2012 QCCA 21, 2012 QCCA 21

Unofficial English Translation Droit de la famille — 1222 2012 QCCA 21 COURT OF APPEAL CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC REGISTRY OF QUEBEC No. 200-09-007441-113 (235-04-000019-111) DATE: January 12, 2012 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE MARIE-FRANCE BICH, J.A. JEAN BOUCHARD, J.A. RICHARD WAGNER, J.A. T. V. APPELLANT – plaintiff v. M. B.

RESPONDENT – defendant and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF QUEBEC IMPLEADED PARTY – impleaded party JUDGMENT [ 1 ] THE COURT; Ruling on the appeal from a judgment rendered on May 19, 2011, by the Superior Court, District of Frontenac (the Honourable Madam Justice Johanne April), which dismissed the appellant's action to have the parties' two children returned to California under the Act respecting the civil aspects of international and interprovincial child abduction ; [1] [ 2 ] For the reasons of Bouchard J.A., with which Bich and Wagner JJ.A. agree; [ 3 ] ALLOWS the appeal; [ 4 ] QUASHES the trial judgment;

[ 5 ] ORDERS the return of the parties' children, X and Y, to California, in the United States, no later than January 30, 2012, or at any other date agreed between the parties; [ 6 ] ORDERS that the children's travel expenses and, as the case may be, those of the appellant, be defrayed by the latter; [ 7 ] ORDERS the respondent to immediately hand over the children's passports to the appellant's attorney; [ 8 ] ORDERS the respondent not to intervene in or otherwise interfere with the process of returning the children to their place of residence in California; [ 9 ] ORDERS that the children remain with the respondent until the arrangements for their return are finalized with the competent public authorities; [ 10 ] ORDERS the respondent not to leave the Town A area in the children's company until their departure for California; [ 11 ] AUTHORIZES the appellant to obtain from the competent public authorities the authorizations necessary for the children's return to California, without the involvement of the respondent; [ 12 ] ORDERS all police authorities with jurisdiction in Canada to take all available means to allow this judgment to be enforced; [ 13 ] ORDERS the provisional execution of this judgment notwithstanding appeal; [ 14 ] The whole without costs. (

s) MARIE-FRANCE BICH, J.A. (

s) JEAN BOUCHARD, J.A. (

s) RICHARD WAGNER, J.A. Mtre. Anke Beese For the appellant

Mtre. Michel Tétrault Collard, Boucher For the respondent Mtre. Marie-Andrée Garneau Chamberland, Gagnon For the impleaded party Date of hearing: November 9, 2011 REASONS OF BOUCHARD, J.A. [ 15 ] The present appeal bears on the application of the Act respecting the civil aspects of international and interprovincial child abduction . The appellant, a U.S. citizen and father of two children, seeks the children's return to the United States after they were brought to Québec by their mother, the respondent, to live here permanently. The facts [ 16 ] The parties lived together for ten years.

Two children were born of their union: X, born on [...], 2001, and Y, born on [...], 2005. The children have a rare disease, phenylketonuria, which requires close medical attention and a very strict diet. [ 17 ] The children have dual citizenship, which is not the case of the parties. The appellant is American and the respondent is Canadian. It should be noted that the respondent has no legal status in the United States. In all the years she lived in that country with the appellant, she never regularized her situation, or made it official, with the U.S. immigration authorities.

She even continued to collect her Québec family allowances by maintaining an address there. The appellant cannot circulate freely in Canada, because he has a criminal record. [2] [ 18 ] The parties had been going through some relationship issues for a while when, in the spring of 2010, the appellant met a woman with whom he quickly became infatuated. On June 3, 2010, he admitted to the respondent that he was having an extramarital affair with this person.

From that point on, the evidence is highly contradictory. [ 19 ] According to the appellant's version, he asked the respondent to think about their situation and leave as planned with the children to spend the summer in Québec. The plane tickets had already been bought and the departure date was scheduled for June 22, 2010. According to the respondent's version, the appellant asked her insistently to leave with the children for good. In short, he threw her out. [ 20 ] The day before the respondent's departure, the appellant's new spouse went to the parties' home and taunted the respondent.

