2013 NBCA 61, 2013 NBCA 61

COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW BRUNSWICK 29-13-CA FÉDÉRATION DES PRODUCTEURS ACÉRICOLES DU QUÉBEC, APPELLANT FÉDÉRATION DES PRODUCTEURS ACÉRICOLES DU QUÉBEC, APPELANTE - and - - et - CAISSE POPULAIRE DE RESTIGOUCHE LTÉE, NATIONAL BANK OF CANADA, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW BRUNSWICK, S.K. EXPORT INC., ÉTIENNE ST-PIERRE and GERMAIN GAUTHIER RESPONDENTS CAISSE POPULAIRE DE RESTIGOUCHE LTÉE, BANQUE NATIONALE DU CANADA, PROCUREURE GÉNÉRALE DU NOUVEAU- BRUNSWICK, S.K. EXPORT INC., ÉTIENNE ST- PIERRE et GERMAIN GAUTHIER INTIMÉS Quebec (Fédération des producteurs acéricoles) v.

Caisse populaire de Restigouche Ltée, 2013 NBCA 61 Québec (Fédération des producteurs acéricoles) c.

Caisse populaire de Restigouche Ltée, 2013 NBCA 61 CORAM: The Honourable Chief Justice Drapeau The Honourable Justice Larlee The Honourable Justice Quigg CORAM : l’honorable juge en chef Drapeau l’honorable juge Larlee l’honorable juge Quigg Appeal from a decision of the Court of Queen’s Bench: January 28, 2013 Appel d’une décision de la Cour du Banc de la Reine : le 28 janvier 2013 History of Case: Historique de la cause : Decision under appeal: 2013 NBQB 42 Décision frappée d’appel : 2013 NBBR 42 Preliminary or incidental proceedings: N/A Procédures préliminaires ou accessoires : s.o.

Appeal heard: June 20, 2013 and October 1, 2013 Appel entendu : le 20 juin 2013 et le 1 er octobre 2013

Judgment rendered: October 1, 2013 Jugement rendu : le 1 er octobre 2013 Counsel at hearing: For the appellant: Sacha D. Morisset and Mathieu Turcotte For the respondent Caisse populaire de Restigouche Ltée: Marc Roy For the respondent National Bank of Canada: Ronald J. LeBlanc, Q.C., and Renée Cormier For the respondent Attorney General of New Brunswick: Gaétan Migneault No one appeared for respondents S.K. Export Inc., Étienne St-Pierre and Germain Gauthier Avocats à l’audience : Pour l’appelante : Sacha D.

Morisset et Mathieu Turcotte Pour l’intimée Caisse populaire de Restigouche Ltée : Marc Roy Pour l’intimée Banque Nationale du Canada : Ronald J. LeBlanc, c.r. et Ren é e Cormier Pour l’intimée Procureure générale du Nouveau- Brunswick : Ga é tan Migneault Personne n’a comparu pour les intimés S.K. Export Inc., Étienne St-Pierre et Germain Gauthier THE COURT The appeal is dismissed with costs. Brief reasons will follow. English version of the decision delivered by THE COURT (Orally) [ 1 ] The appeal is dismissed with costs. Brief reasons will follow.

________________________________________ J. ERNEST DRAPEAU, JUGE EN CHEF DU NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK ____________________________________ M.E.L. LARLEE, J.C.A. _____________________________________ KATHLEEN A. QUIGG, J.C.A.

COURT OF APPEAL OF COUR D’APPEL DU NEW BRUNSWICK NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK 29-13-CA FÉDÉRATION DES PRODUCTEURS ACÉRICOLES DU QUÉBEC, APPELLANT FÉDÉRATION DES PRODUCTEURS ACÉRICOLES DU QUÉBEC, APPELANTE - and - - et - CAISSE POPULAIRE DE RESTIGOUCHE LTÉE, NATIONAL BANK OF CANADA, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW BRUNSWICK, S.K. EXPORT INC., ÉTIENNE ST-PIERRE and GERMAIN GAUTHIER RESPONDENTS CAISSE POPULAIRE DE RESTIGOUCHE LTÉE, BANQUE NATIONALE DU CANADA, PROCUREURE GÉNÉRALE DU NOUVEAU- BRUNSWICK, S.K. EXPORT INC., ÉTIENNE ST- PIERRE et GERMAIN GAUTHIER INTIMÉS Quebec (Fédération des producteurs acéricoles) v.

Caisse populaire de Restigouche Ltée, 2013 NBCA 61 Québec (Fédération des producteurs acéricoles) c.

Caisse populaire de Restigouche Ltée, 2013 NBCA 61 CORAM: The Honourable Chief Justice Drapeau The Honourable Justice Larlee The Honourable Justice Quigg CORAM : l’honorable juge en chef Drapeau l’honorable juge Larlee l’honorable juge Quigg Appeal from a decision of the Court of Queen’s Bench: January 28, 2013 Appel d’une décision de la Cour du Banc de la Reine : le 28 janvier 2013 History of Case: Historique de la cause : Decision under appeal: 2013 NBQB 42 Décision frappée d’appel : 2013 NBBR 42 Preliminary or incidental proceedings: N/A Procédures préliminaires ou accessoires : s.o.

Appeal heard: June 20, 2013 and October 1, 2013 Appel entendu : le 20 juin 2013 et le 1 er octobre 2013 Judgment rendered: October 1, 2013 Jugement rendu : le 1 er octobre 2013 Reasons delivered: January 16, 2014 Motifs déposés : le 16 janvier 2014 Counsel at hearing: For the appellant: Sacha D. Morisset and Mathieu Turcotte For the respondent Caisse populaire de Restigouche Ltée: Marc Roy For the respondent National Bank of Canada: Ronald J. LeBlanc, Q.C., and Renée Cormier For the respondent Attorney General of New Brunswick: Gaétan Migneault No one appeared for respondents S.K.

Export Inc., Étienne St-Pierre and Germain Gauthier Avocats à l’audience : pour l’appelante : Sacha D. Morisset et Mathieu Turcotte pour l’intimée Caisse populaire de Restigouche Ltée : Marc Roy pour l’intimée Banque Nationale du Canada : Ronald J. LeBlanc, c.r. et Ren é e Cormier pour l’intimée Procureure générale du Nouveau- Brunswick : Ga é tan Migneault Personne n’a comparu pour les intimés S.K.

Export Inc., Étienne St-Pierre et Germain Gauthier THE COURT In the text that follows the Court fleshes out the basis for its dismissal of the appeal against the refusal of a judge of the Court of Queen’s Bench to “adopt”, pursuant to the Interprovincial Subpoena Act of New Brunswick, the out-of-province document submitted as a “subpoena”. In sum, the document in question does not meet the essential requirements of a “subpoena” in that it does not name the witness and does not specify the date, time and place of his or her attendance.

LA COUR Dans le texte qui suit, la Cour précise le fondement de son rejet de l’appel à l’encontre du refus par un juge de la Cour du Banc de la Reine d’homologuer le document qui lui a été soumis à

titre de « subpoena » en vertu de la Loi sur les subpoenas interprovinciaux du Nouveau-Brunswick. En bref, le document en question ne satisfait pas aux conditions essentielles d’un « subpoena » puisqu’il ne nomme pas le témoin et ne précise pas la date, l’heure et le lieu de sa comparution.

