is to say in the course of the judicial review proceeding brought by the applicant, and before final judgment on this proceeding. [ 9 ] It is true that the Cullen judgment dismissing the application for revocation of the Brodeur judgment (and the ancillary application for the disclosure of phone records) puts an end to the contestation thereof.

It nevertheless remains, in the circumstances, a judgment “rendered in the course of a proceeding” within the meaning of art. 31 C.C.P. The Brodeur judgment itself was indeed rendered in the course of the applicant’s judicial review proceeding, on an incidental application for disqualification of respondent P. Talbot inc.’s lawyer and her firm. If the applicant had wanted to appeal the Brodeur judgment, leave would have been required pursuant to art. 31, para. 2 C.C.P. The fact that the applicant, instead of seeking leave to appeal, chose to seek revocation of this judgment (arts. 345 and ff.

C.C.P. ) and now wishes to appeal the dismissal of his application for revocation does not give him a right to appeal as of right. The Cullen judgment, in this regard, ruled on an incidental application within the course of the same judicial review proceeding and is thus appealable only with leave. [ 10 ] The same conclusion also applies to that part of the Cullen judgment regarding the stay of the proceedings before the ATQ, irrespective of the applicant’s

interpretation of ss. 44, para. 2 and 44.1 of the Expropriation Act . [5] [ 11 ] In short, the judgment of Cullen, J. was in all respects rendered in the course of the applicant’s application for judicial review filed in January 2020 and it cannot be appealed without leave, according to arts. 31 and 205 C.C.P. * * [ 12 ] Conditions for leave to appeal to be granted. In Francoeur c. Francoeur , [6] the conditions for leave to be granted pursuant to art. 31, para. 2 C.C.P. were explained in the following manner: [7]

[8] La Cour s’est abondamment prononcée sur le sens de l’art. 31 C.p.c. et, en particulier, sur celui de son second alinéa. Il ressort de la jurisprudence que, aux fins d’obtenir une permission d’appeler en vertu de cette disposition, la

partie requérante doit établir que le jugement de première instance décide en

partie du litige ou lui cause un préjudice irrémédiable, ce qui est une condition de recevabilité de sa demande, sans laquelle, même erroné, le jugement ne peut faire l’objet d’un appel. Mais cette démonstration ne suffit pas : la

partie requérante doit également montrer ce en quoi le jugement est affligé, du moins en apparence, d’une erreur de nature, potentiellement, à entraîner une intervention de la Cour. Mais cela encore ne suffit pas : elle doit également démontrer que l’appel projeté sert le « meilleur intérêt de la justice » ainsi que la saine administration de celle-ci (art. 9 et 18 C.p.c. ) et qu’il concorde avec le principe de proportionnalité (art. 18 C.p.c. ).

Afin d’évaluer ces deux dernières conditions, le juge autorisateur se demandera notamment si l’affaire soulève une question méritant l’attention de la Cour et tentera aussi d'apprécier les chances de succès de l’appel envisagé puisque, bien sûr, il sera rarement dans l’intérêt de la justice d’autoriser un appel voué à l’échec.

Il tiendra compte aussi du contexte général de l’affaire, du degré d’avancement de l’instance pendante devant le tribunal de première instance, de la manière dont les parties conduisent le dossier, etc. 3 . _________ 3 Sur les règles régissant l’octroi ou le refus d’une permission d’appeler régie par le second alinéa de l’art. 31 C.p.c. , voir par ex. : 9124-7452 Québec inc. c. Racine & Chamberland inc ., 2020 QCCA 1318 (j. unique), paragr. 8 ; Heroumi c. A.D. , 2020 QCCA 1122 (j. unique), paragr. 7 ; Placements Ashton Leblond inc. c.

Lizotte , 2020 QCCA 769 (j. unique), paragr. 4 ; Succession de Belcourt , 2019 QCCA 2091 (j. unique), paragr. 13 ; Compagnie d'assurance-vie Manufacturers c. Presse Café Franchise Restaurant inc. , 2019 QCCA 1468 (j. unique), paragr. 4 ; Leclerc c. Labrie , 2018 QCCA 2248 (j. unique), paragr. 10-11 ; Mohammed c. 10219355 Canada inc. , 2018 QCCA 1281 (j. unique), paragr. 7 ; PCM Sales Canada Inc. c. Botero-Rojas , 2017 QCCA 1874 (j. unique), paragr. 8 ; Syndicat lofts Wilson c. Constructions Reliance du Canada ltée , 2017 QCCA 1082 (j. unique), notamment au paragr. 12 ; Propriétés Bullion inc. c.

Ville de Montréal , 2017 QCCA 1051 (j. unique), paragr. 4 et 6 ; Devimco Immobilier inc. c. Garage Pit Stop inc. , 2017 QCCA 1 (j. unique), paragr. 9 ; Bailey c. Brome Bird Care Inc. , 2016 QCCA 1711 (j. unique), paragr. 7 . [ 13 ] Leave to appeal pursuant to art. 205 C.C.P. is basically governed by the same rules and conditions, as per art. 31 C.C.P. , judgments on recusation being deemed to fall within the category of judgments that can cause irremediable injury (which, of course, does not ensure in and of itself that leave will be granted). [8] * * [ 14 ] Should leave be granted?

