2014 NBCA 57, 2014 NBCA 57

COURT OF APPEAL OF COUR D'APPEL DU NEW BRUNSWICK NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK 96-13-CA T.D.L. (Applicant) APPELLANT T.D.L. (Requérante) APPELANTE - and - - et - A.-G.L. (Respondent) RESPONDENT A.-G.L. (Intimé) INTIMÉ T.D.L. v. A.-G.L., 2014 NBCA 57 T.D.L. c.

A.-G.L., 2014 NBCA 57 CORAM: The Honourable Justice Larlee The Honourable Justice Quigg The Honourable Justice Green CORAM : l'honorable juge Larlee l'honorable juge Quigg l'honorable juge Green Appeal from a decision of the Court of Queen’s Bench: August 20, 2013 Appel d'une décision de la Cour du Banc de la Reine : le 20 août 2013 History of Case: Historique de la cause : Decision under appeal: Unreported Décision frappée d’appel : inédite Appeal heard: February 18, 2014 Appel entendu : le 18 février 2014 Judgment rendered: September 4, 2014 Jugement rendu : le 4 septembre 2014 Reasons for judgment by: The Honourable Justice Green Motifs de jugement : L'honorable juge Green

Concurred in by: The Honourable Justice Larlee The Honourable Justice Quigg Souscrivent aux motifs : l'honorable juge Larlee l’honorable juge Quigg Counsel at hearing: For the appellant: Kenneth W. Martin For the respondent: Lee McKeigan-Dempsey Avocats à l'audience : Pour l’appelante : Kenneth W. Martin Pour l’intimé : Lee McKeigan-Dempsey THE COURT The appeal is dismissed with costs of $2,500. LA COUR Déboute l’appelante, qui est condamnée à des dépens de 2 500 $. The judgment of the Court was delivered by GREEN, J.A. I. Introduction [ 1 ] The parties, now divorced, are the parents of a young child.

As a result of the breakdown of their marriage and their subsequent separation, they have been engaged in ongoing litigation with respect to custody, access, mobility, the division of marital property, and the payment of spousal support. Most problematic has been the mobility question, which arose when the mother sought permission to relocate with the child to Chicago, Illinois. These issues were determined by a judge of the Court of Queen’s Bench, Family Division, in a decision dated August 20, 2013, which effectively denied all of the relief sought by the applicant mother.

She now appeals that decision. [ 2 ] Within the realm of family law, mobility cases may be said to be second only to child protection matters in terms of the emotion-fraught challenges they pose for the parents of young children, and for the courts charged with the responsibility of weighing the relevant evidence and rendering a just decision.

The guiding principle is clear and straightforward, but nonetheless often poses considerable difficulties in its application: what resolution is in the best interests of the child involved? [ 3 ] In my opinion, the application judge delivered a sound decision that is not open to appellate intervention. For the reasons that follow, I would dismiss the mother’s appeal, with costs. II. Background [ 4 ] Both parties grew up in rural New Brunswick, the mother an anglophone from the Miramichi, the father a francophone from the Acadian Peninsula.

Their respective families still reside, for the most part, in the province. The significance of this fact will become apparent later in these reasons.

[ 5 ] This couple married on May 24, 2002, at which time they resided in the Miramichi area. The mother was a full- time employee at the local hospital. They relocated to Ottawa for a two-year period, while the father was taking a course in architecture at Carleton University. During their stay in Ottawa, the mother successfully applied for admission to a nursing program, which was to commence in the fall of 2005. The application judge explains what transpired next: In September 2005, the couple relocated to New Brunswick as [the father] was pursuing a career opportunity with the National Film Board.

In addition, at that time, [the mother] was pregnant with S.L., and both parties had decided it would be best to bring up their child in the New Brunswick area amongst their extended families. [The mother] did not pursue the nursing program once the parties decided to move back to New Brunswick. [para. 4] [ 6 ] Upon returning from Ontario, the parties initially took up residence in a community outside the Greater Moncton area before purchasing the marital home in Dieppe in the spring of 2006.

In January of that year, the father had secured employment with a local company as a graphic artist, providing “the necessary financial stability” to purchase their home. [ 7 ] The parties welcomed the arrival of a baby in April 2006. The mother stayed at home with S.L. and was the primary caregiver for the first two years of his life. The father was working full-time, but shared parenting responsibilities with the mother in the evenings and on weekends. [ 8 ] At some point in 2008 or 2009, the mother returned to work outside the home. She was able to arrange her

schedule such that she worked evening and weekend shifts, allowing the father to be at home caring for their son whenever the mother was working. The father made arrangements with his employer to have flexibility in his hours of work so as to leave early when necessary.

