R. v. Daley, 2019 NBCA 89

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN APPELLANT SA MAJESTÉ LA REINE APPELANTE - and - - et - ROBERT DALEY RESPONDENT ROBERT DALEY INTIMÉ R. v. Daley, 2019 NBCA 89 R. c.

Daley, 2019 NBCA 89 CORAM: The Honourable Chief Justice Richard The Honourable Justice Green The Honourable Justice French CORAM : l’honorable juge en chef Richard l’honorable juge Green l’honorable juge French Appeal from a decision of the Court of Queen’s Bench: August 31, 2018 Appel d’une décision de la Cour du Banc de la Reine : le 31 août 2018 History of case: Decision under appeal: N/A Preliminary or incidental proceedings: N/A Historique de la cause : Décision frappée d’appel : s.o. Procédures préliminaires ou accessoires : s.o.

Appeal heard: April 9, 2019 Appel entendu : le 9 avril 2019 COURT OF APPEAL OF COUR D’APPEL DU NEW BRUNSWICK NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK 101-18-CA

Judgment rendered: December 19, 2019 Jugement rendu : le 19 décembre 2019 Reasons for judgment by: The Honourable Chief Justice Richard Motifs de jugement : l’honorable juge en chef Richard Concurred in by: The Honourable Justice Green The Honourable Justice French Souscrivent aux motifs : l’honorable juge Green l’honorable juge French Counsel at hearing: For the appellant: Kathryn Gregory, Q.C. For the respondent: Steve R. McNair Avocats à l’audience : Pour l’appelante : Kathryn Gregory, c.r. Pour l’intimé : Steve R.

McNair THE COURT [ 1 ] The Crown’s appeal against the finding the accused was unfit to stand trial is dismissed. LA COUR L’appel interjeté par le ministère public de la conclusion selon laquelle l’accusé était inapte à subir son procès est rejeté. The judgment of the Court was delivered by RICHARD, C.J.N.B. I. Introduction [1] In Canadian criminal law, a person is presumed fit to stand trial unless a court is satisfied otherwise on a balance of probabilities, with the burden of proving so falling on the party asserting the accused is unfit.

For unfitness to be proven, a court must find the accused suffers from a mental disorder and is unable to conduct a defence or to instruct counsel to do so. Among the criteria that would lead to such a determination is the accused’s inability on account of mental disorder to “communicate with counsel”: see definition of “unfit to stand trial” in s. 2 of the Criminal Code , R.S.C. 1985, c.

C-46 . [ 2 ] There is a line of cases, based on a Saskatchewan Court of Appeal decision, holding that the ability to communicate with counsel “is limited to an inquiry into whether an accused can recount to his or her counsel the necessary facts relating to the offence in such a way that counsel can then properly present a defence”: R. v. Jobb , 2008 SKCA 156 , [2008] S.J. No. 764 (QL) , at para. 39 . A more prevalent line of cases, based on an Ontario Court of Appeal decision, holds otherwise.

According to these decisions, it is not the accused’s ability to provide a reliable account of the events immediately preceding and surrounding the alleged crime that is the critical issue, but rather whether the accused is able, in real time, to “speak with counsel rationally, to understand questions and answer them in an intelligible fashion, and to make critical decisions on counsel’s advice, concerning the offence with which he is charged”: R. v. Morrissey , 2007 ONCA 770 , [2007] O.J. No. 4340 (QL) , at para. 56 , quoting the trial judge’s charge to the jury, leave to appeal denied, [2008] S.C.C.A.

No. 102 (QL).

[3] In my view, it is the more prevalent line of authorities that should be followed in NewBrunswick. It is the one the trial judge followed in this case. As explained below, I find no error in the judge’s charge to the jury on thequestion of fitness and, for that reason, I would dismiss the Crown’s appeal against the finding the accused was unfit to stand trial. II. Factual Background [4] Robert Daley was charged with touching a person under the age of sixteen for a sexual purpose (CriminalCode, s. 151(a)). The offence was alleged to have taken place sometime between 2009 and 2012.

At the time of his 2018 trial, Mr. Daleywas 83 years old and suffering from mixed vascular Alzheimer’s dementia. He elected to be tried before a judge and jury and pleaded notguilty. His lawyer argued Mr. Daley was unfit to stand trial. As a result, a separate trial on Mr. Daley’s fitness was ordered. [5] During this week-long trial, a jury heard expert medical evidence on the question of whether or not Mr.Daley’s mental disorder impacted his ability to conduct a defence or to instruct counsel to do so. Mr. Daley’s family physician, Dr. Jean-Pierre Arseneau, who had treated Mr. Daley since 2006, and Dr.

Ernest Clevinger, a neurologist, both testified that Mr. Daley was unfitto stand trial. Dr. Christopher Bryniak, a forensic psychiatrist who, pursuant to a court order, twice assessed Mr. Daley on the issue offitness, was of the opposite view. [6] While all three physicians agreed with the diagnosis of dementia, they were not unanimous on the severity ofhis illness nor on its impact on Mr. Daley’s fitness to stand trial. Dr. Bryniak opined that, while Mr.

Daley could not “represent” himselfat trial, he could instruct counsel for that purpose. [7] During a pre-charge conference between the trial judge and counsel, the distinction Dr. Bryniak had madebetween Mr. Daley not being able to represent himself but being able to instruct counsel for that purpose was a point of contention. Inaddition, there was a dispute regarding the governing legal principles. All agreed the seminal case on the matter was the decision of theOntario Court of Appeal in R. v. Taylor, (ON CA), [1992] O.J. No. 2394 (C.A.) (QL).

The test elaborated is known asthe “limited cognitive capacity test”. The Supreme Court adopted this test in R. v. Whittle, (CSC), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 914,[1994] S.C.J. No. 69 (QL), and it was applied by this Court in Penney v. R., 2010 NBCA 49, 362 N.B.R. (2d) 255. However, the test hasbeen the subject of divergent

interpretations. One

interpretation arises from Morrissey; the other derives from Jobb. Crown counsel urgedthe Court to adopt the Jobb

interpretation, but the trial judge instructed the jury according to Morrissey. The trial judge also informed thejury Dr. Bryniak was in error to suggest a distinction between being able to conduct a defence with or without counsel and emphasizedthat an accused person is either fit or unfit regardless of the presence or absence of counsel. The jury found Mr. Daley unfit to stand trial. III.

Issues on Appeal [8] The Crown submits the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the definition of “unfit to stand trial” andthe test for “limited cognitive capacity.” The Crown also asks this Court to determine whether the trial judge “erroneously instructed thejury with regard to a portion of the expert testimony from Dr. Bryniak such that the jury’s assessment of his evidence was improperlyimpacted.” IV. Analysis A.

Standard of review [9] Section 676(3) of the Criminal Code restricts the Crown’s right to appeal a fitness verdict to “any ground ofappeal that involves a question of law alone.” A trial judge’s failure to properly instruct a jury is an error of law, for which the standardof review is correctness: see Tucker v. R., 2018 NBCA 7, [2018] N.B.J. No. 15 (QL), at paras. 21-22. B. Did the trial judge err in his instructions to the jury on the definition of “unfit to stand trial?”

(1) Section 2 of the Criminal Code: “unfit to stand trial” [10]

Section 672.22 of the Criminal Code states that “[a]n accused is presumed fit to stand trial unless the court issatisfied on the balance of probabilities that the accused is unfit to stand trial.” An accused person’s fitness may be tried if “the court hasreasonable grounds […] to believe that the accused is unfit to stand trial”: s. 672.23(1). The party raising the issue of the accused’sfitness bears the burden of proof: s. 672.23(2). In this case, the defence applied to have Mr. Daley’s fitness tried; thus, it bore the burdenof establishing Mr. Daley’s unfitness on a balance of probabilities. [11]

Section 2 of the Criminal Code defines “unfit to stand trial” as follows: unfit to stand trial means unable on accountof mental disorder to conduct a defence atany stage of the proceedings before a verdictis rendered or to instruct counsel to do so,and, in particular, unable on account ofmental disorder to (

a) understand the nature or object of theproceedings, (

b) understand the possible consequences ofthe proceedings, or (

c) communicate with counsel. inaptitude à subir son procès Incapacité del’accusé en raison de troubles mentauxd’assumer sa défense, ou de donner desinstructions à un avocat à cet effet, à touteétape des procédures, avant que le verdict nesoit rendu, et plus particulièrement incapacitéde :

a) comprendre la nature ou l’objet despoursuites;

b) comprendre les conséquences éventuellesdes poursuites;

c) communiquer avec son avocat. [12] First, the accused must satisfy the condition of suffering from a “mental disorder,” which theCriminal Code defines as “a disease of the mind”: s. 2. This latter phrase was interpreted by Dickson J. (as he then was) in Cooper v. R., (CSC), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 1149, [1979] S.C.J.

No. 139 (QL): […] “disease of the mind” embraces any illness, disorder or abnormal condition which impairs the human mind and its functioning,excluding however, self-induced states caused by alcohol or drugs, as well as transitory mental states such as hysteria or concussion. [p.1159] [13] Second, the effect of the mental disorder must render the accused unable to conduct a defence or to instructcounsel to do so, in particular because of any one of the three criteria in paras. (a), (

b) or (c). If both steps of the unfitness test aresatisfied on a balance of probabilities, then the accused is unfit to stand trial.

