Her Majesty the Queen ) ) Anne Krahn v. Roxanne Gagné,, 2011 MBPC 74

2011 MBPC 74 THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF MANITOBA Winnipeg Centre IN THE MATTER OF: THE CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA AND IN THE MATTER OF: THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS AND IN THE MATTER OF: THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS ACT BETWEEN: Her Majesty the Queen ) ) Anne Krahn and Roxanne Gagné, for the Respondent, ) - and - ) ) Trevor Gary KOPP ) ) Mark Wasyliw and Karl Gowenlock, for the Applicant, ) ) Judgment delivered: ) December 6, 2011 L. M. Martin, P.J. [ 1 ] This is a decision on the

interpretation and constitutionality of s. 16(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (“ CDSA ”) . [ 2 ] On October 17, 2008 Mr. Trevor Kopp (“Kopp”) was arrested for trafficking under s. 5(1) of the CDSA after supplying an undercover police officer with four quarter gram baggies of cocaine in exchange for $80.00 in script cash in a dial-a-dealer operation. A further seventeen quarter gram baggies were located in Kopp’s vehicle (the “vehicle”). The vehicle was seized by the police as a conveyance used to transport and traffic cocaine. [ 3 ] Kopp was sentenced on April 13, 2010.

At that time the Crown applied for an order of forfeiture with respect to Kopp’s vehicle. Kopp opposed the application and filed a Notice of Constitutional Question on October 5, 2010, alleging, in particular that s. 16 of the CDSA violates s. 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the “ Charter” ). Argument on the constitutional issue was heard on June 10, 2011.

Though the constitutionality of s. 16 of the CDSA was challenged in its entirety, the submissions focused on s. 16(1), the mandatory forfeiture provision. [ 4 ] Given that there was disagreement as to what s. 16(1) means, I will deal first with its

interpretation and then determine whether or not it violates s. 12 of the Charter . I. THE MEANING OF S. 16(1) OF THE CDSA The Law [ 5 ] S. 16 of the CDSA reads as follows:

Order of forfeiture of property on conviction 16.

(1) Subject to sections 18 to 19.1, where a person is convicted of a designated substance offence and, on application of the Attorney General, the court is satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that any property is offence- related property and that the offence was committed in relation to that property, the court shall (

a) in the case of a substance included in

Schedule VI, order that the substance be forfeited to Her Majesty in right of Canada and disposed of by the Minister as the Minister thinks fit; and (

b) in the case of any other offence-related property, (

i) where the prosecution of the offence was commenced at the instance of the government of a province and conducted by or on behalf of that government, order that the property be forfeited to Her Majesty in right of that province and disposed of by the Attorney General or Solicitor General of that province in accordance with the law, and (ii) in any other case, order that the property be forfeited to Her Majesty in right of Canada and disposed of by such member of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada as may be designated for the purposes of this subparagraph in accordance with the law. Confiscation lors de la déclaration de culpabilité 16.

(1) Sous réserve des articles 18 à 19.1 et sur demande du procureur général, le tribunal qui déclare une personne coupable d’une infraction désignée et qui est convaincu, selon la prépondérance des probabilités, que des biens infractionnels sont liés à la perpétration de cette infraction ordonne:

a) dans le cas de substances inscrites à l’annexe VI, que celles-ci soient confisquées au profit de Sa Majesté du chef du Canada pour que le ministre en dispose à sa guise;

b) que les autres biens infractionnels soient confisqués au profit : (

i) soit de Sa Majesté du chef de la province où les procédures relatives à l’infraction ont été engagées, si elles l’ont été à la demande du gouvernement de cette province et menées par ce dernier ou en son nom, pour que le procureur général ou le solliciteur général de la province en dispose en conformité avec la loi, (ii) soit de Sa Majesté du chef du Canada pour que le membre du Conseil privé de la Reine pour le Canada chargé par le gouverneur en conseil de l’application du présent sous-alinéa en dispose en conformité avec la loi, dans tout autre cas. Property related to other offences

(2) Subject to sections 18 to 19.1, where the evidence does not establish to the satisfaction of the Court that the designated substance offence of which a person has been convicted was committed in relation to property in respect of which an order of forfeiture would otherwise be made under subsection (1) but the Court is satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt, that that property is offence-related property, the Court may make an order of forfeiture under subsection (1) in relation to that property. Biens liés à d’autres infractions

