2019 QCCA 2218, 2019 QCCA 2218

Viger Blouin c. Roberge 2019 QCCA 2218 COURT OF APPEAL CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC REGISTRY OF MONTREAL No : 500-09-028738-193 ( 500-17-097026-176 , 500-17-099425-178) MINUTES OF HEARING DATE: December 23, 2019 THE HONOURABLE STEPHEN W. HAMILTON, J.A. APPLICANT COUNSEL Louise Viger Blouin Mtre Dimitri Maniatis ( Accent Litigation ) Absent RESPONDENT COUNSEL Jacques Roberge Mtre Christian Azzam ( Donati Maisonneuve ) Absent IMPLEADED PARTY COUNSEL Valeria Wlusek Rosenbloom Mtre Sandra Mastrogiuseppe ( Kugler, Kandestin ) Absent IMPLEADED PARTIES COUNSEL SERVICES IMMOBILIERS GESTRAM INC.

ROCHELLE CANTOR GROUPE SUTTON –CENTRE OUEST INC. MARIE SICOTTE DIMITRI MANIATIS DESCRIPTION: Application for leave to appeal from a judgment rendered in the course of the proceeding on December 3, 2019 by the Honourable Christian Immer of the Superior Court , District of Montréal . (Art. 31 (2) and 357 C.p.c. )

Clerk at the hearing : Mélanie Camiré Courtroom: RC-18 HEARING Continuation of the hearing held on December 20, 2019. The parties were excused from appearing in Court. BY THE JUDGE: Judgment – see page 3. Mélanie Camiré, Clerk at the hearing JUDGMENT [ 1 ] The Applicant made an offer to purchase a property from Mrs. Rosenbloom but refused to execute the deed of sale, with the result that Mrs. Rosenbloom is suing her for her lost profit in Court record 500-17-099425-178 and Mrs. Rosenbloom’s broker is suing her for its lost commission in Court record 500-17-097026-176.

The Applicant called in warranty and impleaded the Respondent, the notary she mandated to complete the transaction. He, in turn, impleaded her attorney. The Applicant and her attorney opposed the impleading of the attorney.

By judgment rendered on December 3, 2019, the Honourable Christian Immer of the Superior Court, District of Montreal, dismissed the oppositions and allowed the impleading of the attorney. [1] The Applicant seeks leave to appeal from that judgment. [ 2 ] There were two preliminary matters before me. [ 3 ] First, I raised the issue of the attorney’s conflict of interest in appearing on behalf of the Applicant to oppose his impleading.

Even though they have made a motion in Superior Court to disqualify him, the parties did not object to the attorney appearing on behalf of the Applicant on this motion. [ 4 ] Second, the Applicant challenged the interest of Mrs. Rosenbaum to make representations on the motion for leave to appeal. Mrs. Rosenbaum did not take

part in the debate in first instance on the oppositions to the impleading. However, in my view, she has an interest in ensuring that the file proceed expeditiously, and as such she has an interest in opposing the motion for leave to appeal and the request that the proceedings in first instance be suspended during the appeal. [ 5 ] The main issue is the motion for leave to appeal. [ 6 ] Because the judgment was rendered in the course of the proceeding, leave to appeal is required and is governed by

Article 31 C.C.P. In order to obtain leave, the Applicant must show that the judgment determines part of the dispute or causes irremediable prejudice, pursuant to

Article 31, paragraph 2 C.C.P. Furthermore, leave will only be granted if it is in the best interests of justice and if the decision to do so is in keeping with the principle of proportionality (Articles 9 and 18 C.C.P. ). [ 7 ] It is clear that permitting the impleading of a party does not determine any part of the dispute.

Moreover, as a general rule, the impleading of a party does not cause irremediable injury to any party. [ 8 ] The Applicant pleads that the effect of allowing the impleading of her attorney is that he will be disqualified from representing her and that this constitutes an irremediable injury. [ 9 ] The disqualification of her attorney may be sufficient to meet the test of irremediable injury: the loss of her attorney is a prejudice and it is irremediable in the sense that the final judgment will not remedy that issue. [2] [ 10 ] Nevertheless, I am not satisfied that this is an appropriate case for granting leave to appeal.

The seriousness of the prejudice to the

Applicant is limited by the judge’s finding that the Applicant has already consulted other attorneys, which “should facilitate any eventual substitution of attorneys”. Moreover, the substitution of attorneys may be required for other reasons. A motion has been made to disqualify the attorney not only because he has been impleaded as a party but also because he will be called as a witness.

The irremediable injury may not be caused by the judgment. [ 11 ] In any event, in my view, there is no reasonable chance of success on the appeal, with the result that it is not in the interest of justice to grant leave to appeal. Granting leave to appeal will also cause further delays in these files that have gone on long enough. THEREFORE, THE UNDERSIGNED: [ 12 ] DISMISSES the application for leave to appeal, with costs. STEPHEN W. HAMILTON, J.A.