English version of the Court’s reasons for judgment delivered by DRAPEAU, C.J.N.B. I. Introduction [1] All provinces, except Quebec, have taken a similar legislative approach to interprovincial subpoenas. The legislation in question paves the way for the legal effectiveness of an extraprovincial “subpoena” in the named person’s province of residence.

The means chosen by the legislator to bring about this effectiveness is the adoption (“homologation”) of the “subpoena” by both the superior court of the province in which it was issued (“the issuing province”) and the superior court of the named person’s province of residence (“the province of final adoption”).

Following the lead of the Uniform Interprovincial Subpoena Act , which the Uniform Law Conference of Canada adopted in 1974, each of those statutes precludes final adoption unless the legislation of the issuing province contains a reciprocity provision with respect to the named person’s legal immunity when he or she attends in answer to the “subpoena”. More specifically, the legislative provision must afford legal immunity similar to the immunity that would apply to residents of the issuing province during their attendance, in answer to a “subpoena”, before a court of the province of final adoption.

It is common ground that Quebec has not passed legislation providing the required immunity-related reciprocity. [ 2 ] The appellant Fédération des producteurs acéricoles du Québec is an association of maple syrup producers. It administers a marketing plan for that product pursuant to Quebec legislation. The respondent Étienne St-Pierre lives in Saint-Quentin, New Brunswick. He is the president of the respondent S.K. Export Inc., whose head office is also in Saint-Quentin. The company exports maple syrup to the United States and Europe.

According to the Federation, these respondents purchased maple syrup from Quebec producers in violation of the aforementioned plan. [ 3 ] The Régie des marchés agricoles et alimentaires du Québec is an administrative tribunal tasked, in particular, with administering Quebec’s marketing legislation. In the fall of 2007, the Régie held a series of public hearings in Quebec in furtherance of a Federation application for orders designed to put an end to the “unauthorized” business activities of Mr. St- Pierre and S.K. Export.

In January 2012, at the instance of the Federation, the Régie ordered Caisse populaire de Restigouche , which is headquartered in Kedgwick, New Brunswick, to delegate a representative [TRANSLATION] “to attend any hearing scheduled by the Régie for which a notice to appear is issued specifying the date, location and time, in order to answer any questions relating to the investigation currently underway.” The Régie also ordered the delegated individual to bring to any hearing at which he or she was called to appear and, if required, to file the documents listed in the

schedule to the subpoena duces tecum that the Régie intended to serve on the individual. An identical order was issued for the Saint-Quentin branch of National Bank. [ 4 ] On application by the Federation, a Quebec Superior Court judge homologated the decision of the Régie and ordered the Caisse and the Saint-Quentin branch of National Bank to comply with it.

The judge attached to his order a document that he described as the [TRANSLATION] “certificate prescribed” by the Interprovincial Subpoena Act , R.S.N.B. 2011, c. 180 (“ Act ”). [ 5 ] The Federation then applied to the Court of Queen’s Bench of New Brunswick for an order adopting the Quebec Superior Court decision.

According to the application, the decision in question attests to the necessity of the testimony before the Régie of representatives of the Caisse and of the Saint-Quentin branch of National Bank. [ 6 ] The Federation’s application was dismissed following the hearing, the Court of Queen’s Bench judge being of the view that: (1) his jurisdiction was circumscribed by the Act ; (2) the reciprocity condition in s. 3 of the Act is constitutional; and (3) this condition compelled him to dismiss the application, since Quebec legislation does not feature a provision affording New Brunswick residents a legal immunity similar to that which the Act extends to Quebec residents. [ 7 ] The Federation appeals, arguing each of those findings is erroneous and that adoption should be ordered.

According to the Federation, the Act should not be interpreted so as to strip the Court of Queen’s Bench of its common law power to adopt an extraprovincial “subpoena”. The Federation’s fallback submission is that any provision of the Act effectively overruling this power is unconstitutional.

[8] Although some general observations are warranted, if only to contextualize the jurisprudentialdebate, it is my view that the record does not contain all of the elements required for a determination of the constitutionality of thestatutory provisions at issue. In this regard, it bears noting, as the Attorney General has underscored, that neither the factual nor thelegislative context (at least as regards the situation in Quebec) has been satisfactorily fleshed out.

Moreover, it would have beenpreferable for the debate regarding constitutionality to deal with the argument that the recognition and enforcement of interprovincial“subpoenas” are matters within the authority of the federal Parliament pursuant to the “Peace, Order and Good Government” clause in s.91 of the Constitution (see Morguard Investments Ltd v. De Savoye, (SCC), [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077, [1990] S.C.J. No. 135(QL), La Forest, J.).

At any rate, I am attracted to the view that it is generally wise to avoid settling a dispute by resort to constitutionalprinciples when some other legal basis is both adequate and available (see Laskin, Canadian Constitutional Law, 3rd ed. (Toronto:Carswell, 1969) at p. 145, and R. v. McGraw, 2007 NBCA 11, 312 N.B.R. (2d) 142), and that is what I intend to do. [9] The first step in determining an application such as the one that concerns us here involvesverifying whether the document in question is in fact a “subpoena” capable of adoption under the Act.

It is only once this question hasbeen resolved in the applicant’s favor that the issues argued in first instance stand to be determined. It is unclear why the parties and thejudge skipped this threshold step. II. Context [10] The following facts were referenced in the written submissions and at the hearing on appeal. [11] The Fédération des producteurs acéricoles du Québec has marketing board status within themeaning of the Act Respecting the Marketing of Agricultural, Food and Fish Products, R.S.Q., c. M-35.1 (“Act Respecting […]Marketing”).

It administers a joint plan governing the conditions under which concentrated maple water is produced and marketed inQuebec. [12] The Act Respecting […] Marketing establishes the Régie des marchés agricoles et alimentairesdu Québec and generally entrusts it with responsibility for the statute’s application. In pursuance of its mandate, the Régie ratified amarketing agreement setting out the terms of purchase for bulk maple syrup, as well as the conditions under which a business isauthorized to buy syrup.

At the end of the day, all Quebec producers are required to deliver their maple syrup to Federation warehousesor to an authorized buyer. [13] On October 18, 2007, the Federation formally asked the Régie to undertake an investigationwith a view to determining whether orders should issue for the purpose of putting an end to the “unauthorized” purchase of maple syrupby the respondents S.K. Export Inc. and Étienne St-Pierre.