As a result, the child “required no outside daycare or babysitting services prior to commencing kindergarten in September of 2011”. [ 9 ] I return to the words of the application judge to describe the next phase of this story: In January 2010, after the relationship between the parties had been deteriorating for some time, they mutually decided to separate. At this time, [the father] moved out of the marital bedroom and began sleeping in his office.

Despite their decision to separate, the parties remained together in the marital home and continued to maintain the same schedules with respect to S.L.’s care and their employment positions. Further, the parties only had one vehicle which they continued to share throughout this period. [para. 10] [ 10 ] The father eventually moved out of the marital home. Although there was a dispute as to when that occurred, the application judge accepted the father’s evidence that he left in May/June 2011.

With financial assistance from his family, the father was able to purchase a vehicle and secure furnishings for an apartment. The mother and child continued to reside in the family home, and use the family vehicle. [ 11 ] During this period, the father’s income continued to be deposited in the parties’ joint bank account. In June and July 2011, he took none of the money to cover his own living expenses. Beginning in August, he began transferring a portion of his pay into a personal account, initially between $300 and $400 biweekly.

In the fall of 2011, the father began paying monthly support payments to the mother in the amount of $1,250 (this amount was reduced to $650 in January, 2012, when the mother began working full time). These arrangements were made in the absence of any formal agreement between the parties with respect to support or the custody of their child. [ 12 ] In 2008 or 2009, the mother began an online friendship with D.W., a firefighter living in Chicago. They met in person for the first time during the summer of 2010, D.W. having travelled to New Brunswick to meet her.

Following this first face-to- face encounter, the mother travelled several times to see D.W. in Chicago: Once [the mother] and D.W. were certain that they wanted to be together, [the mother] began visiting D.W. in Chicago on a regular basis. [The mother] estimated she has travelled to Chicago on 13 occasions between the fall of 2010 and [August 2013]. In addition, D.W. travelled to New Brunswick in August of 2011 and on one other occasion before [the mother] became pregnant in the summer of 2012. August 2011 was the first time D.W. visited New Brunswick and stayed with [the mother] at the home on […] Street.

Since the fall of 2012, D.W. has been spending the vast majority of his time in New Brunswick. [para. 15]

[ 13 ] As the mobility of a child is at issue, it is necessary to briefly explain D.W.’s personal situation. He sustained a work-related injury as a firefighter with the Chicago Fire Department in April 2010. At the time, his annual salary was $122,000. He has been unable to work as a firefighter since his accident. His medical treatments and insurance coverage require his continued presence in Chicago, albeit not on a daily basis.

As stated by the application judge, D.W. began spending a considerable amount of time in this province. [ 14 ] When the father left the marital home in June 2011, the parties agreed to continue the same general approach to caring for their son described earlier. Weekends alternated between the mother and father, and the father cared for the child whenever the mother was working. The child began school in September of that year, with the attendant changes to the boy’s

schedule being worked out between the parties. At this time, there was still no formal agreement in place with respect to custody and access. [ 15 ] An event took place at school in the fall of that year which resulted in the intervention of the Department of Social Development, but as the Department investigated and was satisfied there was no cause for concern over S.L.’s safety, I need say no more on the subject. [ 16 ] The story of this family took an unfortunate turn in January 2012. At that time, the mother obtained a full-time position at the Moncton Hospital working days only.

This can only be seen as a positive development. However, as the mother was now at home each evening, she began restricting the father’s access to the child. He was limited to every second weekend, and one week during the summer, in spite of his repeated requests for more regular access. [ 17 ] In the fall of 2012, the mother filed a Notice of Application seeking sole custody of S.L. and to relocate with the child to Chicago. In March, 2013, the parties appeared before a judge of the Court of Queen’s Bench, Family Division, and secured their first court order in this matter.

The marital home was to be placed for sale. The parties were to have interim joint custody of their child, with the primary residence being with the mother. The father received increased, regular access with his son. The mother was permitted to take the child to Chicago for a single, two-week summer visit. The father was ordered to pay child support in the amount of $403 per month. Special expenses were to be shared on a pro-rated basis. [ 18 ] When the matter came before the application judge, the mother requested permission to relocate to Chicago with S.L.

