2023 QCCQ 276, 2023 QCCQ 276

Lafreniere c. Ville de Montréal 2023 QCCQ 276 COURT OF QUÉBEC "Administrative and Appeal Division" CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC DISTRICT DE MONTREAL "Civil Division" No : 500-80-043290-221 DATE : January 17, 2023 ______________________________________________________________________ BEFORE THE HONORABLE STÉPHANE DAVIGNON, J.C.Q. ______________________________________________________________________ ROSEMARY LAFRENIERE Applicant v.

VILLE DE MONTRÉAL Respondent And TRIBUNAL ADMINISTRATIF DU QUÉBEC Implicated party ______________________________________________________________________ JUDGEMENT ON AN APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL A DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL ADMINISTRATIF DU QUÉBEC ______________________________________________________________________ OVERVIEW [ 1 ] Ms. Rosemary Lafrenière owns a vacant land located in the borough of Rivière-des-Prairies in Montreal, composed of lots 1 456 704, 1 456 705 and 1 456 727 of the Cadaster of Quebec.

She acquired it on March 5, 1987, in a Sheriff’s sale made at the request of the City of Montreal (" Montreal ") for non-payment of property taxes. [ 2 ] These lots are subject of two units of assessment of Montreal, namely the one bearing the service numbers 0560-00-0032-6 (which includes lots 1 456 704 and 1 456 705) and 0559-29-6577-5 (or lot 1 456 727). [ 3 ] From their acquisition in 1987 until 2020, the value entered on the roll for both units was $1. [ 4 ] On March 13 of that year, Mr. Jean-Philippe Hébert, assessor with Montreal, proceeds to a correction ex officio of the roll in accordance with

section 151 of the Act respecting municipal taxation [1] (" ARMT "). He then sets the value of the land at $80/m 2 , using the comparison method. The values on the roll are therefore substantially modified, being set at $367,400 and $75,600 respectively. [ 5 ] Ms. Lafrenière challenges these new values. She considers that they are disproportionate and that the roll should rather reflect those prior to the ex officio correction. She first files a request for review with Montreal. On September 22, 2020, her request is dismissed.

She then submits two applications – one for each of the assessment roll – to the Real Estate Division of the Administrative Tribunal of Québec (" TAQ " ) following the dismissal of her application for review. [ 6 ] Essentially, Ms. Lafrenière alleges that Hébert’s alteration of the entry on the role is not valid, since it was not prepared by a chartered appraiser who has been practicing for 5 years.

She adds that the assessment was made arbitrarily, that it constitutes an abuse of authority and that Montreal's conduct in the evaluation of her file and in the exchanges with her is marked by bad faith. [ 7 ] The two applications are joined and a hearing is held before the TAQ on November 29, 2021, at the end of which the case is taken under advisement.

On December 15, 2021, the decision is rendered (" TAQ1 "). [ 8 ] Recalling that in municipal taxation matters, while the values entered on the rolls benefit of a presumption of validity, the TAQ states that the onus is therefore on the person who contests the values to prove that they are erroneous but concludes that Ms. Lafrenière has failed to discharge this burden, then dismisses her claims. [ 9 ] On February 10, 2022, Ms. Lafrenière files an application for review of TAQ1 with the TAQ pursuant to

section 154 of the Act respecting administrative justice [2] (" ARAJ "). It provides that in certain cases, the TAQ may review or revoke any decision it has rendered. For her part, Ms. Lafrenière submits that TAQ1 should be revoked as, on one hand, she discovered new facts that were unknown to her at the time of the hearing and, on the other hand, because a substantive defect of such a nature as to invalidate the decision was committed during the instruction. [ 10 ] This application is heard by a panel of three members of the TAQ [3] on August 3, 2022.

They render their decision on September 14, 2022 (" TAQ2 ") and dismiss Ms. Lafrenière's claims on both grounds, concluding that her application is not admissible. [ 11 ] Dissatisfied, on October 13, Ms. Lafrenière files an application for leave to appeal against TAQ2. Then, by an amended application of November 8, 2022, she also challenges TAQ1 and ask for leave to appeal that decision as well.