(2) Sous réserve des articles 18 à 19.1, le tribunal peut rendre une ordonnance de confiscation aux termes du paragraphe (1) à l’égard de biens dont il n’est pas convaincu qu’ils sont liés à l’infraction désignée dont la personne a été reconnue coupable, à la condition toutefois d’être convaincu, hors de tout doute raisonnable, qu’il s’agit de biens infractionnels. [ 6 ] As is apparent from the wording of s. 16, there is both a mandatory (s. 16(1)) and a discretionary (s. 16(2)) provision; s. 16(1) requires a court to make an order of forfeiture if the court is satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the property is offence-related property and that the offence was committed in relation to that property; s. 16(2) permits the Court to order forfeiture if the Court finds that the offence the person is convicted of is not committed in relation to property, but is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the property is offence-related property. [ 7 ] The difference between a mandatory and discretionary order of forfeiture therefore turns on whether the offence was “committed in relation to” offence-related property.

It is that phrase – “committed in relation to” – that is in issue in this application. [ 8 ] Counsel for Kopp asserts that the phrase “in relation to” must not only have a different meaning than “offence-related property” but it must also serve to narrow the latter’s general definition. He submits that this phrase must be interpreted to require that the property be “integral” to the commission of the offence, and not merely “incidental” to it, given the definition of “offence-related property” contained in s. 2(1) of the CDSA , which is worded in a similar fashion:

“offence-related property” means, with theexception of a controlled substance, anyproperty, within or outside Canada, (

a) by means of or in respect of which adesignated substance offence is committed, (

b) that is used in any manner in connection withthe commission of a designated substanceoffence, or (

c) that is intended for use for the purpose ofcommitting a designated substance offence; « bien infractionnel » Bien situé auCanada ou à l’extérieur du Canada, àl’exception des substances désignées, quisert ou donne lieu à la perpétration d’uneinfraction désignée ou qui est utilisé dequelque manière dans la perpétrationd’une telle infraction, ou encore qui estdestiné à servir à une telle fin. [9] This position finds some support in the case law. For example, in R. v.

Tammark, 2003 BCPC 6 at para.10, Moss J. discussedhow the vehicle in question was used in the commission of the trafficking offence to which the accused pleaded guilty. He commentedthat the vehicle was not “merely incidental” to the offence but rather, was “essential” and found that as the vehicle was used to “facilitatethe effective and prompt delivery of the drugs involved” the offence of trafficking was committed in relation to the vehicle. Forfeiture ofthe vehicle was ordered. [10] Likewise in R. v.

Kay, 2005 BCPC 519 at para. 25, Judge MacLean considered whether the vehicle was “essential, integral orinstrumental in the commission of the offence”, a distinction he thought was made by Judge Moss in Tammark. Judge MacLean foundthat the vehicle was at most incidental to the commission of the offence and as a result, was not offence-related property. He also foundthat forfeiture would be too onerous given the offender’s limited financial resources. [11] In R. v. Smith (6 January, 2011), St. Thomas, 560/10 (Ont. C.

J.), Justice O’Dea used similar reasoning in refusing to grant anapplication for forfeiture of a vehicle. In that case, the offender drove to a location to exchange drugs for money. Justice O’Dea notedthat the amount of the drugs (94 pills) did not “demand” that they be transported in a vehicle of any nature, and that the truck wastherefore unnecessary in the context of facilitating the meeting between the two offenders: The truck was unnecessary in context of facilitating Smith’s meeting with Freeman. The exchange was within easy walking distance ofSmith’s home.

There is no evidence that timelines were critical to the completion of the sale. There is no evidence otherwise suggestingwhy Smith elected to drive and he is not required to explain his reasons. In context of the nature of the commission of the offense, I findthe evidence supports no more than that the truck was incidental to its commission, not instrumental. [12] With all due respect, I am not certain that Tammark created a distinction, or if it did, that it or Kay and Smith are correctlydecided. This appears to be the view of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal. R. v.

