R. v. Brodeur, 2014 NBCA 44

COURT OF APPEAL OF COUR D'APPEL DU NEW BRUNSWICK NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK 84-13-CA HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN APPELLANT SA MAJESTÉ LA REINE APPELANTE - and - - et - MAXIME BRODEUR RESPONDENT MAXIME BRODEUR INTIMÉ R. v. Brodeur, 2014 NBCA 44 R. c.

Brodeur, 2014 NBCA 44 CORAM: The Honourable Justice Deschênes The Honourable Justice Richard The Honourable Justice Bell CORAM : l’honorable juge Deschênes l’honorable juge Richard l’honorable juge Bell Appeal from a decision of the Court of Queen’s Bench: July 3, 2013 Appel d’une décision de la Cour du Banc de la Reine : le 3 juillet 2013 History of Case: Historique de la cause : Decision under appeal: Unreported Décision frappée d’appel : Inédite Appeal heard: February 11, 2014 Appel entendu : le 11 février 2014 Judgment rendered: June 26, 2014 Jugement rendu : Le 26 juin 2014

Reasons for judgment by: The Honourable Justice Bell Concurred in by: The Honourable Justice Deschênes The Honourable Justice Richard Counsel at hearing: For the appellant: Nicole Poirier, Q.C. For the respondent: James J. Matheson Motifs de jugement : l’honorable juge Bell Souscrivent aux motifs : l’honorable juge Deschênes l’honorable juge Richard Avocats à l’audience : Pour l’appelante : Nicole Poirier, c.r. Pour l’intimé : James J. Matheson THE COURT The appeal is allowed, the verdict is set aside and a new trial is ordered. LA COUR Accueille l’appel, annule le verdict et ordonne la tenue d’un nouveau procès.

The judgment of the Court was delivered by BELL, J.A. I. Introduction [ 1 ] On October 1, 2011, near Salisbury, New Brunswick, Cst. Stéphane Raymond proceeded to stop Maxime Brodeur, who was driving toward Moncton, on Route 2. Mr. Brodeur had 14 pounds of marijuana in his vehicle. The Attorney General filed an indictment charging Mr. Brodeur with illegal possession of over 3 kilograms of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking contrary to s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act , S.C. 1996, c. 19. [ 2 ] Mr. Brodeur pled not guilty and challenged the admissibility into evidence of the marijuana.

He claims the interception of his vehicle constituted arbitrary detention, thus infringing his rights under s. 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms . [ 3 ] The trial judge agreed with Mr. Brodeur’s contentions. Following an analysis under s. 24(2) of the Charter , he refused to admit the marijuana into evidence. In the absence of this evidence, and since the Attorney General did not adduce any other evidence, the trial judge rendered a not guilty verdict. The Attorney General is appealing. He alleges that the trial judge erred in law in grounding some of his critical findings on conjecture.

[ 4 ] For his part, the respondent claims the trial judge based these findings on inferences. Furthermore, he maintains that the Attorney General does not have a right to appeal since s. 676(1) (

a) of the Criminal Code , R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, limits this right to “any ground of appeal that involves a question of law alone”. II. Brief overview of the evidence [ 5 ] On October 1, 2011, Cst. Raymond was patrolling the Trans-Canada Highway (Route 2) near Salisbury, New Brunswick. The highway features a median in which Cst. Raymond was parked. Two kilometers further east it features an exit ramp to the village of Salisbury and several businesses, followed shortly thereafter by an entrance ramp back onto the highway. [ 6 ] Cst.

Raymond testified he is one of four members of the roving traffic unit, headquartered in Moncton, N.B. RCMP management has chosen to assign a police service dog to the roving traffic unit. Cst. Raymond is the dog master. On October 1, 2011, Cst. Raymond was sitting in an unmarked four-wheel drive vehicle on a “U-Turn” area located in the median, in the company of his police service dog. His vehicle was facing west and he was capturing radar readings from vehicles travelling east. He testified that, at one point, he captured three readings, 120 km/h, 125 km/h and 130 km/h.

All three readings were above the posted speed limit of 110 km/h. He testified that the vehicle he believed to be traveling at 130 km/h was a black vehicle whose driver was later identified as Mr. Brodeur. According to him, that vehicle was in the left lane and was passing vehicles in the right lane. [ 7 ] Cst. Raymond moved from his stationary position in the median and pursued Mr. Brodeur’s vehicle, which was the last of the vehicles that had passed him. Cst. Raymond pursued the Brodeur vehicle for approximately 1.5 km before turning on his flashing lights.

He delayed engaging the lights so as not to disrupt the flow of traffic and to avoid stopping Mr. Brodeur at either the exit ramp to Salisbury or the entrance ramp back onto the highway. [ 8 ] After he parked his vehicle behind that operated by Mr. Brodeur, Cst. Raymond exited his vehicle and walked to the passenger side. He smelled perfume as he approached the vehicle. This, for him, was an indication the vehicle might be carrying contraband drugs (marihuana). Based upon his experience and training, those carrying raw marihuana in their vehicles use perfume to camouflage the smell. Cst.

Raymond testified that eventually the smell of perfume dissipated and he could then smell raw marihuana. [ 9 ] He placed Mr. Brodeur under arrest, searched the vehicle incident to the arrest and discovered 14 pounds of marihuana in ziplock bags. Cst. Raymond did not deploy his police service dog during the stop. He testified the seized ziplock bags were not vacuum sealed. Had they been, this would have made it more difficult to smell the raw marihuana. [ 10 ] Mr.

Brodeur testified he was travelling in the right lane at the posted speed limit of 110 km/h with his cruise control engaged when he came upon a vehicle that was traveling under the speed limit. He disengaged his cruise control, waited for a vehicle to pass him on the left, then moved into the left lane where he followed the vehicle that had just overtaken him. He first observed the unmarked police vehicle as he passed by it while in the passing lane. He did not believe he was speeding. He says in his rear view mirror he observed the police officer, who appeared to be talking on the phone.

The officer did not stop him until he was beyond the entrance ramp at the Salisbury exchange. [ 11 ] The trial judge appears to have accepted all of Mr. Brodeur’s testimony, much of which was open speculation about what the officer was doing while following Mr. Brodeur as well as speculation about police techniques. The trial judge rejected virtually all evidence of any relevance offered by Cst. Raymond. In doing so, he rejected the possibility that Cst. Raymond may have been mistaken about the speed of Mr. Brodeur’s vehicle and concluded he was deliberately misleading the court.

To be frank, the trial judge concluded the police officer perjured himself about virtually every aspect of the interception. While credibility findings are owed deference and will rarely raise a question of law alone as contemplated by s. 676 of the Code, that is not always the case. As explained below, where speculation and conjecture are the basis upon which facts are determined, an error of law results. III. The Jurisprudence [ 12 ] It is trite law that trial judges are not to make factual conclusions based upon conjecture or

speculation. To do so constitutes an error of law. In the text Criminal Pleadings and Practice in Canada, loose-leaf, 2nd ed., vol. 3(Aurora, Ont: Canada Law Book, 2009), the Hon. Mr. Justice E.G. Ewaschuk sets out a number of matters which constitute questions oflaw (p. 23:10). They include “conjectural possibility” and “speculation”, as well as the trial judge’s assessment of individual pieces ofevidence in isolation. The Supreme Court has had occasion to address such errors within the context of Crown appeals in several cases.In R. v. Wild, (SCC), [1971] S.C.R. 101, [1970] S.C.J.

No. 69 (QL), the accused, the only survivor in a motor vehiclecrash, was found unconscious, in the driver’s seat, behind the steering wheel. His left leg was to the left of the steering column andpinned between the dashboard and the floor so securely that he could only be released by the use of a hydraulic jack. In the face of thatevidence, the trial judge acquitted Mr. Wild of criminal negligence causing death. Defence counsel theorized that Mr.

Wild had been aback seat passenger, had been thrown into the front seat as the vehicle rotated clockwise and then pinned into position when the vehiclestruck a power pole. The trial judge apparently could not or would not rule out that possibility. As a result, he had a reasonable doubtabout whether the Crown had proven its case and acquitted the accused. The Alberta Court of Appeal reversed and entered a guiltyverdict: [1969] A.J. No. 15 (QL).

The majority of the Supreme Court, speaking through Martland J., concluded the trial judge, as a resultof conjecture and speculation, had misapplied the rule in Hodge’s Case.

Martland J. stated: In the result, it is my opinion that the learned trial judge failed properly to apply the rule in Hodge’s Case to the facts before him in thathe acquitted the appellant, not because he found that there was a rational conclusion on the facts […] inconsistent with his guilt, butbecause there was, in his opinion, a conjectural conclusion which he considered might be inconsistent with his guilt. […] In the present case the learned trial judge, in considering the facts to which he referred failed to appreciate their proper effect, in law, inthat he did not distinguish between a conjectural possibility, arising from those facts, and a rational conclusion arising from the whole ofthe evidence. [pages 114 and 117] [Emphasis added.] [13] Lamer J. (as he then was) confirmed in R. v.

Rousseau, (SCC), [1985] 2 S.C.R.38, [1985] S.C.J. No. 46 (QL), that conjecture and speculation on the part of a trial judge, in and of itself, constitutes an error of lawupon which a Crown appeal can be founded. Mr. Rousseau had been acquitted at trial and a conviction substituted on appeal.

