2017 NBCA 47, 2017 NBCA 47

Source: Court of Appeal of New Brunswick

Date: 2016-10-27

Jurisdiction: New Brunswick

Citation: 2017 NBCA 47

Opinion

COURT OF APPEAL OF COUR D’APPEL DU NEW BRUNSWICK NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK 90-16-CA L.D.M. APPELLANT L.D.M. APPELANTE - and - - et - J.K.D. RESPONDENT J.K.D. INTIMÉ L.D.M. v. J.K.D., 2017 NBCA 47 L.D.M. c.

J.K.D., 2017 NBCA 47 CORAM: The Honourable Justice Green The Honourable Justice Baird The Honourable Justice French CORAM : l’honorable juge Green l’honorable juge Baird l’honorable juge French Appeal from a decision of the Court of Queen’s Bench: October 27, 2016 Appel d’une décision de la Cour du Banc de la Reine : le 27 octobre 2016 History of Case: Historique de la cause : Decision under appeal: Décision frappée d’appel : Preliminary or incidental proceedings: N/A Procédures préliminaires ou accessoires : s.o.

Appeal heard: June 22, 2017 Appel entendu : le 22 juin 2017 Judgment rendered: October 19, 2017 Jugement rendu : le 19 octobre 2017

Reasons for judgment by: The Honourable Justice Green Motifs de jugement : l’honorable juge Green Concurred in by: The Honourable Justice Baird The Honourable Justice French Souscrivent aux motifs : l’honorable juge Baird l’honorable juge French Counsel at hearing: For the appellant: Barbara Hughes Campbell, Q.C. For the respondent: Joseph W. FitzPatrick Avocats à l’audience : Pour l’appelante : Barbara Hughes Campbell, c.r. Pour l’intimé : Joseph W. FitzPatrick THE COURT The appeal is dismissed, with costs of $2,500. LA COUR L’appel est rejeté avec dépens de 2 500 $.

The judgment of the Court was delivered by GREEN, J.A. I. Introduction [ 1 ] The appellant mother and respondent father are the natural parents of one child, born December 2009. On October 16, 2014, the father filed a Notice of Application seeking joint custody of their child, as well as primary care and final decision-making authority in the event of disagreement between the parents on major issues involving the child’s health and education.

A judge of the Court of Queen’s Bench, Family Division, rendered a decision dated October 27, 2016, granting the essential elements of the father’s Application as he requested. The mother now appeals. II. Background [ 2 ] The parties met in late 2008 and began cohabitating in early 2009. At the time their relationship began, the appellant had two young children from a previous relationship. Following interim periods of living apart, the parties finally separated in July 2010.

[ 3 ] With respect to the care of their child, the parties agreed to a week on/week-off custody arrangement, but that initial arrangement broke down in a matter of weeks. It is common ground that over the course of the next few years, up to February 2013, the child regularly spent time with his father and his paternal grandparents. The application judge described the contact as “frequent and substantial”.

These access arrangements often involved the child’s slightly older half-brother as well, but he was not the subject of the proceedings in the court below. [ 4 ] Access with the father and grandparents was curtailed by the mother, according to her testimony, following disclosure to her by the child that he had been molested in some fashion while in his grandmother’s care. For her part, the grandmother testified she herself reported the allegations to the child protection authorities.

The matter was investigated by social workers, and the file closed with no further action. [ 5 ] The father’s decision to file his Notice of Application came from an extended period of being denied access with his child. The motivation to seek primary care was grounded in a number of concerns over the child’s wellbeing. He alleged the child’s education had suffered as a result of being home schooled by the mother without his knowledge or consent, a situation which ended when he became aware of what was happening and intervened.

The father further alleged he had a number of concerns with respect to his child’s health and development: an unnatural fixation on privacy, not bathing on a regular basis, only wishing to brush his teeth once a week, the mother not taking the child for regular doctor or dentist visits, and over-emphasis within the home on the fundamentalist religious beliefs of the mother. Concerns were also expressed during the hearing over the use of corporal punishment within the mother’s home, and specifically to the use of a paddle for discipline purposes.

As noted by the application judge, the mother denied each of these allegations. Such was the basic factual matrix of the case to be decided. [ 6 ] By way of additional background information, I note both the mother and the father entered into stable, continuing relationships with new partners following their separation. [ 7 ] An initial Notice of Application and Notice of Motion were filed by the father and his parents in 2013. It appears the Motion was heard and dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.

The parties subsequently negotiated and signed a Consent Order, but it was never filed with the Court of Queen’s Bench, and the parties agree it was never followed. As noted above, the father filed another Notice of Application, the matter now before the Court, and a Notice of Motion in October 2014. The Motion was heard on December 11 of that year, and a detailed Interim Order setting out custody and access obligations was issued on December 18, 2014. A further Interim Consent Order addressing custody and access was issued July 8, 2016. III. Issues [ 8 ] The mother frames her grounds of appeal as follows.