The Régie agreed and held public hearings commencing in June 2008 for thepurpose of gathering evidence on point. [14] On January 13, 2011, the Régie’s secretary signed a subpoena requiring the CommercialAccount Manager of the Caisse: (1) to appear one week later, more specifically at 10:00 a.m. on January 20, in the J.E. Bernier RoomAB at the Quality Inn & Suites hotel in Lévis, Quebec, to testify; and (2) to bring the documents listed in an attached schedule, to wit: [TRANSLATION]

a) a list of accounts held by Étienne St-Pierre and SK Export Inc., or by any other natural or legal person connected withÉtienne St-Pierre, as well as any business in which he might have an interest, from January 1, 2004, to the present;

b) the account statements for each of those accounts, from January 1, 2004, to the present;

c) all bank instruments relating to any transactions (deposits, transfers, withdrawals, etc.) of $1,000.00 or more in thoseaccounts, from January 1, 2004, to the present;

d) the content, origin and/or destination of those transactions (deposits, transfers, withdrawals, etc.) and, more specifically,with respect to electronic bank transfers. The following day, January 14, 2011, the secretary signed another subpoena, this one requiring an employee of the Saint-Quentin branchof National Bank to: (1) appear and testify on the date, and at the time and location, indicated above; and (2) bring the documents listed

in the attached schedule, to wit: [TRANSLATION] a. a list of accounts held by Étienne St-Pierre and SK Export Inc., or by any other natural or legal person connected withÉtienne St-Pierre, as well as any business in which he might have an interest, from January 1, 2004, to the present; b. the account statements for each of those accounts, from January 1, 2004, to the present; c. all bank instruments relating to any transactions (deposits, transfers, withdrawals, etc.) of $1,000.00 or more in thoseaccounts, from January 1, 2004, to the present; d. the content, origin and/or destination of those transactions (deposits, transfers, withdrawals, etc.) and, more specifically,with respect to electronic bank transfers. [15] Not having been judicially “adopted”, those subpoenas did not impose any legal obligation onthe individuals in question and neither appeared before the Régie. [16] On January 19, 2012, the Régie issued, at the request of the Federation, the orders that lie at theheart of the dispute before us: [TRANSLATION] ORDERS Caisse populaire de Restigouche Ltée to delegate a representative to attend any hearing scheduled by the Régie for which anotice to appear is issued specifying the date, location and time, in order to answer any questions regarding the investigation currentlyunderway before the Régie, and to bring and, if required, file the documents specified in the schedules to the subpoenas duces tecumserved on them; ORDERS National Bank of Canada Ltd. to delegate a representative to attend any hearing scheduled by the Régie for which a notice toappear is issued specifying the date, location and time, in order to answer any questions regarding the investigation currently underwaybefore the Régie, and to bring and, if required, file the documents specified in the schedules to the subpoenas duces tecum served onthem. [17] On April 10, 2012, a judge of the Quebec Superior Court found [TRANSLATION] “thetestimony of the defendants (sic) was necessary” and homologated the Régie’s decision.

He directed [TRANSLATION] “the defendants(sic) Caisse Populaire de Restigouche Ltée and National Bank of Canada, Saint-Quentin branch, to comply with it”. Correlatively, heissued a document that he described as [TRANSLATION] “the certificate prescribed by the Interprovincial Subpoena Act, R.S.N.B.2011, c. 180” and declared that [TRANSLATION] “for all legal purposes, said certificate [is] attached to this judgment as an integralpart hereof”.

As will be seen, and with all due respect for the Superior Court justice, the certificate attached to his judgment does notcomply with the Interprovincial Subpoena Act. [18] The Federation then applied to the Court of Queen’s Bench of New Brunswick for the adoptionof the Quebec Superior Court decision.

The Federation contended adoption was not precluded by the Interprovincial Subpoena Act and[TRANSLATION] “that the rules of comity require the courts of a province to recognize orders issued by a court in another province thathas properly exercised its jurisdiction”, citing a number of Supreme Court of Canada precedents in support of this proposition, includingMorguard Investments Ltd v. De Savoye and Hunt v. T&N plc, (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289, [1993] S.C.J.

No. 125 (QL). [19] After being notified the application took issue with the constitutionality of some provisions ofthe Interprovincial Subpoena Act, the Attorney General of New Brunswick intervened as a party. The right to do so is provided ins. 22(3) of the Judicature Act, R.S.N.B. 1973 c. J-2, which reads as follows:

22(3) In any case in which (

a) a question arises as to whether (

i) a statute or a provision of any statute of the Legislature is constitutionally valid or operative, […] the Attorney General for Canada and the Attorney General for the Province shall be given notice thereof and either may, if he thinks fit, intervene as a party, produce evidence and argue matters of law as well before the trial judge as before the Court of Appeal, but in no case shall costs be awarded either for or against the Crown, nor shall it be necessary for the Crown to plead any matters other than its position with reference to the statutory provision involved. 22

(3) Dans tous les cas où la question soulevée est

a) à savoir (

i) si une loi ou une disposition d’une loi de la Législature est constitutionnellement valide ou applicable; ou […] le procureur général du Canada et son homologue de la province doivent en être avisés et chacun peut, s’il l’estime opportun, intervenir en tant que partie, fournir des preuves et débattre des questions de droit tant devant le juge de première instance que devant la Cour d’appel mais en aucun cas, les frais et dépens ne doivent être prononcés en faveur ou à l’encontre de la Couronne et celle-ci reste entièrement libre de ne pas plaider les questions étrangères à sa position concernant la disposition statutaire impliquée. [ 20 ] The Attorney General of Canada, on the other hand, opted not to intervene in first instance, and his motion for an order striking him from the style of cause was allowed at the outset of the hearing on appeal. [ 21 ] National Bank and the Caisse , the parties directly affected by the application, did not formally oppose it.

In fact, neither appeared at the hearing in first instance. [ 22 ] Nevertheless, the judge dismissed the application on the following grounds: Having considered the Federation’s and the Attorney General’s respective positions, this Court is satisfied by the Federation’s argument that the current principles of Canadian common law in matters of private international law tip the balance in favour of a finding that subpoenas issued by a Canadian jurisdiction should be adopted by other Canadian jurisdictions.

This Court is also satisfied that the facts of this case indicate that the conditions set out in the case-law to allow the Court to exercise its common law power have been met. However, the Court is convinced that the New Brunswick Legislature has removed the Court’s common law power to adopt Canadian interjurisdictional subpoenas, except under the Subpoena Act of New Brunswick. The Court therefore agrees with the Attorney General’s submission that s. 3 of the Subpoena Act should be declared valid and applied as our Legislative Assembly dictates.

The Court is of the view that the Federation’s argument would have been convincing and thus adopted by this Court, were it not for ss. 2, 4, 6 and 7 of the Subpoena Act . Indeed, in this Court’s view, the effect of ss. 2, 4, 6 and 7 of the Subpoena Act is precisely to conform to the current principles of

Canadian private international law to which the Supreme Court of Canada has given constitutional force. As to s. 3 of our Subpoena Act which, it must be remembered, has a counterpart in every province in Canada except Quebec, the Court recognizes that it effectively constitutes (within the meaning of Morguard ) “legislation that may have some effect on litigation in other provinces”, even in the Province of Quebec.

Nevertheless, the Court believes that s. 3 constitutes a public policy decision on the part of the Legislative Assembly and it “respect[s] minimum standards of order and fairness” within the meaning of Morguard . L: DISPOSITION The Court declares that in accordance with the Interprovincial Subpoena Act of this province, the Court is barred from confirming the judgment of the Quebec Superior Court; The Court finds that the said Act , including its

section 3, is constitutionally valid.

