2019 NBCA 65, 2019 NBCA 65

COURT OF APPEAL OF COUR D'APPEL DU NEW BRUNSWICK NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK 21-18-CA LUC LeBLANC APPELLANT LUC LeBLANC APPELANT - and - - et - HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN RESPONDENT SA MAJESTÉ LA REINE INTIMÉE LeBlanc v. R., 2019 NBCA 65 CORAM: The Honourable Chief Justice Richard The Honourable Justice Larlee The Honourable Justice LaVigne LeBlanc c.

R., 2019 NBCA 65 CORAM : l’honorable juge en chef Richard l’honorable juge Larlee l’honorable juge LaVigne Appeal from a decision of the Court of Queen’s Bench: October 11, 2017 (conviction) February 22, 2018 (sentencing) Appel d’une décision de la Cour du Banc de la Reine : le 11 octobre 2017 (déclaration de culpabilité) le 22 février 2018 (détermination de la peine) History of Case: Historique de la cause : Decision under appeal: 2017 NBQB 247 2018 NBQB 60 Décision frappée d’appel : 2017 NBBR 247 2018 NBBR 60 Preliminary or incidental proceedings: None Procédures préliminaires ou accessoires : aucune Appeal heard: March 19, 2019 Appel entendu : le 19 mars 2019 Judgment rendered: September 5, 2019 Jugement rendu : le 5 septembre 2019

Reasons for judgment: The Honourable Justice LaVigne Concurred in by: The Honourable Chief Justice Richard The Honourable Justice Larlee Counsel at hearing: For the appellant: Nathan J.S. Gorham and Breana Vandebeek For the respondent: David W. Schermbrucker and Christian Girouard- Leclerc Motifs de jugement : l’honorable juge LaVigne Souscrivent aux motifs : l’honorable juge en chef Richard l’honorable juge Larlee Avocats à l'audience : Pour l’appelant : Nathan J.S. Gorham et Breana Vandebeek Pour l’intimée : David W. Schermbrucker et Christian Girouard- Leclerc THE COURT The appeal from conviction is dismissed.

Leave to appeal sentence is granted, and the appeal allowed, but only to increase the pre-sentence custody credit from 287 days to 54 months as proposed by the parties, resulting in a net sentence of 114 months, commencing on the date the sentence was initially imposed. In all other respects, the sentence is unaltered. LA COUR L’appel de la déclaration de culpabilité est rejeté.

La demande d’autorisation d’interjeter appel de la peine est accordée et l’appel est accueilli, mais uniquement afin d’augmenter le crédit afférent à la période de détention présentencielle de 287 jours à 54 mois comme le proposent les parties, ce qui équivaut à une peine nette de 114 mois, débutant à la date à laquelle la peine a initialement été infligée. À tous autres égards, la peine demeure inchangée. The judgment of the Court was delivered by LAVIGNE, J.A. I.

Overview [ 1 ] On January 21, 2013, Anthony Knockwood, accompanied by his spouse, Heather Kierstead, attempted to drive a recreational vehicle with 15.91 kg of cocaine concealed therein, across the United States - Mexico border at Brownsville, Texas. The US border guards detected the cocaine; consequently, Mr. Knockwood and Ms. Kierstead were arrested for various criminal offences under US law. During the investigation that followed, Mr. Knockwood and Ms. Kierstead, at first, denied any knowledge of the cocaine, then Ms. Kierstead implicated Mr.

Knockwood, and subsequently, they both identified Luc LeBlanc to US authorities – and then, to Canadian authorities − as the mastermind behind the importation scheme. [ 2 ] Mr. LeBlanc and his spouse, Michelle LeBlanc, stood charged that between November 1, 2012, and April 30, 2013, in Moncton, New Brunswick and in Matamoros, Mexico, they conspired with Mr. Knockwood and Ms.

Kierstead, unindicted conspirators, and others, to commit the indictable offence of importing cocaine into Canada, contrary to section6(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19, and did thereby commit an offence in violation of section 465(1)(

c) ofthe Criminal Code of Canada. [3] Relying on the evidence of Ms. Kierstead and Mr. Knockwood, the prosecution argued at trialthat Mr. LeBlanc devised and directed the conspiracy to import cocaine from Mexico to Canada. It alleged Mr. LeBlanc’s plan was topick up the cocaine in Mexico, have Mr. Knockwood transport it in his RV across the Texas border, and thereafter through the UnitedStates and into Canada, and eventually deliver it to him in Moncton, New Brunswick. [4] The defence denied any involvement in the conspiracy to import cocaine. It alleged that Mr.Knockwood and Ms.

Kierstead planned to vacation in Mexico with the LeBlancs. They drove the RV from Moncton to Matamoros,Mexico, where the LeBlancs, who had flown to Mexico, met them. After several days of vacationing together in Mexico, they said theirgoodbyes. The LeBlancs flew back to Moncton, and Mr. Knockwood drove the RV across the border, where he and his passenger, Ms.Kierstead, were arrested. The defence argued Mr. Knockwood and Ms. Kierstead implicated Mr. LeBlanc, and cooperated fully in theinvestigation and prosecution of Mr.

LeBlanc in Canada, so they could negotiate deals for themselves with the US and Canadianauthorities. [5] The primary issue at trial was whether Mr. Knockwood and Ms. Kierstead were telling thetruth when they testified Mr. LeBlanc was the mastermind behind the plan. [6] Mr. and Ms. LeBlanc were convicted as charged after a 35-day trial before a judge and jury,during which Mr. Knockwood and Ms. Kierstead testified against them. The defence did not present any evidence at trial. This appealconcerns Luc LeBlanc only.

He was sentenced to 14 years in prison, with a remand credit of 287 days applied for pre-sentence custody. [7] Mr. LeBlanc appeals his conviction alleging the trial judge: • erred by not staying the proceedings, on the basis that the conduct of the Crown constituted an abuse of process, underminingtrial fairness and the integrity of the judicial process; • erred in denying his Corbett application (R. v. Corbett, (SCC), [1988] 1 S.C.R. 670, [1988] S.C.J.

No. 40(QL)), which sought to suppress from his criminal record all previous drug convictions, so he could testify without being undulyprejudiced; and, • erred by refusing to exclude from the evidence certain items – his passport and data from electronic devices − which wereseized in violation of s. 8 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, because the police carried out a warrantless search of an RV, withoutany justification, which RV carried a heightened expectation of privacy because it was a home away from home.

He asks this Court to quash the conviction, and order a stay of proceedings, or in the alternative a new trial. [8] Failing this, Mr. LeBlanc seeks leave to appeal his sentence. However, the parties agreed the14-year jail sentence should be confirmed, provided the credit applied against sentence be increased from 287 days to 54 months inconsideration of pre-sentence custody. [9] For the following reasons, I would dismiss the conviction appeal, grant leave to appeal thesentence, and modify the sentence as proposed by the parties. II.

Summary of the evidence at trial

[ 10 ] In December 2012, Luc LeBlanc offered $10,000 to Mr. Knockwood to travel from Moncton, New Brunswick to Matamoros, Mexico, in his RV, pick up 12 to 14 packs of cocaine, and transport them back to Moncton for him. Mr. LeBlanc suggested he bring Ms. Kierstead along to make it look like a vacation. [ 11 ] In early January 2013, Mr. Knockwood and Ms. Kierstead, with the assistance of the LeBlancs, prepared the RV − which was parked in Mr. LeBlanc’s driveway – and on January 8, 2013, they left for Mexico. Ms.

Kierstead believed the LeBlancs wanted them to bring something back from Mexico, but she did not ask any specific questions as she did not want to know. While en route, Mr. Knockwood exchanged text messages with Mr. LeBlanc updating him on their progress as they travelled through the United States. The record of these text messages was submitted into evidence. [ 12 ] The LeBlancs travelled by air and all four met in Matamoros on January 15, where they vacationed together for a few days. The LeBlancs stayed in a hotel, while the other couple stayed in the RV. Some photographs showing Mr. Knockwood with Mr.

LeBlanc, and of the LeBlancs taken by Mr. Knockwood, while they were in Mexico, were entered as exhibits. [ 13 ] A day or two before returning to Canada, Mr. LeBlanc drove the RV to a secluded area, using his phone to navigate until they got to an abandoned building. The men then left the RV carrying a shovel, and Mr. LeBlanc guided Mr. Knockwood behind a shed, felt around on the ground and told Mr. Knockwood where to dig. Mr. LeBlanc told him the buried object had been there for almost a year. Mr. Knockwood dug until he hit a bag; he pulled it up and carried it back to the RV.

It felt like it weighed 30 to 40 pounds. Mr. LeBlanc told Mr. Knockwood to drive. Ms. LeBlanc went to the back of the RV with Mr. LeBlanc and Ms. Kierstead came up front with Mr. Knockwood. Mr. LeBlanc emerged from the back and told Mr. Knockwood to pull over; then, Mr. LeBlanc threw out the bag and took over the driving. Neither Mr. Knockwood nor Ms. Kierstead saw the drugs or saw Mr. LeBlanc concealing the drugs; however, Mr. Knockwood “believed some drugs were hidden under the shower, and Mr.