She alleges the application judge erred in law or in fact and in law: 1. By failing to consider, in depth or at all, all relevant criteria when making a finding of what was in the best interest of the child and in particular by failing to meaningful consider:

a) the doctrine of non-separation of siblings;

b) the custody arrangement and the relationship between the child and the mother; and

c) the views and preferences of the child. 2. By coming to conclusions when there was no reasonable evidentiary basis for such, and in particular by concluding the following:

a) the mother would return the child to home schooling, should she have custody; and

b) the child was not further ahead than he was academically. 3. After determining custody, by failing to consider what access arrangement was in the best interest of the child, and by making one of the conditions of such access the prohibition of religious instruction while at the same time ordering that the child continue attending the child’s current place of worship. IV. Law and Analysis A. Standard of Review [ 9 ] The standard of review in family law cases involving custody and access has been outlined and commented upon by the Court numerous times, and is well understood.

The appellant’s submission acknowledges this and encapsulates the standard clearly and succinctly, “[i]n short, deference is required”. [ 10 ] The relevant jurisprudence and guiding principles are well explained in M.K.R. v. J.A.R. , 2015 NBCA 73 , 443 N.B.R. (2d) 313 : As stated by this Court in P.R.H. v. M.E.L ., 2009 NBCA 18 , 343 N.B.R. (2d) 100: The appropriate standard of review to be applied in an appeal of this nature is discussed in Van de Perre v. Edwards , [2001] 2 S.C.R. 1014, [2001] S.C.J. No. 60 (QL), 2001 SCC 60 .

The Supreme Court of Canada set out a standard of considerable deference for the decisions of trial courts in cases of family law. Intervention on appeal requires that there have been a material error, a serious misapprehension of the evidence, or an error of law. A material error is further explained: As indicated in both Gordon and Hickey , the approach to appellate review requires an indication of a material error. If there is an indication that the trial judge did not consider relevant factors or evidence, this might indicate that he did not properly weigh all of the factors.

In such a case, an appellate court may review the evidence proffered at trial to determine if the trial judge ignored or misdirected himself with respect to relevant evidence. This being said, I repeat that omissions in the reasons will not necessarily mean that the appellate court has jurisdiction to review the evidence heard at trial. [para. 15] Speaking for the Court, Bastarache J. further clarified that “an omission is only a material error if it gives rise to the reasoned belief that the trial judge must have forgotten, ignored or misconceived the evidence in a way that affected his conclusion” (para. 15).

See this Court’s decisions on the application of the deferential standard: MacLean v. MacLean (2004), 274 N.B.R. (2d) 90, [2004] N.B.J. No. 363 (QL), 2004 NBCA 75 at para. 18 ; J.P. v. R.R. (2004), 278 N.B.R. (2d) 351, [2004] N.B.J. No. 467 (QL), 2004 NBCA 98 at para. 27 ; Scott v. Scott (2004), 278 N.B.R. (2d) 61, [2004] N.B.J. No. 468 (QL), 2004 NBCA 99 at para. 32 and Boudreau v. Brun (2005), 293 N.B.R. (2d) 126, [2005] N.B.J. No. 501 (QL), 2005 NBCA 106 at para. 5 . [paras. 8-9] See also Percy v. Percy , 2015 NBCA 16 , [2015] N.B.J.

No. 71 (QL), where Larlee J.A., writing for the Court, states: The standard of review to be followed in family matters dictates that the judge’s decision will be given considerable deference: Lang v. Lang , [2007] N.B.J. No. 348 (C.A.) (QL) ; P.R.H. v. M.E.L. , 2009 NBCA 18 , [2009] N.B.J. No. 77 (QL); MacDonald v. MacDonald , 2011 NBCA 25 , 372 N.B.R. (2d) 179, leave to appeal refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 237 (QL); Smith v. Smith , 2011 NBCA 66 , 375 N.B.R. (2d) 208; Grant v. Grant , 2012 NBCA 101 , 397 N.B.R. (2d) 254; and Simon v. Adey , 2012 NBCA 63 , 391 N.B.R. (2d) 189.

The Court of Appeal cannot re-try a case; it may only overturn a trial judge’s finding of fact if it is the result of a palpable and overriding error, and may only interfere with a discretionary order if it is founded upon an error of law, an error in the application of the governing principles or a palpable and overriding error in the assessment of the evidence. [paras. 3-4] Similar principles were iterated in Wills v. Kennedy , 2015 NBCA 31 , [2015] N.B.J. No. 116 (QL).