In support of his application for leave to appeal and his notice of appeal, the applicant alleges that Cullen, J. committed several errors of law, including that of not addressing the subject of recusal “prior to any ruling on the other demands that were taken under advisement on September 17, 2020.” [9] [ 15 ] Firstly, the fact that the judge ruled on the application for recusation while, in the same judgment, he subsequently ruled on the other applications is not irregular, on the contrary, and it causes no prejudice to the applicant, whose right to appeal (with leave, as prescribed by art. 205 C.C.P. ) remains intact.

There was no error of law in this regard. [ 16 ] On the merits, the applicant’s grounds of appeal on the matter of recusation, which are unsupported by any evidence and arise from misinformed inferences, are ill-founded on their face, in light of the principles set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada . [10] See also: Committee for Justice and Liberty v. National Energy Board ; [11] R. v. S. (R.D.) ; [12] Miglin v. Miglin ; [13] Yukon Francophone School Board, Education Area #23 v. Yukon (Attorney General) ; [14] Boyer c. Loto- Québec ; [15] 9108-5621 Québec inc. c.

Construction Duréco inc. ; [16] Société Radio-Canada c. Syndicat des communications de Radio- Canada (FNC-CSN) ; [17] Droit de la famille — 162288 ; [18] Wightman c. Widdrington (Succession de) . [19] [ 17 ] In addition, judges are often seized of different aspects of the same file and may rule consecutively on different incidental proceedings or applications, which, as such, does not constitute a valid ground for recusation. Art. 157 C.C.P. even allows for the same judge to be in charge of both the management of a case and the trial, which cannot per se be a cause for recusation either.

Nor is the fact, in and of itself, that a judge may render decisions that dismiss a litigant’s applications repeatedly. [20] The applicant’s grounds of appeal in that respect are entirely baseless. [ 18 ] Thirdly, the applicant’s grounds of appeal relating to the dismissal of the application for revocation of the Brodeur judgment, the disclosure of documents or the stay of the proceedings pending before the ATQ are equally untenable and do not have any reasonable chance of success. [ 19 ] The Brodeur judgment relied on the testimonies of both the applicant and the lawyer whose disqualification was sought (along with that of her firm).

This is a matter of fact and credibility, which does not fall within the purview of revocation, as defined in arts. 345 and 346 C.C.P.

Cullen, J. rightly noted that “ le pourvoi en rétractation d’un jugement ne constitue pas un appel de ce dernier. ” If the applicant was unsatisfied with the Brodeur judgment, he should have sought leave to appeal, revocation not being open to him in the circumstances. [ 20 ] Incidentally, as to the phone records that he sought to obtain and that could have supposedly reinforced his allegations against the lawyer and her firm, his application for revocation did not fulfil the requirements of art. 345, para. 2(4) C.C.P.

In that respect, Cullen, J. wrote that: [109] Le demandeur n’a pas démontré qu’il a agi avec toute la diligence raisonnable en temps utile pour demander les relevés téléphoniques additionnels qu’il recherche a posteriori malgré le fait qu’il ait jugé pertinent de présenter à l’audition ses propres relevés téléphoniques. [ 21 ] There is no error in that comment, which reflects the applicable law, as interpreted in a long line of cases. [21] In and of itself, this lack of diligence was sufficient to dismiss both the application for disclosure of documents and the application for revocation.

Art. 345, para. 2(4) C.C.P. does not allow a party to try to enhance ex post facto the evidence that he should have led in due course, i.e. during the

original hearing (in the present case, during the hearing before Brodeur, J.). [ 22 ] On the matter of the stay of the proceedings before the ATQ, and despite art. 530, para. 2 C.P.P. , considering that said proceedings have been pending for 13 years and that the applicant de facto succeeded in securing the postponement of the hearing scheduled before that tribunal last October, the judgment does not cause him any “injury” within the meaning of art. 31 C.C.P. [ 23 ] Finally, and most importantly, granting leave to appeal the Cullen judgment in any of its aspects would infringe upon the principle of proportionality.

The applicant introduced his judicial review proceeding on January 15, 2020 and has since become mired in a series of incidental applications (such as the applications presented to Cullen, J.), that have actually hindered the progress of his lawsuit. [22] Granting leave to appeal would simply delay the process further and does not serve the best interests of justice.

Justice delayed is often justice denied for all concerned, and, to paraphrase what Vallerand, J. famously wrote in another context: in the realm of justice, there is no room for guerilla warfare and the sooner a case is heard on the merits the better. [23] FOR THE ABOVE-MENTIONED REASONS, THE UNDERSIGNED: [ 24 ] DISMISSES the application for leave to appeal, with legal costs. MARIE-FRANCE BICH, J.A. Mr.

Ramzi Daniel (By conference call) Unrepresented Mtre Steve Cadrin Mtre Caroline Charron (By videoconference) DHC AVOCATS INC Mtre Jean-Pierre Baldassare (By conference call) BELANGER, SAUVÉ For Respondent, Ville de Mont-Saint-Hilaire Mtre Émilie St-Pierre (By videoconference) WOODS For Respondent, WSP Canada inc. Mtre Jean-Pierre Boileau (By videoconference) SYLVESTRE & ASSOCIÉS For Respondent, P. Talbot inc. Mtre Myriam Lahmidi (By videoconference) MINISTÈRE DE LA JUSTICE (DGAJ) For Respondent, Attorney General of Quebec Date of hearing: December 15, 2020