R. v. Theroux, 2020 BCPC 249

Citation: R. v. Theroux 2020 BCPC 249 Date: 20201026 File No: 49310-1 Registry: Prince George IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA REGINA v. JASON DEAN THEROUX ORAL REASONS FOR SENTENCE OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE C. MALFAIR Counsel for the Crown: R. Withall Counsel for the Defendant: D. Jenkins, Sr., Q.C. Place of Hearing: Prince George , B.C.

Dates of Hearing: July 9, 2019, January 13, 14, February 7, 2020 Date of Judgment: October 26, 2020 [ 1 ] THE COURT: These are my reasons for sentence in the matter of Mr. Theroux. After trial, I convicted Mr.

Theroux of storing a firearm contrary to regulation contrary to s. 86(2); of possession of brass knuckles for a dangerous purpose contrary to s. 88(1); of possession of a restricted firearm knowing it was unauthorized contrary to s. 92(1); of possessing a prohibited weapon, to wit, brass knuckles, knowing it was unauthorized contrary to s. 92(2); occupying a motor vehicle knowing there was a restricted firearm contrary to s. 94(1); and possession of a unloaded restricted firearm together with readily accessible ammunition contrary to s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code . [ 2 ] The facts may be summarized as follows.

On August 26, 2018, Mr. Theroux was pulled over by police for having an illegal light bar on the truck he was driving as well as to confirm his licencing as he was driving someone else's vehicle. The officers who pulled over Mr. Theroux noticed he had hard-knuckled gloves and a child's sized baseball bat on his centre console within easy reach which raised concerns. They asked him about the items and his answers gave the officers further concern for their safety so they asked Mr.

Theroux to step out of the vehicle. [ 3 ] Upon opening the door to step out, the officers observed a set of brass knuckles in plain view sitting in a pocket on a driver's side door within immediate reach of the driver. Mr. Theroux was arrested for possession of a weapon and his vehicle was searched incidental to that arrest. Under the rear driver's side passenger seat, police found a satchel which contained a tablet I found to be associated to Mr. Theroux as well as an unloaded unsecured .40 calibre handgun.

The satchel also contained .40 calibre ammunition capable of being discharged from that firearm. [ 4 ] The firearm turned out to be stolen, having been taken during a break and enter of a residence months earlier. However, Mr. Theroux was found not guilty of possessing the firearm knowing it was stolen. Mr. Theroux gave a statement to police in which he implied he may have been holding onto the gun at the behest of others. Circumstances of the Offender [ 5 ] Mr. Theroux is 51-years-old and works as a carpenter and a truck driver.

Reference letters from two of his employers were adduced in evidence attesting to his character as a reliable hard worker. The PSR prepared on his behalf reports he had a normal childhood and two long-term intimate relationships. He has the support of his parents and siblings. He has two adult children. He has no mental health issues. [ 6 ] Mr. Theroux abused alcohol in his early 20s, but was able to overcome his addiction following residential treatment. In 2008, he suffered a shoulder injury which led to an addiction to painkillers and eventually heroin.

He attributed the breakdown of his two prior relationships to heroin addiction. Mr. Theroux was able to succeed on the methadone program and still participates in the program. Mr. Theroux says he has not abused any substances since his arrest for these matters in 2018. Mr. Theroux and his family members attribute his conduct to associating with criminal peers. Mr. Theroux claims he has severed those ties since his arrest and has moved to Enderby to physically distance himself from Prince George where those individuals operate. Mr. Theroux has a dated unrelated criminal conviction for mischief from 1990.

He therefore comes before the court with virtually no criminal record. [ 7 ] The Crown seeks a 40-month custodial sentence while Mr. Theroux seeks a conditional sentence order. Principles of Sentencing [ 8 ] The principles of sentencing are set out in s. 718 of the Criminal Code : The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives: (

a) to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct; (

b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences; (

c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary; (

d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders; (

e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and (

f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims or to the community. [ 9 ] Pursuant to s. 718.1 of the Code : A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. [ 10 ] A sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating and mitigating factors, s. 718.2(a). The parity principles espoused in s. 718.2(

