2015 QCCA 1185, 2015 QCCA 1185

Source: Court of Appeal of Québec

Date: 2015-07-16

Jurisdiction: Quebec

Citation: 2015 QCCA 1185

Opinion

Translated from the original French Agence du revenu du Canada c. Allaire 2015 QCCA 1185 COURT OF APPEAL CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC REGISTRY OF MONTREAL No.: 500-10-005695-141 (500-26-082288-147) DATE: July 16, 2015 PRESIDING: THE HONOURABLE FRANCE THIBAULT, J.A. JACQUES DUFRESNE, J.A. GENEVIÈVE MARCOTTE, J.A. CANADA REVENUE AGENCY APPELLANT – Applicant v.

STÉPHANE ALLAIRE RESPONDENT – Respondent and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA SERVICE DE POLICE DE LA VILLE DE MONTRÉAL (SPVM) IMPLEADED PARTIES – Interveners JUDGMENT [ 1 ] The appellant, the Canada Revenue Agency, appeals from the judgment rendered on June 27, 2014, by the Court of Quebec, District of Montreal, presided by Justice of the peace Pierre Fortin, dismissing its application for an exemption from the requirement to produce the documents and information listed in the document production order issued on March 24, 2014; [ 2 ] For the reasons of Dufresne J.A., with which Thibault and Marcotte JJ.A. agree, THE COURT: [ 3 ] DISMISSES the appeal, with costs.

FRANCE THIBAULT, J.A. JACQUES DUFRESNE, J.A. GENEVIÈVE MARCOTTE, J.A. Mtre Pierre Lamothe Mtre Stéphanie Côté Department of Justice Canada Counsel for the appellant Mtre Philippe Vallières-Roland Mtre Marie-Christine Lajoie-Filion Counsel for the Director of Criminal and Penal Prosecutions For the respondent

Mtre Pierre Lamothe Minister of Justice Canada For the impleaded party, the Attorney General of Canada Date of hearing: May 7, 2015 REASONS OF DUFRESNE, J.A. [ 4 ] The Canada Revenue Agency (“CRA”) unsuccessfully sought an exemption from the requirement to produce the documents and information listed in the document production order issued on March 24, 2014, by a presiding justice of the peace (the “Order”).

The Order requires the CRA to provide, on or before April 30, 2014, confidential information concerning six taxpayers that it has in its possession in connection with the application of the Excise Act, 2001 [1] (hereinafter the “ E.A. , 2001 ”). [ 5 ] The Order was obtained ex parte by the respondent, an investigating police officer with the Sûreté du Québec (the “SQ”), pursuant to s. 487.012(1) of the Criminal Code (hereinafter the “ Cr. C. ”).

The Order was requested in the context of a fraud investigation conducted by a joint task force made up of members of the SQ and the Service de police de la Ville de Montréal (the “SVPM”). The Order was served on the CRA on March 26, 2014. [ 6 ] On April 29, in a letter sent by both email and fax, the CRA informed the respondent that it was unable to provide the information listed in the Order on the grounds that providing this information would violate the provisions of the E.A. , 2001 applicable to the disclosure of confidential information.

It asked the respondent to take steps with the Court of Quebec to have the Order set aside, or simply waive its enforcement. [ 7 ] The next day, April 30, the CRA sent the presiding justice of the peace who had issued the Order an application for an exemption under s. 487.015 Cr. C. This application was also communicated to the respondent. [ 8 ] At issue in this appeal is the decision of the presiding justice of the peace, who on June 19, 2014, after hearing the parties, dismissed the application for an exemption. 1 The relevant legislative provisions [ 9 ] A review of the relevant statutory provisions of the Cr.

C. and the E.A., 2001 is vital. [ 10 ] The Cr. C. was amended in 2004 to include new investigative methods for obtaining documents or information in the hands of third parties not under investigation. The document production orders are governed by ss. 487.011 to 481.017 of the Cr. C ., which were modified by amendments that came into force on March 9, 2015. [2] For the purposes of this appeal, however, reference must be made to the provisions existing before these recent amendments. The relevant provisions are as follows: 487.012

(1) A justice or judge may order a person, other than a person under investigation for an offence referred to in paragraph (3)( a ), (

a) to produce documents, or copies of them certified by affidavit to be true copies, or to produce data; or (

b) to prepare a document based on documents or data already in existence and produce it.