(2) Application to the case at bar [14] In this case, both parties agreed that Mr. Daley suffered from a mixed vascular Alzheimer’s dementia, thoughthere was some dispute as to the extent of his mental disorder. The Crown has not raised any issue with respect to the actual existence ofa mental disorder. On the second step of the unfitness test – the effect of the mental disorder – para. (

a) is not at issue on this appeal. Theparties agreed that Mr. Daley met the low bar of understanding “the nature or object of the proceedings.” There was some disagreementover whether Mr. Daley understood “the possible consequences of the proceedings” (para. (b)), but the trial judge instructed the jury in amanner consistent with the Crown expert’s

interpretation and the defence has not contested this aspect of the instructions. [15] The trial judge properly identified para. (c) – the accused’s ability to meaningfully communicate with counsel– as the main point of contention at trial. Indeed, the primary issue raised in this appeal concerns whether the trial judge properlyidentified the appropriate legal test for communicating with counsel in his jury charge.

(3) Communicate with counsel [16] As noted, the analysis used to determine whether an accused is unfit to stand trial is the “limited cognitivecapacity test,” developed by Lacourcière J.A. in Taylor. In that case, the Court had to determine whether both the trial judge and theOntario Criminal Code Review Board had erroneously found the accused unfit to stand trial. Similar to the facts of this case, the primaryissue was whether the accused was able to communicate with counsel.

In determining the appropriate test to be applied under that thirdcriterion, the Court cited the position of the amicus curiae, which first introduced the governing test: Under the “limited cognitive capacity” test propounded by the amicus curiae, the presence of delusions do not vitiate the accused’sfitness to stand trial unless the delusion distorts the accused’s rudimentary understanding of the judicial process.

It is submitted thatunder this test, a court’s assessment of an accused’s ability to conduct a defence and to communicate and instruct counsel is limited to aninquiry into whether an accused can recount to his/her counsel the necessary facts relating to the offence in such a way that counsel canthen properly present a defence. It is not relevant to the fitness determination to consider whether the accused and counsel have anamicable and trusting relationship, whether the accused has been cooperating with counsel, or whether the accused ultimately makesdecisions that are in his/her best interests.

The amicus curiae relies on this court’s decision in Reference re R. v. Gorecki (No. 1) (1976), (ON CA), 14 O.R. (2d) 212, 32 C.C.C. (2d) 129 and R. v. Trecroce, supra. [para. 44] [17] Following a brief review of both Re Regina v. Gorecki (No. 1), (ON CA), [1976] O.J. No.2307 (C.A.) (QL), and R. v. Trecroce, (ON CA), [1980] O.J. No. 1352 (C.A.) (QL), Lacourcière J.A. endorsed thesecases as “set[ting] out the appropriate test at common law for unfitness” (para. 46). He addressed the contention that the assessment offitness should include whether an accused can appreciate their own best interests.

In response to this argument, Lacourcière J.A. madethe following comments regarding the principles underlying the fitness inquiry, as informed by Gorecki and Trecroce: To determine whether the test should be modified as suggested by the respondent, one must remain cognizant of the rationale for thefitness rules in the first place.

In order to ensure that the process of determining guilt is as accurate as possible, that the accused canparticipate in the proceedings or assist counsel in his/her defence, that the dignity of the trial process is maintained, and that, if necessary,the determination of a fit sentence is made possible, the accused must have sufficient mental fitness to participate in the proceedings in ameaningful way. At the same time, one must consider that principles of fundamental justice require that a trial come to a finaldetermination without undue delay.

The adoption of too high a threshold for fitness will result in an increased number of cases in whichthe accused will be found unfit to stand trial even though the accused is capable of understanding the process and anxious for it to cometo completion. In addition, adopting a high threshold of fitness, including a “best interests” component, derogates from the fundamental principle that anaccused is entitled to choose his own defence and to present it as he chooses. In R. v.

Swain, supra, at p. 970 S.C.R., p. 504 C.C.C.,Lamer C.J.C., for the majority, stressed the importance of the accused’s s.7 right to liberty which allows him to control his own defence.An accused who has not been found unfit to stand trial must be permitted to conduct his own defence, even if this means that the accusedmay act to his own detriment in doing so. The autonomy of the accused in the adversarial system requires that the accused should be ableto make such fundamental decisions and assume the risks involved.

The “limited cognitive capacity” test strikes an effective balance between the objectives of the fitness rules and the constitutional right ofthe accused to choose his own defence and to have a trial within a reasonable time. In asking the court to require that the accused be able to act in his own best interests, the respondent is asking this court to adopt thehigher threshold “analytic capacity” test for determining the accused’s fitness to stand trial.

This test has clearly been rejected by thecourts. [paras. 50–53] [18] Relying on this newly formulated test, Lacourcière J.A. ultimately held that it had been an error to adopt “a testwhich required the accused to be capable of making rational decisions beneficial to him in his relationship with counsel” (para. 57). [19] The analysis in Taylor reveals several important principles.

First, the limited cognitive capacity test is meant toensure that the accused is able to “participate in the proceedings in a meaningful way.” Second, the threshold for fitness should not be sohigh that an accused could be found unfit despite having the capacity to understand the process. Finally, whether the accused is capableof acting in their best interests forms no part of the limited cognitive capacity test. Indeed, the Court’s clear language indicates that poordecision-making, on its own, bears no impact on the accused’s fitness.

[20] The limited cognitive capacity test was cited with approval in Whittle. In that case, the Supreme Court had todetermine the requisite cognitive capacity for several pre-trial rights, including the confessions rule, the right to silence and waiving theright to counsel. In his analysis, Sopinka J. cited Taylor in describing the fitness to stand trial test: It requires limited cognitive capacity to understand the process and to communicate with counsel. In R. v.

Taylor (1992), (ON CA), 77 C.C.C. (3d) 551, the Ontario Court of Appeal, after reviewing the authorities, held that the trial judge erred inconcluding that the accused must be capable of making rational decisions beneficial to him. […] Accordingly, provided the accused possesses this limited capacity, it is not a prerequisite that he or she be capable of exercisinganalytical reasoning in making a choice to accept the advice of counsel or in coming to a decision that best serves her interests. [pp. 933-34] [21] Later, Sopinka J. adopted this standard when discussing an operating mind: In exercising the right to counsel or waiving the right, the accused must possess the limited cognitive capacity that is required for fitnessto stand trial.

The accused must be capable of communicating with counsel to instruct counsel, and understand the function of counseland that he or she can dispense with counsel even if this is not in the accused’s best interests. It is not necessary that the accused possessanalytical ability.

The level of cognitive ability is the same as that required with respect to the confession rule and the right to silence.The accused must have the mental capacity of an operating mind as outlined above. [pp. 941-42] Thus, Whittle confirmed the limited cognitive capacity test as the accepted analysis for fitness to stand trial and confirmed that it doesnot require an accused to have the capacity to make decisions in his or her best interests.

Moreover, Whittle held that the accused neednot possess “analytical ability,” but merely a capacity “to understand what he or she is saying and what is said.” [22] Most appellate decisions which cite Taylor, rely on it for the principle that the ability to act in one’s “bestinterests” does not form part of the limited cognitive capacity test analysis: see R. v. M.A.W., 2008 ONCA 555, [2008] O.J. No. 2738(QL), at para. 25; R. v. L.S.C., 2003 ABCA 105, [2003] A.J. No. 388 (QL), at para. 10; Children’s Aid Society of Halifax v. C.V., 2005NSCA 87, [2005] N.S.J. No. 217 (QL), at para. 33; and R. v.

Romanowicz, (ON CA), [1999] O.J. No. 3191 (C.A.)(QL), at para. 47. [23] Outside of the applicability of the best interests principle, however,

interpretations of the limited cognitivecapacity test’s content have diverged. In this context, the Ontario Court of Appeal later reviewed Taylor and clarified its principles.

(4) R. v. Morrissey: revising Taylor [24] In Morrissey, the Court addressed whether testimonial competence was a condition precedent to fitness to standtrial. The critical issue was whether, due to the accused’s retrograde amnesia, he was capable of communicating with counsel. ClarifyingTaylor, Blair J.A. first outlined the limited cognitive capacity test and noted that its “threshold is not high” and “requires only a relativelyrudimentary understanding of the judicial process — sufficient, essentially, to enable the accused to conduct a defence and to instructcounsel in that regard.

It is in that sense that the accused must be able ‘to communicate with counsel’ and relate the facts concerning theoffence” (para. 27). Following these comments, Blair J.A. reinterpreted the findings in Taylor: The Taylor test for limited cognitive capacity has been condensed in some authorities and commentaries — in my view, imprecisely —into a simple “inquiry into whether an accused can recount to his/her counsel the necessary facts relating to the offence in such a waythat counsel can then properly present a defence” (Taylor, supra, at para. 44): see R. v.

