r v. R., 2022 NBCA 44

COURT OF APPEAL OF COUR D’APPEL DU NEW BRUNSWICK NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK 51-21-CA shawn cormier APPELLANT SHAWN CORMIER APPELANT - and - - et - HIS Majesty the KING RESPONDENT SA MAJESTÉ LE ROI INTIMÉ Cormier v. R., 2022 NBCA 44 Cormier c.

R., 2022 NBCA 44 CORAM: The Honourable Chief Justice Richard The Honourable Justice Baird The Honourable Justice LeBlond CORAM : l’honorable juge en chef Richard l’honorable juge Baird l’honorable juge LeBlond Appeal from a decision of the Provincial Court: December 18, 2020 (conviction) April 12, 2021 (sentence) Appel d’une décision de la Cour provinciale : le 18 décembre 2020 (déclaration de culpabilité) le 12 avril 2021 (détermination de la peine) History of Case: Historique de la cause : Decision under appeal: Unreported Décision frappée d’appel : inédite Preliminary or incidental proceedings: N/A Procédures préliminaires ou accessoires : s.o.

Appeal heard: March 8, 2022 Appel entendu : le 8 mars 2022

Judgment rendered: August 11, 2022 Reasons delivered: September 22, 2022 Jugement rendu : le 11 août 2022 Motifs déposés : le 22 septembre 2022 Reasons for judgment by: The Honourable Chief Justice Richard Motifs de jugement : l’honorable juge en chef Richard Concurred in by: The Honourable Justice Baird The Honourable Justice LeBlond Souscrivent aux motifs : l’honorable juge Baird l’honorable juge LeBlond Counsel at hearing: For the appellant: Nathan Gorham, K.C., and Adrian Forsythe For the respondent: Patrick McGuinty Avocats à l’audience : Pour l’appelant : Nathan Gorham, c.r., et Adrian Forsythe Pour l’intimé : Patrick McGuinty THE COURT At the hearing of the appeal on March 8, 2022, leave to appeal was granted and, on August 11, 2022, the appeal was allowed and the sentence imposed in the Provincial Court was varied to one of imprisonment for three years, less the time the sentencing judge credited for time spent on remand, and the prohibition under s. 109(2) (

a) of the Criminal Code was varied to one of ten years, with all other ancillary orders to remain unchanged. These are the reasons for that disposition. LA COUR À l’audition de l’appel, le 8 mars 2022, l’autorisation d’interjeter appel a été accordée et, le 11 août 2022, l’appel a été accueilli et la peine infligée par la Cour provinciale a été modifiée, étant remplacée par une peine d’emprisonnement de trois ans moins le crédit accordé par le juge chargé de la détermination de la peine pour le temps passé en détention provisoire, et l’interdiction prononcée en application de l’ al. 109(2)

a) du Code criminel a été modifiée, étant remplacée par une interdiction de dix ans, toutes les autres ordonnances accessoires demeurant inchangées. Voici les motifs de cette décision. The judgment of the Court was delivered by RICHARD, C.J.N.B. I. Introduction

[ 1 ] This sentence appeal arises out of criminal retaliatory behaviour. This is a case of taking justice into one’s own hands, but not one of blatant vigilantism where vengeance is exacted after careful planning and deliberation.

This case requires an assessment of moral blameworthiness for an unplanned act of retaliation amounting to an aggravated assault, in order to properly apply the parity principle in crafting an appropriate sentence. [ 2 ] Anger-fuelled retaliation motivated 38-year-old Shawn Cormier to commit an aggravated assault by running over and dragging his 45-year-old cousin, Jason Goguen, with a pickup truck. After pleading guilty to committing an aggravated assault ( s. 268 of the Criminal Code ), Mr. Cormier was sentenced to a five-year term of imprisonment less credit for time spent on remand, a sentence he appeals.

While the offence he committed is deserving of significant punishment to denounce his criminal conduct and deter him and others from engaging in similar conduct, it is not deserving of a sanction imposed on offenders whose conduct has more serious consequences or who bear a greater degree of moral blameworthiness.

The sentencing judge’s failure to recognize this constitutes a misapplication of the parity principle that is significant enough to justify appellate intervention. [ 3 ] At the hearing of the appeal, we granted leave to appeal, and, on August 11, 2022, we allowed the appeal and varied the sentence to a term of imprisonment for three years, less the time credited by the sentencing judge for time spent on remand. We also varied the ancillary order made under s. 109 of the Criminal Code . At the time, we indicated reasons for our decision would follow.

These are the reasons that caused me to join my colleagues in issuing that disposition. II. Factual Background [ 4 ] In his 30s, Shawn Cormier became addicted to illegal drugs. This led him to acquire a criminal record dating back to 2015, mostly for property-related offences and his failure to comply with appearance notices or summonses or to respect the conditions of probation orders. All his convictions were the result of guilty pleas. In May 2019, Mr. Cormier received a 15- month conditional sentence for a theft offence committed in 2018 and a similar term for a breach of his resulting probation.

While serving this conditional sentence, Mr. Cormier, who had been admitted to various treatment facilities over the years, achieved sobriety and became a productive member of society. In 2019, he opened his own property maintenance business. [ 5 ] In June 2020, Mr. Cormier’s cousin, Jason Goguen, who also has a criminal past, was looking for a place to store stolen property. He approached Mr. Cormier, who refused to help him. This angered Mr. Goguen and, over the next two weeks, the two men exchanged angry words. [ 6 ] A few weeks later, on August 9, Mr. Goguen spray-painted graffiti on Mr.

Cormier’s vehicles, poured gasoline on what was described as a shed where Mr. Cormier kept some of his property, and set fire to it. A neighbour quickly extinguished the fire. The police were called that day, and, in their presence, Mr. Cormier had a telephone conversation with Mr. Goguen, who had reportedly bragged about his vandalism on Facebook. During this conversation, Mr. Goguen challenged Mr. Cormier to a fight. Mr. Cormier asked the police to arrest Mr. Goguen, which they did not do. [ 7 ] Less than 48 hours later, on August 11, Mr.

Goguen returned and again set fire to the shed, this time burning it to the ground. Not only did Mr. Cormier lose his tools and equipment, but one of his vehicles was also burned. Again, Mr. Cormier called the police. A few hours later, while driving his pickup truck, Mr. Cormier spotted Mr. Goguen riding his bicycle. As Mr. Goguen cut through a parking lot, ostensibly fleeing from Mr. Cormier, the latter drove over the verge, into the parking lot and struck Mr. Goguen with the front of his truck. Both Mr.

Goguen and his bicycle were pinned underneath the truck and dragged several metres as the truck slowed to a stop. A security camera recorded the incident. [ 8 ] To describe the incident and its aftermath, I reproduce the words of the sentencing judge: [TRANSLATION] This video very clearly shows the accused’s frightening conduct. It is troubling to watch. He drives his vehicle – his truck directly toward the victim, who is on his bicycle. He goes from one parking lot to the other, driving over lawn as there is no entrance between the two parking lots. Dust flies everywhere. He hits the victim from behind.

The victim falls on the truck. The accused continues driving and drags the victim, who is now pinned under the vehicle. Obviously, he was truly determined to knock his victim over and cause him harm. The accused finally stops his vehicle and comes out through the driver’s side door. He calmly looks at the victim under his truck. He doesn’t offer any help. His attitude is cold and callous. He searches inside his vehicle, not worrying about the person stuck under his truck. Finally, people arrive at the scene. The accused has a short conversation and nonchalantly leaves the scene, before starting to run away.

The victim, Jason Goguen, suffered serious injuries. The witnesses at the scene helped him extricate himself and he ran away. Once the police found the victim, he was transported to hospital. The photos produced in evidence clearly show the injuries suffered following the accused’s actions. The victim has very deep abrasions all over his body. Wounds cover his back, knees, arms, and legs. He

suffered hematomas. He was wrapped in bandages and prescribed medications. The injuries were described as being similar to burns. [ 9 ] From the outset, Mr. Cormier cooperated with the police investigation. He was initially charged with attempted murder, which charge was withdrawn after he pled guilty to aggravated assault, an offence that carries a maximum sentence of imprisonment for 14 years. At the sentencing hearing in the Provincial Court, Crown counsel argued for a sentence of imprisonment for six years, less credit for the time Mr. Cormier had been remanded in custody, whereas Mr.

Cormier’s counsel submitted that imprisonment for 12 to 18 months would be appropriate in the circumstances. [ 10 ] In giving reasons for imposing a sentence of imprisonment for five years, less credit for remand time, the Provincial Court judge stated there had been animosity between Messrs. Cormier and Goguen. He noted the police’s inaction when called on August 9. He also noted that both Mr. Cormier and Mr. Goguen had, for many years, engaged in criminal behaviour. The judge considered Mr. Cormier’s criminal record and noted that he was still serving a conditional sentence when he struck Mr. Goguen.

