Her Majesty the Queen - v. -, 2019 SKPC 26

IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF SASKATCHEWAN Citation: 2019 SKPC 26 Date: April 29, 2019 Information: 90165452, 90165450 Location: Yorkton _____________________________________________________________________________ Between: Her Majesty the Queen - and - Crystal Ford / Clark Protz Appearing: Shane Wagner and Rhiannon Rees for the Crown Deanna Harris for Ms. Ford and self for Mr. Protz DECISION AFTER VOIR DIRE R. GREEN , J I.

INTRODUCTION [ 1 ] Crystal Ford and Clark Protz are charged with unlawfully possessing methamphetamine and cocaine for the purpose of trafficking on December 10, 2018 near Yorkton, contrary to s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act [ CDSA ]. Ms. Ford, as well, is charged with breaching an undertaking by possessing non-prescription drugs. [ 2 ] Ms. Ford and Mr. Protz were in a grey Dodge Caravan that was stopped by a marked RCMP vehicle near Yorkton in the

early morning hours of December 10, 2018. Cpl. Newton, who was in charge of this investigation, gave an order to police officers working with her to arrest both Ms. Ford and Mr. Protz under s. 5(2), after each could be identified. One of those officers, Cst. Wilson, identified Mr. Protz as the driver, and arrested him. Cpl. Newton soon arrived at the scene, and arrested Ms. Ford from the front passenger seat. [ 3 ] The defense challenges these arrests, alleging that Cpl. Newton did not have the requisite grounds to arrest Mr. Protz and Ms.

Ford in breach of their rights under s. 9 of the Charter , and that, as a result, the search of the van pursuant to the arrests breached their rights under s. 8 of the Charter . Under s. 24(2) of the Charter , the defense seeks to exclude from evidence the large amount of cocaine and methamphetamine, and the other items, found in the van during the search, as well as the evidence obtained subsequently through the search of two cell phones found in the van and through recordings and summaries of Ms.

Ford’s telephone conversations after her arrest. [ 4 ] Before getting to the s. 24(2) application, and the question of what if anything should be excluded under the Charter , Ms. Ford and Mr. Protz, as well, claim that the text messages taken from the search of the two cell phones, and the contents and summaries of telephone conversations that Ms. Ford had after her arrest, should not be admitted into evidence because they do not meet the legal test for relevancy and admissibility. [ 5 ] Thirteen witnesses testified on behalf of the Crown at the voir dire .

All were police officers involved in various parts of the investigation before and after the arrests, except for an employee of the Ramada Hotel in Yorkton. Ms. Ford and Mr. Protz called no evidence at the voir dire . By agreement of all parties, the evidence on the voir dire will be applied to the trial of these charges. II. ARE TEXT MESSAGES FROM TWO SEIZED CELL PHONES AND MS. FORD’S TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WHILE IN CUSTODY RELEVANT AND ADMISSIBLE? [ 6 ] Before considering the defense application under s. 24(2) of the Charter , both Ms. Ford and Mr.

Protz submitted that the text messages taken from cells phone found in the van they were in when arrested, and recordings and summaries of telephone calls made by Ms. Ford after she was arrested, should not be admitted into evidence, because they are not relevant to an issue in this trial, and if so, because the prejudicial value of this evidence outweighs its probative value. They submitted that the prejudice results because this evidence, in effect, is evidence of bad character spanning a time both before and after the offence date alleged.

For the reasons that follow, I disagree. [ 7 ] David Paciocco and Lee Stuesser, in The Law of Evidence (6 th edition) [1] , state that the basic rule of admissibility is that “information can be admitted as evidence only when it is relevant to a material issue in the case”. The authors as well note that a trial judge has an overriding discretion to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect (at pages 37 to 42). [ 8 ] Ms. Rees submits for the Crown, in her legal brief, that these text messages (as reproduced by Cpl.

Paul Fisher in tabs 10 and 11 of the exhibit binder and marked as Exhibits P-8 and P-9) constitute relevant circumstantial evidence, which show that the drugs seized were possessed for the purpose of trafficking, a material issue in this case. [ 9 ] The text messages were taken from an LG Phoenix 2 cell phone (found in Mr. Protz’s effects as per the property report, Exhibit P-6) and a Samsung Galaxy Note 3 cell phone (found in a purse in the front seat of the vehicle, which was believed to be Ms. Ford’s purse).