Thus, appellate intervention will be justified if there has been a material error, a serious misapprehension of the evidence, or an error oflaw. No deference is owed to the motion judge’s decision when reviewing a question of law, including proper

interpretation of theGuidelines when determining a parent’s income for the calculation of child support: M.W.M. v. H.L.M., 2010 NBCA 86, 366 N.B.R. (2d)142, per Quigg J.A. at para. 11. [paras. 9-11] B. Best Interests of the Child [11] In his analysis, the application judge correctly stated: It is clear, absolutely clear, that in dealing with custody and access the best interest of the child must be considered and nothing else. Specifically, not the best interest of the parents, the only situation is the best interest of the child. And best interest of the child is […]defined […] in

section 1 of the Family Services Act. [Decision, Page 19] [12] The application judge also made specific reference to the decision of the Supreme Court inGordon v. Goertz, (SCC), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 27, [1996] S.C.J. No. 52 (QL), and this Court in J.A.D. v. L.D.D., 2010NBCA 69, 364 N.B.R. (2d) 200. While the latter case dealt with the custody of a young child whose parents were married, the principlesto be considered are exactly the same. As Quigg J.A., writing for the Court, states: The case before us concerns the determination of custody of a young child in a dispute between parents who were married to oneanother.

Therefore, one must look to s. 16 of the Divorce Act which vests in the court the power to make an order respecting thecustody and access of children of the marriage. Section 16(8) sets out the factors to be considered when making a custody order: In making an order under thissection, the court shall take intoconsideration only the bestinterests of the child of themarriage as determined byreference to the condition,means, needs and othercircumstances of the child.

En rendant une ordonnanceconformément au présent article,le tribunal ne tient compte quede l’intérêt de l’enfant à charge,défini en fonction de sesressources, de ses besoins et,d’une façon générale, de sasituation. Thus, the Act instructs the court to “take into consideration only the best interests of the child of the marriage ...”. As the Divorce Actdoes not provide a definition of the best interests of the child, this Court has approved the use of the definition of “best interests of thechild” contained in the Family Services Act, S.N.B. 1980, c. F-2.2 (see N.L. v.

R.L., 2008 NBCA 79, 337 N.B.R. (2d) 197, C.M.B.E. v.D.J.E., 2006 NBCA 88, 304 N.B.R. (2d) 191, Ferris v. Ferris, 2002 NBCA 25, [2002] N.B.J. No. 96 (QL).

Section 1 of that Act reads asfollows:

“best interests of the child” means the best interests of the child under the circumstances taking into consideration (

a) the mental, emotional and physical health of the child and his need for appropriate care or treatment, or both; (

b) the views and preferences of the child, where such views and preferences can be reasonably ascertained; (

c) the effect upon the child of any disruption of the child’s sense of continuity; (

d) the love, affection and ties that exist between the child and each person to whom the child’s custody is entrusted, each person to whom access to the child is granted and, where appropriate, each sibling of the child and, where appropriate, each grandparent of the child; (

e) the merits of any plan proposed by the Minister under which he would be caring for the child, in comparison with the merits of the child returning to or remaining with his parents; (

f) the need to provide a secure environment that would permit the child to become a useful and productive member of society through the achievement of his full potential according to his individual capacity; and (

g) the child’s cultural and religious heritage[.] « intérêt supérieur de l’enfant » désigne l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant dans les circonstances, compte tenu

a) de l’état de santé mentale, affective et physique de l’enfant et du besoin qu’il a de soins ou de traitements convenables, ou des deux;

b) des vues et préférences de l’enfant lorsqu’il est raisonnablement possible de les connaître;

c) de l’effet sur l’enfant de toute atteinte à la stabilité dont un enfant éprouve le besoin;

d) de l’amour, de l’affection et des liens qui existent entre l’enfant et chaque personne à la garde de qui il a été confié, chaque personne qui a obtenu le droit de lui rendre visite et, le cas échéant, chaque frère ou soeur de l’enfant et, le cas échéant, chaque grand-parent de l’enfant;

e) des avantages de tout projet de prise en charge de l’enfant par le Ministre comparés à l’avantage pour l’enfant de retourner ou de rester auprès de ses parents;

f) du besoin pour l’enfant d’être en sécurité, dans un milieu qui lui permette de réaliser pleinement son potentiel, selon ses aptitudes personnelles et, ce faisant, de devenir membre utile et productif de la société; et

g) du patrimoine culturel et religieux de l’enfant[.] [paras. 12-13]

[ 13 ] In the present case, the application judge proceeded to consider each of the enumerated criteria when conducting his analysis. The mother alleges the application judge failed “to consider, in depth or at all, all relevant criteria when making a finding of what was in the best interest of the child”. I disagree with her assertion. The proper test was identified, and relevant case law from both this Court and the Supreme Court was referenced. I will, however, examine the specific criticisms of the decision asserted by the mother. C. Views and Preferences of the Child [ 14 ] The wording of the

section clearly instructs the Court to consider “the views and preferences of the child”, but importantly, with the following caveat: “where such views and preferences can be reasonably ascertained”. While judges hearing family law cases involving children may undertake this task in different ways, depending upon the approach each finds most productive, it is far from uncommon for judges to be resistant in seeking the views of young children.