The judge also acknowledged that Mr. Cormier appeared to have put his life in order, having successfully overcome a crack cocaine addiction and started his own property maintenance business after acquiring the necessary tools and two motor vehicles. [ 11 ] In his sentencing reasons, the judge recognized that sentencing is not an exact science and that a sentence must be tailored to fit the circumstances of each case. He explained he was required to consider the principles and objectives set out in ss. 718 , 718.1 and 718.2 of the Criminal Code as well as any aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

He considered Mr. Cormier’s guilty plea to be a mitigating circumstance, though he noted the strength of the prosecution’s case given a security camera had recorded the incident. The judge credited Mr. Cormier for his earlier rehabilitative efforts. [ 12 ] Addressing defence counsel’s argument that Mr.

Goguen’s injuries would not have long-term effects, the sentencing judge noted this was not a mitigating factor but rather simple luck since the nature of the criminal act might otherwise have resulted in a charge of murder or manslaughter. [ 13 ] As for aggravating factors, the sentencing judge noted the seriousness of the charge, Mr. Cormier’s use of a motor vehicle as a weapon, the deliberate and cold-blooded nature of his actions, the fact that he was serving a conditional sentence at the time and his criminal record. The judge did, however, recognize that Mr.

Cormier’s record did not include any violent offences save for a charge of uttering threats in 2015. [ 14 ] The sentencing judge explained that deterrence and denunciation were the primary sentencing objectives for a crime of this nature. He considered this case to be in the upper range of seriousness. In his view, hatred and vengeance motivated this offence. Despite Mr. Cormier’s personal success in putting his life back in order, the judge considered rehabilitation to be a secondary objective in a case of this nature.

In the end, the judge concluded a significant term of imprisonment was necessary to achieve the applicable sentencing objectives. As stated earlier, he sentenced Mr. Cormier to imprisonment for five years less credit for some of the remand time. He also made ancillary orders, including one pursuant to s. 109 of the Criminal Code prohibiting Mr. Cormier for life from possessing any firearm, crossbow, prohibited weapon, restricted weapon, prohibited device, ammunition, prohibited ammunition and explosive substance. [ 15 ] Mr. Cormier seeks leave to appeal his sentence.

He submits the sentencing judge erred by (1) failing to correctly apply the principle of proportionality, (2) relying upon an aggravating factor that had not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and (3) imposing a lifetime firearm ban under s. 109 of the Criminal Code . [ 16 ] Counsel for the Attorney General conceded that leave to appeal should be granted because “it simply cannot be said that there would be no prospect of success on appeal if leave were granted.” With respect to the first ground of appeal, while maintaining that this Court ought to defer to the sentencing judge’s decision on sentencing, counsel “acknowledges the compelling nature of the argument brought forth by [Mr.] Cormier on appeal.” In addition, counsel for the Attorney General concedes the third ground of appeal.

III. Analysis [ 17 ] I will begin by addressing the second ground of appeal, as its resolution might impact the analysis of the first ground.

A. Did the trial judge erroneously rely upon an aggravating fact that had not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt? [ 18 ] Mr. Cormier submits that “[a] sentencing judge may only properly consider a factor aggravating if it is undisputed by the parties or if the Crown satisfies its burden of proving the facts supporting that factor beyond a reasonable doubt.” This is a correct statement of the law: s. 724(3) (

e) of the Criminal Code . [ 19 ] A sentencing hearing following a guilty plea usually proceeds informally, with counsel orally relating the facts to the judge. In most cases, there is no dispute; however, when a relevant fact is disputed, the sentencing judge must request that evidence be adduced: s. 724(3) (a). When the disputed fact involves an aggravating factor, the prosecutor bears the onus of proving it beyond a reasonable doubt. [ 20 ] From proven facts, inferences may be drawn. In LeBreton v. R. , 2018 NBCA 27 , [2018] N.B.J. No. 103 (QL) , Baird J. A. set out the following applicable principles : i.

A plea of guilty, in itself, is an admission of the essential elements of the offence and nothing more; ii. If the facts the Crown wishes to rely on as aggravating are uncontested by the accused, then the sentencing judge is entitled to accept them as proven; iii. If the facts the Crown wishes to rely on as aggravating are disputed, the issue should be resolved by ordinary principles governing criminal proceedings; accordingly, the Crown bears the burden of proving the disputed aggravating facts, and, if there is a reasonable doubt, it is resolved in favour of the accused; iv.

A sentencing judge is permitted to infer a disputed state of mind from the undisputed facts presented at a sentencing hearing without the requirement for hearing further evidence. Of course, where an aggravating factor is involved, the undisputed facts must reasonably support that inference beyond a reasonable doubt. [para. 33] [ 21 ] Mr. Cormier submits there was no admission of facts or uncontested evidence in the record to support the finding that the crime was motivated by hatred and revenge. I agree in part. [ 22 ] It was common ground that there was animosity between Messrs.

Cormier and Goguen, but there was no evidence or even suggestion that it was long-standing. At the sentencing hearing, counsel for the prosecution and Mr. Cormier each made submissions on the relationship between these two men, with the latter admitting some insults were exchanged and animosity had been simmering since June 2020. Counsel for the Attorney General states: “Put bluntly, the inference was clear: the parties hated each other.” I do not fully agree with this statement. Hate is an emotion of extreme dislike. The two cousins clearly disliked each other, especially since Mr. Cormier had refused to take

part in Mr. Goguen’s criminal activity, but the facts are too sparse to allow any conclusion on the extent of the sentiment. [ 23 ] The uncontested record showed that Mr. Goguen attempted to burn down the structure housing Mr. Cormier’s small business twice in 48 hours, succeeding in his second attempt. After finding his building destroyed and his vehicle severely damaged in the early hours of August 11, a few hours later, Mr. Cormier encountered Mr. Goguen mere metres from the still smouldering remains of his livelihood. Mr.

Cormier did not wait for police action; instead, he retaliated. [ 24 ] From these facts, through inferential reasoning, it was open for the sentencing judge to find the crime was committed out of some dislike for Mr. Goguen and in retaliation for what this man had done to Mr. Cormier’s property. However, the judge should have pursued his analysis. [ 25 ] Vengeance leading to criminality can take many forms.

At one extreme, it might take the form of vigilantism where retaliation is the result of careful planning and deliberation and, at the other extreme, it might manifest as retaliation in a momentary lapse of self-restraint. The moral blameworthiness of the former is clearly more significant than that of the latter. It follows that, having concluded a crime was motivated by vengeance, a sentencing judge must then determine where, on the spectrum of

moral blameworthiness, the level of vengeance falls. In the present case, the sentencing judge failed to make this determination. [ 26 ] While I disagree with Mr. Cormier’s submission that the accepted facts did not allow the inference that his crime was motivated by some degree of vengeance, I agree the facts do not allow the inference that exacting vengeance was in any way planned. On this specific point, at the sentencing hearing, Mr. Cormier’s counsel explained that his client acted in the heat of the moment when he saw Mr. Goguen that morning.

This uncontradicted and unchallenged statement should have led the sentencing judge to conclude the motive that he had inferred fell toward the less blameworthy end of the spectrum. The judge did not reach that conclusion. In my view, this failure impacted his application of the parity principle, which is discussed below. B. Did the sentencing judge err in his application of the proportionality principle? [ 27 ] The fundamental principle of sentencing is set out in s. 718.1 of the Criminal Code .

It states as follows: 718.1 A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. 718.1 La peine est proportionnelle à la gravité de l’infraction et au degré de responsabilité du délinquant. [ 28 ] Mr. Cormier contends that “the relatively minor nature of Mr. Goguen’s injuries and the prior, prolonged provocation by Mr.

Goguen should attract a much lower sentence than that sought by Crown counsel.” He argues that the fundamental principle of proportionality was not respected because the sentence was not proportionate to the gravity of the offence and to the degree of Mr. Cormier’s responsibility. [ 29 ] In support of his position, Mr. Cormier invokes the Supreme Court’s decision in R. v.

Lacasse , 2015 SCC 64 , [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089 , underlining the following words of Wagner J., as he then was, writing for the majority: […] The more serious the crime and its consequences , or the greater the offender’s degree of responsibility, the heavier the sentence will be. In other words, the severity of a sentence depends not only on the seriousness of the crime’s consequences , but also on the moral blameworthiness of the offender. [Emphasis by counsel for Mr. Cormier; […] para. 12.] [ 30 ] Mr.

Cormier argues the jurisprudence cited to the sentencing judge should have been distinguished because, in those cases, the crime had much more serious consequences than in the present one, where Mr. Goguen suffered no lasting injury. While this may be so, the argument ignores a principal teaching of the Supreme Court in Lacasse .