(2) The order shall require the documents or data to be produced within the time, at the place and in the form specified and given (

a) to a peace officer named in the order; or (

b) to a public officer named in the order, who 487.012

(1) Sauf si elle fait l’objet d’une enquête relative à l’infraction visée à l’alinéa (3)a), un juge de paix ou un juge peut ordonner à une personne :

a) de communiquer des documents — originaux ou copies certifiées conformes par affidavit — ou des données;

b) de préparer un document à partir de documents ou données existants et de le communiquer.

(2) L’ordonnance précise le moment, le lieu et la forme de la communication ainsi que la personne à qui elle est faite — agent de la paix ou fonctionnaire public nommé ou désigné pour l’application ou l’exécution d’une loi fédérale ou provinciale et chargé notamment de faire observer la présente loi ou toute autre loi fédérale.

has been appointed or designated to administer or enforce a federal or provincial law and whose duties include the enforcement of this or any other Act of Parliament.

(3) Before making an order, the justice or judge must be satisfied, on the basis of an ex parte application containing information on oath in writing, that there are reasonable grounds to believe that (

a) an offence against this Act or any other Act of Parliament has been or is suspected to have been committed; (

b) the documents or data will afford evidence respecting the commission of the offence; and (

c) the person who is subject to the order has possession or control of the documents or data.

(4) The order may contain any terms and conditions that the justice or judge considers advisable in the circumstances, including terms and conditions to protect a privileged communication between a lawyer and their client or, in the province of Quebec, between a lawyer or a notary and their client.

(5) The justice or judge who made the order, or a judge of the same territorial division, may revoke, renew or vary the order on an ex parte application made by the peace officer or public officer named in the order.

(6) Sections 489.1 and 490 apply, with any modifications that the circumstances require, in respect of documents or data produced under this section.

(7) Every copy of a document produced under this section, on proof by affidavit that it is a true copy, is admissible in evidence in proceedings under this or any other Act of Parliament and has the same probative force as the original document would have if it had been proved in the ordinary way.

(3) Le juge de paix ou le juge ne rend l’ordonnance que s’il est convaincu, à la suite d’une dénonciation par écrit faite sous serment et présentée ex parte, qu’il existe des motifs raisonnables de croire que les conditions suivantes sont réunies :

a) une infraction à la présente loi ou à toute autre loi fédérale a été ou est présumée avoir été commise;

b) les documents ou données fourniront une preuve touchant la perpétration de l’infraction;

c) les documents ou données sont en la possession de la personne en cause ou à sa disposition.

(4) L’ordonnance peut être assortie des conditions que le juge de paix ou le juge estime indiquées, notamment pour protéger les communications privilégiées entre l’avocat — et, dans la province de Québec, le notaire — et son client.

(5) Le juge de paix ou le juge qui a rendu l’ordonnance — ou un juge de la même circonscription territoriale — peut, sur demande présentée ex parte par l’agent de la paix ou le fonctionnaire public nommé dans l’ordonnance, la modifier, la renouveler ou la révoquer.

(6) Les articles 489.1 et 490 s’appliquent, avec les adaptations nécessaires, aux documents ou données communiqués sous le régime du présent article.

(7) La copie d’un document communiquée sous le régime du présent

article est, à la condition d’être certifiée conforme à l’original par affidavit, admissible en preuve dans toute procédure sous le régime de la présente loi ou de toute autre loi fédérale et a la même valeur probante que l’original aurait eue s’il avait été déposé en preuve de la façon normale.

(8) Il n’est pas nécessaire de retourner les copies de documents qui ont été communiquées sous le régime du présent article.

(8) Copies of documents produced under this

section need not be returned. … 487.015

(1) A person named in an order made under

section 487.012 and a financial institution, person or entity named in an order made under

section 487.013 may, before the order expires, apply in writing to the judge who issued the order, or a judge of the same territorial division as the judge or justice who issued the order, for an exemption from the requirement to produce any document, data or information referred to in the order.