[ 12 ] Upon receipt of this amended application, Montreal files a motion to contest the proposed amendments, and to request that Ms. Lafrenière’s application for leave to appeal TAQ1 be dismissed on the grounds that it was filed after the deadline. [ 13 ] At the outset of the hearing before the undesigned, following preliminary discussions, Ms. Lafrenière informs the Court that she wishes to withdraw her application for leave to appeal concerning TAQ1 and that she is therefore merely seeking leave to appeal from TAQ2, although she would necessarily refer to the first decision during her arguments.

The withdrawal is noted in the minutes of the hearing of November 16, 2022. Thus, only TAQ2's application for leave to appeal must be decided. [ 14 ] For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that Ms. Lafrenière's application for leave to appeal cannot be allowed. ANALYSIS

i) The law applicable for leave to appeal [ 15 ]

Section 159 of the ARAJ provides that decisions rendered by the TAQ in matters dealt with by the immovable division may be appealed to the Court of Québec, with the permission of a judge, when the question at stake is one that should be submitted to the Court. [ 16 ] This

article has given rise to abundant case law. Thus, it is generally accepted that leave to appeal may be granted if the appeal concerns a question of principle or a new or controversial question. Since this provision of the ARAJ is very similar to subparagraph 3 of

article 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure , the analysis of the jurisprudence of the Court of Appeal concerning the scope of these concepts is very useful and relevant. [ 17 ] Commenting on the scope of the terms as a matter of principle , Justice Morissette stated [4] : [4] Bien qu’abstraits, les termes « question de principe » ont bel et bien un sens eux aussi, et ce sens est clair.

L’expression « question de principe » connote d’emblée l’idée d’un problème sérieux, qui requiert une solution et qui comporte un enjeu juridique grave dépassant souvent de manière appréciable le seul intérêt des parties au litige. [ 18 ] By definition, a question of principle is therefore one that concerns a legal issue that is of general interest that goes beyond that of the parties involved [5] .

Failing that, the appeal may be permitted if the question submitted involves the best interest of justice, for example because of the TAQ's refusal to exercise its jurisdiction or when the impugned decision reveals an apparent weakness, an error of law or an insufficiency of reasons or if there is a demonstration of non-compliance with the rules of natural justice in the taking of evidence and the procedure that led to it. [ 19 ] Nevertheless, and to paraphrase Justice Dalphond in Société en commandite Les bois de Pierrefonds v.

Domaine de parc Cloverdale [6] , the function of the appeal is not to correct all errors of law that may creep into trial judgments, but rather to favor issues of importance, which is particularly the case when it comes to new or controversial questions of law . [ 20 ] That said, in the context of his analysis, the judge hearing an application for leave to appeal must not impose on himself the same judicial deference that is incumbent on the trial judge. He would otherwise usurp his role with the consequence of perverting the right of appeal itself [7] .

In short, leave to appeal the TAQ's decisions must be granted not sparingly, but judiciously [8] . ii) Application of the criteria to Ms. Lafrenière's demand [ 21 ] Ms. Lafrenière's application for leave to appeal identifies the following 12 questions: 1 ) Did TAQ err in law in applying the presumption of validity to the Assessor and his certificates of alterations?

Did the TAQ commit a manifest error by assigning the status of ‘expert’ to the Respondent’s unaccredited evaluator and his discredited evaluation? 2) Did TAQ commit a manifest error by accepting the Respondent’s assessor’s encouragement of a de facto zoning change suggested by his unaccredited evaluator? 3) Did TAQ commit a manifest error by not considering the Respondent’s questionable Assessment Roll anomalies between two consecutive Rolls? 4) Did TAQ commit a manifest error in not recognizing an exceptional case wherein the Respondent’s assessor was altering the Roll values of its own lots during the period of one Roll and into the second year of that period? 5) Did TAQ commit a manifest error by not considering the absence of a free and open market with respect to assessment of the real value versus unsellable lots at nominal value? 6) Did TAQ commit a manifest error by not considering the Respondent willfully dissuaded and deterred a prospective purchaser in July 2021, because the lots were intended for ‘park’ land, while simultaneously involved in the Applicant’s TAQ appeal for these lots the Respondent deemed ‘residential’? 7) Did TAQ commit a manifest error by not recognizing the Respondent’s evaluator provided non-representative comparables to determine a ‘real value’? 8) Did TAQ commit a manifest error in not recognizing a possible conflict of interest where the Respondent’s lawyers were advising the real estate transaction department for six years on acquiring the Applicant’s land for ‘park’ purposes, unbeknownst to the Applicant, while simultaneously counseling the assessor’s department, for the last 21 months of that period, in the Respondent’s defense of their excessive correction ex officio regarding ‘residential’ land? 9) Did TAQ2 commit a manifest error by misinterpreting the limited scope exercised by the Respondent’s Comptroller General in his investigation into this affair?