In the passage quoted above, Wagner J. makes clear that a heavier sentence is justified not only when the consequences of a crime are serious, but also when the offender bears a high degree of moral blameworthiness. [ 31 ] In the same paragraph, Wagner J. points out that “both sentences that are too lenient and sentences that are too harsh can undermine public confidence in the administration of justice” ( Lacasse , at para. 12 ). The principle of parity, reflected in s. 718.2 (

b) of the Criminal Code , is one way of seeking to avoid this: “a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances” (para. 127). In Parker v. R. , 2014 NBCA 17 , 419 N.B.R. (2d) 163 , Green J.A., for this Court, points out that adherence to the parity principle “assures both fairness and predictability within the criminal justice system” (para. 18). [ 32 ] A comprehensive explanation of the parity principle is given in R. v. Liebeck , 2017 NBCA 53 , [2017] N.B.J.

No. 282 (QL) , and bears repeating: The parity principle seeks to encourage the imposition of a sentence that is similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances (see 718.2(b)). The aim of the parity principle is to avoid disproportionate sentences among offenders where, essentially, the same facts and circumstances indicate equivalent or like sentences (see R. v. W.E. , 2010 NLCA 4 , [2010] N.J. No. 15 (QL) ).

Ranges of sentences are indisputably important and helpful in rationalizing the sentence imposed, but they remain “guidelines rather than hard and fast rules” and a deviation may be warranted where it is "in accordance with the principles and objectives of sentencing": R. v. Nasogaluak , 2010 SCC 6 , [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206 , para. 44 . Correlatively, it has been authoritatively suggested the requirement of individualization renders the search for a single appropriate sentence “a fruitless exercise of academic abstraction”: R. v. M.(C.A.) , para. 92.

At any rate, the principle of parity is “secondary to the fundamental principle of proportionality”: R. v. Lacasse , 2015 SCC 64 , [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089 , para. 54 . Indeed, even where the conditions precedent to the application of the parity

principle are established, it “does not preclude disparity where warranted by the circumstances, because of the principle ofproportionality” (italicized in original): R. v. L.M., 2008 SCC 31, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 163, para. 36. [para. 31] [33] Although parity is a laudable principle, it is rarely achievable with precision because of thebroad range of possible offenders and circumstances. Again, I turn to Wagner J. in Lacasse: “Determining a proportionate sentence is adelicate task” (para. 12).

Sentencing involves “the exercise of a broad discretion by the courts in balancing all the relevant factors inorder to meet the objectives being pursued in sentencing” (para. 1). This is why the Supreme Court has “noted the importance of givingwide latitude to sentencing judges,” who “are in the best position to determine, having regard to the circumstances, a just and appropriatesentence that is consistent with the objectives and principles set out in the Criminal Code” (para. 11).

Therefore, courts of appeal areadmonished to give significant deference to sentencing judges and only intervene where an error of law or an error in principle has ademonstrated impact on the sentence, or when the sentence is demonstrably unfit: Lacasse, at para. 11. [34] To respect the principle of parity, sentencing courts rely on reported cases, first from theirprovince and then from other provinces. In sentencing proceedings, both Crown and defence counsel are expected to bring to the judge’sattention previously decided cases to be considered in applying the parity principle.

As this Court pointed out in Liebeck, at paras. 32 and33, the sentencing record and the case law cited in support of the position of each party must enable the judge to look for similarities interms of both the offenders and the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offences involved. [35] When it comes to appellate review of sentences on a parity-based ground, LeBel J., for theCourt, instructs as follows in R. v. L.M., 2008 SCC 31, [2008], 2 S.C.R. 163: Owing to the very nature of an individualized sentencing process, sentences imposed for offences of the same type will not always beidentical.

The principle of parity does not preclude disparity where warranted by the circumstances, because of the principle ofproportionality (see Dadour, at p. 18). As this Court noted in M. (C.A.) [ (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500, [1996] S.C.J.

No.28 (QL)], at para. 92, “there is no such thing as a uniform sentence for a particular crime.” From this perspective, an appellate court isjustified in intervening only if the sentence imposed by the trial judge “is in substantial and marked departure from the sentencescustomarily imposed for similar offenders committing similar crimes” (M. (C.A.), at para. 92). [Emphasis in original; para. 36] [36] In the present case, counsel for the Attorney General does not take issue with Mr. Cormier’sanalysis of sentencing decisions in the context of aggravated assaults committed with the use of a motor vehicle.

Neither do I. [37] Mr. Cormier’s analysis begins with the two cases Crown counsel put forth at the sentencing hearing in support of its submission seeking a custodial sentence of six years (see Antonelli v. R., 2008 QCCA 1573, [2008] J.Q. no 7918(QL); R. v. Cloutier, 2017 ABPC 3, [2017] A.J. No. 28 (QL)). In both these cases, there were multiple victims and much more seriousinjuries resulting from unprovoked assaults.

The offenders were respectively sentenced to terms of incarceration of five years and sixyears. [38] In Antonelli, a youthful offender with no criminal record, unhappy with the breakup of hisrelationship with a woman, attended her place of work with his cousins and tried to convince her to talk to him. She refused and askedhim to leave, but he would not do so. She called her brother, who came over. Outside the establishment, a dispute arose between theoffender and the brother. The latter was thrown to the ground, and the offender’s attack continued until his cousins pulled him away.

Theoffender returned home, changed his clothes and left to join his cousins at a bar. Coincidentally, the woman’s brother and his friendswere in a bus shelter near the bar in question. The offender spotted them as he was driving to the bar. He entered the bar and tried to get abaseball bat from a cabinet, but his cousins intervened. He then returned to his car and drove at full speed into the bus shelter beforestopping abruptly. He then backed up and again drove into the bus shelter, in the process injuring its four occupants.

Two of theoccupants, including the ex-girlfriend’s brother, were seriously injured, and the other two less so. A fifth person, who was outside theshelter, was not injured. [39] The offender argued his crime was the result of momentary impulsivity caused by a paranoiddisorder, but the sentencing judge found it was motivated by revenge.

It was reported that, in the weeks before his sentencing, theoffender bragged he would not go to prison and taunted one of the victims, who had to use a wheelchair. [40] The offender was charged with one count of aggravated assault, three counts of assault causingbodily harm, and damage to property. His lawyer argued for a conditional sentence, pointing to the guilty plea and the offender’sremorse as mitigating factors. Meanwhile, the prosecution argued in favour of a five-year custodial sentence.

The offender wassentenced to five years for the aggravated assault (in which the ex-girlfriend’s brother had been severely injured), four years for one of

the assaults causing bodily harm (involving a seriously injured victim), and three years for each of the other two assaults causing bodilyharm (with less serious injuries), with all sentences to run concurrently. In passing sentence, the judge noted the offender had himselfprovoked the incident, which, although not fully premeditated, was nonetheless planned and deliberate. He also underscored the extent ofthe injuries sustained by one victim, resulting in permanent disability. In addition, the judge noted the offender had bragged about notgoing to prison and taunted a victim who was confined to a wheelchair.

In the judge’s view, the crime was motivated by vengeance. Inupholding the sentences on appeal, the Court highlighted the deliberate and intentional nature of the crime with vengeance as itsmotivation. In that case, the victims had not done anything that could be considered blameworthy. [41] In Cloutier, the offender, who had no previous convictions, became angry with employees of agas station convenience store and drove his truck into the store, injuring four victims. The employees had not done anything that couldbe considered as provocation. Mr.

Cloutier became angry apparently because he had to pay upfront before dispensing gasoline. A victimsuffered a broken left leg, requiring a metal plate and muscle grafts, and a broken femur to her right leg at her hip and knee, requiring theinsertion of metal screws. She also suffered a shattered pelvis, requiring several surgeries and the insertion of a medial plate and medicalscrews, kidney damage, a blood infection, a right shoulder injury, a broken jaw, and a right orbital fracture. This victim was left withpermanent disabilities.

Another victim suffered broken legs, requiring surgery, and a broken left shoulder blade. This victim wasexpected to likely never walk normally again and to require further surgery. The other two victims also sustained injuries, one with somedegree of ongoing disability. Both the injuries resulting from the offences and the offender’s moral blameworthiness were severe. In myview, the sentence of imprisonment of six years was amply justified. [42] Mr.

Cormier continues his analysis with the three cases he submitted to the sentencing judge, inwhich sentences of 26 months’, 18 months’ and 16 months’ incarceration were meted out respectively to offenders who caused theirvictims more serious injuries than those suffered by Mr. Goguen. [43] The first, R. v. Loveys, 2020 NLSC 13, [2020] N.J. No. 20 (QL), involved a youthful first-timeoffender sentenced to incarceration for 26 months for four offences: two offences of aggravated assaults and two offences of dangerousoperation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm.

The offender committed these offences following the breakup of his romanticrelationship, which he did not accept. The offender purposely drove his car onto a sidewalk. The car struck his former girlfriend and hermale companion and grazed another person. The victims suffered serious injuries with expected long-lasting effects. [44] The second, R. v. Clarke (T.J.), 2006 NLTD 72, [2004] N.J. No. 469 (QL), was varied onappeal, but not with respect to the term of imprisonment for aggravated assault, in 2006 NLCA 52, [2006] N.J. No. 255 (QL).