(2) A person, financial institution or entity may only make an application under subsection (1) if they give notice of their intention to do so to the peace officer or public officer named in the order, within 30 days after it is made.

(3) The execution of a production order is suspended in respect of any document, data or information referred to in the application for exemption until a final decision is made in respect of the application.

(4) The judge may grant the exemption if satisfied that (

a) the document, data or information would disclose information that is privileged or otherwise protected from disclosure by law; (

b) it is unreasonable to require the applicant to produce the document, data or information; or (

c) the document, data or information is not in the possession or control of the applicant. […] 487.015

(1) Toute personne visée par l’ordonnance rendue en vertu de l’article 487.012 ou toute institution financière, personne ou entité visée par l’ordonnance rendue en vertu de l’article 487.013 peut, avant l’expiration de l’ordonnance, demander par écrit au juge qui l’a rendue ou à un autre juge de la circonscription territoriale du juge ou du juge de paix qui l’a rendue de l’exempter de l’obligation de communiquer la totalité ou une

partie des documents, données ou renseignements demandés. (2) La personne, l’institution financière ou l’entité ne peut présenter une demande en vertu du paragraphe (1) qu’à la condition d’avoir donné, dans les trente jours suivant celui où l’ordonnance est rendue, un préavis de son intention à l’agent de la paix ou au fonctionnaire public nommé dans l’ordonnance.

(3) L’exécution de l’ordonnance de communication visée par la demande d’exemption est suspendue à l’égard des documents, données ou renseignements mentionnés dans la demande jusqu’à ce qu’une décision définitive ait été rendue sur celle-ci.

(4) Le juge peut accorder l’exemption s’il est convaincu que, selon le cas :

a) la communication révélerait des renseignements protégés par le droit applicable en matière de divulgation ou de privilèges;

b) il serait déraisonnable d’obliger l’intéressé à communiquer les documents, données ou renseignements;

c) les documents, données ou renseignements ne sont ni en la possession de l’intéressé ni à sa disposition. […] 487.017 La personne, l’institution financière ou l’entité qui omet de se conformer à une ordonnance rendue en vertu des articles 487.012 ou 487.013 commet une infraction et encourt, sur déclaration de culpabilité par procédure

sommaire, une amende maximale de 250 000 $ et un emprisonnement maximal de six mois, ou l’une de ces peines.

487.017 A financial institution, person or entity who does not comply with a production order made under

section 487.012 or 487.013 is guilty of an offence and liable on

summary conviction to a fine not exceeding $250,000 or imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or to both. [ 11 ] The E.A., 2001 establishes a legislative and administrative regime for the taxation of spirits, wine and tobacco products.

Section 211 of the E.A. , 2001 recognizes the confidential nature of the nominative information obtained by the Minister of National Revenue in the enforcement or application of the Act. The use or communication of information thus collected is prohibited, save in the exceptional cases expressly set out in the Act . Finally, a confidential information production order may be appealed under s. 211(9). Below are the main provisions relevant to this case: 211. (1) …

(2) Except as authorized under this section, no official or other representative of a government entity shall knowingly (

a) provide, or allow to be provided, to any person any confidential information; (

b) allow any person to have access to any confidential information; or (

c) use any confidential information other than in the course of the administration or enforcement of this Act.

(3) Despite any other Act of Parliament or other law, no official or other representative of a government entity shall be required, in connection with any legal proceedings, to give or produce evidence relating to any confidential information. (4) Subsections (2) and (3) do not apply to (

a) criminal proceedings, either by indictment or on

summary conviction, that have been commenced by the laying of an information or the preferring of an indictment, under

an Act of Parliament; or (

b) any legal proceedings relating to the administration or enforcement of this Act, the Canada Pension Plan, the Employment Insurance Act, the Unemployment Insurance Act or any 211. (1) […]

(2) Sauf autorisation prévue au présent article, il est interdit à un fonctionnaire ou autre représentant d’une entité gouvernementale :

a) de fournir sciemment à quiconque un renseignement confidentiel ou d’en permettre sciemment la fourniture;

b) de permettre sciemment à quiconque d’avoir accès à un renseignement confidentiel;

c) d’utiliser sciemment un renseignement confidentiel en dehors du cadre de l’exécution ou du contrôle d’application de la présente loi.

