2019 QCCA 1514, 2019 QCCA 1514

Shabinsky c. Constructions Mont Tremblant inc. 2019 QCCA 1514 COURT OF APPEAL CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC REGISTRY OF MONTREAL No: 500-09-028499-192 ( 700-17-015159-188 ) MINUTES OF THE HEARING DATE: September 13, 2019 THE HONOURABLE MARK SCHRAGER, J.A. APPLICANT COUNSEL Mark Shabinsky Mtre Christian Daniel Landry ( La boîte juridique ) RESPONDENTS COUNSEL Les constructions Mont Tremblant inc.

GHD CONSULTANTS LTD Mtre Hugo Bachand-Brunet ( Robinson & Sheppard Shapiro ) Mtre Jean-François Vézina ( Langlois avocats, s.e.n.c.r.l.) DESCRIPTION: Application for leave to appeal from a judgment terminating the proceeding rendered on July 5 2019 by the Honourable Claude Dallaire of the Superior Court , District of Terrebonne (Art.30 al.2 et 357 C.p.c.) Clerk at the hearing : Elisabeth Lepage Courtroom: RC-18

HEARING 9:30 Commencement of the hearing. Continuation of the hearing held on September 12, 2019. The parties were excused from appearing in Court. Conclusion of the hearing. Elisabeth Lepage, Clerk at the hearing JUDGMENT [ 1 ] Applicant seeks leave to appeal the judgment rendered on July 5, 2019 by the Superior Court, District of Terrebonne (the Honourable Claude Dallaire), dismissing his action in virtue of

Article 51 C.C.P. because it is prescribed. [ 2 ] Applicant sued the Respondents seeking their responsibility for defects in the construction of his secondary residence in 2003. The judge held that, albeit, the problems manifested themselves gradually, Applicant had sufficient indication and was of the opinion (as disclosed by the evidence) that Respondents had not properly performed their obligations in the construction of the home and that he was of this opinion by 2013 at the latest.

Accordingly, the action instituted in 2018 exceeded the three-year prescription provided by law. [ 3 ] The judgment is a function of the facts disclosed in the allegations, exhibits and deposition of Applicant which the judge reviewed. [ 4 ] Leave is required under

Article 30 C.C.P. since the dismissal of the action was made pursuant to

Article 51 C.C.P. [ 5 ] Leave is granted where a judge of the Court “ considers that the matter at issue is one that should be submitted to that Court, for example because it involves a question of principle, a new issue or an issue of law that has given rise to conflicting judicial decisions.” [ 6 ] Applicant’s attorney deftly distinguishes the problems which manifested themselves in the terrace and retaining wall, on the one hand, from the problems in the foundations of the house.

Counsel seeks to assert that the judge erred in failing to consider these aspects separately and thus, counsel contends that a new point of principle has been raised.

Applicant also argues that prescription should only run in this case from the date the expert definitively determined the cause of the defects. [ 7 ] The judge, however, took such submissions into consideration and held as follows: [23] En effet, s’il fallait toujours attendre d’obtenir de tels rapports, la prescription ne commencerait quasiment jamais à courir, ce qui ne correspond pas à l’esprit des décisions rendues sur le sujet, ni à celui des dispositions législatives sur la prescription, dans le Code civil du Québec . (…) [51] Même si ces constatations étaient en apparence mineures, pour ce qui est de la résidence, nous sommes d’avis que le cumul de ces informations fait en sorte que les questions, les considérations, les préoccupations et les réponses obtenues par rapport aux inquiétudes manifestées auraient amené une personne raisonnable à intenter un recours en responsabilité contractuelle contre l’entrepreneur et l’ingénieur impliqués dans la construction de cette résidence bien avant l’année 2018. [52] Ce n’est pas parce que les ingénieurs s’entendent finalement pour établir la cause exacte de l’origine des dommages, en 2018, que le cumul des constats antérieurs doit être relayé aux oubliettes. [53] Ainsi, la demanderesse aurait dû voir à ses affaires bien avant l’année 2018, car elle n’avait pas à attendre que son dossier soit parfait et complètement constitué pour intenter un recours en justice contre son entrepreneur et son ingénieur. [54] Nous sommes d’avis qu’à partir de la preuve actuellement disponible, la demanderesse avait tout en mains pour entreprendre un recours en justice contre son entrepreneur, au plus tard en 2013, puisqu’à cette époque, elle était déjà d’avis (et l’a reconnu) que ce dernier n’avait pas bien exécuté ses obligations (donc qu’il était fautif pour les dommages qu’il constatait alors). [55] En défense à la demande de rejet, il était certes habile de mettre l’emphase sur les rapports d’experts qui ont été obtenus, lesquels circonscrivent la problématique pour qu’un décideur arrive à la conclusion que la cause des dommages repose sur la fondation de la résidence, plutôt que sur celle qui supporte la terrasse, mais après révision

sommaire desdites expertises, force est de constater que ces

expertises ne mettent tout de même pas de côté l’incidence du mur et de la terrasse comme causes des problèmes à la structure de la fondation de la résidence. [ 8 ] The judge did not accept that it was only in 2015 that the Applicant became aware of problems with the foundation apart from the retaining wall. This conclusion is factual. [ 9 ] These conclusions appear reasonable based on the record and free from overriding error.

Moreover and of immediate impact, they indicate that the judgment is the outcome of a factual inquiry and the application of established principles of law governing prescription to those facts. In the result, there is no new point of principle or other question, which would justify the granting of leave. Moreover, I do not believe given the essential factual nature of the judge’s conclusions, that the appeal would have a reasonable chance of success. As such, the interest of justice [1] militates against the granting of leave. [ 10 ] Accordingly, leave should not be granted in this case.

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, THE UNDERSIGNED: [ 11 ] DISMISSES the “Demande pour permission d’appeler d’un jugement mettant fin à l’instance” with legal costs. MARK SCHRAGER, J.A. [1] Art. 9 (3) C.C.P.