Althoughthe accused was successful in his appeal to the Supreme Court, the following observations are consistent with the jurisprudenceestablished in Wild: The Court of Appeal was well aware, in view of s. 605(1)(a), of the limits beyond which it could not substitute its opinion for that of thetrial judge and override the doubt entertained by the Court as to the accused’s guilt, quash his acquittal and find him guilty. Writing forthe Court, Beauregard, J.A. felt that to consider any possibility other than the existence of a conspiracy between the accused and Asselinwas purely conjectural.

If he was right, there would have been an error of law and the Court of Appeal would have been fully justified inreversing the trial judgment. [para. 16] [Emphasis added.] [14] In R. v. Dubois, (SCC), [1980] 2 S.C.R. 21, [1980] S.C.J. No. 38 (QL), theaccused was acquitted of murder in the beating death of his sister’s boyfriend. The deceased and the accused lived in the same residence.The accused was found in a drunken stupor about five feet from the deceased’s body. The accused’s boots, still on his feet, had blood ontheir toes, consistent with the blood type of the deceased’s.

The instep of the accused’s right boot had human hair on it. An experttestified that the human hair “probably came from the deceased”. The accused’s hands were covered with blood which he tried to lick offafter being refused permission to wash. The accused’s trousers were soaked in blood of a type consistent with the deceased’s blood type.The Crown appeal to the Alberta Court of Appeal was dismissed, McGillivray C.J.A. dissenting: 1979 ABCA 230 , [1979] A.J.No. 848 (QL). On further appeal to the Supreme Court, the appeal was allowed.

Martland J., writing for the Court, simply stated, in part,“We are all in agreement with the reasons given by Chief Justice McGillivray, in dissent in the Court of Appeal”.

McGillivray C.J.A. hadobserved as follows: Apart from the evidence of one Dionne Dubois, I am respectfully of the view that the learned Trial Judge’s observations in the course ofargument, taken with his Reasons for Judgment, establish clearly that he failed to distinguish between a rational conclusion, based onevidence, and a conclusion based on conjecture and unsupported by evidence; and that this is an error of law, and that he misdirectedhimself. […] [para. 15] [Emphasis Added.] [15] McGillivray J.A. continued with the following quotation from McRuer J. in R. v. McIver, [1964]O.J. No. 835 (H.C.J.) (QL):

The rule makes it clear that the case is to be decided on the facts, that is facts proved in evidence, and the conclusions alternative to theguilt of the accused must be rational conclusions based on inferences drawn from proven facts. No conclusion can be a rationalconclusion that is not founded on evidence. Such a conclusion would be a speculative, imaginative conclusion, not a rational one. [para.17] See also, R. v. Paul, (SCC), [1977] 1 S.C.R. 181, [1975] S.C.J. 114 (QL); Wild; and R. v. Torrie, [1967] O.J. No. 967(C.A.) (QL). [16] In the recent decision of R. v.

J.M.H., 2011 SCC 45, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 197, the Court was askedto declare that Wild was no longer sound jurisprudence. The Court did just the opposite. Cromwell J. confirmed that Wild continues to bean accurate statement of the law in relation to the manner by which speculation and conjecture may constitute a question of law alone(paras. 38-39). I note in passing that the “ultimate issue” under consideration in J.M.H., as in other cases cited herein, was the issue ofguilt or innocence of the accused - an issue for which the balance of proof was upon the Crown.

In the present case, the ultimate issue tobe decided by the trial judge was whether Cst. Raymond had conducted an “arbitrary” stop, the proof of which lay upon Mr. Brodeur. [17] The error of law which results from the use of speculation and conjecture by a trial judge wasaddressed by this court in R. v. Martin, 2010 NBCA 41, 361 N.B.R. (2d) 251, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [2010] S.C.C.A. No.302, and, more recently, in R. v.

Tran, 2012 NBCA 74, 393 N.B.R. (2d) 66, where the same trial judge had, in the course of voir dires onpurported Charter violations, speculated about facts that were determinative of credibility. For example, in Martin, the trial judgereferred to a police monitor’s evidence as “convenient coincidence”, yet this Court concluded there was “simply no evidence to suggest[the monitor] was not truthful in this regard” (para. 57). The trial judge also concluded, on the basis of pure speculation, that no oneknew about the whereabouts of the accused at a given time.

This conjecture and speculation caused him to make credibility findingsabout police testimony for which there was no evidentiary underpinning. This amounted to an error of law alone. Finally, in Martin, thetrial judge speculated, without any evidentiary foundation, as to the time within which a lawyer’s interview with his client would haveterminated. This speculation also contributed to negative findings of credibility about a police officer’s testimony.

Richard J.A., for aunanimous Court, explained why factual conclusions “[…] not grounded in evidence but rather in speculation or conjectural possibility[…]” constitute questions of law: It is not difficult to understand why a finding grounded in conjecture or speculation will amount to an error of law. A significantgoverning trial principle is that there must be an evidentiary foundation for findings and inferences of fact.

If a judge allows conjectureand speculation to become the basis for such findings and inferences, he applies the wrong test and thus commits an error of law. [para.36] [18] Richard J.A. summarized the impact of speculation and conjecture on the trial judge’sconclusions about the credibility of the police investigators in the following manner: The inferences of fact based on speculation and conjecture coloured the trial judge’s s. 8 analysis.

The judge’s s. 8 conclusions werepremised on inferences for which there was no evidentiary basis and upon which the trial judge then imputed certain knowledge, motivesand bad faith to the investigators. [para. 60] [19] In Tran, the trial involved the same police officer, the same trial judge and the same geographicarea as in the present case. On that occasion, Cst. Raymond, also then a member of the roving traffic unit, was part of a police checkpointoperation near Salisbury on Route 2. Cst. Raymond stopped Mr.

Tran and then became suspicious of him based on “indicators” heobserved and which he believed were connected to the transportation of contraband. A subsequent search of Mr. Tran’s vehicle resultedin the discovery of 20 pounds of marihuana in a suitcase in the trunk of the car. Some of the indicators Cst. Raymond consideredgrounds for suspicion were:

(1) Mr. Tran had a British Columbia driver’s licence but was operating a vehicle rented in Montreal and wastraveling in New Brunswick;

(2) Mr. Tran said he was going to Moncton because a new casino had recently opened there and hischances of winning were better at a new casino;

(3) Mr. Tran said he had moved from British Columbia to Montreal because of theproblems created by the Olympics;

(4) The constable observed a very nervous passenger in the front seat;

(5) There was a pillow andblanket in the back seat; and

(6) Mr. Tran had a firearm prohibition from British Columbia, a drug trafficking charge in Manitoba and anoutstanding warrant for impaired driving from Quebec. Cst. Raymond testified that in his experience those carrying contraband oftensleep in the car in order to guard the product. Hence, some suspicion arose from the presence of the blanket and pillow. He also testifiedthat those who transport contraband prefer to use rented vehicles to prevent their own from being seized in the event of detection.

Giventhe constellation of factors, including the nervous passenger, the rented car, the pillow and blanket and the suspect explanations offeredregarding the casino and the move from B.C. to Montreal, Cst. Raymond considered he had reasonable suspicion to conduct a search: R.v. Kang-Brown, 2008 SCC 18, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 456. Even though Cst.

Raymond testified that no one factor could constitute reasonablesuspicion, the trial judge speculated about each of the factors the constable took into consideration and explained why, in his view, thatfactor was meaningless, or, more importantly, why the police officer’s testimony was suspect. For example, Cst. Raymond testified as

follows regarding the passenger’s nervousness: He appeared nervous to me. Usually, people will acknowledge the police and in this case, it was a major road check. Mr. [Praught] was not looking anywhere. He was just straight like he was frozen. This to me is significant. I was involved in I’ll say about average five or six cases prior to this case where passengers were nervous and this case – these cases, when I obtained the consent search or searched the vehicle of the people, every time when the passenger was nervous, I found drugs or contraband tobacco […].

For me that was significant at that point. [para. 10] [ 20 ] In Tran , the trial judge’s response was to speculate regarding the bases of the nervousness and use that speculation to question the credibility of the police officer. He said: […] Passenger nervous. How often are there passengers that look nervous but there's nothing wrong. For instance, officer said, every time there was a passenger nervous, that there was something wrong and the passenger was nervous and they've checked, they found something wrong.

It was like a pretty strong statement by the officer, but the Court must wonder how many times there were passengers that looked service - looked nervous and there was nothing wrong with the vehicle, there were no offences being committed? So Mr. Praught, P-R-A-U-G-H-T, look nervous. This was considered like a big thing, a big-a strong indicator for Officer Raymond. Now to state as Mr. Raymond did that from his personal experience, every time he has seen a nervous passenger, there was some kind of contraband taking place, it's hard to accept that statement. [para. 11] [ 21 ] With respect to Mr.

Tran’s explanation that he was traveling to Moncton to try the new casino with expectations that it would be easier to win, the trial judge said : And it’s the same with the trip to Moncton to play the casino. Well, there could be other reasons why a person would want to come to Moncton, it’s just that the first idea that come to mind is thrown like that by the driver.