In fact, she moved into the family home the very next day, the date on which the respondent left with the children. [ 21 ] A week after she arrived in Québec, the respondent phoned the appellant's mother. She told her that she would not be going back to California and that she intended to settle in Town A with her children. The appellant was informed of the situation by his mother. This was in early July of 2010. [ 22 ] In the month of August, the appellant took steps with the U.S. and Canadian authorities to be allowed to enter Canada despite his

criminal record. It is a long, complicated process that can take several months. [ 23 ] Also in August, the respondent instituted legal proceedings in Québec, District of Frontenac, in order to obtain custody of the children. The appellant refused to receive the proceedings which were sent to him in California by priority post and subsequently served on him by fax.

On September 22 and 23, 2010, the attorney he consulted sent the respondent a formal demand letter calling for the immediate return of the children, pursuant to the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction signed at The Hague on 25 October 1980 . [ 24 ] On October 20, 2010, a final judgment of the Superior Court awarded custody of the children to the respondent. On December 13, 2010, the appellant instituted proceedings in California to obtain custody of the children.

Then, on March 29, 2011, he instituted an action in Québec to obtain the children's return under the Hague Convention and the Act respecting the civil aspects of international and interprovincial child abduction (hereinafter, the Act). The Act [ 25 ] The

preamble states the following: WHEREAS the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction signed at The Hague on 25 October 1980 aims to protect children internationally from the harmful effects of their wrongful removal or retention; Whereas the Convention establishes procedures to ensure the prompt return of children to the State of their habitual residence and to secure protection for rights of access; Whereas Québec subscribes to the principles and rules set forth in the Convention and it is expedient to apply them to the largest possible number of cases; [ 26 ]

Section 1, which draws on

Article 1 of the Convention, sets forth the purpose of the Act: 1. The object of this Act is to secure the prompt return to the place of their habitual residence of children removed to or retained in Québec or a designated State, as the case may be, in breach of custody rights . A further object of this Act is to ensure that the rights of custody and access under the law of a designated State are effectively respected in Québec and the rights of custody and access under the law of Québec are effectively respected in a designated State . [ 27 ] Sections 3 and 4 of the Act define cases of wrongful retention: 3.

The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful, within the meaning of this Act, where it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to one or several persons or bodies under the law of Québec or of the designated State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention and where, at the time of removal or retention, those rights were actually exercised by one or several persons or bodies or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention .

The rights of custody mentioned in the first paragraph may arise in particular by operation of law, or by reason of a judicial or administrative decision, or by reason of an agreement having legal effect under the law of Québec or of the designated State . 4. In addition to the cases contemplated in

section 3, the removal or the retention of a child is considered wrongful if it occurs when

proceedings for determining or modifying the rights of custody have been introduced in Québec or in the designated State where the child was habitually resident and the removal or retention might prevent the execution of the decision to be rendered . [ 28 ]

Section 5 of the Act sets out the scope of the Act, namely, children under 16 years of age, which is the case here. [ 29 ] According to the first paragraph of

section 18: " In order to obtain the forced return of a child, the Minister of Justice or the person claiming that there has been a breach of custody rights shall make an application by way of a motion to the Superior Court of the place where the child is or of another appropriate place according to the circumstances". [ 30 ]

Section 20 of the Act, which is the equivalent of

Article 12 of the Convention, provides for the prompt return of the child: 20. Where a child who is in Québec has been wrongfully removed or retained and where, at the time of commencement of the proceedings before the Superior Court, a period of less than one year has elapsed from the date of the removal or retention, the Superior Court shall order the return of the child forthwith .

The Superior Court, even where the proceedings have been commenced after the expiration of the period of one year, shall also order the return of the child, unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in his or her new environment . [ 31 ] Sections 21 and 22 of the Act, which essentially reiterate articles 13 and 20 of the Convention, stipulate the exceptions to the child's prompt return: 21.

The Superior Court may refuse to order the return of the child if the person who opposes his or her return establishes that (1) the person having the care of the person of the child was not actually exercising the custody rights at the time of removal or retention, or had consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention; or (2) there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation . 22 .