L.S.C., 2003 ABCA 105 , [2003] A.J.No. 388, 13 C.R. (6th) 390 (C.A.), at para. 10; R. v. Peepeetch, [2003] S.J. No. 542, 2003 SKCA 76, at para. 52. I make the followingobservations in this respect. First, the concept that the accused must be able to recount “the necessary facts relating to the offence in such a way that counsel can thenproperly present a defence” must be interpreted in a purposive and functional manner, in my view. It is intended to refer more broadly tothe accused person’s ability to recount the facts generally relating to the offence or offences with which he or she has been charged. It is

not intended to narrow the inquiry solely to the ability to relate the immediate facts pertaining to the particular incident giving rise to thecrime (e.g., the immediate events surrounding the actual shooting in this case). This makes sense, since the thrust of the concept ofunfitness to stand trial is that the accused is unable to conduct a defence or to instruct counsel to do so. The ability to communicate withcounsel in the context of a fitness inquiry speaks to the ability to seek and receive legal advice.

An inability to recount the factsimmediately connected with the event giving rise to the charges is not the same as an inability to communicate with counsel in a way thatpermits an accused to seek and receive effective legal advice. Moreover, there are instances where an accused may wish to — or may beable to do nothing but — formulate a defence based on the contention that he or she is unable to remember the events in question.

Secondly, even if the reference to the accused person’s ability to recount the facts relating to the offence is to be interpreted narrowly inthe sense of the ability to recount the events surrounding the criminal incident itself, then in my view Taylor is misconceived as standingfor that proposition. In making the comment referred to above, Lacourcière J.A. was simply reciting one of the submissions of amicus curiae on behalf of Mr.Taylor. This was followed immediately by a

summary of those submissions by amicus curiae that were accepted by Crown counsel, andwhich did not include the foregoing proposition. Lacourcière J.A. did not say that the Court accepted the contention of amicus curiae inthis regard. Indeed, it was unnecessary for him to consider it, as the issue in the case was not whether Mr. Taylor could recall the eventsof the crime, but rather whether he was so delusional that he was unable to instruct counsel in a manner that was reflective of his ownbest interests. It was the latter concern that was at issue in the case, and Taylor stands for the propositions that (

a) the “limited cognitivecapacity” test governs the determination of fitness to stand trial, and (

b) that this test does not require the accused person to be capable ofgiving instructions to counsel that are in his or her best interests. [paras. 28–31] [25] In summarizing his position, Blair J.A. also stated the following: An accused must be mentally fit to stand trial in order to ensure that the trial meets minimum standards of fairness and accords withprinciples of fundamental justice such as the right to be present at one’s own trial and the right to make full answer and defence: see R. v.Steele (1991), (QC CA), 63 C.C.C. (3d) 149, 4 C.R.R. (4th) 53 (Que.

C.A.), at pp. 172-173 and 181 C.R.; R. v.Roberts (1975), (BC CA), 24 C.C.C. (2d) 539 (B.C.C.A.). Meaningful presence and meaningful participation at thetrial, therefore, are the touchstones of the inquiry into fitness. [para. 36] [26] Blair J.A. dismissed any

interpretation which limits the test to asking whether the accused can “relate theimmediate facts pertaining to the particular incident giving rise to the crime.” He also stressed that the narrow

interpretation adopted insome subsequent cases was based on a submission of an amicus curiae, and not any independent judicial pronouncement. As a result, thelimited cognitive capacity test’s content must not be narrowly derived from the paragraph in Taylor that cited the amicus curiae’ssubmission. The mere capacity to recount the facts of an incident is not the threshold used to determine fitness.

Rather, the appropriatequestion is whether the accused can meaningfully participate in the trial by seeking and receiving legal advice. [27] This reinterpretation of Taylor in Morrissey has received significant support in subsequent jurisprudence. In R.v. Adam, 2013 ONSC 373, [2013] O.J. No. 222 (QL), the Court noted that, based on Morrissey, “the fitness inquiry demands anassurance that, despite suffering from a mental disorder, the accused person is able to receive a fair trial. In thiscontext, meaningful participation is required.

For an accused person in a criminal trial, meaningful participation can only mean theability to defend oneself” (para. 29) (emphasis in original). [28] In R. v. Thompson, 2011 ONCJ 209, [2011] O.J.

No. 1869 (QL), the Court also made the following commentswith respect to the Morrissey revision: […] The Court made a number of decisions in Morrissey beginning with the ruling that the ambit of being able to “communicate withcounsel”, an essential element of trial fitness, does not extend to or require that an accused be competent to testify about the criticalevents of the charge and relate those critical events to his counsel.

In order to arrive at that ruling the Court necessarily had to closelyexamine what is entailed by the requirement that an accused be able to “communicate with counsel” as those words are used in s. 2. Morrissey holds that the limited cognitive capacity threshold is not high. “It requires only a relatively rudimentary understanding of thejudicial process – sufficient, essentially, to enable the accused to conduct a defence and to instruct counsel in that regard. It is in thatsense that the accused must be able “to communicate with counsel” and relate the facts concerning the offence.”

The capacity to recount only needs to be a capacity for a general recounting. The capacity does not need to be a focused and fact specific one. It does not require an ability to relate the immediate events surrounding the alleged crime. Moreover, the extent of the ability to communicate with counsel required for trial fitness is simply the ability to seek and receive legal advice. Briefly put, if an accused can be meaningfully present and participate meaningfully at the trial, then that accused is fit to stand trial.

More fulsomely, Morrissey describes the “ability to communicate with counsel as the ability to communicate for the purposes of conducting a defence, considering counsel’s advice, and giving instructions with respect to the defence.” Put otherwise, the accused “must be physically, intellectually, linguistically and communicatively present and able to partake to the best of his natural ability in his full answer and defence to the charge against him. [paras. 11-14; citations omitted] [ 29 ] Further, in R. v. Amey , 2009 NSPC 29 , [2009] N.S.J.

No. 279 (QL) , the court had to determine whether an accused who was diagnosed with dementia and substance abuse with accompanying delusions was unfit to stand trial. After citing from Morrissey to establish the governing test, the court held as follows: The court distinguished “communicating the evidence” from “communicating with counsel.” They are related concepts but founded on different rationales. It said that testimonial competence was not a condition precedent to being fit to stand trial.

It held that being able to communicate with counsel does not necessarily entail the ability to testify about the critical events and relate them to one’s lawyer. At para. 27 Blair, J.A. criticized any reading of Taylor which reduced the test to a simple inquiry into whether the accused “could recount the necessary facts relating to the offence in such a way that counsel can properly present a defense.” At para. 9(

b) however, the court seemed to allow that amnesia of the immediate events “could be a factor in a finding of unfitness.” [...] My reading of Taylor and Morrissey is that an accused, to be considered fit, must possess the ability to engage with the trial process in a meaningful way. A fit accused would not be impervious to incriminating evidence; rather, he would be able to grasp its possible significance, able to appreciate that it might be accepted by the trier of fact. The trial process itself should make some impression on the accused. While it is generally agreed that Mr.

Amey understands that if convicted he could be subjected to a sentence, i.e. that he understands possible consequences of the proceedings, it is far from clear that events during the trial itself would have much impact on him. While he may possess an “in the moment” understanding, the more basic question is whether he possesses the ability to relate trial testimony to past events and to assess, at least on a rudimentary level, the [possible] veracity of such evidence.

Even with amnesia of the subject events an accused should be able to conceive that a trier of fact might make adverse findings based on the evidence of others. [paras. 51, 65] The accused was found fit in a later proceeding, but the deciding court confirmed these statements of law: see R. v. Amey , 2010 NSPC 100 , [2010] N.S.J. No. 742 (QL) . [ 30 ] Courts in British Columbia, Ontario, Québec, and Yukon have also endorsed Morrissey : see R. v. Miller , 2011 BCSC 1292 , [2011] B.C.J. No. 1801 (QL) , at paras. 23 and 25 ; R. v. Kaluza , 2010 QCCQ 3694 , [2010] Q.J. No. 4109 (QL) , at para. 47 ; R. v.

Nehass , 2014 YKTC 23 , [2014] Y.J. No. 117 (QL) , at paras. 58-67 ; R. v. Kathirkamapillai , 2016 ONCJ 377 , [2016] O.J. No. 3409 (QL) , at paras. 9-11 ; and R. v. Williams , 2012 ONSC 5851 , [2012] O.J. No. 4974 (QL) , at paras. 79 , 82-83.

(5) The Jobb

interpretation [ 31 ] In Jobb , the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal adopted the very principle from Taylor that had been rejected in Morrissey . Jobb also concerned an accused’s fitness to stand trial. In assessing the governing test, the Court stated the following: […] Taylor made it clear that the limited cognitive capacity test as it pertains to the requirement of an ability to communicate with counsel requires only that an accused be capable of recounting the facts of the alleged crimes .

Limited cognitive capacity does not require analytic ability or, indeed, the need for the accused to appreciate his own best interest. In short, these authorities establish a very low threshold for fitness to stand trial in keeping with the policy objectives of the Criminal Code , and, in particular, with the right of the accused to make full answer and defence to the allegations with which he is charged. [para. 21] [Emphasis added.]

[ 32 ] At the judgment’s conclusion, the Court further remarked: […] That Mr.