Paziuk, 2007 SKCA 63 dealt with a case where thesentencing judge refused to order forfeiture of a vehicle, noting that the truck was not integral in any way to the offence aside fromtransporting the accused to various places across the country. The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge was inerror. It noted that the truck was offence-related property and as such the sentencing judge was required to order forfeiture given themandatory wording of s. 16(1).

Though the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal does not go into great detail as to why s. 16(1) wasapplicable in that case, the facts indicate that the truck was used in the commission of the offence; the offender who was driving thevehicle when he was arrested was found with 241 ecstasy pills and some marijuana in his possession. [13] In my view, the decision of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal is abundantly clear that when the property in question isdetermined to be offence-related property under s. 2(1) of the CDSA and it is linked or related to the offence the offender is convicted ofby the court, the sentencing judge has no discretion and must order forfeiture of that property.

This finding is, in my view, consistent withthe principles of statutory

interpretation. Principles of Statutory

Interpretation [14] Driedger’s modern approach to statutory

interpretation has consistently been endorsed by the Courts as the preferred approachto statutory

interpretation. (See: Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42 , [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559 at para. 29 andpara. 30) What this means is that words of

an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary senseharmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament. It is only if there is an ambiguity as tothe meaning of a provision that resort can be had to external interpretive aids, including other principles of

interpretation such as the strictconstruction of penal statutes. As stated in Bell ExpressVu at para. 29, an ambiguity is one where the words of the provision arereasonably capable of more than one meaning. [15] The fact that different courts have come to different conclusions as to the

interpretation of a given provision is of little to noimportance: For this reason, ambiguity cannot reside in the mere fact that several courts -- or, for that matter, several doctrinal writers – have come todiffering conclusions on the

interpretation of a given provision. Just as it would be improper for one to engage in a preliminary tallyingof the number of decisions supporting competing

interpretations and then apply that which receives the “higher score”, it is notappropriate to take as one’s starting point the premise that differing

interpretations reveal an ambiguity. It is necessary, in every case,for the court charged with interpreting a provision to undertake the contextual and purposive approach set out by Driedger, and thereafterto determine if “the words are ambiguous enough to induce two people to spend good money in backing two opposing views as to theirmeaning” (Willis, supra, at pp. 4-5). (Bell ExpressVu at para. 30) [16] An initial reading of s. 16 could create some confusion given the definition of s. 2(1) of the CSDA which uses very similarwording to s. 16(1).

For example, if under s. 2(1) property is “used in any manner in connection with the commission of a designatedoffence” is that not the same thing as “committed in relation to” under s. 16(1)?

[17] A closer examination of s. 2(1) and s. 16(1) reveals that there is a difference in regards to which property the court is dealingwith – property used in the commission of any offence versus property used in the commission of the offence before the court. Indeed,s. 2(1), which uses indefinite articles such as “a”, refers generically to designated offences, whereas s. 16(1), which uses demonstrativeadjectives such as “that” and definite articles such as “the”, refers specifically to property and offences.

The French versions are similarlystructured: s. 2(1) refers to “une infraction designée” whereas s. 16(1) refers to “cette infraction”. [18] “In relation to” which means “in regards to” or “in connection with”[1] is therefore used in its everyday sense to link theoffence to the “offence-related property”. [19] This

interpretation is consistent with the legislative context of s. 16. S. 16 of the CDSA is contained within “Part II –Enforcement”, under the

section entitled “Forfeiture of Offence-related Property”. Both s. 16(1) and s. 16(2) deal with the forfeiture ofoffence-related property. They differ however with respect to the standard of proof that is required and with respect to the court’s powerto order any forfeiture.

S. 16(1) which is located under the subheading “Order of forfeiture of property on conviction” requires proof ona balance of probabilities that the property is offence-related and that the offence (presumably the offence of which the offender isconvicted) was committed in relation to that property (presumably the offence-related property in question).

S. 16(2) which is locatedunder the subheading “Property related to other offences” requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that property is “offence-relatedproperty” if the evidence does not establish that the offence the person is convicted of was committed in relation to property (presumablyoffence-related property). [20] The difference between s. 16(1) and s. 16(2) therefore hinges on whether or not the offence-related property was linked to thevery offence of which the person is convicted.