LeBlanc told him he had concealed part of the drugs in the refrigerator panel.” [ 14 ] They all slept in the RV that evening. The next day Mr. LeBlanc and Mr. Knockwood went to Home Depot and purchased insulation and caulk, and that afternoon, they did some modifications to the side panel of the RV. Mr. LeBlanc filled the RV with groceries, commenting this would make it harder to detect anything which was not supposed to be there. They all slept in the RV again that evening. Mr. LeBlanc gave Mr. Knockwood his debit card for expenses in case they ran out of cash on their return trip. (Mr.

LeBlanc’s debit card was seized by US authorities and exhibited as evidence at trial). Mr. Knockwood estimated it would take him 4-5 days to return to Moncton and Mr. LeBlanc told him it would be nice if he could do it in three, promising him an extra $5000. Mr. Knockwood agreed. The LeBlancs flew back to Canada the next day. [ 15 ] As previously noted, the cocaine was detected on January 21, 2013, when Mr. Knockwood and Ms. Kierstead attempted to cross the border and were arrested.

The cocaine was concealed in the RV, in the bathroom beneath the shower, as well as in a compartment behind the refrigerator. [ 16 ] On their way to Matamoros, at one of the border crossings, there was an issue because the RV was registered in Jason Richard’s name. Ms. Kierstead prepared on the spot, a sales receipt she dated January 6, 2013, to evidence the transfer of the RV from Mr. Richard to Mr. Knockwood. This receipt was admitted into evidence. Mr. Knockwood testified Ms. Kierstead had signed Mr. Richard’s name, but in her testimony, Ms. Kierstead denied forging Mr. Richard’s name. Mr.

Richard testified the signature over his name was not his. [ 17 ] Mr. Richard explained the RV which was used to transport the drugs was originally purchased by him on behalf of him and Mr. LeBlanc, in Texas, in September 2012. He believed it was paid for by Mr. LeBlanc, with money transferred via wire by Ms. LeBlanc. He had done this − purchased a RV in Mexico for the LeBlancs and brought it back to Canada − on two prior occasions.

At some point, he thought he might keep the RV, so on November 23, 2012, he registered it under his name in Prince Edward Island where he lived, but ultimately decided he could not afford it, so he delivered it to Mr. LeBlanc in early December 2012. Mr. Richard identified a document dated December 12, 2012, he had prepared to evidence the sale of the RV. In that document, he left the name of the purchaser blank since he did not know to whom Mr. LeBlanc would eventually sell it. The document which he had left in the RV was introduced into evidence. [ 18 ] Mr. Richard testified he had never met Mr.

Knockwood nor sold the RV to him. During cross- examination, he agreed he thought the RV would be sold to Mr. Knockwood or to Ms. LeBlanc’s father. [ 19 ] The main question before the jury was whether the three key Crown witnesses, namely Ms. Kierstead, Mr. Knockwood and Mr. Richard, were telling the truth at trial. All three had given statements in the past, in which they did

not implicate the LeBlancs in this offence. How and why these witnesses changed their story was central to the argument of the defence before the jury. III. Did the trial judge err in dismissing the application for a stay of proceedings ? A. Introduction [ 20 ] Invoking the Charter , more specifically s. 7 − which protects the right of an accused to make full answer and defence – and s. 24(1) , the defence filed, mid-trial, an application for a stay of proceedings asserting an abuse of process.

The trial judge reserved his decision on the outcome of the motion until the end of the trial, after the jury had rendered its verdict. The defence relied primarily on issues concerning trial fairness. It argued the use of evidence from incentivized witnesses, coupled with events that occurred during the trial, prevented the defence from fairly challenging the prosecution’s case.

It also referred to the residual category of abuse of process in support of its application for the stay, arguing the state conduct harmed the integrity of the justice system. [ 21 ] The defence relied on the evidence at trial, and in addition, filed the videotaped statements the witnesses − Ms. Kierstead, Mr. Knockwood and Mr. Richard − had given to the RCMP. In support of its argument that the Crown’s conduct compromised the fairness of Mr.

LeBlanc’s trial, it alleged as follows: • Investigators (from the US and from Canada) openly used the threat of jail time to induce witnesses to change their evidence and implicate Mr. LeBlanc in the offence. • The poor evidentiary record of the statements given to the US authorities by Mr. Knockwood and Ms.

Kierstead prevented the defence from uncovering and presenting evidence to undermine the reliability and credibility of these witnesses, because the statements were summaries written by the authorities, rather than videotaped statements. • These witnesses were represented by counsel in the US when they changed their evidence, such that solicitor-client privilege frustrated the defence’s ability to uncover damaging evidence. • The prosecution allowed the threat of further jail time to loom over the witnesses at trial, making the effect of cross- examination more illusory than real. • Mr.

Hagen, the US prosecutor, testified for the prosecution and repeatedly expressed his opinion as to Ms. Kierstead’s and Mr. Knockwood’s truthfulness during the different interviews he had with them while they were in custody in the US. • During the trial, the prosecutor introduced an inaccurate fact during the re-examination of Mr. Knockwood, namely that the police had offered Mr.

Knockwood the assurance he would not be charged with conspiring to import cocaine into Canada due to the doctrine of double jeopardy. [ 22 ] The defence argued the conduct discussed above also damaged the integrity of the justice system and warranted a stay of proceedings under the residual category. As well, it added the following allegation of prosecutorial misconduct in the residual category: • A couple of months before the beginning of the trial, the prosecutor acted inappropriately, in an attempt to secure the cooperation of Ms. LeBlanc as a witness, by sending a letter to Ms.

LeBlanc’s counsel that would appear “to be an attempt to leverage the threat of professional consequences against counsel for Ms. LeBlanc and penal consequences against Ms. LeBlanc in order to obtain evidence from Ms. LeBlanc” (para. 70 of the Appellant’s Submission).

[ 23 ] The trial judge rejected the claim of abuse of process and dismissed the application for a stay of proceedings: R. v. LeBlanc , 2017 NBQB 247, [2017] N.B.J. No. 344 (QL) . [ 24 ] Mr. LeBlanc argues the trial judge erred in concluding the Crown’s conduct did not result in an abuse of process warranting a stay of proceedings B. Additional context

(1) Ms. Kierstead [ 25 ] Assistant United States Attorney, William Hagen, testified at trial that he was the US prosecutor responsible for the cases concerning Mr. Knockwood and Ms. Kierstead. He explained the US system concerning proffer statements, cooperating witnesses and sentencing persons who provided substantial assistance in prosecuting others. [ 26 ] Ms. Kierstead was arrested and held in custody but she was never charged. Mr. Hagen offered her the opportunity to be a witness early in the process and she accepted after meeting with her counsel.

She provided information under a proffer agreement that prevented the US prosecutor from using anything she said against her. She understood if she provided information to the US authorities, they would drop the charges against her. [ 27 ] Mr. Hagan interviewed Ms. Kierstead four times. In the first interview she denied any knowledge of the concealed drugs and any involvement in this offence. During her second interview (January 26, 2013) and her third interview (February 11, 2013), she implicated Mr. Knockwood, telling the prosecutor Mr.

Knockwood had driven into the desert, left the RV and came back with a duffle bag that could have contained drugs. At that time, she was represented by counsel. She said nothing about Mr. LeBlanc’s alleged involvement or the fact the two couples had vacationed together in Mexico. Mr. Hagen told her he did not believe she was telling the truth, and unless she told the truth, no deal would be negotiated with her and the offer of immunity would no longer apply. In her fourth interview (February 26, 2013), she changed her story, and implicated the LeBlancs in the conspiracy. Specifically, she said Mr.

LeBlanc drove the RV to an abandoned building, where he and Mr. Knockwood dug up a duffle bag containing drugs, and Mr. Knockwood and Mr. LeBlanc concealed the drugs in the back of the RV. [ 28 ] In early March 2013, Mr. Knockwood pleaded guilty, and Ms. Kierstead was released from custody and she returned to Canada. As part of her deal with the US authorities, she was to provide a statement to the RCMP upon her return to Canada and to testify in the Canadian prosecution against Mr. LeBlanc. On May 14, 2014, she met with an RCMP officer and gave a sworn videotaped statement implicating Mr. LeBlanc.

She was never charged in the US or in Canada in relation to these events.

(2) Mr. Knockwood [ 29 ] Mr. Knockwood was arrested, held in custody and charged in the US. The charges carried a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years. A "safety valve" was available to reduce the sentence for eligible offenders who participate in a proffer by truthfully debriefing to US authorities about the offence. There is an additional reduction available that may be given before or after sentencing when an offender provides substantial assistance to an investigation.

In each case, if the prosecutor is satisfied the requirements are met, he will apply to the judge for a reduction in sentence. [ 30 ] At first, Mr. Knockwood denied any knowledge of the offence. However, after he was represented by counsel and received disclosure of Ms. Kierstead’s statement, he gave Mr. Hagen a version of the events that closely resembled her evidence, stating it was Mr. LeBlanc who was the mastermind behind the plan to import cocaine. [ 31 ] Mr. Knockwood testified he decided to plead guilty because his lawyer told him that if he did, Ms.