This caseinvolved young men who had been drinking and having a verbal confrontation with one another, culminating first in the victim strikingthe offender’s car at least once (presumably with a part of his body). The offender initially left the scene of the confrontation. When helater returned, he saw the victim standing in the street a few feet from the sidewalk and behind a parked car. The offender swervedtoward the victim and struck him before leaving the scene.

The victim sustained serious, life-threatening injuries, including a badlybroken left leg, requiring emergency surgery, following which he developed a lung complication. In imposing imprisonment for 18months as the appropriate sentence, the sentencing judge noted the offender’s youthfulness and what he described as “fairly minoroffences” on his criminal record (Clarke, at para. 14). [45] The third, R. v. Chisholm, 1998 NSCA 155 , [1998] N.S.J. No. 274 (QL) (C.A.), beganwith a commotion at a bar. Once the bar closed, the offender approached the victim wanting to fight, but the latter ignored him.

After thevictim left the bar to walk a friend back to her apartment, the offender followed them in his car, stopped, got out and swung a ski pole atthe victim. The blow was deflected, as was a subsequent punch. Having been pulled away by a third party, the offender then backed hiscar toward the victim in an unsuccessful attempt to jam him against a building. The victim retaliated and, in so doing, broke two carwindows. The offender momentarily left in his car, but returned and drove directly at the victim, this time striking him in the leg andpropelling him in the air.

The victim suffered injuries described as “relatively minor” (para. 6). The sentence of imprisonment for a termof 16 months on the charge of aggravated assault that followed was upheld on appeal. [46] Mr. Cormier concludes his analysis of these cases as follows: In

summary, there were vast differences between the cases cited by both Crown and defence during sentencing. The Crown’s casesinvolved unprovoked attacks on multiple victims that inflicted severe, life-altering injuries. The offenders there were sentenced to 5 and 6years respectively. The defence cases involved fewer victims and less serious consequences [than the cases submitted by the Crown].Even acknowledging the principles of denunciation and deterrence in those cases, the sentences ranged from 16 [to] 26 months.

In themost serious of the defence cases, Loveys, there were multiple victims and the aggravating factor of intimate partner violence. [47] In my view, this is, as Crown counsel concedes, a fair analysis of the cases raised before thesentencing judge. At least two other cases of vehicular aggravated assault should have been brought to the attention of the sentencing

judge (see R. v. McConaghie, 2017 ONCA 306, [2017] O.J. No. 1862 (QL); R. v. Kanthavel, 2021 ONSC 57, [2021] O.J. No. 143 (QL)). [48] In McConaghie, after a bar fight between the offender and the victim’s son, the offender waitedin his car outside the bar for 45 minutes. When the victim and his son emerged, the offender deliberately drove his car at them. Thefather pushed his son out of the way and was struck by the offender’s car. The offender then drove away. There is no indication of theextent of the victim’s injuries.

The offender was sentenced to imprisonment for 18 months and probation for two years, a sentence whichwas upheld on appeal. [49] In Kanthavel, the accused was convicted of aggravated assault and dangerous operation of amotor vehicle for driving his vehicle at two pedestrians five times in less than one minute. He hit one of the pedestrians at least once andthen proceeded to back up in the direction of that individual. He left the scene and went into hiding for two weeks.

The victim’s injurieswere characterized as very serious and included compound fractures to his left fibula and tibia, requiring surgery to insert a rod andhospitalization for five days. The offender and the victims were former colleagues with “bad blood”; however, the sentencing judgefound the conflict at the time of the assault was on a “very, very low simmer” (para. 35). The encounter was not planned. The offenderhad a criminal record including one conviction of assault of a peace officer.

The sentencing judge placed the offences “in the serious endof the spectrum of aggravated assaults” and “at or near the most serious end of the spectrum of dangerous driving cases” (para. 7). Hesentenced the offender to three years for aggravated assault and 12 months concurrent for dangerous driving, made an ancillary DNAorder and imposed a 10-year firearm prohibition. In passing sentence, the judge referred to R. v. Balcha, (ON CA),[2004] O.J.

No. 1217 (QL) (C.A.), a case in which a sentence of imprisonment for two years less a day was imposed following aconviction for dangerous driving causing bodily harm and failing to stop and was subsequently upheld on appeal. [50] Like the present case, Balcha involved retaliation. The offender, who had never been in troublewith the law, was randomly attacked by three individuals and struck on the forehead with a beer bottle. The three assailants then left thescene.

The offender, who was bleeding profusely, was assisted to his car and then drove it toward his assailants, mounted a curb, struckone of them and backed up over him, causing him a dislocated jaw, two broken ribs, a sprained ankle, a punctured lung, a broken nose,and fractured cheekbones. In that case, there was neither remorse, nor a guilty plea. The offence was described as a deliberate act and asone for which the “most important objective is to deter people who take the law into their own hands and to make them aware of thelegal consequences should they choose to resort to this type of conduct” (R. v.

Balcha, [2003] O.J. No. 4721 (QL), para. 45, per GrossiJ.). [51] While counsel have focused on cases involving aggravated assault with the use of a motorvehicle, they might also have considered cases from this Court involving sentences imposed for the same crime but in different situations.In R. v. Colin Howe, 2015 NBQB 75, [2015] N.B.J. No. 109 (QL), Ferguson J. undertook a review of many cases decided in NewBrunswick between 1989 and 2014, in support of his conclusion that “[s]imply put, the crime of aggravated assault attracts, with rareexceptions, a lengthy term of imprisonment in New Brunswick” (para. 55).

A review of those cases, and of those decided after Howe wasreleased, reveals that five years generally appears to be at the upper edge of appropriate terms of imprisonment, although clearly somecases may well justify much lengthier terms: see, for example, St. Pierre v. R., 2021 NBCA 48, [2021] N.B.J. No. 283 (QL). One of thecases reviewed, Chiasson v. R., 2005 NBCA 78, [2005] N.B.J.

No. 345 (QL), is particularly noteworthy to illustrate the type of situationthat justifies the general upper edge. [52] In Chiasson, a reluctant female neighbour drove the offender to a place where, unbeknownst toher, he purchased cocaine. When she drove him back, the offender gained entrance to her home by saying he had to use the bathroom.There, he consumed the cocaine and then attacked the victim with a pair of scissors, demanding she remove her clothing. When sherefused, the offender pushed her into the bathroom, began assaulting her with his fists and stabbed her in the neck with the scissors.

Thevictim was seriously injured, with a fractured nose, multiple contusions, swelling and cuts, as well as the stab wound to the neck thatcaused major blood loss, for which she received transfusions and was hospitalized for seven days. She nearly died. Despite his guiltyplea and sincere expression of remorse, Mr.

Chiasson was sentenced to imprisonment for five years in addition to the time he had spenton remand, a sentence that was upheld on appeal although the appeal only related to the remand time. [53] A review of the cases cited above, and others, reveals a wide range of custodial dispositions incases of aggravated assault. Obviously, the consequences of, and the moral blameworthiness for, the offences in cases such as Antonelli,Cloutier and Chiasson were significantly greater than in the present case.

In addition to more serious injuries having been caused in eachof those cases, in Antonelli, the offence was both planned and deliberate; in Cloutier, there was no justification whatsoever for theoffender’s anger, and the crime was almost random; and, in Chiasson, it may be said the offender deceived the victim into giving him aride and in gaining access to her home and obtaining scissors from her, thus showing some degree of planning. When comparing thosecases with the present one, significant differences are revealed. In the present case, without in any way condoning Mr.

Cormier’s actions,one can understand his anger. Furthermore, in the present case, there was no randomness and no planning, and the resulting injuries weremuch less severe than in those three cases. None of these cases should serve as a direct basis for achieving parity. While the sentencingjudge did not rely on Chiasson, which I only raise here to make a point, he did rely on Antonelli and Cloutier, which, as I just pointedout, but for the common feature of having used a vehicle as a weapon, involve circumstances that are not similar to the present ones interms of consequences and moral blameworthiness.

In my view, and with respect, the sentencing judge’s failure to recognize andconsider the dissimilarities between those cases and the present one constitutes an error in principle that is substantial enough to justify

appellate intervention. As a result, it falls on us to vary the sentence to one that is proportionate to the gravity of the offence and Mr. Cormier’s degree of responsibility and, when viewed with other sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences in similar circumstances, would not cause the public to question the credibility of the justice system. [ 54 ] In determining an appropriate sentence in this case, it is critical to bear in mind the fundamental principle of sentencing, which is to make the sentence proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the offender’s degree of responsibility.

Thus, I look first to the gravity of the offence and then to the degree of Mr. Cormier’s responsibility. [ 55 ] To say Mr. Cormier committed a serious offence is an understatement. He chased Mr. Goguen with his pickup truck and literally ran him over and dragged him, thereby committing an aggravated assault – the seriousness of which is demonstrated by the maximum 14 years of imprisonment that attaches to this offence. The maximum sentence prescribed is only one measure of the offence’s actual gravity.