In other words, a court must first satisfy itself that property falls within the definition of“offence-related property”. If it does, the court must then determine whether or not the very offence before the court was committed inrelation to that offence-related property. If it was, it falls under s. 16(1). If it does not, it falls under s. 16(2). [21] This

interpretation is also consistent with the purpose of s. 16 of the CDSA, namely, forfeiture of all offence-related property.As stated in R. v. Van Kessel, 2010 BCSC 257 at para. 21: The first step in considering the purpose of the impugned provisions is the wording of the provisions themselves.

Section 16 is clearlywritten with the purpose of allowing the Court to order forfeiture of offence-related property. The definition of offence-related propertyis extremely broad, as it includes any property by means of or in respect of which a designated substance offence is committed; propertythat is used in any manner in connection with the commission of a designated substance offence; or even property that is intended for usefor the purpose of committing a designated substance offence.

These broad provisions clearly indicate that the removal of this propertyis of utmost importance in this scheme. (See also R. v. Craig, 2009 SCC 23 , 2009 S.C.C. 23 for a general discussion on thepurpose of forfeiture provisions.) [22] This expansive definition came into effect as a result of legislative amendments. As pointed out by Chevalier, J.C.Q. in R. c.Roger Boudreau, (QC CQ) at para. 14, the amended wording demonstrates Parliament’s intention to broaden thescope of forfeiture: La lecture de cet

article de l’ancienne loi et de la définition de « bien infractionnel » que l’on retrouve à la nouvelle loi démontreclairement l’intention du législateur de vouloir élargir le champ d’application du pouvoir de confiscation du juge. La nouvelle loiimpose au juge le devoir de confisquer un bien qui « est utilisé de quelque manière dans la perpétration » d’une infraction désignée(« that is used in any manner in connection with the commission of a designated substance offence » dit la version anglaise) alors quel’ancienne lui donnait le pouvoir de le faire lorsque l’objet « avait servi ou donné lieu à l’infraction ».

L’ancienne loi exigeait entrel’objet qu’on voulait confisquer et l’infraction un lien infiniment plus direct et rapproché que l’actuelle loi. [23] The court in Van Kessel noted that the broad definition and the purpose of the forfeiture provisions of the CDSA allow for theremoval of all offence-related property from circulation regardless of its connection to any specific criminal offence: That the purpose of these provisions is the forfeiture of offence-related property is strengthened in particular by subsection (2) of section16 of the CDSA.

Subsection (2) allows the Court to order forfeiture of any property that it is satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt, isoffence-related property, even if the evidence does not establish that the offence for which a person has been convicted was committed inrelation to that property. This subsection is clearly intended to remove offence-related property from circulation, regardless of itsconnection to any specific criminal offence. (Van Kessel, at para. 22) [24] Given the foregoing, I find that s. 16 is clear and unambiguous.

There is no ambiguity in that the provision is not reasonablycapable of more than one meaning. There are not two or more plausible readings, each equally in accordance with the intentions of thestatute. Ascribing qualifiers to the phrase “in relation to” such as “integral”, “essential”, “instrumental” would simply change theordinary meaning of “committed in relation to” which does not infer any notion of degree or amount. [25] Having found that the provisions of s. 16 are not ambiguous, the next question that arises is whether it offends s. 12 of theCharter. II.

DOES S. 16 OF THE CDSA OFFEND S. 12 OF THE CHARTER The Law [26] S. 12 of the Charter stipulates that: 12. Everyone has the right not to be subjected toany cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. 12. Chacun a droit à la protection contre toustraitements ou peines cruels et inusités. [27] S. 12 of the Charter protects individuals from treatment or punishment that is cruel and unusual. The historical origins of s. 12

[27] S. 12 of the Charter protects individuals from treatment or punishment that is cruel and unusual. The historical origins of s. 12were discussed by Wilson J. in R. v. Smith, (SCC), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045 at para. 112:

Section 12 on its face appears to me to be concerned primarily with the nature or type of a treatment or punishment. Indeed, its historicalorigins would appear to support this view. The rack and the thumbscrew, the stocks, torture of any kind, unsanitary prison conditions,and prolonged periods of solitary confinement were progressively recognized as inhuman and degrading and completely inimical to therehabilitation of the prisoner who sooner or later was going to have to be released back into the community.

