Her Majesty the Queen - v. -, 2014 SKPC 12

IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF SASKATCHEWAN Citation: 2014 SKPC 012 Date: January 24, 2014 Information: 24356829 Location: Prince Albert _____________________________________________________________________________ Between: Her Majesty the Queen - and - Michelle Lee Arcand Appearing: Scott Wolfe For the Crown Mary McAuley For the Accused SENTENCING F. M. DAUNT , J [ 1 ] Michelle Lee Arcand faces sentencing for the following offence: On or about the 10 th day of May, AD 2013 at Prince Albert, Saskatchewan, did possess a substance included in

Schedule 1 to wit Cocaine in an amount not exceeding 3 kilograms for the purpose of trafficking contrary to Section 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act . CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENCE :

[ 2 ] Police had been investigating Kyle Bear, who was Ms. Arcand’s common law partner at the time. On May 10 th they executed a search warrant at their shared residence. Police seized 1.93 grams of cocaine from a TV stand, and another 1.67 grams from under a chair, as well as $175, a drug scale, and several sandwich baggies with the corners cut out. Through further investigation, police found a further 29.1 grams of cocaine at a co-accused’s residence. The co-accused stated that he removed it from Ms. Arcand’s and Mr. Bear’s residence after the police had missed it in their initial search.

The total amount of cocaine seized was therefore 32.7 grams with a street value of $3300. [ 3 ] Ms. Arcand gave a statement to police in which she admitted ownership of the cocaine, and that the $175 was the proceeds of the sale of cocaine. She told the police that they would find her and Kyle Bear’s fingerprints on the cocaine. She admitted selling cocaine from her residence while Kyle Bear would “go on runs.” The couple had one “employee”, J.S., who sold cocaine for them. CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENDER : [ 4 ] Michelle Arcand is 21 years old and a member of the Muskeg Lake First Nation.

She grew up in the “West Flat” area of Prince Albert, which has a largely aboriginal and low-income population. [ 5 ] Ms. Arcand comes before this Court with no criminal record, despite a less-than-ideal childhood. She had an abusive father and both her parents abused alcohol and cocaine, with her father eventually graduating to intravenous drugs. At the age of 13 she was placed in a group home and started running away from her placements. At age 15 she became pregnant and returned to live with her grandmother.

At this point, she settled down a bit but continued to associate with “negative peers,” according to the Pre-sentence Report. [ 6 ] Despite all this, she has reached adulthood without any serious addictions issues of her own. She tried ecstasy one time at the age of 14 or 15. Other than that, she has tried only alcohol and marijuana. She has been alcohol free for two years and has not smoked marijuana since the date of the offence. [ 7 ] Ms. Arcand says she found herself in a “dire financial situation,” partly as a result of debts incurred by a former romantic partner. She was unable to find suitable employment.

She and Mr. Bear decided to sell drugs “to get them through a tough patch.” They moved into the residence in question in April, and the offence occurred in May, so it seems they were engaged in the drug trade for a very brief period before they were arrested. During this time, she sent her young daughter to stay with relatives so she would not be exposed to drug transactions. There is no suggestion that Ms. Arcand was involved in a larger criminal organization. Her foray into the drug trade was short and unsuccessful. [ 8 ] Since the date of the offence, Ms. Arcand has separated from Kyle Bear, a positive move .

She now lives with her grandmother and her 4 ½-year-old daughter. She graduated with her Grade 12 in June of 2011 but needed to upgrade if she was going to continue on to higher education. Thus she completed “Learners with Purpose,” an outreach program with Carlton High School, in June of 2013. She wants to enroll in SUNTEP (Saskatchewan Urban Native Teacher Education Program), which leads to a degree in Education. She is now employed full time at the Prince Albert Co-op. Her employer is aware of her legal difficulties. [ 9 ] Ms.

Arcand acknowledges that she made a bad choice, that there were better ways for her to have dealt with her debt situation. She was remorseful in Court and has done her best to make positive choices in her life since being charged. [ 10 ] Ms. Arcand has been on an Undertaking since May 11, 2013, or just over eight months. The conditions include all the statutory conditions contained in a Conditional Sentence Order, albeit with slightly different wording, as well as other strict controls on her liberty, including reporting to the Prince Albert Police Service.