The Superior Court may also refuse to order the return of the child if (1) it finds that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of his or her views ; (2) the return is contrary to the human rights and freedoms recognized in Québec . [ 32 ]

Section 25 of the Act, which incorporates

Article 16 of the Convention, states: 25. The Superior Court, after having been notified that a child has been wrongfully removed or retained in Québec, shall not decide on the custody of the child if the conditions set out in this Act for the return of the child may be fulfilled or if an application for his or her return may be made within a reasonable time . [ 33 ] Lastly,

section 26 of the Act, based on

Article 17 of the Convention, stipulates:

26 . The sole fact that a decision relating to custody has been given in or is entitled to recognition in Québec shall not be a ground for refusing to order the return of a child, but the Superior Court may take account of the reasons for that decision which are relevant to the application of this Act .

The trial judgment [ 34 ] The trial judge affirmed that she had [TRANSLATION] "no doubt that California was the place of residence of the children before their removal: they lived there with both their parents, and engaged in their sports activities, attended school and received medical care ". [ 35 ] The judge found X to be mature enough for her opinion to be taken into account.

X told the judge of her concerns [TRANSLATION] "should there be any carelessness regarding the diet she must follow", because her father would not be very present. [ 36 ] On the basis of these concerns, among other things, the judge found that this was one exception under the Act that prevented the children's prompt return—a grave risk of physical or psychological harm, pursuant to section 21(2) of the Act. [ 37 ] Similarly, there was no doubt in the judge's mind that the appellant gave [TRANSLATION] "clear, real and unequivocal consent to the mother's departure for Québec with the children", thereby constituting a second exception, set forth in section 21(1) of the Act, on which to base the refusal to order the children's return. [ 38 ] Lastly, although she knew that one of the important objectives of the Act is to ensure that the final decision on custody is made by the authorities in the place of the child's habitual residence before his or her removal, the judge believed that the notion of "interest of the child", in regard to the application of the Act, should nonetheless be broadened. [ 39 ] Since this last comment of the judge refers to the general scheme of the Act, this is where I will begin my analysis of the trial judgment, thereby establishing at the outset the context of the exceptions to a child's return provided for in the Act and invoked by the respondent to oppose the children's return to California.

Analysis Interest of the child [ 40 ] With respect for the trial judge, she committed an error by bringing the notion of "interest of the child" in a broad sense [3] into the Act. In so doing, she gave an overbroad scope to the exceptions in the Act, whereas they must be applied narrowly. [ 41 ]

Section 1 of the Act stipulates that "the object of this Act is to secure the prompt return to the place of their habitual residence of children removed to or retained in Québec or a designated State, as the case may be, in breach of custody rights". The Act's starting assumption is that it is the court in the children's habitual place of residence that is in the best position to rule on the terms of custody that are in the children's best interest.

Consequently, the notion of "interest of the child" cannot have the same scope as that which is applied daily by Québec courts in cases involving no foreign elements at all. [ 42 ] The Court, per Chamberland J., acknowledged that, from the standpoint of the Act, the notion of "interest of the child" had to be more limited in scope than that which was generally accepted: [4] [TRANSLATION] In that regard, I note that the interest of the removed child, in the broad sense of this concept that we are quite familiar with in Québec in matters concerning children, is not stated explicitly in the Convention or the Act as a criterion for precluding the objective of the prompt return of the child to the place of his or her habitual residence.

Within the meaning of the Convention or the Act, the interest of the

removed child is examined from the standpoint—which are undoubtedly narrower—of the few exceptions described therein.

The interest of the child, in the broader sense of that notion, will be taken into account when the judicial authorities of the State of the child's habitual residence rule on custody and access rights, which the Convention does not seek to settle at all. [ 43 ] In another recent case, here is what the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom had to say on the subject: [5] The first object of the Convention is to deter either parent (or indeed anyone else) from taking the law into their own hands and pre- empting the result of any dispute between them about the future upbringing of their children.

If an abduction does take place, the next object is to restore the children as soon as possible to their home country, so that any dispute can be determined there. The left-behind parent should not be put to the trouble and expense of coming to the requested state in order for factual disputes lo be resolved there. The abducting parent should not gain an unfair advantage by having that dispute determined in the place to which she has come. . . . [ 44 ] Thus, the notion of "interest of the child" takes on specific meaning when the Act is to be applied.