I agree, however, with mycolleague that s. 12 is not confined to punishments which are in their nature cruel. It also extends to punishments which are, to use hiswords, “grossly disproportionate”. And by that I mean that they are cruel and unusual in their disproportionality in that no one, not theoffender and not the public, could possibly have thought that that particular accused’s offence would attract such a penalty. It wasunexpected and unanticipated in its severity either by him or by them. It shocked the communal conscience. It was “unusual” becauseof its extreme nature.

Adopting Laskin C.J.’s concept of “interacting expressions colouring each other” (see Miller and Cockriell v. TheQueen, (SCC), [1977] 2 S.C.R. 680, at pp. 689-90) it was so unusual as to be cruel and so cruel as to be unusual. [28] As explained by Lamer J. in Smith at para. 54, the protection afforded by s. 12 deals with the quality of the punishment and itseffect on the person subjected to it: The limitation at issue here is s. 12 of the Charter.

In my view, the protection afforded by s. 12 governs the quality of the punishmentand is concerned with the effect that the punishment may have on the person on whom it is imposed. I would agree with Laskin C.J. inMiller and Cockriell, supra, where he defined the phrase “cruel and unusual” as a “compendious expression of a norm”.

The criterionwhich must be applied in order to determine whether a punishment is cruel and unusual within the meaning of s. 12 of the Charter is, touse the words of Laskin C.J. in Miller and Cockriell, supra, at p. 688, “whether the punishment prescribed is so excessive as to outragestandards of decency”.

In other words, though the state may impose punishment, the effect of that punishment must not be grosslydisproportionate to what would have been appropriate. [29] Not all disproportionate punishment is afforded protection under s. 12: it is only that punishment that is grosslydisproportionate in the sense that it would be considered abhorrent or intolerable. (R. v.

Morrisey, 2000 SCC 39 , [2000] 2S.C.R. 90, para. 26). [30] In assessing whether treatment or punishment is grossly disproportionate, the court must consider: 1) the gravity of the offence; 2) the personal characteristics of the offender and the particular circumstances of the case; 3) the actual effect of the punishment on the individual; 4) the penological goals in sentencing principles upon which the sentence is fashioned; 5) the existence of valid alternatives to the punishment imposed; 6) comparison of punishments imposed for other crimes in the same jurisdictions. (Morrisey, para. 27; R. v.

Goltz, (SCC), [1991] 3 S.C.R. 485) [31] All relevant contextual factors should be examined by the court.

No single factor set out in either Smith or Goltz is paramount.(Morrisey, para. 27) [32] If, after reviewing the contextual factors, the court finds that the treatment or punishment is grossly disproportionate for theindividual offender, the court must then determine whether the infringement of s. 12 can be justified under s. 1 of the Charter. (Morrisey,para. 29) [33] If the court finds however that the treatment or punishment is not disproportionate for the individual offender, then it must stillconsider the constitutionality of the treatment or punishment with reasonable hypotheticals.

If the treatment or punishment is consideredgrossly disproportionate in a reasonable hypothetical case, then the court must consider whether it is justified under s. 1 of the Charter. [34] With respect to what constitutes a reasonable hypothetical, Morrisey indicates that they are examples that could commonlyarise in day-to-day life. They are not to be extreme or far-fetched or marginally imaginable cases.

Further, they are to be reasonable inview of the crime in question. (Morrisey, para. 30 - 33) In other words, and as I understand Morrisey, the hypotheticals must be basedon fact scenarios for the same crime of which the individual offender before the court is convicted. [35] The two part s. 12 test is a stringent one. As referred to in Goltz, at para. 32, it is a test that is not quick to invalidate sentencescrafted by legislators. The means and purposes of legislative bodies are not to be easily upset in a challenge under s. 12.

As reiterated atpara. 73 of the Goltz decision, in reference to the second part of the s. 12 analysis: A reasonable hypothetical example is one which is not far-fetched or only marginally imaginable as a live possibility. While the court isunavoidably required to consider factual patterns other than that presented by the respondent’s case, this is not a licence to invalidatestatutes on the basis of remote or extreme examples. Laws typically aim to govern a particular field generally, so that they apply to arange of persons and circumstances.

