2011 NBCA 40, 2011 NBCA 40

COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW BRUNSWICK 169-10-CA FABIAN DANIEL HENRY APPELLANT FABIAN DANIEL HENRY APPELANT - and - - et - HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN RESPONDENT SA MAJESTÉ LA REINE INTIMÉE Henry v. R., 2011 NBCA 40 Henry c.

R., 2011 NBCA 40 CORAM: The Honourable Chief Justice Drapeau The Honourable Justice Larlee The Honourable Justice Richard CORAM : L’honorable juge en chef Drapeau L’honorable juge Larlee L’honorable juge Richard Appeal from a decision of the Court of Queen’s Bench: November 25, 2010 Appel d’une décision de la Cour du Banc de la Reine : Le 25 novembre 2010 History of Case: Historique de la cause : Decision under appeal: 2010 NBQB 395 Décision frappée d’appel : 2010 NBBR 395 Preliminary or incidental proceedings: N/A Procédures préliminaires ou accessoires : s.o.

Appeal heard: March 30, 2011 Appel entendu : Le 30 mars 2011 Judgment rendered: April 28, 2011 Jugement rendu : Le 28 avril 2011

Counsel at hearing: Fabian Daniel Henry appeared in person For the respondent: Cameron H. Gunn Avocats à l’audience : Fabian Daniel Henry a comparu en personne Pour l’intimée : Cameron H. Gunn THE COURT The application for leave to appeal and the appealare allowed pursuant to s. 839(1) of the CriminalCode, solely for the purpose of correcting thedisposition made in the Court of Queen’s Bench, andproviding for a new trial.

LA COUR La demande en autorisation d’appel et l’appel sontaccueillis conformément au par. 839(1) duCode criminel, uniquement en vue de réformer ledispositif de la Cour du Banc de la Reine etd’ordonner la tenue d’un nouveau procès. The following is the judgment delivered by THE COURT [1] This is an application for leave to appeal the decision of a

summary conviction appeal court judge lifting thestay of proceedings entered in the Provincial Court with respect to two charges under the Criminal Code: one under s. 253(1)(b) (over .08blood/alcohol level) and the other under s. 253(1)(a) (impaired driving). That stay was ordered as a remedy for the perceived violation ofthe appellant’s Charter disclosure rights, as delineated in R. v. Stinchcombe, (SCC), [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326, [1991] S.C.J.No. 83 (QL), and its progeny.

The violation in question was said to have occurred when the Crown could not produce for inspection avideo recording of the respondent that may have been made during his attendance at the Oromocto RCMP detachment for blood alcoholtesting. [2] The circumstances underlying the Crown’s inability to produce the recording, if any, remain murky.Presumably, that uncertainty would have dissipated had consideration of a stay been delayed until a full evidential record of the pertinentcircumstances was assembled. [3] The

summary conviction appeal court judge set aside the stay after canvassing the jurisprudence in otherjurisdictions and concluding the termination of the proceedings was premature and, to a significant extent, predicated upon speculationregarding the circumstances surrounding the claimed Charter violation and those bearing upon the appropriateness of the stay as aremedy, in the event of a violation (see 2010 NBQB 395, 366 N.B.R. (2d) 316). In the result, the judge allowed the appeal and ordered:“the matter is remitted to the Provincial Court to resume the trial” (para. 20).

It is the latter order which is problematic. [4] After due consideration of the appellant’s submissions, we are not persuaded the

summary conviction appealcourt judge’s reasons for decision reflect reversible error. Indeed, those reasons are fully in accord with R. v. Foster, 2001 NBCA 48,237 N.B.R. (2d) 139, which is directly on point. That said, the order disposing of the appeal cannot stand.

[5] By application of s. 822(1), the powers of the

summary conviction appeal court in an appeal of this type areset out in s. 686(4), which provides as follows: 686.

(4) If an appeal is from an acquittal orverdict that the appellant or respondent wasunfit to stand trial or not criminallyresponsible on account of mental disorder,the court of appeal may (

a) dismiss the appeal; or (

b) allow the appeal, set aside the verdict and (

i) order a new trial, or (ii) except where the verdict is that of a courtcomposed of a judge and jury, enter a verdictof guilty with respect to the offence of which,in its opinion, the accused should have beenfound guilty but for the error in law, and passa sentence that is warranted in law, or remitthe matter to the trial court and direct the trialcourt to impose a sentence that is warrantedin law. 686.

(4) Lorsqu’un appel est interjeté d’unacquittement ou d’un verdict d’inaptitude àsubir un procès ou de non-responsabilitécriminelle pour cause de troubles mentauxrendu à l’égard de l’appelant ou l’intimé, lacour d’appel peut :

a) rejeter l’appel;

b) admettre l’appel, écarter le verdict et, selonle cas : (

i) ordonner un nouveau procès, (ii) sauf dans le cas d’un verdict rendu par untribunal composé d’un juge et d’un jury,consigner un verdict de culpabilité à l’égardde l’infraction dont, à son avis, l’accusé auraitdû être déclaré coupable, et prononcer unepeine justifiée en droit ou renvoyer l’affaireau tribunal de première instance en luiordonnant d’infliger une peine justifiée endroit. [6] The Supreme Court has held that a stay of proceedings, which, like the one at issue here, brings an end to theprosecution, is tantamount to an acquittal (see R. v. Jewitt, (SCC), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 128, [1985] S.C.J.

No. 53 (QL)).Thus, a judge setting aside such a stay of proceedings is required by s. 686(4) to either order a new trial or, in some cases unlike thepresent one, enter a verdict of guilty. In R. v. Yelle, 2006 ABCA 276, [2006] A.J. No. 1194 (QL), the Court concluded the power to ordera new trial under s. 686(4) was broad enough to include the return of a case to the trial judge for continuation of the trial.

In that case, thetrial judge had heard approximately three months of evidence before a stay was directed. [7] There are no circumstances in the present case that might attract the kind of analysis Martin J.A. undertook inYelle, and the

summary conviction appeal court judge did not undertake such an analysis. Whether the reasoning in Yelle should beapplied in this Province is something we leave for another day, when the circumstances might require a full analysis of the question. Inthe meantime, the

summary conviction appeal court judge should have disposed of the appeal in the manner sought in the notice ofappeal and as expressly allowed by s. 686(4): he should have ordered a new trial. [8] For these reasons, the application for leave to appeal and the appeal are allowed. The decision of thesummary conviction appeal court is set aside only with respect to the disposition of the appeal. Thus, the stay of proceedings directed inthe Provincial Court is set aside and a new trial is ordered. _____________________________________ J. ERNEST DRAPEAU, CHIEF JUSTICE OF NEW BRUNSWICK

______________________________________ M.E.L. LARLEE, J.A. ______________________________________ J.C. MARC RICHARD, J.A.