Accordingly, the Court denies the remedies sought by the Federation in its application dated May 30, 2012. [paras. 104-114] [ 23 ] According to the notice of appeal, the application judge erred in law by: (1) holding the Interprovincial Subpoena Act negated his common law power of adoption; (2) finding the Act barred the adoption sought in the case at bar; (3) ruling ss. 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7 of the Act [TRANSLATION] “satisfy the constitutional principles of Canadian private international law”; and (4) confirming the constitutional validity of the Act and s. 3 thereof (the provision that makes reciprocal legal immunity a prerequisite for the adoption of interprovincial subpoenas).

III. Legislative Provisions [ 24 ] The relevant legislative provisions are set out in

Schedule A. IV. Analysis and Discussion [ 25 ] On October 1, 2013, the Court dismissed the Federation’s appeal with costs and reasons to follow. In my view, the appeal could not succeed because the underlying application does not seek the adoption of a “subpoena” as defined in s. 1 of the Interprovincial Subpoena Act . That said, and as will be seen, this outcome does appear to be justified by the provisions of the Act upon which the judge relied to dismiss the application in first instance. A. Prerequisites for adoption [ 26 ]

Section 2(

a) of the Interprovincial Subpoena Act is unequivocal. The Court of Queen’s Bench of New Brunswick can adopt a “subpoena” if it is accompanied by a certificate signed by a judge of the superior court of the issuing province. That certificate must be in the form prescribed by regulation. The General Regulation – Interprovincial Subpoena Act , N.B. Reg. 91-68 requires the certificate be in Form 1. [ 27 ] Form 1 obligates the signing judge to set out the

section of the statute of the issuing province that accords absolute immunity to a resident of New Brunswick who is required to attend as a witness “from seizure of goods, service of process, execution of judgment, garnishment, imprisonment or molestation of any kind relating to a legal or judicial right, cause, action, proceeding or process within the jurisdiction of the Legislature of the issuing province except only those proceedings grounded on events occurring during or after the required attendance of the person in the issuing province”. This feature of Form 1 is traceable to s. 3.

[28]

Section 3 bars the Court of Queen’s Bench from adopting a “subpoena” from another provinceunder s. 2 unless the law of that other province includes a provision “similar to

section 6”.

Section 3 states a resident of New Brunswickwho is required to attend as a witness in another province must have “absolute immunity [...] from all proceedings of the nature set out insection 6 and within the jurisdiction of the Legislature of that other province except only those proceedings grounded on events occurringduring or after the required attendance of the person in the other province”. [29] For its part, s. 6 provides a person required to attend before a court in New Brunswick in answerto a “subpoena” adopted by a court in another province “is deemed, while within New Brunswick in answer to the subpoena, not to havesubmitted to the jurisdiction of the courts of New Brunswick other than as a witness in the proceedings in which the person issubpoenaed”.

The

section further states that person “is absolutely immune from seizure of goods, service of process, execution ofjudgment, garnishment, imprisonment or molestation of any kind relating to a legal or judicial right, cause, action, proceeding or processwithin the jurisdiction of the Legislature of New Brunswick except only those proceedings grounded on events occurring during or afterthe required attendance of the person in New Brunswick”. [30] It is common ground that no Quebec legislation contains the provision required by s. 3 of theInterprovincial Subpoena Act.

Moreover, the certificate signed by the Quebec Superior Court justice does not comply with Form 1, sinceit does not set out the provision of Quebec legislation that affords the legal immunity described above to a resident of New Brunswickwho is required to attend as a witness.

That being so, and assuming, arguendo, the document described in the application is actually a“subpoena”, the Court of Queen’s Bench judge cannot be faulted for dismissing the Federation’s application, unless: (1) there is somenon-statutory judicial jurisdiction over the adoption of subpoenas the exercise of which is not barred by lack of reciprocity with respect tolegal immunity; or (2) s. 3 of the Act is unconstitutional. [31] The Federation contends the Court of Queen’s Bench has the power at common law to make itsown a decision of the superior court of another province that has adopted a “subpoena” issued by an administrative tribunal, like theRégie.

No judicial precedent to that effect has been brought to our attention. [32] Furthermore, that power, if it exists, would not necessarily be exercisable in the absence ofinterprovincial reciprocity as to legal immunity. Be that as it may, I conclude the purpose and effect of the Interprovincial Subpoena Actis to establish a comprehensive code of general application in connection with all applications for the adoption of a “subpoena” fromanother province.

That conclusion strikes me as inescapable particularly in light of the object of the Act, the broad wording of thedefinition of “subpoena” and “court” in s. 1, and s. 2’s equally comprehensive wording. The Act would serve no useful purpose if,notwithstanding its enactment, there remained a common law judicial power to adopt a “subpoena” from another Canadian jurisdiction. [33] Moreover, the Federation does not rely upon any express provision of the Constitution insupport of its contention that the Act is unconstitutional.

Specifically, it does not contend the “Peace, Order and Good Government”clause of the Constitution gives Parliament exclusive jurisdiction to legislate respecting the recognition and enforcement ofinterprovincial “subpoenas”. The Federation looks exclusively to unwritten constitutional principles to bolster its argument that thereciprocity condition articulated in s. 3 of the Act cannot be reconciled with the following pronouncements in Morguard Investments Ltd.v.

De Savoye: However that may be, there is really no comparison between the interprovincial relationships of today and those obtaining betweenforeign countries in the 19th century. Indeed, in my view, there never was and the courts made a serious error in transposing the rulesdeveloped for the enforcement of foreign judgments to the enforcement of judgments from sister-provinces.

The considerationsunderlying the rules of comity apply with much greater force between the units of a federal state, and I do not think it much matterswhether one calls these rules of comity or simply relies directly on the reasons of justice, necessity and convenience to which I havealready adverted. […] […] One of the central features of the constitutional arrangements incorporated in the Constitution Act, 1867 was the creation of acommon market. Barriers to interprovincial trade were removed by s. 121.

Generally trade and commerce between the provinces wasseen to be a matter of concern to the country as a whole; see Constitution Act, 1867, s. 91(2). The Peace, Order and Good Governmentclause gives the federal Parliament powers to deal with interprovincial activities (see Interprovincial Co-Operatives Ltd. v. The Queen, (SCC), [1976] 1 S.C.R. 477; as well as my reasons in R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd., [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401(dissenting but not on this point); see also Multiple Access Ltd. v. McCutcheon, (SCC), [1982] 2 S.C.R. 161).

And thecombined effect of s. 91(29) and s. 92(10) does the same for interprovincial works and undertakings. These arrangements themselves speak to the strong need for the enforcement throughout the country of judgments given in one province.[…]

These various constitutional and sub-constitutional arrangements and practices make unnecessary a "full faith and credit" clause such asexists in other federations, such as the United States and Australia. The existence of these clauses, however, does indicate that a regimeof mutual recognition of judgments across the country is inherent in a federation. Indeed, the European Economic Community hasdetermined that such a feature flows naturally from a common market, even without political integration.

To that end its members haveentered into the 1968 Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. The integrating character of our constitutional arrangements as they apply to interprovincial mobility is such that some writers havesuggested that a "full faith and credit" clause must be read into the Constitution and that the federal Parliament is, under the "Peace,Order and Good Government" clause, empowered to legislate respecting the recognition and enforcement of judgments throughoutCanada; see, for example, Black, op. cit., and Hogg, op. cit.