The messages on the LG phone spanned the dates of January 12, 2018 to December 9, 2018, and the messages on the Samsung phone spanned the dates of October 20, 2018 to November 19, 2018. Crown drug expert Cst. Michael Elek analyzed the messages from both cell phones in his report (Exhibit P-16) and his testimony.

Considering his knowledge of the language used in the drug trade, especially involving cocaine and methamphetamine, the way these drugs are trafficked and the prices they are sold for, he identified many messages, from each phone, that suggested communication about the drugs involved in this case, the sale of these drugs and the price to be paid for these drugs. [ 10 ] Taken together, I am satisfied that all of these messages are relevant to a material issue in this case, which is whether, if possession of these drugs is proved against Mr. Protz and/or Ms. Ford, that possession was for the purpose of trafficking.

In making that finding, I note that Justice Tholl, in R v Hefer , 2018 SKQB 98 , considered as admissible evidence similar text messages in the weeks and months leading up to the execution of a search warrant in that case. [ 11 ] Recordings of 69 telephone calls made by Ms. Ford from the White Birch Correctional Centre, after her arrest between

December 12, 2018 and January 21, 2019, were filed as Exhibit P-3. Cpl. Newton reviewed these telephone calls, and summarized themin Exhibit P-4, together with 17 telephone calls Ms. Ford made from the Pine Grove Correctional Centre between January 11 and January27, 2019. Based on those summaries, many of the telephone conversation were said by Cpl. Newton not to be relevant to thisinvestigation.

Five of these telephone conversations summarized in Exhibit P-4 - 2018-12-28 (1305) at page 3; 2019-01-08 (1945) atpage 5; 2019-01-17 (2124) at page 5; 2019-01-21 (2015) at page 6; and 2019-01-21 (2033) at page 6 - were played into the court recordfrom Exhibit P-3. [12] Ms. Rees submitted in oral argument that these five telephone calls were admissions against interest made by Ms. Ford, whichwere circumstantial evidence of a joint enterprise between Ms. Ford and Mr. Protz, regarding the issue of possession for the purpose oftrafficking. She said, in her brief of law, that the language used by Ms.

Ford in the calls, though after the fact, was circumstantialevidence that could be relied on in determining the issue of what knowledge Ms. Ford had of the drugs in the van. Regarding the fivetelephone calls played into the record, I agree with her submissions and find the evidence of these telephone calls to be relevant andadmissible against Ms. Ford on the issue of whether she was in a joint enterprise with Mr. Protz to possess the drugs found in this van forthe purpose of trafficking.

I view all the other telephone calls as either irrelevant to a material issue in this trial – with some of themcontaining a discussion of court strategy or process - or as referring to something Mr. Protz was alleged to have done and, which,therefore, become inadmissible as hearsay for the substantive proof of those allegations against Mr.

Protz. [13] In making these findings, I am satisfied that the prosecutor has shown that the text messages, from both cells phones, and theevidence of these five telephone calls are significantly relevant and probative to material issues in this trial, as identified above. [14] This is not a jury trial, as was the case of R v Rowe, 2012 ONSC 2600, referred to by Ms. Harris.

In that case, previous textmessages were excluded as prejudicial, because the judge was concerned that the jury would apply this evidence of previous disreputableconduct to whether the accused would be the type of person likely to have done what he was charged with (character evidence) ratherthan to a relevant issue in the trial. Keeping that in mind, and with the significant relevance of the text messages and the five telephonecalls to material issues in this trial, I am not satisfied that this evidence is being tendered solely as evidence of bad character.

Takentogether, I am not satisfied that the prejudicial effect to Ms. Ford or to Mr. Protz of any of this relevant evidence exceeds its probativevalue. [15] As a result, I admit into evidence the text messages from both cell phones (Exhibits P-8 and P-9) and the recordings andsummaries of the five telephone calls played into the court record, as recorded in Exhibit P-3 and as summarized in Exhibit P-4. Allother telephone conversations, recorded in Exhibit P-3 or summarized in Exhibit P-4, are inadmissible.

