2011 NBCA 55, 2011 NBCA 55

COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW BRUNSWICK 159-10-CA VILLAGE OF SAINT-FRANÇOIS DEMADAWASKA APPELLANT VILLAGE DE SAINT-FRANÇOIS DEMADAWASKA APPELANT - and - - et - NADEAU POULTRY FARM LIMITED andMAPLE LODGE FARMS LIMITED RESPONDENTS NADEAU FERME AVICOLE LIMITÉE et MAPLELODGE FARMS LIMITED INTIMÉES Village of Saint-François de Madawaska v. NadeauPoultry Farm Limited and Maple Lodge FarmsLimited, 2011 NBCA 55 Village de Saint-François de Madawaska c.

NadeauFerme Avicole Limitée et Maple Lodge FarmsLimited, 2011 NBCA 55 CORAM: The Honourable Chief Justice Drapeau The Honourable Justice Deschênes The Honourable Justice Richard CORAM : L’honorable juge en chef Drapeau L’honorable juge Deschênes L’honorable juge Richard Appeal from a decision of the Court of Queen'sBench: September 29, 2010 Appel d’une décision de la Cour du Banc de la Reine: Le 29 septembre 2010 History of Case: Historique de la cause : Decision under appeal: 2010 NBQB 307 Décision frappée d’appel : 2010 NBQB 307 2010 NBBR 307 Preliminary or incidental proceedings: N/A Procédures préliminaires ou accessoires : S.O.

Appeal heard: March 23, 2011 Appel entendu : Le 23 mars 2011 Judgment rendered: June 9, 2011 Jugement rendu : Le 9 juin 2011

Reasons for judgment by: The Honourable Chief Justice Drapeau Motifs de jugement : L’honorable juge en chef Drapeau Concurred in by: The Honourable Justice Deschênes The Honourable Justice Richard Souscrivent aux motifs : L’honorable juge Deschênes L’honorable juge Richard Counsel at hearing: For the appellant: Deirdre L. Wade, Q.C., Enrico A. Scichilone and Guylaine Boudreau For the respondents: Gilles C. Thibodeau, Q.C. and Raj Datt Avocats à l’audience : Pour l’appelant : Deirdre L. Wade, c.r., Enrico A. Scichilone et Guylaine Boudreau Pour les intimées : Gilles C.

Thibodeau, c.r., et Raj Datt THE COURT The appeal is allowed, but solely for the purpose of deleting from the formal order rendered in the court below any reference to Rule 22.04(3). The other parts of the order stand as the appellant has failed to establish this is a proper case for

summary judgment. The cross-appeal is also dismissed, the issues it raises being moot. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal. LA COUR L’appel est accueilli, mais à seule fin de radier de l’ordonnance officielle rendue par le tribunal d’instance inférieure toute mention de la règle 22.04(3). Les autres parties de l’ordonnance demeurent inchangées étant donné que l’appelant n’a pas établi qu’il y avait lieu, en l’espèce, de rendre un jugement

sommaire. L’appel reconventionnel est également rejeté, les questions qu’il soulève étant purement théoriques. Les parties supporteront leurs propres dépens en appel. The judgment of the Court was delivered by DRAPEAU, C.J.N.B . I. Introduction and Brief Overview [ 1 ] In the underlying action, the respondents, hereinafter referred to collectively as “Maple Lodge”, seek damages of $32,350,206.43 for losses sustained when their poultry processing plant was destroyed by fire in early 2002. Over the course of the previous decade, Maple Lodge had expanded their plant on a handful of distinct occasions.

As a result, the installation of structural fire protection and suppression systems may have become mandatory under provisions of the National Building Code of Canada, 1980 , adopted by the appellant Village in conjunction with the enactment of its Building By-Law in the early 1980s. It is common ground, albeit for present purposes only, that the fire would have been controlled and damage to the plant minimized had those systems been in place.

[ 2 ] The Village (pop. 600) is one of several municipal members of a regional planning commission, the Madawaska District Planning Commission. The latter provides services under the Community Planning Act , R.S.N.B. 1973, c. C-12 that are beyond the Village’s financial wherewithal.

More importantly, the Commission is the body corporate with which Maple Lodge dealt in securing the permits authorizing the execution of its various plant expansion projects. [ 3 ] Although they retained a firm of structural engineers to prepare the plans accompanying their applications to the Commission for the work permits, acted as their own general contractor in executing the work in question and agreed to conform with all Village by-laws, Maple Lodge seek to lay at least part of the blame for their losses at the feet of the Village.

The Statement of Claim describes in these terms their case against the Village and the Commission: Maple Lodge states that the Village and the Planning Commission breached their statutory duty and their common law duty to Maple Lodge by failing to ensure that the plans and specifications submitted as part of the applications for permits conformed with the provisions of the Code before permits were issued, in accordance with the Village’s Building By-Laws and the Community Planning Act , [R.]S.N.B., [c.] C-12, and the regulations made thereunder.

Maple Lodge also states that the Village and the Planning Commission failed to make adequate or appropriate inspections or investigations during or after construction in breach of their statutory and common law duty to Maple Lodge to ensure that work conformed with the Code , in accordance with the Village’s Building By-Laws and the Community Planning Act , [R.]S.N.B., [c.] C-12, and the regulations made thereunder.

Maple Lodge states that the Village and the Planning Commission knew or ought to have known that their actions in approving the plans and specifications and issuing permits for the construction of the additions and improvements, in contravention of their duties to Maple Lodge, both statutorily and at common law, would result in significant loss and damage to Maple Lodge. As would be expected, these allegations are denied in the Village’s Statement of Defence. [ 4 ] After oral discovery of a Commission representative and its Mayor, the Village moved for

summary judgment, contending Maple Lodge’s action could not succeed at trial, at least insofar as the Village was concerned, because it had not been involved in any aspect of the pertinent permit-approval process and follow-up inspections, if any, and any power or duty the Village may have had in that regard had been lawfully transferred to the Commission.

In the Village’s submission, that transfer occasioned a divestiture of authority and accountability that had been both contemplated and sanctioned by the Community Planning Act . [ 5 ] In support of its motion, the Village filed affidavits of the individuals who successively occupied, during the material period, its sole seat on the 18-member Commission. Each confirmed his non-involvement with Maple Lodge’s applications for permits, their issuance and any follow-up inspections by the Commission. [ 6 ] The Village also filed an affidavit of its Mayor, Raoul Cyr.

His affidavit is most interesting, particularly on the subject of the de facto relationship between the Village and the Commission, and the Village’s perception of its legal obligations in connection with the permit-approval process and follow-up inspections. [ 7 ] Mr.

Cyr, who was Mayor of the Village from 1977 to 1990, Councillor from 2001-2004 and re-elected Mayor in 2004, explains that, soon after the Environment Minister proclaimed the Village’s Building By-Law (By-Law No. 17) and the subsequent establishment in early 1983 of the Commission by Order-in-Council, the Village entered into an oral agreement with the Commission whereby the latter “agreed to administer and enforce several of the Village’s by-laws, including By-Law No. 17”.

According to the Mayor, the Village’s lack of resources and expertise left it no other option but to enter into that agreement and rely upon the “reviewing officers and building inspectors employed by [the Commission] to ensure that any construction work that was taking place within the Village would comply with By-Law No. 17 and the National Building Code of Canada”.

It is his understanding of the aforementioned agreement that the Village paid the Commission a yearly fee for community planning services and to assume responsibility for the review of applications for building permits, the issuance of building permits and all follow-up building inspections. [ 8 ] The Mayor acknowledges that, by virtue of its Building By-Law, the Village was responsible for the “nomination” of building inspectors. However, all candidatures originated with the Commission, and the building inspectors, once appointed, became paid employees of the Commission.

None answered “in any way” to the Village.

[ 9 ] The Mayor states the Village “has never been involved with the administration and enforcement of By-Law No. 17, which would include receiving and reviewing applications for building permits, granting building permits and conducting building inspections within the Village”. He adds that the plant expansion work at issue was performed pursuant to applications made to and permits issued by the Commission, and that the Village was not involved “in any way” with either those processes or any follow-up building inspections that may have taken place.