Jobb be able to participate in his defence in “a meaningful way or assist his counsel during the course of a trial” is not, with respect, an accurate application of the limited cognitive capacity test, which requires only that he be able to recount the facts of the offences with which he is charged to his counsel . [para. 43] [Emphasis added.] [ 33 ] Thus, while the Court also held that the limited cognitive capacity test is a low threshold, it diverged from the Ontario Court of Appeal in holding that an accused need only “be capable of recounting the facts of the alleged crimes.” Indeed, this is in direct conflict with the conclusion drawn by Blair J.A. in Morrissey when he said that the test is “ not intended to narrow the inquiry solely to the ability to relate the immediate facts pertaining to the particular incident giving rise to the crime.” Notably, the judgment in Jobb makes no reference to Morrissey , despite being released just over one year later. [ 34 ] In contrast to Morrissey , there are far fewer cases which exclusively cite Jobb.

In R. v. Firingstoney , 2017 ABQB 343 , [2017] A.J. No. 601 (QL) , the trial judge cited Jobb but also relied on the fact that the accused had “the ability to understand the trial process and the capacity to participate and make decisions with the support of counsel” (para. 102). Thus, although the case relied on Jobb , the result did not turn on whether the accused was able to recount the facts of the case; rather, it seemed to reflect the somewhat higher threshold of participation propounded in Morrissey . R. v. T.A.S. , 2017 SKQB 218 , [2017] S.J.

No. 312 (QL) appears to have followed Jobb (see para. 17 ) in a fitness to stand trial determination; but, that is not surprising, being a lower court decision from the same jurisdiction in which Jobb was decided. [ 35 ] The jurisprudence which cites Jobb and not Morrissey is quite limited. This certainly suggests that the Morrissey framework for addressing the limited cognitive capacity test has been more persuasive than the propositions advanced in Jobb .

(6) Reconciling Morrissey and Jobb [ 36 ] Several cases have cited both authorities in interpreting the test for fitness to stand trial. In some cases, the court has preferred Jobb over Morrissey . For example, in R. v. RCMc , 2011 SKPC 61 , [2011] S.J. No. 243 (QL) , Agnew J. noted the differing

interpretations of unfitness with respect to communicating with counsel: “How the ‘limited cognitive capacity’ standard is to be applied to the third branch of the fitness test, the ability to communicate with counsel, is a matter of some dispute. There are two major streams of thought […]” (para. 25).

After reviewing Morrissey and Jobb , Agnew J. clearly adopted the Jobb analysis, whereby a “court’s assessment of an accused’s ability to communicate with and instruct counsel is limited to an inquiry into whether an accused can recount to their counsel the necessary facts relating to the offence in such a way that counsel can then properly present a defence” (para. 31). Agnew J. did not explain the basis for preferring Jobb to Morrissey , but the principle of stare decisis provides a strong inference (see also R. v. Proulx , 2011 SKPC 128 , [2011] S.J.

No. 477 (QL) , at paras. 66 , 82, 92 and 95). [ 37 ] In other cases, however, even within Saskatchewan, courts have been inconclusive as to whether Morrissey or Jobb should be preferred. In R. v. Goyak , 2016 SKPC 168 , [2016] S.J. No. 722 (QL) , for example, the court commented on the differing

interpretations of the limited cognitive capacity test in Morrissey and Jobb : There is a divergence in the law surrounding the application of the limited cognitive capacity standard to the third branch of the fitness test. At one end of the spectrum is the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal decision in Jobb which held that an accused must only be capable of recounting the facts of the alleged offences. […] In Jobb the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal did not consider the Ontario Court of Appeal decision in R. v. Morrissey , 2007 ONCA 770 [ Morrissey ] ; leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada denied:

(2008) S.C.C.A. No 102, which represents the other end of the spectrum that the ability to communicate with counsel also includes the ability to seek and receive legal advice so that the accused can participate in the proceedings in a meaningful way. [paras. 27, 28]

[ 38 ] Rather than reconciling these two cases, however, Rybchuk J. merely noted that the accused, Mr. Goyak, “does not meet the test at either end of the spectrum in this case” (para. 30). He was unable to “articulate words and describe events” (para. 33) but also “unable to register information, store information and recall information necessary to understand the nature of the charges and communicate with his lawyer. […] Thus, Mr. Goyak was also incapable of seeking or receiving legal advice and participating in the proceedings in a meaningful way” (paras. 34-35). In finding Mr.

Goyak unfit to stand trial, Rybchuk J. upheld the findings in both Morrissey and Jobb while acknowledging, but not resolving, their conflicting tests. [ 39 ] Similarly, in R. v. Iyoho , 2009 ABPC 262 , [2009] A.J. No. 950 (QL) , the court cited both Morrissey and Jobb as two of the “authorities” for fitness (para. 57), but primarily relied on Taylor and the principle from Morrissey that an “accused’s testimonial competence was not a component of the definition of fitness to stand trial” (para. 82).

With respect to the communication criterion, the Court found that “[a]pplying the limited cognitive capacity test, the paranoid delusions of persecution, experienced by the accused, diminish even a rudimentary understanding of the process and his being able to instruct Counsel so as to make full answer and defence” (para. 87). As such, the court did not rely on the specific findings of either Morrissey or Jobb , nor did it provide further insight as to which authority is more persuasive. [ 40 ] Unlike the cases above, in R. v. Eisnor , 2013 NSSC 241 , [2013] N.S.J.

No. 390 (QL) , the court explicitly addressed the disjuncture, ultimately finding that Morrissey was the more appropriate test. McDougall J. made the following critical observations: The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal did not cite Morrissey in Jobb . In his brief before the Provincial Court, Mr. Burrill, counsel for the accused, suggests that Jobb is significant in that it “recognizes, post- Morrissey , that there is a necessity to hear evidence regarding the ability/inability to recount the offence,” of which there is “an abundance” in the present case.

To the extent that Jobb can be read as differing from, or expanding upon, Morrissey , I am of the opinion that Morrissey provides a clearer and more persuasive analysis. [para. 36] [ 41 ] In support of this position, McDougall J. cited both Amey and Adam before concluding that “the caselaw does not stipulate that ‘meaningful participation’ demands a specific recollection of the events relating to the charge. The question is, rather, whether the accused is capable of engaging in a rational way with the trial process” (para. 41). In a later fitness decision involving the same accused, R. v.

Eisnor , 2013 NSSC 263 , [2013] N.S.J. No. 584 (QL) , McDougall J. again affirmed the principles from his earlier decision: In the case that is before me, the only real issue respecting Mr. Eisnor’s level of fitness to stand trial that could be put to a jury is his inability to remember the events immediately surrounding the alleged events and for the six month period preceding it and also for a much shorter period in its aftermath.

No one is challenging that the accused has retrograde amnesia which prevents him from communicating to his counsel his version of the events that has led to the charge that is now before the Court. It is clear from my reading of Morrissey that this fact, in and of itself [emphasis added], is not sufficient to render the accused unfit to stand trial. [paras. 26-27] [ 42 ] These principles were later affirmed by the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in R. v. Eisnor , 2015 NSCA 64 , [2015] N.S.J. No. 257 (QL) : Here, the appellant was able to plead and properly stand his trial.

He understood the nature and object of the proceedings, and the possible consequences, and he could communicate rationally with counsel. The only claim to say he was not fit was his lack of memory of the events. That alone, is insufficient. [para. 143] [ 43 ] Unlike the other cases, which either came out of Saskatchewan or did not resolve the conflict between Morrissey and Jobb , Eisnor provided a clear treatment of the conflict and a reasoned analysis for why Morrissey is the preferred authority for the content of the limited cognitive capacity test.

In Eisnor , Beveridge J.A., for the Court, undertook a comprehensive review of the history leading to the current provision on fitness to stand trial and its current

interpretation. I can do no better than refer to it and adopt it.

(7) New Brunswick cases

[44] In New Brunswick, lower courts have demonstrated a clear preference for Morrissey, but there have been aminimal number of cases on this point. In R. v. R.L.F., 2010 NBPC 35, 365 N.B.R. (2d) 54, the court did not cite Jobb or comment on itsconflict with Morrissey in addressing the accused’s fitness to stand trial. However, Jackson C.J.P.C. (as he then was) relied heavily onthe findings of Morrissey and R. v. Steele, (QC CA), [1991] J.Q.

No. 240 (C.A.) (QL), a case predating Taylor inwhich Fish J.A. (as he then was), “came to a similar conclusion as to the necessary qualities an accused must have in order to be able toconduct his defence […]” (para. 9). With respect to Morrissey, Jackson C.J.P.C. determined that “[w]hile an accused must only have arudimentary understanding of the judicial process, the right to make full answer and defence requires something more than mere physicalpresence at trial” (para. 8).

He continued with the following statement: Given the clear limitations of R.L.F. in vocabulary, in conversing with strangers, and in comprehending abstract concepts such as guilt,innocence or motive, it is clear to me that he is incapable of participating in any meaningful way in the trial process including hisinability to discuss options with counsel and to give or receive instructions through the course of the trial. I am therefore satisfied on abalance of probabilities that R.L.F. is unfit to stand trial. [para. 10] [45] In R. v. A.J.B., 2015 NBQB 42, [2014] N.B.J.