Kierstead could go home, and if he fought the charge and lost he would get thirty years instead of ten. He explained he declined to

cooperate with authorities at first because Mr. LeBlanc had told him he would take care of it if he kept his mouth shut. [ 32 ] On April 10, 2013, prior to his sentencing, he participated in a proffer. On November 7, 2013, he was sentenced to 70 months instead of the 10-year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment. This took into account a favourable recommendation from Mr. Hagen and mitigation for his guilty plea. [ 33 ] On December 3, 2013, two RCMP officers – including Officer Francoeur − travelled to meet with him at the jail.

Someone from the US Homeland Security Department and a Canadian customs officer were also present during the meetings. Negotiations went on for several hours; the RCMP wanted a formal sworn statement about the events that had occurred prior to his arrest, and Mr. Knockwood was trying to obtain a better bargain including sentence reduction, transfer from the holding centre to a federal prison, and the assurance he would not be prosecuted for conspiring to import cocaine into Canada. Although the police had advised him they did not intend to prosecute him in Canada, Mr.

Knockwood was concerned their intentions could change. In the end, Mr. Knockwood asked for the night to consider his options. On December 4, 2013, Mr. Knockwood agreed to cooperate with the RCMP, and he provided a formal sworn videotaped statement implicating Mr. LeBlanc. His account of the events closely mirrored what Ms. Kierstead had said in her statement. [ 34 ] As a result, his sentence was amended to 46 months. It was reduced again to 37 months because of a change in the guideline level for sentencing (not dependent on cooperation).

Finally, after he completed a residential drug and alcohol program, he received a further reduction. Mr. Knockwood testified he lied to get into the addiction program to reduce his sentence but in the end the program really helped him. He was released to a halfway house in Florida on June 23, 2014, and unconditionally released on October 31, 2014, and permitted to return to Canada.

(3) Mr. Richard [ 35 ] Mr. Richard was the registered owner of the RV which was confiscated by the US authorities; therefore, the authorities contacted him. On May 23, 2013, he gave a statement to the RCMP wherein he said he had sold the RV to Mr. Knockwood for $22,000 and it was paid for, at least partly, in cash. Approximately one month later, a police officer contacted Mr. Richard to inform him the police did not believe what he said in that statement because they had found evidence that contradicted his version of events. Another statement was obtained from Mr. Richard on June 4, 2014.

At the outset of this statement, the officer explained to Mr. Richard he was being investigated for conspiracy to import cocaine and obstruction of justice – due to the alleged lies in his first statement. In this second statement, Mr. Richard explained Mr. LeBlanc owned the RV, and he had heard it was to be sold to Mr. Knockwood or another person. C. Standard of review [ 36 ] The decision to grant a stay is discretionary. On review, an appellate court may therefore not interfere just because it takes a different view of the facts.

According to the teachings of the Supreme Court, “[a]ppellate intervention is warranted only where a trial judge misdirects him or herself in law, commits a reviewable error of fact, or renders a decision that is ‘so clearly wrong as to amount to an injustice’”: R. v. Babos , 2014 SCC 16 , [2014] 1 S.C.R. 309, at para. 48 . Also see Richard J.A. (as he then was) in Lang v. Lang , [2007] N.B.J. No. 348 (C.A.) (QL), at para. 3 . D.

General principles for a stay of proceedings based on an abuse of process [ 37 ] Principles regarding a stay of proceedings for abuse of process in the criminal context are discussed in Babos , where Moldaver J., writing for the majority, notes: A stay of proceedings is the most drastic remedy a criminal court can order ( R. v. Regan , 2002 SCC 12 , [2002] 1 S.C.R. 297, at para. 53 ). It permanently halts the prosecution of an accused. In doing so, the truth-seeking function of the trial is frustrated and the public is deprived of the opportunity to see justice done on the merits.

In many cases, alleged victims of crime are deprived of their day in court.

Nonetheless, this Court has recognized that there are rare occasions – the “clearest of cases” – when a stay of proceedings for an abuse ofprocess will be warranted (R. v. O’Connor, (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411, at para. 68).

These cases generally fall into twocategories: (1) where state conduct compromises the fairness of an accused's trial (the "main" category); and (2) where state conductcreates no threat to trial fairness but risks undermining the integrity of the judicial process (the “residual” category) (O’Connor, at para.73). […] [paras. 30-31] [38] The test for determining whether a stay of proceedings is warranted is the same for bothcategories and consists of three requirements: (1) there must be prejudice to the accused's right to a fair trial or to the integrity of thejustice system that will be manifested, perpetuated or aggravated through the conduct of the trial, or by its outcome; (2) there must be noalternative remedy capable of redressing the prejudice; and (3) where there is still uncertainty over whether a stay is warranted after steps1 and 2, the court must balance the interests in favour of granting a stay against the interest that society has in having a final decision onthe merits: Babos, at para. 32. [39] In the same decision, Moldaver J. explains the first stage of the test as follows: Commencing with the first stage of the test, when the main category is invoked, the question is whether the accused's right to a fair trialhas been prejudiced and whether that prejudice will be carried forward through the conduct of the trial; in other words, the concern iswhether there is ongoing unfairness to the accused.

By contrast, when the residual category is invoked, the question is whether the state has engaged in conduct that is offensive to societalnotions of fair play and decency and whether proceeding with a trial in the face of that conduct would be harmful to the integrity of thejustice system. […] [paras. 34-35] [Emphasis in original.] E. The ruling of the trial judge [40] The trial judge identified the correct legal test for a stay set out in Babos and he was alive to thealleged impugned conduct.

He reviewed in detail the different interviews carried out by the RCMP prior to trial, commenting on howthey came about, the demeanour of the witnesses and the contents of the different statements. He remarked that before the statementswere given to the RCMP, a KGB warning was read and each witness swore to tell the truth.

(1) Concerning the witnesses [41] While discussing Mr. Knockwood’s statement to the RCMP, the trial judge acknowledged therewas “no doubt that [he] had to gain by cooperating and gave a statement to obtain a reduced sentence” (para. 21); however, as he noted,“[t]his fact was made clear to the jury” (para. 21). He also remarked Mr. Knockwood was “cross-examined intensely and his evidencewas aggressively challenged” but it was “never contradicted,” and “confirmatory evidence was received at trial” (para. 20). [42] As to the recorded statement given by Ms.

Kierstead, the trial judge wrote it was made clear toher, “that this interview had nothing to do with her agreement with the US Assistant Attorney General to get immunity” (para. 27), butshe nonetheless voluntarily gave her statement, and he observed that this statement and her evidence at trial were also “consistent with allof the evidence in this matter” and “[s]he was subjected to an intense cross​examination” (para. 29). [43] Concerning Mr.

Richard’s first statement, wherein he stated he had sold the RV to Mr.Knockwood, the trial judge found it was “likely implausible and lacked credibility,” but there was no doubt, “he gave this statementvoluntarily without any promises or threats” (para. 33). The judge described the unfolding of the second statement and his testimony attrial in detail. He noted that in cross-examination counsel tried “to have Jason Richard recant his latest version of events and triedfervently” to have him adopt the first statement as being the truth (para. 53). The trial judge found that thereafter Mr.

Richard was “allover the place,” giving “whatever answer that he thought would suit defence counsel and would even give divergent answers to the samequestions” (para. 53). At the end of his cross-examination, while being questioned by counsel for Ms. LeBlanc, the judge noted Mr.Richard was very clear: he, “had never been threatened by the police” (para. 54).

[ 44 ] The trial judge concluded: “None of these witnesses seemed fazed by the pressure applied to them by the police. The possibility of charges of obstruction or perjury was raised but in a reasonable tone and in an informational manner. None of the witnesses were pressed hard to spill the beans” (para. 68). [ 45 ] Most importantly the trial judge found there was “not a shred of evidence that Jason Richard, nor any other witnesses, were threatened with criminal charges if he or she did not change his or her story to support a conviction of Luc LeBlanc” (para. 71).

A bit further, he added: “There is simply no evidence that these witnesses fabricated or tailored their evidence to suit the prosecution's case” (para. 75). [ 46 ] The judge remarked: “A criminal investigation is not a tea party and the circumstances of this investigation required the police to challenge some of the witnesses” (para. 65).

He determined it was reasonable in the circumstances for the authorities to be suspect about the first statement given by these witnesses and he found no impropriety in the conduct of the police. [ 47 ] The jury was provided with instructions − including a Vetrovec warning concerning unsavoury witnesses and an instruction concerning prior inconsistent statements − to guide them in how to deal properly with the evidence of these witnesses. They were instructed on the permitted and prohibited use of the evidence and told about the dangers of relying on this evidence.

