2018 QCCQ 463, 2018 QCCQ 463

Rolland c. Compagnie d'assurances du Canada sur la vie 2018 QCCQ 463 COURT OF QUEBEC Small Claims Division CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC DISTRICT OF GATINEAU TOWN OF GATINEAU Civil Division No: 550-32-023559-161 DATE: February 2 nd 2018 ______________________________________________________________________ BY THE HONOURABLE STEVE GUÉNARD, J.C.Q. ______________________________________________________________________ LINDA ROLLAND Plaintiff v.

LA COMPAGNIE D’ASSURANCE DU CANADA SUR LA VIE Defendant ______________________________________________________________________ JUDGMENT ______________________________________________________________________ [ 1 ] Ms. Linda Rolland applied, on January 17 th , 2014 for a Group disability insurance offered by the Defendant, the whole in relation with Ms. Rolland’s mortgage with the CIBC. [ 2 ] In such application [1] , Ms.

Rolland answered NO to the following medical question: In the past 24 months, have you received any medical treatment, tests, advice, consultation or follow-up for, or been diagnosed with or had any known indication of: Disorders, arthritis, sprains, strains or other problems or conditions of the neck, back, shoulder, elbow or other joints, muscles, ligaments or tendons? [ 3 ] Consequently, her application for Disability insurance was approved by the Defendant. [ 4 ] Defendant confirmed such on January 29 th 2014 [2] .

The fixed monthly benefit was set to an amount of 700$, while the monthly premium was quantified at 19.08$. [ 5 ] Ms. Rolland filed on February 16 th 2015, a disability claim [3] for a leg fracture [4] that she sustained on November 25 th 2014, while on vacation in Cuba. [ 6 ] Since such alleged disability occurred within 24 months of the date of the insurance, [5] the Defendant advised Ms. Rolland that it wished to review her medical history [6] . [ 7 ] The Defendant’s review of Ms.

Rolland’s medical report revealed many medical appointments linked with a “ prolapsed disc with sciatica ” problematic, the appointments ranging from July 17 th 2012 to February 27 th 2013. [ 8 ] Because of such situation, and after further review and analysis, the Defendant informed Ms.

Rolland, on April 28 th 2015, [7] that her claim was refused because the medical information pertaining to her back pain was not disclosed at the time of the application, adding furthermore that the application for disability insurance would have been rejected if such information had been known by the Defendant. [ 9 ] It is not contested that the amount of premiums paid up to that date by Ms. Rolland, of an amount of 286,20$, have been reimbursed following the cancelation, by the Defendant, of the Disability insurance. [ 10 ] It is not contested that Ms.

Rolland was unable to work, as a bus driver for the Société de Transport de l’Outaouais (STO), for a long period, her claim ranging from February 2015 to June 2016. [ 11 ] Unsatisfied of such situation, Ms. Rolland claims a total amount of 13 900$ from the Defendant, more specifically a sum of 11 900$ representing the total amount of monthly coverage left unpaid (17 months X 700$) [8] . Ms. Rolland also claims an amount of 2 000$ for other damages, which include stress and inconvenience, as well as legal costs.

[ 12 ] The Defendant strongly denies owing any of those amounts stating that Ms. Rolland failed to respond properly to a very relevant medical question and that such question was clearly material to the assessment of the risk by the Defendant. QUESTIONS IN ISSUE [ 13 ] The present file raises the following factual and legal questions:

i) Did Ms. Rolland fail in her obligation to divulge relevant elements? ii) If so, does the evidence demonstrate that those elements are likely to materially influence an insurer in the appraisal of the risk or the decision to cover it? iii) If Ms. Rolland’s claim is well founded, can the Court grant the total amount claimed of 13 900$? CONTEXT AND ANALYSIS [ 14 ] Ms. Rolland duly testified in front of the Court during the Trial.

She explains, at the beginning of the Trial, that she did answer NO to the above quoted question because she did not think that she suffered from any chronic medical condition, including to her back. [ 15 ] “ I did not have any disorders, nor any conditions ”, she says. [ 16 ] In trying to support such claim, Ms. Rolland produces a letter [9] , dated August 16 th 2017, from her treating physician, namely Dr. Catherine L. Sanderson-Guy, M. Sc., M.D. This letter does support, as stipulated by Ms. Rolland, that she does not have a chronic back condition.