The weight to be placed on alladmissible evidence at this trial will be determined once all of the evidence is received. III. DID CPL. NEWTON HAVE LAWFUL GROUNDS TO ARREST MS. FORD AND MR. PROTZ? What grounds were required to arrest Ms. Ford and Mr. Protz? [16] Section 495(1)(

a) of the Criminal Code authorizes a peace officer to arrest without warrant a person who, on reasonablegrounds, the officer believes has committed or is about to commit an indictable offence. It is clear that Cst. Wilson was entitled to actupon the basis for arrest held by his superior officer Cpl. Newton (see R v Debot, (SCC), [1989] 2 SCR 1140, [Debot] atpar 57), but did Cpl. Newton have reasonable grounds to believe Mr. Protz and Ms.

Ford had committed or were about to commit anindictable offence? [17] Ultimately, this is determined by what “reasonable grounds” means in the context of the information possessed by Cpl.Newton. [18] In R v Shinkewski, 2012 SKCA 63, 399 Sask R 11 [Shinkewski] the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal set out the test fordetermining reasonable grounds to arrest, at para 13 (citations omitted): (

a) an arresting officer must subjectively hold reasonable grounds to arrest and those grounds must be justifiable from an objectivepoint of view - in other words, a reasonable person placed in the position of the arresting officer must be able to conclude there wereindeed reasonable grounds for the arrest; (

b) an arresting officer is not required to establish the commission of an indictable offence on a balance of probabilities or a primafacie case for conviction before making the arrest; but an arresting officer must act on something more than a "reasonable suspicion" or a

hunch; (

c) an arresting officer must consider all incriminating and exonerating information which the circumstances reasonably permit,but may disregard information which the officer has reason to believe may be unreliable; (

d) a reviewing court must view the evidence available to an arresting officer cumulatively, not in a piecemeal fashion; and (e) "...the standard must be interpreted contextually, having regard to the circumstances in their entirety, including the timinginvolved, the events leading up to the arrest both immediate and over time, and the dynamics at play in the arrest"; and, context includesthe experience and training of the arresting officer. [19] I note that the above test for determining reasonable grounds to arrest, from Shinkewski, was recently repeated with approvedby the Court of Appeal in R v Todd, 2019 SKCA 36 (at para 26), a case which, similar to this case before me, involved the lawfulness ofthe arrest of a motorist who was then charged under s. 5(2) of the CDSA. [20] In further considering the meaning of reasonable grounds to arrest, the Court of Appeal in Shinkewski went on (at para 16 and19) to consider and cite the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R v Storrey, (SCC), [1990] 1 SCR 241 [Storrey] forthe following propositions: [16] … the standard of "reasonable grounds to believe" does not require that an arresting officer ensure there has been "informedconsideration" of all the information available at the time of arrest before the officer may lawfully effect an arrest.

The standard simplyrequires the arresting officer to consider all incriminating and exonerating information which the circumstances reasonably permit… [19] As to judicial review of the sergeant's conclusion, R. v. Storrey directs a court to conduct its assessment of the objectivereasonableness of the grounds for arrest from the retrospective viewpoint of a reasonable person placed in the position of the arrestingofficer.

Where the circumstances of arrest do not reasonably permit the arresting officer to inquire into the veracity of the informationwhich formed the basis of the grounds for arrest, the law similarly does not permit judicial consideration of any evidentiary shortcomingswhich might come to light or be discovered post-arrest. … [21] Regarding Storrey, I note that on April 12, 2019, the Manitoba Court of Appeal, in R v Omeasoo, 2019 MBCA 43,[Omeasoo], at para 29, cited Storrey in determining the lawfulness of an arrest without a warrant under s. 495(1)(a). [22] In further assessing the appropriate test for reasonable grounds to arrest, I as well have considered the words of Doherty, JAof the Ontario Court of Appeal in R v Lewis, (1998), (ON CA), 122 CCC (3d) 481.

At para 22 of that decision,despite finding in that case that there were not reasonable grounds for arrest, Justice Doherty stated: I do not suggest that there must be confirmation of the very criminality of the information given by the tipster.

The totality of thecircumstances approach is inconsistent with elevating one circumstance to an essential prerequisite to the existence of reasonablegrounds. [23] Finally, in considering how the information from confidential informants is to be interpreted by an investigating officer, theSupreme Court in Debot held (at pages1143 and 1144) that the “police need not confirm each detail in an informant's tip so long as thesequence of events actually observed conforms sufficiently to the anticipated pattern to remove the possibility of innocent coincidence”. What did Cpl.