They would live as a family unit with D.W. and the mother’s infant child. The mother and D.W. were to be married in August, 2013. The mother also outlined plans for an eventual further move, from Chicago to a small community with a population of 500 situated on a lake in rural Minnesota. The intention was to purchase and operate a resort using the proceeds of D.W.’s insurance. It was stated that D.W.’s mother and brother would be relocating to the same community.

The mother also requested retroactive spousal support. [ 19 ] In her decision, the application judge ordered that the parties were to have joint custody of their child, with the child’s primary residence remaining with the mother, but only until such time as the mother may relocate to the United States. Thereafter, the child’s primary residence was to be with the father. Detailed provisions for access were set out, involving the father prior to the relocation, and the mother post-relocation. The equity in the marital home was divided equally. The mother’s request for spousal support was rejected.

The father was ordered to continue paying child support, but his obligations would cease in the event of the mother’s relocation. Post-relocation, the mother would not be required to pay child support in order to fund the costs of access visits with the child. As suggested by the parties, each side was to bear their own costs. III. Issues [ 20 ] The mother’s Notice of Appeal alleges the application judge made the following errors: 1. In determining that the parties had a shared custody arrangement. 2.

In determining that beginning in January, 2012, the mother had unquestionably and without valid reasons restricted the father’s access with the child. 3. In determining that the mother had thwarted the father’s attempts to have access.

4. In determining that “the Appellant’s role as a psychological parent, her good faith and motives in requesting the relocation and thedesire to maintain the relationship between S.L. and his new little sister are all factors which allow for the move and are not offset by thegoal of maximizing contact with the access parent and controlling the disruption of the son’s life”. 5. In “ignoring the fact of the son’s contact to his little sister, the age of the child is not relevant in the sense of being an exceptionalground for the separation of siblings”. 6.

In denying spousal support on the basis of past benefits. [21] Although the Notice of Appeal characterizes all six of the above grounds of appeal as errors in law, I disagree. Inreality, the allegations concern supposed errors in fact, or at best, errors of mixed law and fact. IV. Law and Analysis A. Standard of Review [22] This Court has identified the applicable standard of review in family law cases on numerous occasions, to theextent it is not necessary to elaborate upon the standard yet again.

Suffice to say that considerable deference is owed to trial judges onmatters such as custody, access and spousal support. The jurisprudence on point was recently summarized by Larlee J.A. in Brooks v.Brooks, 2014 NBCA 29, [2014] N.B.J. No. 112 (QL): In family law matters, this Court takes the view that it must show considerable deference to the decisions in first instance. In MacDonaldv. MacDonald, 2011 NBCA 25, 372 N.B.R. (2d) 179, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [2011] S.C.C.A.

No. 237, the Court stated thefollowing: The standard of review that applies to family matters generally is that the judge's decision must be given considerable deference. Anappellate court is empowered to set aside or vary a decision or order where it is the product of an error of law, an error in principle, asignificant misapprehension of the evidence or if it is clearly wrong [...]. [para. 7] This principle has been iterated in our decisions: P.R.H. v. M.E.L., 2009 NBCA 18, 343 N.B.R. (2d) 100, at paras. 8 and 9; Smith v.Smith, 2011 NBCA 66, 375 N.B.R. (2d) 208, at para. 10; Doiron v.

Wilcox, 2012 NBCA 70, 393 N.B.R. (2d) 183, at paras. 9 to 11;C.M.H. v. J.R.H., 2012 NBCA 71, 393 N.B.R. (2d) 154, at para. 8; and Sangster v. Sangster, 2014 NBCA 14, [2014] N.B.J. No. 60 (QL),at para. 3. In MacLean v.

MacLean, 2004 NBCA 75, 274 N.B.R (2d) 90, the Court explained the standard when reviewing supportorders: Despite the ostensibly wide powers conferred upon appellate courts by s. 21(5) [of the Divorce Act], the proper approach to appellatereview of spousal support orders requires that an appellant court give considerable deference to the decision of the trial judge. [...] Thus,appellate courts are instructed that they "should not overturn support orders unless the reasons disclose an error in principle, a significantmisapprehension of the evidence, or unless the award is clearly wrong": see Hickey, (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 518 atpara. 11. [...] [para. 18] [para. 9] [23] Thus, in order for the mother in the present case to be successful, she must satisfy the Court that the decisionunder review is the product of an error in law, an error in principle, a significant misapprehension of the evidence, or that the decision isclearly wrong.