No. 344 (QL), Walsh J. heard a motion to determine whetherthere were reasonable grounds to believe the accused was unfit to stand trial. In reviewing the governing authorities on point, he citedR.L.F. and the principles in Morrissey, but not Jobb. On this basis, the court relied on the testimony of the accused’s adult son, theaccused’s defence counsel, and the opinion of an expert witness.

Although Walsh J. did not engage in a fulsome analysis by comparingthe evidence to the test from Morrissey, he assessed the evidence presented, including the son’s testimony that his father “‘[didn’t] seemto grasp why he was here’”(para. 17), the solicitor’s position that he had “considerable doubt over his client’s ability to effectivelycommunicate, engage and understand” (para. 18), and finally the expert’s report showing that “scores obtained from the accused usingthe Montreal Cognitive Assessment […] reveal […] an actual overlap between mild cognitive impairment and dementia […] on theborderline” (para. 23).

On this basis, Walsh J. found that there were “reasonable grounds to believe that the accused is unfit to stand trial,such that a jury should decide if the accused is or is not unfit” (para. 25). [46] Despite the lower courts’ reliance on Morrissey, this Court, in Penny v. R., 2010 NBCA 49, 362 N.B.R. (2d)255, referred only to Jobb and did not mention Morrissey in a case where the issue was not an accused’s fitness to stand trial. [47] In Penny, on the heels of a conviction for aggravated assault, the accused was found to be a dangerous offenderand sentenced to an indeterminate term in a federal penitentiary.

He appealed both his conviction and indeterminate term of incarcerationon several grounds, one being that he was sentenced without adequate consideration of his mental health. He argued that, beforesentencing him, the judge should have ordered a trial on the fitness issue. In disposing of this ground, Quigg J.A., for the Court,reviewed some of the authorities on the question of fitness to stand trial. In doing so, she referred to Jobb and other cases but in the endconcluded there was nothing on the record to “reveal where [Mr. Penny’s] fitness to stand trial could have come into question” (para.42).

As Crown counsel in the present case concedes, Penny was not a case that “necessitated an examination of the conflictinginterpretations in Morrissey and Jobb.” Thus, in this Court, the issue until now remains open.

(8) Conclusion [48] The above caselaw demonstrates that when Jobb has, on occasion, been cited instead of Morrissey, it has rarelybeen exclusively used outside of Saskatchewan, and seldom relied on for the contentious proposition that the accused is fit if they havethe ability to recount the facts of the case to counsel. In contrast, the Morrissey

interpretation has gained considerable force in thecaselaw, and has been relied on to the exclusion of Jobb more frequently. Moreover, when courts have relied on both authorities, theyhave usually either failed to resolve the conflict between the two, or, as in Eisnor, have found that Morrissey is the better

interpretation.This is a sensible result given that Morrissey was an explicit revision of a former decision by the same Court and predates Jobb, a furtherindication that Morrissey carries more precedential value. Jobb’s failure to comment on Morrissey suggests that the decision was madein isolation of Morrissey’s critical revision of Taylor, and thus does not consider the Ontario Court of Appeal’s current enunciation of thefitness to stand trial test. Based on all of these factors, and for the reasons Beveridge J.A. gave in Eisnor, I conclude the Morrisseyapproach is the one to be applied. It follows that, in adopting the Morrissey

interpretation of the limited cognitive capacity test, the trialjudge made no error in law in his instructions to the jury. C. Did the trial judge err in his instructions regarding Dr. Bryniak’s expert testimony? [49] The critical point of contention in this ground of appeal is whether, in cautioning the jury respecting Dr.Bryniak’s expert testimony, the trial judge erred in law. During the trial, Crown counsel conducted a direct examination of Dr. Bryniakand asked his opinion as to whether the accused was fit to stand trial. In response, Dr. Bryniak, indicated that Mr.

Daley was not fit “torepresent himself” but he did clarify that, “through communicating with counsel – an attorney to assist in his defense – yes, I think that hecan.” On this basis, the trial judge noted the following in his instructions to the jury:

When Dr. […] Bryniak testified that Mr. Daley was unfit in one scenario, but fit in the other scenario, he was in serious error in his legalassumption that there is a difference. He never explained it. I don’t know why he did that differentiation. And […] he appears to haveconflated or confused the notion of whether a person is fit to stand trial with the notion of whether or not a person is competent to defendthemselves at a trial for the reason I illustrated.

To this extent, it is again necessarily what he said there, the difference he made, in myopinion, seriously affects the weight to be given to his opinion that Mr. Daley is fit to stand trial. Said differently, you really need towonder and be concerned how that legal – that erroneous legal assumption infected Dr. Bryniak’s opinion that Mr. Daley was fit toinstruct counsel. [50] Mr. Daley rightly submits that there are not two different standards of fitness depending on whether theaccused is represented at trial. This was clearly articulated in R. v. Peepeetch, 2003 SKCA 76, [2003] S.J.

No. 542 (QL): As noted in Whittle, there is not a higher standard for determining whether the accused (appellant) can represent himself. Once anaccused is determined to be fit to stand trial on the test as set forth in s. 672.22 that the accused is able to understand the nature or objectof the proceedings; to understand the possible consequences of the proceedings; or to communicate with counsel, then he or she iscapable to choose whether or not to defend himself or herself.

As Lamer C.J. stated in Swain: … An accused who has not been found unfit to stand trial must be considered capable of conducting his or her own defence. [para. 65] [51] Thus, it would be an error of law to find that there is a different fitness standard for those who have legalrepresentation and for those who do not. [52] In the case at bar, however, it is admittedly unclear whether Dr. Bryniak was proposing two different standardsof fitness. As confirmed by the parties’ submissions, there are two viable

interpretations of his testimony on this point. First, he mayhave been incorrectly applying two different fitness standards based on whether the accused had representation.

Second, as the Crownsubmits, he may have been “making a distinction between competency and fitness”, and that “[i]f Dr. [Bryniak] was referencing aconcern that the Respondent could not navigate the complexities of trial from a fairness perspective as opposed to what he understoodthe basic fitness level to be, the very fact of the introduction of this distinction should have prompted the trial judge to explain theconcepts to the jury and leave it to them to determine what he meant by the distinction”. [53] However, as the Crown concedes, there is no obligation on a judge to supply a meaning to expert testimony.

InThériault v. The Queen, (CSC), [1981] 1 S.C.R. 336, [1981] S.C.J. No. 32 (QL), Dickson J. (as he then was) held thefollowing: With respect, I agree with Jacques J.A. and Mr. Justice Lamer that there is no obligation on the trial judge to interpret the testimony ofexperts. Mr. Justice Kaufman speaks of the risk of “losing precision.” Equally grave is the danger of error in translating technicallanguage into common and everyday vernacular. If the testimony is highly technical counsel who has called the expert witness shouldask the witness to explain himself in language the layman can understand.

The judge may, in his discretion, decide that somesimplification is desirable but failure on his part to undertake this difficult and potentially hazardous task is not, in my view, reversibleerror. [p. 342] [54] This principle was also affirmed later in R. v.

Daley, 2007 SCC 53, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 523, where Bastarache J.held that “[i]t is a long-held principle of our criminal justice system that it is the role of the jury to draw inferences from the evidenceand that this is a sphere trial judges should enter with extreme caution, if at all” (para. 61). [55] In this regard, it was not incumbent on the trial judge to interpret or explain the expert testimony offered by Dr.Bryniak. Moreover, while the trial judge clearly conveyed his hesitation regarding the weight to be given to Dr. Bryniak’s testimony, healso stressed two additional points to the jury.

First, it was not entirely clear what Dr. Bryniak meant when he made the distinctionbetween representation alone and representation by counsel, leaving open the possibility that he could have “conflated or confused thenotion of whether a person is fit to stand trial with the notion of whether or not a person is competent to defend themselves at a trial[…]”. Second, he impressed upon the jury that it was their responsibility to weigh the experts’ evidence: “You really need to wonder andbe concerned how that legal – that erroneous legal assumption infected Dr.

Bryniak’s opinion.” [56] The trial judge’s opinion concerning the potentially erroneous nature of Dr. Bryniak’s evidence was clear, and

his decision to merely present Dr. Bryniak’s position as he stated it, noting its potential confusion, does not constitute reversible error. V. Disposition [ 57 ] For these reasons, I would dismiss the Crown’s appeal. Version française du jugement de la Cour rendu par LE JUGE RICHARD, J.C.N.-B. I. Introduction [1] En droit criminel canadien, une personne est présumée apte à subir son procès, sauf si un tribunal en est autrement convaincu selon la prépondérance des probabilités, le fardeau de cette preuve incombant ainsi à la

partie invoquant l’inaptitude de l’accusé. Pour que l’inaptitude soit prouvée, un tribunal doit conclure que l’accusé souffre de troubles mentaux et qu’il est incapable d’assumer sa défense ou de donner des instructions à un avocat à cet effet. Figure parmi les critères qui mèneraient à cette détermination l’incapacité de l’accusé, en raison de troubles mentaux, de « communiquer avec son avocat » : voir la définition du terme « inaptitude à subir son procès » à l’ art. 2 du Code criminel , L.R.C. 1985, ch.