b) provides that a sentence should be similar to that imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances. The principle of judicial restraint is codified in s. 718.2(d). The principles of sentencing which ought to be emphasized for a crime of this nature are denunciation and deterrence, R. v. Sellars , 2018 BCCA 195 . [ 11 ] While it was not raised with the author of the PSR, in submissions Mr. Theroux raised that he was

part Cree, maybe one-third. He was raised in a predominately non-Indigenous household. The Supreme Court in Ipeelee and Gladue has directed sentencing judges to consider the unique circumstances of Aboriginal offenders and how the legacy of racism, colonialism, displacement, and residential

schools has led to higher incarceration rates for Indigenous people in this country. Mr. Theroux admits he was raised in a non-Indigenous household and little evidence was adduced as to his cultural heritage, how he has been alienated from his heritage, and how that alienation has negatively impacted him. [ 12 ] Mr. Theroux reports a positive childhood and functional family environment and good work history. His substance abuse was initially the product of being immature with too much money which led to excessive partying and, later on, a persistent injury that led to a painkiller addiction.

He does not suffer from any trauma or personal circumstances often endured by Indigenous offenders which can contribute to substance abuse and related offending. There is no evidence that the offence for which he is being sentenced today relates to substance abuse or a constellation of disadvantaged personal factors often suffered by Indigenous offenders. [ 13 ] Notwithstanding, it is not necessary for Mr. Theroux to establish a direct causal connection between his Indigenous identity and his offending.

I have considered his Indigenous background in determining an appropriate sentence, but am not persuaded that that ground operates in these circumstances to substantially reduce his moral culpability. [ 14 ] Mr. Theroux told the author of the PSR that the reason the gun was in his car was because he wanted it out of the house and, as a favour, was taking it to a friend of the original owner, none of whom he identifies.

He claims the brass knuckles belonged to his girlfriend who was the registered owner of the truck and he was not aware they were there, despite being in plain view. [ 15 ] The offence which attracts the most severe sanction in this is the conviction under s. 95 for possession of a handgun together with readily accessible ammunition. In the seminal case of Nur , the Supreme Court struck down the mandatory minimum three-year sentence on the basis of a reasonable hypothetical involving possession by a person otherwise licenced to possess firearms who runs technically afoul of s. 95.

Cases dealing with sentencing for s. 95 offences have therefore distinguished between individuals whose illegal firearms possession is due to regulatory type of infractions versus individuals who possess firearms for a "true crime purpose." The latter invites a lengthy federal sentence. [ 16 ] In all of the circumstances, I have no doubt the gun was possessed for a true crime purpose. While Mr. Theroux argues there was no overt evidence of criminality associated with the gun possession, a true crime purpose can be inferred from all of the evidence.

The gun could not have been legitimately purchased from a bona fide gun dealer because it was stolen. Mr. Theroux was not licenced to possess a handgun. The firearm was not stored or transported safely in a manner consistent with possession for an innocent or lawful purpose such as by being secured with a trigger lock or being kept in a locked receptacle or stored separately from the ammunition. Other prohibited weapons, the brass knuckles, were being transported in the same vehicle at the same time. Mr.

Theroux told the author of the PSR that the gun was not his, he was holding onto it for someone else, and other statements in the PSR point to that person being someone Mr. Theroux knew to be engaged in negative or criminal conduct. [ 17 ] In R. v. Kachuol , 2017 BCCA 292 , the offender possessed a loaded illegal handgun in the centre console of his vehicle with no explanation. The sentencing judge declined to infer he possessed the gun for a truly criminal purpose on the basis that the Crown had failed to adduce other contextual evidence of criminality to support the inference.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge had erred in mischaracterizing the offender's conduct as something less than truly criminal, saying at paragraph 28: There was nothing in the evidence to indicate that Mr. Kachuol’s possession of the loaded, prohibited “crime gun” was for anything other than a criminal purpose. Nor did he even suggest it. There was simply no possible benign reason for his unlawful possession of the loaded gun apparent on the evidence.

In such circumstances, proof of a direct connection with other criminal activity was unnecessary to situate the offence at the “true crime” end of the s. 95(1) spectrum. In my view, requiring such proof would tend to defeat the purpose of the provision . [ 18 ] There is no evidence Mr. Theroux is a collector, tinkerer, farmer, trapper, veteran, a formerly licenced handgun owner, or otherwise in a position where the court may infer he had an innocent purpose for possessing the handgun and ammunition in his truck. The only explanation the court has for possession of a firearm that Mr.