Newton know? [24] Much of the information Cpl. Newton had, to support this arrest, came from three confidential informants: A, B and C. Band C were under her professional care, as she is the RCMP officer in Yorkton in charge of dealing with confidential informants. A wasunder the care of Cst. Nelson, who relayed to Cpl. Newton information told to him by A. Taken together, Cpl. Newton believed theseinformants to be reliable and credible.

She said, in deciding what, if any, payment would be made to any of the informants, sheconsidered the totality of the information provided in deciding how much the RCMP would pay. [25] Cpl. Newton said A had been a confidential informant for the Yorkton detachment for two years, and that information fromthis informant had led to three search warrants. A had received payment for the information, and as well wanted to assist in protectingthe community.

[ 26 ] Cpl. Newton said B was in her view a reliable and credible informant. B had provided information to her for 18 months and had received financial payment for this information. Information from B had led to two search warrants and, in this investigation, B ’s information corroborated information received from A . [ 27 ] C had been an informant for seven months, and had received financial payment for information provided.

Information from C had never been used in a search warrant application, but the information provided by C was consistent and similar to, and therefore corroborated, the information received from B and A . [ 28 ] Cpl. Newton said she understood the information provided by all three confidential informants was personal information held by those informants, and not in the nature of rumour. Cpl.

Newton said, to protect the identity of these informants, she could not repeat word by word what each had said, but would describe their information in a generalized form. [ 29 ] The information from all three informants came to her during the first 10 days of December 2018. C called to say Mr. Protz was pushing cocaine in Yorkton and was working with Crystal Ford. C as well said Crystal Ford had sold her house at 159 Allanbrooke in Yorkton and was going to use the funds from the sale to head out west and buy and bring back a shipment of controlled substances to Yorkton. The source as well said that Ms.

Ford had moved to 215 Betts Avenue in Yorkton. [ 30 ] Cpl. Newton corroborated the information from C : (1) through an email from a co-worker who confirmed the sale of Ms. Ford’s house; (2) by looking up the Multiple Listing Service website, which confirmed the Allanbrooke house sale; and (3) by obtaining a copy of a Ms. Ford’s court undertaking from a previous release, which ordered her to live at 215 Betz (Exhibit P-2). [ 31 ] A few days later C again called her and said Ms. Ford and Mr. Protz had an accident out west, that they were bringing drugs back to Yorkton and that people were waiting for their return.

The source as well said that Ms. Ford was heavily into using crystal meth and Mr. Protz was staying with Brad Chernipeski in Yorkton. [ 32 ] Cpl. Newton corroborated the information from C by checking on the police information portal where she learned that Mr. Protz had been in an accident near Chase, British Columbia on November 30, 2018, and that Ms. Ford was a passenger in his vehicle. Mr. Protz’s vehicle had been towed from the scene after it hit a deer. The driver, Mr. Protz, was not found to be at fault.

She as well checked the police report system and found that Brad Chernipeski resided at 12 Gladstone in Yorkton. [ 33 ] At this point Cpl. Newton knew that Ms. Ford and Mr. Protz had been out west and were coming towards Yorkton. She, however, did not know what vehicle they were in because of the accident. She then heard again from C , who said that Ms. Ford was back in Yorkton, and was keeping a low profile because she brought back drugs and was driving around with Mike McDonald in a red SUV. [ 34 ] Cpl. Newton then spoke to B , who told her that Ms. Ford travelled out west with Mr. Protz. B said that Ms.

Ford got back a few days previous and that she had sold her house giving her access to money from the sale of the house, and said Ms. Ford had brought back a large amount of drugs and had moved into a house on Betts Avenue with a guy named Skippy. B said the vehicle Ms. Ford was in out west had broken down, and she was driving a rental vehicle. [ 35 ] Cpl. Newton said the information from B in her view corroborated that from C . At that point, however, she was unable to find information about what rental vehicle may have been rented by either Ms. Ford or Mr. Protz. [ 36 ] Cpl.

Newton then had another discussion with B , who said that Mr. Protz was staying at a house on Gladstone north of the intersection near Broadway and Gladstone. This informant as well said that Ms. Ford and Mr. Protz were planning another trip out west and that an individual in Yorkton named Darwin Whitehawk was helping Ms. Ford sell “product” in Yorkton. [ 37 ] Cpl. Newton drove to the area north of that intersection, and discovered that 12 Gladstone, where Brad Chernipeski was said to reside, was just north of the intersection. In her view, that corroborated the information coming from B and C .