The undertaking includes a clause that she submit to random, warrantless, groundless searches. In Prince Albert, the police monitoring these undertakings do not hesitate to conduct these searches frequently. Yet Ms. Arcand has not been found in breach of her undertaking in all this time. [ 11 ] Ms. Arcand is an aboriginal offender, so her individual circumstances include the post-colonial history of First Nations

people in this country. According to the Supreme Court of Canada, I am required to take judicial notice of the history of colonialism,displacement, and residential schools. The effects of this history are multi-generational and continue to translate into lower educationalattainment, lower incomes, higher unemployment, substance abuse and suicide, and higher levels of incarceration for Aboriginal peoples.[R. v. Gladue, (SCC), [1999] 1 SCR 688, R. v. Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13 , [2012] 1 SCR 433] In Ms.

Arcand’scase, it is not difficult to see why, when faced with financial problems, she might think she had fewer choices than a 21-year-old middleclass college graduate who has a family with some financial resources. Ms. Arcand’s immediate family is dysfunctional. Many of herpeers live on the fringes of society. With that past history and present reality, it is easier to understand how Ms. Arcand might stray intothe margins herself. CROWN POSITION: [12] For the Crown, Mr. Wolfe asserts that Ms. Arcand was driven, not by any addiction of her own, but solely by a desire forfinancial gain.

He says she was perfectly capable of working, but didn’t like working with “foreign people.” (PSR p. 5) She hadoptions, but decided that selling cocaine was a faster way to make money. She knew what she was doing was wrong, evidenced by thefact that she sent her daughter away while doing it. [13] Mr. Wolfe submits that, with the recent amendments to the Criminal Code, a Conditional Sentence Order is no longeravailable for this offence because the maximum penalty is life in prison. See

section 742.1(c). Parliament must have intended, then, thatincarceration is the only fit sentence for this offence. [14] Mr. Wolfe relies on R. v. Shawile, 2012 SKCA 51 and McIntyre v. R., 2012 SKCA 111 to show that denunciation anddeterrence are the primary sentencing objectives for this offence, and that the range of sentences is 18 months to four years of actualincarceration. He acknowledges that the SKCA will go below 18 months in an appropriate situation, and, recognizing the mitigatingfactors present in this case, suggests a range of 15 to 18 months in jail. DEFENCE POSITION: [15] Ms.

McAuley for the defence acknowledges that a conditional sentence order would be an illegal sentence, but emphasizesthat a whole range of alternatives to incarceration remain available to this Court. [16] Ms McAuley recognizes the range of sentencing set by our Court of Appeal for this offence, but points out that those casesalso contemplate the availability of a conditional sentence for this offence, albeit rarely used. Now, with the recent amendments to theCriminal Code, she suggests that the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal might take a different view. She cites R. v.

Proulx 2000 SCC 5, [2000] 1 SCR 61 for the proposition that jail is not the only way to achieve denunciation and deterrence. She also points outthat the Supreme Court of Canada, the highest Court in the land, has directed sentencing judges to take a more restorative and creativeapproach when sentencing aboriginal offenders. According to Ipeelee and Gladue (supra), it is an error in principle to ignore the historyof colonialism and systemic discrimination underlying the over-representation of aboriginals in the justice system. [17] Ms. McAuley indicates that Ms.

Arcand is a youthful offender who pleaded guilty to the only offence with which she was evercharged. She distinguishes Shawile and McIntyre on the basis that the former had a “nominal” record, while the latter had pendingcharges about which he was less than forthcoming. Ms. Arcand, however, has no criminal record at all, unlike Mr. Shawile, and hasabided by her strict undertaking without breaching or incurring new charges, unlike Mr. McIntyre. Furthermore, neither Mr. Shawile norMr. McIntyre were aboriginal offenders. [18] Regarding the comment in the pre-sentence report that Ms.

Arcand has been associating with negative peers, Ms. McAuleypoints out that, in the Prince Albert Aboriginal community, everybody is related to or otherwise acquainted with everybody else. Someof those relatives and acquaintances might be associated with gangs. That does not mean that Ms. Arcand, by association, is alsoinvolved with gangs. In other words, it is difficult if not impossible to be a First Nations person living in the West Flat and not havesome peers with legal or social problems. [19] Ms. McAuley strongly urges the Court to consider a lengthy term of probation with conditions crafted to achieve the

objectives of denunciation and deterrence, as well as rehabilitation, emphasizing the principle of restraint. THE LAW : [ 20 ] Section 5(3) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act states:

(3) Every person who contravenes subsection (1) or (2) (a) ... if the subject matter of the offence is a substance included in

Schedule I or II, is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for life, and (

i) to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of one year if (

A) the person committed the offence for the benefit of, at the direction of or in association with a criminal organization, as defined in subsection 467.1(1) of the Criminal Code , (