In this instance, the application judge made the following determination: [The child] is seven years old, almost. [The child] is not in a position to give me a statement either through personal contact of through an observer that I can rely upon. [The child] does not understand what the issues are in dealing with [the child’s] own best interest. [Decision, Page 20] [ 15 ] The mother’s position is that the application judge had the jurisdiction to order a Voice of the Child assessment be conducted, and should have done so.

For his part, the father points out although the judge clearly had the jurisdiction to do so, ordering such an assessment is purely discretionary, and absent palpable and overriding error, his exercise of discretion should be respected. I agree. The utility of such an assessment for a child of six years is very much open for debate, and I see no basis for this Court to second-guess the application judge on point. Such assessments are not inexpensive, and if the application judge was of the view the results could not be relied upon, why put the parties through the expense and the child through the experience? D.

The Non-Separation of Siblings [ 16 ] As stated, the parties had only one child. There are no full biological siblings. There are both half-siblings and step-siblings, and it is important to note the homes of both the mother and the father have other children. In the mother’s home are two half-siblings with whom the child had been residing. This is obviously an important consideration. In the father’s home are a half-sibling and two step-siblings. It should be readily apparent the situation is not as straightforward as the mother may have us believe.

The application judge was aware of these dynamics, and it cannot be said he ignored the issue in crafting his decision. [ 17 ] In speaking to his consideration of the fourth element of the best interests analysis, the application judge found as follows (for the ease of conveying the material, and preserving the anonymity of the child and his family, I paraphrase rather than offer a direct quote): This is a very fortunate child. As I have heard it, everyone that the child comes in contact with loves and shows affection to the child. This includes the children with whom he resides at the mother’s house.

It also includes, though at varying degrees of affection, the children at the father’s residence. The child also has the father’s mother and her husband. And an extended family, it appears, on the father’s side and the mother’s side. So I am not suggesting that best interest is affected by the love, affection and ties on either side. The child has love from both sides. [Decision, pages 21-22] [ 18 ] In making reference to the two families, and in particular the half-siblings and step-siblings, the application judge referred to most by name.

It cannot be said he was oblivious to their existence, nor their individual or collective impact on the life of the parties’ child. [ 19 ] The doctrine of non-separation of siblings is far from simple, especially in a situation such as that outlined above. We are not considering a case of full biological siblings potentially being separated from one another. In A.F.G. v. D.A.B. , 2011 NBCA 100 , [2011] N.B.J. No. 401 (QL) , Quigg J.A. for the Court states: Therefore, in custody cases generally, the failure to address the impact of separating siblings could be viewed as a significant omission and a material error.

In this case, however, the motion judge did not err, as he provided an explanation why this situation gave rise to “exceptional circumstances”. In this matter, there is more than one sibling relationship to consider. The child has a half-sibling through her father, with whom she is very close. The father’s partner also has a young son with whom the child has developed a close

bond. Therefore, there are several sibling relationships, and thus exceptional circumstances exist. [para. 18] [ 20 ] In my opinion, the application judge discharged his responsibility in considering “the love, affection and ties that exist between the child and each person to whom the child’s custody is entrusted, each person to whom access to the child is granted and, where appropriate, each sibling of the child and, where appropriate, each grandparent of the child”. I see no error in his analysis, and his conclusions cannot be said to be unreasonable. E.

The Existing Custody Arrangement [ 21 ] Flowing from the above observations, I move on to the application judge ’s consideration of the custody arrangement which had been in place, with the mother having primary care, and the relationship between mother and child. Again, the mother’s allegation that the application judge failed to consider these points “in depth or at all” is simply without foundation.

Indeed, it is evident certain aspects of the child’s day to day life while in the mother’s primary care are what concerned the application judge the most. [ 22 ] When the application judge directed his mind to “the need to provide a secure environment that would permit the child to become a useful and productive member of society through the achievement of his full potential according to his individual capacity”, he clearly found having the father’s residence as a primary home would be in the child’s best interests.

At this point in the analysis, the application judge returned to the issues of the child’s anxieties, the reluctance to bathe, the refusal to brush teeth except prior to attending church once each week, and the lack of regular and preventative medical and dental appointments. All weighed in favour of having the child live with the father, and in granting the father final decision-making authority in the event the parents were unable to agree on how best to proceed. F.

Education [ 23 ] The application judge had obvious concerns about the child’s education, and the mother seems convinced he placed an inordinate emphasis on this issue, and on home schooling in particular, in reaching his ultimate conclusions on custody and primary care. I disagree. As stated, it was a concern, but not an overwhelming one. In my opinion, the application judge was more concerned and placed greater weight on the issue outlined in the preceding paragraph. Perhaps of greater concern was the mother’s decision to home school the child without the prior knowledge and consent of the father. G.