Alleged errors of fact or mixed law and fact must rise to the threshold of palpable and overriding error to warrantappellate intervention. In my opinion, the mother has not demonstrated reversible error on the part of the application judge. I willelaborate. B. Custody and Mobility

[24] The application judge properly identified the Supreme Court decision in Gordon v. Goertz, (SCC), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 27, [1996] S.C.J. No. 52 (QL), as the leading authority on questions of child custody and relocation. In thatlandmark case, McLachlin J., as she then was, held as follows: The law can be summarized as follows: 1. The parent applying for a change in the custody or access order must meet the threshold requirement of demonstrating a materialchange in the circumstances affecting the child. 2.

If the threshold is met, the judge on the application must embark on a fresh inquiry into what is in the best interests of the child,having regard to all the relevant circumstances relating to the child's needs and the ability of the respective parents to satisfy them. 3. This inquiry is based on the findings of the judge who made the previous order and evidence of the new circumstances. 4. The inquiry does not begin with a legal presumption in favour of the custodial parent, although the custodial parent's views areentitled to great respect. 5. Each case turns on its own unique circumstances.

The only issue is the best interest of the child in the particular circumstancesof the case. 6. The focus is on the best interests of the child, not the interests and rights of the parents. 7. More particularly the judge should consider, inter alia: (

a) the existing custody arrangement and relationship between the child and the custodial parent; (

b) the existing access arrangement and the relationship between the child and the access parent; (

c) the desirability of maximizing contact between the child and both parents; (

d) the views of the child; (

e) the custodial parent’s reason for moving, only in the exceptional case where it is relevant to that parent’s ability to meet the needs ofthe child; (

f) disruption to the child of a change in custody; (

g) disruption to the child consequent on removal from family, schools, and the community he or she has come to know. In the end, the importance of the child remaining with the parent to whose custody it has become accustomed in the new location mustbe weighed against the continuance of full contact with the child's access parent, its extended family and its community. The ultimatequestion in every case is this: what is in the best interests of the child in all the circumstances, old as well as new? [paras. 49-50]

[25] Another crucial step in the analysis was for the application judge to direct her mind to the framework fordetermining the best interests of the child. Again, she clearly identified the proper approach, relying upon the decision of Quigg J.A. inJ.A.D. v. L.D.D., 2010 NBCA 69, 364 N.B.R. (2d) 200. As here, that case involved parties going through or having gone through adivorce, which necessitated determining custody issues pursuant to the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2d Supp.) as opposed to provinciallegislation.

Given that the Divorce Act is silent on the definition of “best interests of the child”, this Court has long endorsed turning tothe Family Services Act, S.N.B. 1980, c. F-2.2, for guidance. Quigg JA. states: Thus, the Act instructs the court to “take into consideration only the best interests of the child of the marriage…”. As the Divorce Actdoes not provide a definition of the best interests of the child, this Court has approved the use of the definition of “best interests of thechild” contained in the Family Services Act, S.N.B. 1980, c. F-2.2 (see N.L. v.

R.L., 2008 NBCA 79 , 2008 NBCA 79, 337N.B.R. (2d) 197, C.M.B.E. v. D.J.E., 2006 NBCA 88 , 2006 NBCA 88, 304 N.B.R. (2d) 191, Ferris v. Ferris, 2002 NBCA 25,[2002] N.B.J. No. 96 (QL).

Section 1 of that Act reads as follows: “best interests of the child” means the bestinterests of the child under the circumstancestaking into consideration (

a) the mental, emotional and physical healthof the child and his need for appropriate careor treatment, or both; (

b) the views and preferences of the child,where such views and preferences can bereasonably ascertained; (

c) the effect upon the child of any disruptionof the child’s sense of continuity; (

d) the love, affection and ties that existbetween the child and each person to whomthe child’s custody is entrusted, each personto whom access to the child is granted and,where appropriate, each sibling of the childand, where appropriate, each grandparent ofthe child; (

e) the merits of any plan proposed by theMinister under which he would be caring forthe child, in comparison with the merits ofthe child returning to or remaining with hisparents; (

f) the need to provide a secure environmentthat would permit the child to become auseful and productive member of societythrough the achievement of his full potentialaccording to his individual capacity; and (