As mentioned, the best interest of the child coincides with the child's return to his or her habitual place of residence, unless one of the exceptions comes into play. Hence, it is this narrower scope that must be ascribed to the notion of "interest of the child" when applying the Act. [ 45 ] In addition, effective application of the Hague Convention depends on the close and necessary cooperation between the signatory States. By signing the Convention, Québec recognizes that the State where the child has his or her habitual residence is in the best position to determine custody rights.

Also, when the judge said she favoured a broadening of the notion of "interest of the child", she clearly ran afoul of the Act's raison d'être, which necessarily had the effect of tainting her reasoning, particularly when she applied the grave-risk exception in section 21(2). A closer look is warranted. Grave risk [ 46 ] The trial judge mentioned that she was concerned about the children’s health issues and the medical attention exercised by the father if the children were with him, particularly as regards meal preparation.

The judge went on to say: [TRANSLATION] [59] When she met with me, X said that her father was not very present. If today she is a healthy young girl, it is because the mother has given her the best care since birth and the same is true of Y. [60] But there is more.

Although she did not express a clear preference for one living environment over another, X said in her testimony that, for her and her sister, the situation was unequivocal: they were in Québec to stay and could go to California for vacation. [61] Upsetting the fragile equilibrium of these children—acquired, not without difficulty, since June 2010—is, for the Court, a sufficiently serious psychological danger to consider that the situation gives rise to the exceptions provided by law and not order their return to the United States. [ 47 ] In my view, the judge committed an error in concluding that the children would be exposed to a grave risk if their return to California were ordered. [ 48 ] First, the judge's concerns about the children's diet were exaggerated, given that the respondent was willing to let the applicant have custody of the children for the summer, as indicated in an email from the respondent to the appellant, dated October 22, 2010: What I desire is to have the children here, with me, in Québec.

You will have the summer with them, vacations and other holidays , without creating problems for the school routine, which means quality time with them. You can come here, they can go there, and we can all get together and do things, as parents with harmony and respect for each other. Those are good times with them, and it is a good compromise since you are working so much. I am trying to make it the best for all. [Emphasis added.]

[ 49 ] This is an all or nothing situation. Either the appellant is able to ensure that the children receive medical care and follow their diet, or he is not. If the respondent was willing to leave the children with him for the summer, it must be concluded that she is not worried when they are with their father. Accordingly, I do not see how the judge could affirm that she was worried, when the children's own mother is not. [ 50 ] The trial judge met with X, the elder of the parties' daughters. She wrote that X was [TRANSLATION] "very stable" and "very much in control of her emotions".

Later on, however, she wrote that the children's return to California would upset their "fragile" equilibrium. She cannot have it both ways. Either X is a very stable girl, or her equilibrium is fragile. One thing is certain, however. The application of the exception in section 21(2) of the Act, in respect of the children's return, cannot be based on such tentative factual findings. [ 51 ] There is necessarily a risk of psychological harm in ordering the children's return to the State of their habitual residence.

However, the risk, linked to a new change in their living conditions, is common to most, if not all, of the children contemplated by the Act. Accordingly, this risk cannot characterize the state of danger or the intolerable situation contemplated by the exception. As the Attorney General submits, considering the return itself to be a grave risk would lead to an excessively liberal application of the exception, with the likely consequence that the Act would be rendered without effect. [ 52 ] That argument has in fact been dismissed many times by the courts.

For example, in Droit de la famille – 2454 , [6] the removing parent invoked the following: [TRANSLATION] . . .

The appellant persists in claiming that the children's return to California would expose them to "grave harm", "certain psychological upset" and a "situation that would be intolerable, to say the least, in the short and medium term". . . . [ 53 ] Chamberland J. responded that the risk was not sufficient for the grave-risk exception to apply: [7] [TRANSLATION] Lastly, I note that several of the difficulties invoked by the appellant in discussing the shock awaiting the children on their return to California stem from the very fact that they were wrongfully removed to Canada on January 18, 1996.

The appellant likely did not act as she did to do wrong but, to the contrary, according to her perception of things, to protect the best interest of the children. Nevertheless, she took justice into her own hands, in flagrant violation of the custody rights she and her husband exercised together. She created a situation in which a return to California after several months in Québec would certainly upset the children, to an extent that is difficult to assess, however, and that will greatly depend on the parties' very attitude. [ 54 ] In the landmark ruling Friedrich v. Friedrich , [8] Boggs J., for the U.S.