Access Arrangement [ 24 ] Having determined the child’s best interests required the father to be the primary caregiver, the application judge turned to access arrangements. His decision on point reads as follows: As far as access is concerned I accept that the access arrangement that the parties negotiated and that was dealt with in the consent order is appropriate for transfer in the opposite direction in the [the mother] shall have such access as is set out.

There was some discussion about the holidays and I’m going to leave it to counsel [to] discuss the nature of the final wording of the access arrangement because there may be some other dates that the parties want to deal with. If the parties cannot agree then I will be executing the access that was set out in the interim order. [ 25 ] The mother objects to the

summary fashion in which access was dealt with. In other words, although she felt the father’s access was reasonable when she had primary care of the child, the same would not be true when the roles were reversed. While there may be some merit to this contention, it is important to note the Consent Order in question was negotiated and signed a mere three and one half months before the application judge rendered his final decision, hardly a significant passage of time.

I also note it was the application judge who reviewed and signed the Consent Order. [ 26 ] In addition, it was disclosed at the hearing on appeal that the matter of access did not end with the application judge rendering his decision. As there was a subsequent disagreement between counsel on the wording of the final order, a hearing on a motion was conducted after the oral decision, with further submissions on access. In fairness to the mother’s counsel on

appeal, who had not been counsel in first instance, this information came to her attention for the first time at the hearing before this Court. [ 27 ] There is no question the application judge could have devoted more time to his consideration of access arrangements, but I am not persuaded this amounted to reversible error. I reject the mother’s allegation that the application judge “gave no thought to access”. This is both inaccurate and overly simplistic. We must be cognizant of the entirety of the circumstances in this case.

Given the amount of time it often takes family disputes to wind their way through the justice system, it might be said the ink on the consent order dealing with access was barely dry when the issue was again before not only the same court, but the same judge. H. Religious Instruction [ 28 ] The application judge was confronted with two diametrically opposed views of religion and religious instruction, the mother’s deeply held Christian beliefs, and the father’s equally firmly held lack of religious belief.

The challenge was to find within that irreconcilable gap what would be within the best interests of the child. [ 29 ] As a starting point, the application judge recognized and acknowledged the fact the child had been regularly attending his mother’s church, “loves going” and “loves being part of that faith community”. He went on to determine the child “should not be forced to lose that”. How, then, was the judge to find some workable solution to religious education?

The judge had concerns with the approach of both parents, and it was clear it would not be in the best interests of the child at such a young age to have the parents confuse him with completely contradictory views on religion. In my opinion, the application judge made a sensible determination based on what he perceived to be in the child’s best interests, as set out in the final order: 4.

Both parties shall ensure the child attends service at his church when [the child] is in their care unless [the child] is ill until such time as [the child’s] age and maturity develop that [the child decides to] no longer attend. 5. Neither party shall provide religious instruction to the child. 6.

The [father] shall ensure that the child is transported to the child’s place of worship, and into [the] mother’s care, on any and all Sundays for religious services when [the child] is in his physical custody. [Order of December 20, 2016] [ 30 ] I recognize the mother’s frustration with this arrangement, but commend the application judge for fashioning what on its face should be a workable solution to an important issue. The judge clearly crafted a decision on this point he felt was in the child’s best interests, and I see no basis for appellate interference.

The child will continue to be an active part of the faith community which has been an important part of the child’s young life, and the mother should take some solace in the knowledge her religious views will no doubt be imparted to her child through their shared church. I. Adequacy of Reasons [ 31 ] In the course of oral argument on appeal, it was clear the mother was taking issue with the overall sufficiency of the application judge’s reasons for decision, even though this had not been articulated as a ground of appeal. Again, I disagree.

The Application was heard on October 20 and 21, 2016, and the application judge delivered an oral decision the following week. As is often the case with true oral decisions, as opposed to a finely crafted written decision simply being read aloud in open court, this decision is not seamless, nor would I expect it to be.

Having been convinced it was in this child’s best interests to leave the primary care of his mother and begin residing with his father, the application judge reacted quickly to render his decision. [ 32 ] We cannot be critical of the delays in family law matters, and then be critical when judges within the system take positive steps to deliver their reasons for decision swiftly as was the case here. [ 33 ] In P.R.H. v. M.E.L. , 2009 NBCA 18 , 343 N.B.R. (2d) 100 , Larlee JA writing for the Court states:

In R. v. Walker , [2008] S.C.J. No. 34 (QL), 2008 SCC 34 , the Court emphasized that the parties are entitled to know why the judge reached his or her decision, and that reasons must be sufficient to allow for appellate review. However, an appellate court is not to intervene merely because a trial court did a poor job in expressing itself. The Court held that reasons are sufficient if they are responsive to the live issues of the case and the parties’ key arguments. Sufficiency of reasons must be measured by the degree to which they respond to the substance of what was in issue.