g) the child’s cultural and religious heritage; « intérêt supérieur de l’enfant » désignel’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant dans lescirconstances, compte tenu

a) de l’état de santé mentale, affective etphysique de l’enfant et du besoin qu’il a desoins ou de traitements convenables, ou desdeux;

b) des vues et préférences de l’enfantlorsqu’il est raisonnablement possible de lesconnaître;

c) de l’effet sur l’enfant de toute atteinte à lastabilité dont un enfant éprouve le besoin;

d) de l’amour, de l’affection et des liens quiexistent entre l’enfant et chaque personne à lagarde de qui il a été confié, chaque personnequi a obtenu le droit de lui rendre visite et, lecas échéant, chaque frère ou soeur de l’enfantet, le cas échéant, chaque grand-parent del’enfant;

e) des avantages de tout projet de prise encharge de l’enfant par le Ministre comparés àl’avantage pour l’enfant de retourner ou derester auprès de ses parents;

f) du besoin pour l’enfant d’être en sécurité,dans un milieu qui lui permette de réaliserpleinement son potentiel, selon ses aptitudespersonnelles et, ce faisant, de devenirmembre utile et productif de la société; et

g) du patrimoine culturel et religieux del’enfant; [para. 13]

The application judge proceeded to conduct her analysis using this framework. C. Shared Custody [ 26 ] In examining the nature of the custody and access arrangements between the parties, the judge did so “with the presumption that the parties have had an equally shared custody arrangement”. This statement forms the basis of the first ground of appeal. [ 27 ] In family law, the term “shared custody” has a specific meaning within the context of support payments pursuant to the Federal Child Support Guidelines .

Under s. 9 of the Guidelines , a “shared custody” arrangement is defined as follows: [A] spouse exercises a right of access to, or has physical custody of, a child for not less than 40 per cent of the time over the course of a year […] [ 28 ] The mother asserts such was not the situation given the facts of this case, and I agree, certainly after the father left the marital home and in particular after his access was significantly restricted.

However, I am fully satisfied this definition is not what the application judge was referring to, nor did she intend to suggest this was a shared custody arrangement for the purposes of calculating child support . She was simply stating that prior to the restricted access, these parents were raising their child jointly, and each spent a considerable amount of time with the child discharging parental responsibilities. [ 29 ] When reviewing the application judge’s reasons for decision, it is readily apparent why she used the phrase “shared custody”.

She was cognizant of and being attentive to the directions of this Court in P.R.H. v. M.E.L. , 2009 NBCA 18 , 343 N.B.R. (2d) 100 , per Larlee J.A., and in particular the following portion of that judgment: […] A proposed move is less likely to be approved where caregiving and physical custody have been equally shared between parents […] [para. 18] [ 30 ] The father was fully engaged in his son’s life, to an extent comparable to that of the mother, before the access changes outlined above took place. In my opinion, this ground of appeal is much ado about very little. There was no error here. D.

Restricted Access [ 31 ] Grounds two and three both deal with the father’s restricted access to his son, and the findings of the application judge on point. I intend to dispose of these grounds in short order. There was a clear evidentiary foundation upon which the application judge made the determinations she did. When the application judge found that the mother had “thwarted [the father’s] access attempts at every turn” based upon the evidence before her, it was fully open to her to make that finding of fact. I find no merit to these grounds. E.

Mobility Request [ 32 ] The application judge spent considerable time looking at the proposed move of S.L. to Chicago, and how such a move would impact upon the child’s relationship with his father. She also carefully considered the potential impact on the child of the converse, i.e. remaining in New Brunswick with the father when the mother relocated to Illinois. Maximizing contact between the child and both of his parents figured prominently in her analysis and her ultimate decision.

The application judge had real concerns with respect to the mother’s commitment to maximizing contact should the relocation be permitted. Similar concerns were not present with respect to the father should the child remain in this province.

[ 33 ] The application judge also expressed concern over not one but two significant disruptions to young S.L.’s life should the mother be permitted to relocate with her son. This concern stems from the mother’s stated intention to move from Chicago to McGregor, Minnesota, at some unspecified future date. [ 34 ] The following four paragraphs from the challenged decision encapsulate the application judge’s reasons for denying the request to relocate: A move to Chicago would mean that S.L. would rarely see his maternal grandparents and paternal grandmother, to whom he is close.