The Mayor asserts the Commission neither consulted the Village nor advised it of any concerns arising from Maple Lodge’s “various applications for building permits” or with respect to any follow-up building inspections. While the Commission forwarded a copy of its Annual Report to the Village, it did so, as well, for the responsible Minister and all other municipalities that formed “part of the Planning District of the Madawaska Planning Commission”.

Moreover, those reports revealed general information only (about the Commission’s activities for the year in question) and did not provide particulars of the applications for building permits received and permits granted within the Madawaska Planning District. Nor did the reports relay specific information regarding building inspections.

In addition, the Mayor emphasizes that, under the terms of the oral agreement with the Commission, the latter was under no obligation to consult with or “report to the Village on specific applications for building permits […] or on the results of building inspections that took place following the granting of such permits”. [ 10 ] By way of response, Maple Lodge produced two affidavits. The first offered the opinion evidence of Ralph Bartlett whose areas of expertise are described as including “fire protection engineering, building and fire code consulting, and origin and cause investigations”.

The gist of his opinion evidence is that, at the time the work at issue was carried out, the plant was regulated by the 1995 National Building Code of Canada, which required the plant “have an automatic sprinkler system”. It is his opinion, as well, that “had the plant been sprinklered in accordance with the applicable code at the time of the fire on February 14, 2002, then the sprinkler’s operation would likely have controlled the fire and a significant amount of the damages caused by the fire would have been prevented”.

The other affidavit, which was sworn by Yves Landry, Maple Lodge’s general manager, included as attachments the transcript of the Mayor’s discovery testimony and that of the selected Commission representative. Both of those affidavits were ruled inadmissible. [ 11 ] The Village’s Building By-Law adopts certain provisions of the National Building Code of Canada, 1980 . On the record at our disposal, it is unclear whether successor Codes were ever adopted by the Village.

At any rate, the stated purposes of the By-Law include: (1) the adoption of standards for the construction and altering of a building; (2) the prohibition of work of that nature in violation of those standards; and (3) the establishment of a system of permits for such work, and the specification of terms and conditions under which permits may be issued, the form of those permits and the fees for their issuance.

Section 4 of the By-Law states that the Council “shall appoint a building inspector who shall exercise such powers and perform such duties as are provided by this By- Law”. Section 5(1) provides that a person shall not undertake or continue the construction or altering of a building without a building permit issued pursuant to “this section”. Section 5(2) obligates a person seeking to obtain a building permit to make application in writing to the building inspector .

The application must be in a form prescribed by the Council, be signed by the applicant, state the intended use of the building and, absent waiver by the building inspector, include copies of the specifications and scale drawings of the building with respect to which the work is to be carried out. Those specifications and scale drawings must show, inter alia , the dimensions of the building.

As I understand the record, a firm of structural engineers retained by Maple Lodge prepared the plans that accompanied their several applications for permits green lighting the plant expansion projects giving rise to the underlying action. [ 12 ] The motion judge’s lengthy reasons for dismissing the Village’s motion for

summary judgment feature extensive references to the jurisprudence dealing with, among other subjects, the law of agency for tort liability purposes in the municipal law context, the conditions precedent to the imposition of direct and vicarious liability in general and on municipalities in particular, and the law with respect to delegable and non-delegable municipal duties under the Municipalities Act , R.S.N.B. 1973, c. M- 22 and the Community Planning Act .

Those reasons also focus on the liability implications of several provisions of those statutes and various sections of the Village’s Building By-Law. [ 13 ] As is well known, appeals ultimately stand or fall on the basis of the disposition made in first instance, and not the tribunal’s supporting reasons. Error-laced reasons for judgment may yet produce the right outcome. [ 14 ] The order executed by the motion judge shows that he dismissed the motion for

summary judgment pursuant to Rules 22.01(3), 22.04(1) and 22.04(3) of the Rules of Court . Of those three rules, only the latter two actually deal with the court’s dispositive powers. Rule 22.04(1) provides the court may grant judgment where the applicant satisfies it there is no merit to a claim or part thereof and he or she is entitled to judgment. Rule 22.04(3) deals with a situation where the only obstacle to

summary judgment is a question of law. In that particular context, the court may determine the pivotal question of law and grant judgment accordingly. The case at hand does not fit within Rule 22.04(3). Indeed, as will be seen, material facts remain in genuine dispute. Moreover, and perhaps even more fundamentally, the motion judge did not grant judgment. [ 15 ] The Village appeals, with leave, arguing the motion judge erred in law: (1) in confusing the test and principles that inform a motion for

summary judgment with those applicable under Rule 23.01(1)(b) (striking a pleading on the grounds that it does not disclose a reasonable cause of action or defence); (2) in finding the Statement of Claim featured an implicit assertion of vicarious liability and that Maple Lodge could rely on that theory of liability to resist the motion for

summary judgment; and (3) in failing to address the effect of the policy decision to delegate to the Commission the powers that are the subject of the allegations of negligence against the Village, as required under the second branch of the duty of care test established in Anns v. Merton London Borough Council , [1978] A.C. 728 (H.L.) .

[16] Maple Lodge cross-appeals, arguing the motion judge erred in law in: (1) rejecting the expert opinion putforward by way of Mr. Bartlett’s affidavit; (2) rejecting the factual evidence given by the Village and the Commission at theirexamination for discovery; and, in the alternative, (3) failing to provide them with an opportunity to present that expert opinion and thosefacts by way of admissible evidence. [17] While there are parts of the motion judge’s reasons for decision that evince a misapprehension of the legalframework applicable to motions for

summary judgment and a misunderstanding of the ratio decidendi of some of the judicialprecedents cited, I conclude any related error is inconsequential. Despite the valiant efforts of counsel for the Village directed at makingthe case for the contrary view, I conclude the motion judge got it right when he dismissed the motion for

summary judgment pursuant toRule 22.04(1)(a). [18] That said, I would nonetheless allow the appeal, in part, solely for the purpose of removing from the ordergranted in the court below any reference to Rule 22.04(3). Correlatively, it is my view that none of the motion judge’s observations onthe common law and the several provisions of the Community Planning Act, the Municipalities Act and the Village’s Building By-Lawreferenced by the parties amount to determinations of questions of law within the meaning of Rule 22.04(3).

To be clear, nothing in themotion judge’s 107-paragraph reasons for decision, or these reasons for that matter, should influence, let alone be perceived as bindingupon, the trial judge. In particular, on the record at our disposal, it remains very much an open question whether the Village can, as amatter of law, or should, as a matter of fact, be found liable for the losses sustained by Maple Lodge. II.

Legislative Provisions [19] The text of the legislative provisions mentioned by the parties and the motion judge (ss. 5(2), 7(3), 74(3), 93and 94(1) of the Municipalities Act, ss. 5(2), 7(2), 7(4)(a), (b), (d), (e), 10, 11 and 59 of the Community Planning Act, s. 3(2) ofRegulation 81-126 under the Community Planning Act and ss. 2, 4, 5 and 6 of the Village’s Building By-Law) is reproduced in AppendixA. III. Analysis and Decision A.

The Village’s appeal [20] Experienced civil litigators and those otherwise acquainted with our rules of procedure will readilyacknowledge that an action may be without merit even though the Statement of Claim discloses a reasonable cause of action. Whether aStatement of Claim fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action within the meaning of Rule 23.01(1)(

b) is, at bottom, a question of law,which almost invariably stands to be settled by reference to the pleading only. In contrast, whether an action is without merit within themeaning of Rule 22.04(1)(

a) is a question whose resolution depends on the nature of the cause of action asserted in the Statement ofClaim, the admissions arising from the pleadings and otherwise, and the evidential record. [21] Unlike the situation availing in Ontario, the scheme under Rule 23.01(1)(

b) does not provide for judgment inthe event the court concludes the Statement of Claim does not disclose a reasonable cause of action. The moving party must invoke acomplementary rule, Rule 37.10(a) (see Norris v. Lloyd’s of London (1998), (NB CA), 205 N.B.R. (2d) 29, [1998]N.B.J. No. 351 (C.A.) (QL), at paras. 13, 17-21). In the exercise of its jurisdiction under Rule 23.02(1)(b), the court reviews theStatement of Claim to determine whether it is “plain and obvious” that it does not disclose a reasonable cause of action (see Hunt v.Carey Canada Inc., (SCC), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959, [1990] S.C.J.