The present case was not, however, argued on that basis, and I need not gothat far. For present purposes, it is sufficient to say that, in my view, the application of the underlying principles of comity and privateinternational law must be adapted to the situations where they are applied, and that in a federation this implies a fuller and more generousacceptance of the judgments of the courts of other constituent units of the federation.

In short, the rules of comity or private internationallaw as they apply between the provinces must be shaped to conform to the federal structure of the Constitution. […] A similar approach should, in my view, be adopted in relation to the recognition and enforcement of judgments within Canada.

As I seeit, the courts in one province should give full faith and credit, to use the language of the United States Constitution, to the judgmentsgiven by a court in another province or a territory, so long as that court has properly, or appropriately, exercised jurisdiction in the action.I referred earlier to the principles of order and fairness that should obtain in this area of the law. Both order and justice militate in favourof the security of transactions. It seems anarchic and unfair that a person should be able to avoid legal obligations arising in one provincesimply by moving to another province.

Why should a plaintiff be compelled to begin an action in the province where the defendant nowresides, whatever the inconvenience and costs this may bring, and whatever degree of connection the relevant transaction may have withanother province? And why should the availability of local enforcement be the decisive element in the plaintiff's choice of forum?[paras. 35-41] [Emphasis added.] [34] Those constitutional considerations were reaffirmed in Hunt v. T&N plc: Now, as perusal of the last cited passage from Morguard reveals, the constitutional considerations raised are just that.

They areconstitutional imperatives, and as such apply to the provincial legislatures as well as to the courts, as the Attorney General for Ontarioconceded and as a number of commentators have maintained; see, for example, P. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (3rd ed. 1992),at p. 335; V. Black and J. Swan, "New Rules for the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye",supra.

In short, to use the expressions employed in Morguard, at p. 1100, the "integrating character of our constitutional arrangements asthey apply to interprovincial mobility" calls for the courts in each province to give "full faith and credit" to the judgments of the courts ofsister provinces.

This, as also noted in Morguard, is inherent in the structure of the Canadian federation, and, as such, is beyond thepower of provincial legislatures to override. [para. 56] [35] The Supreme Court of Canada also recognized the importance of the underlying constitutionalprinciples in Reference re Secession of Quebec, (SCC), [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61 (QL): Although these underlying principles are not explicitly made part of the Constitution by any written provision, other than in somerespects by the oblique reference in the

preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867, it would be impossible to conceive of our constitutionalstructure without them. The principles dictate major elements of the architecture of the Constitution itself and are as such its lifeblood. [...] Underlying constitutional principles may in certain circumstances give rise to substantive legal obligations (have "full legal force", as wedescribed it in the Patriation Reference, supra, at p. 845), which constitute substantive limitations upon government action.

Theseprinciples may give rise to very abstract and general obligations, or they may be more specific and precise in nature. The principles arenot merely descriptive, but are also invested with a powerful normative force, and are binding upon both courts and governments. “Inother words”, as this Court confirmed in the Manitoba Language Rights Reference, supra, at p. 752, "in the process of Constitutionaladjudication, the Court may have regard to unwritten postulates which form the very foundation of the Constitution of Canada”. [paras.51 and 54]

[ 36 ] However, although substantive legal obligations may arise from those underlying principles, it is important to properly delineate their scope. In British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd. , 2005 SCC 49 , [2005] 2 S.C.R. 473 , the Court offers a relatively narrow conception of the ambit of these principles: This does not mean that the rule of law as described by this Court has no normative force. As McLachlin C.J. stated in Babcock , at para. 54, “unwritten constitutional principles”, including the rule of law, “are capable of limiting government actions”.

See also Reference re Secession of Quebec , at para. 54 . But the government action constrained by the rule of law as understood in Reference re Manitoba Language Rights and Reference re Secession of Quebec is, by definition, usually that of the executive and judicial branches. Actions of the legislative branch are constrained too, but only in the sense that they must comply with legislated requirements as to manner and form (i.e., the procedures by which legislation is to be enacted, amended and repealed) . [ Para. 60 ] [Emphasis added.] Finally, in Babcock v.

Canada (Attorney General) , 2002 SCC 57 , [2002] 3 S.C.R. 3 , the Court rejected the contention that unwritten constitutional principles limited the government action under consideration in that case, reiterating in passing that Parliamentary sovereignty must inform the

interpretation of those principles. [ 37 ] The Federation does not contend the Legislature of New Brunswick flouted [TRANSLATION] “legislated requirements as to manner and form” when it passed the Act . It also concedes the Act does not systematically bar all applications for adoption. [ 38 ] Indeed, the Act sets out a few prerequisites that applicants from other common law provinces can easily meet since those jurisdictions have put in place a legislative scheme that ensures reciprocal legal immunity.

The same would apply to a “subpoena” from Quebec if that province were to pass legislation prescribing the requisite reciprocity. This state of affairs suffices to distinguish Hunt , where the impugned Quebec legislation precluded the recognition and enforcement of orders from other Canadian jurisdictions.

After all, s. 3 of the Act merely requires the issuing province to provide, through legislation, immunity comparable to the immunity its residents will enjoy when they appear before a New Brunswick court in answer to a subpoena. [ 39 ] Admittedly, the reciprocity requirement has an incidental effect on litigation in Quebec, but this alone does not suffice to render the source provision unconstitutional.

The issue is addressed in Hunt : […] This does not mean, however, that a province is debarred from enacting any legislation that may have some effect on litigation in other provinces or indeed from enacting legislation respecting modalities for recognition of judgments of other provinces. But it does mean that it must respect the minimum standards of order and fairness addressed in Morguard . [para. 56] [ 40 ] Quebec is the only province that has not passed legislation ensuring reciprocity with respect to the legal immunity of witnesses under subpoena.

This is a choice the province was entitled to make, and it is not my place to question its wisdom. New Brunswick, like the other common law provinces, settled upon a different option, and I do not see how that choice fails to respect the minimum standards of order and fairness to which Morguard refers.

All things considered, the Federation’s contention of unconstitutionality, although quite interesting and well argued, strikes me as one that rests on a rather weak foundation. [ 41 ] In any event, Morguard requires the recognition of judgments issued by a court of another province only where that court “has properly, or appropriately, exercised jurisdiction” (para. 41). In my judgment, it is unclear whether the Régie had jurisdiction to issue the orders in question and whether the Quebec Superior Court had jurisdiction to homologate them. B.

Jurisdiction of the Régie [ 42 ] Under the first paragraph of s. 43 of the Act Respecting […] Marketing , the Régie may, under certain circumstances, issue an order requiring “a marketing board or any person engaged in the production or marketing of a product marketed under a plan, to perform or not to perform a particular act”.

Section 43 expressly provides the Régie’s decision may be homologated by the Quebec Superior Court after which it becomes executory as a judgment of that Court.

[ 43 ] The parties targeted by the Régie decision that was homologated by the Quebec Superior Court, namely the Caisse and the Saint-Quentin branch of National Bank, are not marketing boards or persons subject to s. 43.

Moreover, the relevant part of that provision, namely the first paragraph, authorizes the Régie to make an order requiring a marketing board, producer or any person engaged in the marketing of a product marketed under a plan, “to perform or not to perform a particular act where it is of the opinion that such act or omission may hinder the carrying out of the plan, a by-law, a homologated agreement or an arbitration award”.