C-46 . [2] Il existe un courant jurisprudentiel, fondé sur une décision de la Cour d’appel de la Saskatchewan, selon lequel la capacité de communiquer avec son avocat [TRADUCTION] « se limite à déterminer si un accusé peut relater à son avocat les faits nécessaires se rapportant à l’infraction pour permettre ensuite à ce dernier de présenter comme il se doit une défense » : R. v. Jobb , 2008 SKCA 156 , [2008] S.J. No. 764 (QL) , au par. 39 . Un courant jurisprudentiel plus répandu, fondé sur une décision de la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario, abonde dans le sens contraire.

Selon cette série de décisions, la question cruciale n’est pas la capacité de l’accusé de fournir un récit fiable des événements survenus immédiatement avant le crime reproché et les circonstances de celui-ci, mais plutôt de savoir si l’accusé est capable, en temps réel, de [TRADUCTION] « communiquer rationnellement avec son avocat, de comprendre les questions et d’y répondre de façon intelligible, et de prendre d’importantes décisions compte tenu des conseils de son avocat, relativement à l’infraction qu’on lui reproche » : R. v. Morrissey , 2007 ONCA 770 , [2007] O.J.

No. 4340 (QL) , au par. 56 , citant l’exposé de la juge du procès au jury, demande d’autorisation d’appel rejetée, [2008] C.S.C.R. n o 102 (QL). [3] À mon avis, c’est le courant jurisprudentiel le plus largement accepté qui devrait être suivi au Nouveau-Brunswick. C’est celui que le juge du procès a suivi en l’espèce.

Comme je vais l’expliquer, je conclus que le juge du procès n’a commis aucune erreur dans son exposé au jury sur la question de l’aptitude et, pour cette raison, je suis d’avis de rejeter l’appel interjeté par le ministère public de la conclusion selon laquelle l’accusé était inapte à subir son procès. II. Contexte factuel [4] Robert Daley a été accusé d’avoir touché un enfant âgé de moins de seize ans à des fins d’ordre sexuel ( Code criminel , al. 151a) ). L’infraction aurait été commise à un moment donné entre 2009 et 2012. Au moment de son procès en 2018, M.

Daley était âgé de 83 ans et souffrait de démence mixte (maladie d’Alzheimer et démence vasculaire). Il a choisi d’être jugé devant juge et jury et a plaidé non coupable. Son avocat a soutenu que M. Daley était inapte à subir son procès. Par conséquent, un procès distinct sur l’aptitude de M. Daley a été ordonné. [5] Au cours du procès d’une semaine, un jury a entendu des témoignages de médecins experts sur la question de savoir si les troubles mentaux de M. Daley avaient une incidence sur sa capacité d’assumer sa défense ou de donner des instructions à son avocat à cet effet.

Le D r Jean-Pierre Arseneau, médecin de famille de M. Daley qui le traitait depuis 2006, et le

Dr Ernest Clevinger, neurologue, ont tous deux témoigné que M. Daley était inapte à subir son procès. Le Dr Christopher Bryniak,psychiatre judiciaire ayant évalué M. Daley à deux reprises sur la question de l’aptitude en application d’une ordonnance judiciaire, étaitd’avis contraire. [6] Les trois médecins étaient d’accord avec le diagnostic de démence, mais n’étaient pasunanimes sur la gravité de la maladie de M. Daley et sur l’incidence de celle-ci sur l’aptitude de ce dernier à subir son procès. Le Dr Bryniak était d’avis que, bien que M.

Daley ne puisse pas se [TRADUCTION] « représenter » lui-même au procès, il pouvait donnerdes instructions à son avocat à cet effet. [7] Au cours de la discussion préalable aux instructions entre le juge du procès et les avocats, la distinction faite par le Dr Bryniak entre l’inaptitude de M. Daley à se représenter lui-même et l’aptitude de ce dernier à donner desinstructions à son avocat à cet effet était un point de discorde. Il y avait également un litige sur les principes juridiques applicables.

Tousont convenu que l’arrêt faisant autorité sur la question était la décision de la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario dans l’affaire R. v. Taylor, (ON CA), [1992] O.J. No. 2394 (C.A.) (QL). Le critère qui y est élaboré est connu comme le « critère de la capacitécognitive limitée ». La Cour suprême l’a adopté dans l’arrêt R. c. Whittle, (CSC), [1994] 2 R.C.S. 914, [1994] A.C.S. no 69 (QL), tout comme notre Cour l’a appliqué dans Penny c. R., 2010 NBCA 49, 362 R.N.-B. (2e) 255. Toutefois, le critère a faitl’objet d’interprétations divergentes.

Une interprétation découle de l’arrêt Morrissey; une autre découle de l’arrêt Jobb. L’avocate duministère public a exhorté la Cour à adopter l’interprétation retenue dans l’arrêt Jobb, mais le juge du procès a donné les directives au jury selon l’interprétation retenue dans l’arrêt Morrissey. Le juge du procès a également informé le jury que le Dr Bryniak a erronémentproposé une distinction entre l’aptitude à assumer sa défense avec ou sans avocat et a souligné qu’un accusé est soit apte soit inapte, sanségard à la présence ou à l’absence d’un avocat. Le jury a déclaré M. Daley inapte à subir son procès. III.

Questions à trancher en appel [8] Le ministère public soutient que le juge du procès a commis une erreur dans ses directives aujury sur la définition du terme « inaptitude à subir son procès » et sur le critère de la « capacité cognitive limitée ». Le ministère publicdemande également à notre Cour de déterminer si le juge du procès [TRADUCTION] « a donné des directives erronées au jury sur une

partie du témoignage d’expert du Dr Bryniak de sorte que l’évaluation par le jury de son témoignage a été indûment influencée ». IV. Analyse A. Norme de contrôle [9] Le paragraphe 676(3) du Code criminel restreint le droit du ministère public d’interjeter appeld’un verdict portant sur l’aptitude d’un accusé à subir son procès à « tout motif d’appel qui comporte une question de droit seulement ».L’omission d’un juge de première instance de donner des directives appropriées au jury est une erreur de droit et la norme de contrôle qui s’applique est celle de la décision correcte : voir Tucker c.

R., 2018 NBCA 7, [2018] A.N.-B. no 15 (QL), aux par. 21 et 22. B. Le juge du procès a-t-il commis une erreur dans ses directives au jury sur la définition du terme « inaptitude à subir sonprocès »?

(1) Article 2 du Code criminel : « inaptitude à subir son procès » [10] L’article 672.22 du Code criminel prévoit que « [l]’accusé est présumé apte à subir son procèssauf si le tribunal, compte tenu de la prépondérance des probabilités, est convaincu de son inaptitude ». L’inaptitude d’un accusé peutêtre instruite si « [l]e tribunal [...] a [...] des motifs raisonnables de croire que l’accusé est inapte à subir son procès » : par. 672.23(1). Lacharge de la preuve incombe à la

partie qui soulève la question de prouver l’aptitude de l’accusé à subir son procès : par. 672.23(2). Enl’espèce, la défense a demandé que l’aptitude de M. Daley soit déterminée; il lui incombait, par conséquent, d’établir l’inaptitude deM. Daley selon la prépondérance des probabilités. [11] Voici la définition du terme « inaptitude à subir son procès » donnée à l’art. 2 du Codecriminel :

unfit to stand trial means unable on accountof mental disorder to conduct a defence atany stage of the proceedings before a verdictis rendered or to instruct counsel to do so,and, in particular, unable on account ofmental disorder to (

a) understand the nature or object of theproceedings, (

b) understand the possible consequences ofthe proceedings, or (

c) communicate with counsel; inaptitude à subir son procès Incapacité del’accusé en raison de troubles mentauxd’assumer sa défense, ou de donner desinstructions à un avocat à cet effet, à touteétape des procédures, avant que le verdict nesoit rendu, et plus particulièrement incapacitéde :

a) comprendre la nature ou l’objet despoursuites;

b) comprendre les conséquences éventuellesdes poursuites;

c) communiquer avec son avocat. [12] D’abord, l’accusé doit satisfaire à la condition de souffrir de « troubles mentaux », terme définidans le Code criminel comme s’entendant de « [t]oute maladie mentale » : art. 2. Le juge Dickson (tel était alors son titre) a interprété cette définition dans Cooper c.

R., (CSC), [1980] 1 R.C.S. 1149, [1979] A.C.S. no 139 (QL) : […] « maladie mentale » comprend toute maladie, tout trouble ou tout état anormal qui affecte la raison humaine et son fonctionnement àl’exclusion, toutefois, des états volontairement provoqués par l’alcool ou les stupéfiants, et des états mentaux transitoires commel’hystérie ou la commotion. [p. 1159] [13] Ensuite, les conséquences des troubles mentaux doivent rendre l’accusé incapable d’assumer sadéfense ou de donner des instructions à son avocat à cet effet, et plus particulièrement, pour l’un ou l’autre des trois critères indiqués auxal. a),

b) ou c). Si les deux étapes du critère de l’inaptitude sont franchies selon la prépondérance des probabilités, alors l’accusé estinapte à subir son procès. (2) Application au cas qui nous occupe [14] En l’espèce, les deux parties ont convenu que M. Daley souffrait de démence mixte (maladied’Alzheimer et démence vasculaire), mais l’ampleur de ses troubles mentaux demeurait un point de désaccord. Le ministère public n’asoulevé aucune question sur l’existence réelle de troubles mentaux. À la deuxième étape du critère de l’inaptitude – les conséquences destroubles mentaux – l’al.

a) n’est pas visé par le présent appel. Les parties ont convenu que M. Daley remplissait le critère peu exigeant decomprendre « la nature ou l’objet des poursuites ». Un désaccord persistait sur la question de savoir si M.