She then contacted Budget Rent a Car near Chase, B.C., who had towed Mr. Protz’s vehicle after the accident. She also contacted the Kamloops RCMP, who had spoken to employees at Budget Rent a Car. The records from Budget Rent a Car showed the accident happened on November 30, 2018, and listed the driver as Clark Trotz, which she believed to be a typographical error. After the accident, Mr. Protz came to Budget Rent a Car in Kamloops, and was denied a rental vehicle, but was then dropped off at the Knights Inn in Kamloops.

[ 38 ] At that point, Cst. Newton was not sure what vehicle Ms. Ford and Mr. Protz were travelling in. She directed Cst. Kelly to set up surveillance at 215 Betts Avenue in Yorkton. He observed a native male get into a red Impala. The license plate of that vehicle was covered in snow, making it illegible. Twenty minutes later, this male returned to that residence, which in Cpl. Newton’s view was at least consistent with a drug drop-off. [ 39 ] Cpl. Newton checked the police system and determined that Darwin Whitehawk lived at 465 Lakeview Road in Yorkton.

At a later date, she drove by that residence, and saw a red Impala vehicle that was similar to one seen by Cst. Kelly in front of the Betts Avenue residence. This vehicle was running in a side alley, and she could see a male in the driver seat. She was not able to determine what the male was doing, and she watched the vehicle for 45 minutes. The driver of the vehicle was Darwin Whitehawk, who was slumped over in the driver’s seat and was in possession of cocaine when he was arrested.

She believed this was the same native male that had left the Betts Avenue address, and that this information corroborated B ’s information about Mr. Whitehawk. [ 40 ] Cpl. Newton then received information from B that Ms. Ford and Mr. Protz had left for the west coast, and were going to pick up “product” and were coming back to Yorkton later on the weekend. Then, on Sunday December 9, B contacted Cpl. Newton and said that Ms. Ford and Mr. Protz were on their way back to Yorkton and that Ms. Ford was bringing “product” back with her. On the same day, Cst. Nelson contacted Cpl.

Newton, and said that information he had received from A was the same; i.e. that Ms. Ford and Mr. Protz were travelling back to Yorkton. Cpl. Newton understood that Cst. Nelson had spoken to A two to three times that week. Cst. Nelson, as well, told her that A had said that Ms. Ford had sold her house and was using the money from that sale to buy a large amount of contraband substance and that she was travelling with Mr. Protz. [ 41 ] Then, that same day, Sgt. Smith advised Cpl.

Newton that an RCMP member had spoken with a staff member at the Ramada Hotel in Yorkton, who said that she had received a telephone call from Ms. Ford who had attempted to rent a room for Mr. Protz. That staff member said that Ms. Ford was calling from Hinton, Alberta and required a room for one week. Ms. Ford did not rent the room, when she was advised that pre-payment was required. [ 42 ] Cpl. Newton believed that Ms. Ford and Mr. Protz were in Hinton, Alberta, a distance of 1,133 kilometers from Yorkton, based on her Google search, and approximately an eleven to twelve hour drive to Yorkton.

She believed they were travelling in a rental vehicle, based on information from B . As a result, she set up a team of members in unmarked vehicles to the west of Yorkton, with Sgt. Smith near Theodore, another officer near Springside, Cpl. Newton just to the west of Yorkton and Cst. Kelly outside of 215 Betts Avenue in Yorkton. [ 43 ] At 2:50 a.m., Sgt. Smith radioed to her that he had followed a grey van with an Alberta license E55 177, which, based on his quick police computer check, turned out to be rented from Enterprise Rent a Car in Calgary. Cpl. Newton then radioed Cst. Reed and Cst.

Wilson and ordered them to drive out to highway #16 in their marked police vehicle, to locate the grey van with this license number, and, if Ms. Ford and Mr. Protz were identified, to arrest them both for an offence under s. 5(2) of the CDSA . [ 44 ] As a result of the arrest of Ms. Ford and Mr. Protz, the rental van was searched and, among other contents, bags containing 140.13 grams of cocaine and 198.43 grams of methamphetamine were found.