The cross-examination before the jury was aimed at demonstrating that all three witnesses were not to be believed, and had changed their story to tell the authorities what they wanted to hear so that they could negotiate a better deal for themselves. Having assessed this evidence, the jury believed Mr. LeBlanc conspired with Mr. Knockwood and Ms. Kierstead to import cocaine to Canada and found him guilty.

(2) Conduct concerning US interactants [ 48 ] Concerning the solicitor-client privilege that may have been attached to the discussions between Mr. Knockwood, Ms. Kierstead and their US lawyers, there was no motion seeking access to this information. As the trial judge pointed out, the applicability of such privilege was not raised by the defence during the trial. [ 49 ] As to the complaints about the conduct of the US authorities − whether it was not recording their interactions with Ms. Kierstead and Mr. Knockwood, offering them too great incentives, or Mr.

Hagan testifying during cross- examination about his assessment of their truthfulness during his interviews with them in the US − this conduct is not related to the state, and none of this was within the control of the Crown. [ 50 ] In the context of this case, Mr. Knockwood and Ms. Kierstead would not get any deal unless Mr. Hagen believed they truthfully debriefed. It was therefore very difficult for him to answer questions during cross-examination, to explain how the system worked and why Ms. Kierstead and Mr.

Knockwood were offered deals, without commenting on whether or not he believed what they had told him at the time. The Crown discouraged Mr. Hagan from commenting on the credibility of the witnesses. As we know, the jury is the judge of the facts and assessing credibility falls under its discretion; the judge instructed the jury as to who was the proper authority to decide credibility and to ignore Mr. Hagan’s comments. [ 51 ] There was no evidence of collusion or improper conduct by the Crown concerning any of these matters.

(3) The concept of double jeopardy [ 52 ] As previously noted, although the RCMP had told Mr. Knockwood they had no intention of charging him for conspiracy in Canada, he was worried their intentions could change. At trial, in response to a question from defence counsel as to whether, in his mind , he could still be charged with conspiring to import cocaine into Canada, he answered, “I’m guessing so”. In re-examination, in response to a question from the prosecutor as to whether anybody had ever explained to him the concept of double jeopardy, he answered that his lawyer in the US had explained it to him, and he understood he could not be charged again in the US.

[ 53 ] He testified that RCMP Officer Francoeur had assured him he was not being investigated by them, and he understood from his conversations with the RCMP, that because he was going to be a witness, and was not being indicted, he “would not be charged ‘cause [he] was already charged for it in the United States and that [he] couldn’t be charged for it here for the double jeopardy.’” [ 54 ] The prosecutor then asked him: “Okay. So when you answered Mr. Gorham’s question that you weren’t sure if you would be charged here or not, in fact you do know that you won’t be charged here in Canada, right?”, and Mr.

Knockwood answered, “Yes.” [ 55 ] Defence counsel objected, arguing that on the video, Officer Francoeur had advised Mr. Knockwood that technically he could be charged in Canada . After discussion and argument about what Mr. Knockwood was told or not, by the RCMP, the parties agreed a portion of the video would be played in the presence of the jury to refresh Mr. Knockwood’s memory about his discussion with Officer Francoeur. The jury heard the officer explain to Mr. Knockwood the RCMP had no intention of charging him, but that technically he could be charged in Canada.

After the video was played, he was asked what his current belief was, and he replied, “that I can’t be charged with conspiracy.” [ 56 ] The important thing was what Mr. Knockwood believed , while he was testifying at trial, not whether or not the concept of double jeopardy was properly explained to him or whether it was properly understood by him. He testified he believed he could not be charged with conspiracy to import drugs into Canada; therefore, this did not impair the fairness of Mr. LeBlanc’s trial and, in the circumstances, there was no need for an instruction to the jury concerning double jeopardy.

(4) Letter sent by the prosecutor [ 57 ] Concerning the letter sent to Ms. LeBlanc’s counsel, the judge did not find any impropriety, noting, “[i]t was intended by the prosecution to relate his discomfort with the situation and being more precautionary than anything else” (para. 80). The letter sent to Ms. LeBlanc’s counsel questioned whether he had advised his client that the Crown had offered to remove the charges against her if she accepted to testify at trial for the prosecution, and the consequences for him if he did not relay this offer to her. As to the allegation the prosecutor was coercing Ms.

LeBlanc or the letter constituted threats towards Ms. LeBlanc and her counsel, those allegations were rejected by the trial judge, who qualified the allegations as “nonsensical” (para. 82), “simply speculation and conjecture” and “lacking a factual basis” (para. 83). Ms.

LeBlanc did not testify. [ 58 ] The judge saw no merit in the argument this case involved conduct that threatened the integrity of the justice system. [ 59 ] Since the trial judge reserved his decision until the end of the trial, he had the opportunity to observe the conduct of the prosecution and the defence and he listened to all the witnesses at trial and to all the recorded video statements given prior to the trial. He was best positioned to assess the actual nature of any trial unfairness or threat to the integrity of the justice system.

He made several findings of fact respecting the motion for a stay of proceedings; these findings are entitled to deference. F. Conclusion [ 60 ] Disreputable witnesses are a staple of drug prosecutions. At trial, the defence made every possible effort to demonstrate the evidence from Mr. Knockwood, Ms. Kierstead and Mr. Richard was false or unreliable. The challenges that may come when such witnesses testify are not new and the law has developed safeguards to protect against injustice.

Those safeguards were readily employed in this case, including disclosure, multiple instructions to the jury, and rigorous cross-examination. Furthermore, confirmatory evidence was received at trial, as noted by the trial judge. [ 61 ] As has been said many times before, the accused is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect trial. [ 62 ] The trial judge referred to the Supreme Court’s direction in Babos and concluded Mr. LeBlanc had not established prejudice to his right to a fair trial or to the integrity of the justice system, which is required to meet the first stage of

the test discussed in Babos . Mr. LeBlanc has not discharged the burden of showing this finding contained a reviewable error. [ 63 ] The state conduct did not substantiate an abuse of process, or otherwise meet the threshold for the extraordinary remedy of a judicial stay. Keeping the applicable standard of review in mind, I find none of the arguments justify the intervention of this Court with regard to the findings of the trial judge that there had been no abuse of process justifying a stay of proceedings. Accordingly, I would dismiss this ground of appeal. IV.

Did the trial judge err in deciding the Corbett application ? A. Additional context [ 64 ] The defence brought a Corbett application to suppress the criminal record of Mr. LeBlanc from being used to cross-examine him in the event he chose to testify. [ 65 ] At the time of trial, Mr. LeBlanc had a criminal record which included convictions dealing with dishonesty and several drug offences. The most notable recent entries were six drug convictions in 2016, for offences arising from a single event which occurred on August 15, 2013, when drugs were found in an RV Mr. LeBlanc was driving.

As a result, he was convicted of the following offences: trafficking in cocaine, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, trafficking in methamphetamine, possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, trafficking in cannabis resin, and possession of cannabis resin for the purpose of trafficking. [ 66 ] The Crown contended Mr.

LeBlanc’s complete criminal record should be included for cross- examination purposes, and alleged it would create a serious imbalance to exclude the drug offences in a case where the accused had launched a heavy attack on the credibility and general character of the Crown witnesses, especially on Ms. Kierstead and Mr. Knockwood. The defence conceded the offences involving dishonesty should remain, but asked that all drug convictions be excluded because the probative value of these convictions − especially the 2016 convictions − was outweighed by its prejudicial effect.

It argued prior drug offences generally have little, if any, probative value regarding credibility, while the admission of a defendant's prior drug offences during a drug prosecution carries a heavy risk of prejudice. It maintained that it did not attack the character of the Crown witnesses. [ 67 ] In the Appellant’s Submission, defence counsel writes: “No instruction, regardless of how forceful, could have prevented the jury from reasoning that Mr.

Leblanc was more likely to have conspired to import the cocaine from Mexico given that he had been found guilty of trafficking large amounts of drugs in a motorhome in August 2013 – eight months after the alleged offence” (para. 86). It must be remembered that when cross-examination on the criminal record of an accused is allowed, the questioning is limited to the date, place, specific crime and sentence which was imposed on the prior occasion. It would be impermissible for the Crown to go further and attempt to elicit details of the facts that underlie any of the prior record.

Therefore, the details concerning the 2013 offence, such as the fact it consisted of large amounts of drugs concealed in an RV driven by Mr. LeBlanc, could not be alluded to. [ 68 ] The trial judge specifically disagreed with the claim by the defence that it had not attacked the character of the Crown witnesses. There is no doubt the defence vigorously attacked Mr. Knockwood and Ms. Kierstead’s credibility in relation to this offence, including their role therein. But, as was noted by the trial judge, “[i]t did not end there.” The trial judge was explicit in his findings of fact concerning attacks on Mr.

Knockwood’s and Ms. Kierstead’s characters in general: Both of their characters were attack[ed] on numerous subject matters in front of the jury without limiting the generalities of the following, Mr. Kierstead – Mr. Knockwood was attacked on his application for a passport, cash on hand at the border, question[ed] about being in possession of a gun late one night while driving an individual home, his addiction problem, his financial situation and so on.