B) the person used or threatened to use violence in committing the offence, (

C) the person carried, used or threatened to use a weapon in committing the offence, or (

D) the person was convicted of a designated substance offence, or had served a term of imprisonment for a designated substance offence, within the previous 10 years, or (ii) to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of two years if (

A) the person committed the offence in or near a school, on or near school grounds or in or near any other public place usually frequented by persons under the age of 18 years, (

B) the person committed the offence in a prison, as defined in

section 2 of the Criminal Code , or on its grounds, or (

C) the person used the services of a person under the age of 18 years, or involved such a person, in committing the offence. [ 21 ]

Section 10 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act states:

(1) Without restricting the generality of the Criminal Code , the fundamental purpose of any sentence for an offence under this

Part is to contribute to the respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society while encouraging rehabilitation, and treatment in appropriate circumstances, of offenders and acknowledging the harm done to victims and to the community.

(2) If a person is convicted of a designated substance offence for which the Court is not required to impose a minimum punishment, the Court imposing sentence on the person shall consider any relevant aggravating factors including that the person (

a) in relation to the commission of the offence, (

i) carried, used or threatened to use a weapon, (ii) used or threatened to use violence, (iii) trafficked in a substance included in

Schedule I, II, III or IV or possessed such a substance for the purpose of trafficking, in or near a school, on or near school grounds or in or near any other public place usually frequented by persons under the age of eighteen years, or (iv) trafficked in a substance included in

Schedule I, II, III or IV, or possessed such a substance for the purpose of trafficking, to a person under the age of eighteen years; (

b) was previously convicted of a designated substance offence; or (

c) used the services of a person under the age of eighteen years to commit, or involved such a person in the commission of, a designated substance offence.

(3) If, under subsection (1), the Court is satisfied of the existence of one or more of the aggravating factors enumerated in paragraphs (2) (

a) to (c), but decides not to sentence the person to imprisonment, the Court shall give reasons for that decision.

(4) A Court sentencing a person who is convicted of an offence under this Part may delay sentencing to enable the offender (

a) to participate in a drug treatment Court program approved by the Attorney General; or (

b) to attend a treatment program under subsection 720(2) of the Criminal Code .

(5) If the offender successfully completes a program under subsection (4), the Court is not required to impose the minimum punishment for the offence for which the person was convicted. [ 22 ]

Section 10 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA) operates in addition to the objectives, purposes and principles of sentencing listed in sections 718 to 718.3 of the Criminal Code , which are well-known, so I will not reproduce here. ANALYSIS : 1. The Non-custodial Option: [ 23 ] Counsel for the Crown contends that, because a conditional sentence is proscribed for this offence, Parliament must have intended that nothing short of incarceration could be a fit sentence. However, someone guilty of breaking and entering a dwelling house is also ineligible to receive a conditional sentence.

The maximum penalty for that offence is also life in prison. Nevertheless, youthful first offenders often receive a suspended sentence or other probationary disposition for this offence. It does not appear that, in enacting

section 742.1(c), Parliament turned its mind to any specific offence.

Section 742.1(

c) is drafted in general language. The purpose is to foreclose a conditional sentence order for the most serious offences, including manslaughter, aggravated assault, attempted murder, terrorism offences, and others. One of the pre-requisites to a conditional sentence order is that the appropriate sentence is a term of incarceration of less than two years. Even where the offence carries a maximum sentence of 14 years or life, there are offences for which jail is not appropriate, and so a conditional sentence is not appropriate.

Parliament is saying that, where a jail sentence of less than two years is appropriate for those most serious offences, a conditional sentence may not be substituted. I cannot find that Parliament intended that for any specific offence -- such as breaking and entering a dwelling house -- other penalties, such as fines, fines plus probation, or suspended sentences are similarly no longer available. Neither can I find that Parliament intended to preclude other non- custodial sentences for the offence under s. 5(2) of the CDSA , especially when one examines the language in

section 10 of the CDSA . [ 24 ] The aggravating factors listed in

section 10 are the same as the prerequisites for the mandatory minimum sentences in s. 5(3) (a). When dealing with

Schedule I or II drugs, jail is mandatory if one or more of those aggravating factors exist. When dealing with

Schedule III or IV drugs, jail is highly probable where one or more of those aggravating factors exist. None of those factors exist in Ms. Arcand’s case. The CDSA anticipates non-custodial sentences in cases where the aggravating factors are not present, as there is no special requirement to give reasons for a non-custodial sentence in those cases. Furthermore, even where there is a mandatory minimum jail sentence – that is, even where those aggravating factors exist -- if the accused avails himself of a drug treatment option, a non- custodial sentence is allowed. This is so, even though a conditional sentence is not available for an offence of possession of cocaine, a