The live issues of the case must be dealt with, and the basis for the ruling must be clear. [para. 12] [ 34 ] Applying the above to the decision under appeal, I am satisfied the parties know why the application judge reached the decision he did, and, in my opinion, the reasons are more than sufficient to allow for appellate review. To be clear, the application judge expressed himself clearly, identified the proper legal tests and applied them as required. He made the necessary findings with respect to credibility, and, finally, there was a clear evidentiary foundation for his findings of fact. V.

Conclusion and Disposition [ 35 ] There are seldom neat and easy decisions to be made when parents find themselves before the courts, unable to agree on how best to raise their child once they, as parents, are living separate and apart from one another. Our guiding principle is clear – we are mandated by law to make decisions on custody and access based upon the best interests of the child, and nothing else. In the case before us, the application judge did precisely that.

I find no basis for appellate intervention, and accordingly I would dismiss the appeal and order the appellant to pay costs in the amount of $2,500. Version française de la décision de la Cour rendue par LE JUGE GREEN I. Introduction [1] La mère appelante et le père intimé sont les parents naturels d’un unique enfant, né en décembre 2009.

Le 16 octobre 2014, le père a déposé un avis de requête indiquant qu’il demanderait la garde conjointe de leur enfant, ainsi que la responsabilité principale de ses soins et le pouvoir de prendre une décision finale en cas de désaccord des parents sur des questions importantes touchant sa santé et son éducation. Un juge de la Division de la famille de la Cour du Banc de la Reine a prononcé une décision datée du 27 octobre 2016 accordant au père l’essentiel des mesures qu’il demandait. La mère en appelle aujourd’hui. II.

Contexte [2] Les parties se sont connues à la fin de 2008 et ont commencé à cohabiter au début de 2009. Au départ de leur relation, l’appelante avait deux jeunes enfants d’une relation antérieure. Des intervalles de vie séparée ont été suivis, en juillet 2010, de la séparation définitive des parties. [3] Les parties ont arrêté, au

chapitre des soins de l’enfant, que chacune aurait la garde une semaine sur deux, mais cet arrangement initial a été abandonné en l’espace de quelques semaines. Il est convenu qu’au cours des deux ou trois années qui ont suivi, plus précisément jusqu’en février 2013, l’enfant a passé du temps régulièrement avec son père et avec ses grands-parents paternels. Le juge saisi de la requête a qualifié le contact de [TRADUCTION] « fréquent et considérable ». Souvent, le demi-frère un peu plus âgé de l’enfant était associé aux arrangements d’accès.

Il n’a pas été visé, cependant, par la procédure de première instance. [4] L’accès qu’avaient le père et les grands-parents a été restreint par la mère, comme elle l’a indiqué dans son témoignage, après qu’elle a appris de l’enfant qu’il avait subi des sévices de quelque sorte tandis que confié à sa grand- mère. La grand-mère, pour sa part, a témoigné qu’elle avait elle-même communiqué ces allégations à la protection de l’enfance. Des travailleurs sociaux ont enquêté, après quoi l’affaire a été classée sans que des mesures soient prises.

[5] Le père a pris la décision de déposer un avis de requête après une longue période au cours de laquelle l’accès lui avait été refusé. Des craintes pour le bien-être de son enfant l’ont poussé à demander la responsabilité principale des soins. L’éducation de l’enfant s’était ressentie, a-t-il soutenu, de l’enseignement à domicile que la mère, à son insu et sans son consentement, avait dispensé, situation qui avait pris fin lorsqu’il l’avait appris et qu’il était intervenu.

Le père a fait part, en outre, de sujets d’inquiétude en ce qui concerne la santé et le développement de l’enfant : il faisait une fixation anormale sur la préservation de son intimité, ne prenait pas de bains réguliers et ne désirait se brosser les dents qu’une fois par semaine; la mère ne lui obtenait pas de consultations régulières chez le médecin ou le dentiste; les croyances religieuses fondamentalistes de la mère tenaient une place excessive à la maison.

De même, des craintes ont été exprimées, lors de l’audience, à propos du recours au châtiment corporel chez la mère, plus précisément à l’emploi d’une palette pour punir. Comme l’a indiqué le juge saisi de la requête, la mère a nié chacune de ces affirmations. Tels étaient les faits essentiels de l’affaire sur laquelle une décision devait être rendue. [6] J’ajoute que le père et la mère ont noué tous deux de nouvelles relations, stables et durables, après leur séparation. [7] Le père et ses parents avaient déposé un avis de requête et un avis de motion initiaux en 2013.

Il semble que la motion ait été entendue, mais que des questions de compétence aient conduit à son rejet. Par la suite, les parties ont négocié et signé une ordonnance par consentement qui n’a toutefois jamais été déposée auprès de la Cour du Banc de la Reine, et elles reconnaissent qu’elle n’a jamais été mise en application. Nous avons vu que le père a déposé en octobre 2014 un autre avis de requête, à l’origine de l’affaire dont notre Cour est saisie aujourd’hui, et un avis de motion.