(3) Malgré toute autre loi fédérale et toute règle de droit, nul fonctionnaire ou autre représentant d’une entité gouvernementale ne peut être requis, dans le cadre d’une procédure judiciaire, de témoigner, ou de produire quoi que ce soit, relativement à un renseignement confidentiel.

(4) Les paragraphes (2) et (3) ne s’appliquent :

a) ni aux poursuites criminelles, sur acte d’accusation ou sur déclaration de culpabilité par procédure

sommaire, engagées par le dépôt d’une dénonciation ou d’un acte d’accusation, en vertu d’une loi fédérale;

b) ni aux procédures judiciaires ayant trait à l’exécution ou au contrôle d’application de la présente loi, de la

Loi sur l’assurance-chômage, du Régime de pensions du Canada, de la

Loi sur l’assurance-emploi ou de toute loi fédérale ou provinciale qui prévoit l’imposition ou la perception d’un impôt, d’une taxe ou d’un droit.

other Act of Parliament or law of a province that provides for the imposition or collection of a tax or duty. ...

(6) An official may … (

d) provide any person who is legally entitled under

an Act of Parliament to confidential information with, or access to, that information, solely for the purposes for which the person is entitled to the information; …

(9) An order or direction that is made in the course of or in connection with any legal proceedings and that requires an official or other representative of a government entity to give or produce evidence relating to any confidential information may, by notice served on all interested parties, be appealed immediately by the Minister or by the person against whom it is made to (

a) the court of appeal of the province in which it is made, in the case of an order or direction made by a court or other tribunal established under the laws of the province, whether that court or tribunal is exercising a jurisdiction conferred by the laws of Canada; or (

b) the Federal Court of Appeal, in the case of an order or direction made by a court or other tribunal established under the laws of Canada.

(10) The court to which an appeal is taken may allow the appeal and quash the order or direction appealed from or may dismiss the appeal, and the rules of practice and procedure from time to time governing appeals to the courts shall apply, with any modifications that the circumstances require, in respect of the appeal. […]

(6) Un fonctionnaire peut : […]

d) fournir un renseignement confidentiel à toute personne qui y a légalement droit par l’effet d’une loi fédérale, ou lui en permettre l’examen ou l’accès, mais uniquement aux fins auxquelles elle y a droit; […]

(9) Le ministre ou la personne contre laquelle une ordonnance est rendue, ou à l’égard de laquelle une directive est donnée, dans le cadre ou à l’occasion d’une procédure judiciaire enjoignant à un fonctionnaire ou autre représentant d’une entité gouvernementale de témoigner, ou de produire quoi que ce soit, relativement à un renseignement confidentiel peut sans délai, par avis signifié aux parties intéressées, interjeter appel de l’ordonnance ou de la directive devant:

a) la cour d’appel de la province dans laquelle l’ordonnance est rendue ou la directive donnée, s’il s’agit d’une ordonnance ou d’une directive émanant d’une cour ou d’un autre tribunal établi en application des lois de la province, que ce tribunal exerce ou non une compétence conférée par les lois fédérales;

b) la Cour d’appel fédérale, s’il s’agit d’une ordonnance ou d’une directive émanant d’une cour ou d’un autre tribunal établi en application des lois fédérales.

(10) La cour saisie d’un appel peut accueillir l’appel et annuler l’ordonnance ou la directive en cause ou rejeter l’appel. Les règles de pratique et de procédure régissant les appels à la cour s’appliquent à l’appel, avec les adaptations nécessaires.

(11) L’application de l’ordonnance ou de la directive objet d’un appel est différée jusqu’au prononcé du jugement.