The letter was produced in the file with the consent of the Defendant’s representative, Ms. Josée Cantin. [ 17 ] That letter from Dr. Sanderson-Guy states the following: Ms. Rolland has been a patient in my practice since 1988. Her general health has been overall very good. Ms. Rolland requested a letter to document any history of back pain recorded in her medical chart. On review of her medical record she has not had any chronic musculoskeletal conditions. Ms. Rolland had one acute episode of mechanical back /sciatic pain in July 2012.

This resulted from lifting a heavy object and she developed muscle spasm and facet joint pain. This resolved within the expected time frame and she has not had any recurrence nor limitation in activity from this acute episode. [ 18 ] Ms. Rolland indicates that it was clear in her mind that she did not have any “issues” with her neck and shoulders. She does admit the content of the Medical chart produced by the Defendant, which states, more specifically, the following: July 17th, 2012 Hurt back lifting portable firepit 3 [weeks] ago and has had back ache since… now radiating down r[ight] leg.

On exam she can heel walk but barely and with more pain on R. She can toe walk. Forward flexion very limited (to knees only: can normally touch the floor.) Extension easier. Knee jerks normal, but absent r[ight] ankle jerk. DIAGNOSIS: Prolapsed disc with classical L5 sciatica. July 19 th , 2012 Ms. Rolland was initially assessed at CBI Physiotherapy & Rehabilitation Centre, Ottawa East location on July 19, 2012, with a three week history of predominantly low back pain spreading into the right leg to the thigh. She also described intermittent paraesthesias in both legs, again predominantly on the right.

After careful examination Ms. Rolland’s signs and symptoms are consistent with a more mechanical presentation. There was no clear evidence of nerve root irritation or conduction deficit. (…) I anticipate four to six weeks of treatment. July 26 th , 2012 Back pain L5 sciatica No flexion few degrees of extension lat flexion and rotation (…) Power dec[rease] r[ight] hip flexor due to pain. Tylenol 3. Add mobicox. [10] August 21, 2012 R[ight] L5 sciatica slowly improving good days and bad days C[ontac]t with physio 3X / week

Add m[uscle] relaxants to tyl #3 and to mobicox 3/4 wks January 28 th 2013 Back pain Seems that every time in certain buses with certain seat cannot sit without pain needs lumbar support to be able to put on bus driver seat February 28 th , 2013 Has been improving with physio Working on r[ight] side strength Sill some pain though from today May return to work [ 19 ] Ms. Rolland confirms that she met with a physiotherapist for about 4 to 6 weeks. She indicates that she did not think that this situation qualified under the medical question asked by the Defendant in the Questionnaire. [ 20 ] Ms.

Rolland also confirms that this situation in 2012 made her miss about 4 to 6 weeks of work. She was on short term disability during that period of time. [ 21 ] Ms. Rolland testifies that, following her accident in Cuba in November 2014, that she had another incident at home, while vacuuming, on January 4 th 2016. She fractured her right ankle on such date. No surgery was necessary. [ 22 ] That being said, Ms. Rolland, at the end of her testimony, confirms that she did have a “ back muscle strain” but that this event was not, and never became, a chronic condition.

Consequently, she pleads that her answer to the Questionnaire was correct. She further adds that the fractures that she suffered in November 2014 and January 2015 are in no way linked to her prior medical status, namely the condition that she suffered in 2012 and 2013. [ 23 ] As to the Defendant, its representative, Ms. Cantin, argues that the medical condition of Ms. Rolland, in 2012-2013 clearly constituted a sprain and/or strain of the back, as admitted by Ms. Rolland. [ 24 ] Ms. Cantin does not deny that this condition didn’t seem to evolve into a chronic condition.

However, that "acute” event was serious enough to warrant Ms. Rolland’s absence from work for a period of close to 6 weeks. [ 25 ] Ms. Cantin further adds that Ms. Rolland should also have answered YES to the following question provided in the same Questionnaire: Are you currently receiving disability or Worker’s Compensation benefits or have you ever received disability or Worker’s Compensation benefits for a period of longer than one month? [ 26 ] However, based on the relevant jurisprudence, the Court will not consider that second – and new – element raised, only during the Trial.