Theroux was holding onto it as a favour for an unnamed individual who it is implied is a criminal, and therefore falls in the true crime spectrum. [ 19 ] In support of a conditional sentence, Mr. Theroux relies on R. v. Sears , 2016 BCSC 965 ; R. v. Haus , 2016 BCPC 11 ; R. v. Abma , 2019 BCPC 268 ; and R. v. Sellars . The facts in those cases are mainly distinguishable on the grounds of possession for a true crime versus non-criminal purpose. In none of the cases were the firearms found in a vehicle. [ 20 ] In Sears , the accused was licenced to possess handguns.

He had purchased the handgun legally and had originally had a registration certificate for it, but the certificate had lapsed. His guns were removed due to threats he had made while intoxicated to kill himself. The trial judge found as fact the case was distinguishable from cases involving true crime or outlaw conduct. I also note that the sentencing judge found a 25-month jail sentence was appropriate and imposed a 19-month CSO after giving credit for six months' jail time served. Given jail and a CSO cannot both be imposed on the same count, it was unclear how the sentence was allocated. In this case, Mr.

Theroux does not have the benefit of remand time. [ 21 ] In Haus , the sentencing judge found as a fact the accused was a pillar of the community who happened to be a collector and tinkerer of guns, especially antiques, many of which he collected before they were prohibited. He kept them locked in his home and garage. He did not possess the firearms for a true crime purpose. Mr. Haus was found to be in pursuit of what would otherwise be a harmless hobby of collecting unique and antique firearms and he fell at the least blameworthy end of the spectrum as noted in Nur .

His collection valued at half a million dollars was forfeited to the Crown. [ 22 ] In Abma , a sawed-off shotgun was located in a case secured in some joists under the accused's rural residence, hidden in a crawlspace only accessible through a trapdoor in a broom closet. The offender had acquired the firearms as novelty items from a neighbour 10 years earlier who was disposing of various items. He fired them once, then stored them in his shop, then under the crawlspace, and never used them again.

The sentencing judge referred to the fact that the firearms were not stored in a location that presented a significant risk to others, they were not readily accessible, and were kept in a secluded rural farm. The sentencing judge considered it significant that due to the relatively inaccessible location where the firearms were stored, they did not constitute a real and immediate danger to those in the offender's orbit and found the accused's conduct fell below the truly criminal end of the spectrum. The

accused had pled guilty, a mitigating factor not present in this case. He was sentenced to an 18-month conditional sentence. [ 23 ] The case in Abma is different than the case at bar where the firearms were not acquired as a novelty and they were in a motor vehicle where they posed a risk to individuals in Mr. Theroux's immediate orbit.

While I find the firearm was not easily accessible to the driver if the driver remained in the front seat, it could be quickly acquired and loaded if the driver were to stop the vehicle and access the back. [ 24 ] In Sellars , the accused was an Indigenous person with compelling Gladue factors which the court found diminished the accused's moral culpability. The accused possessed the firearm because he had previously belonged to an Indigenous gang. His cousin and best friend had been murdered in the two prior years and he had been warned by police he was the target of a planned hit.

All of this prompted the accused to arm himself with a firearm for defensive purposes. At the time of sentencing, the accused had made considerable strides towards rehabilitation to the extent the sentencing judge found exceptional circumstances as contemplated in R. v. Voong existed warranting a significantly reduced sentence.

He had left the gang, been treated for his addictions, and was leading a prosocial lifestyle involving full-time work and family. [ 25 ] The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge had erred in imposing a suspended sentence in part on the basis that possessing the handgun was not for a truly criminal purpose.

Notwithstanding the gun was found to be possessed for a true crime purpose, the court substituted a two-year CSO for the three-year suspended sentence imposed by the trial judge in recognition of the compelling Gladue factors and the offender's self-rehabilitation which rose to the level of exceptional circumstances. Neither of those factors are present in Mr. Theroux's case. In Sellars , the court stated that the range of sanction for general deterrence and denunciation begins with three years' imprisonment. [ 26 ] In R. v.