The nature and extent of any injuries, or of the harm to society and its values, are also important considerations. In the present case, while Mr. Goguen suffered serious burn-like injuries to his body, the medical report indicated these were not life-threatening, and there is no indication of any long-term effects. In this limited respect, Chisholm and McConaghie appear to be more in line with the present case. Recall that, in those cases, sentences of imprisonment for terms of 16 and 18 months respectively were imposed and upheld on appeal. [ 56 ] Turning then to the degree of Mr.

Cormier’s responsibility, we must seek to establish the extent of his moral blameworthiness. In this regard, relevant considerations are not only the deliberate nature of the crime − which this was − but also the circumstances in which it was committed as well as the motive behind it. While the sentencing judge inferred hatred and vengeance as the motivating factors, as pointed out above, there was some evidence showing dislike but no real evidence from which one could infer actual hatred. And while the facts allowed for an inference that the crime was motivated by vengeance, Mr.

Cormier’s actions were not the result of any type of premeditation. The offence is best described as a sudden loss of self-control resulting in anger-fuelled retaliation. [ 57 ] In argument before us, the question of provocation was raised. Mr. Cormier argued he was provoked to a state of desperation. On the other hand, counsel for the Attorney General argued that provocation is mitigating only if s. 232 requirements are met.

Section 232(1) applies to culpable homicide that might be murder if it wasn’t for the fact that the offender committed the offence “in the heat of passion caused by sudden provocation.” The Attorney General acknowledges there is a dearth of jurisprudential authority on whether provocation outside the context of s. 232 can be a mitigating factor in sentencing and quite properly points to conflicting authority. [ 58 ] I have chosen to view this matter not through the lens of provocation but rather through that of moral blameworthiness. From this perspective, Mr.

Goguen’s actions are part of the circumstances to be considered in determining the degree of Mr. Cormier’s responsibility. Although not excusing or justifying Mr. Cormier’s behaviour, Mr. Goguen’s actions help contextualize Mr. Cormier’s anger toward him. They also indicate that Mr. Cormier did not assault random victims, unlike the offenders in Cloutier and, to some degree, Antonelli . The moral blameworthiness that attaches to Mr.

Cormier’s actions is significant because it is never acceptable to exact “justice” through criminal behaviour; however, it is not as significant as in those cases that involve planning or random victims. In this regard, the present case is more akin to Balcha , although the retaliation in that case was more temporally related to the harm the victim had caused the offender. Hours had not passed, as in the present case. [ 59 ] As I stated earlier, parity is a laudable principle, though it is rarely achievable with precision. This is one of those cases. None of the cases cited is determinative.

Several involve similar offences, but those that involve similar offenders feature different circumstances and vice versa. The absence of better comparators may be argued to militate in favour of giving deference to the sentencing judge; however, that is not my conclusion in the present case. This because comparators, while they do not provide a precise guide for achieving parity, nonetheless serve to establish an appropriate range within which to situate this offence committed by this offender. [ 60 ] As stated earlier, in my view, Mr.

Cormier’s moral blameworthiness was lower than that of the offenders in Antonelli and Cloutier , where sentences of five and six years were respectively imposed. It might credibly be argued that the offences committed in Loveys and Clarke – cases that involved very serious injuries with long-lasting effects – were also more serious than the one committed in the present case. However, to consider sentences of 26 months and 18 months to be applicable here would be to ignore significant differences in terms of both the age of the offenders and their criminal records.

In this latter respect, this would also apply for Chisholm . When he committed the offence, Mr. Cormier was not a youthful person, as was the case in Loveys , Clark e and Chisholm . In addition, Mr. Loveys had no criminal record, and Messrs. Clarke and Chisholm only had minor records, whereas Mr. Cormier had several offences on his criminal record, and, more importantly, was serving a conditional sentence when he committed this offence.

[ 61 ] Considering the above, the parity principle guides us to consider a shorter term of imprisonment than those terms imposed in Antonelli and Cloutier and longer than those imposed in Loveys , Clarke and Chisholm . In arriving at an appropriate term, one must balance some factors against others. The seriousness of the crime involved, the injuries suffered by Mr. Goguen, although not life-threatening, the fact that Mr. Cormier left the scene while Mr. Goguen was still under his pickup truck, Mr.

Cormier’s criminal record, and the fact that he was serving a custodial sentence at the time, as well at his motivation of vengeance, all militate in favour of a significant term of imprisonment. These factors must be balanced with others, such as the absence of any planning by Mr. Cormier, the spontaneity of his actions, the basis for his anger, his efforts in getting his life in order, his cooperation with the police, and his admission of guilt. In the end, I am of the view this serious crime, committed in these circumstances by an offender such as Mr.

Cormier, is deserving of a sentence of imprisonment for three years. Such a sentence loudly denounces retaliatory conduct of this kind and will adequately serve to deter others from engaging in similar conduct. [ 62 ] At the hearing of this appeal, Mr. Cormier brought a motion to adduce new evidence in the event we were to decide to vary his sentence. This evidence is in the form of an affidavit by Mr. Cormier, in which he describes in greater detail his relationship with Mr. Goguen and emphasizes that Mr. Goguen sought to engage him in criminal behaviour and that he refused.

He also provides more information of the events that led to his striking Mr. Goguen with his pickup truck. I would not admit the proffered evidence not only because it easily could have been introduced before the sentencing judge, but also, and especially, because it would not influence my view of the appropriate sentence. C. Did the sentencing judge err by imposing a lifetime firearm prohibition under s. 109 of the Criminal Code ? [ 63 ] Mr. Cormier contends the sentencing judge erred by ordering a lifetime firearms prohibition order when the Crown was only seeking a 10-year ban. Mr.

Cormier points out that s. 109(2) (

a) provides that, in the case of a first conviction or discharge from the offence to which the order relates, as was the case for Mr. Cormier, the judge was required to prohibit him from possessing “any firearm, other than a prohibited firearm or restricted firearm, and any crossbow, restricted weapon, ammunition and explosive substance” for at least ten years after his release from imprisonment, and “any prohibited firearm, restricted firearm, prohibited weapon, prohibited device and prohibited ammunition for life.” [ 64 ] Mr.

Cormier submits that “[c]ourts across the country have held that, where the Crown seeks a lifetime ban, instead of a ten-year ban, s. 727 of the Criminal Code requires that the accused be given notice,” citing R. v. R.J.F. , 2004 MBCA 188 , [2004] M.J. No. 435 (QL) , at para. 13 ; R. v. Alexander , 2013 NLCA 15 , [2013] N.J. No. 71 (QL) , at para. 5 ; and R. v. Denny , 2016 NSSC 76 , [2016] N.S.J. No. 110 (QL) , at para. 242 . In addition, Mr. Cormier contends the sentencing judge should have provided reasons for his deviation from what the Crown was seeking. [ 65 ] Counsel for the Attorney General joins in Mr.

Cormier’s request for a substitution of ten years for the lifetime ban. He concedes the sentencing judge misapprehended the Crown’s position on this issue. Counsel admits there are no exceptional circumstances that would justify the Crown departing from its position taken at trial. [ 66 ] Considering the Attorney General’s position, I would give effect to this ground of appeal without any further comment. It is obvious the sentencing judge misapprehended the Crown’s position on the matter. In the circumstances, I would vary the prohibition issued under s. 109(2)(

a) to one of ten years. IV. Disposition [ 67 ] For these reasons, I joined with my colleagues in allowing Mr. Cormier’s appeal to vary the term of imprisonment to one of three years, less the time the sentencing judge credited for time spent on remand, and to vary the prohibition order made under s. 109(2) (

a) of the Criminal Code to one of ten years, with all other ancillary orders to remain unchanged.

Version française de la décision de la Cour rendue par LE JUGE EN CHEF RICHARD I. Introduction [1] Le présent appel contre la peine fait suite à un comportement criminel adopté en guise de représailles. Le délinquant s’est fait lui-même justice, mais il n’a pas commis un pur acte de vigilantisme où la vengeance est exercée après avoir été soigneusement planifiée et réfléchie.

Pour appliquer correctement le principe de la parité, en vue d’établir la peine appropriée en l’espèce, il faut évaluer la culpabilité morale associée à un acte non planifié de représailles constituant des voies de fait graves. [2] Un désir de représailles attisé par la colère a incité Shawn Cormier, âgé de 38 ans, à commettre des voies de fait graves en renversant et en traînant avec une camionnette son cousin Jason Goguen, âgé de 45 ans. Après avoir plaidé coupable à l’infraction de voies de fait graves ( art. 268 du Code criminel ), M.

Cormier s’est vu infliger une peine d’emprisonnement de cinq ans moins le crédit accordé pour le temps passé en détention provisoire; il interjette appel de cette peine. Bien que l’infraction commise mérite d’être sévèrement sanctionnée, pour dénoncer le comportement criminel de M. Cormier et le dissuader ainsi que quiconque de se livrer à un comportement semblable, elle ne mérite pas la sanction infligée aux auteurs dont le comportement produit des conséquences plus sérieuses ou dont le degré de culpabilité morale est plus élevé.