Heather Kierstead was portrayed as a person who would tend to lie to get what she wanted, as she'd lied to her new employer regarding what she would - what she told them about the events. In

summary, their characters were subjected to arduous and gruel-, grueling test during cross-examination. Both were subject to give evidence on their personality, psychological state, attitude and were questioned about their general capacity to engage in this particular crime of importing cocaine. This character evidence was intended to show that these two individual[s] were not credible nor reliable and in a given situation would lie if it was to their advantage, suggesting

that they did in a-, in this case. [69] The trial judge ruled he would edit Mr. LeBlanc’s record by removing three of the six offencesrelated to the August 15, 2013 event, namely those dealing with possession for the purpose of trafficking. He found the prejudice thatmay be caused by the disclosed convictions could be addressed by trusting the jury to receive and follow clear directions. Mr. LeBlancchose not to testify. B.

General principles [70] A Corbett ruling is discretionary, and an appellate court ought not to intervene, “absent error inprinciple, a misapprehension of material facts, or an exercise of the discretion which, in the totality of the circumstances, must beregarded as unreasonable”: R. v. Mayers, 2014 ONCA 474, [2014] O.J. No. 3128 (QL), at para.3. [71] The real issue is whether Mr. LeBlanc would have been deprived of his right to a fair hearing byreason of the introduction of his prior convictions. [72]

Section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. C-5, permits a witness to be questionedas to whether he or she has been convicted of a criminal offence. Prior convictions are simply evidence for the jury to consider, alongwith everything else, in assessing the credibility of an accused that chooses to testify. In Corbett, the Supreme Court held that a trialjudge may exclude the accused’s criminal record, where its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect and referred to a usefulcatalogue of factors which may be considered in determining how this discretion is to be exercised.

These were later summarized by theSupreme Court in R. v. Underwood, (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 77, [1997] S.C.J.

No. 107 (QL), as, “the nature of theprevious convictions, the time since the previous convictions, and any attacks made on the credibility of Crown witnesses” (para. 9).These factors are used to determine the fairness of the proceedings. [73] In Corbett, Dickson C.J. is clear in his instructions to trial judges: they are to allow cross-examination on the criminal record of the accused; however, they have the discretion “to exclude evidence of prior convictions in thoseunusual circumstances where a mechanical application of s. 12 would undermine the right to a fair trial” (p. 692). [74] Recall that in Corbett, the portion of the criminal record which carried the greatest potentialprejudice to the accused was the 1971 conviction for non-capital murder.

Mr. Corbett was still on parole for that offence at the time thefirst-degree murder trial took place in 1983, and yet the Supreme Court was of the view a proper instruction was sufficient to focus thejury on the proper use to which the evidence could be put. [75] The rules of evidence are replete with examples where a jury is permitted to hear and usepotentially prejudicial evidence relevant to one issue, or accused, and not to another.

As to the potential misuse of the criminal record ofthe accused in this instance, I am in full agreement with the following view expressed by Dickson C.J., in Corbett: […] it would be quite wrong to make too much of the risk that the jury might use the evidence for an improper purpose. This line ofthinking could seriously undermine the entire jury system. The very strength of the jury is that the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence isdetermined by a group of ordinary citizens who are not legal specialists and who bring to the legal process a healthy measure of commonsense.

The jury is, of course, bound to follow the law as it is explained by the trial judge. Jury directions are often long and difficult, butthe experience of trial judges is that juries do perform their duty according to the law. We should regard with grave suspicion argumentswhich assert that depriving the jury of all relevant information is preferable to giving them everything, with a careful explanation as toany limitations on the use to which they may put that information.

So long as the jury is given a clear instruction as to how it may andhow it may not use evidence of prior convictions put to an accused on cross-examination, it can be argued that the risk of improper use isoutweighed by the much more serious risk of error should the jury be forced to decide the issue in the dark. [p. 692] [76] Richard, J.A. made similar comments regarding jury competence in Melanson v.

R., 2007NBCA 94, 325 N.B.R. (2d) 203, at para. 45, in the context of a jury instruction directed at preventing the use of a confession given byone accused from being used by the jury in determining the guilt of a co-accused.

[77] It must be remembered that prejudicial potential and probative value are not abstract qualities.They exist in the context of a concrete case and are determined with reference to the circumstances of the case. Each case must bedetermined on its own facts. In the present case, a deliberate attack was made upon the credibility and the general character of Crownwitnesses, and the resolution of the case boiled down to a credibility contest between the accused and those witnesses.

In thesecircumstances, there were compelling reasons for exploring all avenues which would shed light on which of the witnesses were to bebelieved. [78] In the context of this case, by editing Mr. LeBlanc’s record to suppress half of the 2016convictions, the trial judge properly balanced the probative value and prejudicial potential of the criminal record.

Any concern about themisuse of the remaining criminal record evidence by the jury could have been dispelled by a clear direction to the jury with respect tolimiting the use of criminal records to the credibility assessment process. [79] The trial judge recognized his obligation to balance the probative value of the record against theprejudicial effect of its admission in order to ensure a fair trial. He noted, correctly, that the record contained a number of offencesinvolving dishonesty which could have an impact on the jury’s assessment of Mr. LeBlanc’s credibility.

He was aware of the risk ofpropensity reasoning posed by prior convictions of a similar nature, but concluded that suppressing all drug offences could createcredibility imbalance where credibility was the crucial point. He recognized the six drug convictions in 2016 could have a “wow” effectand proposed to remove half of them and give a clear direction to the jury. He was of the view the jury would have been misled ratherthan aided by the exclusion of all 2016 convictions. C.

Conclusion [80] When an appellate court undertakes to review a trial judge's decision which is based at least inpart on the unique circumstances of the case before him or her and his or her own first-hand view of the proceedings, restraint ought tobe exercised in interfering with that exercise of discretion, in the absence of clear error. [81] I discern no error in the trial judge’s ruling. He made relevant findings of fact, referred to theapplicable case law, applied the correct principles and came to a reasonable result.

I view the trial judge's discretionary ruling as anunobjectionable and careful application of the Corbett principles. There is no basis for appellate intervention, and consequently I wouldnot interfere with his decision. I would dismiss this ground of appeal. V. Did the trial judge err in dismissing the application toexclude evidence pursuant to

section 8 of the Charter? [82] As previously mentioned, on August 15, 2013, the RV Mr. LeBlanc was driving wasintercepted by police. He was arrested and the entire RV was searched incident to the arrest, including the bedroom area. Informationgathered during this search was used to obtain search warrants for Mr. LeBlanc's residence where his passport and some electronicdevices were seized. The Crown intended to produce, in this trial, the passport as well as data found in the electronic devices.

Mr.LeBlanc sought to have the results of the searches excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, claiming the warrantless search of the RVviolated his right, under s. 8 of the Charter, to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure.

Section 8 protects an individual'sreasonable expectation of privacy. [83] A warrantless search of a motor vehicle, being driven on a public highway, is both authorized atlaw and constitutionally unobjectionable where it is truly incident to the driver’s lawful arrest, and the search is carried out in areasonable manner with the objective to discover evidence for the offence for which the driver is being arrested. In such circumstances,the existence of exigent circumstances is not required to justify the search: see R. v. Caslake, (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R.51, [1998] S.C.J.

No. 3 (QL), per Lamer C.J., at para. 15; and Tontarelli v. R., 2009 NBCA 52, 348 N.B.R. (2d) 41, per DrapeauC.J.N.B. (as he then was), at paras. 35-51. [84] Before us, defence counsel did not seriously dispute that the police search of Mr. LeBlanc’s RV

was within the lawful scope of a search incident to arrest. His chief argument was that the living spaces of the RV, more specifically the bedroom, gave rise to a heightened expectation of privacy, similar to what applies in a dwelling-house, and in the absence of exigent circumstances, a warrant was needed to search it. The Crown argued the police search of the RV was authorized as a search of a motor vehicle, incident to an arrest. [ 85 ] It is settled law that the onus is on the accused to establish, on a balance of probabilities, infringement of a Charter right.

The trial judge disagreed there was a heightened expectation of privacy in the RV, held the search did not offend s. 8 of the Charter and dismissed the application. I agree with the results reached by the trial judge, substantially for the reasons he gave. [ 86 ] As stated in R. v. Urban , 2017 ABCA 436 , [2017] A.J.

No. 1393 (QL), “[a] decision as to whether the Charter has been breached in a particular case is one of mixed fact and law, reviewable on a standard of palpable and overriding error, although extricable questions of law are reviewable for correctness: R. v Côté , 2011 SCC 46 , [2011] 3 SCR 215” (para. 13) (emphasis added). The application of a legal standard to the facts of the case is a question of law. Although the trial judge’s factual findings are entitled to deference absent a palpable and overriding error, the trial judge's ultimate ruling is subject to review for correctness: see Richard J.A., in R. v.