But again it is, objectively, rationally speaking, why would a person think that her or his [chances] are better at the Moncton Casino, but the Court can understand that a person that likes to play casino is like a person that likes to play golf or any sports, sometimes they want to move around, they want to try other [casinos] and these things are done and people want to visit the Maritimes. [para. 9] [ 22 ] Larlee J.A., for a unanimous court, noted that the trial judge had no such evidence before him “and he was speculating as to the reasons why somebody would travel from Montreal to Moncton to go to a casino” (para. 9). [ 23 ] Both Martin and Tran support the Crown position that speculation and conjecture in the making of credibility findings constitute questions of law alone from which the Attorney General may appeal.

IV. Application of the jurisprudence [ 24 ]

Section 9 of the Charter provides that “Everyone has the right not to be arbitrarily detained”. The exchange between the Court and defence counsel prior to the calling of the first witness on the voir dire demonstrated that the parties and the trial judge understood clearly the issue to be addressed. According to the trial judge « [I]t’s at the level of the validity of the interception that the issue will be decided. » [Transcript of the decision, July 2, page 24, lines 21 to 22]. [ 25 ] After testifying to his approximately 23 years of service in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Cst.

Raymond described the interception of Mr. Brodeur’s vehicle as it travelled easterly near Salisbury on the Trans-Canada Highway. The highway is the main arterial route through New Brunswick, with two lanes of traffic travelling easterly and two traveling westerly, featuring a median between the two travelled portions. Cst. Raymond was sitting in his unmarked vehicle situated in the median, with his radar device operational, capturing the speed of oncoming easterly traffic.

He testified to the following: [TRANSLATION] He was travelling—he was going toward Moncton, toward the east, and was coming from—from a westward direction. At that moment, I observed a—several vehicles coming toward me, including Mr. Brodeur’s which was in the—in the passing lane. The other vehicles were in the—the driving lane. At that point, I looked at my—my radar device. The radar had registered several speeds—on my screens— on my speed screen—120, 125, 130. I observed the—the vehicles. Mr.—Mr. Brodeur’s vehicle, a black vehicle, looked like it was passing the other ones.

So, at that moment, I formed my opinion that Mr. Brodeur’s vehicle was the one which—which was travelling

the fastest of the—of the—of all these vehicles. The vehicles drove by. Once they had passed me, I checked to make sure that it was safe to proceed. I entered traffic in left lane, the—the—the passing lane, in order to catch up to the vehicle in question and stop it for speeding. I followed it at a distance. I might have driven close to one kilometre before I caught up with him. When I did, we were close —close to the—close to the Irving Big Stop near Salisbury.

At that point, when I caught up with him, there was an exit ramp for the— the Big—the Big Stop, and also on—on the other side of the overpass, the—the bridge, there was an on-ramp going east. I then waited until I had passed the on-ramp to move closer to Mr. Brodeur’s vehicle, for safety reasons. There was a lot of traffic in that—in that area. With people entering and exiting the highway, it can become dangerous for other vehicles if we stop a driver there. So I stopped him right after the—the exit ramp from the Salisbury Irving Big Stop, toward Moncton. I stopped the vehicle. I put my lights on. I stopped Mr.

Brodeur’s vehicle. He stopped as soon as I put on the—the lights. I approached the vehicle—I parked my vehicle. When I park my vehicle, I usually do a—a licence plate check on my computer. So I did a check. I walked over to Mr. Brodeur’s vehicle on the—on the passenger side. I approached the vehicle. I asked Mr. Brodeur in which language he wished to receive service. He—he chose French. So I spoke to him in French. I told him that I was stopping him for speeding and that I would need his documents—driving documents. Also, in this case, this was a rental vehicle. Mr.

Brodeur said he didn’t have the rental contract with him. At that point, I—he gave me his driver’s licence. He also told me about a company he was trying to set up or was about to bring—business to the Moncton area or the Maritimes. I listened to him for a few seconds. He said he did not believe he was speeding but would take my word for it since I said he was.

I explained to him that there was a—there were several vehicles and he was in the passing lane, and with the—the readings I got on my radar screen—that I saw, and with my estimate of his speed compared to the other speeds—of the other vehicles, that he was the— the most—the fastest of that—that bunch of vehicles. [Transcript of the decision, July 2, 2013, page 48, lines 22 to 23; p. 49 to 51, to line 22] [ 26 ] Mr. Brodeur also testified about the interception. I set out below the relevant parts of his direct examination: [TRANSLATION] Q. Basically, you knew that the product was there. R.

That’s why I was driving on cruise control at one ten. Q. Go on. Explain — R. When I got to Salisbury, I —I ended up behind someone who was driving below 110, so I had to disengage the cruise control to get into the left-hand lane where I saw Mr. Raymond in his patrol car, which was pretty obvious as all undercover police cars have the same —the same wheels. So you know at once it’s a police car. I then re-engaged the cruise control at 110. When I saw it, I got back into the right-hand lane at once.

But before that—that’s right—as I was getting into the left-hand lane, there was someone approaching in that lane, so I let him pass me, then I got into the left-hand lane behind him. So the speeds Mr. Raymond “shot” were probably his, but in the video, since the camera started late, you can only see him far away. [Transcript of the decision, July 2, 2013, page 192, line 23; page 193, lines 1 to 21] V. Speculation regarding speed [ 27 ] From the above exchange, it is apparent, according to Mr.

Brodeur, that he was travelling in the right hand lane with his cruise control engaged at 110 km/h, came upon a vehicle traveling under 110 km/h, disengaged his cruise control, waited for a vehicle in the left lane to pass and then pulled out into the left lane where he followed the passing vehicle, saw the unmarked police vehicle, moved to the right hand lane and then re-engaged his cruise control. At no time did Mr. Brodeur testify that he had his cruise control engaged when he first saw the police vehicle. Cst. Raymond did not testify that Mr.

Brodeur was in the right hand lane when his vehicle was captured on the radar. He testified that he first noticed M. Brodeur’s vehicle when it was in the passing lane and seemed to be passing other vehicles. [ 28 ] Mr. Brodeur confirmed on cross-examination that he believed Cst. Raymond stopped the wrong vehicle. He said: [TRANSLATION]

. . . and I remember there was a car in front of me and that’s the one that should have been stopped, not me. [Transcript of the decision, July 2, 2013, page 205, lines 15 to 17]. [ 29 ] Although it will become evident that the trial judge speculated about Cst. Raymond’s motives for moving from a stationary position, it is somewhat telling that even Mr. Brodeur, when speculating about Cst.

Raymond’s motives for leaving the median to pursue his vehicle, said: [TRANSLATION] But it’s a shame he never specified that there was a car ahead of me when I know it was there, and in the video, he didn’t start his pursuit for nothing — [Transcript of the decision, July 2, 2013, page 209, lines 3 to 6] [Emphasis added.] [ 30 ] As already indicated, Mr. Brodeur did not testify that his cruise control was engaged at the time he saw the police officer. Furthermore, he did not state his rate of speed when the cruise control was not engaged. The exchange proceeded as follows: [TRANSLATION] Q.

Constable Raymond did not deny there may have been another vehicle doing 130 as well, but you, you —you were doing 130. R. That’s impossible because there was a car in front of me. So how could he have figured out my speed if there was someone in front of me who had just passed me? How is that possible? Q. Your reasoning —that’s—that’s not the question here. R. Well, it’s my answer. [Transcript of the decision, July 2, 2013, page 209, lines 7 to 16] [ 31 ] In rejecting Cst. Raymond’s evidence regarding the radar reading and his evidence that Mr. Brodeur passed vehicle(

s) that were in the right hand lane, the trial judge speculated as follows: [TRANSLATION] In general, the vehicle in the driv —in the passing lane is going faster, but that isn’t always necessarily the case. A vehicle can be in the passing lane and slow down. Vehicles can be in the —in the right-hand lane and speed up. And that possibility isn’t excluded … [Transcript of the decision, July 3, 2013, page 37, lines 19 to 23; page 38, lines 1 to 2] […] … the Court accepts Mr.

Brodeur’s testimony that he wasn’t going over the speed limit, which was 110 kilometres, and it doesn’t accept Constable Raymond’s testimony in which he infers that the —the vehicle—that Mr. Brodeur was the one in that group of vehicles who was doing 130. [Transcript of the decision, July 3, 2013, page 38, lines 5 to 12] [ 32 ] With respect, a reasonable inference from the evidence would have been that, when Mr. Brodeur moved from the right hand lane to the passing lane because he had caught up to another vehicle, he would have accelerated to overtake that vehicle, as was his intention.

It is pure speculation that Mr. Brodeur slowed down while in the left hand lane. In fact, it contradicts Mr. Brodeur’s own statement recorded after his vehicle was stopped, which I will address below. VI. Speculation used to reject the Crown position that Cst. Raymond could have made a “good faith” interception but was mistaken about which vehicle was speeding

[ 33 ] It was open to the trial judge to conclude that Cst. Raymond intercepted a vehicle he, in good faith, believed was traveling at 130 km/h, but that it was the wrong vehicle. Although such a mistake is often successfully pled as a defence to an accusation of speeding, the trial judge appears to have summarily rejected such a possibility. The unwillingness on the part of the trial judge to accept such a possibility appears to be founded upon speculation that it was impossible to reconcile the testimony of Mr. Brodeur with that of Cst. Raymond. Given the absence of evidence from Mr.