Le défaut du juge chargé de la détermination de la peine de reconnaître ce fait constitue, dans l’application du principe de la parité, une erreur suffisamment importante pour justifier l’intervention en appel. [3] Lors de l’audition de l’appel, nous avons accordé l’autorisation d’interjeter appel et, le 11 août 2022, nous avons accueilli l’appel et modifié la peine d’emprisonnement pour la remplacer par une peine de trois ans, moins le crédit accordé par le juge chargé de la détermination de la peine pour le temps passé en détention provisoire.

Nous avons aussi modifié l’ordonnance accessoire prononcée en application de l’ art. 109 du Code criminel . À l’époque, nous avons indiqué que les motifs suivraient. Voici les raisons qui m’ont porté à joindre mes collègues pour rendre cette décision. II. Contexte factuel [4] Dans la trentaine, Shawn Cormier a développé une dépendance aux drogues illégales. Il en est résulté pour lui un casier judiciaire remontant à 2015, principalement à l’égard d’infractions contre les biens et pour défaut d’obtempérer à des citations à comparaître ou des assignations ou de respecter les conditions d’ordonnances de probation.

Toutes les déclarations de culpabilité prononcées contre lui ont découlé de plaidoyers de culpabilité. En mai 2019, M. Cormier a obtenu une peine d’emprisonnement avec sursis de 15 mois, pour une infraction de vol commise en 2018, et une peine d’une durée semblable pour manquement aux conditions de l’ordonnance de probation qui en était résultée. Pendant qu’il purgeait sa peine d’emprisonnement avec sursis, M. Cormier, admis dans divers établissements de traitement au fil des ans, est parvenu à la sobriété et est devenu un membre productif de la société.

En 2019, il a lancé sa propre entreprise d’entretien de propriétés. [5] En juin 2020, Jason Goguen, un cousin de M. Cormier ayant lui aussi des antécédents criminels, cherchait un endroit où entreposer des biens volés. Il s’est tourné vers M. Cormier, qui lui a refusé son aide. Cela a mis M. Goguen en colère et, dans les deux semaines qui ont suivi, il y a eu entre les deux hommes des échanges houleux. [6] Quelques semaines plus tard, le 9 août, M. Goguen a couvert les véhicules de M. Cormier de graffitis et il a versé de l’essence sur ce que l’on a dit être un cabanon où M.

Cormier remisait certains de ses biens, puis y a mis le feu. Un voisin a rapidement éteint l’incendie. Des policiers ont été appelés sur les lieux ce jour-là et, en leur présence, M. Cormier a parlé au téléphone avec M. Goguen, qui se serait vanté de ses actes de vandalisme sur Facebook. Au cours de cet échange, M. Goguen a mis M. Cormier au défi de se battre avec lui. M. Cormier a demandé aux policiers d’arrêter M. Goguen, mais ils ne l’ont pas fait. [7] Moins de 48 heures plus tard, le 11 août, M. Goguen est revenu sur les lieux et il a de nouveau mis feu au cabanon, qui cette fois a été réduit en cendres.

Non seulement M. Cormier a-t-il perdu ses outils et son matériel, mais un de ses véhicules a aussi été incendié. M. Cormier a de nouveau appelé la police. Quelques heures plus tard, alors qu’il conduisait sa camionnette, M. Cormier a aperçu M. Goguen qui faisait de la bicyclette. M. Goguen a alors traversé un terrain de stationnement, dans le

but manifeste de fuir M. Cormier, qui a roulé sur l’accotement puis dans le terrain de stationnement où il a percuté M. Goguen avec le devant de sa camionnette. Coincés sous celle-ci, M. Goguen et sa bicyclette ont été traînés sur plusieurs mètres alors que le véhicule ralentissait avant de s’arrêter. L’incident a été enregistré par une caméra de sécurité. [8] Pour décrire l’accident et ses suites, je reprendrai les propos du juge chargé de déterminer la peine : Ce vidéo démontre très bien le comportement effrayant de la part de l’accusé. Il est troublant de regarder ce qui suit.

Celui-ci conduit son véhicule — son camion directement vers la victime qui est sur une bicyclette. Il passe d’un stationnement à l’autre. Pour s’y rendre, il conduit sur du gazon puisqu’il n’y a aucune entrée entre les deux stationnements. La — la poussière vole partout. Il frappe la victime par derrière. Celle-ci tombe sur le camion. L’accusé continue sur son chemin et traine la victime, qui est maintenant coincée sous le véhicule. De toute évidence, il était bel et bien déterminé de culbuter la victime et lui causer du tort. L’accusé arrête finalement son véhicule. Il sort par la porte du conducteur.

Il regarde calmement sous son camion où se situe la victime. Il n’offre aucune aide. Son comportement est froid et calleux. Il fouille à l’intérieur de son véhicule sans inquiétude pour la personne prise sous son camion. Finalement, des personnes arrivent sur les lieux. L’accusé a une conversation de courte durée et quitte les lieux de façon nonchalante avant de finalement commencer à courir pour s’enfuir de la scène. La victime, Jason Goguen, a subi des blessures graves. Les témoins à la scène lui ont aidé à se dégager. Il est parti en courant.

Une fois que la police a retrouvé la victime, il fut transporté à l’hôpital. Les photos présentées en preuve dévoilent bien les blessures subies à la suite des actes de l’accusé. Son corps est rempli d’abrasions de natures très profondes. Ces plaies recouvrent le dos, genoux, les bras et les jambes de la victime. Il a souffert des hématomes. Il a été enveloppé de pansements et prescrit des médicaments. Les blessures ont été décrites comme étant similaires à des brûlures. [9] M. Cormier s’est montré coopératif dès le départ lors de l’enquête policière.

Il a d’abord été accusé de tentative de meurtre, mais cette inculpation a été retirée lorsqu’il s’est reconnu coupable de voies de fait graves, une infraction passible d’une peine maximale de 14 ans d’emprisonnement. Lors de l’audience de détermination de la peine devant la Cour provinciale, le procureur du ministère public a plaidé en faveur d’une peine d’emprisonnement de six ans, moins un crédit pour le temps passé par M. Cormier en détention provisoire. Pour sa part, l’avocat de M.

Cormier a prétendu qu’une peine d’emprisonnement de 12 à 18 mois conviendrait dans les circonstances. [10] Lorsqu’il a exposé ses motifs pour infliger une peine d’emprisonnement de cinq ans, moins un crédit pour le temps passé en détention provisoire, le juge de la Cour provinciale a fait état de l’animosité qui existait entre MM. Cormier et Goguen. Il a mentionné l’inaction des policiers lorsqu’ils avaient été appelés le 9 août. Il a aussi relevé le fait que, pendant de nombreuses années, tant M. Cormier que M. Goguen s’étaient adonnés à des activités criminelles.

Le juge a pris en compte le casier judiciaire de M. Cormier et a souligné que ce dernier purgeait toujours une peine d’emprisonnement avec sursis lorsqu’il a percuté M. Goguen avec son véhicule. Le juge a aussi reconnu que M.

Cormier semblait avoir pris sa vie en main, comme il avait vaincu sa dépendance au crack et lancé sa propre entreprise d’entretien de propriétés après avoir acquis les outils nécessaires et deux véhicules à moteur. [11] Dans ses motifs de détermination de la peine, le juge a reconnu que la détermination de la peine n’était pas une science exacte et que chaque peine devait être adaptée à la situation d’espèce. Il a expliqué qu’il devait prendre en compte les principes et objectifs énoncés aux art. 718 , 718.1 et 718.2 du Code criminel ainsi que l’existence de toute circonstance aggravante et atténuante.

Il a estimé que le plaidoyer de culpabilité de M. Cormier constituait une circonstance atténuante, tout en relevant cependant la solidité de la preuve de la poursuite du fait qu’une caméra de sécurité avait enregistré l’incident. Le juge a reconnu les efforts consentis par M. Cormier dans le passé pour se réadapter. [12] Quant à l’argument de l’avocat de la défense selon lequel les blessures subies par M.

Goguen ne lui laisseraient pas de séquelles à long terme, le juge chargé de la détermination de la peine a dit qu’il ne s’agissait pas d’une circonstance atténuante, mais simplement d’un coup de chance, puisque la nature de l’acte criminel aurait pu donner lieu, sinon, à une accusation de meurtre ou d’homicide involontaire. [13] S’agissant des circonstances aggravantes, le juge chargé de la détermination de la peine a mentionné la gravité de l’accusation, le fait que M.