Schedule I drug, for the purpose of trafficking. [ 25 ] In

summary, a non-custodial sentence is clearly an option in the case at bar. 2. Range of Sentence/Parity Principle : [ 26 ] Nevertheless, even though the mandatory minimum is not applicable in this case, and the CDSA contemplates non-custodial sentences in a case like this, our Court of Appeal says that the sentence for this offence should range from 18 months to four years. But in R. v. McIntyre , the Court of Appeal reduced a 14 month sentence to 10 months. In R. v.

Shawile the Court overturned a 22 month conditional sentence and substituted a sentence of 10 months, being 18 months less credit of eight months for time served on a conditional sentence order. The cases cited in McIntyre at paragraph 40 show a range including an 11 month jail sentence, an 18 month conditional sentence, and, at the most severe, two years less a day incarceration. The case of R. v. Von Hagen , in which the Court of Appeal set aside a jail term in favour of a conditional sentence, would attract a mandatory minimum jail penalty today.

[ 27 ] The “range of sentence” means something more that guidelines, or “guidance” [ Shawile ] and something less than a “tariff” [ McIntyre ]. As Richards J.A. (as he then was) said at para. 37 in McIntyre (after repeating the range of 18 months to four years for trafficking in cocaine): All of these points having been made, it must also be stressed that determining an appropriate sentence for trafficking (like determining an appropriate sentencing for any other offence) involves more than the application of a fixed tariff.

As required by s. 718.1 of the Criminal Code , a fit sentence must, at bottom, be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. Moreover, a fit sentence must appropriately take account of the relevant sentencing considerations identified in the other provisions of the Code and the CDSA .

Thus, not surprisingly, this Court has itself imposed sentences outside of the 18 month to four year jail term range in light of the particular circumstances of individual cocaine trafficking offences. [ 28 ] In short, the range of sentence is nothing more than the practical application of the parity principle: similar offenders committing similar offences should be given similar sentences. This is an important principle. If it were otherwise, sentences would appear arbitrary and whimsical, rather than reasoned and consistent.

But the range is not a judicially created scheme of mandatory minimums and maximums to be applied mechanically. That, too, would be arbitrary. Rather, Parliament dictates that, within the confines of the statute, sentencing is in the discretion of the trial judge. [subsections 718.3(1) and (2)] The sentencing Court can impose a sentence outside the range in certain circumstances. If the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender demand it, the Court can impose a sentence higher than the upper end of the range, up to the maximum allowed by the statute.

Conversely, the Court can impose a sentence lower than the bottom of the range in certain circumstances. The sentencing judge may take a “calculated risk” and give a non-custodial sentence where the range would dictate a custodial one. [ R. v. Keepness , 2000 SKCA 28 , R. v. Laliberte 2000 SKCA 27 ] [ 29 ] Sentencing is an individual process; no two offenders are identical, and no two offences are identical. Even two co-accused in the same offence can have differing degrees of responsibility and so receive different sentences. As stated in Ipeelee at para. 78 : The interaction between s. 718.2(

e) and 718.2(b) – the parity principle – merits specific attention.

Section 718.2(

b) states that “a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances”. Similarity, however, is sometimes an elusory concept.... In practice, similarity is a matter of degree. No two offenders will come before the courts with the same background and experiences, having committed the same crime in the exact same circumstances.

Section 718.2(

b) simply requires that any disparity between sanctions for different offenders be justified. To the extent that Gladue will lead to different sanctions for Aboriginal offenders, those sanctions will be justified based on their unique circumstances – circumstances which are rationally related to the sentencing process. Courts must ensure that a formalistic approach to parity in sentencing does not undermine the remedial purpose of s. 718.2(e). ... It is true that on the surface imposing the same penalty for the nearly identical offence is only fair.

That might be closer to the truth in a society that is more equitable, more homogeneous and more cohesive than ours. But in an ethnically and culturally diverse society, there is a differential impact from the same treatment. Indeed, that has been recognized in the jurisprudence on equality rights under the Charter. Thus, there is a constitutional imperative to avoiding excessive concern about sentence disparity. 3. Gladue/Ipeelee : [ 30 ] Here we are dealing with an aboriginal offender, so 718.2(

e) of the Criminal Code is of particular application: all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders. [ 31 ] This principle of sentencing has been broadly interpreted by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Gladue and more recently in R. v. Ipeelee . Because of the unique position aboriginal people hold in our society, it is appropriate to pay special attention to their personal circumstances in crafting a fit sentence.