10) Did TAQ2 commit a manifest error by stating the Applicant’s new information was known at the time of TAQ1? 11) Did TAQ2 commit a manifest error by disregarding the ramifications of the new information wherein the history and context validated all evidence submitted in an exceptional case that harkens to disguised expropriation and/or deferred zoning? 12) Did TAQ2 commit a manifest error by not referring the case back to TAQ1 for a new hearing or, given the exceptional nature of the case with ail the Respondent’s questionable plans, methods, and actions, not reverting the Roll valuations to nominal value of land that is unsellable except to the Respondent? [ 22 ] It must be reminded that Ms.

Lafrenière doesn’t seek leave to appeal TAQ1. Therefore, to decide whether her application should be granted, the Court must strictly address the grounds pertaining to TAQ2, namely questions 9 to 12 and evaluate if they meet the criteria set out in

section 159 ARAJ . [ 23 ] However, in this case, the leave sought relates to a judgment rendered in the context of an application for review under

section 154 ARAJ . In this case, the appeal has a special character, since the initial decision has already been called into question. Decisions concerning similar situations have already been rendered in the past. [ 24 ] In the case of Lubecki [9] , Justice Champoux states: [9] Autrement dit, si les questions visées par la demande de révision de l’appelant Lubecki étaient des questions qui auraient dû faire l’objet d’un appel, TAQ2 n’aurait pas dû les réviser.

Si TAQ2 a refusé de les réviser, soit parce qu’il a considéré que la question n’était pas de celles qui se prêtent à la révision, soit qu’il ait considéré erronément que la question soulevée était « révisable » mais a décidé de ne pas le faire, encore une fois, le présent Tribunal n’a aucune raison de permettre l’appel, lequel serait manifestement voué à l’échec. [ 25 ] He goes on specifying the corridor within which a decision on an application for review may be appealed: [15] En conséquence, sur quoi peut porter l’appel? [16] D’abord, si TAQ2 avait dû considérer révisable une question soulevée par l’appelant et ne l’a pas fait, l’appelant peut potentiellement présenter des arguments défendables à cet effet en vue d’un appel.

Ensuite, si TAQ2 a considéré qu’il y avait une erreur révisable mais l’a mal révisée, encore une fois, cette question peut faire l’objet d’une demande de permission d’appeler. [17] Dans tous les cas où, en conséquence, un appel peut être ouvert, celui-ci ne peut porter que sur ce qu’aurait dû apporter une bonne révision, jamais un bon appel. […] [21] Encore une fois, il est utile de le répéter : l’examen approprié à faire ne consiste pas à décider si TAQ1 a commis des erreurs ou aurait pu rendre une décision différente à la vue de la preuve faite devant lui.

La véritable question à trancher est de savoir si TAQ2 a correctement révisé TAQ1. [22] Même si TAQ2 avait mal révisé TAQ1, le Tribunal doit tout de même faire preuve de déférence envers celui-ci, un tribunal spécialisé en la matière et évaluer si, encore une fois, l’erreur alléguée constitue une question de celles qui justifient la permission d’appeler, soit être une question sérieuse, controversée, nouvelle ou d’intérêt général. [ 26 ] Then, in a case almost identical to the present one Justice Forlini writes [10] : [31] As the Court of Québec pointed out in Lubecki , which is a case that bears a striking resemblance with the present case, an application for revision is governed by

section 154 ARAJ whereas an application for leave to appeal is governed by

section 159 . These are two distinct recourses. When an appeal is sought from a TAQ decision dismissing an application for review under

section 154 ARAJ , the grounds of appeal must pertain to whether the TAQ properly applied the framework of

section 154 and not whether there exist grounds of appeal of the initial decision. [32] As the respondent appropriately submits, this Court must determine whether TAQ-2 properly reviewed TAQ-1. If it finds an error in TAQ-2, then it must determine whether that error constitutes an issue that is such as to warrant the granting of leave to appeal. [ 27 ] Based on these teachings, the Court rules on each of the grounds of appeal of TAQ2 identified in questions 9 to 12 of Ms. Lafrenière's application for leave.

