2013 QCCQ 13285, 2013 QCCQ 13285

Unofficial English Translation R. c. Boudreault 2013 QCCA 13285 JB-4370 COURT OF QUEBEC CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC DISTRICT OF ALMA "Criminal and Penal Division" No.: 160-01-000435-115 [001 and 002] DATE: October 22, 2013 ______________________________________________________________________ PRESIDING: THE HONOURABLE MICHEL BOUDREAULT, J.C.Q. ______________________________________________________________________ THE QUEEN Prosecutrix respondent v.

MARTIN BOUDREAULT [001] and ISABELLE BÉGIN [002] Co-accused petitioners ______________________________________________________________________ JUDGMENT ON A MOTION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE ( Sections 8 and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms ) ______________________________________________________________________ [ 1 ] Following a 911 call, police officers were dispatched to the apartment of Isabelle Bégin and Martin Boudreault. [ 2 ] On the way there, they learned that one of the residents owned two legally registered firearms. [ 3 ] At the apartment, they were told that the weapons were at another location. [ 4 ] That being so, were the police officers authorized to search the apartment? [ 5 ] The parties agreed to proceed by joint hearing and to let the prosecution adduce its evidence.

Subsequently, the petitioners informed the court of their intention to call one or two witnesses to contest the lawfulness of the search and then to seek the exclusion of the evidence gathered. [ 6 ] The petitioners admit that it is incumbent upon them to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the conduct of the police officers was in violation of

section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms , and that the evidence must therefore be excluded pursuant to section 24(2) thereof. The Facts [ 7 ] On May 16, 2011, at 12:24 p.m., two Sûreté du Québec police officers from the Alma station were dispatched by the 911 call centre to ..., Alma, to see Isabelle Bégin. [ 8 ] The 911 call was made by Bégin's daughter, who was worried for her mother's safety after the latter had made some suicidal statements.

She asked for officers to check in on her. [ 9 ] On the way, the police officers learned that one of the occupants of the address, Martin Boudreault, was apparently the owner of two legally registered firearms (reference to the Firearms Registry).

[ 10 ] At 1:01 p.m., the officers knocked on the apartment door. Isabelle Bégin was alone at the time and agreed to let them in. The officers explained their reason for being there and observed that Bégin was crying, feeling badly, and going through a difficult time. [ 11 ] At 1:10 p.m., in light of Isabelle Bégin's state, the officers called a social worker, Ms. Lafrance. Bégin agreed to speak with Ms. Lafrance, talking for about thirty minutes. [ 12 ] Officer Denis Langevin then asked Ms.

Lafrance how they should proceed with respect to Bégin's state. [ 13 ] A [ translation ] "safety net" was established with the worker, Lafrance, who would follow-up by calling Bégin again around 5 p.m., thereby avoiding the need to bring Isabelle Bégin in against her will, which the officers would have been authorized to do under Act respecting the protection of persons whose mental state presents a danger to themselves or to others. [1] [ 14 ] Officer Denis Langevin then informed the social worker and Bégin that they intended to seize the firearms in her residence.

Testimony of Officer Denis Lévesque [ 15 ] Regarding the presence of firearms, Isabelle Bégin informed the officers that these two weapons were the property of her spouse, Martin Boudreault, and that to her knowledge, the weapons were at his brother's house, at ... . [ 16 ] Officer Lévesque therefore decided to call Martin Boudreault at his place of work. Because Boudreault was unavailable, Officer Lévesque left a message, but Boudreault returned the call within a few minutes.

Boudreault was told of the situation involving his spouse and of the officers' wish to seize the firearms. [ 17 ] Martin Boudreault informed him that his two firearms were at his brother Gaétan's house, at ... . [ 18 ] Despite this information, Officer Lévesque, who did not know Boudreault, told the latter that they would still proceed with a search since, he claimed, there might be unregistered weapons present. [ 19 ] Officer Lévesque declared that the purpose of the call was to avoid having to perform an in-depth search of the apartment.

He spoke of a cursory search since the firearms in question were quite long. He therefore searched the bedroom, under the bed, in the closet, in the bath tub, and in a bedroom off the kitchen. He was unable, however, to check in a second bedroom because the door was locked. [ 20 ] The officer was able to open the locked door by inserting a pen into the lock.