Cormier s’était servi d’un véhicule à moteur comme d’une arme, le fait qu’il avait commis les actes délibérément et de sang-froid, le fait qu’il purgeait à l’époque une peine d’emprisonnement avec sursis et son casier judiciaire. Le juge a toutefois reconnu que le casier judiciaire de M. Cormier ne comptait pas d’infractions avec violence, mis à part une accusation de profération de menaces en 2015. [14] Le juge chargé de la détermination de la peine a expliqué que la dénonciation et la dissuasion constituaient les objectifs premiers de détermination de la peine pour un crime d’une telle nature.

Il considérait que l’affaire se situait dans la fourchette supérieure de l’échelle de la gravité. Il estimait que l’infraction commise était motivée par la haine et la vengeance.

Selon le juge, même si M. Cormier avait su prendre sa vie en main, la réinsertion sociale constituait un objectif secondaire dans une affaire de cette nature. Le juge a conclu, en fin de compte, qu’un emprisonnement de longue durée était nécessaire pour atteindre les objectifs applicables de détermination de la peine. Comme je l’ai mentionné, le juge a infligé à M. Cormier une peine d’emprisonnement de cinq ans, moins un crédit pour le temps passé en détention provisoire. Il a aussi rendu des ordonnances accessoires, notamment une ordonnance en application de l’ art. 109 du Code criminel , qui interdisait à M.

Cormier, à perpétuité, de posséder des armes à feu, arbalètes, armes prohibées, armes à autorisation restreinte, dispositifs prohibés, munitions, munitions prohibées et substances explosives. [15] M. Cormier demande l’autorisation d’interjeter appel de sa peine.

Il soutient que le juge chargé de la détermination de la peine a commis une erreur (1) en n’appliquant pas correctement le principe de la proportionnalité, (2) en se fondant sur une circonstance aggravante qui n’avait pas été prouvée hors de tout doute raisonnable et (3) en lui interdisant à perpétuité la possession d’armes à feu en application de l’ art. 109 du Code criminel . [16] L’avocat du procureur général a concédé qu’il convenait d’accorder l’autorisation d’interjeter appel parce qu’il était [TRADUCTION] « tout simplement impossible de dire qu’il n’y aurait aucune possibilité que l’appel soit accueilli si l’autorisation était accordée ».

Quant au premier moyen d’appel, l’avocat, tout en affirmant que la Cour devait faire montre de retenue envers la décision du juge chargé de la détermination de la peine, [TRADUCTION] « reconnaît que l’argument avancé par [M.] Cormier en appel est convaincant ». L’avocat du procureur général concède, de plus, le troisième moyen d’appel. III. Analyse [17] J’aborderai d’abord le deuxième moyen d’appel, comme la résolution de cette question est susceptible d’influer sur l’analyse du premier moyen. A.

Le juge de première instance s’est-il fondé erronément sur un fait aggravant qui n’avait pas été prouvé hors de tout doute raisonnable? [18] M. Cormier soutient que [TRADUCTION] « [l]e juge chargé de la détermination de la peine ne peut à bon droit considérer une circonstance comme étant aggravante que si cela n’est pas contesté par les parties, ou si le ministère public réussit à prouver hors de tout doute raisonnable les faits qui étayent cette circonstance ». Il s’agit d’un énoncé juste de la règle de droit ( al. 724(3)

e) du Code criminel ). [19] Une audience de détermination de la peine faisant suite à un plaidoyer de culpabilité se déroule habituellement de manière informelle, les avocats relatant les faits au juge verbalement. Dans la plupart des cas, il n’y a aucune contestation. Lorsqu’un fait pertinent est contesté, toutefois, le juge chargé de la détermination de la peine doit exiger que le fait soit établi en preuve ( al. 724(3) a)).

Lorsque le fait contesté vise une circonstance aggravante, le poursuivant a le fardeau de prouver ce fait hors de tout doute raisonnable. [20] Des inférences peuvent être tirées des faits prouvés. Dans l’arrêt LeBreton c. R. , 2018 NBCA 27 , [2018] A.N.-B. n° 103 (QL), la juge d’appel Baird a exposé les principes applicables suivants : i. Un aveu de culpabilité est, en soi, un aveu des éléments essentiels de l’infraction, sans plus. ii.

Si les faits que le ministère public souhaite invoquer en tant que faits aggravants ne sont pas contestés par l’accusé, le juge chargé de déterminer la peine est en droit de les considérer comme prouvés. iii. Si les faits que le ministère public souhaite invoquer en tant que faits aggravants sont contestés, la question doit se régler selon les principes ordinaires qui régissent les procédures en matière criminelle; le ministère public a donc le fardeau de prouver les faits aggravants contestés, et un doute raisonnable, le cas échéant, doit profiter à l’accusé. iv.

Il est permis au juge, sans avoir à entendre une preuve complémentaire, d’inférer un état d’esprit contesté des faits non contestés présentés lors d’une audience de détermination de la peine. Évidemment, si un facteur aggravant entre en jeu, les faits non contestés doivent raisonnablement autoriser cette inférence hors de tout doute raisonnable. [par. 33]

[21] M. Cormier soutient qu’aucun fait admis ni aucun élément de preuve non contesté figurant au dossier n’étaye la conclusion voulant que le crime fût motivé par la haine et la vengeance. Je souscris partiellement à sa prétention. [22] Tous admettent qu’il y avait de l’animosité entre M. Cormier et M. Goguen, mais aucune preuve n’indique et rien même ne laisse entendre que cette situation existait depuis longtemps. À l’audience de détermination de la peine, l’avocat de la poursuite et l’avocat de M. Cormier ont chacun présenté des observations sur la relation entre les deux hommes, ce dernier admettant que M.

Cormier et M. Goguen s’étaient échangés des insultes et que l’hostilité couvait entre eux depuis juin 2020. L’avocat du procureur général a déclaré : [TRADUCTION] « Pour parler franchement, on peut facilement inférer que les parties se détestaient l’une l’autre. » Je ne suis pas totalement d’accord avec lui. La haine est un sentiment d’inimitié extrême. Il est clair que les deux cousins ne s’aimaient pas, surtout depuis que M. Cormier avait refusé de prendre part à l’activité criminelle de M.

Goguen, mais les faits sont trop ténus pour qu’on puisse tirer une conclusion quelconque sur l’ampleur de ce sentiment. [23] D’après les faits non contestés au dossier, M. Goguen a tenté deux fois en 48 heures d’incendier la construction abritant la petite entreprise de M. Cormier; il a réussi à sa deuxième tentative. Quelques heures après avoir découvert son bâtiment détruit et son véhicule gravement endommagé tôt le matin du 11 août, M. Cormier a trouvé M. Goguen à quelques mètres seulement des vestiges de son moyen de subsistance toujours en train de se consumer. M.

Cormier n’a pas attendu l’intervention policière; il a exercé ses représailles. [24] Il était loisible au juge chargé de la détermination de la peine d’inférer, à partir de ces faits, que le crime avait été commis en raison d’une certaine aversion de M. Cormier envers M. Goguen et en représailles de ce que ce dernier avait fait à ses biens. Le juge, toutefois, aurait dû pousser plus loin son analyse. [25] La vengeance conduisant à la perpétration d’un crime peut revêtir de nombreuses formes.

À une extrémité de l’échelle, il peut s’agir d’un acte de vigilantisme où les représailles sont exercées après avoir été soigneusement planifiées et réfléchies. À l’autre extrémité, il peut s’agir de représailles engagées par manque temporaire de retenue. La culpabilité morale est manifestement plus significative dans le premier cas que dans le deuxième. Il s’ensuit que, après avoir conclu qu’un crime était motivé par la vengeance, le juge chargé de la détermination de la peine doit décider où, sur l’échelle de la culpabilité morale, se situe la vengeance exercée.

En l’espèce, le juge chargé de la détermination de la peine ne l’a pas fait. [26] Sans souscrire à l’argument de M. Cormier selon lequel les faits admis ne permettaient pas d’inférer que son crime était motivé par un certain désir de vengeance, je conviens que les faits ne permettent pas d’inférer que la vengeance exercée était le moindrement planifiée. Sur ce point précis, à l’audience de détermination de la peine, l’avocat de M. Cormier a expliqué que son client avait agi sous l’impulsion du moment lorsqu’il a vu M. Goguen ce matin-là.

Cet énoncé non contredit ni contesté aurait dû mener le juge chargé de la détermination de la peine à conclure que la motivation qu’il avait inférée se situait au bas de l’échelle de la culpabilité morale. Or, le juge n’a pas tiré une telle conclusion. À mon avis, son défaut de le faire a influé sur son application du principe de la parité, dont il sera traité ci-dessous. B.

Le juge chargé de la détermination de la peine a-t-il appliqué erronément le principe de la proportionnalité? [27] Le principe fondamental en matière de détermination de la peine est énoncé à l’ art. 718.1 du Code criminel , reproduit ci-après : 718.1 A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. 718.1 La peine est proportionnelle à la gravité de l’infraction et au degré de responsabilité du délinquant. [28] Selon M. Cormier, [TRADUCTION] « compte tenu des blessures relativement mineures subies par M.