First ground of appeal pertaining to new information disregarded by TAQ2 (questions 9 to 11) [ 28 ] It should be recalled that Ms. Lafrenière's application for review before the TAQ related to two aspects. The first was the discovery after TAQ1 of important information unknown to her at the time of the hearing. The second, which will be dealt with in the next ground of appeal, was the conduct of the proceedings. [ 29 ] However, questions 9 to 11 set out above are all related to the first ground raised by her application for review.

Thus, they should be grouped together for the purposes of this analysis. [ 30 ] Ms. Lafrenière alleges that she discovered, after the trial that led to TAQ1, information that is essential to her case and that, should she be able to put in evidence, would likely have resulted in a different outcome. [ 31 ] In its decision, the TAQ first reminds the narrow framework within which an application for review under

section 154 must be made. Then, after setting out the applicable rules, it directly addresses Ms. Lafrenière's allegations:

[14] La

partie requérante a transmis au dossier de TAQ2, une série de documents, dont le contenu de certains, selon son témoignage, lui était inconnu lors de l’audition devant le TAQ1. [15] Le Tribunal doit donc déterminer si les nouvelles pièces constituent une preuve nouvelle qui pourrait justifier une décision différente de TAQ1. Parmi ces pièces, la

partie requérante attire particulièrement l’attention du Tribunal sur le Rapport d’analyse du contrôleur général de la Ville de Montréal du 8 octobre 2021. [ 32 ] TAQ2 deals specifically with the issue of the limited scope granted by the TAQ to the report of the Comptroller General (question 9). It explains why Ms.

Lafrenière's contention that the TAQ1 decision would have been different should she had been able to introduce new information obtained after the TAQ1 hearing cannot be accepted: [16] Il est vraisemblable qu’au moment de l’audience tenue devant TAQ1, le 29 novembre 2021, le rapport du contrôleur général n’était pas connu par la requérante, celui-ci portant la date du 8 octobre 2021.

Toutefois, les faits auxquels réfère ce rapport étaient-ils des faits nouveaux ? [17] Le Tribunal constate, de manière générale, que le rapport met en lumière des lacunes dans le processus d’acquisition entrepris par la Ville, du moins pour une

partie des propriétés visées, sous l’égide de l’article 192 de l’annexe C de la Charte de la Ville de Montréal. Le rapport aborde certains faits relatifs aux événements survenus entre mars 2017 et avril 2020 pertinents aux propriétés de la

partie requérante, notamment la tentative de la Ville de les acquérir. [18] Il apparait clair que ces faits visant les propriétés de la

partie requérante étaient connus de celle-ci avant l’audience devant le TAQ1 tenue en novembre 2021. En effet, la

partie requérante était elle-même

partie prenante à ces événements et au surplus, était en possession des pièces P-8 et P-9 qui se rapportent directement à ces événements depuis au moins le 25 novembre 2020. Ces faits ont également fait l’objet du témoignage de cette dernière lors de l’audition devant le TAQ1. [19] De toute évidence, ces éléments ne constituent donc pas de la preuve nouvelle. Par ailleurs, quant aux commentaires contenus au rapport mettant en lumière certains ratés du processus d’acquisition de la Ville, qui pourraient être qualifiés de faits nouveaux, bien que cela soit en

partie contestable puisqu’il s’agit aussi d’opinions, ceux-ci, selon le Tribunal, n’ont aucune incidence sur la détermination de la valeur réelle des propriétés de la

partie requérante. [ 33 ] With respect to the other information that Ms. Lafrenière alleged to be new, TAQ2, dismisses her claims on the following grounds: [20] Le Tribunal a examiné attentivement les autres pièces identifiées comme se rapportant à des faits « nouveaux » par la