Indeed, the fact that the Defendant did not raise that specific element in its refusal letter [11] , is sufficient, in the current file, to reject this second element as being non relevant in the evaluation of the claim from Ms. Rolland. [12] [ 27 ] That being said, it does appear from the evidence that the 2012-2013 incident was serious enough to generate a leave of absence for a period of about 6 weeks. [ 28 ] Ms. Cantin refers the Court to the existence of a misrepresentation of facts. She testifies that back issues, namely those of Ms.

Rolland in 2012 and 2013, were material to the risk and the willingness of the Defendant’s to accept such risk. [ 29 ] Ms. Cantin explains that the policy in question, which was linked to a group insurance (with the STO) was and still is a “standard risk policy”. The answer YES to the above-mentioned question clearly puts, as per her testimony, the risk over the acceptable “standard risk” rate. [ 30 ] The Defendant also produces the report [13] of an independent underwriter, Ms.

Josée Malboeuf, who mentions that the Defendant’s decision was reasonable and within the parameters applicable in the insurance industry. [ 31 ] Ms. Malboeuf’s report, after reviewing the available documentation, states the following: 7.1 Referencing back to the scope of my mandate, I would answer as follows: 1. The applicant did not correctly answer the Application dated January 14, 2014; 2. The applicant has a history of sciatica and prolapsed disc. 3. Dr. Catherine Sanderson-Guy’s medical record shows the following undisclosed facts: i. Multiple consultation for Prolapsed disc L5S1 and sciatica ii.

Treatment with medication and physiotherapy

iii. Ongoing symptoms and treatment noted in the February 2013 consultation notes 4. Had the underwriter known all the facts, he would have: i. Declined the disability coverage 8.0

Summary Had Ms. Rolland correctly answered the questions of the application the underwriter would have requested additional details. Upon reception of the complete medical history, and in view of the parameters of the product, the underwriter would have declined the Disability coverage. The undisclosed facts were material to the evaluation of the risk as the Disability insurance coverage would not have been accepted and issued had the underwriter known all the facts. [ 32 ] As to the reasonableness of such decision by the Defendant, Ms. Malboeuf adds, in

section 6.0 of her report that she compared the Defendant’s guidelines with two other series of guidelines, namely the RGA and the Munich Re underwriting manuals, both manuals being, as it appears from the evidence, commonly used for the assessment of disability insurance in the industry. [ 33 ] After analysing the relevant sections of both manuals, Ms. Malboeuf concludes that both underwriters would also have declined the Disability coverage. [ 34 ] From all those factual elements, to what conclusion must the Court arrive? APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND DECISION [ 35 ] Ms. Rolland’s claim is of a civil nature.

Consequently, it was her burden to demonstrate, by way of preponderant evidence, that her claim is well founded. [ 36 ] Sections 2803 and 2804 of the Civil of Québec (hereinafter CCQ ) states: 2803. A person seeking to assert a right shall prove the facts on which his claim is based. A person who claims that a right is null, has been modified or is extinguished shall prove the facts on which he bases his claim. 2804. Evidence is sufficient if it renders the existence of a fact more probable than its non-existence, unless the law requires more convincing proof. [ 37 ]

Chapter 15 of the CCQ provides the provisions applicable to insurance contracts. More precisely, sections 2389 and 2392 enunciate as follows: 2389. A contract of insurance is a contract whereby the insurer undertakes, for a premium or assessment, to make a payment to the client or a third person if a risk covered by the insurance occurs. Insurance is divided into marine insurance and non-marine insurance. 2392. Insurance of persons covers the life, physical integrity or health of the insured. Insurance of persons is divided into individual insurance and group insurance.

Group insurance of persons covers, under a master policy, the participants in a specified group and, in some cases, their families or dependants. [ 38 ] As it is mentioned by the Honourable Justice Dominique Langis, J.C.Q., in the Morissette v. Desjardins Sécurité financière [14] case, [28] La Cour d’appel du Québec a reconnu la particularité des assurances collectives. L’assureur de cette forme d’assurance n’étudie pas chaque dossier préalablement, à la différence d’un contrat d’assurance individuelle, mais assure automatiquement toute personne faisant

partie d’un groupe prédéterminé dans la mesure où elle remplit les conditions préalables. [ 39 ] As it was explained by Justice Lucille Chabot, J.C.Q., in D.C. v. Desjardins sécurité financière and al [15] : [11] Nous sommes ici en matière d'assurance collective et non en matière d'assurance individuelle. La Caisse Populaire de Rouyn- Noranda est le preneur tandis que Desjardins Sécurité Financière est l'assureur. Les emprunteurs, comme M. C... sont des adhérents. La validité d'une demande d'adhésion en matière d'assurance collective est habituellement analysée à rebours.