Burke , 2011 NBCA 51 , 374 N.B.R. (2d) 255, at para. 17 ; and Drapeau C.J.N.B. in Tontarelli , at para. 61 . [ 87 ] Mr. LeBlanc’s alleged heightened expectation of privacy in the RV’s bedroom had been previously heard and dismissed by another Justice of the Court of Queen’s Bench in the context of a separate prosecution against Mr. LeBlanc in relation to the event which occurred on August 15, 2013. He found Mr. LeBlanc failed to establish the bedroom of his RV should attract a heightened expectation of privacy.

In conclusion, he wrote: Overall, considering the whole of the evidence, I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the real and primary purpose of the motor home was to aid in the furthering of Mr. LeBlanc’s business of transporting drugs and not for the purpose of residing in it. As such, Mr. LeBlanc could not reasonably expect an enhanced degree of privacy other than what he might expect with respect to any other vehicle.

Objectively, based on the information Staff Sergeant Potvin had at the time, he appeared to view the status and use of the motor home in the same manner and in my opinion it was reasonable for him to view it in such a manner in the particular circumstances of this case. [ 88 ] The parties agreed to put before the trial judge the transcript of the evidence and arguments that were before the previous judge, as well as his decision on this issue.

However, they would be allowed to argue the case anew, since the defence alleged the governing principles had not been brought to the judge’s attention during the prior proceeding and, as such, his decision should not be followed. [ 89 ] The trial judge commented no further principles had been raised before him. He applied the principle of judicial comity, held Mr. LeBlanc had not met the minimum threshold to be entitled to the reconsideration he was seeking, and thereby concurred in the result of the previous decision.

He also considered the evidence himself and rightly found the search of the RV was truly incidental to the arrest, and there was no heightened expectation of privacy therein at the time of the search as it was being used as a vehicle. [ 90 ] Considering the context of this case, common sense, and a consideration of the interests of justice, there was no strong reason for the trial judge not to follow the prior decision.

I am also of the view the finding of fact that, in the circumstances of this case, the RV that was searched on August 15, 2013, was a motor vehicle being used as a transporter of drugs, and not a dwelling-house being used as a residence, is unassailable. Mr. LeBlanc did not establish he had a heightened expectation of privacy in the subject matter of the search. [ 91 ] The search of the RV was reasonable; Mr. LeBlanc failed to establish there was a breach of his s. 8 Charter right. I would not accede to this ground of appeal as I discern no error in the trial judge’s analysis and ultimate ruling on this issue.

VI. Sentence appeal

[ 92 ] Mr. LeBlanc also sought leave to appeal his sentence. [ 93 ] Mr. LeBlanc was already incarcerated for the August 15, 2013 matter when he was charged in the present case. The trial judge did not give any credit for time served prior to August 15, 2017, as he concluded this was attributable to Mr. LeBlanc’s other convictions. Those convictions have now been overturned by our Court: LeBlanc v. R. , 2018 NBCA 65 , [2018] N.B.J. No. 237 (QL). Therefore, the parties agree that time served from the time Mr.

LeBlanc was charged for the present offence to the date of his sentence should be credited at a ratio of 1.5:1, and they propose the 14-year jail sentence be confirmed, provided the credit applied against sentence be increased from 287 days to 54 months, in consideration of the pre-sentence custody. [ 94 ] I am satisfied the proposed disposition of the sentence appeal is appropriate, and represents a fit sentence. Therefore, I would amend the sentence accordingly. VII. Disposition [ 95 ] I would dismiss the appeal against conviction.

I would grant leave to appeal the sentence, and allow the appeal but only to increase the pre-sentence custody credit from 287 days to 54 months as proposed by the parties, resulting in a net sentence of 114 months, commencing on the date the sentence was initially imposed. In all other respects, I would leave the sentence unaltered. Version française du jugement de la Cour rendu par LA JUGE LAVIGNE I.

Aperçu [1] Le 21 janvier 2013, Anthony Knockwood et son épouse, Heather Kierstead, ont tenté de traverser la frontière entre les États-Unis et le Mexique à Brownsville, au Texas, à bord d’un véhicule récréatif dans lequel étaient dissimulés 15,91 kg de cocaïne. Les gardes-frontière des États-Unis ont détecté la cocaïne; par voie de conséquence, M. Knockwood et M me Kierstead ont été arrêtés pour diverses infractions criminelles visées par la législation des États-Unis. Durant l’enquête qui a suivi, M. Knockwood et M me Kierstead ont, d’abord, nié toute connaissance de la cocaïne, puis M me Kierstead a impliqué M.

Knockwood; par la suite, ils ont tous deux identifié Luc LeBlanc aux autorités américaines – puis aux autorités canadiennes – comme étant le cerveau du stratagème d’importation. [2] M. LeBlanc et son épouse, Michelle LeBlanc, ont été accusés d’avoir, entre le 1 er novembre 2012 et le 30 avril 2013, à Moncton, au Nouveau-Brunswick, et à Matamoros, au Mexique, comploté avec M.

Knockwood et M me Kierstead, complices non inculpés, et d’autres, pour commettre l’acte criminel d’importation de cocaïne au Canada visé au paragraphe 6(1) de la Loi réglementant certaines drogues et autres substances , L.C. 1996, ch. 19 , et d’avoir ainsi commis un acte criminel visé à l’ alinéa 465(1)

c) du Code criminel du Canada . [3] Sur le fondement de la preuve de M me Kierstead et de M. Knockwood, la poursuite a soutenu au procès que M. LeBlanc a conçu et dirigé le complot en vue d’importer de la cocaïne du Mexique au Canada. Elle a soutenu que le plan de M. LeBlanc était de récupérer la cocaïne au Mexique, de la faire passer par M. Knockwood à bord de son véhicule récréatif à la frontière du Texas, puis par les États-Unis jusqu’au Canada, et de la lui livrer éventuellement à Moncton, au Nouveau-Brunswick.

[4] La défense a nié toute participation au complot en vue d’importer de la cocaïne. Elle a soutenu que M. Knockwood et Mme Kierstead avaient planifié des vacances au Mexique avec les LeBlanc. Ils ont conduit le véhicule récréatif deMoncton à Matamoros, au Mexique, où les LeBlanc, qui avaient pris l’avion jusqu’au Mexique, les ont rencontrés. Après plusieurs joursde vacances ensemble au Mexique, ils se sont séparés. Les LeBlanc ont repris l’avion vers Moncton et M. Knockwood a conduit le véhicule récréatif en passant la frontière, où lui et sa passagère, Mme Kierstead, ont été arrêtés.

La défense a prétendu que M. Knockwood et Mme Kierstead avaient impliqué M. LeBlanc et qu’ils avaient pleinement collaboré à l’enquête et à la poursuiteintentée contre M. LeBlanc au Canada afin de pouvoir se négocier des ententes avec les autorités américaines et canadiennes. [5] La principale question à trancher au procès était de savoir si M. Knockwood et Mme Kiersteaddisaient la vérité lorsqu’ils ont indiqué dans leur témoignage que M.

LeBlanc était le cerveau du plan. [6] M. et Mme LeBlanc ont été déclarés coupables des infractions dont ils étaient accusés après un procès de 35 jours devant juge et jury, au cours duquel M. Knockwood et Mme Kierstead ont témoigné contre eux. La défense n’aprésenté aucun élément de preuve au procès. Le présent appel concerne uniquement Luc LeBlanc. Ce dernier a été condamné à 14 ansd’emprisonnement, déduction faite des 287 jours passés en détention présentencielle. [7] M.

LeBlanc interjette appel de sa déclaration de culpabilité en soutenant que le juge duprocès : • a commis une erreur en ne procédant pas à la suspension de l’instance, ou l’arrêt des procédures, sur le fondement que laconduite du ministère public constituait un abus de procédure, compromettant ainsi l’équité du procès et l’intégrité du processusjudiciaire; • a commis une erreur en refusant sa demande de type Corbett (R. c.

Corbett, (SCC), [1988] 1 R.C.S. 670, [1988] A.C.S. no 40 (QL)) visant à faire exclure de son casier judiciaire toutes les déclarations de culpabilité antérieures relatives à ladrogue pour qu’il puisse témoigner sans subir de préjudice indu; • a commis une erreur en refusant d’exclure de la preuve certains éléments – son passeport et des données de ses dispositifsélectroniques – qui ont été saisis en violation de l’art. 8 de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés, étant donné que la police aprocédé à une fouille sans mandat d’un véhicule récréatif, sans motif, lequel véhicule suscite une attente accrue en matière de vie privéepuisqu’il constituait un foyer hors du foyer.

Il demande à notre Cour d’annuler la déclaration de culpabilité et d’ordonner une suspension de l’instance ou, subsidiairement, la tenued’un nouveau procès. [8] À défaut, M. LeBlanc demande l’autorisation d’interjeter appel de sa peine.

Toutefois, lesparties ont convenu que la peine d’emprisonnement de 14 ans devrait être confirmée, pourvu que le crédit appliqué contre la peine passede 287 jours à 54 mois compte tenu de la période de détention présentencielle. [9] Pour les motifs qui suivent, je rejetterais l’appel de la déclaration de culpabilité, j’accorderaisla demande d’autorisation d’interjeter appel de la peine et j’apporterais les modifications à la peine proposées par les parties. II.