partie requérante et conclut que celles-ci ne sont pas pertinentes aux fins d’établir la valeur réelle de ses propriétés, même en présumant qu’il s’agit d’une preuve nouvelle. En effet, ces pièces concernent le processus et les démarches d’acquisition des terrains entrepris par la Ville pour l’agrandissement de son Parc-nature et n’apportent donc aucun éclairage utile quant au litige. Conclusion sur la preuve nouvelle [21] Eu égard à ce qui précède, la requête de la

partie requérante ne saurait donc être accordée sur la base du paragraphe 1 de l’article 154 LJA, c’est-à-dire fondée sur des faits nouveaux, puisque : a. d’une part, tous les faits soulevés dans le rapport P-1 relatifs aux propriétés de la

partie requérante étaient connus lors de l’audience tenue devant le TAQ1 (et ont d’ailleurs fait l’objet du témoignage de la

partie requérante et de dépôt de pièces); b. d’autre part, les autres pièces présentées comme faits nouveaux ne sont pas pertinentes à la question qui était soumise devant le TAQ1, c’est-à-dire la détermination de la valeur réelle des propriétés de la

partie requérante. [ 34 ] It should be recalled that the original purpose of the proceeding taken by Ms. Lafrenière before the TAQ and which led to the TAQ1 was to challenge the values entered on the property rolls for her land. To succeed, she had to present evidence to refute the values recorded by Montreal. [ 35 ] In the case of Godin [11] , the Court of Appeal stated that in the context of an application for review under

section 154 ARAJ , it is not the function of the TAQ to review a decision of a previous panel by interpreting the facts differently. Thus, it was not the role of the TAQ to change through TAQ2 the findings already drawn from the evidence by TAQ1. [ 36 ] TAQ1 concludes that Ms. Lafrenière has not presented any evidence to refute the proof adduced by the City's assessor. This is also the finding of TAQ2, which concludes that the new elements that she seeks to introduce into evidence are of no help to her in contradicting the assessment made by Montreal.

The TAQ also recalls that the appraiser himself testified to explain why the values on the Roll jumped in 2020, stating that his predecessor had erroneously determined that the land was in a conservation zone, when in fact it is in a residential zone. [ 37 ] Ms. Lafrenière alleges that it was only after an Access to information request that she finally succeeded to obtain the report of the Comptroller General of Montreal, in February 2022. However, the TAQ concluded in TAQ2 that, for the most part, the information contained therein was already known to Ms.

Lafrenière and, above all, that this information was not of such a nature as to challenge the conclusions of Montreal’s appraiser and, consequently, to allow the modification of TAQ1 with regard to the values entered on the Roll. [ 38 ] This information, as it appears from paragraphs 27 to 36 of Ms. Lafrenière's application, concerns certain transactions in the vicinity of her land and Montreal's strategic plan for the sector. However, the real estate transactions are all published in the Land Registry. As for other actions that can be taken by Montreal, a roll is prepared in relation to a reference date.

Thus, it is the situation on that reference date that is relevant in determining the value of an immoveable property and not hypothetical situations that may arise from future transactions or zoning changes.

[39] Ms. Lafrenière is attacking the actions of Montreal, which she accuses of having, for all intents and purposes, used a scheme toindirectly expropriate her land. The TAQ did not have to rule on such allegations, more of the nature of a claim for damages, that shouldrather be brought before a court of justice. [40] TAQ2's conclusions are based on the proper application of the framework set for in

section 154 ARAJ. Ms. Lafrenière'sapplication does not question the state of the law, nor does it raise a debate of general interest, a new question, or a controversial issue.Therefore, her application does not meet the criteria to grant leave to appeal on this ground. Second ground of appeal pertaining to a substantive or procedural defect (question 12) [41] Although Ms. Lafrenière's original application for review leading to TAQ2 did not specifically raise this ground, the decisionshows that she was also challenging the procedure before the TAQ.

The TAQ2 decision does show that, at the hearing, the nature of Ms.Lafrenière's interventions suggests that she is alleging a substantive defect in her first hearing before the TAQ that led to TAQ1. [42] In her application for leave, by way of question 12, she criticizes the TAQ in TAQ2 for not having upheld her claims and,consequently, for not having ordered a completely new hearing because of the exceptional nature of her case and the wrongful conductof Montreal. [43] For the following reasons, the Court cannot further grant the leave sought based on this ground. [44] Although it is of obvious importance to her, with all due respect for her opinion, Ms.

