2021 QCCA 1313, 2021 QCCA 1313

Droit de la famille — 211671 2021 QCCA 1313 COURT OF APPEAL CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC REGISTRY OF MONTREAL No: 500-09-029655-214 ( 500-04-077032-218) MINUTES OF HEARING DATE: August 31, 2021 THE HONOURABLE MARK SCHRAGER, J.A. APPELLANT COUNSEL V. C. Mtre SHAY JOSEPH MERGUI ( Mergui avocats ) By visioconference RESPONDENT COUNSEL C. P. Mtre IVAN CAIREAC By visioconference IMPLEADED PARTY VI. CH. UNREPRESENTED By visioconference DESCRIPTION: Application to suspend the provisional execution of a judgment of first instance (Art. 660 C.C.P. ) .

Clerk at the hearing : Paola Garcia Rosario Courtroom: RC-18 HEARING 9:37 Commencement of the hearing. Identification of counsel. 9:38 Submissions by Mtre Mergui. 9:56 Submissions by Mtre Caireac. 10:09 Reply by Mtre Mergui. 10:12 BY THE JUDGE: Judgment – see page 3. 10:13 Conclusion of the hearing.

Paola Garcia Rosario, Clerk at the hearing JUDGMENT [ 1 ] This is an appeal as of right of the final judgment of the Superior Court, District of Montreal (the Honourable Annie Breault), rendered on August 12, 2021, granting certain rights of access to Respondent, the grandmother of Appellant’s two minor children aged 8 and 2 years. Appellant seeks the suspension of provisional execution. [ 2 ] The judge concluded as follows: [86] Le Tribunal est convaincu de l’intérêt sincère de la grand-mère de développer et maintenir une relation significative avec ses deux seuls petits-fils.

La preuve ne fait pas voir que sa présence auprès des enfants ait pu être néfaste, bien au contraire dans le cas de X. [87] Le besoin de séparation de la mère ne peut aller aussi loin que de priver les enfants de toute relation avec leur grand-mère. Le Tribunal est confiant que la mère sera en mesure de poursuivre son processus d’émancipation et de guérison sans que cela soit au détriment des enfants ou de la quiétude familiale. [88] L’intérêt des enfants n’a pas à se confondre dans celui de la mère.

En fonction de la preuve présentée, l’intérêt des enfants demeure d’entretenir une relation avec leur grand-mère maternelle comme ils sont autorisés à le faire avec les grands-parents paternels et avec le père de la mère et la conjointe de ce dernier, relation dont ils sont privés depuis plus d’un an. [ 3 ] She then granted the following rights of access to the Respondent: [105] ACCORDE à la demanderesse, en plus des échanges sous forme de lettres, des contacts auprès des enfants X et Y de la façon suivante et ORDONNE à la défenderesse et à l’intervenant de les respecter :

a) À COMPTER DU 22 AOÛT 2021 – un appel vidéo le dimanche matin à 10h30 pour une durée approximative de 30 minutes, sans interférence des parents, ceux-ci devant s’assurer que ce contact ait lieu;

b) À COMPTER DU 3 OCTOBRE 2021 – de 11h00 à 14h00, le premier dimanche du mois, dans un endroit neutre convenu entre les parties pour partager un repas, étant entendu que ce contact tient lieu de celui par appel vidéo ayant lieu les autres dimanches matins;

c) À COMPTER DE 2022 – deux périodes de 24 heures par année, incluant un coucher, soit l’une entre le 26 et le 30 décembre de chaque année et l’autre, pendant les vacances estivales, avec un préavis de 8 semaines à la défenderesse et à l’intervenant quant au choix des dates;

d) Un appel vidéo le jour de l’anniversaire de chacun des enfants, de même que le jour de l’anniversaire de la demanderesse, à 18h30, et ce, pour une durée approximative de 30 minutes;

e) À tout autre moment suivant entente entre les parties et le désir des enfants. [ 4 ] In issue as well, is the judge’s refusal to deny that Appellant’s street address be kept confidential, but the judge did order as follows: [111] PREND ACTE de l’engagement de la demanderesse à ne pas se présenter à la résidence de la défenderesse et de l’intervenant, de même qu’à l’école des enfants, sans y avoir été invitée et lui ORDONNE de s’y conformer; [ 5 ] Appellant argues that the judge failed to properly consider the opinion of the psychologist as to the Appellant’s “emotional setbacks” from interaction with Respondent and that this conflict is disruptive to the family and as such impacts in a negative way on the children.