Sommaire de la preuve présentée au procès [10] En décembre 2012, Luc LeBlanc a offert 10 000 $ à M. Knockwood pour se rendre de Moncton,au Nouveau-Brunswick, à Matamoros, au Mexique, dans son véhicule récréatif et récupérer 12 à 14 paquets de cocaïne puis lui ramener ceux-ci à Moncton. M. LeBlanc a suggéré de voyager avec Mme Kierstead pour donner l’impression qu’ils étaient en vacances. [11] Au début de janvier 2013, M. Knockwood et Mme Kierstead, avec l’assistance des LeBlanc, ont

préparé le véhicule récréatif – qui était stationné dans l’entrée de M. LeBlanc – et le 8 janvier 2013, ils sont partis pour le Mexique. M me Kierstead croyait que les LeBlanc souhaitaient qu’ils leur ramènent quelque chose du Mexique, mais elle n’a pas posé de questions particulières, ne voulant pas savoir. En route, M. Knockwood a échangé des messages textes avec M. LeBlanc pour le tenir au courant du chemin parcouru à travers les États-Unis.

Le relevé de ces messages texte a été présenté en preuve. [12] Les LeBlanc ont pris l’avion, et les quatre se sont rencontrés à Matamoros le 15 janvier, où ils ont pris des vacances ensemble durant quelques jours. Les LeBlanc séjournaient à l’hôtel, tandis que l’autre couple séjournait dans le véhicule récréatif. Des photos montrant M. Knockwood avec M. LeBlanc et des photos prises par M. Knockwood montrant les LeBlanc, pendant leur séjour au Mexique, ont été produites comme pièces. [13] Un jour ou deux avant de retourner au Canada, M.

LeBlanc a conduit le véhicule récréatif jusqu’à une zone isolée, en s’aidant de son téléphone pour se rendre jusqu’à un bâtiment abandonné. Les hommes ont alors quitté le véhicule récréatif avec une pelle, M. LeBlanc a guidé M. Knockwood vers le derrière d’un cabanon, il a tâté le sol puis indiqué à ce dernier où creuser. M. LeBlanc lui a dit que l’objet y était enfoui depuis près d’un an. M. Knockwood a creusé jusqu’à ce qu’il atteigne un sac; il l’a sorti du trou et l’a apporté au véhicule récréatif. Ce sac donnait l’impression de peser entre 30 et 40 livres. M. LeBlanc a ensuite ordonné à M.

Knockwood de conduire. M me LeBlanc est allée à l’arrière du véhicule récréatif avec M. LeBlanc et M me Kierstead est allée s’asseoir en avant avec M. Knockwood. M. LeBlanc a surgi de l’arrière et a ordonné à M. Knockwood de se ranger sur l’accotement; ensuite, M. LeBlanc a balancé le sac et a pris le volant. M. Knockwood et M me Kierstead n’ont pas vu les drogues ni vu M. LeBlanc dissimuler les drogues; toutefois, M. Knockwood [TRADUCTION] « a supposé que des drogues avaient été cachées sous la douche, et M. LeBlanc lui a dit qu’il avait dissimulé une

partie des drogues dans le panneau du réfrigérateur ». [14] Ils ont tous dormi dans le véhicule récréatif ce soir-là. Le lendemain, M. LeBlanc et M. Knockwood se sont rendus au Home Depot pour acheter de l’isolant et du mastic, et cette après-midi-là, ils ont apporté des modifications au panneau latéral du véhicule récréatif. M. LeBlanc a rempli le véhicule récréatif de produits alimentaires, en disant que ça serait plus difficile de détecter quelque chose qui n’aurait pas d’affaire là. Ils ont, une fois de plus, tous dormi dans le véhicule récréatif ce soir-là. M. LeBlanc a donné à M.

Knockwood sa carte de débit pour couvrir les dépenses au cas où ils manqueraient d’argent sur le chemin du retour. (La carte de débit de M. LeBlanc a été saisie par les autorités américaines et a été produite en preuve au procès.) M. Knockwood a estimé qu’il lui faudrait quatre ou cinq jours pour retourner à Moncton, et M. LeBlanc lui a dit que ce serait bien s’il pouvait le faire en trois jours, en promettant de lui donner 5 000 $ de plus. M. Knockwood a accepté.

Les LeBlanc sont revenus au Canada en avion le jour suivant. [15] Comme je l’ai indiqué précédemment, la cocaïne a été détectée le 21 janvier 2013, lorsque M. Knockwood et M me Kierstead ont tenté de traverser la frontière et qu’ils ont été arrêtés. La cocaïne était dissimulée à l’intérieur du véhicule récréatif, sous la douche dans la salle de bains et dans un compartiment derrière le réfrigérateur. [16] En chemin pour Matamoros, à un des postes frontaliers, un problème est survenu parce que le véhicule récréatif était immatriculé au nom de Jason Richard.

M me Kierstead a préparé sur-le-champ un reçu de vente qu’elle a daté du 6 janvier 2013, en guise de preuve de transfert du véhicule récréatif de M. Richard à M. Knockwood. Le reçu a été admis en preuve. M. Knockwood a témoigné que M me Kierstead avait signé le nom de M. Richard, mais dans son témoignage, M me Kierstead a nié avoir contrefait la signature de M. Richard. M. Richard a témoigné que la signature au-dessus de son nom n’était pas la sienne. [17] M. Richard a expliqué qu’il avait initialement acheté, pour son compte et pour celui de M.

LeBlanc, le véhicule récréatif ayant servi à transporter les drogues, au Texas, en septembre 2012. Il pensait que M. LeBlanc avait payé le véhicule avec de l’argent que M me LeBlanc lui aurait transféré par virement télégraphique. Il avait déjà procédé ainsi deux fois – acheter un véhicule récréatif au Mexique pour les LeBlanc et le ramener au Canada. À un moment donné, il pensait qu’il pourrait garder le véhicule récréatif, alors le 23 novembre 2012, il l’a immatriculé à son nom à l’Île-du-Prince-Édouard où il demeurait, mais il a finalement décidé qu’il n’en avait pas les moyens, alors il l’a livré à M.

LeBlanc au début de décembre 2012. M. Richard a identifié un document daté du 12 décembre 2012, qu’il avait préparé pour prouver la vente du véhicule récréatif. Dans ce document, il avait laissé en blanc le nom de l’acheteur puisqu’il ne savait pas à qui M. LeBlanc finirait par le vendre. Le document qu’il avait laissé dans le véhicule récréatif a été introduit en preuve. [18] M. Richard a témoigné qu’il n’avait jamais rencontré M. Knockwood et qu’il ne lui avait pas vendu le véhicule récréatif. Pendant le contre-interrogatoire, il a reconnu qu’il pensait que le véhicule récréatif serait vendu à M.

Knockwood ou au père de M me LeBlanc. [19] La principale question que le jury devait trancher était de savoir si les trois témoins à charge

principaux, soit M me Kierstead, M. Knockwood et M. Richard, avaient dit la vérité au procès. Ils avaient tous les trois fait des déclarations antérieures dans lesquelles ils n’impliquaient pas les LeBlanc dans cette infraction. L’aspect central de l’argumentation de la défense devant le jury visait à comprendre comment et pourquoi ces témoins avaient changé leur histoire. III. Le juge du procès a-t-il commis une erreur en rejetant la demande de suspension de l’instance? A.

Introduction [20] Invoquant la Charte , plus particulièrement l’ art. 7 – qui protège le droit de l’accusé à une défense pleine et entière – et le par. 24(1) , la défense a déposé, au milieu du procès, une demande de suspension de l’instance en alléguant un abus de procédure. Le juge du procès a mis en délibéré sa décision sur l’issue de la motion jusqu’à la fin du procès, après que le jury eut rendu son verdict. La thèse de la défense reposait principalement sur les questions relatives à l’équité du procès.

La défense a soutenu que l’utilisation des témoignages de témoins ayant reçu des incitatifs, combinée avec des événements étant survenus durant le procès, l’ont empêchée de contester en toute équité la preuve de la poursuite. Elle a également invoqué la catégorie résiduelle d’abus de procédure au soutien de sa demande de suspension, en soutenant que la conduite de l’État portait préjudice à l’intégrité du système judiciaire . [21] La défense s’est fondée sur la preuve présentée au procès et elle a, en outre, déposé les déclarations enregistrées sur bande vidéo des témoins − M me Kierstead, M. Knockwood et M.

Richard − à la GRC. Au soutien de son argument selon lequel la conduite du ministère public avait compromis l’équité du procès de M. LeBlanc, la défense a prétendu ceci : • Les enquêteurs (des États-Unis et du Canada) ont ouvertement utilisé la menace de peine d’incarcération pour persuader les témoins à changer leurs témoignages et à impliquer M. LeBlanc dans l’infraction. • Le dossier de preuve médiocre des déclarations de M.