Lafrenière's case is not so exceptional thatit goes beyond her sole interest. It is, in short, a property assessment challenge that follows the same rules as all the others and does notraise any difficulty. [45] Yet, Ms. Lafrenière points out that behind the ex officio correction made in 2020 there are other hidden objectives on the part ofMontreal. However, at the risk of repetition, this is not the basis of analysis that was to guide the TAQ in its assessment of the evidencethat led to its first decision.

Moreover, it is not a basis for reviewing its decision in the context of TAQ2. [46] The situations that may lead to a review of a decision by the TAQ are well defined in

section 154 ARAJ. In Syndicat destravailleurs(euses) des épiciers unis Métro Richelieu (CSN) v. Métro Richelieu Inc. [12], the Court of appeal refused to grant leave toappeal from a decision of the Superior Court which granted an application for judicial review of the Commission des relations de travailwhich itself had reviewed a decision of an earlier panel of the same administrative body, stating that the appeal did not raise a question ofprinciple, nor a novel or controversial question. [47] Then, in Ministère de l’Emploi et de la Solidarité sociale v.

R.C.[13], the Court of appeal once again summarized the scope ofthis provision: [20] La jurisprudence de la Cour portant sur la question du vice de fond de nature à invalider une décision est sans équivoque. Le vicede fond connote l’idée d’une erreur grave, évidente et déterminante. Une divergence d’opinions sur l’interprétation d’une dispositionlégislative ne suffit pas à invalider une décision. Le fait pour le premier décideur d’opter pour une interprétation minoritaire necorrespond pas à un vice de fond lorsque cette interprétation est tout aussi compatible avec le texte de loi.

La requête en révision internene constitue « pas […] un outil destiné à assurer la cohérence des décisions administratives ». [48] In Lubecki [14], the Court listed what might constitute a substantive defect that would warrant a rehearing: [10] La seule disposition invoquée dans le présent dossier qui puisse donner ouverture à la révision de TAQ1 – et les parties en conviennent entièrement – est l’article 154 3e alinéa : il doit alors être démontré que s’y trouve « un vice de fond ou de procédure (…) denature à invalider la décision ». [11] La jurisprudence est relativement nombreuse pour définir ce qui peut justifier l’application de cette autocompleteStr=lubecki&autocompletePos=7 - _ftn3. [12] Sans être limitatif, on peut penser par exemple à des situations de la nature suivante :

a) le défaut d’entendre l’une des parties;

b) la partialité du décideur;

c) l’application fondamentalement erronée de dispositions légales, par exemple quant à l’application d’une mauvaise loi, d’une loiabrogée, etc.;

d) l’utilisation d’un élément de preuve ne provenant pas du dossier;

e) l’erreur de calcul dans le dossier, telle qu’une inversion de chiffres, etc. [49] The scope of

section 154 ARAJ his well established and Mr. Lafrenière does not suggest that it should be extended otherwise.In the context of TAQ2, although it was not clear if she had raised the issue, the TAQ nevertheless analysed the argument as to whetherTAQ1 was rendered following a substantive procedural defect which would warrant a new hearing. [50] Apart from arguing that the TAQ should have revoke TAQ1 because new evidence had been found – an argument already beendelt with - Ms. Lafrenière does not further argue the TAQ2 improperly applied section 154 (3) ARAJ. Hence, the Court concludes thatthere is therefore no reason to intervene by allowing the appeal on this ground.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT : [ 51 ] DISMISSES Ms. Rosemary Lafrenière’s Application for leave to appeal; __________________________________ STÉPHANE DAVIGNON, J.C.Q. Ms. Rosemary Lafrenière Not represented Applicant Me Hugo Pépin and Me Michelle Picard GAGNIER GUAY BIRON Lawyers for the Respondent Ville de Montréal Mr. Julien Renaud, articling student BARIL & AVOCATS Lawyers for the Impleaded party Tribunal administratif du Québec Hearing Date: November 17, 2022