No. 93 (QL) and Caissie v. Sénéchal Estate, 2001 NBCA35, 237 N.B.R. (2d) 232, at paras. 10-11). Maple Lodge’s Statement of Claim easily passes muster under Rule 23.01(1)(b). In fact, theVillage does not claim the opposite. [22] In my respectful judgment, the motion judge erred in relying on Hunt v. Carey and Murray v. Moncton (City)(1993), (NB CA), 140 N.B.R. (2d) 282, [1993] N.B.J. No. 484 (C.A.) (QL), and in bringing into play the “plain andobvious” test, and its off-shoot, the “germ of a cause of action” test. Neither of those essentially equivalent tests has application to amotion for

summary judgment under Rule 22, except in those very rare cases where, unlike the present one, the court’s decision hingesexclusively on whether the Statement of Claim discloses a reasonable cause of action. As the Court explained in Cannon v. Lange(1998), (NB CA), 203 N.B.R. (2d) 121, [1998] N.B.J. No. 313 (C.A.) (QL) at para. 5, it is only in those rare and

exceptional cases that the application of the “plain and obvious” or the “germ of a cause of action” tests would be unobjectionable. It isequally plain the motion judge erred in positing that, on a defendant’s motion for

summary judgment, the court is entitled to deem truethe Statement of Claim’s contested allegations of fact. The opposite is hornbook law (see Shareline Systems Ltd. v. New Brunswick, 2001NBCA 29, 235 N.B.R. (2d) 162, at para. 18 and Canada (Attorney General) v. Lameman, 2008 SCC 14, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 372, at para.11). [23] The Village submits those procedural errors cast doubt over the analysis that culminated in the dismissal of itsmotion.

I respectfully agree and conclude the Court should make its own determination of the merits of Maple Lodge’s action against theVillage, having regard to the cause of action asserted in the Statement of Claim, the issues raised, the factual admissions in the record, ifany, and the admissible evidence. The issue is simply whether the dismissal at trial of Maple Lodge’s action against the Village is aforegone conclusion. If it is not, no court can disregard the law and grant

summary judgment simply because that outcome squares withits view of a “just” result (see Provincial Court Judges’ Association et al. v. The Province of New Brunswick, 2009 NBCA 56, 347N.B.R. (2d) 296, at paras. 23-25).

On that score, I view as a mere slip of the pen the motion judge’s implicit suggestion at paragraph 47of his reasons for judgment that this last mentioned decision is at odds with the judicial oath of office. [24] At any rate, I agree with the motion judge that, for the purposes of the motion, the Statement of Claim shouldbe read as advancing a claim of direct and vicarious liability against the Village. In my view, Maple Lodge’s contention on point has notbeen persuasively countered, given that the Village conducts its affairs through officers, servants and agents. The following observationsin Walsh v.

Nicholls and CGU Insurance Company of Canada, 2004 NBCA 59, 273 N.B.R. (2d) 203 are also apposite: Defining the nature of the “action” requires a consideration of both the express and implicit features of the Statement of Claim. In thatregard, the finality of

summary judgment requires reading the Statement of Claim in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. To that end,ambiguities should be resolved against the defendant and drafting deficiencies overlooked in favor of a generous understanding of thenature of the action or actions prosecuted by the plaintiff. [para. 62] [25] In its Notice of Motion, the Village did not seek alternative relief under Rule 22.05 in the event

summaryjudgment was denied. The legal framework within which motions for

summary judgment simpliciter stand to be determined in thisProvince is set out in the following excerpts from Cannon v. Lange:

a) The purpose of Rule 22 The intent in permitting

summary judgment is to rid innocent parties and the system not only of meritless actions, but also of frivolousclaims or defences. The claims and defences which are without merit render the proceedings cumbersome and are a source ofunnecessary expense and delay. This Court has consistently urged motion judges not to be unduly timid where the circumstancesdemonstrate a clear absence of merit. (See RCL Operators Ltd. et al. v.

National Bank of Canada et al. (1994), (NBCA), 144 N.B.R. (2d) 207 (C.A.), at 211, para. (6)). [para. 9] […] As well, Rule 22.04(3) allows the court to determine a question of law, and to grant judgment accordingly. There is nothing to preventthe court from determining such a question, even if it is in serious dispute. In this regard, Haché v. Boudreau (1993),(NB KB), 132 N.B.R. (2d) 262 (Q.B.) is probably an example of unwarranted judicial timidity.

It must be remembered, however, thatthis power can only be exercised where the question of law is the only outstanding issue between the parties. (See RCL Operators Ltd.,supra, at p. 211, para. (7)). [para. 11] […] The wording of Rule 22.04 sets the standard at a high level. It provides that the court may grant judgment only where there is no merit tothe defence or no merit to the claim, or part thereof. The wording leaves no room for anything but a very stringent test. Practicalexperience with the civil process inspired the trial lawyers and judges who drafted Rule 22.04 to choose its wording.

The wordingreflects their conviction that, except in clear cases, the best truth-finding device is a trial. Stratton C.J.N.B., writing for a unanimous Court, articulated the test in the oft-quoted case of Ripulone v. Pontecorvo (1989), 1989

8320 (NB CA), 104 N.B.R. (2d) 56 at p. 63. He held: [13] ...

Summary judgment should be granted only when there is no reason for doubt as to what the judgment of the court should be if thematter proceeds to trial[.] The moving party's case must be unanswerable. [paras. 17-18] […] The most recent pronouncement by the Ontario Court of Appeal echoes at least the spirit of the test espoused by this Court in Ripulone.In Aguonie v. Galion Solid Waste Material Inc. (1998), (ON CA), 156 D.L.R. (4th) 222 (Ont.

C.A.), Borins J. (ad hoc)writes at pp. 235-36 that: ... [summary judgment] was not intended to, nor can it, deprive a litigant of his or her right to a trial unless there is a clear demonstrationthat no genuine issue exists, material to the claim or defence, which is within the traditional province of a trial judge to resolve. [para.20] […] In dealing with any motion for

summary judgment, the court must undoubtedly take a hard look at the pleadings and the evidence todetermine whether there is truly some merit to the action or defence, or part thereof. The court's ability to do so will necessarily dependon the nature and quality of the evidentiary record which the parties can place before it. In some cases, perhaps not this one, theevidentiary constraints imposed by Rules 22 and 39.01(4) will make a judgment without trial inappropriate. Common sense should move the parties to put their best foot forward on a motion under Rule 22.

Such a course of conduct isparticularly wise for a respondent, since he or she has the most to lose. As stated by the Ontario Court of Appeal in 1061590 Ontario Ltd.v. Ontario Jockey Club (1995), (ON CA), 21 O.R. (3d) 547 at 557 in a vernacular expression, the respondent "mustlead trump or risk losing." It will rarely be sufficient for the respondent to promise that evidence, which is admissible pursuant to Rule39.01(4), will be produced at trial: absent a compelling explanation, the respondent is required to produce admissible evidence whichwill prevent a conclusion that the action or defence is bereft of merit.

I have no doubt that, where the ends of justice require, the courtwill allow all appropriate accommodations including leave to file further affidavit evidence. It is up to the moving party to satisfy the court that an apparent factual controversy or credibility conflict is a sham. If material factsremain genuinely in dispute after the court has taken a hard look at the evidence and the pleadings, it is not appropriate to grant

summaryjudgment (see RCL Operators Ltd.). Likewise, where there is an unresolved genuine credibility conflict relating to a material question, itis not appropriate to grant

summary judgment. [paras. 22-24] That understanding of the applicable principles has been repeatedly echoed in the case law (see, for example, Losier v. Hébert, 2001NBBR 39 2001 NBQB 39, 240 N.B.R. (2d) 214 (per Léger, J.); R.H. Frenette Trucking Ltée v. Midland Manufacturing Ltd.,2005 NBQB 31, [2005] N.B.J. No. 31 (QL) (per Riordon, J.); Dupuis v. City of Moncton, 2005 NBCA 47, 284 N.B.R. (2d) 97 (perLarlee, J.A.); Morris v. Gilbert, 2006 NBQB 404, 311 N.B.R. (2d) 73 (per P. Creaghan, J.); The Board of Trustees of the City of SaintJohn Employee Pension Plan et al. v.