Cette analyse se fait lors de la réclamation formulée par l'adhérent. [13] Si le demandeur avait répondu oui à cette question, il aurait dû répondre à la question suivante et un rapport d'assurabilité aurait dû être fourni par celui-ci. Dès lors, la défenderesse, Desjardins Sécurité Financière aurait dû statuer sur son assurabilité, comme ce fut le cas en 1994. Ayant répondu non, M. C... se trouvait automatiquement assuré. Cependant, dans les faits, une réponse affirmative aurait dû être fournie.

Ayant répondu non à cette question, non seulement il se retrouvait assuré, mais sa demande ne pouvait pas être plus avant analysée, cette analyse devant plutôt se faire lors de la réclamation ce qui a conduit au présent litige. [14] Si le demandeur C... avait répondu oui, un rapport d'assurabilité aurait dû dès lors être fourni. La défenderesse, Desjardins Sécurité Financière, soumet que si l'assurabilité de monsieur avait été analysée au moment de chacune des demandes, le bénéfice de

l'assurance lui aurait été refusé en raison de la période de deux ans d'invalidité connue entre 2001 et 2003 pour problèmes de dépression majeure, de même qu'un usage de cocaïne occasionnel. [ 40 ] Furthermore, it is not contested that the disability occurred during the first two years of the insurance, thus permitting the Defendant to raise the argument that a false representation was made in order to attempt to cancel the disability insurance. To that effect,

section 2424 CCQ does provide the following: 2424. In the absence of fraud, misrepresentation or concealment as to risk does not justify the annulment or reduction of insurance which has been in force for two years.

However, this rule does not apply in the case of disability insurance if the disability begins during the first two years of the insurance. [our emphasis] [ 41 ] A Court that is seized of the question to determine if an insurance contract was validly cancelled by an insurer must determine if the circumstances, now communicated, were known by either party at the time of the conclusion of the contract, and if that information was of a nature likely to materially influence an insurer (a reasonable insurer) as to the appraisal of the risk or the decision to cover it. [16] [ 42 ] The burden of evidence to demonstrate that material link and the potential influence on a reasonable insurer rests clearly upon the shoulders of the insurer. [ 43 ] That being said, in the analysis of the answer given by Ms.

Rolland to the Questionnaire, the Court must refer to sections 2408 and 2409 CCQ, which are highly relevant: 2408. The client, and the insured if the insurer requires it, is bound to represent all the facts known to him which are likely to materially influence an insurer in the setting of the premium, the appraisal of the risk or the decision to cover it, but he is not bound to represent facts that the insurer knows or is presumed to know because of their notoriety, except in answer to inquiries. 2409.

The obligation with respect to representations is deemed properly met if the representations are such as a normally provident insured would make, if they were made without material concealment and if the facts are substantially as represented. [ 44 ] Ms. Rolland does confirm to the Court that she had the time to read carefully the Questionnaire and more specifically Question A. [ 45 ] It appears clearly that Ms.

Rolland considered that the events that took place in 2012 and 2013 were “not serious enough” to justify answering YES to the above-mentioned Question. [ 46 ] On that topic, Justice Pierre Cliché, J.C.Q., explains the following, in the Lessard v. Sécurité Financière Desjardins [17] case: [46] La Cour d'appel rappelle de plus que « l'adhérent n'a pas à se substituer à l'assureur pour apprécier le risque », mais qu'il doit «répondre franchement aux questions posées au premier stade de la demande d'assurance » . [47] Enfin, le Tribunal souligne certains autres principes applicables au présent litige, soit : 1.

Le principe général qui oblige l'assuré à déclarer tout risque est basé sur la bonne foi et par conséquent, l'assureur est en droit de connaître tous les faits essentiels à l'appréciation de celui-ci; 2. L'obligation de l'assuré de répondre adéquatement aux questions n'est aucunement liée à sa perception qu'il peut avoir de son véritable état de santé. Par conséquent, le critère objectif de la conformité des faits par rapport à ses déclarations l'emporte sur sa perception subjective. [18] 3.