Court of Appeal, 6th Circuit, also dismissed that argument. He explained that the removing parent cannot invoke that the new removal caused by the order of return will bring suffering to the child, as it is that same parent who created the situation in which the child was placed: [9] Mrs. F. alleges that she proved by clear and convincing evidence in the proceedings below that the return of T. to Germany would cause him grave psychological harm. Mrs. F. testified the T. has grown attached to family and friends in Ohio.

She also hired an expert psychologist who testified that returning T. to Germany would be traumatic and difficult for the child, who was currently happy and healthy in America with his mother. . . . If we are to take the international obligations of American courts with any degree of seriousness, the exception to the Hague Convention for grave harm to the child requires far more that the evidence that Mrs. F. provides. Mrs. F. alleges nothing more than adjustment problems that would attend the relocation of most children. . . .

Mrs F. advocates a wide

interpretation of the grave risk of harm exception that would reward her for violating the Convention. A removing parent must not be allowed to abduct a child and then – when brought to court – complain that the child has grown used to the surroundings to which they were abducted. Under the logic of the Convention, it is the abduction that causes the pangs of subsequent return.

The disruption of the usual sense of attachment that arises during most long stays in a single place with a single parent should not be a "grave" risk of harm for the purposes of the Convention. [ sic ] [ 55 ] There is another reason why the trial judge could not decide that the risk of psychological harm related to the planned change in the children's living conditions further to their return to California constituted the intolerable situation referred to in section 21(2) of the Act. To wit, that provision must be interpreted consistently with the Act as a whole. As it happens,

section 20 of the Act provides for a separate exception aimed specifically at sparing a child who has integrated into his or her new living environment the stress related to the return. For the sake of convenience, I've reproduced

section 20 again: 20. Where a child who is in Québec has been wrongfully removed or retained and where, at the time of commencement of the proceedings before the Superior Court, a period of less than one year has elapsed from the date of the removal or retention, the Superior Court shall order the return of the child forthwith . The Superior Court, even where the proceedings have been commenced after the expiration of the period of one year, shall also order the return of the child, unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in his or her new environment . [Emphasis added.] [ 56 ] A consistent

interpretation of sections 20 and 21(2) of the Act supposes that the risk relative to the children's new change of State does not constitute the grave risk provided for in section 21(2) of the Act—an

interpretation accepted by the High Court of New Zealand in C. v. C. : [10] If the purpose of the Hague Convention are not to be wholly eroded, it is necessary to recognize that the situation in which children who have been removed wrongfully find themselves will almost inevitably cause stress to them. Often that stress may be substantial and may have psychological effects. For that reason the standard set by the convention and the

section is high and is stringently tested (see Re F W (minor: abduction: rights of custody abroad) [1995] 3 All ER 641 ; A v. W. [1994] NZFLR 132; D. v. D. [1993] NZFLR 548; M. v. M. [1995] NZFLR 225). Such an approach is also prompted by the distinct grounds provided by s.13(1)(

a) which provides that the fact that a chiId is settled in his or her new environment is not itself sufficient grounds where application for an order for return is made within a year of the removal of the child (as is the case here) . Where children are settled, it seems to me that stress attendant upon the dislocation which results from an order for return is almost inevitable. [ sic ] [Emphasis added.] [ 57 ] Thus, the trial judge confused the two exceptions when, in paragraphs 60 and 61 of her judgment, [11] she took into consideration that the children's fragile equilibrium would be upset by their return to California. In addition, the second paragraph of

section 20 does not apply in this case, because more than a year did not elapse between the children's removal and the institution of the appellant's action before the Superior Court. [ 58 ] For all these reasons, it appears to me that the trial judge, in deciding that the children would be exposed to a grave risk, committed an error reviewable by this court. [ 59 ] I will now examine the second exception in the Act accepted by the judge, namely, the appellant's consent to the permanent

removal of the children to Québec. Appellant's consent [ 60 ] The circumstances surrounding the respondent's departure with the parties' children on June 22, 2010, are unclear. The trial judge had to decide between two, diametrically opposed versions of the facts, and she accepted the respondent's version.