Brodeur regarding his speed while in the passing lane, there is no inconsistency in this aspect of the evidence. Regardless, I am of the view the lengthy excerpt set out below demonstrates, at best, the trial judge’s willingness to speculate about Cst. Raymond’s motives, and, at worst, a closed mind to the theory of the case offered by the Attorney General: [TRANSLATION] MR. POIRIER: . . . Motor Vehicle Act for speeding in order for the interception of the vehicle to be —to be legal. So we have the evidence of Constable Raymond.

There is no —nothing that stands out from Constable Raymond’s testimony which showed that he acted in—in bad faith or that he didn’t really believe that the vehicle in question was doing 130. We have inferences on the part of Mr. Aucoin to the effect that it was because he saw the licence plate, because it was a rental vehicle. Those allegations aren’t supported in any way. The only evidence we have with respect to the stopping of the vehicle has to do with speeding. THE COURT: No, but just wait a minute.

If the Court accepts on a preponderance of evidence that this vehicle never did go over 110 — there was a witness who testified—wasn’t there? Mr. Brodeur testified under oath at this hearing —at this hearing that he never went over 110. If —if the Court accepts his testimony, well, that becomes impossible—doesn’t it?—Constable Raymond’s—testimony that Mr. Brodeur was—his vehicle was the fastest in a group of vehicles which gave readings of 120, 125, 130, then, by logical inference, that becomes impossible. Unreconciliable. The Court cannot believe both Mr. Brodeur and Mr. Raymond at the same time.

If the Court doesn’t believe Mr. Raymond, well, the foundation for his stopping Mr. Brodeur’s car crumbles. And that can’t be reconciled. MR. POIRIER: That doesn’t —that doesn’t make it arbitrary. That doesn’t make it an arbitrary detention within the meaning of

section 9 . That— THE COURT: No—no, but— MR. POIRIER: Perhaps it’s a—speeding couldn’t be proven, but— THE COURT: No, no, but that wouldn’t be— MR. POIRIER: —that (inaudible)— THE COURT: —only the result of a mistake. MR. POIRIER: No. THE COURT: That could only be a mistake as in the example you gave where an officer thinks that a driver isn’t wearing his seat belt, but finds out that he is, but if he finds pot, that can’t be due to a mistake. With the— MR. POIRIER: But it absolutely can be— THE COURT: —with the details Mr.

Raymond gave the Court, that there were three—a few vehicles—which registered—and they weren’t fuzzy readings. They were precise readings of 120, 125, 130. He saw with his own eyes that Mr. Brodeur was the fastest in the group. He inferred that the speed was 130. That cannot be due to a mistake—as if he thought that—that he was wearing a—a seatbelt or not. And then, on the other hand, there’s Mr. Brodeur who says he had the cruise control on—it was either 110 or less than 110. All right. Listen, let’s say that I accept Mr. Brodeur’s version, I couldn’t accept the—the—the argument you put forward that, Ah, well,

then, if I accept that he was only doing 110, Mr. Raymond made an innocent mistake when he thought that Mr. Brodeur was driving faster but he was wrong like someone can be wrong about the driver wearing a seatbelt. I won’t go there. I’m going to say that I don’t believe Mr. Raymond if I accept Mr. Brodeur’s version because Mr. Brodeur’s version cannot be accepted and then reconciled with the version of a police officer who made an error, not with the details given by the police officer—hearsay. MR.

POIRIER: Well, certainly, our argument is that Constable Raymond—that’s indeed what he saw—130— THE COURT: No, no—well, no— MR. POIRIER: —kilometres an hour— THE COURT: —but I want to say, argue that I have to—I have to believe Constable Raymond, but don’t argue, alternatively, that if— MR. POIRIER: Well— THE COURT: —Constable Raymond got the speed wrong and it’s possible that Mr. Brodeur was only doing 110 but that Mr. Raymond made a mistake like a police officer can make a mistake about the seatbelt. That’s an option I will not consider . I’ll either accept that— the version of Mr. Raymond that Mr.

Brodeur suggested, and I won’t believe Mr. Brodeur, or I’ll accept Mr. Brodeur’s version that he wasn’t doing more than 110 and I won’t believe Mr. Raymond . And I won’t take as an approach that Mr. Raymond may have made an innocent mistake if I accept Mr. Brodeur’s version . I’m telling you (inaudible) Mr. Brodeur’s version, well, I’m going to find that Mr. Raymond— I don’t accept his testimony . MR. POIRIER: But the—the burden is with respect to arbitrary detention. THE COURT: Preponderance of the evidence. MR. POIRIER: Yes. And it rests on Mr. Aucoin.

LA COUR : To—to satisfy me, on a preponderance of evidence, and—and a pivotal, crucial piece of evidence is whether Mr. Brodeur drove over 110 or not or— MR. POIRIER: But the evidence—sorry for interrupting. THE COURT: Yes, yes, go ahead. MR. POIRIER: This is—this is what I am trying to argue, Your Honour, you could find that maybe Constable Raymond believed that Mr. Brodeur was doing 130. I submit that— THE COURT: And he was wrong. But I am telling you that this won’t be my finding . MR. POIRIER: Well, it’s an option.

THE COURT: And, well, I’m telling you that—the option, don’t insist on it. I will not consider it. I’m telling you— MR. POIRIER: Well, I think you should consider every—with respect, Your Honour, every option— THE COURT: I considered it and I discarded it . I’m telling you the—the option I’m going to consider here is either—Mr. Brodeur was doing 130 as Mr. Raymond test—testified, or he was doing 110 as Mr. Brodeur testified. But if I accept that Mr. Brodeur was doing 110 , I will not consider the version (inaudible) that Mr. Raymond may have made an honest mistake when—when he thought that Mr.

Brodeur was doing 130, reasonably, but that this was not the case. That option, I—I considered it, but I discarded it . I am telling you this. O.K. ? Mr. POIRIER: All right. Personally, I—anyway, I can’t— THE COURT: But, no, there’s nothing wrong with arguing that. I’m telling you that—don’t waste your breath on that possibility. Not in the—not in the context of the evidence as it was presented to the Court. MR. POIRIER: Because your—your decision may be influenced by many—many things that were said which have no connection with the speed, including Mr. Aucoin’s allegations that Mr.

Raymond was checking the licence plate, that—that he was—he knew that the vehicle was a rental, and that this was the reason for his stopping it. There is no proof of this. There are—assumptions or fairly strong conjecture— THE COURT: He is asking the Court to draw inferences. O.K.? MR. POIRIER: Yes, but the evidence was provided by Constable Raymond who said that he did not do that. And you would not have any reason for not believing him. So— THE COURT: Well, Mr. Aucoin—Mr. Aucoin, for his part, thinks that the Court has reasons for not believing him. Do you understand? MR. POIRIER: Based on what, Your Honour?

THE COURT: Well, he made his argument. MR. POIRIER: Well, it’s—an argument isn’t evidence. This is—this is exactly what I’m trying to—to say here, but— THE COURT: No, but I was—I was only telling you— MR. POIRIER: Yes. THE COURT: —which are the—the arguments I have to consider— MR. POIRIER : Well, this is—anyway, I can—

THE COURT: —and—and I’m not arguing with you. I’m saying to you—I’m identifying—I’m trying to identify with you the—the issues I have to determine. And I have—I have—in my interventions, I clarified that I don’t have to decide the validity as such of—of the grounds for the arrest, Constable Raymond’s grounds to believe that marihuana was—was present . O.K. ? This is not the issue to be decided. Mr. Aucoin accepted that—that the issue will be decided with regard to the validity of the interception—whether it was an arbitrary detention or not . All right.

And it is—through my [interventions] that I circumscribed the debate, and I— MR. POIRIER: All right. THE COURT: —Say, I (inaudible) the deliberations […] when I decide if the interception was valid, I will have to (inaudible) based on the evidence, if I—I accept Constable Raymond’s version, that he stopped the vehicle because it was speeding. O.K.? And in order to accept it, I have to accept his —his testimony that Mr. Brodeur was in a group of drivers whose speeds were 125—120, 125, 130, and that he had the highest speed. All right.

And here, you tell me—all right—to give you the example of the police officer who stops someone for not wearing a seatbelt, you suggest that, by analogy, that if Mr. Brodeur has (inaudible) on Mr. Raymond’s speed, if he sincerely believed that Mr. Raymond was doing 130, that—that doesn’t invalidate his interception of the car and it doesn’t invalidate the— the validity of his arrest for the—for the marihuana . This is what you are arguing. MR. POIRIER: Exactly. THE COURT: And I’m telling you that this—this argument, in the alternative, here, don’t put too much hope in it, don’t hold your breath.

That’s all I’m saying to you . MR. POIRIER: I can’t—I don’t see the distinction you are making between this analysis—the facts of this case and the seatbelt analysis. And the police officer may have acted in extremely good faith as Constable Raymond obviously did in—in the present case, but — THE COURT: No, it’s because— MR. POIRIER: —to note— THE COURT: —the police officer’s version doesn’t permit that scenario. When the police officer is testifying in the witness box and says that Mr.