L'assureur n'est pas tenu de faire une enquête exhaustive afin de pouvoir découvrir des faits qui auraient dû être révélés par l'assuré. Il est cependant tenu à une diligence raisonnable, relativement aux moyens dont il dispose, afin de vérifier le dossier médical de l'assuré, et ce, compte tenu de son expérience dans un domaine précis d'assurance. 4. Cependant, le fait que l'adhérent ait donné à l'assureur l'autorisation de consulter son dossier médical ne constitue pas une excuse pour son défaut d'avoir divulguer correctement son état de santé. 5.

L'assuré doit répondre adéquatement aux questions contenues au formulaire d'adhésion relativement à son état de santé. Il doit donc divulguer tous les renseignements susceptibles de rendre pertinentes la consultation par l'assureur de son dossier médical. Par conséquent, il se doit de faire état de tous les examens qu'il a pu subir, puisque cette information peut inciter l'assureur à faire une enquête plus approfondie avant d'accepter de couvrir le risque de son invalidité. 6. L'assureur n'est pas tenu de faire une enquête exhaustive afin de pouvoir découvrir des faits qui auraient dû être révélés par l'assuré.

Il est cependant tenu à une diligence raisonnable, relativement aux moyens dont il dispose, afin de vérifier le dossier médical de l'assuré, et ce, compte tenu de son expérience dans un domaine précis d'assurance. 7. Il importe peu que l'assuré ait répondu par erreur ou de façon délibérée en complétant le formulaire fourni par l'assureur.

En effet, les simples réticences ou fausses représentations concernant des faits de nature à diminuer l'appréciation du risque sont suffisantes pour justifier la nullité du contrat d'assurance, tout comme les fausses représentations ou réticences faites de façon frauduleuse. [our emphasis] [ 47 ] The Court of Appeal, in the case of Caisse Populaire Mistral v. Boisvert [19] , stated:

Il n'incombe pas au preneur d'une assurance collective de prendre l'adhérent par la main, de lui expliquer chaque paragraphe de la demande d'adhésion et, surtout, de vérifier que, dans les faits, les déclarations de l'adhérent sont vraies ou que, malgré l'affirmation de l'adhérent qu'il est admissible, du fait que celui-ci l'est réellement. [ 48 ] The Court does not dispute the fact that Ms. Rolland was, and still is, acting in good faith. However, it appears clearly from the evidence that she did not complete adequately the medical Questionnaire. [ 49 ] Ms.

Rolland clearly downgraded considerably the medical situation that she had to face in 2012 and 2013. The medical notes produced to the Court, duly quoted hereinabove, are clear. The words used are strong and demonstrate that the sciatica condition of Ms. Rolland was serious. [ 50 ] It was serious enough to warrant a rather long absence from work. [ 51 ] Even Dr. Sanderson-Guy, in her August 2017 th letter does twice refer to an “ Acute episode”. [ 52 ] An acute episode is a severe one.

It cannot be construed as being purely mild and easy to forget. [ 53 ] The medical notes do refer, at the very least, to 4 medical consultations regarding that sciatica. The notes only refer to a slow improvement of the situation. The back pain lasts, from it appears from the evidence, for a rather long period, namely many months. The medication had to be adjusted in order to add Mobicox, a muscle relaxant. [ 54 ] Ms.

Rolland further adds, in her own testimony, that this medical situation only consisted in a “back muscle strain”. [ 55 ] The questionnaire specifically refers to a back strain. [ 56 ] The Questionnaire, as we have seen, did not ask Ms. Rolland if she suffered from a chronic back condition. [ 57 ] Ms.

Rolland had the obligation to divulge the relevant information that would have rendered relevant the consultation and further inquiry by the Defendant as to her medical chart. [ 58 ] The evidence demonstrates that those prior elements were not trivial, minor, or insignificant. [ 59 ] Consequently, the Court considers that the evidence clearly demonstrates that Ms. Rolland should have answered YES to Question A. [ 60 ] The evidence also clearly shows that the Defendant, subjectively, would not have agreed to provide coverage to Ms.