Ferguson, 2008 NBCA 24, 328 N.B.R. (2d) 319 (per J.Z. Daigle, J.A.); SAR Petroleum et al. v.Peace Hills Trust Company, 2010 NBCA 22, 357 N.B.R. (2d) 202 (per Robertson, J.A.); and Canada (Attorney General) v. Lameman, atparas. 10-11). [26] In their written submission, Maple Lodge make a number of arguments against

summary judgment. None ofthose can be safely described as unanswerable. Yet, none is frivolous. In truth, each of those arguments warrants meticulous scrutiny andserious consideration. In that regard, and by way of illustration only, I would highlight the points made at paragraphs 29, 30 and 31 of theRespondents’ Submission: In the present case, section 74(3) of the Municipalities Act makes it clear that building inspectors appointed by the Appellant are in factmunicipal officers.

Section 74(3) states: The council of a municipality may appoint an assistant clerk, an assistant treasurer, an engineer, a building inspector, a solicitor and suchother officers as are necessary for the administration of the municipality.

It is settled law that a municipality is vicariously liable for the acts of its officers. Pursuant to s. 4 of the building by-law, all buildinginspectors are to be appointed by the Appellant. Mr. Cyr, the Appellant’s mayor, acknowledges that the Appellant had to formallynominate the inspectors recommended by the Commission. Thus, it is clear that the inspectors were acting at all material times asofficers of the Appellant. […] In Charlebois v. Greater Moncton Planning Commission (1994), (NB KB), 144 N.B.R. (2d) 343 (N.B.Q.B.), thedefendant building inspector was employed by the Planning Commission.

Justice Riordon held that had the inspector acted negligently,he would have found the defendant municipality vicariously liable for the inspector’s negligence. Albeit in obiter dicta, at paragraph 47,Justice Riordon made the following comments: The Plaintiffs allege that the Town or the Commission are vicariously liable for wrongs and negligence alleged to have been committedby Mr. Biddington, the Town building inspector. If Mr.

Biddington had committed wrongs and if he had been negligent, which I donot find that he did or was, although the Town would be vicariously liable, I am of the opinion, that the Commission would notbe vicariously liable. In his capacity as the Town building inspector he was acting as an officer of the Town and not as an officerof the Commission. Section 74(3) of the Municipalities Act authorizes a municipal Council to appoint a building inspector and hewas so appointed. The various transactions between the Plaintiffs and Mr.

Biddington were in relation to his duties as the Town buildinginspector and did not in any way pertain to his involvement or employment with the Commission. [Emphasis in original.] [27] The premise of those plausible-sounding contentions is that the various construction projects referenced in theStatement of Claim were undertaken pursuant to a “building permit” issued by the Village’s “building inspector”.

However, the accuracyof that premise is debatable. [28] Indeed, while the two “building permits” for the work done in the early 1990s appear to have been issued bysomeone identified as “a building inspector”, the expansion work in the years immediately preceding the 2002 fire was performedpursuant to three “development permits”, each of which was signed by a “development officer”. None of those permits bears thesignature of someone identifying himself or herself as a building inspector. Interestingly, the Village’s Building By-Law makes noreference to a “development permit” or to a “development officer”.

That noted, the parties did not make submissions on the implicationsfor the Village’s liability of this unexplained process-related change, and those implications remain nebulous. I am given to understandthe Village undertook at discovery to produce its Council’s resolution or resolutions appointing a building inspector under s. 4 of itsBuilding By-Law, but that undertaking currently stands unfulfilled. [29] There are other genuine disputes over material facts. Thus, the true scope of the oral agreement between theVillage and the Commission remains shrouded by doubt.

True, the Mayor’s understanding is that the agreement transfers to theCommission the responsibility and accountability for not only building inspection services, but as well the review of applications forbuilding permits and their issuance. However, I repeat: that agreement is not in writing. Moreover, our attention was not drawn to anyprovision of the Community Planning Act that refers, at least in explicit terms, to an agreement for the delivery of services by theCommission in relation to the review of applications for building permits and their issuance.

As well, the question of the Village’sassertions of authority and its de facto control over the operations of the Commission remains unsettled. That is likewise the case withrespect to the work of the Building Inspectors and the Development Officers employed and remunerated by the Commission. [30] Neither the Village nor Maple Lodge contends the other side has made admissions that settle any of thosefactual disputes.

I discern none in the record at our disposal. [31] Finally, even if there were no genuine disputes over the material facts and the only issue was a question of law,I would probably decline to determine that question. The case at hand raises manifold questions of law, few of which, if any, have beenconclusively determined in the jurisprudence. In LeBlanc v. Boisvert, 2005 NBCA 115, 294 N.B.R. (2d) 325, the Court observed thatRule 23.01(1)(a) (“Determination of Questions before Trial”) was generally ill-suited for the determination of novel, complex anddifficult questions of statutory

interpretation where that determination would: (1) be facilitated by the contextualization provided throughthe evidence at trial, including evidence shedding light on the object of the statutory provision at issue and the Legislature’s intention inrelation thereto; and (2) benefit “from the refinement and honing of arguments that typically takes place over the course of pre-trialpreparation and at the trial itself” (para. 35). That cautious approach applies perforce to the judgment-justifying determination of aquestion of law under Rule 22.04(3).

[32] While judges ought not to shy away from applying settled law to settled facts in disposing of motions forsummary judgment, even where the questions of law raised are in dispute, Rule 22.04(3) should not, as a general rule, be employed todetermine unsettled, complex and difficult questions of law that turn, as is the case here, not only on policy considerations but, as well,on the contextual

interpretation of numerous multi-sourced legislative provisions that may well have been drafted without regard to thelarger context and, in particular, any liability-associated issues (see the discussion on point in Romano v. D’Onofrio,(ON CA), [2005] O.J. No. 4969 (C.A.) (QL) and Nadvornianski v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co., (ON SC), [2006] O.J.No. 2611 (S.C.J.) (QL), which deal with Ontario’s Rule 20 (“Summary Judgment”) that is, in some respects, far more liberal than ourRule 22). B.

The cross-appeal [33] In my view, the motion judge had no choice but to reject the affidavit evidence proffered by Maple Lodge,once the Village objected to its admissibility. While the situation may be otherwise in other jurisdictions, in this Province, both themoving and the responding party are subject to the same evidential limits on a

summary judgment motion. More pertinently, andcontrary to the respondents' contention, Rules 22 and 39 do not set up a more relaxed regime for the evidence offered by a respondingparty. In that regard, suffice it to highlight that Rule 39.01(4) targets “the case of a motion for

summary judgment”, not simply themoving party, in excluding statements as to the information and belief of an affidavit deponent. Specifically, on a motion for

summaryjudgment, opinion evidence proffered by a responding party to which objection is taken cannot be received by way of affidavit evidence(see Fraser v. Brookville Carriers Van LP Inc. (2007), (NB CA), 319 N.B.R. (2d) 297, [2007] N.B.J. No 175 (C.A.)(QL) (per Richard J.A.)). Accordingly, the opinion evidence proffered by Maple Lodge was not admissible by way of affidavit. [34] However, proper opinion evidence could have been adduced through viva voce testimony, with leave of thecourt (see Rioux v. Berthelot et al. (1996), (NB KB), 177 N.B.R. (2d) 144, [1996] N.B.J.

No. 287 (Q.B.) (QL) (perDeschênes J., as he then was). I now turn to the affidavit to which was attached a transcript of the discovery testimony of the Village’sMayor and of the Commission’s selected representative. [35] In Sewell v. Sewell et al., 2010 NBCA 32, 358 N.B.R. (2d) 27, the Court noted that discovery evidence couldbe received on motions for documentary production under Rule 31 and for a medical examination under Rule 36: In due course, the Court of Queen's Bench was called upon to determine a motion by Ms. Sewell for production of the report mentionedabove and motions by Ms. McCann and Mr.