Once open, he found a very well-lit room with several plants on the floor, which turned out to be sixty marijuana plants. [ 21 ] Following this discovery, the officers called their supervisor to obtain the help required to continue the investigation. [ 22 ] Officers specialized in narcotics then took over. [ 23 ] Referring again to their reasons for searching for firearms, Officer Lévesque points out that they obtained this information from the Sûreté du Québec dispatcher while Bégin was speaking with the social worker.

He did not, however, take any notes to this effect. [ 24 ] The objective, he claims, was to ensure Bégin's safety. He points out that they are instructed to seize firearms. In fact, they were looking for not only registered firearms, but also any unregistered ones. [ 25 ] In cross-examination, Officer Lévesque admitted that he did not search the drawers because he thought that this would have made the search unreasonable. [ 26 ] He states that they often proceed in this way, following procedure, but cannot state what it is that confers on him the powers to do so.

It is simply what he was taught in training. [ 27 ] He reiterated to the Court that the purpose of the call to the owner of the firearms, Martin Boudreault, was to avoid having to perform an in-depth search because he felt that he was in good faith and wanted to save some time since firearms are often hidden. [ 28 ] It is noteworthy that this same officer admitted that it was possible that the search started before the call was made to Martin Boudreault. In Officer Lévesque’s view, they needed to ensure beyond any doubt that there were no firearms in the apartment.

He admitted, however, that even if they had not known that one of the occupants owned registered firearms, they would have performed a cursory search. [ 29 ] Cross-examined on the fact that they searched the premises even though Martin Boudreault had told him that his firearms were at his brother's house, he stated that they would have searched in any event because, first, they did not know Boudreault, and second, they did not believe him; it was therefore necessary for them to check. [ 30 ] Finally, he reiterated his good intentions and that he felt morally obligated to perform the search.

Testimony of Officer Denis Langevin [ 31 ] Officer Langevin told the Court that when officers go to premises where a person is suicidal, they must ensure that there will be a follow-up and provide any necessary assistance, thus invoking to

chapter P-38.001 , the Act respecting the Protection of persons whose mental state presents a danger to themselves or to others . [ 32 ] Langevin stated that, during this intervention, he was satisfied that a [ translation ] "safety net" had been set up for Bégin by the Info-Social service, which had arranged to call her around 5:00 p.m. [ 33 ] He testified that, in this type of situation, they must check the Firearms Registry. In this case, they found out that one of the

residents, Martin Boudreault, owned two legally registered firearms, and it was their duty to locate them. [ 34 ] He stated that both he and Officer Lévesque looked around the rooms of the apartment for firearms measuring three to four feet in length. He described this search as cursory. [ 35 ] Cross-examined on this way of proceeding, he stated that these were the instructions from his police force.

He affirmed that he had reasonable and probable grounds to think that these two firearms were at this location since the Firearms Registry indicated that Boudreault was the owner and that they were probably on site. [ 36 ] He admitted, however, that when the occupants of a dwelling inform the officers that they do not own any firearms or if the Firearms Registry does not reveal any such information, they do not perform a search.

In this case, he asserts that they had reasonable grounds to believe that there were firearms present. [ 37 ] Their sole objective was to ensure the safety of Isabelle Bégin, and they were searching only for the two registered firearms, not unregistered ones. He repeated that had they not had this information, they would have left the premises without performing a search, which happens regularly, several times a week.

Testimony of Isabelle Bégin [ 38 ] Bégin confirmed that she lives in Alma at ..., with her spouse Martin Boudreault. [ 39 ] On May 16, 2011, she was sitting at the kitchen table when she heard a knock on the door. Before answering, she went to one of the bedroom doors to lock it. [ 40 ] She opened the door to the officers, who explained the reason for their visit.

She then stated that she lived with Martin Boudreault and said that things were difficult these days because she had only recently moved to the area, had few friends, and was very lonely. [ 41 ] She related having little recollection of her telephone conversation with the social worker and explained that it was most probably because she was intensely nervous that day. [ 42 ] When asked a question by Officer Langevin, she answered that her spouse Martin Boudreault had firearms, which were not in the apartment but at the home of his brother, who lived at ... . [ 43 ] She then called Martin Boudreault.

Because he was working in a timber yard, he was unable to speak with her at the moment, but called back later. She asked him if his firearms were at their home or at that of his brother Gaétan. [ 44 ] Officer Langevin then took the handset and spoke with Martin Boudreault to find out where the firearms were located. [ 45 ] Noticing that the officers were searching the apartment, she told them that they had no business performing a search since there were no firearms present. She then saw Officer Langevin insert a pen into the knob of the door to the room.