Daley comprenait « lesconséquences éventuelles des poursuites » (al. b)), mais le juge du procès a donné des directives au jury d’une manière compatible avecl’interprétation des experts du ministère public et la défense n’a pas contesté cet aspect des directives. [15] Le juge du procès a correctement cerné l’al. c) – la capacité de l’accusé de communiquer defaçon significative avec son avocat – en tant que principal point de discorde au procès.

D’ailleurs, la principale question soulevée dans lecadre du présent appel est de savoir si le juge du procès a correctement cerné le critère juridique applicable relativement à lacommunication avec un avocat dans son exposé au jury.

(3) Communiquer avec son avocat [16] Comme je l’ai mentionné précédemment, l’analyse effectuée pour déterminer si l’accusé estinapte à subir son procès est le « critère de la capacité cognitive limitée », qui a été établi par le juge Lacourcière dans l’arrêt Taylor.Dans cette affaire, le tribunal devait décider si le juge du procès et la Commission d’examen de l’Ontario constituée en vertu du Codecriminel avaient conclu à tort que l’accusé était inapte à subir son procès. Les faits de cette affaire sont semblables à ceux en l’espèce : la

principale question était de savoir si l’accusé avait la capacité de communiquer avec son avocat.

Dans la détermination du critère qu’ilconvient d’appliquer pour ce qui est du troisième critère, la Cour a cité la position de l’ami de la cour, celui-ci ayant introduit pour lapremière fois le critère applicable : [TRADUCTION] Selon le critère de la « capacité cognitive limitée » proposé par l’ami de la cour, la présence d’idées délirantes ne vicie pas l’aptitude del’accusé à subir son procès, à moins que les idées délirantes faussent la compréhension rudimentaire de l’accusé du processus judiciaire.Il est avancé que selon le critère, l’évaluation par le tribunal de la capacité de l’accusé d’assumer sa défense ou de communiquer avecson avocat et de lui donner des instructions se limite à déterminer si un accusé peut relater à son avocat les faits nécessaires se rapportantà l’infraction pour permettre ensuite à ce dernier de présenter comme il se doit une défense.

Il n’est pas pertinent quant à la déterminationde l’aptitude de savoir si l’accusé et son avocat ont une relation amicale et de confiance, si l’accusé a collaboré avec son avocat ou sil’accusé, en fin de compte, prend des décisions qui servent au mieux ses intérêts. L’ami de la cour se fonde sur la décision de notre Courdans les arrêts Reference Re Regina v. Gorecki (No. 1) (1976), (ON CA), 14 O.R. (2d) 212, 32 C.C.C. (2d) 129, etR. v. Trecroce, précité. [par. 44] [17] Après un bref examen des arrêts Re Regina v. Gorecki (No. 1), (ON CA),[1976] O.J. No. 2307 (C.A.) (QL), et R. v. Trecroce, (ON CA), [1980] O.J.

No. 1352 (C.A.) (QL), le juged’appel Lacourcière les a approuvés en disant qu’ils [TRADUCTION] « établiss[aient] le critère approprié de l’inaptitude en commonlaw » (par. 46). Il a abordé l’argument selon lequel il y aurait lieu de déterminer, dans le cadre de l’évaluation de l’aptitude, si l’accusésait ce qui sert au mieux de ses intérêts.

En réponse à cet argument, le juge Lacourcière a fait les observations suivantes en ce quiconcerne les principes qui sous-tendent l’analyse de l’aptitude, selon les arrêts Gorecki et Trecroce : [TRADUCTION] Pour déterminer si des modifications devraient être apportées au critère comme le suggère la

partie intimée, il faut d’abord connaître lefondement des règles applicables à la détermination de l’aptitude. Pour garantir que la procédure visant à déterminer la culpabilité soitaussi exacte que possible, que l’accusé puisse participer à l’instance ou aider son avocat à assumer sa défense, que la dignité du processusd’instruction soit maintenue et que, s’il y a lieu, la détermination d’une peine appropriée soit possible, l’accusé doit avoir une aptitudementale suffisante pour participer à l’instance de façon significative.

En même temps, il faut garder à l’esprit le fait que les principes dejustice fondamentale exigent qu’une décision définitive soit rendue sans délai excessif dans le cadre d’un procès. L’adoption d’un critèrede l’aptitude trop rigoureux mènera à l’augmentation du nombre d’affaires dans lesquelles l’accusé sera jugé inapte à subir son procès,même s’il est en mesure de comprendre la procédure et qu’il est impatient que celle-ci prenne fin.

De plus, l’adoption d’un critère de l’aptitude rigoureux, comportant l’élément de [TRADUCTION] « servir au mieux ses intérêts »,déroge au principe fondamental qui veut qu’un accusé a le droit de choisir sa propre défense et de la présenter comme il le souhaite.Dans R. c.

Swain, précité, à la p. 970 du R.C.S., p. 504 des C.C.C., le juge en chef Lamer, s’exprimant au nom de la majorité, a soulignél’importance du droit de l’accusé à la liberté que lui confère l’art. 7, droit qui lui accorde le pouvoir de conduire sa propre défense.L’accusé qui n’a pas été jugé inapte à subir son procès doit pouvoir conduire sa propre défense, même si cela signifie qu’il puisse le faireà son détriment. L’autonomie de l’accusé dans le système contradictoire exige que l’accusé puisse prendre ces décisions fondamentaleset assumer les risques qui en découlent.

Le critère de la « capacité cognitive limitée » permet d’atteindre un équilibre réel entre les objectifs des règles applicables à ladétermination de l’aptitude et le droit constitutionnel de l’accusé de choisir sa propre défense et de subir son procès dans un délairaisonnable.

En demandant au tribunal d’exiger que l’accusé soit en mesure d’agir au mieux de ses intérêts, l’intimée demande à notre Cour d’adopterle critère plus rigoureux de la [TRADUCTION] « capacité d’analyse » dans la détermination de l’aptitude de l’accusé à subir son procès.Les tribunaux ont clairement rejeté ce critère. [par. 50 à 53] [18] Se fondant sur ce critère nouvellement énoncé, le juge d’appel Lacourcière a fini par conclureque l’on avait eu tort d’adopter [TRADUCTION] « un critère qui exigeait que l’accusé soit en mesure de prendre des décisionsrationnelles qui soient avantageuses pour lui dans ses rapports avec son avocat » (par. 57). [19] L’analyse effectuée dans l’arrêt Taylor révèle plusieurs principes importants.

D’abord, lecritère de la capacité cognitive limitée vise à garantir que l’accusé est en mesure de [TRADUCTION] « participer à l’instance d’unefaçon significative ». Ensuite, le critère préliminaire de l’aptitude ne devrait pas être rigoureux au point que l’accusé puisse être jugéinapte malgré sa capacité de comprendre le processus. Enfin, la capacité de l’accusé d’agir dans son intérêt supérieur sort du cadre du

critère de la capacité cognitive limitée. En effet, le texte clair de la Cour indique que le fait que l’accusé prend de mauvaises décisions, àlui seul, n’a aucune incidence sur son aptitude. [20] Le critère de la capacité cognitive limitée a été cité et approuvé dans l’arrêt Whittle. Dans cetteaffaire, la Cour suprême était appelée à déterminer la capacité cognitive requise pour l’exercice de plusieurs droits accordés avant leprocès, y compris la règle des confessions, le droit de garder le silence et la renonciation au droit à l’assistance d’un avocat.

Dans sonanalyse, le juge Sopinka a cité l’arrêt Taylor pour décrire le critère de l’aptitude à subir son procès : Il requiert une capacité cognitive limitée de comprendre le processus et de communiquer avec un avocat.

Dans l’arrêt R. c.Taylor (1992), (ON CA), 77 C.C.C. (3d) 551, la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario a statué, après examen de la doctrine et dela jurisprudence, que le juge du procès avait commis une erreur en concluant que l’accusé doit être en mesure de prendre des décisionsrationnelles qui soient avantageuses pour lui. […] En conséquence, pourvu que l’accusé ait cette capacité limitée, il n’est pas nécessaire, au préalable, qu’il soit capable de recourir à unraisonnement analytique pour choisir d’accepter les conseils d’un avocat ou pour prendre une décision qui sert au mieux ses intérêts.[p. 933 et 934] [21] Plus loin, le juge Sopinka a adopté cette norme en traitant de l’état d’esprit conscient : En exerçant son droit à l’assistance d’un avocat ou en y renonçant, l’accusé doit avoir la capacité cognitive limitée qui est nécessairepour être apte à subir son procès.