(11) An appeal shall stay the operation of the order or direction appealed from until judgment is pronounced. 2 The trial judgment [ 12 ] At the outset, the judge noted that in light of the information and the grounds alleged by the police investigator, he was convinced when he issued the Order on March 24, 2014, that there were reasonable grounds to believe that a fraud had been committed by a group of persons against the federal government and the Government of Quebec (s. 380(1)(

a) Cr. C. ) and that the CRA was in possession of data or documents that could provide evidence of such fraud. [ 13 ] On April 30, 2014, the last possible day to do so, the CRA filed its application for an exemption from the requirement to produce any document, data or information referred to in the Order (s. 487.015 Cr.

C. ). [ 14 ] After reviewing the conditions set out in that provision, the judge concluded that the CRA’s application should be dismissed because it did not give the respondent notice of its intention to make its application within the 30–day time period from the date the Order was issued (s. 487.015(2) Cr. C. ).

Because he was of the view that this was a mandatory deadline and because no application to extend the deadline was filed before its expiry, the judge found the absence of notice within the time period to be fatal. [ 15 ] That conclusion alone justified dismissing the application for exemption, but the judge nevertheless analyzed the substantive grounds raised by the respondent to contest the application and found that the exemption should in any event have been refused and the application dismissed. [ 16 ] The judge was aware that the requested information is confidential within the meaning of s. 211(1) E.A., 2001 .

That being said, he was surprised that the CRA refused to cooperate with the police when it is one of the two victims of the fraud under investigation, the other being the Government of Quebec, in both cases for unpaid tax and duty on contraband products. The judge pointed out that the E.A., 2001 aims precisely to impose tax and duty on the sale of tobacco and alcohol.

He was of the view that, in this context, the expectation of privacy of the persons and businesses concerned by the application for information is limited, if it exists at all. [ 17 ] Moreover, he was of the view that the Order is a judicial authorization rather than a legal proceeding within the meaning of s. 211(3) of the E.A., 2001 and concluded that, in this context, s. 211 E.A. , 2001 does not prevent the disclosure of confidential information in one’s possession. The judge was of the view that a peace officer within the meaning of the Cr.

C. , equipped with a court order such as the Order in this case, is covered by s. 211(6)(

d) E.A., 2001 and may, consequently, obtain the information sought. [ 18 ] The judge concluded that the application for an exemption could not be granted in the circumstances and ordered the CRA to comply with the March 24, 2014, request for disclosure and provide all the requested information in its possession by July 21, 2014. 3 Issues [ 19 ] Two issues summarize the essence of the grounds of appeal raised by the appellant: 1. Is the 30-day notice deadline in s. 487.015(2) of the Cr. C. mandatory? 2.

If the answer to the first question is no, do any of the exceptions set out in s. 211 E.A., 2001 to the prohibition against disclosing third- party information in the appellant’s possession justify issuing the Order? 4 Analysis [ 20 ] Before considering the grounds of appeal, a preliminary issue must be resolved: should the Court decide an issue that has become moot since the case was taken under advisement? 4.1 Mootness of the appeal [ 21 ] On May 8, 2015, the day after the appeal was heard, criminal charges were filed against the persons concerned by the Order.

Six days later, the CRA sent the respondent the documents listed in the Order [ translation ] “… after having concluded that the conditions set out in s. 211(4) (

a) of the Excise Act, 2001 are met”, without, however, acknowledging the legal arguments raised by the respondent. [ 22 ] The parties agree that the legal debate has become moot but ask the Court to decide the issue nevertheless as, in their view, [ translation ] “… a dispute involving the same legal issues is likely to reoccur”. [ 23 ] An appeal concerning an issue that has become moot must meet the conditions of the two-step analytical approach recommended by the Supreme Court of Canada in Borowski v. Canada (Attorney General) . [3] The first step is to determine whether the issue has become purely academic.

That is the case here. Because the response to the first question is affirmative, it is necessary to decide if the grounds justify the court exercising its discretionary power. In this case, they do. [ 24 ] I note at the outset that this is not an issue of fundamental rights or a constitutional question. The issue essentially concerns the

interpretation of a statutory provision and its very limited application. By its nature, the parties involved in this legal debate are limited. Indeed, the CRA’s application to be exempted from complying with a court order to disclose confidential information pursuant to the provisions of a federal tax or excise act can only involve a provincial or municipal police force. It should be noted that the CRA interpreted the application of the E.A., 2001 differently in response to a request from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in a similar situation.