Since her conclusion is based on her assessment of the evidence, the Court can, in principle, intervene only if a palpable and overriding error was committed. [ 61 ] I say "in principle", because this case involves the application of an exception to the Act, which, as such and like any other exception, must be interpreted narrowly. The deference normally owed to the trial judge must be tempered accordingly. [ 62 ] The Act, in this respect, does not define the notion of consent.

However, both case law and scholarly commentary recognize that consent must not only be free and informed, but must also be given clearly, positively and unequivocally. [12] [ 63 ] In my opinion, the judge could not conclude that the appellant consented, even implicitly, to the permanent removal of the children. The relevant facts are reiterated below. [ 64 ] The respondent has no legal status in the United States. She worked for the appellant's business. In June of 2010, the appellant admitted to her that he had a mistress. He asked the respondent to leave.

Admittedly, it had already been planned that she would spend the summer in Québec with the children, but that in no way alters the fact that the appellant hardly gave her the choice. Indeed, his new spouse moved in the same day the respondent left the family residence with her two daughters. [ 65 ] The least that can be said is the appellant conducted himself in an odious, vile manner towards the respondent. But does that mean that he agreed to the respondent's leaving with the children forever? I do not believe so.

Here again, it is necessary to review the facts. [ 66 ] One week after she arrived in Québec, the respondent contacted the appellant's mother, informing her of her intention to settle permanently in Québec with the children. Informed of the situation, the appellant undertook steps with the Canadian authorities the very next month to be able to enter Canada despite his criminal record. [ 67 ] In September, he contacted an attorney, who sent the respondent a formal demand letter in which he sought the application of the Hague Convention.

This formal demand letter was in response to proceedings instituted by the respondent in the District of Frontenac seeking custody of the children. In October, the parties also discussed their situation. [ 68 ] In December, the appellant in turn instituted proceedings in California to obtain custody of his children.

Finally, with his difficulties entering Canada in the process of being resolved, the appellant instituted in March 2011 the action that is the backdrop for the present appeal and by which the appellant asked that his children be returned to California. [ 69 ] In my opinion, the trial judge neglected to consider the factual narrative as a whole, which could not help but impact her conclusion that the appellant consented to the permanent removal of the children. [ 70 ] As we have just seen, and contrary to what the judge wrote, the appellant never stopped being interested in his children's fate.

With the means at his disposal (I reiterate that the appellant could not enter Canada because of his criminal record), he was proactive whenever appropriate and he tried to regain custody. That is not the conduct of a parent who supposedly gave his consent. [13] [ 71 ] Yes, the appellant clearly told the respondent that he was breaking up with her. Nor is there any doubt that his conduct toward the respondent was odious. However, his conduct does not show that, on June 22, 2010, he consented to the permanent removal of the children. Rather, the evidence shows that the respondent left because she had no choice.

Once in Québec, however, she decided to keep the children and transform the trip into wrongful retention.

[ 72 ] In closing, I can do no better than to repeat the remarks of Chamberland J. in Droit de la famille – 2454 , [14] which apply to our case and reflect the delicate nature of a situation in which the children's return is ordered after a long time: [TRANSLATION] The decision to return the children to California is not an easy one, especially since it has been nine months since their wrongful removal; in my opinion, though, it is the only option.

The Convention was ratified by the international community, led by Canada, because our political leaders saw it as the best means of countering the scourge that is the wrongful removal and retention of children. The exceptions to the principle of the prompt return of children to the place of their habitual residence are deliberately few in number and must be interpreted narrowly.

Otherwise, as pointed out by Professor Pérez-Vera, the Convention would quickly become useless and we would all, children and adults alike, go back to square one, which is not desirable. [ 73 ] For these reasons, I propose to allow the appeal, order the children's return to California no later than January 30, 2012, or at any other date agreed between the parties, to entrust the children to the appellant, the whole without costs, the children's travel expenses and, as the case may be, those of the appellant, to be borne by the latter since his financial means exceed the respondent's. (

s) JEAN BOUCHARD, J.A. [5] RE E (Children) (FC) , [2011] UKSC 27 at para. 8. [11] Supra at 9. [13] Nigel Lowe, supra note 11 at 319; S. S.-C. v. G.C. , August 15, 2003, 500-04-003270-035 (Sup. Ct.) at para.75.