She stated that she never gave anyone permission to enter or to search. [ 46 ] Finally, she states that the search began well before the call was made to her spouse Martin Boudreault. Issues in dispute [ 47 ] Did searching the co-accused's apartment violate their right guaranteed under

section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms ? [ 48 ] If

section 8 of the Charter was violated, must the product of the search be excluded? Arguments of the parties [ 49 ] The petitioners submit that, from the moment the officers entered the apartment until the moment Isabelle Bégin ended her telephone conversation with the social worker, there was no violation because the officers were authorized to be there under the Act respecting the Protection of persons whose mental state presents a danger to themselves or to others (see also R. v.

Godoy ). [2] [ 50 ] The officers did not have the authority to carry out the subsequent search of the premises or otherwise intrude on the privacy of the occupants; certainly, the Firearms Act did not allow them to do so. [ 51 ] Beyond this, the petitioners argue that the search was unlawful because in this situation a warrantless search was not authorized under a statute or the common law. . [ 52 ] Although the prosecution relies on subsection 117.04(2) of the Criminal Code (search and seizure without warrant - urgency), the conditions for its application were not respected in that the officers did not have reasonable grounds to believe that firearms might be found on the persons of the co-accused or in the apartment they occupied. [ 53 ] Thus, the search was based only on discretionary and arbitrary grounds and mere suspicions. [ 54 ] Moreover, the petitioners never consented to such a search. [ 55 ] Finally, the culmination of this violation is the exclusion of the evidence pursuant to section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms .

[ 56 ] The prosecution, however, argues that a [ translation ] "safety net" was set up to allow Isabelle Bégin to remain in her apartment.

Knowing that Martin Boudreault had two legally registered firearms, the officers had reasonable grounds to believe that this person was in possession of these firearms and, therefore, that there were reasonable grounds to believe that it would not be desirable, in the interests of Bégin’s safety , for her to be in possession of these weapons. [ 57 ] Thus, despite the statements of Isabelle Bégin and Martin Boudreault that the firearms were at the home of Gaétan Boudreault, who lives on the Melançon range road, the officers still had reasonable and probable grounds to believe that Bégin was in possession of the firearms in question. [ 58 ] Consequently, there was no violation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms .

But even if there was, it would not lead to the exclusion of this material and necessary Crown evidence. Analysis [ 59 ]

Section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms protects everyone's right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure. It protects the right to privacy [3] and everyone's right to privacy in their home is of overriding importance. [4] [ 60 ] A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable.

It therefore fell to the prosecution to refute this presumption on a balance of probabilities. [5] [ 61 ] A search is constitutionally authorized, however, if it is otherwise authorized by law (including the common law), if the law itself is reasonable and if the manner in which the search was carried out is reasonable. [6] 911 Call and Police Powers [ 62 ] Godoy [7] establishes the limit on the right of police officers to enter a residence without a warrant when there is a conflict between a citizen's privacy and the authority of police officers to investigate 911 calls. [ 63 ] The Supreme Court of Canada found that the police ab initio have the authority to investigate 911 calls and that the issue of whether police officers may enter a dwelling-house in the course of such an investigation depends on the circumstances of each case. [ 64 ] To determine whether, in this case, the police officers had the authority to enter, the Court must decide two questions: First, does the conduct fall within the general scope of any duty imposed by statute or recognized at common law; and second, does the conduct, albeit within the general scope of such a duty, involve an unjustifiable use of powers associated with the duty? [8] [ 65 ] In the present case, the parties agree that Officers Langevin and Lévesque had the right to enter pursuant to the authorizing statute, Act P-38 (persons in distress, referring to the Act respecting the Protection of persons whose mental state presents a danger to themselves or to others) [ 66 ] The Crown also relies on the Police Act : [9] MISSION 48.

The mission of police forces and of each police force member is to maintain peace, order and public security, to prevent and repress crime and, according to their respective jurisdiction as set out in sections 50, 69 and 289.6, offences under the law and municipal by- laws, and to apprehend offenders.In pursuing their mission, police forces and police force members shall ensure the safety of persons and property, safeguard rights and freedoms, respect and remain attentive to the needs of victims, and cooperate with the community in a manner consistent with cultural pluralism.