Furthermore, he would be very limited in his ability to visit with and spend time with his paternal cousins. Finally, it cannot be overlooked that despite Chicago’s rich cultural offerings, S.L. will not be exposed to the Acadian culture nor will he be able to profit from the early immersion school system in New Brunswick. […] Were S.L. to relocate to Chicago, he would be leaving behind everything he has known in his young life with the exception of his mother and his infant sister. S.L. loves and is attached to his father.

There is no question that [the father] has the capacity and the willingness to care for S.L. By remaining in New Brunswick, S.L. will continue in his school, continue with his classmates, continue to visit with his grandparents, continue to reside in his father’s home to which he is accustomed and continue to enjoy exposure to his French, Acadian culture. The disruption to S.L. in spending far less time with his mother cannot be underestimated. [The mother] is a very good parent who has been S.L.’s psychological parent throughout his young life.

However, the disruption to their relationship can be minimized by maximizing their access, using technology to ensure frequent communication and continuing to ensure S.L. spends time with his maternal grandparents. [The father] will ensure S.L.’s time with his mother is maximized and will accommodate all requests for contact via Skype and telephone. […] [The mother’s] request to relocate is being denied essentially for two reasons.

Firstly, the Court’s grave concerns about [the mother’s] ability and willingness to maximize [the father’s] access to S.L. should they move and second the uncertain nature of S.L.’s future in the States given the proposed move to Chicago followed by another potential move to Minnesota. While the Court fully appreciates the desire and benefit of maintaining siblings in the same household, S.L.’s access to his sister cannot trump his access to his father.

Were the Court to find that [the mother’s] demonstrated difficulties with respect to access and maximizing contact with [the father] along with the disruption such a move would cause for S.L. negates against an order allowing relocation, only to allow the relocation on the grounds that the siblings should not be separated, would be depriving S.L. of his regular access with his father at the expense of living with his sister. […] [The mother’s] request to relocate with S.L. to the United States is denied.

The attachment between S.L. and [his mother], [the mother’s] role as the psychological parent, [the mother’s] good faith motives for requesting the relocation and the desire to maintain the relationship between S.L. and his new little sister are all factors which are positive and at first blush tip the scales in favor of [the mother’s] request. However, when the negative factors of the goal of maximizing contact with the access parent and controlling the disruption to S.L.’s life are added to the scale, the weight of the negative factors exceeds those of the positive factors.

Given the circumstances of this case and the evidence before the Court, I am satisfied that to ensure S.L. enjoys maximum contact with both of his parents during his formative years requires that he remain with [his father] following [his mother’s] move to the United States.

I am equally satisfied that the solution which limits the inevitable disruption to S.L.’s life is in his short as well as long term best interests is that he remain in New Brunswick. [paras. 60, 62, 64, and 66] [ 35 ] I have taken the liberty of replicating this rather lengthy excerpt from the application judge’s decision for the following reason. Her words explain why she decided as she did much more eloquently than I could hope to summarize them. Furthermore, they stand as a full and complete answer to the allegations of error put forth by the mother.

In my opinion, the application judge was fully justified in her disposition of the request to relocate. She adhered fully to the applicable legal principles, conducted a thorough analysis, and rendered a fulsome and thoughtful decision. The fourth and fifth grounds of appeal do not meet the threshold for appellate intervention, and accordingly must be rejected.

F. Spousal Support [ 36 ] The sixth and final ground of appeal pertains to spousal support, and this Court is asked to remit the matter to the Court of Queen’s Bench “for reinterpretation”. The argument in support of this request was succinct, both in the appellant’s written brief and in her counsel’s oral submission. As outlined earlier, the scope for an appellate court to interfere with an order pertaining to spousal support is narrow. I am not convinced intervention is warranted here, and would reject this ground as well. V.

Conclusion and Disposition [ 37 ] In conclusion, it is apparent the application judge was fully seized of the fact that the issue she was being asked to decide with respect to this young boy’s life was of fundamental importance to his future and that of his parents. She did so according to law, and with an abundance of fairness, compassion and common sense. I would not disturb her findings, or her ultimate disposition of the case. [ 38 ] I would dismiss the appeal, and order the appellant mother to pay costs in the amount of $2,500. ___________________________ BRADLEY V. GREEN, J.A.

WE CONCUR: ____________________________ M.E.L. LARLEE, J.A. ____________________________ KATHLEEN A. QUIGG, J.A.