LeBel J., writing for the Court in Ipeelee , outlines the task of the sentencing judge, starting at paragraph 66: First, sentencing judges can endeavour to reduce crime rates in Aboriginal communities by imposing sentences that effectively deter

criminality and rehabilitate offenders. These are codified objectives of sentencing. To the extent that current sentencing practices do not further these objectives, those practices must change so as to meet the needs of Aboriginal offenders and their communities. As Professors Rudin and Roach ask, “[if an innovative sentence] can serve to actually assist a person in taking responsibility for his or her actions and lead to a reduction in the probability of subsequent re-offending, why should such a sentence be precluded just because other people who commit the same offence go to jail?” (J. Rudin and K.

Roach, “Broken Promises: A Response to Stenning and Roberts’ ‘Empty Promises’” (2002), 65 Sask. L. Rev. 3, at pl 20). Second, judges can ensure that systemic factors do not lead inadvertently to discrimination in sentencing. Professor Quigley aptly describes how this occurs: Socioeconomic factors such as employment status, level of education, family situation, etc., appear on the surface as neutral criteria. They are considered as such by the legal system. Yet they can conceal an extremely strong bias in the sentencing process.

Convicted persons with steady employment and stability in their lives, or at least prospects of the same, are much less likely to be sent to jail for offences that are borderline imprisonment offences. The unemployed, transients, the poorly educated are all better candidates for imprisonment. When the social, political and economic aspects of our society place Aboriginal people disproportionately within the ranks of the latter, our society literally sentences more of them to jail. This is systemic discrimination. (T. Quigley, “Some Issues in Sentencing of Aboriginal Offenders”, in R. Gosse, J.Y. Henderson and R.

Carter, eds., Continuing Poundmaker and Riel ’s Quest: Presentations Made at a Conference on Aboriginal Peoples and Justice (1994), 269, at pp. 275-76) Sentencing judges, as front-line workers in the criminal justice system, are in the best position to re-evaluate these criteria to ensure that they are not contributing to ongoing systemic racial discrimination.

Section 719.2(

e) is therefore properly seen as a “direction to members of the judiciary to inquire into the causes of the problem and to endeavour to remedy it, to the extent that a remedy is possible through the sentencing process ” ( Gladue , at para. 64 (emphasis added)). Applying the provision does not amount to “hijacking the sentencing process in the pursuit of other goals” (Stenning and Roberts, at p. 160).

The purpose of sentencing is to promote a just, peaceful and safe society through the imposition of just sanctions that, among other things, deter criminality and rehabilitate offenders, all in accordance with the fundamental principle of proportionality. Just sanctions are those that do not operate in a discriminatory manner. Parliament, in enacting s. 718.2(e), evidently concluded that nothing short of a specific direction to pay particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders would suffice to ensure that judges undertook their duties properly. ... The

section does not mandate better treatment for aboriginal offenders than non-aboriginal offenders. It is simply a recognition that the sentence must be individualized and that there are serious social problems with respect to aboriginals that require more creative and innovative solutions. This is not reverse discrimination. It is an acknowledgement that to achieve real equity, sometimes different people must be treated differently. [ 32 ] In considering Gladue factors, I must also be mindful of the next generation. Ms. Arcand has a daughter who is 4 ½ years old. If I sentence Ms.

Arcand to a lengthy prison term, what effect will that have on her daughter? Visiting her mother in jail may well reinforce the notion that it is normal for aboriginals to live in prison. Will that make it easier for her daughter to stray down a similar path later in life? Or perhaps the goal of a just, safe, and peaceful society is better achieved by Ms. Arcand continuing with her education, raising her daughter, and becoming a role model for others in her community. 4.

Summary : [ 33 ] For more than eight months, Ms. Arcand has been on strict bail conditions, conditions that mimic those one would expect to find in a conditional sentence order. Time at large on bail is not credited in the same way that pre-trial detention is, but I recognize that Ms. Arcand has had her liberty substantially restricted while she awaits the outcome of her charge. I also note that our Court of Appeal has given credit against sentence for time spent in the community on a conditional sentence order. [ 34 ] Regarding the gravity of the offence, I recognize that Ms. Arcand, along with two others, was in possession of a total of 32.7

grams of cocaine, which is more than the offenders in some of the cases cited. While she seemed to be a low level street dealer, she wasnot at the lowest level, having one person working under her. As well, although there is no specific “victim” in this offence, I recognizethe harm done to the community by those who deal in drugs. Their presence in a neighbourhood certainly makes it less desirable. Theyare part of an underground economy and promote illicit dealings, with extralegal methods for dispute resolution. However, I amconfident, based on the pre-sentence report, that Ms.