Sewell for separate medical examinations pursuant to Rule 36 of the Rules of Court("Medical Examination of Parties"). In her Notice of Motion, Ms. Sewell articulated the following prayer for relief: (

a) that [...] Woodstock Trailmakers - Snowmobile Association Inc. and/or [...] Carla McCann and Shawn Sewell produce Dr.Kirkpatrick's report and that the said report be produced before any of the Respondents are granted a defence medical examination; (

b) in the alternative, that [she] be granted an order that John McLellan [the discovery representative of Woodstock Trailmakers -Snowmobile Association Inc.] re-attend at the examination for discovery to answer [her] questions and to answer such follow upquestions, which are proper that [she] may have; (

c) that [...] Woodstock Trailmakers - Snowmobile Association Inc. and/or John McLellan and/or [...] Carla McCann and Shawn Sewell,comply with any such order before [she] is ordered to attend on [any] physician for a defence medical examination [...]. Transcripts of Mr. McLellan's, Ms. McCann's and Mr. Sewell's examination for discovery were attached as exhibits to both Ms. Sewell'ssupporting and responding affidavits. At the hearing, the motions judge ruled the discovery transcripts inadmissible on the authority of Montreal Trust Company of Canada v.OCCO Dev. (1997), (NB CA), 190 N.B.R. (2d) 386; [1997] N.B.J.

No. 342 (QL). It bears pointing out, if only forfuture guidance, that none of the respondents has persuasively answered Ms. Sewell's submission that the motions judge erred on point,having regard to this Court's decision in Dill v. East Coast Lumber Ltd. (2000), (NB CA), 228 N.B.R. (2d) 184,[2000] N.B.J. No. 314 (QL) where Ryan J.A. made the following observations on behalf of a unanimous Court:

East Coast Lumber refers to Montreal Trust v. OCCO as a precedent from this court that discovery evidence is to be used only for trialpurposes. In Montreal Trust v. OCCO, counsel for Occo authored an affidavit to which he appended discovery evidence of an Occowitness, not evidence of an opposite party. We held at para. [11] that when counsel makes the affidavit, discovery extracts of his ownwitness are not subject to cross examination. Further, cross examination of the lawyer in such a case would be bootless.

In the case on appeal before us, the discovery evidence is admissible to support the claim for financial statements. The extracts are of theopposite party's designated witness and go to the purpose of the motion, the production of financial records relating to company lossesduring the periods of Mr. Dill's alleged poor performance. [paras. 11-12] That said, the present appeals, which were consolidated at the outset of the hearing in this Court, do no more than challenge the motionsjudge's ruling in relation to the admissibility of the discovery transcripts.

No decision has been rendered with respect to the motionsthemselves, and their ultimate disposition could very well render the contested ruling moot. Be that as it may, the fact remains, as theCourt pointed out proprio motu, that the present appeals are from an interlocutory ruling on the admissibility of evidence proffered in thecontext of an interlocutory proceeding. [paras. 2-4] [36] In Ontario, the parties may make use of an adverse party’s discovery evidence on a motion for

summaryjudgment. Rule 20.01(3) of that Province’s Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to move for

summary judgment “with supportingaffidavit material or other evidence” (emphasis added). Discovery evidence of an adverse party is admissible as “other evidence” (seeLana International Ltd. v. Menasco Aerospace Ltd., (ON CA), [2000] O.J. No. 3261 (C.A.) (QL). [37] The case law in this Province reflects a divergence of approaches. While in Lapointe v. MacIntosh Foods Ltd.(2000), 238 N.B.R. (2d) 274, [2000] N.B.J.

No. 524 (Q.B.) (QL), the motion judge allowed the responding party to rely on the movingparty’s discovery evidence, that approach, at least at first blush, is not easily reconcilable with the views expressed in RCL OperatorsLtd. et al. v. National Bank of Canada et al. (1994), (NB CA), 144 N.B.R. (2d) 207, [1994] N.B.J. No. 55 (C.A.)(QL).

It is nonetheless arguable that the last-mentioned case does no more than underscore this truism: there is no provision in our Rulesequating the situation at trial, where it is permissible for counsel to read in discovery evidence, or to provide the salient parts of thetranscript to the judge, with the situation on a motion for

summary judgment. [38] As matters currently stand, it is at least arguable that a party to a

summary judgment motion is not precludedfrom adducing affidavit evidence setting out the following: (1) the affiant was present at discovery; (2) the affiant heard the adverseparty provide sworn testimony regarding certain facts, which are then detailed in the affidavit itself or contained in the attached pertinentexcerpts of the discovery transcript. In that scenario, the adverse party’s sworn testimony is not used qua discovery evidence and thetranscript simply provides a reliable account of what the affiant heard the adverse party say under oath regarding factual matters.

Thatbeing said, I prefer to await the right case before coming to any definitive conclusion on the matter. [39] In the case at bar, the affidavit to which the discovery transcripts were attached provides no indication whetherthe affiant was present at discovery when the testimony in question was given. That being so, the motion judge cannot be faulted forruling against its admission. [40] In the result, however, the rejection of Maple Lodge’s affidavit evidence has not prevented them fromsuccessfully resisting the Village’s motion. The issues raised by the cross-appeal are therefore moot.

That state of affairs acknowledged,I do not doubt the motion judge would have heard the parties on the appropriateness of giving Maple Lodge an opportunity to fill anyevidential lacuna if he had concluded the rejection of Maple Lodge’s affidavit evidence compelled

summary judgment. In that regard, Iwould simply point out that, in Cannon v. Lange, at paragraph 23, the Court urged consideration be given to all reasonableaccommodations susceptible of promoting a merits-based determination of Rule 22 motions. In appropriate circumstances, thoseaccommodations include, but are not limited to adjournments required for the production of pivotal evidence. IV. Conclusion and Disposition [41] For those reasons, I would allow the appeal, but solely for the purpose of deleting from the formal orderrendered in the court below any reference to Rule 22.04(3). The other parts of the order must stand as the appellant has not establishedthat this is a proper case for

summary judgment. [42] Moreover, I would dismiss the cross-appeal. The issues it raises are moot as a result of the foregoingdisposition of the appeal.

[ 43 ] Success being more or less evenly divided, I would order the parties to bear their own costs on appeal. ____________________________________ J. ERNEST DRAPEAU, CHIEF JUSTICE OF NEW BRUNSWICK WE CONCUR: _____________________________________ ALEXANDRE DESCHÊNES, J.A. ______________________________________ J.C. MARC RICHARD, J.A.

SCHEDULE A /

ANNEXE A Sections 5(2) , 7(3) , 74(3) , 93 and 94(1) of the Municipalities Act , R.S.N.B. 1973, c. M-22 / Paragraphes 5(2), 7(3) et 74(3), art. 93 et par. 94(1) de la

Loi sur les municipalités , L.R.N.-B. 1973, ch. M-22 : 5(2) Except as provided by regulation, no agreement, contract, deed or other document made or issued after January 1, 1967 to which a municipality is a party has any force or effect unless it is (

a) sealed with the corporate seal of the municipality, and (

b) signed by the mayor and the clerk. 7(3) Where a municipality carries out any of the powers or provides any of the services under this Act it 5(2) Sauf lorsque le règlement le prévoit, les conventions, contrats, actes ou autres documents faits ou établis après le 1 er janvier 1967 et auxquels une municipalité est partie, n’ont de validité ou d’effets que s’ils

a) portent le sceau corporatif de la municipalité, et

b) sont revêtus de la signature du maire et du secrétaire. 7(3) Lorsqu’elle assume l’un des pouvoirs que lui confère la présente loi ou fournit l’un des services prévus par la présente loi, une municipalité

a) doit veiller à l’application de ces pouvoirs et services,

(

a) shall administer, (

b) shall pay the costs of, and (

c) subject to the Motor Vehicle Act may make by-laws with respect to, such powers and services. 74(3) The council of a municipality may appoint an assistant clerk, an assistant treasurer, an engineer, a building inspector, a solicitor and such other officers as are necessary for the administration of the municipality. 93 The Lieutenant-Governor in Council may by regulation approve codes that may be adopted by a municipality respecting (

a) standards for maintenance and occupancy of buildings and premises, (a.1) blasting operations including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the conducting of pre-blast surveys of properties that may be affected by blasting operations, the maintenance and inspection of blasting records, the establishment of hours of operation and the establishment of the maximum permissible levels of sound, dust and vibration that may be created by blasting operations, and (

b) Repealed: 2003, c.27, s.41 . (

c) Repealed: 2003, c.27, s.41 . (

d) any other municipal matters. 94(1) A council may by by-law adopt a code approved under

section 93 or a portion of such a code, with or without setting forth its provisions.