Knockwood et M me Kierstead aux autorités américaines a empêché la défense de découvrir et de présenter des éléments de preuve qui compromettraient la fiabilité et la crédibilité de ces témoins, puisqu’il s’agissait de déclarations rédigées sous forme de résumé par les autorités, plutôt que de déclarations enregistrées sur bande vidéo. • Ces témoins étaient représentés par avocat aux États-Unis lorsqu’ils ont changé leurs témoignages, de telle sorte que le privilège du secret professionnel de l’avocat a été un obstacle à la capacité de la défense de découvrir la preuve préjudiciable. • La poursuite a permis que la menace de peine d’incarcération supplémentaire soit imminente dans l’esprit des témoins au procès, rendant ainsi davantage illusoire que réel le contre-interrogatoire. • M.

Hagen, le procureur des États-Unis, a témoigné pour la poursuite et a, à maintes reprises, exprimé son avis sur la franchise de M me Kierstead et de M. Knockwood durant les diverses entrevues qu’il a eues avec eux lorsqu’ils étaient détenus aux États-Unis. • Au cours du procès, la poursuite a introduit un fait inexact durant le réinterrogatoire de M.

Knockwood, savoir que la police lui avait offert la garantie qu’il ne serait pas accusé de complot d’importation de cocaïne au Canada en raison de la doctrine du double péril. [22] La défense a soutenu que la conduite susmentionnée a également miné l’intégrité du système judiciaire et justifiait une suspension de l’instance au

titre de la catégorie résiduelle. De plus, elle a ajouté l’allégation suivante d’inconduite de la poursuite dans la catégorie résiduelle : • Quelques mois avant le début du procès, la poursuite a agi de façon inappropriée, afin de tenter d’obtenir la collaboration de M me LeBlanc comme témoin, par l’envoi d’une lettre à l’avocat de M me LeBlanc qui semble [TRADUCTION] « être une tentative de tirer parti de la menace de conséquences professionnelles pesant contre l’avocat de M me LeBlanc et de conséquences pénales pesant contre M me LeBlanc en vue d’obtenir des éléments de preuve de la part de M me LeBlanc » (par. 70 du mémoire de l’appelant).

[23] Le juge du procès a rejeté l’allégation d’abus de procédure ainsi que la demande de suspension de l’instance : R. c. LeBlanc , 2017 NBBR 247 , [2017] A.N.-B. n o 344 (QL) . [24] M. LeBlanc prétend que le juge du procès a commis une erreur en concluant que la conduite du ministère public ne constituait pas un abus de procédure justifiant une suspension de l’instance . B. Autres éléments contextuel s (1) M me Kierstead [25] Le procureur général adjoint des États-Unis, William Hagen, a témoigné au procès qu’il était le procureur des États-Unis chargé des dossiers de M. Knockwood et de M me Kierstead.

Il a expliqué le système des États-Unis en ce qui concerne les ententes d’immunité conditionnelle, les témoins collaborateurs et la détermination de la peine des individus ayant fourni une aide substantielle à la poursuite d’autrui. [26] 0 M me Kierstead a été arrêtée et détenue, mais aucune accusation n’a été portée contre elle. M. Hagen lui a offert la possibilité d’agir comme témoin au début du processus, et M me Kierstead a accepté cette offre après consultation avec son avocat.

Elle a fourni des renseignements dans le cadre d’une entente d’immunité conditionnelle qui empêchait le procureur des États-Unis d’utiliser ses déclarations contre elle. Elle a compris que si elle fournissait des renseignements aux autorités américaines, ces dernières retireraient les accusations contre elle. [27] M. Hagan a interrogé M me Kierstead à quatre reprises. Au cours de la première entrevue, elle a nié toute connaissance des drogues dissimulées et toute participation à l’infraction. Durant la seconde entrevue (le 26 janvier 2013) et la troisième entrevue (le 11 février 2013), elle a impliqué M.

Knockwood, en mentionnant au procureur que M. Knockwood avait conduit dans le désert, avait quitté le véhicule récréatif et était revenu avec un sac de voyage qui aurait pu contenir des drogues. À ce moment-là, elle était représentée par un avocat. Elle n’a rien dit à propos de la participation alléguée de M. LeBlanc ni des vacances que les deux couples avaient passées ensemble au Mexique. M. Hagen lui a dit qu’il ne croyait pas qu’elle disait la vérité, et qu’à moins qu’elle ne dise la vérité, aucune entente ne serait négociée avec elle et l’offre d’immunité ne serait plus applicable.

Au cours de la quatrième entrevue (le 26 février 2013), elle a changé son histoire et a impliqué les LeBlanc dans le complot. Plus précisément, elle a dit que M. LeBlanc avait conduit le véhicule récréatif jusqu’à un bâtiment abandonné, où lui et M. Knockwood ont déterré un sac de voyage contenant des drogues, et M. Knockwood et M. LeBlanc ont dissimulé celles-ci à l’arrière du véhicule récréatif. [28] Au début du mois de mars 2013, M. Knockwood a plaidé coupable, et M me Kierstead a été mise en liberté puis elle est retournée au Canada.

Selon l’entente avec les autorités américaines, elle devait fournir une déclaration à la GRC à son retour au Canada et témoigner dans la poursuite intentée au Canada contre M. LeBlanc. Le 14 mai 2014, elle a rencontré un agent de la GRC et a fait une déclaration sous serment enregistrée sur bande vidéo impliquant M. Leblanc. Des accusations n’ont jamais été portées contre elle aux États-Unis ou au Canada relativement à ces événements.

(2) M. Knockwood [29] M. Knockwood a été arrêté, détenu et accusé aux États-Unis. Les accusations comportaient une peine minimale de 10 ans d’emprisonnement. Un délinquant admissible ayant donné des renseignements véridiques aux autorités américaines sur une infraction dans le cadre d’une entente d’immunité conditionnelle peut bénéficier d’une [TRADUCTION] « latitude » aux fins de réduction de sa peine. Une autre réduction peut être accordée avant ou après la détermination de la peine lorsqu’un délinquant fournit une aide substantielle à une enquête.

Dans chaque cas, si le procureur constate que les exigences ont été remplies, il demandera au juge une réduction de la peine. [30] Au départ, M. Knockwood a nié toute connaissance de l’infraction. Toutefois, une fois qu’il a été représenté par avocat et qu’il a reçu la communication de la déclaration de M me Kierstead, il a donné à M. Hagen une version des événements qui était très semblable au témoignage de M me Kierstead, en disant que c’était M. LeBlanc qui était le cerveau du plan

d’importation de cocaïne. [31] M. Knockwood a témoigné qu’il a décidé de plaider coupable parce que son avocat lui avait dit que s’il plaidait coupable, M me Kierstead pourrait rentrer à la maison, tandis que s’il contestait l’accusation et perdait, il pourrait subir une peine d’emprisonnement de trente ans au lieu de dix. Il a expliqué qu’il avait d’abord refusé de collaborer avec les autorités parce que M. LeBlanc lui avait dit qu’il s’occuperait de l’affaire s’il ne disait rien. [32] Le 10 avril 2013, avant la détermination de sa peine, il a participé à une entente d’immunité conditionnelle.

Le 7 novembre 2013, il a été condamné à une peine d’emprisonnement de 70 mois au lieu de la peine d’emprisonnement minimale obligatoire de 10 ans. Cette peine prenait en considération une recommandation favorable de M. Hagen et l’atténuation en raison de son plaidoyer de culpabilité. [33] Le 3 décembre 2013, deux agents de la GRC – y compris le gendarme Francoeur – se sont rendus à la prison pour le rencontrer. Une personne du ministère de la Sécurité intérieure ( Department of Homeland Security ) des États- Unis et un agent des douanes du Canada étaient aussi présents durant les rencontres.

Les négociations ont duré plusieurs heures; la GRC souhaitait obtenir une déclaration formelle faite sous serment sur les événements qui sont survenus avant son arrestation, et M. Knockwood essayait d’obtenir une meilleure offre dont une réduction de sa peine, un transfert du centre de surveillance à un pénitencier fédéral et la garantie qu’aucune accusation de complot d’importation de cocaïne au Canada ne serait portée contre lui. Bien que la police l’ait avisé qu’elle n’entendait pas porter d’accusations contre lui au Canada, M. Knockwood s’inquiétait que les intentions de la police puissent changer.

En fin de compte, M. Knockwood a demandé de prendre la nuit pour réfléchir à ses options. Le 4 décembre 2013, M. Knockwood a accepté de collaborer avec la GRC, et il a fourni une déclaration officielle enregistrée sur bande vidéo faite sous serment impliquant M. LeBlanc. Son récit des événements correspondait étroitement à ce que M me Kierstead avait dit dans sa déclaration. [34] Par conséquent, sa peine a été réduite à 46 mois. Elle a été réduite de nouveau à 37 mois en raison d’un changement apporté aux lignes directrices sur la détermination de la peine (qui ne sont pas fonction de la collaboration).

Finalement, après avoir suivi un programme en résidence sur les drogues et l’alcool, sa peine a été réduit

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