Brodeur was in a group of drivers who were—who gave readings of 120, 125 and 130, and that he had the highest speed— O.K.? —the physical possibility, here, in Mr. Brodeur’s version, here—the physical possibility that Mr. Brodeur was doing 110, it’s excluded. O.K.? It isn’t a possibility.

If a police officer says, I believed he wasn’t wearing his seatbelt, but we know that because of the reflections and the different—contrasting colours of seatbelt and clothing, and that a police officer can sincerely believe that the—the driver isn’t wearing his seatbelt but he is wearing it—O.K.?—therefore there is a possibility of mistaken perception. But when a police officer does not leave room for error which—there were three speeds—which were all illegal—120, 125, 130 in a 110-zone. Mr. Brodeur had the highest speed. He didn’t say, I thought, or I had the impression. He said—he was the fastest.

Therefore, that doesn’t—that leaves no room for error. Why should the Court give the benefit of the error and say, well, I don’t accept that Mr. Brodeur was driving at 100— 120, 125 or 130, but I will give the police officer, who knows he made a mistake, the benefit of the doubt. His version doesn’t leave any room for error. That’s why I’m telling you, save your breath—keep—don’t put any hope in that option. That’s it. Therefore, I’m going to return to my deliberations, to determine whether I accept on a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Brodeur did not—was doing 110 or less.

And if I accept this, I will find that I don’t accept the version of the—the police officer . And if I don’t accept this, if I accept the version of—if I don’t accept this, therefore, I accept the police officer’s version that Mr. Brodeur was doing 130, and therefore it removes—the interception of the car was valid. That’s it in a nutshell . [Transcript of the decision July 2, 2013, page 258, line 23; pages 259 – 269, to line 21.] [Emphasis added.] [ 34 ] Crown counsel was correct when she contended that even if Cst.

Raymond was mistaken as to which vehicle was speeding, such a mistake would not result in an unlawful interception. The trial judge improperly limited his analysis by speculating that the police officer was either truthful or he was deliberately misleading the court. For him, there could be no middle ground. The trial judge effectively found that if Mr. Brodeur was truthful, the officer was necessarily not. Not only did this reasoning ignore the logic that the officer might have simply mistaken Mr. Brodeur as the speeding culprit, the conclusion reached is the product of the judge’s overall speculation that Cst.

Raymond targeted Mr. Brodeur’s vehicle because it had a Quebec licence plate. There was no evidentiary basis for this, yet, as shown below, it permeates the judge’s oral reasons.

VII. Speculation based upon Cst. Raymond’s training, equipment, resources and duty post [ 35 ] At the time he apprehended Mr. Brodeur, Cst. Raymond was a 23 year veteran of the RCMP with previous experience with the drug

section in Montreal and in general duty police work. As already indicated, he was one of four members working in the roving traffic unit and was the dog master assigned to that unit. In addition to other courses undertaken while in the RCMP, Cst. Raymond benefited from a two-day course known as “Pipeline” training, which teaches police officers doing traffic duty to be vigilant about signs or indicators of other offences that might be taking place “under their nose” (my words) while performing a routine traffic stop.

Constable Raymond’s training, experience and resources were the basis of much speculation by the trial judge regarding his truthfulness. It seemed to matter not that Cst. Raymond was assigned to a traffic unit, that he was patrolling the only major arterial highway in New Brunswick from Quebec to Nova Scotia, that easterly flowing traffic was heavier than westerly traffic at that time, that he was equipped with a radar device and that he was trained in its use. The Pipeline training and presence of a police dog, even though it was not deployed, caused the trial judge to speculate about Cst. Raymond’s motives.

That speculation is evident in the following excerpts from the transcript: [TRANSLATION] The drugs come in from either Ontario or Quebec. They are brought to the Atlantic region and they go through —and that’s the idea of the Pipeline . They often come through Salisbury, on Route 2, in the direction of Moncton.

And I will say it again, most of the time, Constable Raymond, the —the (inaudible) monitoring the eastbound traffic when he —he works from Salisbury, which can’t —which can’t—which can only be explained by this other part of the evidence to the effect that if—it squares with the main direction of the drug traffic.

In addition, Constable Raymond works in an unmarked vehicle with a dog trained to detect drugs, which squares, in this context, along with the other pieces of evidence, with a police officer whose mission is to —to stop, to catch drug traffickers. [Transcript of decision, July 3, 2013, page 21, lines 7 to 23] […] Therefore, the Court, based on the—Constable Raymond’s testimony in chief and cross-examination, finds that Constable Raymond’s main objective, given the unit he belongs to, given the—the traffic he monitors between—mostly in an easterly direction, given that he works with a dog trained to detect drugs, that his main objective isn’t the enforcement of the Motor Vehicle Act , that—that the act—the Motor Vehicle Act is a tool used to gain legal access to the vehicles he intercepts in order to detect more serious offences.

So the Motor Vehicle Act is a tool he uses to make legitimate traffic stops and then to apply his Pipeline training, in other words, to discover other evidence of trafficking. This is the finding of the Court and it—was—was demonstrated even more in cross-examination through the— through Constable Raymond’s comments. And if this is not—is not—was not acknowledged openly, the Court draws an inference. It is clear that Constable Raymond was very reluctant to admit this fact, but in my opinion it is obvious from the evidence as a whole, and I make it my finding.

And the evidence shows that most seizures, as well, to do with drugs, are made from vehicles driving in an easterly direction—toward Moncton—and that the—the dog—the dog used, as Mr. Aucoin indicated, which is—it seems to me it’s rather obvious, but it’s almost—it is revealing to repeat it, the dog isn’t used to help the police officer detect speeding, or—or identify drivers with no licence or no insurance or—no need to go on. That’s obvious. And the Court reiterates this, it isn’t as if every police officer on patrol in New Brunswick had a dog—a sniffer dog.

There are four such dogs in New Brunswick trained to detect marihuana, and Constable Raymond has one at his disposal on a full time basis. [Transcript of the decision, July 3, 2013, page 40, lines 22 to 23; page 41, lines 1 to 23; page 42, lines 1 to 5] [ 36 ] In my view, speculating about Cst. Raymond’s motives for stopping Mr. Brodeur’s vehicle based upon equipment, resources available and direction of traffic is tantamount to questioning the motives or credibility of a police officer accused of excessive force because he happens to carry a baton or a revolver and is trained in its use.

The approach adopted by the trial judge appears to advance the notion that Charter violations will be easier to prove when the arresting officer testifying is highly trained and has significant resources available to him or her, the presumption being that the police officer would use that knowledge and equipment for an improper purpose. The converse, of course, is that where police officers are poorly trained and have limited resources available, the court will be less inclined to be skeptical of their motives and less inclined to find a Charter breach.

I need make no comment on the legitimacy of such an approach. VIII. Speculation regarding whether Cst. Raymond had time to verify the licence plate before approaching Mr. Brodeur’s vehicle [ 37 ] Cst. Raymond’s police vehicle was equipped with a video recording device (see Exhibit C-1) and Cst. Raymond was equipped with a device which captured the audio while interacting with Mr. Brodeur. The trial judge used that video and audio to discredit Cst. Raymond. Unfortunately, the trial judge erred in his factual conclusions about the contents of the video and, as a result, speculated about what Cst.

Raymond could or could not have done within the time frame available to him. As I explain below, the trial judge essentially makes the same sort of speculative error to discredit the police officer as he did in Martin . At page 34 of his reasons for decision, the trial judge correctly concludes that Cst. Raymond activated his emergency lights at 14:50:08. However, he

incorrectly states that at 14:50:20 Cst. Raymond exited his vehicle. Exhibit C-1 demonstrates clearly that the police vehicle is still moving at 14:50:20. The trial judge then makes a second finding as to when the police vehicle stops: 14:50:27. He is correct in that regard. He then makes a second finding that Cst. Raymond exits his vehicle at 14:50:29. It is that finding that is pure speculation. There is no evidence Cst. Raymond exited the vehicle at 14:50:29. The trial judge’s speculative conclusion that Cst. Raymond exited the vehicle 2 seconds after it stopped led him to conclude, yet again, that Cst.

Raymond was not a credible witness. According to the trial judge, it is : [TRANSLATION] . . . absolutely implausible that Constable Raymond, between the time he stopped his vehicle and the—the time he got out of his car, that he had time to do a licence plate check or a—a driver’s licence check—any check at all on any system he may have. [Transcript of the decision, July 3, 2013, pages 34 to 35, lines 17 to 23]. [ 38 ] He continues: [TRANSLATION] The time it takes to stop the vehicle and the time it takes to open the door and get out, that amounts to two seconds.

So if, as Constable Raymond explains, he waited, for safety reasons, until he had stopped his vehicle to perform his checks before he got out of the vehicle, from a practical point of view, he did not have the time to do any check. [Transcript of the decision, July 3, 2013, page 35, lines 1 to 7] [ 39 ] I would also note that at no time did Cst. Raymond indicate he verified the driver’s licence. He testified that it is his practice to verify the licence plate.