Police forces shall target an adequate representation, among their members, of the communities they serve. [ 67 ] Since the police officers knew that Martin Boudreault owned two registered firearms, were they authorized to search the premises and intrude on the privacy of its occupants? LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS [ 68 ] Subsections 117.04(1) and (2) of the Criminal Code state the following: Application for warrant to search and seize 117.04

(1) Where, pursuant to an application made by a peace officer with respect to any person, a justice is satisfied by information on oath that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person possesses a weapon, a prohibited device, ammunition, prohibited ammunition or an explosive substance in a building, receptacle or place and that it is not desirable in the interests of the safety of the person, or of any other person, for the person to possess the weapon, prohibited device, ammunition, prohibited ammunition or explosive substance, the justice may issue a warrant authorizing a peace officer to search the building, receptacle or place and seize any such thing, and any authorization, licence or registration certificate relating to any such thing, that is held by or in the possession of the person.

Search and seizure without warrant

(2) Where, with respect to any person, a peace officer is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that it is not desirable, in the interests of the safety of the person or any other person, for the person to possess any weapon, prohibited device, ammunition, prohibited ammunition or explosive substance, the peace officer may, where the grounds for obtaining a warrant under subsection (1) exist but, by reason of a possible danger to the safety of that person or any other person, it would not be practicable to obtain a warrant, search for and seize any such thing, and any authorization, licence or registration certificate relating to any such thing, that is held by or in the possession of the person .

(Emphasis added.) [ 69 ] All agree that it was not desirable to leave Isabelle Bégin in her home in possession of two legally registered firearms. Were there reasonable grounds, however, to believe that this woman was in possession of such weapons? This question is determinative with respect to the application of subsection 117.04(2) of the Criminal Code , which refers to subsection (1). [ 70 ] The Court must answer it in the negative.

The officers could not have demonstrated to a justice of the peace that they had reasonable grounds to believe that Isabelle Bégin was in possession of these firearms, and even less so that Martin Boudreault was. [ 71 ] To justify the search of the co-accused's apartment, Officer Langevin stated that, in that situation, protocol allows them to act as they did, that is, to search not only for registered firearms, as in this case, but also for weapons that might not have been registered. [ 72 ] This is tantamount to saying that in Officer Langevin's view, he does not need reasonable grounds to believe that the person in distress calling 911 is in possession of firearms to perform a search. [ 73 ] Accepting the conduct of the police officers would give them the authorization, when dealing with this type of 911 call, to perform searches systematically, without reasonable grounds to believe that the person in distress is in possession of weapons.

Officer Langevin admitted that he was not aware of the provisions of

section 117.04 of the Criminal Code . [ 74 ] But then what was the purpose of the police officers calling Martin Boudreault to find out where the firearms were, when in reality, his answer did not matter because they had decided to perform a search regardless? [ 75 ] The Court can see only one explanation, as Officer Langevin in fact admitted: "to save some time searching for these firearms". [ 76 ] The Court cannot approve of this way of doing things.

From the start, the police officers knew that one of the occupants of the apartment, Martin Boudreault, owned two legally registered firearms. [ 77 ] This did not give them license to conclude that these firearms were necessarily to be found in Mr. Boudreault's home. They might have been in his home, his cottage, or elsewhere, appropriately stored in accordance with the provisions of the Firearms Act. At most, this information gave rise to suspicions. [ 78 ] It was up to Officers Langevin and Lévesque to ask where these firearms were, which is exactly what they did.

They received answers from both occupants of the apartment. [ 79 ] First, Isabelle Bégin told them that the firearms were at the house of her brother-in-law Gaétan, who lives in ... . Later, during a telephone conversation with Martin Boudreault, they learned that these weapons were indeed at his brother's house.

On this subject, Officer Lévesque stated that he did not believe Boudreault. [ 80 ] This amounts to saying that, since they did not believe either Bégin or Boudreault, the police officers were justified in performing a search of the rooms of the apartment. [ 81 ] The Court finds that the information received from Isabelle Bégin and Martin Boudreault justified further verification.

If the officers went to the trouble of communicating with Martin Boudreault to learn the whereabouts of the firearms, they could just as easily have communicated with Gaétan Boudreault to confirm the truth of the versions offered by Isabelle Bégin and Gaétan Boudreault and ensure that these weapons were in fact at that location. [ 82 ] In truth, there were other reasonable solutions that would have enabled the police officers to fulfil their duty while ensuring the safety of Bégin and avoiding a search that the Court finds was unreasonable in the circumstances.