Kachuol , the Court of Appeal set aside the CSO imposed on the offender and substituted a three-year jail sentence. In Nur , the Supreme Court upheld a 40-month sentence for a 19-year-old offender with no criminal record who was found in possession of a loaded handgun outside a community centre. [ 27 ] In R. v. Guha , the Court of Appeal increased the offender's sentence from three years' jail to four in circumstances where he possessed a loaded handgun in his waistband while driving. However, unlike Mr.

Theroux, he had prior convictions for drug trafficking and was subject to a lifetime firearms prohibition at the time. [ 28 ] In Kachuol , the Court of Appeal substituted a three-year jail sentence for a CSO imposed on an offender with a grade 10 education who had suffered a brain injury and was caring for his ailing mother. Mr. Kachuol's circumstances were more aggravating that Mr. Theroux's as the offender had a criminal record and the gun was loaded and stored in the centre console of a vehicle within reach of the driver.

In this case, while not immediately accessible, the handgun was readily accessible and capable of being quickly loaded by the driver or any passenger of the vehicle with relative ease. It was not secured or locked and it was stored in the cab of the truck. [ 29 ] The circumstances in this case resemble those in R. v. Holt , 2015 BCCA 302 , in which the Crown successfully appealed an 18- month jail sentence imposed by the trial judge. The 66-year-old offender was pulled over for a traffic stop having consumed alcohol and crack cocaine before driving.

He was arrested for possession of drugs and a search of the vehicle yielded a loaded handgun in a backpack. The offender had no criminal record and suffered from a drug addiction. As in the case at bar, the gun was possessed in an urban environment in a populated area. After reviewing the authorities, the court concluded a realignment of the range of sentence for these type of offences was warranted and that a sentence of three years' jail represented a sentence which fell at the bottom end of the range for possession of a gun for a criminal purpose.

The Court of Appeal substituted a 30-month jail sentence for the 18-month sentence imposed by the trial judge. [ 30 ] Mr. Theroux argues a lower sentence is appropriate in these circumstances where the gun was not his and he was holding onto it at the behest of someone else. There is no evidence of duress or the existence of a special relationship between Mr. Theroux and this unnamed person which would make Mr. Theroux particularly vulnerable to such a dangerous request. The information disclosed in the PSR and Mr. Theroux's statement to police suggest the true owner was involved in a criminal lifestyle.

Criminals can thrive when they enlist others to assist them such as by having individuals outside the attention of police hold onto weapons, drugs, or other contraband on their behalf to avoid seizure or detection. In these circumstances, I consider the fact that Mr. Theroux was holding onto the gun for someone who was likely engaged in criminal activity to be a neutral, not mitigating factor. [ 31 ] Most recently in R. v. Padda , 2019 BCCA 351 , the Court of Appeal reemphasized the need to deter illegal possession of loaded handguns or handguns kept together with readily accessible ammunition.

In that case, a restaurant owner bought an illegal prohibited handgun and stored it in his business for protection after questionable acquaintances showed up at the restaurant one evening and threatened his staff. One night after consuming alcohol, he brandished the loaded gun at employees and struck one with his hand. The offender was otherwise a model citizen with broad community support. He was a businessman. He had pled guilty and expressed remorse and stopped abusing substances.

However, citing the dangers posed by his conduct, the Court of Appeal declined to substitute the 30-month sentence imposed by the trial judge for a CSO as sought by Mr. Padda. [ 32 ] A review of the authorities supports the conclusion that the bottom end of the range of sentence for possession of a loaded or unloaded handgun with readily accessible ammunition for a true crime purpose falls around three years' jail.

Non-custodial sentences have only been imposed for true crime possession where there are exceptional circumstances arising from significant post-offence rehabilitation or compelling personal circumstances significantly diminishing the offender's moral culpability. Neither of those factors are present in Mr. Theroux's case. [ 33 ] Sentencing authorities for s. 95 offences all decry illegal firearms and the devastation they cause.

Appellate authorities have been universal in their direction to trial judges that possession of these items in a true crime context requires the imposition of lengthy jail sentences absent exceptional circumstances. As the Court of Appeal said in R. v. Guha at paragraphs 28 to 30: [28] The serious and inherently dangerous circumstances associated with firearm-related offences have been forcefully underscored by front-line trial judges [cites omitted] …

[29] This Court has also proffered the view that sentences for firearm-related offences must reflect their very serious and dangerous nature … and R. v. Jarsch … where the Court referenced the following comments of Madam Justice Southin in Nguyen : [5] In my view, the sentences which the learned judge here imposed on the possession of weapons charges could well have been much higher and the sentence imposed on the trafficking charge much less.