Obviously, he could not verify the driver’s licence until he had communicated with the driver and obtained the licence. [ 40 ] After the stop at 14:50:27, one hears a sound like that of a transmission being placed into park and/or locks disengaging and/or a door opening at 14:50:29. This is the point at which the trial judge speculates Cst. Raymond exited his police vehicle. One then hears another sound similar to the first in the seconds that follow. However, one does not see Cst. Raymond until 14:50:34 at which time he appears in the video at the driver’s side front fender of the police vehicle.

These facts are irrefutable. However, the trial judge’s conclusion that Cst. Raymond only had two seconds to key in a licence plate number is simply speculation. It is speculation because it does not contemplate one starting to key in a licence plate number in the few seconds immediately before the police vehicle came to a full stop. Nor does it contemplate the police officer keying in a number with the right hand while opening the door with the left.

Most importantly, it is based on two speculative conclusions: 1) that the first sound heard was that of a door opening when it could have been the vehicle being placed into park, doors unlocking automatically and/or the door opening; and 2) that Cst. Raymond exited the police vehicle at precisely 14:50:29. IX. Speculation about speed and credibility – ignoring Exhibit C-2 [ 41 ] Throughout his decision, the trial judge continually refers to the fact that Mr. Brodeur was traveling at 110 km/h. He accepts this evidence because, as he says, Mr.

Brodeur was aware of the contents in the trunk and he would not want to draw the attention of the police. His conclusion that Mr. Brodeur was only traveling at 110 km/h is, according to his analysis, essential to his conclusion that the interception was arbitrary. The trial judge framed this issue as either Cst. Raymond was truthful (with no room for good faith error) or Mr. Brodeur was truthful when he said he was traveling at 110 km/h. The judge totally overlooked a statement Mr. Brodeur made at the scene that was recorded and adduced in evidence. At 14:51:40 and the seconds that follow on Exhibit C-2 Mr.

Brodeur says “I was going 110, 115 maximum ...". Mr. Brodeur then informs Cst. Raymond that his cruise control was set at 115 . [Emphasis are mine.] [ 42 ] On this point, however, I cannot conclude the finding was the result of speculation since the judge had Mr. Brodeur’s testimony regarding speed upon which to anchor his finding of fact. While the trial judge was entitled to accept none, some or all of the evidence, it would have been helpful if he had at least referred to Mr. Brodeur’s out of court version and specifically rejected it. X. Speculation about Cst.

Raymond’s sense of smell, effect of rain on dissimulation of odour [ 43 ] Constable Raymond testified he detected a strong odour of perfume as he approached the vehicle. He also testified that drug traffickers often use perfume to camouflage the odour of marihuana. He also testified that an open bottle of AXE perfume was in plain sight in the console of the vehicle. (See photo at page 3 of Exhibit C-1) On October 1, 2011, it was

raining heavily and Mr. Brodeur’s vehicle had just come to a stop on the side of the road. According to the trial judge, eight secondspassed from the time Cst. Raymond left his vehicle to the time he arrived at Mr. Brodeur’s vehicle. Actually, eight seconds passed fromthe time Cst. Raymond reached the driver’s side front fender (14:50:34) of his own vehicle and the time he said hello to Mr. Brodeur(14:50:42).

The trial judge considered the fact it was raining and the recent stop to conclude the police officer was perjuring himself.The trial judge stated: [TRANSLATION]Constable Raymond’s testimony that he detected a strong smell of perfume, in the circumstances, in the context that the Court justdescribed, is improbable. [Transcript of decision, July 3, 2013, page 36, lines 13 to 16]. [44] The trial judge’s conclusion about Cst.

Raymond’s credibility in relation to the smell of perfumeis speculative and contrary to the uncontradicted evidence that an open bottle of AXE perfume was in plain view in the console of thevehicle. The trial judge had no evidence before him to contradict the testimony of Cst. Raymond regarding the smell of perfume. Therewas no evidence about the gaseous properties of the perfume and its ability to circulate in the air – whether there is precipitation or not.This did not prevent the trial judge from speculating about Cst. Raymond’s ability to smell the perfume.

This speculation, that it wouldbe impossible to smell perfume as one walked up to the vehicle in the rain, is not founded upon any evidence and is irrational. XI. One final observation [45] The trial judge provided a self-instruction regarding the distinction between speculation and inferencesproperly founded on the evidence. He stated: [TRANSLATION]When dealing with inferences based on the evidence, if a person agrees with it, he says—I agree with the inferences. When he doesn’tagree, he says it’s mere speculation.

All of this is very relative, this—it’s semantics, but I—this Court considers that its finding is areasonable inference based on the evidence. [Transcript of decision, July 3, 2013, page 49, lines 9 to 16] [46] With respect, the test for a properly made inference is not a matter of semantics. The test issimple and contains two essential elements: (1) is the conclusion rational; and (2) is it based on the evidence? In light of the trial judge’sobservations regarding conjecture and inference, it is appropriate to restate the distinction between the two as summarized by DrapeauJ.A., as he then was, in Parlee v.

McFarlane (1999), (NB CA), 210 N.B.R. (2d) 284, [1999] N.B.J. No. 88 (C.A.)(QL): Once again, we must underscore the fundamental difference between conjecture and inference. The first is not a reliable fact finding toolfor the simple reason that it does not rest upon a compelling evidentiary foundation. As such, it has no place in judicial decision-making.The second is the product of a time-honoured fact-finding process. This process involves the extraction of a logical conclusion fromcogent evidence.

As such, it is unquestionably a reliable weapon in the judicial fact finding arsenal. [para. 43] [47] As is evident from all of the above, the trial judge made several conclusions in the course of thevoir dire that were neither rational nor based on the evidence. It is not his findings of fact that I consider to be errors that would allow meto overturn this acquittal. Rather, it is the fact the judge applied the wrong legal test to determine the facts, just as he had done in Martinand Tran. XII.

Conclusion [48] For these reasons, I conclude the judge applied the wrong legal test to the determination of thefacts, leading to a verdict that was the product of a significant error of law. I would, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the verdict andorder a new trial.

__________________________ B. RICHARD BELL, J.A. WE CONCUR: ALEXANDRE DESCHÊNES, J.A. J.C. MARC RICHARD, J.A. Version française de la décision de la Cour rendue par LE JUGE BELL I. Introduction [1] Le gendarme Stéphane Raymond a arrêté Maxime Brodeur le 1 er octobre 2011 près de Salisbury au Nouveau-Brunswick. M. Brodeur conduisait une voiture sur la route numéro 2, en direction de la ville de Moncton. Dans le véhicule de M. Brodeur se trouvaient 14 livres de marijuana. Le procureur général a déposé un acte d’accusation par lequel Mr.

Brodeur a été inculpé d’avoir eu illégalement en sa possession, dans le but d’en faire le trafic, plus de 3 kilogrammes de marijuana, infraction prévue au par. 5(2) de la Loi réglementant certaines drogues et autres substances , L.C. 1996, ch. 19. [2] M. Brodeur a plaidé non coupable et a contesté l’admissibilité en preuve de la marijuana. Selon lui, l’interception de son véhicule constituait une détention arbitraire, portant ainsi atteinte au droit garanti à l’ art. 9 de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés . [3] Le juge du procès a accepté les prétentions de M. Brodeur.

À la suite d’une analyse effectuée en vertu du par. 24(2) de la Charte , il a refusé d’admettre la marijuana en preuve. En l’absence de cette preuve, et puisque le procureur général n’a pas offert d’autres preuves, le juge du procès a rendu un verdict de non-culpabilité. Le procureur général interjette appel. Il prétend que le juge de première instance a commis des erreurs de droit en fondant certaines conclusions déterminantes, sur de la conjecture. [4] Pour sa part, l’intimé prétend que le juge a fondé ces conclusions sur des inférences.

De plus, il soutient que le procureur général n’a pas le droit d’interjeter appel, puisque l’ al. 676(1)

a) du Code criminel , L.R.C. 1985, ch. C-46 limite ce droit à « tout motif d’appel qui comporte une question de droit seulement ». II. Bref survol de la preuve [5] Le 1 er octobre 2011, le gendarme Stéphane Raymond patrouillait sur la route Transcanadienne

(route 2) à la hauteur de Salisbury (Nouveau-Brunswick). L’autoroute est pourvue d’un terre-plein central sur lequel il était garé. Unebretelle de sortie, deux kilomètres à l’est, mène au village de Salisbury et à quelques commerces; une bretelle d’accès, un peu plus loin,ramène à l’autoroute. [6] Le gendarme Raymond a indiqué, lors de son témoignage, qu’il fait

partie de l’Équipe mobilede la sécurité routière, unité de quatre membres basée à Moncton. La direction de la GRC a choisi d’associer à l’équipe mobile un chien policier. Le gendarme Raymond en est le maître-chien. Le 1er octobre 2011, il se trouvait à bord d’un véhicule à quatre roues motricesbanalisé, en compagnie de son chien policier, dans une zone de demi-tour du terre-plein. Son véhicule orienté vers l’ouest, il relevait auradar la vitesse des véhicules circulant en direction est. Il a témoigné que, à un certain moment, le radar avait mesuré trois vitesses :120 km/h, 125 km/h et 130 km/h.