The quoted text is surely not elastic to the point of including subpoenas. [ 44 ] It follows the Régie must draw from another legislative provision the jurisdiction required to issue the orders in question. The Federation rests its hopes on s. 165 of the Act Respecting […] Marketing . [ 45 ]

Section 165 authorizes the Régie to “summon any person for examination and require the filing of documents useful for the conduct of an investigation or any matter brought before it”. The Federation submits the Régie decision that was homologated by the Quebec Superior Court is, for all intents and purposes, a summons to witness within the meaning of s. 165. With respect, I cannot subscribe to that view. [ 46 ] A summons to witness must name the person in question and specify the place, date and time he or she is to attend.

It will be recalled that the subpoenas signed by the secretary of the Régie in January 2011 set out the date (January 20, 2011), time (10:00 a.m.) and place (J.E. Bernier Room AB at the Quality Inn & Suites hotel in Lévis, Quebec) of the attendance of the targeted individuals. At the hearing in this Court, the Federation conceded – quite rightly, in my view – that under Quebec law, a subpoena must name the person targeted and specify the date, time and place of attendance.

That being the case, neither of the orders issued by the Régie on January 19, 2012 and subsequently homologated by the Quebec Superior Court qualifies as a summons within the meaning of s. 165. [ 47 ] Moreover, the Federation did not point to any other provision of the Act Respecting […] Marketing, or of any other Quebec legislation, as a source of the jurisdiction the Régie assumed in issuing the orders of January 19, 2012. [ 48 ] But there is more. C.

Jurisdiction of the Quebec Superior Court [ 49 ] By enacting a law similar to the Interprovincial Subpoena Act , each common law province invested its superior court with the power to adopt a “subpoena” issued by a “court”, such as the Régie. Since Quebec opted to go it alone and not enact corresponding legislation, its superior court must draw jurisdiction from another source. [ 50 ] Of course, a Quebec court cannot draw jurisdiction over subpoena adoption from the Interprovincial Subpoena Act of New Brunswick.

Its right to intervene must originate in Quebec legislation. [ 51 ] As mentioned, the Act Respecting […] Marketing empowers the Quebec Superior Court to homologate the decisions described in s. 43. However, those decisions do not include summonses to witnesses, which fall under s. 165. The Quebec legislator has not provided in s. 165 that the Superior Court can homologate a summons to witness, and the Federation has not pointed to any other provision of the Act Respecting […] Marketing that might give that power to the Superior Court.

As well, if other Quebec legislation confers such a power, the enabling provision has not been brought to our attention. This begs the following question: did the Quebec legislator intend to authorize the Régie to issue subpoenas for individuals who do not live in Quebec? Regrettably, that question was not debated on appeal and, consequently, I must refrain from commenting on the subject. That said, the analysis may be appropriately pursued on the assumption that Quebec’s legislative landscape includes a provision authorizing its Superior Court to homologate a “summons” to witness issued under s. 165. D.

Jurisdiction of the Court of Queen’s Bench of New Brunswick [ 52 ]

Section 1 of the Interprovincial Subpoena Act defines the term “subpoena” as follows:

“subpoena or other document issued by a court requiring a person within a province other than the province of the issuing court to attend as a witness before the issuing court”.

The Oxford Canadian Dictionary (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998) ascribes the following meaning to the term “subpoena”: subpoena / sǝ’pi:nǝ / n. & v. • n , a writ issued by a court or other authorized body requiring the attendance of a person at a stated time and place, usu. to testify or present evidence, subject to penalty for non-compliance. • v.t.r. (past and past part. subpoenaed ) 1 summon (a person) to appear in court as a witness. 2 require (evidence etc.) to be brought by a witness so that it may be presented in court. [Middle English from Latin sub poena under penalty (the first words of the writ)] [ Emphasis added.] [ 53 ] The definition in Black’s Law Dictionary , Revised 4 th ed. (St.

Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1968), is along the same lines: SUBPOENA. ( Lat. Sub, under, poena, penalty ). A process to cause a witness to appear and give testimony, commanding him to lay aside all pretenses and excuses, and appear before a court or magistrate therein named at a time wherein mentioned to testify for the party named under a penalty therein mentioned . Alexander v, Harrison, 2 Ind.App. 47, 28 N.E. 119, 121. This is called distinctively a subpoena ad testificandum. [Emphasis added.] See, to the same effect, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary , Rawle’s Third Revision, Vol. 3 N.Y., (St.

Paul, Minn.: Vernon Law Book Company, 1914). [ 54 ] Furthermore, the forms for a “subpoena” or summons to witness invariably provide the name of the person in question, as well as the date, time and place of his or her appearance (see, for example, the forms for subpoenas in Appendix J to the Rules of the Supreme Court of New Brunswick, form 55A (“Summons to Witness”) in Rule 55 of the Rules of Court and form 16 (“Subpoena to a Witness”) in

Part XXVIII of the Criminal Code of Canada). [ 55 ] Put simply, a subpoena ad testificandum is a court order requiring a person to attend at a specific location at a specific time to testify. In accordance with the definition in s. 1 of the Act , the term “subpoena” includes any other formal document having the same function. I readily accept that a “summons to witness” in proper form is a “subpoena”. [ 56 ]

Section 4 of the Act provides that failure, without lawful excuse, to comply with a subpoena adopted by a judge of the Court of Queen’s Bench constitutes contempt of court. That

section further states a person who has been served with a subpoena is subject to a fine and/or imprisonment if he or she has received the prescribed witness fee and travelling expenses “[...] before the date the person is required to attend in the issuing court” (emphasis added). [ 57 ] To my mind, to be adoptable, the document described in the application, irrespective of its label (e.g., subpoena, citation or summons), must have the attributes of a subpoena.

In particular, it must identify the witness and clearly set out his or her obligations in order to ensure compliance and, if necessary, allow for the imposition of a penalty for breach of those obligations. More specifically, the document must, in addition to naming the person in question, indicate the date, time and place of his or her appearance. [ 58 ] Neither of the orders issued by the Régie on January 19, 2012, which the Federation requested the Court of Queen’s Bench adopt, names the person targeted. In addition, they do not specify the date, time and place of attendance.

Although the orders refer to a notice to appear and to a subpoena duces tecum , those documents had not yet been issued at the time of the hearing in first instance and, as a consequence, neither forms part of the record. That being so, I can only conclude those orders are not “subpoenas” that may be adopted under the Act . V. Conclusion [ 59 ] The foregoing reasons prompted me to add my voice to those of my colleagues in dismissing the

appeal, with costs. I repeat, the underlying application for adoption could not succeed since it does not involve a “subpoena” as defined in the Interprovincial Subpoena Act of New Brunswick. All that remains to be settled is the issue of costs. [ 60 ] In light of s. 22(3) of the Judicature Act , it is beyond dispute that costs cannot be awarded to the Crown. The respondents S.K. Export, Étienne St.-Pierre and Germain Gauthier did not participate in the appeal, so there is no reason to make an award of costs in their favour. [ 61 ] However, the Caisse and National Bank are entitled to costs on appeal.