b) doit en acquitter le coût, et

c) peut, sous réserve des dispositions de la Loi sur les véhicules à moteur , prendre des arrêtés y relatifs. 74(3) Le conseil d’une municipalité peut nommer un secrétaire-adjoint, un trésorier- adjoint, un ingénieur, un inspecteur des constructions, un avocat et tous autres fonctionnaires nécessaires à la bonne administration de la municipalité. 93 Le lieutenant-gouverneur en conseil peut, par voie de règlement, approuver les codes qu’une municipalité a adoptés en ce qui concerne

a) les normes d’entretien et d’occupation des bâtiments et locaux, a.1) les opérations de dynamitage comprenant, entre autres, les études préalables sur les effets possibles des opérations de dynamitage sur les biens, le maintien et l’inspection de registres sur le dynamitage, l’établissement d’un horaire des opérations et la détermination du niveau de plafond admissible au bruit, à la poussière et aux vibrations que les opérations de dynamitage peuvent provoquer, et

b) Abrogé : 2003, c.27, art.41 .

c) Abrogé : 2003, c.27, art.41 .

d) toute autre question municipale. 94(1) Un conseil peut, par voie d’arrêté, adopter un code approuvé en application de l’article 93 ou une

partie de ce code en reprenant ou non ses dispositions.

Sections 5(2) , 7(2) , 7(4) (a), (b), (d), (e), 10 , 11 , 11.1 and 59 of the Community Planning Act , R.S.N.B. 1973, c. C-12 / Paragraphes 5(2) et 7(2), al. 7(4) a ), b ),

d) et

e) et art. 10, 11, 11.1 et 59 de la

Loi sur l’urbanisme , L.R.N.-B. 1973, ch. C-12 : 5(2) The Minister may by order (

a) define the boundaries of and establish one or more planning districts, and (

b) alter the boundaries of a planning district. 7(2) The powers and duties of a commission are (

a) those accruing under (

i) any zoning by-law provision under paragraph 34(3)(

g) or (

h) or paragraph 34(4) (

c) with respect to particular uses of land, and any similar provision in (

A) a rural plan under subsection 27.2(1), or 77.2(5), or (

B) a rural plan or zoning regulation under paragraph 77(6)(a); (ii) sections 35, 36 and 46, paragraph 77(6) (c), and paragraph 77(8)(b), with respect to certain proposed uses and to variance, (iii) subsections 40(2) and (4), with respect to non-conforming uses, (iv) any subdivision by-law provision pursuant to paragraph 42(3)(c), (

f) or (l), with respect to approval of an access, the location of land for public purposes and street names, respectively, and pursuant to paragraph 42(3) (

k) and any similar subdivision regulation provision under paragraph 77(7)(b), with respect to approval of a subdivision plan, and (v) subsection 56(2), with respect to the location of streets or land for public purposes; 5(2) Le Ministre peut, par arrêté,

a) créer un ou plusieurs districts d’aménagement et en définir les limites, ou

b) modifier les limites d’un district d’aménagement. 7(2) Les pouvoirs et fonctions d’une commission sont

a) tous ceux qui découlent (

i) d’une disposition d’un arrêté de zonage adopté conformément aux alinéas 34(3)

g) ou

h) ou à l’alinéa 34(4)

c) en ce qui concerne certaines utilisations d’un terrain et toute disposition semblable (

A) d’un plan rural établi en vertu du paragraphe 27.2(1) ou 77.2(5), ou (

B) d’un plan rural ou d’un règlement de zonage établi en vertu de l’alinéa 77(6)a); (ii) des articles 35, 36 et 46 et des alinéas 77(6)

c) et 77(8)

b) en ce qui concerne certaines utilisations de terrain projetées et les dérogations, (iii) des paragraphes 40(2) et (4) relativement aux usages non-conformes, (iv) d’une disposition d’un arrêté de lotissement pris conformément aux alinéas 42(3)c),

f) ou

l) relativement à l’approbation d’un accès, à l’emplacement des terrains d’utilité publique et aux noms de rues respectivement, et conformément à l’alinéa 42(3)k), et de toute disposition d’un règlement de lotissement en application de l’alinéa 77(7)

b) relativement à l’approbation d’un plan de lotissement, et (

v) du paragraphe 56(2) relativement à l’emplacement des rues ou des terrains

(

b) to advise the Minister in the preparation of a regional plan for the planning region in which the district is located; (

c) if a district planning director has been appointed, to prepare (

i) a municipal plan, basic planning statement, development scheme or urban renewal scheme for a municipality in the district or a rural plan under subsection 27.2(1) for a village in the district, or (ii) a rural plan under subsection 77(2.1) or 77.2(1); (

d) to advise municipalities and rural communities in the district and the Minister (

i) subject to paragraph (c), in the preparation of plans, statements and schemes mentioned therein, and (ii) in relation to any aspect of community planning within the district; (d.1) to provide a building inspection service in an unincorporated area in the planning district; (d.2) Repealed: 2005, c.7, s.12 . (

e) to give its views to the council or rural community council in the planning district proposing to enact a by-law on the proposed by-law or to the Minister on a proposed regulation to be effective in the planning district, whether or not such views have been requested under

section 66 or subsection 77(11); and (

f) to exercise such powers and perform such d’utilité publique;

b) de conseiller le Ministre dans l’établissement d’un plan régional pour une région d’aménagement dans laquelle le district est situé;

c) d’établir, si un directeur de district d’aménagement a été nommé, (

i) un plan municipal, une déclaration des perspectives d’urbanisme, un projet d’aménagement ou de rénovation urbaine pour une municipalité dans le district, ou un plan rural établi en vertu du paragraphe 27.2(1) pour un village du district, ou (ii) un plan rural établi en vertu du paragraphe 77(2.1) ou 77.2(1);

d) de conseiller les municipalités et les communautés rurales situées dans le district et le Ministre (

i) sous réserve de l’alinéa c), dans l’établissement des plans, des déclarations et des projets qui s’y trouvent mentionnés, et (ii) sur toute question d’urbanisme dans le district; d.1) d’assurer un service d’inspection des constructions dans les secteurs non constitués en municipalité du district d’aménagement; d.2) Abrogé : 2005, c.7, art.12 .

e) de donner son avis à un conseil ou à un conseil de la communauté rurale du district d’aménagement sur tout arrêté qu’il se propose d’adopter, ou au Ministre sur tout règlement dont l’application en vertu de la présente loi est proposée dans le district d’aménagement, qu’un tel avis ait été ou non demandé conformément à l’article 66 et au paragraphe 77(11); et

f) d’exercer les pouvoirs ou de remplir les fonctions que prévoit le présent

article ou que lui confère par ailleurs la présente loi ou le conseil d’une municipalité ou le conseil d’une communauté rurale dans le district.