We must not lose sight of the fact that the police officers were in dwelling-house, a place where the expectation of privacy is very high indeed. [ 83 ] As a matter of fact, based on the facts revealed by the evidence and in application of subsection 117.04(1) of the Criminal Code , the Court is of the view that a request for a search warrant would never have been granted. [ 84 ] Without a doubt, a justice of the peace would have found that there were no reasonable grounds to believe that Isabelle Bégin was in possession of these firearms.

He or she would have prudently analyzed Isabelle Bégin's version, in light of her personal situation, and Martin Boudreault's version afterwards, and would necessarily have directed the officers to ask Gaétan Boudreault whether the firearms were indeed at his home. [ 85 ] Therefore, and as previously stated, there were other reasonable alternatives to avoid a search. [ 86 ] Officer Langevin is of the view that the versions of Bégin and Boudreault were not accepted and no additional verifications were made because the officers had always proceeded in this way, systematically performing searches when distress calls were made. [ 87 ] If such verifications had been made, however, they would have learned that the firearms were indeed at the home of Gaétan Boudreault. [ 88 ] The Court cannot condone this type of practice. [ 89 ] In particular, the Court refers to paragraph 22 of Godoy , supra , which states: ...

The police have authority to investigate the 911 call and, in particular, to locate the caller and determine his or her reasons for making the call and provide such assistance as may be required. The police authority for being on private property in response to a 911 call ends there. They do not have further permission to search premises or otherwise intrude on a resident’s privacy or property . In Dedman , supra , at p. 35, Le Dain J. stated that the interference with liberty must be necessary for carrying out the police duty and it must be reasonable . ...

(Emphasis added.) [90] For these reasons, the search of the co-accused’s apartment is unreasonable and violates

section 8 of the Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms. [91] Must the evidence obtained in conditions that violated the petitioners' rights be set aside in light of the circumstances becauseits use would be likely to bring the administration of justice into disrepute? [92] Grant and Harrison[10] are two recent judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada concerning the analytical frameworkapplicable when determining whether evidence should be excluded following a violation of Charter rights. [93] The criteria that must be considered are the seriousness of the violation, the impact of that violation of the rights of the accused,and society's interest in seeing the case adjudicated on the merits. [94] The Court must weigh and balance all these various factors.

Seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct [95] With respect to the seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct, the Supreme Court of Canada states in Grant that:[11] Extenuating circumstances, such as the need to prevent the disappearance of evidence, may attenuate the seriousness of police conductthat results in a Charter breach: R. v. Silveira, (SCC), [1995] 2 S.C.R. 297, per Cory J. “Good faith” on the part of thepolice will also reduce the need for the court to disassociate itself from the police conduct.

However, ignorance of Charter standardsmust not be rewarded or encouraged and negligence or wilful blindness cannot be equated with good faith: R. v. Genest, (SCC), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 59, at p. 87, per Dickson C.J.; R. v. Kokesch, (SCC), [1990] 3 S.C.R. 3, at pp. 32-33, perSopinka J.; R. v. Buhay, 2003 SCC 30, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 631, at para. 59. Wilful or flagrant disregard of the Charter by those very personswho are charged with upholding the right in question may require that the court dissociate itself from such conduct.

It follows thatdeliberate police conduct in violation of established Charter standards tends to support exclusion of the evidence. It should also be keptin mind that for every Charter breach that comes before the courts, many others may go unidentified and unredressed because they didnot turn up relevant evidence leading to a criminal charge.

In recognition of the need for courts to distance themselves from thisbehaviour, therefore, evidence that the Charter-infringing conduct was part of a pattern of abuse tends to support exclusion. [96] In my view, a consideration of this element favours excluding the evidence. It is undeniable that the police officers acted ingood faith, while knowing that their intervention was taking place in a dwelling-house, a place that is highly protected by the valuesenshrined in the Charter. The violation must not be trivialized.

Good faith is only one element of the analysis and must be considered inrelation to the factors affecting the seriousness of the violation.[12] [97] In this case, arguing good faith – which the prosecution does and which the Court does not question – is tantamount tocondoning ignorance.

Officers who interact on a daily basis with citizens must have and maintain an appropriate knowledge of the stateof the law governing the actions they must take, with respect to the scope and proper execution of their duty and authority. [98] Although the violations were not [translation] "deliberate" in the sense that they were not committed for the purpose of violatingthe Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, they were the result of negligence and show a lack of respect for Charter rights.