Toutes étaient supérieures à la limite affichée de 110 km/h. Il a témoigné que le véhicule auquel ilavait supposé une vitesse de 130 km/h était un véhicule noir que conduisait, comme l’a établi le contrôle d’identité ultérieur,M. Brodeur. Au dire du gendarme, ce véhicule roulait dans la voie de gauche et dépassait les véhicules de la voie de droite. [7] Le gendarme Raymond a abandonné le terre-plein pour prendre en chasse le véhicule de M.Brodeur, dernier des véhicules passés devant lui. Il l’a suivi sur une distance d’environ 1,5 km avant d’allumer ses feux clignotants.

Legendarme a attendu pour les activer, afin de ne pas perturber la circulation et de ne pas avoir à intercepter M. Brodeur aux bretelles desortie ou d’accès de Salisbury. [8] Après avoir rangé son véhicule derrière celui que M. Brodeur conduisait, le gendarmeRaymond en est descendu et s’est dirigé vers le côté du passager du véhicule intercepté. Il s’en approchait lorsqu’une odeur de parfumlui est parvenue. Cette odeur a éveillé en lui le soupçon d’un transport de drogue (de marihuana) en contrebande.

Son expérience et saformation lui avaient appris que ceux qui transportent de la marihuana brute dans leurs véhicules se servent de parfum pour en camouflerl’odeur. Le gendarme Raymond a témoigné que le parfum avait fini par se dissiper et qu’il avait pu sentir la marihuana brute. [9] Il a procédé à l’arrestation de M. Brodeur, puis à une fouille accessoire du véhicule qui l’amené à la découverte de sacs à fermeture par pression et glissière contenant 14 livres de marihuana. Le gendarme Raymond n’a pas eurecours à son chien policier pendant l’intervention.

Il a témoigné que les sacs saisis n’étaient pas scellés à vide. L’emballage sous videde la marijuana brute aurait rendu l’odeur plus difficile à déceler. [10] M. Brodeur a témoigné qu’il circulait dans la voie de droite aux 110 km/h autorisés, allure quemaintenait son régulateur de vitesse, lorsqu’il a atteint un véhicule qui roulait en deçà de la vitesse limite. Il a désactivé le régulateur etattendu qu’un véhicule soit passé à sa gauche. Il s’est ensuite engagé dans la voie de gauche et il a suivi le véhicule qui venait de ledoubler.

Il a aperçu le véhicule de police banalisé après être arrivé à sa hauteur, dans la voie de dépassement. Il ne croyait pas conduiretrop vite. Il dit avoir vu dans son rétroviseur l’agent de police, qui semblait parler au téléphone. L’agent ne l’a intercepté que passé labretelle d’accès à l’autoroute de Salisbury. [11] Il semble que le juge du procès ait accueilli tout entier le témoignage de M. Brodeur, quiconsistait pour beaucoup en de libres conjectures sur ce que l’agent faisait, pendant qu’il le suivait, et en des conjectures sur lestechniques de police.

Le juge a pratiquement rejeté toute la preuve du gendarme Raymond, quelque pertinence qu’elle ait eue. Du coup ila écarté la possibilité d’une méprise du gendarme sur la vitesse du véhicule de M. Brodeur et conclu qu’il trompait délibérément la Cour.Pour dire les choses franchement, le juge du procès a conclu que l’agent de police s’était parjuré sur pratiquement tous les aspects del’interception.

Quoique les conclusions tirées quant à la crédibilité appellent à la déférence et qu’elles ne soulèvent pas, -qu’à de raresexceptions près, une question de droit seulement, aux termes de l’art. 676 du Code, ce n’est pas toujours le cas. Ainsi que je l’expliquedans les présents motifs, s’il est jugé des faits sur le fondement de conjectures et de suppositions, il s’ensuit une erreur de droit III. La jurisprudence [12] Il est élémentaire, en droit, que le juge du procès ne doit pas tirer de conclusion de fait reposantsur des suppositions ou sur des conjectures.

Tirer pareille conclusion constitue une erreur de droit. Dans Criminal Pleadings & Practice in Canada (2e éd., feuillets mobiles, Aurora (Ont.), Canada Law Book, 2009, vol. 3, à la p. 23-10), le juge E.G. Ewaschuk écrit que sontnotamment constitutives de questions de droit la [TRADUCTION] « possibilité conjecturale » et l’[TRADUCTION] « hypothèse », ainsique l’appréciation d’éléments de preuve isolés par le juge du procès. Plusieurs causes ont amené la Cour suprême, dans le contexted’appels interjetés par le ministère public, à se pencher sur ces erreurs. Dans Wild c.

La Reine, (SCC), [1971] R.C.S. 101, [1970] A.C.S. no 69 (QL), l’accusé, seul survivant d’une collision de véhicules à moteur, avait été retrouvé inconscient sur le siègedu conducteur, derrière le volant. Sa jambe gauche, à la gauche du tube de direction, était coincée si étroitement entre le tableau de bordet le plancher qu’il avait fallu avoir recours à un vérin hydraulique pour le libérer. Devant cette preuve, le juge du procès avait acquittéM. Wild de négligence criminelle ayant causé la mort. L’avocat de la défense avait émis l’hypothèse que M. Wild, assis à l’arrière, avait

été projeté sur le siège avant, avec la rotation du véhicule dans le sens des aiguilles d’une montre, et qu’il y avait été coincé lorsque levéhicule avait heurté un poteau électrique. Le juge du procès ne pouvait ou ne voulait pas, semble-t-il, écarter cette possibilité. Enconséquence, le bien-fondé de l’accusation lui avait paru susciter un doute raisonnable et il avait acquitté l’accusé. La Cour d’appel del’Alberta a annulé le verdict et inscrit un verdict de culpabilité ([1969] A.J. No. 15 (QL)).

Les juges majoritaires de la Cour suprême,dont les motifs ont été rédigés par le juge Martland, ont conclu que le juge du procès avait mal appliqué la règle de l’affaire Hodge dufait de son recours à des conjectures et à des suppositions.

Le juge Martland a écrit ce qui suit : En conséquence, je suis d’avis que le savant Juge de première instance n’a pas correctement appliqué la règle de l’affaire Hodge aux faitsen preuve, en acquittant l’appelant, non parce qu’il a conclu qu’il y a une solution logique des faits qui est incompatible avec laculpabilité de celui-ci, mais parce qu’il y a, selon lui, une solution conjecturale qui à son avis, pourrait être incompatible avec cetteculpabilité. […] Dans la présente affaire, le savant Juge de première instance, dans l’examen des faits qu’il relate en a mal interprété la portée en droit, ence qu’il n’a pas fait la distinction entre une possibilité conjecturale fondée sur ces faits, et une solution logique découlant de l’ensemblede la preuve. [P. 114 et 117] [Je souligne.] [13] Le juge Lamer (tel était alors son titre), dans Rousseau c.

La Reine, (SCC), [1985] 2 R.C.S. 38, [1985] A.C.S. no 46 (QL), a confirmé que des conjectures et des hypothèses, de la part d’un juge du procès,constituent en soi une erreur de droit sur laquelle un appel du ministère public peut être fondé. M. Rousseau avait obtenu au procès unacquittement auquel une déclaration de culpabilité avait été substituée en appel.

Bien que l’accusé ait eu gain de cause devant la Coursuprême, les observations suivantes s’accordent avec la jurisprudence issue de Wild : La Cour d’appel était bien consciente, en regard de l’al. 605(1)a), des limites au-delà desquelles elle ne pouvait substituer son opinion àcelle du juge du procès pour écarter le doute qu’il entretenait quant à la culpabilité de l’accusé, casser son acquittement et le déclarercoupable. Écrivant pour la Cour, le juge Beauregard a estimé qu’envisager une hypothèse autre que l’existence d’un complot entrel’accusé et Asselin tenait de la pure conjecture.

Eût-il eu raison, c’eût été une erreur de droit et la Cour d’appel aurait dès lors étépleinement justifiée d’infirmer le jugement en première instance. [Par. 16] [Je souligne.] [14] Dans R. c. Dubois, (SCC), [1980] 2 R.C.S. 21, [1980] A.C.S. no 38 (QL),l’accusé avait été acquitté du meurtre du compagnon de sa sœur, battu à mort. Le défunt et lui habitaient la même demeure. L’accuséavait été retrouvé, ivre mort, à cinq pieds environ du corps de la victime. Le bout des bottes de l’accusé, qu’il portait encore, était tachéde sang d’un groupe sanguin correspondant à celui du défunt.

Des cheveux humains se trouvaient sur la cambrure de sa botte droite. Unexpert avait témoigné que les cheveux [TRADUCTION] « provenaient probablement du défunt ». Les mains de l’accusé étaientcouvertes de sang, qu’il avait tenté d’enlever à coups de langue après que la permission de se laver lui avait été refusée. Le pantalon del’accusé était trempé de sang d’un groupe correspondant au groupe sanguin du défunt.

Les juges de la Cour d’appel de l’Alberta,exception faite du juge McGillivray, juge en chef de la Cour et auteur de motifs de dissidence, ont débouté le ministère public de l’appelqu’il avait interjeté (1979 ABCA 230 , [1979] A.J. No. 848 (QL)). Le pourvoi formé auprès de la Cour suprême a été accueilli.Le juge Martland, au nom de la Cour, a indiqué tout simplement ce qui suit : « Nous sommes tous d’accord avec les motifs que le jugeen chef McGillivray a donnés dans sa dissidence en Cour d’appel ».