duties as are provided by this

section or are otherwise given to it by this Act or the council of a municipality or rural community council in the district. 7(4) A commission may (

a) appoint such officers and employees as it considers necessary (

i) to assist the development officer in carrying out his responsibilities, (ii) where an agreement under paragraph (

d) is entered into, to supply a building inspection service in the area affected by the agreement, and (iii) for the performance of its powers and duties other than those mentioned in subparagraphs (

i) and (ii); (

b) enter into such contracts as it considers advisable for the performance of its powers and duties; […] (

d) enter into an agreement (

i) with a council mentioned in paragraph (

c) to supply a building inspection service in the municipality at the expense of the municipality, (i.1) with a rural community council mentioned in paragraph (

c) to supply a building inspection service in the rural community at the expense of the rural community, or (ii) with a group consisting of two or more councils mentioned in paragraph (

c) to supply a building inspection service in the municipalities, rural communities or both, as the case may be, with the expense to be shared among the members of the group as they may agree to; and 7(4) Une commission peut

a) nommer les cadres et employés qu’elle juge nécessaires (

i) pour aider l’agent d’aménagement dans l’accomplissement de ses fonctions, (ii) pour fournir, en cas de conclusion d’un accord en application de l’alinéa d), un service d’inspection des constructions dans le secteur visé par l’accord, et (iii) pour assumer ses pouvoirs et fonctions autres que ceux mentionnés aux sous-alinéas (

i) et (ii);

b) conclure les contrats qu’elle juge appropriés pour exercer ses pouvoirs et fonctions; […]

d) conclure un accord (

i) avec un conseil mentionné à l’alinéa c) pour fournir un service d’inspection des constructions dans la municipalité aux frais de la municipalité, (i.1) avec un conseil d’une communauté rurale mentionné à l’alinéa c) pour fournir un service d’inspection des constructions dans la communauté rurale aux frais de la communauté rurale, ou (ii) avec un groupe composé de deux ou plusieurs conseils mentionnés à l’alinéa c), pour fournir un service d’inspection des constructions dans les municipalités, les communautés rurales ou les deux, selon le cas, à frais partagés entre les membres du groupe selon ce dont ils auront convenu; et

e) utiliser les fonds qui peuvent être rendus disponibles pour tout objet mentionné dans le présent article. 10(1) Le 15 septembre au plus tard de chaque

(

e) expend such funds as may be made available for a purpose mentioned in this section. 10(1) Not later than September 15 in each year, a commission shall submit an itemized estimate of its expenses for the next year to the Minister and to the council of each municipality and each rural community council in the planning district. 10(2) If a council or a rural community council is dissatisfied with any part of an estimate submitted under subsection (1), it may within thirty days after the estimate is delivered to the clerk of the municipality or the rural community clerk, as the case may be, file an objection with the Minister, and the Minister’s decision on the objection is final. 10(3) Where in the opinion of the Minister any part of an estimate submitted under subsection (1) is unreasonable or unnecessary, the Minister shall so notify the commission, and if after such notification is received the commission incurs such expense it shall not be included in the expenses of the commission for the purposes of an agreement under

section 9. 10(4) The amount that a council of a municipality or a rural community council in a planning district is required to contribute to meet the expenses of the commission shall be paid to the commission quarterly during the first month of each quarter. 10(5) If a municipality or a rural community is in arrears for a period in excess of thirty days with respect to any payment due under subsection (4), the Minister may make such payment to the commission and deduct a similar amount from any money owed by the Province to the municipality or the rural community, as the case may be. 11(1) Not later than March 1 in each year, a commission shall submit to the Minister and to each council and rural community council in the planning district, in a form acceptable to the Minister, année, une commission doit soumettre une prévision détaillée de ses dépenses pour l’exercice suivant au Ministre et au conseil de chacune des municipalités et au conseil de chacune des communautés rurales du district d’aménagement. 10(2) Si un conseil ou un conseil d’une communauté rurale n’est pas satisfait d’une

partie de la prévision qui lui est soumise en application du paragraphe (1), il peut, dans les trente jours de la remise de la prévision au secrétaire de la municipalité ou au greffier de la communauté rurale, selon le cas, faire opposition au Ministre dont la décision est définitive. 10(3) Lorsqu’il estime que toute

partie d’une prévision soumise en application du paragraphe (1) est déraisonnable ou inutile, le Ministre doit en aviser la commission et si, après avoir reçu cette notification, la commission effectue quand même ces dépenses, celles-ci ne peuvent être comprises dans les dépenses de la commission payables en application de l’article 9. 10(4) La contribution qu’est tenue de faire le conseil d’une municipalité ou le conseil d’une communauté rurale dans un district d’aménagement pour faire face aux dépenses de la commission doit être versée à cette dernière trimestriellement le premier mois de chaque trimestre. 10(5) Si une municipalité ou une communauté rurale est en retard de plus de trente jours dans le paiement d’une somme due en application du paragraphe (4), le Ministre peut en verser le montant à la commission et déduire celui-ci des sommes dues par la Province à la municipalité ou à la communauté rurale, selon le cas. 11(1) Le 1 er mars de chaque année au plus tard, une commission doit soumettre au Ministre et à chaque conseil et à chaque conseil d’une communauté rurale dans un district d’aménagement, en la forme qui convient au Ministre,

a) un rapport financier vérifié pour l’exercice précédent, et

b) un rapport annuel sur ses activités au cours de l’année précédente.

(

a) an audited financial report for the previous year, and (

b) an annual report setting out its activities for the previous year. 11(2) Where an expenditure included in a financial report under paragraph (1)(

a) was not included in the estimate submitted for the year under subsection 10(1) or is in excess of the estimate, the Minister may reduce accordingly payments made pursuant to subsection 9(1). 11.1 No order made under subsection 5(2) before the commencement of this

section is invalid or shall be considered to have been invalidly made and no act, decision or thing done by a commission established under such order is invalid or shall be considered to have been invalidly done by reason only of failure to file such order as a regulation with the Registrar of Regulations under the Regulations Act . 59(1) Subject to this section, a council or rural community council may enact a building by-law to prescribe standards for the building, locating or relocating, demolishing, altering, structurally altering, repairing or replacing, or any combination thereof, of a building or structure. 59(2) In relation to work mentioned in subsection (1), a by-law under this

section may (

a) prohibit the undertaking or continuing of such work in violation of standards prescribed by the by-law, and (

b) prescribe a system of permits for such work, their terms and conditions, the 11(2) Lorsqu’une dépense, comprise dans un rapport financier visé à l’alinéa (1)a), n’apparaît pas dans la prévision soumise pour l’année en application du paragraphe 10(1), ou est supérieure à la prévision, le Ministre peut réduire d’autant les paiements à effectuer conformément au paragraphe 9(1). 11.1 Nul arrêté pris en vertu du paragraphe 5(2) avant l’entrée en vigueur du présent

article n’est invalide ou ne peut être considéré avoir été pris de façon invalide et nul acte posé, nulle décision rendue ou nulle chose faite par une commission établie en vertu d’un tel arrêté n’est invalide ou ne peut être considéré avoir été posé, rendue ou faite de façon invalide en raison du seul fait de l’inobservation du dépôt de l’arrêté comme règlement au bureau du registraire des règlements en vertu de la

Loi sur les règlements. 59(1)

Sous réserve des dispositions particulières du présent article, un conseil ou un conseil d’une communauté rurale peut édicter un arrêté de construction fixant des normes quant à l’édification, l’implantation, ou la réimplantation, la démolition, la modification, la modification structurelle, la réparation ou le remplacement d’un bâtiment ou d’une construction ou quant à toute combinaison de plusieurs de ces travaux. 59(2) En ce qui concerne tout travail visé au paragraphe (1), un arrêté pris en application du présent

article peut

a) interdire d’entreprendre ou de continuer ce travail en violation des normes prescrites par l’arrêté, et

b) instaurer un système de permis pour tout travail de ce genre et arrêter leurs modalités, leurs conditions de délivrance, de suspension, de rétablissement, de révocation et de renouvellement ainsi que leur forme et le montant des droits à acquitter. 59(3)