La motion a été entendue le 11 décembre 2014 et, le 18 décembre 2014, une ordonnance provisoire détaillée définissant les obligations des parties en matière de garde et d’accès a été prononcée. Une nouvelle ordonnance provisoire portant sur la garde et l’accès a été rendue, par consentement, le 8 juillet 2016. III. Questions en litige [8] Par les moyens d’appel qu’elle formule, la mère avance que le juge saisi de la requête a commis les erreurs de droit, ou de fait et de droit, suivantes : 1.

Le juge n’a pas examiné en profondeur, ou du tout, l’ensemble des critères pertinents, pour ce qui est de tirer une conclusion sur ce qui servait l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant, et notamment n’a pas suffisamment tenu compte :

a) du principe de non-séparation de la fratrie,

b) des arrangements de garde et de la relation de l’enfant avec la mère,

c) des vues et des préférences de l’enfant. 2. Il est arrivé à des conclusions qui ne reposaient pas sur un fondement probatoire raisonnable. Il a notamment conclu :

a) que la mère reprendrait l’enseignement à domicile dispensé à l’enfant si elle obtenait la garde;

b) que l’enfant n’était pas plus avancé qu’il ne l’était sur le plan scolaire. 3. Après avoir statué sur la garde, il n’a pas examiné quels arrangements d’accès serviraient l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant et il a imposé pour condition de l’accès, tout en ordonnant que l’enfant continue de fréquenter son lieu de culte actuel, une interdiction d’instruction religieuse.

IV. Droit et analyse A. Norme de contrôle [9] La norme de contrôle que font intervenir les affaires de droit de la famille où la garde et l’accès sont en jeu a été exposée et commentée maintes fois par notre Cour, et elle est bien comprise. Le mémoire de l’appelante le reconnaît et exprime clairement et succinctement cette norme : [TRADUCTION] « Bref, la déférence s’impose ». [10] L’arrêt M.K.R. c. J.A.R. , 2015 NBCA 73 , 443 R.N.-B. (2 e ) 313 , donne une bonne explication des principes directeurs et des précédents pertinents : Comme l’écrivait notre Cour dans P.R.H. c.

M.E.L. , 2009 NBCA 18 , 343 R.N.-B. (2 e ) 100 : La norme de contrôle qui s’applique dans le cadre d’un appel de cette nature a été examinée dans l’arrêt Van de Perre c. Edwards , [2001] 2 R.C.S. 1014, [2001] A.C.S. n o 60 (QL), 2001 CSC 60 . La Cour suprême du Canada a énoncé une norme prescrivant une grande déférence envers les décisions des tribunaux de première instance dans des affaires qui ressortissent au droit de la famille. L’intervention en appel n’est justifiée que s’il y a une erreur importante, une erreur significative dans l’interprétation de la preuve ou une erreur de droit.

Elle a explicité en quoi consiste une erreur importante : Comme l’indiquent les arrêts Gordon et Hickey , la révision en appel exige l’indication d’une erreur importante. S’il existe une indication que le juge de première instance n’a pas pris en considération des facteurs ou des éléments de preuve pertinents, cela peut vouloir dire qu’il n’a pas dûment apprécié tous les facteurs. Dans ce cas, la cour d’appel peut revoir la preuve produite au procès pour déterminer si le juge a négligé d’examiner ou mal interprété des éléments pertinents de la preuve.

Cela dit, je répète que des omissions dans les motifs ne signifieront pas nécessairement que la cour d’appel a compétence pour examiner la preuve entendue au procès. [par. 15] Le juge Bastarache, qui s’exprimait au nom de la Cour, a en outre précisé qu’« une omission ne constitue une erreur importante que si elle donne lieu à la conviction rationnelle que le juge de première instance doit avoir oublié, négligé d’examiner ou mal interprété la preuve de telle manière que sa conclusion en a été affectée » (par. 15). Voir les décisions de notre Cour sur l’application de cette norme de déférence : MacLean c.

MacLean (2004), 274 R.N.-B. (2 e ) 90, [2004] A.N.-B. n o 363 (QL), 2004 NBCA 75 , au par. 18 ; J.P. c. R.R. (2004), 278 R.N.-B. (2 e ) 351, [2004] A.N.-B. n o 467 (QL), 2004 NBCA 98 , au par. 27 ; Scott c. Scott (2004), 278 R.N.-B. (2 e ) 61, [2004] A.N.-B. n o 468 (QL), 2004 NBCA 99 , au par. 32, et Boudreau c. Brun (2005), 293 R.N.-B. (2 e ) 126, [2005] A.N.-B. n o 501 (QL), 2005 NBCA 106 , au par. 5 . [par. 8 et 9] On pourra se reporter également à l’arrêt Percy c.