Goguen et de la provocation qu’il a longuement exercée auparavant, la peine infligée devrait être beaucoup moins sévère que celle demandée par le procureur du ministère public ». M. Cormier soutient que le principe fondamental de la proportionnalité n’a pas été respecté puisque la peine n’était pas proportionnelle à la gravité de l’infraction non plus qu’à son propre degré de responsabilité. [29] À l’appui de son argument, M. Cormier invoque l’arrêt R. c.

Lacasse , 2015 CSC 64 , [2015] 3 R.C.S. 1089 , de la Cour suprême, en soulignant les propos suivants du juge Wagner (tel était alors son titre), qui s’exprimait au nom de la majorité :

[…] Plus le crime commis et ses conséquences sont graves , ou plus le degré de responsabilité du délinquant est élevé, plus la peine sera lourde. En d’autres mots, la sévérité de la peine ne dépend pas seulement de la gravité des conséquences du crime , mais également de la culpabilité morale du délinquant. […] [Soulignement de l’avocat de M. Cormier; par. 12] [30] M.

Cormier affirme que le juge chargé de la détermination de la peine aurait dû distinguer la présente affaire de celles qui lui ont été citées puisque, dans ces dernières, le crime commis avait entraîné des conséquences beaucoup plus graves qu’en l’espèce, où M. Goguen n’a subi aucune blessure permanente. C’est peut-être le cas, mais l’argument fait abstraction de la principale leçon donnée par la Cour suprême dans l’arrêt Lacasse .

Dans le passage précité, le juge Wagner indique clairement qu’une peine plus sévère est justifiée non seulement quand les conséquences du crime sont graves, mais aussi quand le degré de culpabilité morale du délinquant est élevé. [31] Au même paragraphe, le juge Wagner souligne que « tant les peines trop clémentes que les peines trop sévères peuvent miner la confiance du public dans l’administration de la justice » ( Lacasse , par. 12 ).

Le principe de la parité, énoncé à l’ al. 718.2b) du Code criminel – « l’infliction de peines semblables à celles infligées à des délinquants pour des infractions semblables commises dans des circonstances semblables » (par. 127) –, constitue une manière d’éviter cet écueil. Dans l’arrêt Parker c.

R. , 2014 NBCA 17 , 419 R.N.-B. (2 e ) 163 , le juge d’appel Green, s’exprimant au nom de la Cour, souligne que le respect du principe de la parité « assure l’équité et la prévisibilité dans le système de justice pénale » (par. 18). [32] Une explication exhaustive du principe de la parité est présentée dans l’arrêt R. c.

Liebeck , 2017 NBCA 53 , [2017] A.N.-B. n° 282 (QL), et vaut la peine d’être répétée : Le principe de la parité cherche à favoriser l’infliction de peines semblables à celles infligées à des délinquants [semblables] pour des infractions semblables commises dans des circonstances semblables (voir l’al. 718.2b)). Le principe de la parité vise à éviter l’infliction de peines démesurées à des délinquants lorsque les faits et les circonstances sont essentiellement les mêmes et indiquent que des peines équivalentes ou semblables devraient être infligées (voir R. c. W.E. , 2010 NLCA 4 , [2010] N.J. No. 15 (QL) ).

Les fourchettes de peines revêtent indiscutablement une grande importance et utilité dans la rationalisation de la peine infligée, mais elles demeurent « tout au plus des lignes directrices et non des règles absolues », et la décision d’y déroger peut être justifiée si la sanction « respecte les principes et les objectifs de détermination de la peine » : R. c. Nasogaluak , 2010 CSC 6 , [2010] 1 R.C.S. 206 , par. 44 . Corrélativement, il a été proposé, avec jurisprudence à l’appui, que le critère d’individualisation fait que la recherche d’une peine appropriée devient un « exercice stérile et théorique » : R. c.

M. (C.A.) , par. 92 . Quoi qu’il en soit, le principe de la parité est « subordonné au principe fondamental de la proportionnalité » : R. c. Lacasse , 2015 CSC 64 , [2015] 3 R.C.S. 1089 , par. 54 . En effet, même si les conditions d’application du principe de la parité sont établies, ce principe « n’interdit pas la disparité si les circonstances le justifient , en raison de l’existence de la règle de la proportionnalité » (en italiques dans l’original) : R. c.

L.M. , 2008 CSC 31 , [2008] 2 R.C.S. 163 , par. 36 . [par. 31] [33] Si le principe de la parité est fort louable, il est rarement réalisable avec précision en raison de la grande diversité des délinquants et des circonstances possibles. Encore une fois, je citerai les propos du juge Wagner dans l’arrêt Lacasse : « Fixer une peine proportionnée est une tâche délicate » (par. 12).

La détermination de la peine implique « l’exercice par [les tribunaux] d’un large pouvoir discrétionnaire dans la mise en balance de tous les facteurs pertinents afin de pouvoir satisfaire aux objectifs visés par le prononcé des peines » (par. 1). C’est pour cette raison que la Cour suprême a « rappelé l’importance d’accorder une grande latitude au juge qui prononce la peine [qui] est le mieux placé pour déterminer, eu égard aux circonstances, la peine juste et appropriée conformément aux objectifs et aux principes énoncés au Code criminel à cet égard » (par. 11).

Les cours d’appel sont donc exhortées à faire preuve d’une grande retenue envers la décision du juge chargé de la détermination de la peine, et à ne pas intervenir, sauf dans les cas où ce dernier commet une erreur de droit ou une erreur de principe ayant une incidence réelle sur la détermination de cette peine, ou que si cette peine est manifestement non indiquée ( Lacasse , par. 11 ). [34] Pour respecter le principe de la parité, les tribunaux chargés de la détermination de la peine se fondent sur les précédents publiés, de leur province d’abord, puis des autres provinces.

Dans le cadre de la procédure relative à la détermination de la peine, tant le procureur du ministère public que l’avocat de la défense devraient attirer l’attention du juge sur la jurisprudence antérieure pertinente pour l’application du principe de la parité. Comme la Cour l’a souligné dans l’arrêt Liebeck , aux paragraphes 32 et 33 , le dossier de détermination de la peine et la jurisprudence citée par chaque

partie à l’appui de sa thèse doivent renseigner le juge sur les similitudes entre les affaires en cause, tant en ce qui concerne les délinquants que les circonstances de la perpétration des infractions. [35] S’agissant du contrôle des peines en appel pour un moyen fondé sur le principe de la parité, le juge LeBel, s’exprimant au nom de la Cour suprême, donne les indications suivantes dans l’arrêt R. c. L.M. , 2008 CSC 31 , [2008] 2 R.C.S. 163 :

Des peines prononcées à l’égard des mêmes catégories d’infraction ne seront pas toujours parfaitement semblables, en raison de la naturemême d’un processus de détermination de la peine axé sur l’individu. En effet, le principe de la parité n’interdit pas la disparité si lescirconstances le justifient, en raison de l’existence de la règle de la proportionnalité (voir Dadour, p. 18). Comme notre Cour l’a rappelédans M. (C.A.) [ (SCC), [1996] 1 R.C.S. 500, [1996] A.C.S. n° 28 (QL)], par. 92, « il n’existe pas de peine uniformepour un crime donné ».

Dans un tel contexte, une cour d’appel n’est justifiée d’intervenir que si la peine qu’a infligée le juge du procès« s’écarte de façon marquée et substantielle des peines qui sont habituellement infligées à des délinquants similaires ayant commis descrimes similaires » (M. (C.A.), par. 92). [Italiques dans l’original; par. 36] [36] Dans la présente affaire, l’avocat du procureur général ne conteste pas l’analyse que M. Cormiera faite des décisions sur la peine rendues pour des voies de fait graves commises avec l’aide d’un véhicule à moteur. Je ne conteste pasnon plus cette analyse. [37] M.

Cormier entame son analyse avec les deux décisions invoquées par le procureur du ministèrepublic à l’audience de détermination de la peine au soutien de son argumentation en faveur d’une peine d’emprisonnement de six ans (voir Antonelli c. R., 2008 QCCA 1573, [2008] J.Q. no 7918 (QL); R. c. Cloutier, 2017 ABPC 3, [2017] A.J. No. 28 (QL)). Dans cesdeux affaires, il y avait de nombreuses victimes ayant subi, sans provocation, des voies de fait causant des blessures beaucoup plusgraves qu’en l’espèce.

Des peines d’emprisonnement de cinq ans et de six ans, respectivement, ont été infligées aux délinquants dans cesaffaires. [38] Dans l’arrêt Antonelli, un jeune délinquant sans antécédents judiciaires, mécontent de sa ruptureavec une femme, s’était présenté avec des cousins au lieu de travail de celle-ci et avait tenté de la convaincre de lui parler. L’ex-petiteamie a refusé et lui a demandé de partir, ce qu’il n’a pas voulu faire. Elle a téléphoné à son frère, qui est venu la rejoindre. À l’extérieur,une dispute a éclaté entre le délinquant et le frère. Le délinquant a jeté le

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