According to the CRA, it did not object, even though no legal proceedings were instituted, on the basis of another provision of the E.A., 2001 . In short, the debate is well circumscribed among the parties who are very likely to also be involved in a future debate,

especially as significant judicial resources have already been committed, and the appeal has already been taken under advisement. Judgment on the merits should therefore be rendered. 4.2 The appeal on the merits [ 25 ] The appeal must fail. Although the deadline for providing notice set out in s. 487.015(2) of the Cr. C. does not entail the nullity of the application for exemption, the Order, which is a legal proceeding concerning the enforcement or administration of a federal or provincial statute providing for the imposition or collection of a tax or duty, benefits from the exception set out in s. 211(4)(

b) E.A. , 2001 to the prohibition against disclosure. Let us consider this in greater detail. 4.2.1 Is the 30-day notice period in s. 487.015(2) of the Cr. C. mandatory? [ 26 ] An application for an exemption (s. 487.015(1) of the Cr. C. ) was submitted with respect to the Order rendered by the presiding justice of the peace under s. 487.012(3), but the notice provided to the respondent was sent after the prescribed 30-day deadline had expired. The judge considered this deadline to be mandatory and irremediable.

The chronology of proceedings in this case is as follows. [ 27 ] The Order rendered on March 24, 2014, was valid for over 30 days, that is, until April 30, 2014. It was served on the CRA on March 26. On April 30, the last possible day to do so, the Attorney General of Canada, on behalf of the appellant, sent the CRA’s application for an exemption to the trial judge and the respondent.

Even if the CRA had until the expiry date of the Order to present its application for an exemption, it nevertheless had to inform the respondent of its intention to do so within 30 days from when the Order was made (s. 487.015(2) of the Cr. C. ). That deadline expired on April 23, i.e., five days before the Order itself expired. [ 28 ] The judge considered this deadline to be mandatory, entailing forfeiture of the right to request an exemption, and consequently dismissed the appellant’s application for an exemption. With respect, I am of the contrary opinion.

The appellant could be relieved from its failure to act. [ 29 ] Sending a notice of intention to make an application for an exemption within the prescribed time period is certainly a condition of its admissibility. The deadline set out in s. 487.015(2) of the Cr. C . does not, however, deprive a party who wishes to apply for an exemption of the possibility of being relieved from its failure to act sooner. [ 30 ] Pierre-André Côté provides the rules of

interpretation applicable to provisions setting out formalities such as time periods: Statutes prescribing formalities, most commonly related to the conduct of public officials, can be classified as either imperative or directory. Used in this context, the words “imperative” and “directory” suggest two meanings, and this is a frequent source of ambiguity. A formality is said to be imperative if it is mandatory to comply with it; i.e. it is not optional or permissive. But a formality can also be described as imperative if the consequences of non-compliance are nullity.

As Pigeon has pointed out, a distinction must be made between “an absolute requirement that cannot be omitted without nullifying the operation, and requirements that are less absolute – prescribing rules to be followed but for which non-compliance does not lead to nullity”.. The most common question asked by the courts is whether non-compliance with a particular provision entails nullity. Consideration of a formality’s obligatory character, however, is rather rare.

When it does occur, the judge can apply the same criteria that are employed to determine whether provisions regulating juridical acts are imperative or directory. Consequently, special attention is paid to the enactment’s wording. Use of the prohibitive form or of the word “shall” could, according to the construction indicated by the

interpretation acts, imply an obligation. But two caveats should be pointed out. The presumption that a provision is imperative, deduced from use of the word “shall”, is of a prima facie nature and can be set aside. Secondly, the mere fact that a provision is imperative rather than directory does not necessarily entail nullity for non-compliance; such a sanction is applied only where its respect is compulsory or under pain of being declared void. “Shall” by itself is insufficient to suggest the legislature intended nullity as a consequence of non-respect. The Quebec

Interpretation Act ( s. 51 ) and its federal counterpart ( s. 28 ) “… clearly distinguish between that which is permissive and that which is note, but they do not decree the nullity of that which has not been done (according to the law)”. Most frequently, the courts attempt to determine whether formalities prescribed by statute are “imperative” and “absolute”, or “directory”, in order to rule on whether nullity is the consequence of non-compliance. … In the absence of express provisions, several elements may indicate whether the legislature intended nullity as the consequence of an error in form.