Il doit être en mesure de communiquer avec un avocat pour lui donner des instructions et il doit saisir lerôle de l’avocat et comprendre qu’il peut se passer des services d’un avocat même si ce n’est pas au mieux de ses intérêts. Il n’est pasnécessaire que l’accusé ait une aptitude analytique. Le degré de capacité cognitive est le même que celui qui est exigé à l’égard de larègle des confessions et du droit de garder le silence.

Comme je l’ai mentionné précédemment, l’accusé doit avoir la capacité mentalequi découle d’un état d’esprit conscient. [p. 941 et 942] Ainsi, dans l’arrêt Whittle, la Cour suprême a confirmé que le critère de la capacité cognitive limitée est l’analyse acceptée pourl’aptitude à subir son procès et que ce critère ne requiert pas que l’accusé soit en mesure de prendre des décisions qui servent au mieuxses intérêts.

En outre, dans Whittle, la Cour suprême a jugé que l’accusé n’a pas besoin d’avoir une « aptitude analytique », maisseulement la capacité « de comprendre ce qu’il dit et ce qui est dit ». [22] La plupart des décisions rendues par des cours d’appel qui citent l’arrêt Taylor se fondent surcet arrêt pour le principe selon lequel la capacité de l’accusé d’être en mesure d’agir « au mieux de ses intérêts » sort du cadre del’analyse du critère de la capacité cognitive limitée : voir R. v. M.A.W., 2008 ONCA 555, [2008] O.J. No. 2738 (QL), au par. 25; R. v.L.S.C., 2003 ABCA 105, [2003] A.J.

No. 388 (QL), au par. 10; Children’s Aid Society of Halifax v. C.V., 2005 NSCA 87, [2005] N.S.J.No. 217 (QL), au par. 33; R. v. Romanowicz, (ON CA), [1999] O.J. No. 3191 (C.A.) (QL), au par. 47. [23] Hormis l’applicabilité du principe de l’intérêt supérieur, les interprétations divergentnéanmoins sur la teneur du critère de la capacité cognitive limitée. Dans ce contexte, la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario a par la suiteréexaminé l’arrêt Taylor et clarifié ses principes.

(4) R. v. Morrissey : réexamen de l’arrêt Taylor [24] Dans l’arrêt Morrissey, la Cour a examiné si l’habileté à témoigner constituait une conditionpréalable à l’aptitude à subir son procès. La question déterminante à trancher consistait à savoir si l’accusé, en raison de son amnésierétrograde, était en mesure de communiquer avec son avocat.

En précisant l’arrêt Taylor, le juge d’appel Blair a d’abord donné lesgrandes lignes du critère de la capacité cognitive limitée et a souligné que ce critère préliminaire [TRADUCTION] « n’est pasrigoureux » et qu’il [TRADUCTION] « exige seulement une compréhension relativement rudimentaire du processus judiciaire – qui soit,essentiellement, suffisante pour permettre à l’accusé d’assumer sa défense et de donner des instructions à son avocat à cet effet. C’estdans ce sens-là que l’accusé doit être en mesure de « communiquer avec son avocat » et de relater les faits se rapportant à l’infraction »(par. 27).

Après ces observations, le juge d’appel Blair a réinterprété les conclusions tirées dans l’arrêt Taylor :

[TRADUCTION] Le critère de la capacité cognitive limitée élaboré dans l’arrêt Taylor a été résumé dans certaines décisions et certains commentaires – àmon avis, de façon imprécise – à une simple analyse visant à [TRADUCTION] « déterminer si l’accusé peut relater à son avocat les faitsnécessaires se rapportant à l’infraction pour permettre ensuite à ce dernier de présenter comme il se doit une défense » (Taylor, précité,au par. 44) : voir R. v. L.S.C., 2003 ABCA 105 , [2003] A.J. No. 388, 13 C.R. (6th) 390 (C.A.), au par. 10; R. v. Peepeetch,[2003] S.J. No. 542, 2003 SKCA 76, au par. 52.

Je fais les observations suivantes à cet égard. Premièrement, le concept selon lequel l’accusé doit être en mesure de relater [TRADUCTION] « les faits nécessaires se rapportant àl’infraction pour permettre ensuite à son avocat de présenter comme il se doit une défense » doit être interprété d’une manièretéléologique et fonctionnelle, à mon avis. Il vise plus largement la capacité de l’accusé de relater les faits se rapportant généralement àl’infraction ou aux infractions dont il est accusé.

Il ne vise pas à restreindre l’analyse à la seule capacité de relater les faits immédiats serapportant à l’incident en particulier donnant lieu au crime (par ex. les événements immédiats entourant le coup de feu ayant causé lamort). Cela est logique, étant donné que le concept de l’inaptitude à subir son procès repose sur la prémisse selon laquelle l’accusé estincapable d’assumer sa défense ou de donner des instructions à son avocat à cet effet. Dans le contexte d’une analyse de l’aptitude, lacapacité de communiquer avec son avocat porte sur la capacité de solliciter et de recevoir des conseils juridiques.

L’incapacité de relaterles faits directement liés à l’événement donnant lieu aux accusations et l’incapacité de communiquer avec son avocat d’une manière àpermettre à l’accusé de solliciter ou de recevoir des conseils juridiques efficaces constituent deux concepts différents. De plus, parfoisl’accusé pourrait souhaiter présenter une défense fondée sur le fait qu’il est incapable de se souvenir des événements en question – oupourrait ne pas être en mesure de faire autrement.

Deuxièmement, même si le renvoi à la capacité de l’accusé de relater les faits se rapportant à l’infraction doit recevoir une interprétationétroite, c’est-à-dire la capacité de relater les événements se rapportant à l’incident criminel lui-même, alors à mon avis, cette propositiondécoule d’une mauvaise interprétation de l’arrêt Taylor. En faisant l’observation mentionnée précédemment, le juge d’appel Lacourcière mentionnait simplement l’une des observations de l’amide la cour formulées au nom de M.

Taylor et il a immédiatement poursuivi en résumant les observations de l’ami de la cour ayant étéacceptées par l’avocat du ministère public, résumé qui ne comprenait pas la proposition qui précède. Le juge d’appel Lacourcière n’a pasdit que la Cour a accepté l’argument de l’ami de la cour à cet égard. D’ailleurs, il ne lui était pas nécessaire de le prendre enconsidération puisque la question en l’espèce n’était pas de savoir si M. Taylor pouvait relater les événements du crime, mais plutôt desavoir s’il était délirant au point d’être incapable de donner des instructions à son avocat au mieux de ses intérêts.

La question litigieuseen l’espèce visait cette dernière préoccupation, et l’arrêt Taylor appuie les propositions voulant

a) que le critère de la capacité cognitivelimitée régisse la détermination de l’aptitude à subir son procès, et

b) que ce critère n’exige pas que l’accusé soit en mesure de donner desinstructions à son avocat qui sont au mieux de ses intérêts. [par. 28 à 31] [25] En résumant sa position, le juge d’appel Blair a ajouté ceci : [TRADUCTION] L’accusé doit être mentalement apte à subir son procès pour garantir que le procès satisfasse aux normes minimales d’équité et concordeavec les principes de justice fondamentale comme le droit d’être présent à son propre procès et le droit de présenter une défense pleine etentière : voir R. c.

Steele (1991), (QC CA), 63 C.C.C. (3d) 149, 4 C.R.R. (4th) 53 (C.A.Q.), aux p. 172, 173 et 181 desC.R.; R. v. Roberts (1975), (BC CA), 24 C.C.C. (2d) 539 (C.A.C.-B.). La présence et la participation significatives auprocès constituent donc la pierre angulaire de l’analyse de l’aptitude. [par. 36] [26] Le juge d’appel Blair a rejeté toute interprétation qui limite le critère à une détermination de laquestion de savoir si l’accusé peut [TRADUCTION] « relater les faits immédiats se rapportant à l’incident en particulier donnant lieu aucrime ».

Il a également souligné que l’interprétation étroite adoptée dans certaines affaires subséquentes se fondait sur une observationd’un ami de la cour et non sur une décision de justice indépendante. Par conséquent, la teneur du critère de la capacité cognitive limitéene doit pas étroitement découler du paragraphe de l’arrêt Taylor citant l’observation de l’ami de la cour. La simple capacité de relater lesfaits d’un incident n’est pas le critère préliminaire utilisé pour déterminer l’aptitude.

La question appropriée est plutôt de savoir sil’accusé peut participer de façon significative au procès en sollicitant et en recevant des conseils juridiques. [27] Cette réinterprétation de l’arrêt Taylor dans l’arrêt Morrissey a reçu un appui considérable dansla jurisprudence subséquente. Dans R. v. Adam, 2013 ONSC 373, [2013] O.J. No. 222 (QL), la Cour a souligné que, sur le fondement del’arrêt Morrissey, [TRADUCTION] « l’analyse de l’aptitude requiert une assurance que, malgré qu’il souffre de troubles mentaux,l’accusé est en mesure de subir un procès équitable.

Dans ce contexte, une participation significative est requise. Pour un accusé dans unprocès criminel, la participation significative peut uniquement signifier la capacité de se défendre » (par. 29) (italiques dans l’original).

[28] Dans R. v. Thompson , 201

[…]