It is true that this court has been vigilant, wherever possible, to ensure that a proper factualfoundation exists before measuring legislation against the Charter. [36] To date, s. 12 has never afforded protection to proprietary interests: ... the absence of provisions expressly protecting the security of property at the very least significantly limits the extent to which availmay be had to the Charter for protection from penal sanctions mandating confiscation of property, whether through fines, forfeitures orotherwise. (R. v. Lambe, 2000 NFCA 23, para.71)

[ 37 ] Though the lack of precedents does not foreclose the possibility of s. 12 protection for proprietary interests, the possibility of such protection is nonetheless remote ( Lambe , para. 72 ) as the cases provided to this Court indicate. [ 38 ] In Turner v. Manitoba, 2001 MBCA 207 , the appellant submitted that the mandatory forfeiture provisions in The Wildlife Act upon a conviction for using headlights for hunting big game animals violated s. 12 of the Charter . In that case, the vehicle forfeited was in excess of $44,000.

The loss of the vehicle impacted the appellant’s aboriginal and treaty rights to hunt and to carry out his duties as Chief of the Grand Rapids First Nation.

The Manitoba Court of Appeal dismissed the application, noting that while forfeiture orders may “amount to a significant monetary penalty...that penalty will always be an amount that the accused chose to put at risk when he or she chose to commit the offence.” ( Turner at para. 38 ) [ 39 ] Similar findings were made in: • Lambe, supra which dealt with the forfeiture of all-terrain vehicles valued between $3000 and $4000 that were operated outside of approved areas contrary to provincial legislation; • R. v.

Spence, 2004 NLSCTD 113 where a seaplane was ordered forfeited after the appellant was convicted of several offences under the Wildlife Act ; • R. v. Lafitte, 1996 CarswellNfld 224 (Nfld. T.D.) where a vehicle was ordered forfeited under the Tobacco Tax Act . Analysis [ 40 ] Kopp concedes that an order of forfeiture of the vehicle would not be grossly disproportionate in his case.

Consistent with this position, no evidence was led with respect to either the value of the vehicle or the actual effect of the forfeiture on Kopp. [ 41 ] Kopp alleges however that as s. 16(1) of the CDSA is mandatory and makes no distinction as to the amount of the personal property subject to forfeiture unlike s. 19 of the CDSA , any such order could result in grossly disproportionate treatment.

For example, in the case of a mother who drives to her son’s residence to give him a dose of her prescription for Xanex to calm his nerves or a father who crosses the Canadian border with a bottle of Sudafed he purchased in the United States to relieve his cold symptoms, forfeiture of the vehicles would be grossly disproportionate to an offence of trafficking or importation. [ 42 ] As stated in Morrisey , the hypotheticals must be reasonable in view of the offence committed. The offence in the case at bar is trafficking. The Sudafed hypothetical involves an importation scenario and is therefore not appropriate.

As for the Xanex hypothetical, it does not appear to be reasonable in that it is not a situation that commonly arises in day-to-day life. [ 43 ] It is true that s. 16(1) of the CDSA covers all designated substance offences. It will therefore cover trafficking in cannabis marijuana, amphetamines, cocaine, barbiturates and benzodiazepines, to name but a few. The range of sentence for trafficking varies correspondingly from a maximum term of imprisonment not exceeding one year to life. The type of conduct that constitutes trafficking also varies greatly.

To echo Gonthier J’s comments in Morrisey (para. 31 ) it may be that trafficking scenarios “ do not easily lend themselves to resorting to reasonable hypotheticals as guides to assessing punishment as cruel and unusual as they can be committed in an almost infinite variety of ways”. Such a determination will need to be left to another day. In the present case, given my finding on the lack of reasonable hypotheticals, Kopp’s application is dismissed. III.

RULING ON THE APPLICATION FOR FORFEITURE [ 44 ] In the case at bar, Kopp was convicted of a designated substance offence which he used his vehicle to commit; not only did he use the vehicle to drive to the location where the cocaine was trafficked, he transported the cocaine in that vehicle, and more drugs were found inside the vehicle when it was searched incident to arrest.

In all of the circumstances, I am satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the vehicle is offence-related property that was used in relation to the commission of the offence to which Kopp pleaded guilty. [ 45 ] As a result, I am ordering that the vehicle be forfeited to Her Majesty in right of Canada and disposed of by such member of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada as may be designated in accordance with the law. L. M. Martin, P.J.