This search, pursuant to the arrest of both individuals, as well led to discovery of a number of cell phones, which were subsequently searched after a warrant was obtained using primarily the information about the drugs found in the van. As well, a production order, based on what had been found in the van, was granted to obtain recordings of telephone calls made by Ms. Ford, in custody, after her arrest.

Was the arrest lawful? [ 45 ] Having considered the meaning of lawful grounds to arrest set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in Storrey and Debot , and as well by the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in Shinkewski , and having considered the information possessed by Cpl. Newton in the early morning hours of December 10, 2018, I am satisfied that the arrest of Mr. Protz and Ms. Ford was lawful. That is because: (

a) Taken together, I am satisfied that Cpl. Newton had a subjective belief that Mr. Protz and Ms. Ford had committed the offence of possession for the purpose of trafficking under the CDSA , and that, given everything known to her cumulatively, and as well considering all the circumstances of this case, that belief was in my view reasonable, and clearly was more than a suspicion or a hunch; (

b) While not all of the information Cpl. Newton received from the confidential informants was corroborated, while confidential informant C was a recent source whose information had not in any sense been judicially tested, and while there were no observations of

Ms. Ford or Mr. Protz in Yorkton over this ten day period, I am satisfied that there was significant corroboration of much of the information provided by these confidential informants, both between the informants and externally. In particular: (

i) information from C that Ms. Ford had sold her house and was living on Betts Avenue in Yorkton was corroborated by Cpl. Newton from the MLS web site and by her getting a copy of Ms. Ford’s undertaking; (ii) information from C that Ms. Ford was working with Mr. Protz was corroborated by Ms. Ford’s telephone call to the Ramada Hotel in Yorkton, from Hinton, Alberta, when she attempted to rent a room for him; (iii) information from B that Ms. Ford was out west with Mr. Protz and that the vehicle she was in broke down, was corroborated by Cpl. Newton’s inquiries about Mr.

Protz’s accident near Chase, British Columbia; (iv) information from B that Ms. Ford and Mr. Protz were travelling in a rental vehicle was supported by the information discovered by Cpl. Newton that Mr. Protz, with Ms. Ford as passenger, hit a deer near Chase British Columbia, and then tried to rent a vehicle at Budget Rent a Car in Kamloops; (

v) information from B that Ms. Ford had sold her house and used the proceeds to purchase a large amount of drugs and she was travelling back to Yorkton with Mr. Protz was corroborated by A ; and (vi) information from B that Darwin Whitehawk was helping Ms. Ford sell drugs in Yorkton, was supported by the arrest of Darwin Whitehawk in possession of cocaine, and in a red Impala outside his residence in Yorkton, which I am satisfied Cpl. Newton reasonably believed to be the same person seen leaving the Betts Avenue residence in the same vehicle a few days earlier; (

c) While, as noted, each detail in the information provided by the confidential informants was not confirmed by Cpl. Newton, or the other officers working on this investigation, I am nevertheless satisfied that the information possessed by Cpl. Newton, about this sequence of events which was unfolding quickly over the weekend of December 9 and 10, and was believed to be occurring in a rental vehicle on a major highway, conformed sufficiently to the pattern Cpl. Newton was expecting so as to remove the possibility of an innocent coincidence; and (

d) While the decisions cited by counsel on the issue of reasonable grounds to arrest - which include R v Morin/Lachance , 2012 SKQB 61 , Shinkewski , R v Hardy , 45 BCAC 146, and R v Protz , 2014 SKQB (unreported) - depend on the unique circumstances of each case, I have read and considered these cases, and I am of the view that, while some of them have stronger grounds for arrest than others, the issue for me to determine is whether the standard for arrest without a warrant from Shinkewsky has been met. For the reasons stated above, I am satisfied that it has.

I, as well, note that the Omeasoo decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal, rendered two weeks ago, found an arrest without a warrant in a vehicle to be objectively reasonable, based on the constellation of factors known to the police officers. Having read and considered that decision, I am satisfied that the information possessed by Cpl. Newton was at the least equal to that possessed by the officers in Omeasoo . Because I am satisfied that Cpl. Newton held the requisite grounds to arrest both Mr. Protz and Ms.

Ford for an indictable offence, under s. 5(2) of the CDSA , I am not satisfied that the rights of either under ss. 8 or 9 of the Charter were violated. As a result, the defense application under s. 24(2) of the Charter is dismissed. ____________________ R. Green, J