2016 QCCA 522, 2016 QCCA 522

Placements Sergakis inc. c. Montréal (Ville de) 2016 QCCA 522 COURT OF APPEAL CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC REGISTRY OF MONTREAL No: 500-10-006089-161 (500-36-007650-156) MINUTES OF THE HEARING DATE: March 22, 2016 THE HONOURABLE MARK SCHRAGER, J.A. PETITIONERS ATTORNEY PLACEMENTS SERGAKIS INC.

PETER SERGAKIS Mtre SÉBASTIEN SÉNÉCHAL (Bardagi Sénéchal inc.) RESPONDENT ATTORNEY VILLE DE MONTRÉAL Mtre NORMAND LABELLE (Ville de Montréal, Aff. pénales, criminelles) IMPLEADED PARTY ATTORNEY PROCUREURE GÉNÉRALE DU QUÉBEC aBSENT DESCRIPTION: Application for leave to appeal from a judgment rendered on January 12, 2016, by Alexandre Boucher of the Superior Court, district of Montréal Clerk: Shirley Thomas Courtroom: RC-18

HEARING 9:37 Commencement of the hearing. Identification of counsel. 9:38 Representations by Mtre Sénéchal. 9:50 Representations by Mtre Labelle. 9:54 By the Judge: The case is continued to 14 h 15 for judgment. Attorneys are exempted from attending the Court. The minutes will be emailed them. 9:54 Recess. 14:15 Resumption of the hearing. 14:16 By the Judge: Judgment – see page 3. 14:17 Conclusion of the hearing.

SHIRLEY THOMAS Clerk BY THE JUDGE JUDGMENT [ 1 ] Appellants seek leave to appeal the judgment of the Superior Court, District of Montreal, delivered orally on January 12, 2016 (the Honourable Alexandre Boucher). The Superior Court was sitting in appeal of a judgment of the Municipal Court of Montreal wherein both Appellants were found guilty of offenses under

Section 84.1 of the Act respecting Offences Relating to Alcoholic Beverages . [1] [ 2 ] The only ground of appeal before the Superior Court and before me, in the motion, stems from the

interpretation of

Section 134 of the Act which reads as follows:

134. The owner or lessee of premises where an offence against this Act is committed or the holder of a permit issued for such premises who authorizes or allows such an offence to be committed therein is guilty of an offence and liable to the penalty prescribed for the offence he authorized or allowed. Proof of offence.

In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, in any proceedings under the first paragraph, proof that an offence against this Act was committed by a person in the employ of the owner, lessee or permit holder is proof that that person has committed the offence with the authorization or consent of the owner, lessee or permit holder. Persons party to offence.

If the person who has committed an offence against this Act , the owner or lessee of the premises where the offence was committed or the holder of a permit issued for such premises is a partnership or a legal person, each partner or each director of the legal person who authorized or allowed the commission of the offence is deemed to be a party thereto. 134.

Le propriétaire ou le locataire d'un lieu où une infraction à la présente loi est commise ainsi que le titulaire d'un permis délivré pour ce lieu qui autorise ou permet qu'une telle infraction y soit commise, commet une infraction et est passible de la peine prévue pour l'infraction qu'il a autorisée ou permise. Preuve d'infraction.

Dans une poursuite en vertu du premier alinéa, la preuve qu'une infraction à la présente loi a été commise par une personne à l'emploi de ce propriétaire, ce locataire ou ce titulaire de permis constitue la preuve, en l'absence de toute preuve contraire, que cette personne a commis cette infraction avec l'autorisation ou l'assentiment de ce propriétaire, ce locataire ou ce titulaire de permis.

Partie à l'infraction. Si celui qui a commis une infraction à la présente loi ou si le propriétaire ou le locataire du lieu où l'infraction est commise ou si le titulaire du permis délivré pour ce lieu est une société ou personne morale, chaque associé ou chaque administrateur de la personne morale qui autorise ou permet la perpétration de cette infraction est réputé être

partie à celle-ci. [ 3 ] Appellants submit that one only of the corporate Appellant or its sole shareholder/director, the personal Appellant can be validly charged and convicted pursuant to

Section 134. Appellants argue that the text in

Section 134 is not clear such that the legislator’s intent may be sought to resolve the ambiguity. The latter exercise leads Appellants to the conclusion that the purpose of

Section 134 is to permit the lifting of the corporate veil to seek personal liability of a corporate director. [ 4 ] The Superior Court judge determined that the wording of

Section 134 is clear and unambiguous. The provision permits the conviction of the holder of a liquor permit (the corporate Appellant) in virtue of the first paragraph and in the event that the holder of the permit is a corporation, then paragraph 3 provides that each director is deemed to be a party to the infraction. [ 5 ] The judge correctly added at the end of his judgment, in paragraph 18, that there is nothing exceptional in the content of paragraph 3 of

Section 134, since in penal matters several persons can have culpability arising from the same infraction. [ 6 ]

Section 291 of the Code of penal procedure [2] provides that leave to appeal to the Court of appeal may be granted when a case demonstrates “sufficient interest in a question of law”. While Appellants raise a question of law, there is no question of interest for this Court to decide, in my opinion. As the Superior Court judge held,

Section 134 is clear and there is no legal obstacle to the legislator imposing culpability on multiple parties for one infraction. FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, THE UNDERSIGNED: [ 7 ] DISMISSES the motion for leave to appeal. MARK SCHRAGER , J.A.