It appears to me from the cases which have been cited to us that the judges of the courts below are taking far too lenient an approach to the possession of restricted weapons which patently have some illicit purpose. This Court where necessary and appropriate should do what we can do in order to help rid this community of people who possess firearms unlawfully for an illicit purpose - they should be treated severely. ... [30] In short, firearms, and in particular handguns, are extremely dangerous when possessed for an illicit purpose. That purpose can only be to threaten or inflict serious bodily harm or death.

Sentences for these types of offences must reflect society’s absolute rejection of such unacceptable conduct. [ 34 ] The mitigating factors in this case are the fact that Mr. Theroux has effectively no criminal record and is generally employed. The aggravating factors are that the gun was possessed, as I have found, for a true crime purpose. It was possessed in a motor vehicle that was being driven in an urban populated environment. Given the strong direction our court has received from appellate courts concerning the range of appropriate sentences for crimes of this nature, I cannot impose a CSO.

Not only is a custodial sentence necessary, but the bottom end of the appropriate sentencing range identified by the appellate authorities exceeds two years less a day. [ 35 ] While not a mitigating factor, it is relevant that the handgun was not loaded and stored in a location where it could be immediately deployed. Some steps, albeit brief, needed to be undertaken to access and load the firearm before it could be deadly to another person. In addition, it is relevant to consider Mr.

Theroux's Indigenous heritage notwithstanding his personal background does not operate to significantly diminish his moral culpability. [ 36 ] In all of the circumstances, I find a sentence of 30 months to be fit and appropriate on the s. 95 count. All other firearms offences should attract concurrent sentences as they involve the same subject matter. Possession of the brass knuckles is a separate offence independent of the firearm possession offence and warrants a consecutive sentence of one month.

Even after applying the principle of totality, I do not find it appropriate to impose that sentence to be served concurrently. The global sentence therefore, Mr. Theroux, is 31 months' jail. It shall be served as follows, and before I get going, Mr.

Jenkins, does he have any remand time that can be deducted from any of this? [DISCUSSION RE ACCUSED'S REMAND TIME CALCULATION] [ 37 ] So, Madam Clerk, Count 1 -- so, Madam Clerk, actually I am going to start with this, Madam Clerk. [ 38 ] So Count 9, Madam Clerk, possession of an unloaded restricted firearm with readily accessible ammunition, the sentence is 30 months' jail. [ 39 ] On Count 1, storing a firearm contrary to regulation contrary to s. 86(2) of the Criminal Code , three months' jail concurrent -- [ 40 ] THE CLERK: Sorry, how many? [ 41 ] THE COURT: Three months' jail concurrent.

On Count 6 -- [ 42 ] MR. JENKINS SR.: You said three months, Your Honour? [ 43 ] THE COURT: Three months concurrent. On Count 6 -- [ 44 ] THE CLERK: Sorry, Your Honour, I do not have a Count 6. [DISCUSSION RE COUNT 6] [ 45 ] THE COURT: Okay. So Kienapple 'd, all right. So, Madam Clerk, so Count 6 is nothing. He is not being sentenced on Count 6. [ 46 ] THE CLERK: Thank you. [ 47 ] THE COURT: Okay, that makes that easy, but the rest of it, seven, eight, nine? [ 48 ] THE CLERK: Seven, eight, and nine, yes. [ 49 ] THE COURT: Okay. All right. Sorry, counsel, somehow I do not have that note on my written materials.

So it might have been something we discussed and I did not update.

Okay. [ 50 ] So, Count 1, Madam Clerk, storing a firearm contrary to regulation, three months' jail concurrent. [ 51 ] Count 8, occupy the motor vehicle with a firearm contrary to s. 94, six months' jail concurrent. [ 52 ] Then moving to the brass knuckles, Count 2, possession of brass knuckles for a dangerous purpose contrary to s. 88(1), 30 days' jail, Madam Clerk, consecutive less time credited nine days calculated as six real days, nine after enhanced credit is given, 21 new days, and I know I am mixing days and months, but it is a consecutive sentence, Madam Clerk, so it should not be a problem. [ 53 ] Then Count 7, possession of the brass knuckles knowing he was not the holder of a licence contrary to s. 92(2), 30 days' jail concurrent with Count 2, less time credited of nine days, calculated as six real days, nine after enhanced credit is given, 21 new days.