The impact of the violation on the accused's Charter rights [99] As explained by the Supreme Court of Canada in Grant,[13] to determine the seriousness of the infringement from thisperspective, the Court must look to the interests engaged by the infringed right and examine the degree to which the violation impactedon those interests. [100] As for the interests engaged by the violation of

section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, this case involvesthe unreasonable search of a private dwelling-house (apartment) where the expectation of privacy is extremely high.[14] [101] In this case, there was a search and the evidence obtained as a result of the violation led to the discovery of sixty marijuanaplants. These plants would never have been discovered had there been no violation. [102] A consideration of this element favours excluding the evidence.

Society's interest in seeing the case adjudicated on the merits [103] With respect to society's interest in seeing the case adjudicated on the merits, the Court must weigh the impact of excluding theevidence obtained in violation of Charter rights:[15] Society generally expects that a criminal allegation will be adjudicated on its merits. Accordingly, the third line of inquiry relevant to thes. 24(2) analysis asks whether the truth-seeking function of the criminal trial process would be better served by admission of theevidence, or by its exclusion.

This inquiry reflects society’s “collective interest in ensuring that those who transgress the law are broughtto trial and dealt with according to the law”: R. v. Askov, (SCC), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1199, at pp. 1219-20. Thus the Courtsuggested in Collins that a judge on a s. 24(2) application should consider not only the negative impact of admission of the evidence onthe repute of the administration of justice, but the impact of failing to admit the evidence. (Emphasis added.) [104] In this inquiry, the "public interest in truth-finding remains a relevant consideration under the s. 24(2) analysis. The reliability of

the evidence is an important factor in this line of inquiry". [16] Also, "[t]he importance of the evidence to the prosecution’s case is another factor that may be considered in this line of inquiry". [17] The seriousness of the offence charged must also be considered. [18] [ 105 ] In this case, using the evidence gathered, the importance [19] and reliability of which are not in doubt, would serve society's interest in seeing the case adjudicated on the merits and ensuring that those who transgress the law are brought to trial and dealt with according to the law.

But that is true of every case like ours. [ 106 ] Conversely, the petitioners' production of cannabis is far from the highest degree of seriousness. I find that the negative repercussions on the repute of the administration of justice created by using the evidence gathered as a result of the unreasonable search performed in this case far outweigh those created by excluding the evidence. [20] [ 107 ] An examination of this element favours excluding the evidence.

Balancing the factors [ 108 ] In Harrison , [21] the Supreme Court of Canada recalls: The balancing exercise mandated by s. 24(2) is a qualitative one, not capable of mathematical precision. It is not simply a question of whether the majority of the relevant factors favour exclusion in a particular case. The evidence on each line of inquiry must be weighed in the balance, to determine whether, having regard to all the circumstances, admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

Dissociation of the justice system from police misconduct does not always trump the truth-seeking interests of the criminal justice system. Nor is the converse true. In all cases, it is the long-term repute of the administration of justice that must be assessed. [ 109 ] This qualitative exercise leads the Court to conclude that, in this case, using the evidence gathered from the home of the petitioners would be likely in the long term to bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The privacy-infringing conduct is serious, even though the police officers were acting in good faith. [ 110 ] Thus, for all the reasons stated above, the police officers could have reasonably acted otherwise while ensuring this woman’s safety and offering her the help she needed without needing to perform a search, which the Court finds was unreasonable. [ 111 ] Finally, the circumstances of the perpetration of the offences do not place them at the top of the scale of seriousness. [ 112 ] Consequently, the Court finds that admitting the evidence would in the long term bring the administration of justice into disrepute. [ 113 ] In conclusion, the evidence will not be used at trial.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT: [ 114 ] DECLARES the search performed on May 16, 2011, in the residence of the co-accused, at ..., Alma, to be unreasonable and in breach of

section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms . [ 115 ] DECLARES that, in light of section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms , the evidence gathered at ..., Alma, cannot be used at trial. _____________________________ MICHEL BOUDREAULT Judge of the Court of Quebec Mtre Amélie Gilbert Criminal and penal prosecutor

Mtre Stéphane Ouellet Counsel for the co-accused petitioner Martin Boudreault désy, aubin, simard Mtre Xavier Jean-Gagnon Counsel for the co-accused petitioner Isabelle Bégin Date of hearing: May 8, 2013