I would allow each of them costs of $5,000. ____________________________________ J. Ernest Drapeau, Juge en chef du Nouveau-Brunswick NOUS SOUSCRIVONS À L’AVIS ____________________________________ M.E.L. Larlee, j.c.a. ____________________________________ Kathleen A. Quigg, j.c.a.

SCHEDULE “A” /

ANNEXE « A » Interprovincial Subpoena Act , R.S.N.B. 2011, c. 180

Definitions 1 The following

definitions apply in this Act . “court” means any court in a province of Canada and includes a board, commission, tribunal or other body of a province of Canada that has the power to issue a subpoena. (tribunal) “prescribed” means prescribed by regulation. (prescrit)

Loi sur les subpoenas interprovinciaux , L.N.- B. 2011, c. 180 Définitions 1 Les définitions qui suivent s’appliquent à la présente loi. « prescrit » Prescrit par règlement. (prescribed) « province » Est assimilé à une province tout territoire du Canada. (province)

“province” includes a territory of Canada. (province) “subpoena” means a subpoena or other document issued by a court requiring a person within a province other than the province of the issuing court to attend as a witness before the issuing court. (subpoena) Receipt and adoption of subpoena from another province 2 The Court of Queen’s Bench of New Brunswick shall receive and adopt as an order of the court a subpoena from a court outside New Brunswick if (

a) the subpoena is accompanied by a certificate attached to or endorsed on the subpoena in the prescribed form signed by a judge of a superior, county or district court of the issuing province and impressed with the seal of that court, signifying that, on hearing and examining the applicant, the judge is satisfied that the attendance in the issuing province of the person subpoenaed (

i) is necessary for the due adjudication of the proceeding in which the subpoena is issued, and (ii) in relation to the nature and importance of the cause or proceeding, is reasonable and essential to the due administration of justice in that province, and (

b) the subpoena is accompanied by the prescribed witness fees and travelling expenses. Conditions in adopting subpoena 3 The Court of Queen’s Bench of New Brunswick shall not adopt a subpoena from another province under

section 2 unless the law of that other province has a provision similar to

section 6 providing absolute immunity to a resident of New Brunswick who is required to attend as a witness in the other province from all proceedings of the nature set out in

section 6 and within the « subpoena » Subpoena ou autre document délivré par un tribunal, enjoignant une personne qui se trouve dans une province autre que celle dans laquelle est situé le tribunal d’origine de comparaître comme témoin devant ce tribunal. (subpoena) « tribunal »

Tout tribunal d’une province du Canada et s’entend également d’un conseil, d’une commission, d’un tribunal administratif ou d’un autre organisme d’une province du Canada qui a le pouvoir de délivrer un subpoena. (court) Réception et homologation d’un subpoena émanant d’une autre province 2 La Cour du Banc de la Reine du Nouveau- Brunswick ne reçoit et n’homologue un subpoena délivré par un tribunal d’une autre province que si :

a) y est annexé ou y est porté en la forme prescrite un certificat signé par un juge d’un tribunal supérieur, de comté ou de district de la province d’origine et portant le sceau de ce tribunal cour, déclarant qu’après avoir entendu et interrogé le requérant, le juge est convaincu que la présence dans cette province de la personne citée à comparaître : (

i) est nécessaire à une décision juste de l’action dans le cadre de laquelle le subpoena a été délivré, (ii) est raisonnable et essentielle à la bonne administration de la justice dans cette province étant donné la nature et l’importance de la cause ou de l’action;

b) y sont joints les indemnités et les frais de déplacement de témoin prescrits. Conditions d’homologation d’un subpoena 3 La Cour du Banc de la Reine du Nouveau- Brunswick ne peut homologuer, en vertu de l’article 2, un subpoena délivré dans une autre province que si la législation de cette dernière contient une disposition semblable à l’article 6 qui prévoit qu’une personne résidant au Nouveau-Brunswick qui doit se présenter pour témoigner dans cette autre province jouit d’une immunité absolue à

jurisdiction of the Legislature of that other province except only those proceedings grounded on events occurring during or after the required attendance of the person in the other province. Contempt of court 4 A person who without lawful excuse fails to comply with a subpoena adopted under

section 2 is in contempt of The Court of Queen’s Bench of New Brunswick and is subject to a fine not exceeding the maximum fine set by the Provincial Offences Procedure Act for a category F offence, to imprisonment for not more than 90 days or to both a fine and imprisonment, if the person has been served with the subpoena and given the prescribed witness fee and travelling expenses not less than ten days, or such shorter period as the judge of the court in the issuing province may indicate in the judge’s certificate, before the date the person is required to attend in the issuing court. […] Immunity 6 A person required to attend before a court in New Brunswick by a subpoena adopted by a court outside New Brunswick is deemed, while within New Brunswick in answer to the subpoena, not to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the courts of New Brunswick other than as a witness in the proceedings in which the person is subpoenaed and is absolutely immune from seizure of goods, service of process, execution of judgment, garnishment, imprisonment or molestation of any kind relating to a legal or judicial right, cause, action, proceeding or process within the jurisdiction of the Legislature of New Brunswick except only those proceedings grounded on events occurring during or after the required attendance of the person in New Brunswick. l’égard de toute action prévue à l’article 6 et relevant de la compétence de la Législature de cette autre province, à l’exception seulement d’une action fondée sur des événements survenus pendant ou après la comparution requise de cette personne dans cette autre province.

Outrage au tribunal 4 Quiconque, sans excuse légitime, omet de se conformer à un subpoena homologué en vertu de l’article 2, commet un outrage au tribunal devant la Cour du Banc de la Reine du Nouveau-Brunswick et est passible d’une amende n’excédant pas l’amende maximale qui peut être imposée en vertu de la

Loi sur la procédure applicable aux infractions provinciales à

titre d’infraction de la classe F, d’un emprisonnement maximal de quatre- vingt-dix jours, ou des deux à la fois, quiconque ayant été assigné parsubpoena et ayant reçu l’indemnité et les frais prescrits de déplacements des témoins dix jours au moins, ou dans un délai plus court indiqué par le juge du tribunal de la province d’origine dans son certificat, avant la date de sa présence devant le tribunal d’origine. […] Immunité 6 Une personne tenue de comparaître devant un tribunal du Nouveau-Brunswick en vertu d’un subpoena homologué par un tribunal de l’extérieur du Nouveau-Brunswick est réputée, tant qu’elle demeure au Nouveau- Brunswick en réponse au subpoena, ne pas s’être soumise à la compétence des tribunaux du Nouveau-Brunswick autrement que comme témoin dans une action où elle a été citée à comparaître et elle jouit d’une immunité absolue à l’égard d’une saisie de biens, de la signification d’un acte de procédure, de l’exécution d’un jugement, d’une saisie-arrêt, d’un emprisonnement ou de toute contrainte de quelque nature que ce soit reliés à un droit judiciaire ou en common law, à une cause, à une action, à une procédure ou à une instance relevant de la compétence de la Législature du Nouveau- Brunswick, à l’exception seulement d’une action fondée sur des événements survenus pendant ou après la comparution requise de cette personne au Nouveau-Brunswick. [...] Règlements