Arcand has extricated herself from this lifestyle. She is assessed to be a mediumrisk to re-offend, a risk that can be lowered with targeted intervention. Her prospects for rehabilitation are good. [35] It is a long standing principle of our justice system that a youthful offender before the Court to be sentenced for his or her firstoffence is to be treated differently from the career criminal. In the case of a habitual criminal, deterrence, denunciation, and separatingthe offender from society become paramount.

Sherstobitoff J.A. put it succinctly: Rehabilitation is usually put ahead of other sentencing factors in cases of first offenders, young offenders, persons with short or minorcriminal records, and in cases of less serious offences. R. v. Morin, (SK CA), 1995 134 SaskR 120; 101 CCC (3d) 124(SKCA) [36] Based on the case law and the seriousness of the offence, some jail is warranted to denounce the unlawful conduct and todeter Ms. Arcand and others from committing similar offences.

However, it should be short enough that it does not interfere with thegoals of rehabilitation, reparation to the community, and promoting a sense of responsibility in the offender. 5. Conclusion: [37] Acknowledging the seriousness of the offence, but recognizing Ms. Arcand’s great prospects for rehabilitation, the sentence isas follows: 90 days in custody, to be served intermittently. This will take about 22 weekends, if she goes in Friday and comes out Monday, oralmost six months. To arrive at this figure, I take into account the 10 months given to both Mr. Shawile and Mr. McIntyre.

I also takeinto account the eight and a half months Ms. Arcand spent on bail conditions which are punitive and mimic a conditional sentence order. I am combining it with a probation order which shall last for two years, and be very strict for the first six months. That will denounce herunlawful conduct and deter her and others from committing similar offences. The rest of the probationary period will achieve the goalsof rehabilitation, reparation and responsibility. While on probation, Ms. Arcand shall: 1. Keep the peace and be of good behaviour. 2. Appear before the Court when required to do so by the Court. 3.

Notify the Court or the probation officer in advance of any change of name or address and promptly notify the Court or probationofficer of any change of employment or occupation. 4. Report to a supervisor at 12th Floor, 800 Central Avenue, Prince Albert, SK in person within two working days and after that, as toldto do so by the probation officer or designate. 5.

Surrender herself into custody at Pine Grove Correctional Centre by no later than 6:00 pm on Friday, January 31st, 2014, and eachFriday after that, and remain in custody following every Friday admission until 7:00 am on Monday, until her sentence is completed. 6. Not use alcohol or drugs that have not been prescribed for her 24 hours before going to the Correctional Centre to serve your sentence.

7. Live at a residence approved by the probation officer and not change that residence without the prior permission of the probation officer or the Court. 8. For the first 6 months of this order, stay inside her approved residence 24 hours a day, unless she has the prior permission of the probation officer or the Court. 9. For the remainder of this order, stay inside her approved residence from 10:00 pm each night to 7:00 am the next morning, except with the permission of her probation officer or the Court. 10. Not possess or consume alcohol or drugs that have not been prescribed for her by a medical doctor. 11.

Not enter or be in any place in which the main purpose is the sale of alcohol, such as bars or liquor stores. 12. Participate in an assessment and complete programming for addictions, as told to do so by her probation officer. 13. Participate in assessments and complete programming for issues identified in the Pre-sentence Report (upbringing and relationship issues) as told to do so by the probation officer. 14. Seek and maintain employment or educational programming as directed by the probation officer. 15. Perform 200 hours of community service work by December 31 st , 2014. 16.

If acceptable to the program and if directed by the probation officer, attend one or more classes of “Learners With Purpose” or such other group as may be acceptable to the probation officer, and speak to them about the negative impact the drug trade has had on her life, to encourage them to avoid making the choice she made. [ 38 ] Furthermore, Ms. Arcand shall pay a victim fine surcharge of $100.00, payable on or before June 30, 2014. Pursuant to

section 109 of the Criminal Code , I impose the mandatory firearm prohibition for a period of 10 years. [ 39 ] Dated this 24 th day of January, A.D. 2014, in the City of Prince Albert, in the Province of Saskatchewan. _______________________ F. M. Daunt, J