So that is concurrent to Count 2, but consecutive to Counts 1, 8, and 9.

[ 54 ] All right, and is that everything, Madam Clerk? [ 55 ] THE CLERK: That is, thank you. [ 56 ] THE COURT: Okay. So, given the length of time, that is a federal sentence, there will not be any probation. [ 57 ] Now, is there mandatory firearms prohibition orders or DNA that is applicable in this case? [ 58 ] MR. WITHALL: Yes, Your Honour, there is a firearms prohibition order, 10 years -- [ 59 ] THE COURT: Okay. [ 60 ] MR. WITHALL: -- and I would request that there be a DNA order, as well. [ 61 ] THE COURT: Is it primary or secondary? [ 62 ] MR. WITHALL: I think it is primary.

I am just -- can -- [ 63 ] THE COURT: Okay, is it a 109 order? I think 95 is a s. 109 order. [ 64 ] MR. WITHALL: I believe it is a 109. [ 65 ] THE COURT: All right. Pursuant to s. 109 of the Criminal Code , Mr.

Theroux, you are prohibited from possessing any firearm, other than a prohibited firearm or restricted firearm, and any crossbow, restricted weapon, ammunition, explosive substances for a period of 10 years following your release from prison, and any prohibited firearm or restricted firearm, prohibited weapon, prohibited device, and prohibited ammunition for life. [ 66 ] THE ACCUSED: Is that from this date or from the date I handed in my FAC? [ 67 ] THE COURT: It is imposed from the date you are released from prison.

So it will be 10 years from that date. [ 68 ] Then with respect to DNA, is that mandatory or secondary? [DISCUSSION RE PROVISION OF DNA SAMPLES AND FORFEITURE ORDER] [ 69 ] THE COURT: All right. Madam Clerk, so I will say pursuant to s. 491 the handgun is forfeited to Her Majesty to be returned to the lawful owner provided they are properly licenced to possess the handgun, and I will let you draft the order -- [ 70 ] MR. WITHALL: Thank you, Your Honour. [ 71 ] THE COURT: -- Mr.

Withall, and then so it is a secondary designated offence, do the parties wish to make submissions on whether or not I ought to exercise my discretion to make a DNA order? [SUBMISSIONS RE PROVISION OF DNA SAMPLES] [ 72 ] THE COURT: All right. Well, in terms of the seriousness of the offence of s. 95, Parliament has already considered the seriousness of the offence and the need for DNA and has determined it is a secondary designed offence. Given that Mr. Theroux does not really have a record, I am not going to exercise my discretion to make a DNA order in these circumstances.

So I am not going to make that order, but the s. 109 order is made. [ 73 ] Any further orders or submissions on behalf of the Crown, Mr. Withall? [ 74 ] MR. WITHALL: No, Your Honour. [ 75 ] THE COURT: All right. [ 76 ] MR. JENKINS SR.: Just so he understands and we understand, Your Honour, hopefully I do, can I tell him that what he is looking at is 31 months less nine days? [ 77 ] THE COURT: Yes. [ 78 ] MR. JENKINS SR.: In other words, two-and-a-half years plus 21 days? [ 79 ] THE COURT: You mean after remission? [ 80 ] MR.

JENKINS SR.: No, the initial sentence. [ 81 ] THE COURT: It is 30 months -- 30 months plus 21 days. Yes, so that would be -- [ 82 ] MR. JENKINS SR.: Yes, thank you. [ 83 ] THE COURT: That is right, yes. [ 84 ] MR. JENKINS SR.: All right. [ 85 ] THE COURT: Two-and-a-half years plus --

[ 86 ] MR. JENKINS SR.: Thank you. [ 87 ] THE COURT: -- an extra 21 days. All right. Thank you, Mr. Jenkins. [ 88 ] MR. JENKINS SR.: Thank you. [ 89 ] THE COURT: Thank you for all your help and submissions, counsel. [ 90 ] MR. WITHALL: Thank you, Your Honour. (REASONS FOR SENTENCE CONCLUDED)