[…] Regulations 9 The Lieutenant-Governor in Council may make regulations (

a) prescribing the certificate referred to in sections 2 and 5; 9 Le lieutenant-gouverneur en conseil peut, par règlement :

a) prescrire le certificat mentionné aux articles 2 et 5; NEW BRUNSWICK REGULATION 91-68 under the Interprovincial Subpoena Act (O.C. 91-304) Filed April 24, 1991 Under

section 9 of the Interprovincial Subpoena Act , the Lieutenant-Governor in Council makes the following Regulation: 1 This Regulation may be cited as the General Regulation - Interprovincial Subpoena Act . 2 In this Regulation “ Act ” means the Interprovincial Subpoena Act. 3 A certificate referred to in paragraph 2(

a) of the Act shall be in Form 1. RÈGLEMENT DU NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK 91-68 pris en vertu de la

Loi sur les subpoenas interprovinciaux (D.C. 91-304) Déposé le 24 avril 1991 En vertu de l’article 9 de la

Loi sur les subpoenas interprovinciaux, le lieutenant- gouverneur en conseil prend le règlement suivant : 1 Le présent règlement peut être cité sous le

titre : Règlement général -

Loi sur les subpoenas interprovinciaux. 2 Dans le présent règlement « Loi » désigne la

Loi sur les subpoenas interprovinciaux. 3 Une attestation visée à l’alinéa 2a) de la Loi est établie au moyen de la formule 1. FORM 1 CERTIFICATE ( Interprovincial Subpoena Act , R.S.N.B. 2011, c.180 , s.2(a)) I, ___________________________________, (name of judge) a judge of the FORMULE 1 ATTESTATION (

Loi sur les subpoenas interprovinciaux , L.R.N.B. de 2011, ch. 180, al. 2a)) Je soussigné(e) ______________________________ , (nom du juge)

__________________________________ (name of superior, county or district court in issuing province) certify that I have heard and examined ___________________________________ (name of applicant) who seeks to require the attendance of ___________________________________ (name of witness) to produce documents or other articles or to give evidence, or any combination thereof, in a proceeding in ____________________ (name of issuing province) in the _____________________________ (name of court in which witness is to appear) which proceeding is styled _____________ (style of proceeding) and has the court file number __________________.

I further certify that I am satisfied that the attendance of __________________________________ (name of witness) as a witness is necessary for the due adjudication of the proceeding in which the subpoena is issued and, in relation to the nature and importance of the cause or proceeding, is reasonable and essential to the due administration of justice in __________________________________ (name of issuing province)

Section _____________ of the ___________________ (name and citation of Act of ______________ provides for the immunity of issuing province) __________________________as follows: (name of witness) (Set out the

section of the Act of the issuing province which provides absolute immunity to a resident of New Brunswick who is required to attend as a witness in the issuing province from seizure of goods, service of process, juge de ___________________________, (nom de la cour supérieure, de comté ou de district de la province d’origine) atteste que j’ai entendu et interrogé _________________________________ (nom du demandeur) qui demande la comparution de _________________________________ pour (nom du témoin) présenter des documents ou autres articles ou pour témoigner, le cas échéant, lors d’une procédure se déroulant dans _________________________________ (nom de la province d’origine) dans _____________________________ (nom de la cour où le témoin doit comparaître) relativement à l’affaire intitulée ____________________ (intitulé de la procédure) et qui porte le numéro de dossier __________________.

J’atteste de plus que je suis convaincu que la présence de _________________________________ (nom du témoin) à

titre de témoin est nécessaire pour que le prononcé du jugement dans la cause pour laquelle le subpoena a été décerné, soit juste et, est fondée et essentielle pour que l’administration de la justice dans ______________________ (nom de la province d’origine) soit juste du fait de la nature et de l’importance de la cause ou de la procédure.

Article ___________________ de ________________________ (nom et citation de la loi de la province _____________ offre l’immunité à _________________ d’origine) (nom du témoin) (Citez l’article de la Loi de la province d’origine qui offre à un résident du Nouveau-Brunswick qui doit comparaître à

titre de témoin dans la province d’origine une immunité totale contre une saisie de biens, une signification de procédure, une

execution of judgment, garnishment, imprisonment or molestation of any kind relating to a legal or judicial right, cause, action, proceeding or process within the jurisdic tion of the Legislature of the issuing province except only those proceedings grounded on events occurring during or after the required attendance of the person in the issuing province.) DATED at ____________________________________ , this __________ day of ___________________, 19____.

Court _________________________________ Seal (signature of judge of superior, county or district court in issuing province) exécution d’un jugement, une saisie-arrêt, un emprisonnement ou toute molestation découlant d’un droit, d’une cause, d’une action, d’une procédure ou d’une démarche en justice relevant de la compétence de la Législature de la province d’origine, à l’exception de toutes les procédures fondées sur des événements survenus au cours de ou après la comparution de cette personne dans la province d’origine.) FAIT à ____________________________________ , le _______________________ 19____.

Sceau ________________________________ de la Cour (signature du juge de la cour supérieure, de comté ou mde district de la province d’origine)

Act Respecting the Marketing of Agricultural, Food and Fish Products , R .S.Q., c. M-35.1 43. The Régie may, of its own initiative or at the request of an interested person, order a marketing board or any person engaged in the production or marketing of a product marketed under a plan, to perform or not to perform a particular act where it is of the opinion that such act or omission may hinder the carrying out of the plan, a by-law, a homologated agreement or an arbitration award.

The Régie may also decide on the payability of a sum of money under a plan, a by-law, a homologated agreement, an arbitration award in lieu of an agreement or a decision in lieu of an arbitration award, and order its payment. Any decision made by the Régie under the first and second paragraphs may be homologated by the Superior Court on a motion by the Régie or an interested person, and after homologation it becomes executory as a judgment of the Court. […] 165.

The Régie may, with the signature of its secretary or one of the members, summon any person for examination and require the filing of documents useful for the conduct of an investigation or any matter brought before it. The secretary or a member of the Régie has the power to require any person examined by the Régie to take an oath.

Loi sur la mise en marché des produits agricoles, alimentaires et de la pêche , L.R.Q., c. M-35.1 43. La Régie peut, de son propre chef ou à la demande d'une personne intéressée, ordonner à un office ou à une personne engagée dans la production ou la mise en marché d'un produit visé par un plan, d'accomplir ou de ne pas accomplir un acte déterminé si elle constate que l'omission ou l'action risque d'entraver l'application de ce plan, d'un règlement, d'une convention homologuée ou d'une sentence arbitrale.

La Régie peut aussi décider de l'exigibilité d'une somme d'argent en application d'un plan, d'un règlement, d'une convention homologuée, d'une sentence arbitrale qui en tient lieu ou d'une décision qui tient lieu de sentence arbitrale et en ordonner le paiement.

Toute décision prise par la Régie en application des premier et deuxième alinéas peut être homologuée par la Cour supérieure sur requête de la Régie ou d'une personne intéressée et devient, après homologation, exécutoire comme un jugement de cette cour. […] 165. la Régie peut, sous la signature de son secrétaire ou d'un régisseur, assigner toute personne pour l'interroger et exiger le dépôt de documents utiles au déroulement d'une enquête ou d'une affaire portée devant elle.

Le secrétaire ou un régisseur ont le pouvoir d'exiger de toute personne qui est interrogée par la Régie qu'elle prête serment en faisant une affirmation solennelle.