On this question “it has been said that no general rule can be laid down, and that in every case the object of the statute must be looked at.” Amongst the factors which seem to have an important influence on the courts, three stand out: the nature of the formality, the private or public inconveniences which would result from non-compliance or a court’s finding of nullity, and the subject matter of the legislation.

Of the three, the first two factors are without doubt the most important, as MacLachlin J. observed: “the object of the statute, and the effect of ruling one way or the other, are the most important considerations in determining whether a directive is mandatory or directory …” ... The courts are particularly concerned with the prejudice that will result from non-compliance with formalities, and the prejudice that will result from a declaration of nullity. … [4]

[Citations omitted; Emphasis added.] [ 31 ] The author E.G. Ewaschuk states the following in regard to the

interpretation of mandatory or directory provisions in criminal law: In determining whether a statutory directive is mandatory or directory, a court must be guided by the object of the statute and the effects of ruling one way or the other. ... Where a general rule applies and the “shall” requirement is found to be mandatory, “failure to comply with the requirement” does not necessarily entail “nullity or loss of jurisdiction”.

Instead, the court must determine the legislative intent on that point by construing the legislative scheme as a whole. [5] [References omitted.] [ 32 ] The purpose of sending a notice is to inform the party that obtained the production order and the judge who ordered it of the intention of the party from whom the information is required to seek an exemption from the order, even if only in part. [ 33 ] Upon analysis, the mandatory nature of the notice period cannot be inferred from the nature or purpose of the right granted, especially since harm does not necessarily arise solely from a delay. [ 34 ] The heading of the French version of s. 487.015(2) of the Cr.

C. , i.e., “ Préavis obligatoire ”, may be misleading. The corresponding English heading is simply “Notice”, like the text of the provision itself, in which the words “give notice of their intention” are used. The fact that a notice is required to exercise the right to request an exemption does not mean that the deadline is necessarily mandatory. The terminology used in this provision of the Cr.

C. does not sound like a deadline that entails the forfeiture of a right, like, for example, the following wording: [ translation ] “Unless a notice of intention to make an application for an exemption is presented within 30 days from when the order is made, the application for an exemption is deemed not to have been made”. Other mandatory formulations may have the same effect, [6] but that is not the case for the wording retained here by the legislature, which is of an indicative nature. [ 35 ] In fact, one of the specific characteristics of s. 487.015(2) of the Cr.

C. is the fact that the order may remain in effect beyond the 30-day-notice period. In that context, it can hardly be a mandatory deadline that cannot be extended. It is hard to imagine that a party could not be relieved of its failure to provide notice within the prescribed time period, on grounds considered valid by a judge, when the deadline to comply with the order has not yet expired. [ 36 ] In short, the deadline set out in s. 487.015(2) of the Cr. C. does not entail forfeiture of the right to make an application for exemption.

The appellant’s failure to abide by the deadline does not mean that it could not be relieved from that failure. In fact, it should have been. 4.2.2 Considering the answer to the previous question, do any of the exceptions set out in s. 211 E.A., 2001 to the prohibition against disclosing third-party information in the appellant’s possession justify issuing the Order? [ 37 ] This question must be answered in the affirmative. Contrary to what the trial judge decided, it is not the exception to the general principle prohibiting the disclosure of confidential information set out in s. 211(6)(

d) of the E.A., 2001 that applies in this case, but rather the exception set out in s. 211(4)(

b) of the E.A., 2001 . [ 38 ] It appears useful here to reiterate the wording of both the provision setting out the prohibition against the disclosure of confidential information in the hands of the appellant and the applicable exception. First, the general prohibition:

211. …