Sous réserve du paragraphe (4), lorsqu’il arrête des normes en application du paragraphe (1), le conseil ou le conseil d’une communauté rurale

a) doit adopter, par voie de référence ou autrement, le Code national du bâtiment ou toute

partie de celui-ci, relativement (

i) aux bâtiments, et

conditions under which they may be issued, suspended, reinstated, revoked and renewed, their form and the fees therefor. 59(3) Subject to subsection (4), in prescribing standards under subsection (1), a council or rural community council (

a) shall adopt by reference or otherwise the National Building Code, or a portion thereof, in relation to (

i) buildings, and (ii) structures for which standards are therein provided; (

b) may adopt a supplementary building code approved under subsection (6) or, if no code has been so approved, prescribe reasonable standards that may have been so approved and designate classes of buildings to which the standards shall apply; and (

c) may prescribe any reasonable standards in relation to structures for which standards are not provided under paragraph (a). 59(4) Where a code is adopted under this section, a council or rural community council shall not adopt any penalty clause or, by reference, any administrative procedure contained therein. 59(5) Where a building by-law is in effect, no wiring permit pursuant to regulation under the Electrical Installation and Inspection Act may be issued in respect of a development unless the applicant therefor delivers a copy of the building permit for such development. 59(6) For the purpose of making public buildings accessible to and usable by (ii) aux constructions pour lesquelles des normes y ont été établies;

b) peut adopter un code supplémentaire du bâtiment approuvé en application du paragraphe (6) ou, si aucun code n’a été approuvé en vertu de ce paragraphe, fixer des normes raisonnables qui peuvent avoir été ainsi approuvées et désigner les catégories de bâtiments auxquels ces normes s’appliquent; et

c) peut fixer toutes normes raisonnables quant aux constructions pour lesquelles aucune norme n’a été prévue en application de l’alinéa a). 59(4) Lorsqu’un code est adopté en application du présent article, le conseil ou le conseil d’une communauté rurale ne doit pas adopter de clauses pénales ni, par voie de renvoi, de procédures administratives contenues dans ce code. 59(5) Lorsqu’un arrêté de construction est en vigueur, nul permis pour la pose des fils, conformément au règlement de la

Loi sur le montage et l’inspection des installations électriques , ne peut être délivré pour un aménagement à moins que le requérant ne présente une copie du permis de construction autorisant cet aménagement. 59(6) Afin de permettre aux handicapés physiques d’avoir accès aux bâtiments publics et de les utiliser, le lieutenant- gouverneur en conseil peut, par voie de règlement, approuver un code du bâtiment formant supplément au Code national du bâtiment, en vue de son adoption en vertu du paragraphe (3).

physically handicapped persons, the Lieutenant-Governor in Council may by regulation approve a building code, for adoption under subsection (3), supplementary to the National Building Code. Section 3(2) of Regulation 81-126 under the Community Planning Act / Paragraphe 3(2) du Règlement 81-126 pris en vertu de la

Loi sur l’urbanisme : 3(2) This Regulation is not effective in (

a) a municipality which has enacted a building by-law, or (

b) a rural community which has enacted a building by-law. 3(2) Le présent règlement ne s’applique pas dans

a) une municipalité qui a édicté un arrêté de construction, ou

b) une communauté rurale qui a édicté un arrêté de construction. Sections 2, 4, 5 and 6 of the Village’s Building By-Law / Articles 2, 4, 5 et 6 de l’arrêté de construction du Village : PORTÉE 2. Le présent arrêté vise à : (

a) fixer des normes quant à l’édification, l’implantation ou la réimplantation, la démolition, la modification ou le remplacement d’un bâtiment; (

b) à interdire que soit entrepris ou poursuivi tout travail visé par le paragraphe (

a) en violation de normes fixées dans le présent arrêté; et (

c) à instaurer un système de permis pour tout travail visé par le paragraphe (

a) et à arrêter leurs modalités et conditions; leurs conditions de délivrance, de suspension, de rétablissement, de révocation et de renouvellement ainsi que leur forme et le montant des droits perçus contre leur délivrance. NOMINATION D’UN INSPECTEUR DES CONSTRUCTIONS 4. Le Conseil doit nommer un inspecteur des SCOPE 2. The purpose of this By-Law is: (

a) to prescribe standards for the building, locating or relocating, demolishing, altering or replacing of a building or structure; (

b) to prohibit the undertaking or continuing of work mentioned in clause (

a) in violation of standards prescribed hereby; and (

c) to prescribe a system of permits for work mentioned in clause (a), their terms and conditions under which they may be issued, suspended reinstated, revoked and renewed, their form and fees therefor.

constructions qui exerce les pouvoirs et fonctions prévus par le présent arrêté. PERMIS DE CONSTRUCTION 5.

(1) Nul ne doit entreprendre ni poursuivre l’édification ou la réimplantation, la démolition, la modification structurale ou le remplacement d’un bâtiment sans avoir obtenu au préalable un permis de construction à cet effet conformément au présent article. 5.

(2) Quiconque désire obtenir un permis de construction doit en faire la demande écrite à l’inspecteur des constructions et ladite demande doit : (

a) être soumise selon la formule prescrite par le Conseil; (

b) être signée par le requérant; (

c) faire état de l’affectation projetée pour le bâtiment; (

d) à moins que l’inspecteur des constructions ne diffère la présente exigence, inclure, sous réserve de l’alinéa (7), deux exemplaires des devis et des plans, à l’échelle du bâtiment relatifs aux travaux à exécuter en y indiquant : (

i) les dimensions du bâtiment; (ii) l’affectation projetée pour chaque pièce ou surface de plancher; (iii) les dimensions du terrain sur lequel le bâtiment est ou sera situé; (iv) les niveaux des rues et des égouts attenants au terrain visé par le sous- paragraphe (iii); et (

v) l’emplacement, la hauteur et les dimensions horizontales de tous les bâtiments situés, et qui seront situés, sur ledit terrain; APPOINTMENT OF BUILDING INSPECTOR 4. The Council shall appoint a building inspector who shall exercise such powers and perform such duties as are provided by this By-Law. BUILDING PERMITS 5.

(1) A person shall not undertake or continue the building, locating, or relocating, demolishing, altering or replacing of a building unless a building permit therefor has been issued pursuant to this section. 5.

(2) A person seeking to obtain a building permit shall make application in writing to the building inspector, and such application shall: (

a) be in a form prescribed by the Council; (

b) be signed by the applicant; (

c) state the intended use of the building; (

d) unless waived by the building inspector, include, subject to subsection (7), copies in duplicate of the specifications and scale drawings of the building with respect to which the work is to be carried out, showing: (

i) the dimensions of the building; (ii) the proposed use of each room or floor area; (iii) the dimensions of the land on which the building is, or is to be, situated; (iv) the grades of the streets and sewers abutting the land mentioned in subclause (iii); and

(

e) déterminer le coût total prévu pour les travaux projetés; et (

f) contenir tout autre renseignement que l’inspecteur des constructions peut exiger pour vérifier la conformité au présent arrêté. RESPONSABILITÉ DU DÉTENTEUR DE PERMIS 6.

(1) Lorsqu’un permis de construction a été délivré, la personne dont le nom figure sur le permis doit donner à l’inspecteur des constructions : (

a) un préavis d’au moins 48 heures de son intention de commercer les travaux autorisés par le permis; (

b) Un préavis d’au moins 24 heures de la mise en place d’un mur de fondation souterrain avant de procéder au remblayage de l’excavation; (

c) Un avis du parachèvement des travaux décrits dans le permis dans les dix (10) jours suivant ledit parachèvement; et (

d) Tout autre renseignement exigé en vertu du présent arrêté.

(2) Lorsqu’on effectue des essais sur les matériaux afin de s’assurer de la conformité aux exigences du présent arrêté, il faut garder les données de vérification enregistrées pour la duré[e] des travaux autorisés aux fins d’inspection.

(3) Ni l’approbation des plans et devis, ni la délivrance d’un permis de construction, ni les inspections effectuées ne libère une personne d’un devoir ou d’une responsabilité quelconque à l’égard de l’exécution des travaux conformément au présent arrêté. (

v) the position, height and horizontal dimensions of all buildings on, and those proposed to be located on, the land referred to; (

e) set out the total estimated cost of the proposed work; and (

f) contain such other information as the building inspector may require for the purpose of determining compliance herewith. RESPONSIBILITY OF PERMIT HOLDER 6.

(1) Where a building permit has been issued, the person named in the permit shall give to the building inspector: (

a) at least 48 hours notice of the intention to start work authorized by the permit; (

b) at least 24 hours notice of the placement of a foundation wall below land surface prior to any backfilling of the excavation; (

c) notice of the completion of the work described in the permit within 10 days of such completion; and (

d) such other information as may be required hereunder.

(2) Where tests of any materials are made to ensure conformity with the requirements of this By-Law, records of the text data shall be kept available for inspection during the carrying out of the work authorized.

(3) The approval of plans or specifications the issuing of a building permit or any inspections hereunder do not relieve a person of any duty or responsibility for carrying out works in accordance with this By-Law.