Rolland if those circumstances had been known. [ 61 ] The Court is satisfied of the link between that medical situation, which was not divulged by Ms. Rolland, and the liability coverage offered by the Defendant and the appreciation of the risk related to such coverage. [ 62 ] Based on the evidence submitted by the Defendant, the Court must also conclude that this element was, objectively speaking, highly material for an insurer’s decision – a reasonable insurer’s decision - to cover Ms. Rolland and in its appraisal of the risk. [ 63 ] Indeed, not only Ms.

Cantin’s testimony is clear and precise, the report of Ms. Josée Malboeuf adds to the alleged reasonableness of the Defendant’s position in the present file. [ 64 ] As to Ms. Rolland’s argument that the incident in Cuba, namely her broken ankle, is in no way linked to the “undisclosed” risk (sciatica and so on), this argument is, with respect, without legal merit [20] .

Section 2410 of the CCQ provides the following: 2410. Subject to the provisions on statement of age and risk, any misrepresentation or concealment of the facts by either the client or the insured nullifies the contract at the instance of the insurer, even with respect to losses not connected with the risks so misrepresented or concealed . [our emphasis] [ 65 ] Consequently, the Court is clearly satisfied of the material link between the undisclosed information by Ms. Rolland and the evaluation of the risk by the Defendant.

The Court is also, clearly, satisfied by the evidence submitted that a reasonable insurer would not have accepted the risk if such medical information had been known. [ 66 ] As it was established by the evidence submitted by the Defendant, as per the credible testimony of Ms. Cantin, and as it appears from the Refusal letter produced as Exhibit D-7: If the question had been answered correctly, we would have had an opportunity to review your medical history and your application for mortgage disability insurance coverage would have been subsequently declined.

It should be emphasized that individuals making application to this group Insurance plan must be considered standard in order to be approved. As a result of your health history, placement within the standard category was not possible. We do not have the provisions for charging extra premiums or issuing exclusion riders, which commonly are available on individual insurance plans. In order to provide our Group Policy customers with low-cost insurance, we can accept only those participants considered to be an average risk. [ 67 ] Indeed, the testimony by Ms. Cantin and the report from Ms.

Malboeuf are not seriously contested by Ms. Rolland.

[ 68 ] As it was indicated by Justice Michel Bédard, J.C.Q., in Whittier v. L’Excellence compagnie d’assurance-vie [21] : [15] S'en référant au terme de l'

article 2408 du Code civil du Québec , le Tribunal rappelle que cette disposition réfère à la règle voulant qu'en matière d'assurance, les relations entre l'assureur et l'assuré doivent être empreintes de la plus haute bonne foi; étant entendu qu'il n'appartient pas à l'assuré de décider de la pertinence ou non des faits à révéler, ce dernier ayant l'obligation de répondre franchement et sans réserve à toutes les questions posées à la proposition d'assurance. [ 69 ] The Court also considers that

section 2409 CCQ cannot be of real help to Ms. Rolland’s assertions. Indeed, because of the clear, and established material link, the Court considers that the evidence cannot support the application of said

section 2409 CCQ. Indeed, a “normally provident insured” would definitely have answered YES to Question A. By not doing so, the Court cannot be convinced that the facts duly divulged are “substantially” accurate. [ 70 ] Indeed, the seriousness of the situation that occurred in 2012-2013, and the duration of such, as it appears from the medical chart and the evidence, clearly demonstrate and establish that such cannot be reasonably construed as being minor, mild or insignificant. The evidence clearly points in the opposite direction. [ 71 ] Consequently, Ms.

Rolland’s claim must be dismissed. [ 72 ] Because of that decision, Ms. Rolland’s further claim (2 000$) as to moral damages and as to legal costs must also be dismissed. THE COURT COSTS [ 73 ] As to the court costs, paragraph 1 of

section 340 of the Civil code of procedure [22] stipulates as follows: 340. Legal costs are owed to the party that was successful, unless the court decides otherwise. [ 74 ] In the present file, because of the circumstances, the Court deems it appropriate not to condemn Ms. Rolland to pay the court costs. [ 75 ] Consequently, the claim will be dismissed but without any court costs. FOR THOSE REASONS, THE COURT: DISMISSES the Plaintiff’s claim; THE WHOLE without court costs. __________________________________ STEVE GUÉNARD, J.C.Q. Date of hearing: January 22nd 2018