Le juge McGillivray avait fait observer ce qui suit : Le témoignage de la nommée Dionne Dubois mis à part, je suis respectueusement d’avis que les observations que le distingué juge duprocès a faites pendant le débat, considérées conjointement avec ses motifs de jugement, établissent clairement qu’il n’a pas fait ladistinction entre une conclusion rationnelle, fondée sur la preuve, et une conclusion qui est fondée sur des conjectures et qui ne trouvepas appui dans la preuve, que c’est là une erreur de droit et qu’il s’est fondé sur des considérations erronées en droit. [Par. 15] [Je souligne.] [15] Le juge McGillivray a ensuite cité la décision qui avait été rendue par le juge McRuer dansRegina c.

McIver, [1964] O.J. No. 835 (QL) :

La règle dit clairement que la cause doit être jugée d’après les faits, c’est-à-dire les faits en preuve, et les solutions compatibles avecl’innocence de l’accusé doivent être logiques et fondées sur des déductions tirées des faits prouvés. Une conclusion ne peut être logiquesi elle ne se fonde pas sur la preuve. Une telle conclusion est conjecturale et imaginaire, mais non logique. [Par. 17] On pourra se reporter également à R. c. Paul, (SCC), [1977] 1 R.C.S. 181, [1975] A.C.S. no 114 (QL), à Wild, précité,et à Regina c. Torrie, [1967] O.J. No. 967 (C.A.) (QL). [16] Dans un pourvoi récent, R. c.

J.M.H., 2011 CSC 45, [2011] 3 R.C.S. 197, la Cour suprême étaitpriée de déclarer que Wild ne faisait plus jurisprudence. La Cour a déclaré exactement le contraire. Le juge Cromwell a confirmé queWild donne toujours un énoncé exact du droit pour ce qui est de la façon dont le recours à des conjectures et à des suppositions peut êtreconstitutif d’une question de droit seulement (par. 38 et 39).

Je signale que la « question ultime » dans J.M.H., comme en d’autres causesauxquelles je renvoie ici, était celle de la culpabilité ou de l’innocence de l’accusé – sur ce point, la prépondérance de la preuve incombeau ministère public. En l’espèce, la question ultime qu’avait à trancher le juge du procès était celle de savoir si le gendarme Raymondavait procédé à une interception « arbitraire », ce qu’il revenait à M. Brodeur de prouver. [17] Notre Cour s’est penchée sur l’erreur de droit qui découle de l’emploi par un juge du procès de conjectures et de suppositions dans R. c.

Martin, 2010 NBCA 41, 361 R.N.-B. (2e) 251 (autorisation de pourvoi auprès de la Cour suprême refusée, [2010] C.S.C.R. no 302), et, plus récemment, dans R. c. Tran, 2012 NBCA 74, 393 R.N.-B. (2e) 66. Dans ces affaires,le même juge du procès avait, au cours de voir-dire tenus sur de prétendues violations de la Charte, avancé des conjectures sur des faitsdéterminants en matière de crédibilité. Par exemple, dans Martin, le juge avait qualifié ce qu’indiquait la preuve d’une préposée àl’écoute de « coïncidence qui arrange[ait] » le ministère public.

Notre Cour a pourtant conclu qu’il n’y avait « tout simplement aucunélément de preuve qui donnait à penser que [la préposée à l’écoute] n’avait pas dit la vérité à cet égard » (par. 57). Le juge du procèsavait en outre conclu, par pure conjecture, que personne ne savait où se trouvait l’accusé à un certain moment. Cette supposition l’avaitconduit à des conclusions, quant à la crédibilité de témoignages policiers, qui ne trouvaient aucun appui dans la preuve. Il en résultaitune erreur de droit seulement.

Enfin, dans Martin toujours, le juge avait hasardé une conjecture, sans assise dans la preuve, sur le tempsque devait avoir duré l’entrevue d’un avocat avec son client. Cette conjecture avait aussi concouru à des conclusions défavorables sur lacrédibilité d’un agent de police.

Le juge Richard, au nom d’une Cour unanime, a expliqué pourquoi les conclusions de fait qui « netrouvent pas appui dans la preuve mais sont plutôt fondées sur des conjectures ou des possibilités hypothétiques » soulèvent desquestions de droit : Il n’est pas difficile de comprendre pourquoi une conclusion fondée sur des conjectures ou des suppositions constitue une erreur dedroit. Il existe un principe directeur important qui régit les procès et qui veut que les inférences et les conclusions de fait doivent reposersur des preuves.

Si un juge permet que des conjectures et des suppositions fondent ces conclusions et inférences, il applique le mauvaiscritère et commet une erreur de droit. [Par. 36] [18] Le juge Richard a résumé ainsi l’incidence que les conjectures et les suppositions avaient euesur les conclusions du juge du procès quant à la crédibilité des enquêteurs de police : Les inférences de fait fondées sur des conjectures et des suppositions ont faussé l’analyse que le juge du procès a faite au regard de l’art.8.

Les conclusions qu’il a tirées relativement à l’art. 8 étaient fondées sur des inférences que n’étayait aucun élément de preuve et surlesquelles le juge du procès s’est ensuite appuyé pour imputer certaines connaissances, certains motifs et de la mauvaise foi auxenquêteurs. [Par. 60] [19] Au procès de l’affaire Tran, le policier, le juge et le secteur géographique étaient les mêmesqu’en l’espèce. L’agent Raymond, également membre à l’époque de l’Équipe mobile de la sécurité routière, avait pris part à un contrôleroutier, opération policière menée près de Salisbury, sur la route 2. Le gendarme avait sommé M.

Tran de s’arrêter. Ses soupçons avaientensuite été éveillés par des « indices » qu’il associait au transport de marchandises de contrebande. Une fouille ultérieure du véhicule deM. Tran avait mené à la découverte de 20 livres de marihuana dans une valise rangée à l’intérieur du coffre arrière de la voiture. Legendarme Raymond considérait comme des motifs de soupçons, entre autres, les indices suivants :

(1) M. Tran avait un permis deconduire de la Colombie-Britannique, mais conduisait, au Nouveau-Brunswick, un véhicule loué à Montréal;

(2) M. Tran avait indiquéqu’il se rendait à Moncton parce qu’un casino y avait ouvert ses portes récemment et qu’il aurait de meilleures chances de gagner dansun nouveau casino;

(3) M. Tran avait expliqué qu’il était parti de la Colombie-Britannique pour s’installer à Montréal en raison desproblèmes occasionnés par les Jeux olympiques; (4) le gendarme avait remarqué que le passager du siège avant était très nerveux; (5) unoreiller et une couverture reposaient sur la banquette arrière; (6) une interdiction de possession d’armes à feu avait été prononcée contreM. Tran en Colombie-Britannique, une accusation de trafic de drogue pesait contre lui au Manitoba et un mandat avait été lancé contrelui, au Québec, par suite d’une accusation de conduite avec facultés affaiblies.

Le gendarme Raymond a témoigné que son expérience luiavait appris qu’il n’est pas rare que ceux qui transportent des marchandises de contrebande dorment dans la voiture pour en assurer lagarde. La présence de la couverture et de l’oreiller engendrait donc des soupçons. Il a témoigné en outre que ceux qui transportent desmarchandises de contrebande préfèrent se servir de véhicules loués afin d’éviter la saisie du leur s’ils sont pris. Vu l’ensemble des

facteurs qui s’étaient présentés à lui, dont le passager nerveux, la voiture louée, l’oreiller et la couverture, les explications suspectes données à propos du casino et du déménagement à Montréal depuis la Colombie-Britannique, le gendarme Raymond avait jugé que des soupçons raisonnables le fondaient à pratiquer une fouille ( R. c. Kang-Brown , 2008 CSC 18 , [2008] 1 R.C.S. 456 ).

Malgré que le gendarme eût témoigné qu’aucun facteur, à lui seul, ne pouvait asseoir un soupçon raisonnable, le juge du procès a formulé des hypothèses sur chacun des facteurs pris en considération par l’agent de police et il a expliqué pourquoi, à son avis, ce facteur ne voulait rien dire ou, surtout, pourquoi le témoignage de l’agent était suspect. Par exemple, le témoignage du gendarme Raymond, à propos de la nervosité du passager, avait été le suivant : [TRADUCTION] Il m’a paru nerveux. D’habitude, les gens réagissent à la présence de la police.

Ici, il s’agissait d’un contrôle routier important, M. [Praught] ne regardait nulle part. Il demeurait figé, comme une statue. Pour moi, c’est significatif. J’avais eu affaire auparavant, à peu près cinq ou six fois, peut-être, à des passagers nerveux et cette fois... chaque fois, lorsque j’ai obtenu le consentement de fouiller, ou que j’ai fouillé le véhicule, toutes les fois que le passager était nerveux, j’ai trouvé de la drogue ou du tabac de contrebande […]. Pour moi, à ce moment-là, c’était significatif . [Par. 10] [20] Dans Tran , le juge d

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