Moreover, Appellant submits that since Respondent has been excluded from the children’s lives for a year, an additional period while the appeal is pending would not impact the children in an overly negative way. [ 6 ] Appellant also argues regarding the communication of her address that provisional execution of this conclusion would potentially render moot the eventual appeal judgment. [ 7 ]

Article 660 C.C.P. provides inter alia that a judgment which “adjudicates on parental authority” is subject to provisional execution as of right. The judgment here is based on the application of

Article 611 C.C.Q. :

611. In no case may the father or mother, without a grave reason, interfere with personal relations between the child and his grandparents. 611. Les père et mère ne peuvent sans motifs graves faire obstacle aux relations personnelles de l’enfant avec ses grands-parents. Failing agreement between the parties, the terms and conditions of these relations are decided by the court. À défaut d’accord entre les parties, les modalités de ces relations sont réglées par le tribunal. [ 8 ] This

article limits parental authority and unsurprisingly is found in Title Four “Parental Authority” of Book Two “The Family”. As such, provisional execution applies as of right under Article 660 (1) C.C.P. [1] [ 9 ] The judge reasons at paragraph [97] that provisional execution is warranted since the Respondent has been denied access during the preceding year. Despite the weakness of such justification which could apply to any and all rights subject to litigation, the judgment is subject to provisional execution as of right.

Nevertheless, a judgment of the Court of appeal may stay the provisional execution where the judgment suffers from an apparent weakness and the provisional execution causes prejudice. The burden on Appellant to establish this is considered heavy. [2] [ 10 ] While acknowledging Appellant’s difficulties in the relationship with her mother and faced with the proof that this situation effects the 8 year-old child, the judge’s decision is founded on the evidence of a significant relationship between the Respondent grandmother and the child developed while she was a caregiver for the child.

As such, and without expressing any opinion on the chances of success of the appeal, any weakness in the judgment is not readily apparent. The grounds invoked by Appellant may be arguable but that does not constitute an apparent weakness in the judgment. [3] [ 11 ] In terms of the prejudice for the mother, the Appellant, or the child, there has been access before and the judge obviously, sensitive to the delicate situation, ordered a return to access on a limited and stepped basis.

Should anything occur during any period of access which might be harmful to the child, the possibility of further orders of this Court or the court of first instance could be open as a redress depending on the circumstances. As such, the argument for prejudice is also weak. [ 12 ] I am informed that the August 22 and August 29 access by videoconference were not allowed by Appellant. The undersigned takes a dim view of a litigant who seeks the assistance of the courts but appears not to respect adverse decisions.

The interest of justice, indeed the proper functioning of the system, requires respect by the parties for the decisions of the courts. [ 13 ] The situation, however, regarding the confidentiality of Appellant’s address is different. The judge’s reasons are based on

Article 277 C.C.P. obliging witnesses to state their address. However, the Court’s inherent jurisdiction as well as the jurisdiction to issue orders in the interest of the parties in family matters (Articles 14, 15 and 16 C.C.P. ) could be the basis of the order sought to maintain confidentiality of the address of Appellant. Respondent does not require knowledge of the address in order to exercise the access rights granted or send email communications.

Moreover, Respondent undertook not to go to the residence so that she does not require the address. [ 14 ] For the foregoing reasons, the justification not to grant the confidentiality order appears weak and there is potential prejudice for Appellant and on balance, no prejudice for Respondent. Moreover, as Appellant suggests, without a suspension the appeal on this issue would become moot. I will thus grant the suspension of this part of the judgment.

FOR ALL THE FOREGOING REASONS, THE UNDERSIGNED: [ 15 ] GRANTS in part only the Application to suspend the provisional execution of the judgment of first instance and ORDERS the suspension of the provisional execution of the conclusion found at paragraph [104], only and DISMISSES the other conclusions sought in the motion. [ 16 ] The whole without costs given the nature of the matter. MARK SCHRAGER, J.A.