Percy , 2015 NBCA 16 , [2015] A.N.-B. n o 71 (QL), où la juge Larlee, auteure des motifs de la Cour, a indiqué ce qui suit : La norme de contrôle à appliquer dans les affaires relevant du droit de la famille exige une grande retenue à l’égard de la décision du juge : Lang c. Lang , [2007] A.N.-B. n o 348 (C.A.) (QL) ; P.R.H. c. M.E.L. , 2009 NBCA 18 , [2009] A.N.-B. n o 77 (QL); MacDonald c. MacDonald , 2011 NBCA 25 , 372 R.N.-B. (2 e ) 179, autorisation de pourvoi refusée, [2011] C.S.C.R. n o 237 (QL); Smith c. Smith , 2011 NBCA 66 , 375 R.N.-B. (2 e ) 208; Grant c.

Grant , 2012 NBCA 101 , 397 R.N.-B. (2 e ) 254; et Simon c. Adey , 2012 NBCA 63 , 391 R.N.-B. (2 e ) 189. La Cour d’appel ne peut juger une affaire de nouveau; elle ne peut infirmer une conclusion de fait du juge de première instance que si celle-ci résulte d’une erreur manifeste et dominante, et elle ne peut modifier une ordonnance discrétionnaire que si celle-ci est fondée sur une erreur de droit, une erreur dans l’application des principes directeurs ou une erreur manifeste et dominante dans l’appréciation de la preuve. [par. 3 et 4] Des principes semblables ont été énoncés dans l’arrêt Wills c.

Kennedy , 2015 NBCA 31 , [2015] A.N.-B. n o 116 (QL).

Ainsi, il sera justifié d’intervenir, en appel, s’il y a eu erreur importante, erreur significative dans l’interprétation de la preuve ou erreurde droit. La Cour ne doit accorder aucune déférence à la décision rendue par le juge saisi de la motion lorsqu’elle se penche sur unequestion de droit, dont celle de la façon dont il faut interpréter les Lignes directrices lorsque l’on détermine à combien s’élève le revenud’un parent aux fins du calcul de son obligation alimentaire à l’égard d’un enfant (M.W.M. c. H.L.M., 2010 NBCA 86, 366 R.N.- B. (2e) 142, la juge Quigg, par. 11). [par. 9 à 11] B.

Intérêt supérieur de l’enfant [11] Dans son analyse, le juge saisi de la requête a correctement déclaré ce qui suit : [TRADUCTION]Il est clair, d’une clarté absolue, qu’en matière de garde et d’accès il faut prendre en considération l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant et riend’autre. Non pas, plus précisément, l’intérêt des parents : seul compte l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant. Et l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant est[…] défini […] à l’art. 1 de la

Loi sur les services à la famille. [décision, p. 19] [12] En outre, il s’est reporté à l’arrêt rendu par la Cour suprême dans Gordon c. Goertz, (SCC), [1996] 2 R.C.S. 27, [1996] A.C.S. no 52 (QL), ainsi qu’à celui que notre Cour a prononcé dans J.A.D. c. L.D.D., 2010 NBCA 69, 364 R.N.-B. (2e) 200. Quoique cette dernière affaire ait porté sur la garde d’un jeune enfant dont les parents étaientmariés, les principes qui interviennent demeurent exactement les mêmes.

Comme l’a écrit, au nom de la Cour, la juge d’appel Quigg : L’instance dont nous sommes saisis concerne la détermination des droits de garde d’un jeune enfant dans le cadre d’un litige opposantdes parents qui ont été mariés l’un à l’autre. Il nous faut donc nous tourner vers l’art. 16 de la

Loi sur le divorce qui confère à la Cour lepouvoir de rendre une ordonnance relative à la garde des enfants à charge et à l’accès auprès d’eux. Le paragraphe 16(8) énonce lesfacteurs dont il faut tenir compte au moment de rendre une ordonnance de garde : In making an order under thissection, the court shall take intoconsideration only the bestinterests of the child of themarriage as determined byreference to the condition,means, needs and othercircumstances of the child.

En rendant une ordonnanceconformément au présent article,le tribunal ne tient compte quede l’intérêt de l’enfant à charge,défini en fonction de sesressources, de ses besoins et,d’une façon générale, de sasituation. Ainsi, la Loi prescrit que le tribunal « ne tient compte que de l’intérêt de l’enfant à charge… ». Puisque la

Loi sur le divorce ne définitpas en quoi consiste l’intérêt de l’enfant, notre Cour a approuvé le recours à la définition de l’expression « intérêt supérieur de l’enfant »que l’on trouve dans la

Loi sur les services à la famille, L.N.-B. 1980, ch. F-2.2 (voir les arrêts N.L. c. R.L., 2008 NBCA 79, 337 R.N.- B. (2e) 197; C.M.B.E. c. D.J.E., 2006 NBCA 88, 304 R.N.-B. (2e) 191; Ferris c. Ferris, 2002 NBCA 25, [2002] A.N.-B. no 96 (QL).L’article 1 de cette Loi est ainsi rédigé :